THE TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY IN THAILAND
Author(s): Clark D. Neher
Source: Asian Perspective , Fall-Winter 1996, Vol. 20, No. 2, Special Issue on A Peace
Regime on the Korean Peninsula (Fall-Winter 1996), pp. 301-321
Published by: {lrp}
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ASIAN PERSPECTIVE, Vol. 20, No. 2, Fall-Winter 1996, pp. 301-321
THE TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY
IN THAILAND
Clark D. Neher
The essay analyzes the process of democratization in
Thailand during the contemporary period. The process has
proceeded in fits and starts , and is characterized by difficulty
reconciling Westernstyle democracy with Asian traditions .
The article points out the differences and similarities between
Western and Thai democracy , concluding that the term
"semidemocracy" best describes the Thai system.
While Thailand has most of the structures characteristic
of Western democracies , behaviorally , the kingdom does not
meet the standard criteria. Personalistic patron-client network 5, ruralurban economic gaps, pervasive corruption , voter
and candidate buying , weak political parties , and the dispro-
portionate inñuence character are examples of that undermine democracy's chances in Thailand. Nevertheless , Thailand's movement toward democracy has been inexorable. The
article covers the period from the authoritarian regime of
General Sarit Thanarat in th 1960s to the present civilian leaders , showing the incremental changes that have moved Thailand closer to democratic standards. The prime ministership
of Banharn Silapa-archa set back the clock with the reemergence of old-style money politicians , but in the larger context ,
his administration was a temporary blip rather than a reversal
of the evolution toward democratic procedures.
The article concludes that Thailand is well placed to continue its semidemocracy. Increased communications , pragmatic governments , routinization of democratic processes ,
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302 Clark D. Neher
stable economic development , population control, and the
absence of major internal and external threats bode well for
the future of the nation and the future of semidemocracy.
The New Era in Democracy
One hundred years from now, historians will refer to th
1980s and 1990s as the era of an historic transformation of the
world's political landscape toward democratization. Never
before have so many nations attempted the transition from
authoritarian to democratic governments. The wide variety of
democracies reminds us that no one definition suffices for the
concept. Nevertheless, it seems reasonable to suggest that more
and more people are enjoying widened liberties and some form
of participation in their nation's political life.
The Meaning of Democracy
It is difficult not to be ethnocentric in defining democracy.
The overwhelming number of modern democratic nations has
been situated in the West, and the most influential scholars and
philosophers of democracy have come from the West as well. A
relatively objective, yet thorough, definition of a democratic
nation is one in which: (1) the citizens participate in choosing
government leaders; (2) candidates for elective offices compete
against one another; and (3) the government recognizes citizens'
civil and political liberties.1
It is not necessary that there be specific constitutional
arrangements such as a parliamentary or presidential form of
government, a two-party political system, or separation of powers. The three-part definition above allows for a variety of insti-
tutions and processes. Political participation can be manifested
through voting in elections, campaigning for a political candidate, or a personal appeal to a powerful patron. But the voice of
the people must be heard and responded to by those in authority. In Western societies, elections are the primary way to participate. Similarly, the degree of civil liberties varies from nation to
nation. To be democratic, civil liberties must be sufficient to
assure that citizens have the information necessary and the abili-
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The Transition to Democracy in Thailand 303
ty to choose among potential leaders representing a range of
political viewpoints.
Democracy's chances improve when economic development
leads to broad improvements in citizens' overall quality of life.
The reason is that economic development leads to the growth of
a middle class that demands moderate, stabilizing policies.
Development also leads to the growth of autonomous groups
that are necessary for democracy to work. These private groups
balance the monopoly on the legitimate use of force that every
state claims.2
Thailand: A Semidemocracy
Given the wide range of criteria for evaluating democratic
nations, it is not surprising that there are degrees of democracy.
In Southeast Asia, the process has proceeded by fits and starts,
characterized by difficulty reconciling Western democracy with
Asian traditions. This paper argues that many of the so-called
Asian democracies should more accurately be termed
semidemocratic. They have some characteristics of liberal
democracy, such as free and fair elections and a modicum of
civil liberties. But these elements are modified sufficiently to
require a different term, such as semidemocracy or "Asian
democracy."
Because Thailand fits the description of a modified democracy, the term semidemocracy appears apt. The formal democratic structures of government exist, but within a context of
dependence upon authoritarian leadership.3 Many Thais define
democracy in terms of individual freedom ("being left alone"),
while simultaneously they support military coup leaders who
have seized state power and abolished constitutional guarantees
of elections and freedom of speech and assembly.4 In Thai, the
word prachathipatai is generally defined as "democracy." However, the Thai word means something rather different from the
standard definition of democracy. To Thais, prachathipatai does
not mean popular sovereignty, control by elected representatives over the executive branch, or power to the people. Instead,
the term sees politics as emanating down from the monarchy
and bureaucracy to the common citizen, not up from the
masses.5
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304 Clark D. Neher
Patron and Client
In Thailand, patron-client relationships, and their modern
equivalents, still determine power, status, authority, and the citizens' role in society. Powerful people in all walks of life (patrons)
often dominate their followers (clients) through unequal relation-
ships. These superior-subordinate ties have been the foundation
of society and politics in Thailand for many centuries, and still
play a crucial, although lesser role today. Indeed, patron-client
networks pervade Thai society, for the most part satisfying
Thais' immediate needs, as many citizens ignore institutionalized
political structures. These patronage ties are central to many soci-
eties that practice personalism. In countries where institutions
such as bureaucracies, political parties, pressure groups, legisla-
tures, and the like are poorly developed, personal bonds are
more important, because they are more reliable.
Of course, as Thailand modernizes, patron-client ties diminish in importance. When foreign and domestic capital filters out
to the rural areas, patronage loses its primacy. Some Thais have
learned to use new social strategies that do not rely so heavily
on their patrons. The traditional patrons can sometimes be circumvented, now that government institutions have begun to
penetrate the rural areas, and now that more and more Thais are
a part of large groups such as corporations and bureaucracies.
The biggest change in patron-client ties stems from rapid
industrialization and urbanization that has brought a new group
of jao pho (local godfathers) to important positions in the
provinces. Through negotiations with provincial, bureaucratic,
business, and political elites, they have gained control over
much of the economic and political life of the nation. Both mod-
ern business executives and the jao pho have used elections as a
route to .political power.6 In the most recent cabinet of Prime
Minister Banharn Silapa- Archa, several jao pho even held impor-
tant ministerial positions. To the extent that jao pho exercise
major influence over Thai politics, the degree of democracy correspondingly decreases, since they operate outside of the law.
The jao pho are sometimes involved with criminal activities, they
have disproportionate influence over elections and policy, and
they manipulate the institutions of parliamentary democracy.7
Restrictions on Thai peasants' liberties have come less from
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The Transition to Democracy in Thailand 305
the government and more from patrons and jao pho. The right to
vote, for example, is sometimes interpreted as the right to vote
the way one's patron or the local "godfather" wishes. In this
way, Thai society does not meet the criteria for full-blown
democracy.8
Because Bangkok elites have long understood and enjoyed
the advantages of patronage, there is hubris in their belittling of
provincial citizens for involvement in the same system. Moreover, urban elites and academic intellectuals look askance at
rural Thais who vote for the personalities they know rather than
for the platforms they respect. Thais see politics as they see their
patrons: They want leaders who will meet their needs, such as
help in finding jobs, credit to finance projects, and entry into
prestigious schools. Many Thais make these electoral decisions
in accordance with views about the desires of the patrons. In
recent elections, these evaluations have been compounded and
corrupted through vote-buying practices. The 1995 election that
led to the rise of Prime Minister Banharn is viewed as the
apotheosis of patronage politics.
Problems in the Political Structure
Further contributing to Thailand's status as a semidemocracy is the character of the legislative body. It includes an elected
lower house, the National Assembly, and an upper house, the
Senate, that is appointed by the prime minister and is therefore
essentially a rubber stamp for his wishes. Until March 1996,
when Banharn appointed a new 260-member Senate, military
generals and corporation executives dominated the body to
assure power and influence to their respective groups, and to
veto "extremist" ideas from passing the lower house and becoming law. For example, the Senate acted to undermine important
decentralization policies during the rule of Banharn's predecessor, Prime Minister Chuan Leekpai.
The junta led by General Suchinda Kraprayoon appointed
the Senate until Prime Minister Banharn made his own appointments in 1996. Military numbers were reduced, ending the military domination of the upper house and diminishing the armed
forces' influence in politics. Members of the armed forces took
over 39 positions in the new Senate, in contrast to the 146 retired
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306 Clark D. Neher
or active military personnel included in the former junta
appointed Senate. Banharn chose new Senate members who
would support him, particularly in terms of constitutiona
amendments that require approval from a joint session of the
House of Representatives and Senate. The combination of an
appointed Senate and an elected National Assembly perfectly
exemplifies the concept of a semidemocracy.
Prior to 1932, when the absolute monarchy was overthrown,
Thai provinces had been ruled by central officials from the con
servative and powerful Ministry of Interior.9 Under Prime Min
ister Chuan, the government made various attempts at decentralization of authority. However, senior bureaucrats at the Ministry of Interior, as well as leaders of patronage-oriented political parties, protested the proposals. In response, the members of
parliament "played it safe," advocating incremental change
that would not undermine the traditional prerogatives of party
leaders, bureaucrats, and provincial officials. This reluctance to
provide local levels with increased authority is another exampl
of semidemocracy.
For most Thais, decentralization is part of the definition of
democracy. At the same time, Thais want their government to
be efficient and to leave them alone. They rarely demand new
authority for local governments. Local level officials, governors,
and district officers in particular, argue that they can more efficiently meet the needs of the people because of their direct line
to wealthy ministries such as the Ministry of Interior, and their
lack of dependence on local level oligarchs. The result is that full
democratization has not come about in terms of providing Thais
with control over their polity at the local level.
Convoluted parliamentary procedures also are responsible
for the failure of decentralization policies. The structure of th
Thai public policymaking process is not conducive to rapid decisionmaking.10 First, the government sets up special committee
composed of politicians, senior bureaucrats, and stakeholder
experts to work out a proposal. Few bills get through this level
The proposed bill must then go to conferences, public hearings,
and various government agencies. Political party leaders can
squelch bills by threatening to leave the cabinet coalition. The
House of Representatives has myriad committees with the
authority to block a bill. For example, when Chuan submitted
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The Transition to Democracy in Thailand 307
bill for decentralization, the policy was undercut at every stage.
For many decades after 1932, when Thais defined their government as "democratic/' they referred to the existence of a con-
stitution, support of His Majesty the King, the preeminence of
Buddhism, and being left alone by government officials. Today,
there exists a fundamental divide between rural and educated
elite urbanités over this issue. The rural peoples continue to see
patronage politics as the quintessential democratic way, with
voting guided by perceived interests rather than principles,
while urban elites believe that democracy requires an informed,
involved citizenry, an absence of patronage, and government
commitment to the overall national interest.
This fundamental difference in the perceptions of rural and
urban Thais about democracy is not surprising. It is caused by
the large attitudinal and behavioral gap between poor rural
Thais and richer, more highly educated urban Thais. The urbanités have attempted to thrust their image of the rational, egalitar-
ian, activist citizen on the whole country. They see criticism of
their government as integral to a working democracy, while the
majority of the population view such behavior as decidedly unThai and a subversion of the traditional society. The rural people see very little relationship between this more Westernized
concept of democracy and their prospects for a higher standard
of living.11
Political Background in Thailand
From Monarchy to Bureaucratic Polity
Prior to 1932, Thailand generally had a highly centralized
political system. It was characterized by absolute monarchs who
ruled paternalistically during the Sukhothai Kingdom (12381350), and autocratically during the Ayuthayan Kingdom (1350-
1767). The perception of the kings as deva raja (god kings)
remains, even today, an important element of the veneration
shown the king by his subjects. The Chakri reign
(1782 - present) continued centralized rule along with reforms
and a modernization program that helped Thailand get through
the period of imperialism with its independence intact.
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308 Clark D. Neher
The change from an absolute to a limited monarchy in 1932
did not alter the lives of the people in any fundamental way, as
real power simply moved into the hands of top-level bureaucratic and military leaders. The 64-year period from 1932 to the
present has been largely dominated by the military. During that
same time, seventeen elections have been held, two fewer than
the number of coups d'Çtat carried out by military factions vying
for power. The military kept political parties, interest groups, a
separate judiciary, and the legislature from functioning meaningfully in the people's interests. Instead, army generals used
the term democracy to legitimate their regimes and to indicate
support for the king. One of the military dictators, Sarit
Thannarat (prime minister from 1957 to 1963), was most effec-
tive in putting forth the military as the rightful leader of the peo-
ple. His development programs, particularly in the impoverished Northeast, and his integration of the monarchy into his
program, made him a hero to many Thais, who still remember
his leadership with nostalgia.
During the 1960s and early 1970s, Thai politics was most
often analyzed in terms of the bureaucratic polity, where all
decisions were made within the civilian or military bureaucracy
with no involvement of extrabureaucratic forces, such as interest
groups and political parties. The bureaucratic polity was antithetical to democratic processes because the people were not
participating in choosing the nation's leaders and the government was accountable only to the bureaucrats and military gen-
erals.
This notion of the bureaucratic polity was undermined significantly during the democratic period (1973-1976) that followed the successful overthrow of the military dictatorship by a
student-led revolt. New interest groups emerged, and politicians who were more accountable to the people took over the
high positions of government. The period lasted only three
years, however, until 1976, when the military regrouped and
took advantage of civilian-politician weakness and factionalism,
as well as a fear of communist triumphs in neighboring coun-
tries, to reassert control.
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The Transition to Democracy in Thailand 309
The Advent of Semidemocracy
Although democracy was crushed, Thai politics has not
been the same since, with new expectations on the part of the
people about accountability, and having their needs met. The
military gradually was subordinated, even when a general or
former general ruled. Politicians, technocrats, and business lead-
ers all became more active in the political realm. The most
important transition figure was a former general, Prime Minister
Prem Tinsulanond (1980-1988), who used his support from the
military, the king, and the people to strengthen democratic insti-
tutions.
During Prem's rule, business executives became a more
influential extrabureaucratic group, making Thailand more of a
"bourgeois polity" rather than a bureaucratic polity. Sino-Thai
entrepreneurs, in particular, began to take over ministerial
posts, and to run for parliament. During Prem's rule,
semidemocracy was the term used to describe a government
balanced among the military, politicians, business executives,
and interest group leaders. The 1978 constitution featured repre-
sentative rule, albeit with an appointed Senate in the bicameral
legislature, universal suffrage, free and open campaigning for
office, and the right of political parties to mobilize votes for their
candidates. At the same time, patronage and personalism were
the reasons people voted for candidates, rather than ideology or
platform. Army officers continued to wield great influence and
sometimes threatened the civilian government unless it met
their demands. The government combined elements of military,
parliamentary-constitutional, and monarchical rule.
The clearest sign of democratization was the rise to power
of Chatichai Choonhavan, the first elected member of parliament to become prime minister since 1976. Chatichai assumed
his position following the 1988 elections, when the political
party he led received the largest plurality of votes. The smooth
transition from Prem to former general Chatichai reflected the
new optimism about Thailand's evolution toward democracy.
He had assumed power without relying on the support of the
army. The constitutional provisions for elections worked well in
transferring political power.
Chatichai's rule was not universally applauded. The open
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310 ClarkD.Neher
media began an assault on his character and the gross c
tion of his government. The rising middle class believed
political party, Chart Thai, had "bought" its way into
through rampant vote buying. In a shocking assault
notion that Thailand had democratized, these problems
ed the rationalization for the military to carry out a coup
Actually, the coup, was greeted with acquiescence by t
populace, and turned more on factionalism among the m
and a belief that important generals were being discredited
On February 23, 1991, Army Commander-in-Chief Su
Kraprayoon abrogated the constitution, dismissed the
government, and assumed temporary martial law power
ever, it soon became clear that Thais had been socialize
more democratic political culture. Although progress t
democracy had been temporarily halted, the military u
stood that it could not return to the days of stark army
nance.
Suchinda appointed a respected civilian, An
yarachun, to the position of prime minister, and let
lish a cabinet of technocrats, scholars, and senior officials.
Anand carried out significant reforms and paved the way for
elections, which led to a coalition of parties sympathetic to the
military. Suchinda sought the prime ministership; but he stayed
in that position for only 48 days, while massive anti-military
demonstrations took place in Bangkok in May 1992. The demonstrators prevailed, and drove Suchinda from office. The Their
victory was mainly due to support from King Phumipol and
modern technology (copiers, fax machines, e-mail, and cellular
phones), which kept the demonstrators aware of their progress
in spite of the government's censorship of the press. The king's
intervention was indicative of a system that had not yet system-
atized succession processes without the help of the ceremonial
head of state.
The military, especially General Suchinda, underestimated
the power of the ideal of democracy among the country's
increasingly sophisticated and educated urban citizens. He did
not understand that the 1991 coup did not undo two decades of
new participatory values. He did not understand that Thais
were embarrassed that their country had suffered another coup
just at the time the world was moving toward more open and
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The Transition to Democracy in Thailand 311
liberal regimes. He did not realize that his claim that the demon-
strators were pawns of "communist" elements was deemed
irrelevant to contemporary realities. Even when the demonstrators' putative leader, Bangkok Governor Chamlong Srimuang,
was arrested, the demonstrations continued without what was
thought to be his indispensable leadership. The military soon
saw that the protest had no single head that could be cut off; in
the more democratic environment of the 1990s, each person had
his or her own head, making it impossible for the military to
prevail.12
In an ironic way, the 1991 coup and the subsequent demonstrations against Suchinda's power grab were indicative of the
new sense of democratization that had begun most clearly during the 1973-1976 democratic period, but that had remained and
evolved during the Prem and Chatichai administrations. The
demonstrators sought to change the elite view that democracy,
even semidemocracy, is mostly about constitutions and elections. They, along with the nongovernmental organization networks, sought to show that citizen involvement is also crucial in
a democracy.
Positive Steps Toward Democratization
The Elections of 1992
Anand Panyarachun was reappointed to the position of
prime minister. This time, new elections in September 1992
brought about a coalition of parties opposed to the military and
supportive of civilian rule. The election featured 2,417 con-
tenders from sixteen parties contesting 360 parliamentary seats.
Chuan Leekpai, leader of the Democratic Party, mobilized a
coalition of parties to become prime minister, and set forth the
goal of democratizing the political system. He became the
longest serving elected civilian prime minister in Thai history.
His challenge was to find a balance between democratic rule
and sensitivity to the traditional prerogatives of the military.
On May 19, after losing the support of a coalition partner,
Chuan called for a 44-day period of campaigning for the new
parliament. About 40 million people voted, 50 percent of the
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312 Clark D. Neher
voting population. Included in that number were nearly two
million people as young as 18. They voted for the first time
because of a constitutional change that lowered the voting age
from 20, after public backlash against the military's shooting of
democracy demonstrators in 1992.13 Chuan's call for elections
was a further sign of the routinization of democracy. For the
first time in many years, a free election was carried out by a
civilian prime minister, who would either be kept in office, or
replaced by another civilian prime minister. Virtually no groups
in Thailand called for authoritarian rule.
The 1995 Election
The 1995 election can be interpreted as a further evolutionary step toward democratic government in Thailand. The military made no attempt to intervene and stayed scrupulously neu-
tral, even after the incoming defense minister, Chavalit
Yongchaiyuth, revised the annual military reshuffle list. Moreover, there was much competition for electoral power as twelve
political parties and 2,300 candidates vied for the 391 House
seats. The press was unfettered so that Thais could read in great
detail about the candidates.
Although the parties did not present coherent platforms,
individual candidates talked at campaign stops about rural
poverty, environmental degradation, Bangkok's notorious traffic, land reform, and bureaucratic inefficiencies. At towns and
villages, candidates focused on the specific concerns of the constituents - such as roads, bridges, schools, temples, and irrigation. The Democrat Party campaigned on the issue that Chuan
Leekpai was the best candidate for the position of prime minister, and that other party leaders were not as well qualified or as
honest. Chart Thai leaders, on the other hand, extolled the
virtues of their leader, Banharn Silapa-archa, and their view of
Chuan as lackluster and implicated in a land reform scandal in
southern Thailand.
Democrat Party leaders extolled the virtues of the Chuan
administration, stressing his moderation, adherence to constitutional rules, and the overall stability of the nation. Rapid economic growth, averaging about eight percent a year, had continued under his administration. Most importantly, his land reform
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The Transition to Democracy in Thailand 313
program had resulted in providing title to illegal settlers on state
property. Many of these settlers represented poor tenant farmers. About half a million farm families received land during the
years of Chuan's administration. However, a minority of titles
was given to wealthy people who appeared to have close ties
with the Democrat Party. Because Chuan's government had proclaimed "honest government" as its centerpiece, the land reform
revelations undercut the administration's credibility.
Significant for the strengthening of democratic procedures
during Chuan's tenure was the policy to give more decisionmaking power to the local level, specifically the tambon (commune) councils. In the face of enormous pressure against fullscale decentralization from the Ministry of Interior, the appoint-
ed Senate, and even coalition parties, plans for elected provincial governors were dropped. Nevertheless, Chuan initiated a
variety of projects designed to make the bureaucracy more efficient and responsive to the needs of Thai citizens. He also got
through a bill increasing the number of years of compulsory
schooling from six to nine, thereby providing greater education-
al opportunities.
Banharn's supporters spoke about his vast experience: A
billionaire business executive, he had also served six terms in
parliament and had held the posts of minister of agriculture,
industry, interior, finance, and transportation and communications. He was promoted as a mover and shaker who could cut
through the bureaucratic red tape that had hamstrung Chuan.
His admirers argued that he was the most experienced in meeting the needs of his local constituents, and could use that same
strength nationally as prime minister. Rural Thais viewed elite
contempt as the typical arrogance of those who do not appreciate the positive aspects of patronage-oriented politics.14 Banharn's supporters mocked Chuan for his indecisiveness. Jokes
were made about his family name, Leekpai, which means
"escape from danger."
Banharn's opponents campaigned that he was corrupt, a
close associate of sleazy rural jao pho and public figures. He was
disdainfully described as "Mr. ATM" to remind Thais that he
had bought himself into power. He was scorned by Bangkok
voters and by the intellectuals, who viewed him as a nouveau
riche country bumpkin who had no class or education.15
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314 Clark D. Neher
The openness and criticism of vote buying, and the divergent viewpoints about the two major contenders for the position
of prime minister, reflects the high degree of politicization o
Thai candidates and voters. Opposition attacks on government
policy during the campaign were reminiscent of the same
behavior in Western democracies. The election was doing precisely what elections are supposed to do in democratic soci
eties - presenting voters with a wide array of choices about policy, character, and leadership.
Adding to the positive trend toward democracy was the rise
of nongovernmental agencies as a force for disseminating infor
mation and fomenting change. Labor unions, farmers' groups
women's associations, and slum organizations are examples of
NGOs that sought improvement of conditions and benefits for
their members. They were allowed to set forth their views an
mobilize members to increase their clout. Politicians had to take
NGOs into consideration because the membership often consisted of the most outspoken constituents.
Political systems become stronger when economies are
flourishing. The 1995 election took place during a time of economic growth and stability in Thailand. The nation was continuing its extraordinary economic growth rates, averaging about
eight percent in 1995. Exports during the same time period grew
at about 30 percent. Thailand was no longer on the United States
trade representative's priority watch list. Two-way trade
between the United States and Thailand grew 23 percent in 1994,
making the United States Thailand's second-largest trading
partner after Japan. Rural poverty decreased and the per capita
income grew to just over $2,000, compared to $250 in 1960, and
$250 in contemporary Vietnam.
In international affairs as well, Thailand was in a period of
non-crisis. During the election period there were no external
military threats to Thai sovereignty. Instead, as Thailand was
integrated into the world capitalist system, foreign-policy concerns moved from security to economics. Because the military
has traditionally used foreign-policy crises to rationalize and
explain their intervention into domestic affairs, the absence of
security threats further strengthened the evolution toward
democracy.
The increased involvement of business executives in politi-
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The Transition to Democracy in Thailand 315
cal activity has made Thailand more and more a "bourgeois
polity/' The result is that a closer political identity has occuried
between the Thai and Sino-Thai. Fully 28 percent of the 1992
National Assembly were Sino-Thai, almost all representing busi-
ness interests. An additional 20 percent represented
entrepreneurial classes, although they were not Sino-Thai. The
high percentage of business-oriented candidates is not surprising. Successful electoral campaigns depend on having sufficient
financial resources to forge patron-client networks.
Wealthy, connected candidates win elections more often than do
less well-off candidates.
The Routiniza tion of Poli tics
The implications of the increasing business orientation of
Thai politics is that political stability and democratic processes
have been enhanced. The middle class, traditionally the most
influential group for sustaining democracy, has close connections with business interests. They view business involvement
as an important balance vis-à-vis the military and bureaucracy,
and as technically and fiscally more conservative. Having the
Sino-Thais assimilated into the polity undermines the view that
the Chinese business community's primary allegiance is to the
motherland in China. Ethnic conflicts have been defused, and
there are no serious divisive issues such as those found in many
of the world's new democracies. Democracy has been strengthened by the continuing veneration of the Thai people toward the
king, Phumipol Adunyadej. At 68 years of age, King Phumipol
continues to symbolize the unity and all that is right in the king-
dom. His presence assures that no government leader can move
in extreme directions without raising royal objections. He is a
modifying force who provides credibility and legitimacy to gov-
ernment leaders.
The foregoing analysis suggests that the prospects for sustaining Thailand's semidemocracy are excellent. Democracy has
been routinized, and maintained by meaningful elections featur-
ing divergent ideas and candidates for the Thai people to
choose. A growing middle class, the absence of ethnic divides,
the dearth of international and domestic crises, and the continu-
ing importance of the king all bode well for democracy's
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316 Clark D. Neher
chances. Nevertheless, problems exist that threaten this scenario.
Negative Issues Undermining Democracy
Although the 1995 electoral campaign focused on many
issues, the campaign featured an exorbitant degree of candidate
and vote buying. Parties offered up to five million baht
($200,000) to any competing candidates with a good chance of
success who would switch parties. In addition, voters were
offered 100 to 300 baht ($4 to $12) if they promised to vote for
particular candidates. The wealthy Chart Thai Party, led by Ban
ham, was targeted as the chief culprit by the press, official anticorruption organizations. Vote and candidate buying were an
indication of candidate self-interest, without concern for party
policy positions, and reflected the continued importance of personalism and patronage in Thai politics. Throughout the kingdom signs were erected telling people that to sell a vote was to
sell the nation; but the perception of voters and the media was
that the best way to assure election was to purchase the office
affiliate with the provincial godfathers, and promise the voter
everything. Banharn's victory, and his ascent as the quintessential patronage operator in Thailand, were an apt reflection of
politics as usual. This persistence of patronage relationship
means that the right to vote is restricted by influential patron
and jao pho.
Corruption has undermined the policy process as well.
Increased civilian domination of politics is generally considered
a positive step toward democratization, but it also facilitates cor-
ruption. The civilian presence is a two-edged sword because the
civilians have to give favors to business associates, bureaucrats,
and others in order to keep their clout. Thus, there are constant
calls for politicians to quit interfering with the technocratic
bureaucrats. Increased involvement in the budget-making process by elected politicians, many of them serving at the pleasure
of local jao pho, also facilitates corruption and favoritism. If the
budget were drafted by a committee of technocrats, there might
be less corruption and the national interest might be better met,
but the process would be less democratic.16 The main point for
this semidemocracy is that ordinary Thais have little ability to
influence policy making. Once elected, most legislators lose
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The Transition to Democracy in Thailand 317
interest in their constituents until the next election.
Democracy requires that major government institutions
play the role for which they were established. However, the
political party system remains weak, with neither a coherent
ideology nor a mass base. Few political parties have endured,
since they tend to center around individual leaders rather than
longterm ideologies. Part of the reason for party weakness stems
from the fact that the nation's provinces have multimember districts, and voters can vote for a candidate strictly in their partic-
ular electoral district. Hence, candidates run not only against
competitive party candidates, but also against their own party
colleagues. There has been a consequent breakdown of party
loyalty and discipline.17
Party weakness has meant that most Thais vote for the can-
didate who has paid them or who most effectively promises to
meet their needs. In the South in the 1995 election, however,
where the Democrats maintained their hold on power by winning 46 of 51 contested seats, and in Bangkok, there is a semblance of party voting. In other areas voters more often split
their votes among more than one party. Parties win and lose
elections in terms of their ability to lure prominent incumbent
politicians and local patrons into their fold.
Adding stress to the polity were reports that King Phumipol's health was declining. His presence has been deemed critical to the stability of the country. His likely successor, the Crown
Prince, does not have the king's baramee (charisma), nor does he
appear to have his father's values about developing and uplifting
the nation. The king's departure could seriously undermine stability, bring about the reintervention of the military, and foment
a period of crisis to be exploited by demagogues. All of this is
hypothetical, of course, but of serious concern to all Thais.
Further stress on the system stems from the generally nega-
tive response Prime Minister Banharn received to his appointed
cabinet. Made up of politicians loyal to Banharn, and bereft of
technocrats or respected leaders, the cabinet is highly volatile
and unstable. Financial support from big business has provided
party leaders with resources they need to perpetuate their
power, although these resources have, ironically, kept parties
from seeking a broader electoral base from non-wealthy constituents. The general perception of the cabinet as corrupt and
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318 Clark D. Neher
inexperienced has thwarted Banharn's attempt to forge
administration that is respected throughout the kingdom, an
has raised questions about the administration's ability to sol
such problems as Bangkok's traffic, inadequate roads, pollutio
the lack of sufficient water, poor communications, and decaying
schools. King Phumipol, with unprecedented regularity, h
been critical of the Banharn administration. Citing his positi
as a Thai citizen with full rights of free speech, the King has sp
ken out about Bangkok's traffic and flooding, and the gene
malaise felt by Thais about the government's intentions and
honesty.
Banharn's prime ministership came to an end in September
1996, when his majority coalition turned against him and forced
his resignation. His administration had been beset by a sluggish
economy that had cost him the support of the crucial business
class. The opposition brought personal charges against Banharn,
claiming that he was not a natural born citizen (required by the
constitution for members of parliament), and that his master's
thesis was plagiarized. His opponents also argued that Banharn
was not a suitable prime minister, and that he was an embarrassment to the kingdom. Immediately prior to a vote of no-confidence, his coalition party leaders requested his resignation,
realizing that he had been severely wounded by the parliamentary debate and could no longer govern effectively. When he
agreed to resign, the coalition agreed to support him against the
no-confidence vote.
Banharn's demise occurred within the context of democratic
procedures (a parliamentary vote of confidence), an open press
and media that reported the details of the case against the prime
minister, and a peaceful struggle among many aspirants for the
top position. Because Banharn was not able to achieve a consensus for his replacement from among leaders of his coalition, he
dissolved the parliament and called for new elections in Novem-
ber 1996.
Conclusion
The foregoing discussion must be viewed in terms of Thailand's status as a developing nation and its incremental, albeit
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The Transition to Democracy in Thailand 319
inexorable, transition to democracy. The nations of Southeast Asia
can be ranked as democratic, semidemocratic, semiauthoritarian,
or authoritarian. When Thailand is evaluated on its record of citi-
zen participation, electoral competition, and civil liberties, it ranks
as a semidemocracy.18 The ranking is imprecise because of the
rapid political changes Thailand has experienced. For example,
the recent return to semidemocracy, following the short-lived
authoritarian period from 1991 to 1992, did not drastically change
the lives of the Thai people. Nevertheless, Thailand moved from
an authoritarian to a semidemocratic government.
Thailand has all the formal legal trappings of democracy: a
freely elected and representative National Assembly, an executive accountable to the people, competition for office, and a mul-
tiparty system. However, the nation has not achieved full
democracy because personalism and patronage are the major
features of these institutions, especially in the rural areas where
about 70 percent of Thais live. The military sits on the sidelines
ready to intervene if its perceived interests are thwarted, and the
Senate is appointed by the prime minister. This semidemocracy
exhibits features compatible with Thai values that desire stability, order, security, and monarchy. The new government must
respond to severe environmental deterioration that threatens the
nation's economy and value system. The gap between the rich
and poor is rising, while Westernization continues to undermine
traditional Thai values and to separate rural from urban Thais.
To solve these and other problems will require superb leadership by hitherto untested rulers. Rather than moving the nation
toward a more progressive democracy, the 1995 elections set
back the clock with the reemergence of old-style politicians and
money interests.
At the same time, Thailand is well placed to continue its
semidemocracy. Information is ubiquitous from newspapers,
radio, and television. The latter can be found in virtually every
village. Westernization has pervaded the nation, with values
that are less traditional and deferential, and more pragmatic and
self-oriented. Thais have shown a remarkable capacity to cope
with change. The routinization of democratic processes, the
rapid economic development enjoyed by all socio-economic
classes, the commitment to free market forces, the successful
control of birth rates, and the absence of major internal and
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320 Clark D. Neher
external threats bode well for the future of the nation and the
future of democracy.
NOTES
1. This difinition, based largely on the Western experience, is accepted
most analysts of democracy, including those from Southeast Asia. Su
a standard definition allows the analyst to compare the government
features of the world's nations with this model of democracy. Withou
standard definition, the term loses meaning and the ability to compa
and contrast systems.
2. See Daniel Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society : Modernizing the M
dle East (New York: Free Press, 1958); S. M. Lipset, Political Man: Th
Social Bases of Politics , rev. ed. (New York: Doubleday, 1984); Rober
Dahl, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (New Haven: Yale Univer
ty Press, 1971); Tatu Vanhanen, The Process of Democratization (New
York: Taylor and Francis, 1990); Alex Inkeles, ed., On Measuring Demo
racy (New Brunswick: Transaction, 1991); Larry Diamond, Juan J. Lin
and Seymour Martin Lipset, eds., Politics in Developing Countries: Co
paring Experiences with Democracy (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 19
Guilermo O'Donnell found, however, that high rates of econom
growth more often led to authoritarianism than to democracy.
argued that economic growth generally widened the gap between ri
and poor. See his Modernization and Bureaucratic authoritarianism (Ber
ley: University of Institute for International Studies, 1973).
3. For accounts of Thai democracy, see Thak Chaloemtiarana, Thailand
The Politics of Despotic Paternalism (Bangkok: Social Science Associati
of Thailand, 1979); Joseph J. Wright Jr., The Balancing Act: A History
Modern Thailand (Bankok: Asia Books, 1991); Pasuk Phongphaichit an
Chris Baker, Thailand: Economy and Politics (Oxford: Oxford Univers
Press, 1995); Likhit Dhiravegin, Demi Democracy: The Evolution of t
Thai Political System (Singapore: Times Academic Press, 1992); Chai-
Anan Samudavanija, "Thailand: A Stable Semi-Democracy," in Lar
Diamond ed., Politics in the Developing Countries (Boulder, Colo.: Lyn
Rienner Publishers, 1988); Daniel King and Jim Logerfo, "Thaila
Toward Democratic Stability," Journal of Democracy , vol. VII, No. 1 (Ja
uary, 1996).
4. For a superb discussion or the contradictory values Ihais have toward
dependency /authoritarianism and independence /individualism, see
Kamol Somvichian, "The Thai Political Culture and Political Develop-
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The Transition to Democracy in Thailand 321
ment," in Clark D. Neher, ed., Modern Thai Politics : From Village to
Nation (Cambridge, Mass.: Schenkman, 1979).
5. David Morell and Chai-Anan Samudavanija, Political Conflict in Thailand: Reform , Reaction, Revolution (Cambridge, Mass.: Oelgeschlager,
Gunn and Hain, 1982), p. 25.
6. Pasuk Phongpaichit and Sungsidh Piriyarangsan, Corruption and
Democracy in Thailand (Bangkok: The Political Economy Centre, Chulalongkorn University, 1994), p. 12.
7. Ibid., pp. 51-52.
8. This is the main point in Kullada Kesboonchoo, "Thai Democratization:
Historical and Theoretical Perspectives," Southeast Asia Research, vol. Ill,
No. 2 (September, 1995), pp. 205-217.
9. Bidhya Bowornwathana, "Political Realities of Local Government
Reform in Thailand," unpublished ms., 1996, p. 2.
10. The following ideas are taken from ibid., pp. 1-8.
11. Anek Laothamatas discusses these points in his essay, "Sleeping Giant
Awakens? The Middle Class in Thai Politics," in Asian Review 1993
(Institute of Asian Studies, Chulalongkorn University, 1993).
12. William A. Callahan, "Non-Governmental Organizations, Non-Violent
Action, and Post-Modern Politics in Thailand," Sojourn : Journal of Social
Issues in Southeast Asia, vol. X, No. 1 (April, 1995), p. 91.
13. Clark D. Neher, "Thailand's Politics as Usual," Current History, vol.
XCIV, No. 596 (December, 1995), p. 435.
14. Ibid., p. 436.
15. Ibid., p. 436.
16. Personal e-mail communication from Daniel King, December 28, 1995.
17. Kine and Loeerfo, "Thailand," d. 112.
18. Citizen participation rankings are based on voter rights (extent of suffrage), opposition vote, citizen impact (accountability of regime to citi-
zenry), autonomy from foreign domination, influence of interest
groups, and extent of political party participation. Electoral competition
rankings are based on regularity of elections, diversity of candidates
and platforms, impact of the elected national legislative body, impact of
the elected chief authority, and absence of election fraud and control.
Civil liberties rankings are based on qualitative assessments of the
degree of freedom of the press, freedom of assembly, citizen autonomy
from superiors (dynastic families, landlords), freedom of speech, freedom from political terror or imprisonment, and freedom of religion. For
a more detailed analysis, see Clark D. Neher and Ross Marlay, Development and Democracy in Southeast Asia (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1995).
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