Journal of Muslims in Europe 5 (2016) 205-223
brill.com/jome
“Most Muslims are Like You and I, but
‘Real’ Muslims . . .”
Ex-Muslims and Anti-Muslim Sentiments
Göran Larsson
University of Gothenburg
goran.larsson@religion.gu.se
Abstract
The aim of this article is to analyse the views of a public critic of Islam, namely the Swedish
Somali-born former Muslim Mona Walter (b. 1973). She has been selected because she
has been very active in online media, social media and more ‘traditional’ forms of media
such as print, radio and broadcasting. In my analysis I will discuss whether her thoughts
can be viewed as Islamophobic, and if so to what extent. To decide on this matter, I have
compared her statements about Islam with how the Runnymede Trust and the Swedish
National Council for Crime Prevention (BRÅ) define Islamophobia. The empirical data
consist of an online interview with Mona Walter for the Swedish podcast RLM. This particular interview has been chosen for analysis because this program has been associated
with anti-Muslim views and is renowned for its strong criticism of Sweden’s migration
policies and its multicultural society. The interview with Walter is analysed with the
help of a content analysis.
Keywords
ex-Muslims – Sweden – islamophobia – freedom of religion – freedom of speech –
RLM podcast
1
Aims and Outline
Whereas it is important to analyse the unfolding of a biographical narrative when we want to understand why an individual decides to join or leave
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Larsson
a religious group or tradition,1 the aim of the present article is not to look
for reasons why a particular person has chosen the ‘opposition exit’ or some
other form of exit from a religious organisation or tradition in that person’s
biography.2 Rather, the aim of the present study is to analyse the views of a
public critic of Islam in Sweden, namely the Swedish Somali-born former
Muslim Mona Walter (b. 1973). She has been selected because she has been
very active in online media and social media, as well as in more ‘traditional’
forms of media such as print, radio and broadcasting. In addition, because
of her extensive public activity, she fits the term ‘career apostate’ coined by
Lawrence Foster.3 In Foster’s understanding, a career apostate is someone who
makes a new career by criticising his or her former religion. However, in my
analysis I will discuss whether Walter’s thoughts can be viewed as a form of
Islamophobia, and if so, to what extent. In order to decide this matter, Walter’s
views are compared with how the term ‘Islamophobia’ is defined in the UK
Runnymede Trust report Islamophobia: A Challenge for Us All,4 and by the
Swedish National Council for Crime Prevention (Brå). While the first text was
published by an international NGO, the second was produced by a Swedish
government body that, among many things, collects and writes an annual
report on hate crimes on the basis of incidents recorded by the Swedish police.
This report contains information about the following hate crimes that can be
related to religion: Anti-Semitism, Islamophobia, and Christophobia.
The definition provided by the Runnymede Trust has been chosen because
it is widely disseminated. The definition used by the Swedish government body
has been selected because it is applicable to a debate about Islamophobia in
Sweden. Whereas the definition proposed by the Runnymede Trust puts the
focus on what can be seen as ideological manifestations or world views (products), the Swedish government body focuses on both ideological manifestations (products) and consequences (that is, exclusionary practices, violence,
and crimes against individuals or institutions that are perceived to be Islamic
1 See, for example, Zuckerman, Phil, Faith No More: Why People Reject Religion (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2012), and Enstedt, Daniel and Larsson, Göran, “Telling the Truth about
Islam? Apostasy Narratives and Representations of Islam on WikiIslam.net”, CyberOrient,
Vol. 7, Issue 1 (2013).
2 A detailed outline of different so-called exit trajectories is found in Streib, Heinz,
“Deconversion”, in Rambo, Lewis L., and Charles E. Farhadian (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of
Conversion, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014).
3 Foster, Lawrence, “Career Apostates: Reflections on the Works of Jerald and Sandra Tanner”,
Dialogue: A Journal of Mormon Thought, 17, 2 (1984), pp. 35-60.
4 Islamophobia: A Challenge for Us All (London: Runnymede Trust, 1997).
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or Muslim). Both definitions have received criticism, and some of the problems associated with them are discussed in more detail in Section 3 below.
2
Methodological Considerations
Since Walter left Islam and converted to Christianity in 2006 or 2007, she has
been very active and open in her criticisms of Islam in both social media
(blogs, YouTube) and more established print and broadcasting media. In order
to place a limit on the material, my analysis and discussion will focus on her
appearance in the Swedish podcast RLM,5 a program hosted by Ingrid Carlqvist
(b. 1960) and someone broadcasting anonymously under the name ‘Conrad.’
According to the Swedish anti-racist NGO EXPO, this podcast has been associated with anti-Muslim views.6 While there is no information available about
Conrad, Carlqvist is a novelist, journalist, and editor of the online publication
Dispatch International. According to its critics, this publication gives voice
to anti-Muslim and racist opinions, but Carlqvist prefers to call her position
‘Islam-critical’ instead of anti-Muslim.7 Dispatch International was established
in 2012 together with Lars Hedegaard (b. 1942), a well-known Danish critic
of Islam, and the journal often promotes ideas that are close to those of the socalled international counter-jihad milieu.8 Because of her activities and outspoken criticism of Islam, Walter has received negative attention and a large
number of threats (including death threats, because of which she currently
lives with a protected identity),9 but she has also been associated with parties
5 The name RLM is an abbreviation of Radio Länsman. The Swedish word länsman is an old
word for police, but the webpage uses the word to denote someone who is trusted in the local
community. Today the podcast is known as Radio Realism, but the old name of RLM has been
retained. For more information, see www.rlm.nu/om-rlm/, accessed 18 April 2016.
6 Tuffaha, Elias, “Vad SVT inte berättade om Mona Walter”, EXPO Idag Blogg, 7 October 2015.
7 On Dispatch International, see, for example, Thomsen, Dante, “Ingrid Carlqvist lanserar
‘islamkritisk’ tidning”, Dagens media, 3 September 2012, www.dagensmedia.se/medier/
tidskrifter/ingrid-carlqvist-lanserar-islamistkritisk-tidning-6132347, accessed 1 April 2016.
8 See, for example, Poohl, Daniel, “Expo: ‘Carlqvists vanföreställning en följd av att hon tror
hon lever i Absurdistan”, Dagens media, 24 September 2012, www.dagensmedia.se/experter/
debatt/expo-carlqvists-vanforestallning-en-foljd-av-att-hon-tror-hon-lever-i-absurdistan6131075, accessed 1 April 2016. See, for example, Carr, Matt, “You are now entering Eurabia”,
Race & Class, 48, 1 (2006), pp. 1-22, for an overview to the major ideas that thrive within the
so-called counter-jihad movement.
9 Björk, Frida, “Hotades efter att ha konverterat”, SVT Nyheter, 17 April 2014, www.svt.se/
nyheter/lokalt/vast/hotades-efter-att-ha-konverterat, accessed 5 April 2016.
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like the Sweden Democrats (Sverigedemokraterna)10 and other groups that
maintain negative views of Islam, Muslims, and immigrants more generally.
According to the anti-racist NGO EXPO, she has participated in media outlets
that are closely connected to neo-Nazi groups and anti-Muslim spokespersons.11
The podcast episode that I am going to analyse was broadcast by RLM podradio on 11 April 2015. The program features an interview with ex-Muslim Mona
Walter and is 62 minutes and 28 seconds long.12 The episode is available online,
and several websites contain links and directions that make it very easy to find
it. From the information provided via the YouTube link that contains the specific podcast, we can deduce that 323 individuals have recorded that they like
the content and 40 that they dislike it. Overall, the file has been viewed 20,048
times (as of 16 August 2016), but this information does not tell us anything
about the viewers (listeners), or whether they listened to the whole program
or only parts of it.13
Methodologically I have used content analysis to “measure a specific phenomenon against some standard in order to classify the phenomenon” and to
“make a judgment about it” so as to “determine how close it comes to meeting
a particular standard or expectation.”14 Since oral and written texts are matters of interpretation that involve both hermeneutical and cognitive aspects,
it is doubtful whether content analysis should be seen as an objective method.
Every reader, or researcher for that matter, brings assumptions and meanings to a text. However, to reduce this problem, and to make it possible for
researchers to test and replicate the results inter-subjectively, the content of
the selected podcast is compared with the ways the Runnymede Trust and the
Swedish National Council for Crime Prevention (Brå) define Islamophobia
10 The Sweden Democrats could be described as a nationalist party that has roots in racist
and neo-Nazi circles. On this party, see, for example, Hellström, Anders, Vi är de goda:
Den offentliga debatten om Sverigedemokraterna och deras politik (Hägersten: Tankekraft,
2010). The party has often described Islam and Muslims in a negative light, and the party
leader Jimmie Åkesson has said, for example, that Islam is the greatest foreign threat
that Sweden is facing today. See, Åkesson, Jimmie, “Muslimerna är vårt största utländska hot”, Aftonbladet, 19 October 2009, www.aftonbladet.se/debatt/debattamnen/politik/
article12049791.ab, accessed 2 April 2016.
11 Tuffaha, “Vad SVT”.
12 The episode I listened to is taken from www.youtube.com/watch?v=qEa98B5mKHo,
accessed 5 April 2016.
13 www.youtube.com/watch?v=qEa98B5mKHo, accessed 5 April 2016.
14 All three quotations in this sentence are taken from Nelson, Chad and Woods, Robert
H. Jr., “Content analysis”, in Stausberg, Michael, and Steven Engler (eds.), The Routledge
Handbook of Research Methods in the Study of Religion (London and New York: Routledge,
2014), pp. 109-121.
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(see Section 3 below).15 While the aim is to determine whether the content can
be viewed as Islamophobic, it is important to stress that my comparison does
not say anything about the intent of the speakers in the podcast (Mona Walter
and those who interviewed her) or how a presumed audience (i.e. the listeners) understands or contextualises its content.16 Likewise the selected podcast
does not say anything statistically representative about how ex-Muslims view
Islam. The results are therefore limited to one podcast and to a specific occasion. The objective is only to compare what the speakers in the selected podcast say about Islam and Muslims in order to compare these statements with
how two agencies (one international and one Swedish) define Islamophobia.
After listening to the podcast, the content was organised according to the
following topics:
•
•
•
•
•
•
Walter’s time in Somalia
Islam in Sweden
Islam, women, and the hijab
‘Real Muslims’ and ‘nominal Muslims’
Racism within Islam
Those who are seduced and deceived, and those who seduce and deceive
The topics listed above should mainly been seen as heuristic tools used in
organising the content of the program and facilitating its analysis. The topics
therefore do not automatically correspond to explicit questions raised by the
interviewers, but have been extracted from the content of the interview with
Walter. The boundary between the topics is often open to interpretation, and
some are hard to separate from their entanglement with one another. To make
it easier for the reader to follow my line of thought, I have written the topics
listed above in bold and italics when I summarise and analyse the content of
the podcast episode in Sections 4 and 5.
3
Definitions of Islamophobia
By 1951 Sweden had adopted a law guaranteeing freedom of religion, and from
2000 the principle was laid down that the Swedish state should be confessionally neutral, as long as religious practices do not violate the law. According to
15 Chad and Woods, “Content”, p. 112.
16 Since it is the content of the program and the discussion between Mona Walter and the
hosts of the podcast that is my focus in this article, I have not conducted any interviews
with the participants in the actual podcast program.
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the Swedish legal system, it is possible to hold a religious belief and to conduct, for example, missionary work with the aim of attracting converts to a
certain tradition, even though this might cause tensions and friction within
and between members of different faith communities.17 But it should also be
possible for the individual to change or abandon a religious world view if that
individual so chooses. The legal prerequisite is that a religious belief or choice
of world view (philosophy, value system) should not be based on any kind of
compulsion or violence, and that a violation of that prerequisite constitutes a
violation of the legal system that is punishable by law.18
Before I turn to the definitions of Islamophobia that are found in both international research and in Swedish documents that guide government bodies
like, for example, the Swedish police and the Swedish National Council for
Crime Prevention (Brå), it is important to stress that it is legally permissible
to hold negative or stereotypical views about religions in Sweden. From a legal
point of view, the law makes a sharp distinction between thoughts and actions.
In other words, the individual is entitled to hold and express strong and even
provocative opinions about a religious system, but is not entitled to threaten
or use violence against individuals who hold other opinions, for example, by
embracing or denouncing a religious world view.19 Although the individual is
entitled to voice his or her opinion, it is illegal to harass or use hate speech
against individuals or groups. The right to voice criticism of a religion is therefore related to both the law on freedom of religion and the law on freedom of
speech.20 As in many other European countries, however, it is often difficult to
make a clear distinction between legal and illegal freedom of expression in the
context of freedom of religion. The extent to which the line is between freedom of speech and hate speech is thin is illustrated by the Swedish Christian
pastor Åke Green (b. 1941), who in 2003 delivered a sermon in which he compared homosexuals who “live out their homosexuality” with cancer. Initially
Green was sentenced to one month in prison for hate speech, but the sentence
17 See, for example, Larsson, Göran, “Apostasy in the West: A Swedish Case Study”, in
Adang, Camilla, Hassan Ansari, Maribel Fierro, and Sabine Schmidtke (eds.), Accusations
of Unbelief in Islam: A Diachronic Perspective on Takfīr (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2016),
pp. 381-392.
18 On the history and legal aspects of the freedom of religion law, see Enkvist, Victoria,
Religionsfrihetens rättsliga ramar (Uppsala: Iustus förlag, 2013) and Alwall, Jonas, Muslim
Rights and Plights: The Religious Liberty Situation of a Minority in Sweden (Lund: Lund
University Press, 1998).
19 See the Swedish constitution (Regeringsformen, 2 kap, 2§).
20 Both laws are part of the Swedish constitution (Regeringsformen, 2 kap, 1§).
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was changed by a higher court in Sweden because it thought it likely that the
European court would stress that the pastor was entitled to make use of his
right to freedom of speech.21
Although Sweden was an early adopter of legislation to protect minorities and vulnerable groups from experiencing discrimination or racism,
Islamophobia, as a special sub-category of hate crime, was first introduced in
the statistical information issued by the Swedish National Council for Crime
Prevention in 2006.22 Islamophobia is defined as follows:
Fear of, or hostility or hatred towards, Islam and Muslims which causes
anti-Islamic reactions targeting Islam, Muslim properties, institutions, or
persons who are or are perceived to be either Muslims, or representatives
of Muslims.23
According to Swedish legislation, Islamophobia is a sub-category of hate
crime, but it is not a category of crime on its own. For example, if a perpetrator
is convicted of a crime (e.g. assault) that also includes a hate crime element, it
is possible for the legal system to pass a harsher punishment.
Following international debates, and especially since the publication of
the Runnymede report Islamophobia: A Challenge for Us All, Islamophobia
has become an accepted category that is used in police reports, statistics of
hate crimes, and governmental policies combating discrimination, racism,
and xenophobia. Compared to the definition given above, the Runnymede
report delineates Islamophobia by considering eight components. They are:
21 In the lower court it was argued that the content of Green’s sermon had violated
Chapter 16, 8§ in Brottbalken 1962:700, but when discussed in relation to the European
Convention and freedom of religion it was decided that Green could not be sentenced
for hate speech. See, Fahlbeck, Reinhold, Bed och arbeta: Om religionsfrihet i arbetsliv och
skola (Malmö: Liber, 2011), pp. 83-85, and Brandberg, Ulrika, and Tom Knutson, “Fakta Åke
Green-målet”, Advokaten, Nr. 7, Årgång 77 (2011), www.advokatsamfundet.se/Advokaten/
Tidningsnummer/2011/Nr-72011-Argang77/Fakta-Ake-Green-malet/, accessed 29 March
2016.
22 Larsson, Göran, and Simon Stjernholm, “Islamophobia in Sweden: Muslim Advocacy and
Hate-Crime Statistics”, in Pratt, Douglas, and Rachel Woodlock (eds.), Fear of Muslims?
International Perspectives on Islamophobia (Dordrecht: Springer, 2016), pp. 153-166.
23 Hatbrott 2006. En sammanställning av polisanmälningar med främlingsfientliga, islamofobiska, antisemitiska och homofobiska motiv (Stockholm: BRÅ, 2007), p. 55. My translation
from the Swedish.
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5
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Islam is seen a monolithic bloc, static and unresponsive to change.
Islam is seen as separate and other. It does not have values in common
with other cultures, is not affected by them and does not influence them.
Islam is seen as inferior to the West. It is barbaric, irrational, primitive,
and sexist.
Islam is seen as violent, aggressive, threatening, supportive of terrorism,
and engaged in a clash of civilisations.
Islam is seen as a political ideology and is used to acquire political or military advantage.
Criticism of the West by Muslims is rejected out of hand.
Hostility towards Islam is used to justify discriminatory practices towards
Muslims and the exclusion of Muslims from mainstream society.
Anti-Muslim hostility is seen as natural or normal.24
This multidimensional definition has had a large impact on public debates
about Islamophobia and anti-Muslim attitudes. Basically, it makes a distinction between what it calls open and closed attitudes towards Islam and
Muslims. The list above is a summary of “closed attitudes towards Islam
and Muslims,” consisting of aspects that could be used to decide whether a
person or an utterance could be labelled Islamophobic or not, at least according to the definition proposed by the Runnymede Trust.
Even though government bodies, the United Nations, the European Union,
and individual countries like Sweden have accepted and started to use Islam­
ophobia as a category, it is remains a contested term. Among other things,
it has been criticised for being imprecise, and some critics hold that its status as a phobia is inaccurate and that anti-Muslim or anti-Islam notions are
not simply a mental illness that can be treated or cured.25 Some critics have
also argued that there is a risk of the term being used as a political tool to
hinder ‘reasonable’ criticism of so-called Islamism, or Islam in more general
terms.26 Those who embrace this criticism often argue that Islamophobia
24 Although the list is taken from Larsson, Göran, and Åke Sander, “An Urgent Need to
Consider How to Define Islamophobia”, Bulletin for the Study of Religion, Vol. 44, No. 1
(2015), p. 14, it is based on the Runnymede Trust report Islamophobia.
25 An extensive critique can, for example, be found in Allen, Chris, Islamophobia (Farnham:
Ashgate, 2010), especially Chapter 8.
26 See, for example, Pipes, Daniel, “Islamophobia?”, New York Sun, 25 October 2005, www
.danielpipes.org/3075/islamophobia, accessed 2 April 2016. Although Pipes stresses that
he is only criticising Islamism or radical Islam and not Islam as a religion, it is not that
clear what he actually includes in these terms. As a result it is more or less up to the
reader to define what should be counted as Islamism or radical Islam. The problem with
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is manufactured to hinder individuals in telling the ‘truth’ about Islam. This
claim, however, is hard to substantiate, and today it is easy to find a large number of studies showing that Islam and Muslims are mainly associated with negative opinions and negative news coverage.27 What should be counted as ‘true’
or representative accounts of Islam is therefore a matter of heated debate, and
it is easy to find contested and diverging opinions among both Muslims
and non-Muslims.
The definition proposed by the Runnymede Trust also suffers from other
problems. First of all, it is primarily focused on what it calls “an Islamophobic
ideology” or “an Islamophobic belief-disbelief system.” Because of this focus,
one could ask: is it enough that a person has felt or feels what is perceived
to be an unfounded fear or hatred of Islam and Muslims to be labelled an
Islamophobe, or must the individual act upon these feelings and resentments
(verbally or physically) in order to so labelled? If we choose the first option,
we will run into problems with freedom of thought. As noted earlier in this
text, an open democratic society like Sweden’s should also leave room for negative and even stereotypical notions of religions, so long as individuals do not
act upon these feelings by violating or threatening an individual or group. A
second problem with both the Runnymede Trust and the Swedish National
Council for Crime Prevention definitions are that they seem to require the
individual who commits an Islamophobic crime to be driven by an ideology
that he or she is consciously motivated by (i.e. it is based on an active choice).
Relying on this requirement makes it much harder to capture actions that
are driven by ‘simpler’ forms of prejudice and behaviour. In other words, is it
necessary to be ideologically motivated to be a racist, sexist, or homophobe?28
By emphasising ideology, it becomes much harder to capture so-called everyday racism and xenophobia.29 A third problem is related to the number of
so-called political correctness (i.e. that it is not possible to tell the ‘truth’ about Islam)
is also discussed in the podcast program I am analysing in this article.
27 A recent study containing an argument that Islam and Muslims mainly receive negative coverage in news media is found in the Swedish report, Representationer, stereotyper
och nyhetsvärdering. Rapport från medieanalys om representationer av muslimer i svenska
nyheter (Stockholm: Diskrimineringsombudsmannen, Rapport 2015: 1).
28 A more developed discussion about some of these problems is found in, for example,
Larsson and Sander, “An Urgent”.
29 In this case I am using racism and xenophobia as synonyms, but some researchers point
out that it is important to differentiate between racism and xenophobia. While hostility, resentment, and resistance against the ‘foreign’ drive the latter, the first is informed
by a reflected and intellectualised ideology. It is therefore a conscious decision to treat
individuals differently because of skin colour, ethnic background, sexual preferences, or
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components included in the Runnymede Trust’s list. In other words, is it necessary for the individual to embrace all beliefs (i.e. the eight components in the
list above) to be considered an Islamophobe, or is it enough to hold only some of
these beliefs?30
4
The Podcast Interview31
In this section I give a descriptive outline of the content in the program ‘RLM
podradio interviews Ex-Muslim Mona Walter’, broadcast by RLM podradio on
11 April 2015. The description is not chronological, and the outline follows the
topics I presented in Section 2 (‘Methodological considerations’).
A fair part of the program focuses on Mona Walter’s upbringing and her time
in Somalia. Her time as a child and an adult is generally portrayed in a positive light. Mona and her family were more or less free to do what they wanted,
but the good times were destroyed by the war that followed the toppling of
the dictator Mohammed Siyyad Barre (1919-1995, ruled 1969-1991). The political vacuum created by the removal of Siyyad Barre was soon filled by Islamic
groups, such as, for example, the Harakat al-Shabaab, which introduced an
interpretation of Islam that was very different from earlier traditions that had
predominated in the country.32 Because of the new political situation, Mona,
and many other Somalis, had to leave the country.33
Whilst she had been free to go to the movies, dance, and care about her appearance in Somalia, she experienced a very different situation when she arrived in
Sweden. In Somalia people were Muslims in name, and it was only the older generation who went to the mosque, but Islam in Sweden was different. In Sweden,
people pushed her into an Islamic identity. For example, people expected her to
30
31
32
33
religious beliefs. This important distinction is, for example, stressed by Demker, Marie,
Sverige åt svenskarna. Motstånd och mobilisering mot invandring och invandrare i Sverige
(Stockholm: Atlas akademi, 2014), pp. 38-39.
Larsson and Sander, “An urgent”, pp. 14-15.
The data for Section 4, “The podcast interview”, is taken from www.youtube.com/
watch?v=qEa98B5mKHo unless otherwise stated.
On the political situation after Mohammed Siyyad Barre and the rise of al-Shabaab in
Somalia, see, for example, Marchal, Roland, “A tentative assessment of the Somali Harakat
Al-Shabaab”, Journal of Eastern African Studies, 3: 3, pp. 381-404. I would like to express my
gratitude to Associate Professor Terje Østebø, University of Florida, who pointed me in
the direction of this article.
For a detailed study of the history and institutionalisation of Somali communities in
Sweden, see Brinkemo, Per, Mellan klan och stat. Somalier i Sverige (Stockholm: Timbro,
2014).
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wear a head scarf, even though this was not her choice and against her convictions. As a result, she felt extremely uncomfortable in her new situation, and
instead of experiencing the freedom and gender equality that the open and liberal democratic society of Sweden often aspires to be associated with, she only
felt discomfort and pressure. For Walter, the suburbs of Gothenburg (the town
she first settled in after arriving in Sweden) were patrolled by a kind of moral
police enforcing rules and regulations based on what she considers to be a literal
reading of Islam, a topic to which I return below.34
A recurring theme in the interview is Islam, women, and the hijab. This
topic is crucial for both Mona Walter and her interviewers. In talking about
this topic, Walter makes references to the Qur’an (Q 24:3 and Q 3:59), but she
also clearly states her view that it was Umar ibn al-Khattab (d. 644), the second Caliph, who was responsible for imposing these traditions. His voice has a
strong position within the prophetic tradition (i.e. the hadith literature), and he
is responsible for the development of early Muslim society. However, it is still
a Qur’anic text that ‘says’ that Muslim women should wear the hijab, according to Walter’s understanding. But when discussing the hijab, the interviewer,
Ingrid Carlqvist, is very eager to pose questions implying that the tradition of
wearing the hijab could explain why women who do not wear one are raped.
For example, after a brief discussion about what she calls the current “wave of
mass rape” in Europe—a topic she associates with Muslim men who are said
to be prone to raping non-Muslim women35—Carlqvist asks: “Are you saying
that these Muslim men actually find support for this [i.e. the practice of raping
non-Muslim women] in the Qur’an?”, and Mona responds: “Yes, that’s correct.”36
34 Although it is difficult to substantiate the claim that a form of moral policing is active
in the suburbs of Sweden, the Swedish police indicate that this is a problem that they
have noticed in some parts of the country. See, for example, Utsatta områden: sociala
risker, kollektiv förmåga och oönskade händelser (Stockholm: Polisen, Nationella operativa
avdelningen, 2015), p. 20. The problem with social control (especially concerning girls) is
also documented and analysed in Kakabaweh, Amineh, Guluzar Tarhan Selvi, and Jonas
Lundgren, Elva hundra: En studie om kartläggning av förekomsten av diskriminering och
förtryck i hederns namn bland 1100 ungdomar och 50 tals föräldrar (Stockholm: Varken hora
eller kuvad, 2016).
35 See, for example, Carlqvist, Ingrid, ‘Muslimer kraftigt överrepresenterade i våldtäktsbrott’, Dispatch International, 7 May 2014, www.d-intl.com/2014/05/07/muslimer-kraftigtoverrepresenterade-i-valdtaktsbrott/, accessed 19 April 2016. A similar conclusion is also
proposed in Hedegaard, Lars, Muhammeds flickor: Våld, mord och våldtäkter i Islams hus
(Fredriksberg: Free Speech Library/Trykkefrihedsselskabets Bibliotek, 2014).
36 This quotation reads in Swedish: “Menar du att dessa muslimska män faktiskt finner stöd för
det i Koranen”?, and Mona’s response reads “Ja, det är klart”. Retrieved from www.youtube
.com/watch?v=qEa98B5mKHo, time 16:00, accessed 18 April 2016.
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One of the central themes discussed in the interview is the distinction
between ‘real Muslims’ and ‘nominal Muslims’. In discussing this topic, Walter
is eager to stress that “most Muslims are like you and I” (i.e. they have a similar moral sense) and that this large group are only Muslims in name. However,
people in this group are not ‘real’ Muslims because they do not follow or read
the Qur’an literally. Walter stresses that she has spent much time reading the
Qur’an and the prophetic and exegetical literature and she is keen on stressing
that there is only one true reading of the texts. There is an essence in Islam that
all ‘true’ Muslims follow, according to her understanding. Those who do not
are either lying or are neglecting the ‘real meaning’ and are thus reduced to
the status of nominal Muslims. Consequently, the so-called real Muslims view
non-Muslims and the nominal Muslims as sub-human. Walter says: “You [i.e. a
non-Muslim] are not a human, you are repulsive, sickening, a dog.”37 It was this
hatred of non-Muslims and nominal Muslims that made Walter leave Islam.
However, to leave Islam is dangerous, which Walter illustrates by referring to the
prophetic tradition that says that apostates should be killed.38 Those who openly
37 This quotation reads in Swedish: “Du är inte människa, du är vidrig, äcklig, hund”.
Retrieved from www.youtube.com/watch?v=qEa98B5mKHo time 19:24, accessed
18 April 2016.
38 A detailed overview of the literature on apostasy from Islam is, for example, found in
Peters, R. and De Vries, G. J. J., “Apostasy in Islam”, Die Welt des Islams, 17:1/4 (1976-1977),
pp. 1-25; O’Sullivan, D., “The Interpretation of Qur’anic Text to Promote or Negate the
Death Penalty for Apostates and Blasphemers”, Journal of Qur’anic Studies, 3, Issue 2,
pp. 63-93; Ahmedov, A., “Religious minorities and apostasy in early Islamic states: Legal and
historical analysis of sources”, Journal of Islamic State Practices in International Law, 2(3)
(2006), pp. 1-17; and Cook, D., “Apostasy from Islam: A Historical Perspective”, Jerusalem
Studies in Arabic and Islam, 31 (2006), pp. 248-288. A growing number of academic publications document and analyse cases in which alleged apostates from Islam have been
punished by excommunication, legal penalties and even death; see, for example, Peters,
Rudolph, Crime and Punishment in Islamic Law: Theory and Practice from the Sixteenth
to the Twenty-first Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). These studies
are important to consult for two reasons. First they demonstrate that individuals who
have left Islam of their own will or who have been defined by some Muslim authority as
having abandoned Islam because of their thoughts or actions have been punished in various ways, and some of have also been executed. Secondly, these studies also demonstrate
that it is possible to find different views among Muslim theologians and leaders of states
that are predominantly influenced by interpretations of Islam when it comes to both
the definition of apostasy and how apostates should be treated. While most theologians
argue that it is a sin, some theologians stress that it is a personal choice and that it is not
right to force individuals to believe. Consequently it is not up to the community to punish
someone who leaves Islam.
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217
criticise Islam in particular are running a great risk of being harassed, according
to Walter. Because of this threat, we do not know how many ‘Muslims’ are actually atheists or agnostics, and those in this group remain silent about their own
views, not wanting to cause any harm, sadden their families, or expose them to
harassment by other Muslims who see themselves as following a ‘true’ interpretation of Islam. For Walter, it was necessary to leave Islam and to defend and
“fight for freedom of expression, democracy, and freedom of religion.”
Another major topic in the interview is the question of racism, and especially racism within Islam. According to Walter, a number of verses in the
Qurʾan—she mentions Q 3:110; Q 98:6 and Q 22:55—legitimise oppression.
That Christians and Jews are reduced to second-class citizens by the dhimmi
system illustrates, she contends, that Islam is a religion based on racism.
To illustrate her point, Walter says: “Islam is in reality a racist and fascist
ideology [. . .] if you read their scriptures one sees that it really is an antihuman ideology.”39 At this point Walter pauses and modifies her statement by
saying: “Now I am not saying that all Muslims are . . .” It is only the texts that
are anti-human, according to Walter’s conclusion. Furthermore, Walter argues
that Arabs hate Africans, whom they commonly call ya ‘abd (‘yo slave’), which
Walter translates as “nigger.” In her reading, the hadith literature is packed with
derogative and demeaning statements about Africans, the only black person
who is treated fairly in the Islamic tradition being the first muezzin in Islamic
history (i.e. Bilal, who is said to have come from Ethiopia).40 Instead of labelling those who criticise Islam as racist, one should say that: “The believing
Muslims [i.e. the ‘true’ Muslims] are real racist, real fascists, they are Nazis.”41
Walter’s position is that the scriptures of Islam are filled with hatred, and anyone who reads the texts will come to this conclusion. Islam is also a religion
built on a hierarchy that categorises humans according to different degrees of
humanity, making it a racist ideology based on violence, according to Walter.
That some people in Sweden do not accept Walter’s summary and have
problems with it shows that it is possible to talk about those who are seduced
39 This quotation reads in Swedish: “Islam [är] i själva verket [en] rasistisk och fascistisk
ideologi . . . om man läser deras texter så ser man att det verkligen är en människofientlig
ideologi”. Retrieved from www.youtube.com/watch?v=qEa98B5mKHo, time 27:26,
accessed 18 April 2016.
40 A detailed and critical study of the question of Islam and race is found in, for example,
Lewis, Bernard, Race and Color in Islam (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1971).
41 This quotation reads in Swedish: “De troende muslimerna är riktiga fascister, riktiga rasister, de är nazister”. Retrieved from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qEa98B5mKHo
(time 30.17), accessed 18 April 2016.
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and deceived, and those who seduce and deceive. First and foremost it is the
‘media’ that seduce and deceive the general public into thinking that Islam
is a peaceful religion and that all criticism of Islam and Muslims equates
Islamophobia with racism. For example, when Walter said that: “Muslim
women do not belong to Swedish law; Muslim women belong to shari’a, and
it is shari’a law that prevails in the suburbs,” her words were not included in a
program broadcast by Swedish television.42 Although this subject is not pursued further by Walter, it is clearly a favourite topic for the two interviewers,
who stress the media’s great responsibility. According to Carlqvist, it is typical
that the “Media always want to portray Islam in a positive light,” and further,
that “Swedish journalists are not interested in the truth.”43
For example, instead of realising that ‘true’ Islam is a danger, the Church of
Sweden and its current Archbishop, Antje Jackelén (b. 1955), have decided to
ignore this fact. When talking about this topic, Conrad sighs and says that they
[i.e. the Church of Sweden] do not even know that “Muhammad was a warlord,” while “Jesus was a personification of goodness.” According to Conrad and
Carlqvist, the podcast hosts, it is important to admit that not all religions are
on an equal footing and the Archbishop is only pampering Islam and Muslims
out of naivety. However, there are also theological explanations according to
Walter: “The Church of Sweden is not a Church of God—it does not belong to
Jesus” but is run by the state, and because of this connection it cannot be considered independent in making its own decisions. Although the program’s hosts
stress that the Church of Sweden and the Swedish state have been separate
since 2000, Conrad says that he ‘understands what she means.’ Furthermore,
it is also telling for the program hosts that Archbishop Jackelén has chosen
‘God is greater’ as her motto as, in their view, it reveals that she is influenced by
Islam and the Arabic saying Allahu Akbar, which also means ‘God is greater.’44
42 This quotation reads in Swedish: “Muslimska kvinnor tillhör inte Sveriges lag, muslimska
kvinnor tillhör Sharia och det är Sharialagar som gäller i förorten”. Retrieved from www
.youtube.com/watch?v=qEa98B5mKHo, time 38:45, accessed 18 April 2016.
43 Carlqvist expresses a similar line of thought in Thomsen, Dante, “Ingrid Carlqvist lanserar
‘islamkritisk’ tidning”, Dagens media, 3 September 2012, www.dagensmedia.se/medier/
tidskrifter/ingrid-carlqvist-lanserar-islamistkritisk-tidning-6132347, accessed 19 April 2016.
44 The Archbishop’s motivation for her choice of the motto is found on the webpage of the
Church of Sweden; see www.svenskakyrkan.se/omoss/arkebiskopens-valsprak, accessed
16 April 2016. The fact that the motto is found in 1 John 3:18-20 (which reads: “Dear children,
let us not love with words or speech but with actions and in truth. This is how we know
that we belong to the truth and how we set our hearts at rest in his presence. If our hearts
condemn us, we know that God is greater than our hearts, and he knows e­ verything”)
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219
Besides the media and the Church of Sweden, it is the politicians (for example, Margot Wahlström, Sweden’s foreign minister, and Gudrun Schyman,
leader of Feministiskt initiativ), who are the most responsible for the prevailing
situation. Instead of fighting the alleged Islamisation of society, they ignore the
fact that Muslim organisations establish parallel societies, and they pamper
the foreign fighters who have returned to Sweden from the turmoil in Syria.
To remedy the situation, according to Walter and her podcast hosts, the state
should, for example, control imams, no Muslim organisations should receive
support from Saudi Arabia, all individuals who have joined IS (and similar
organisations) should be imprisoned, they should receive no help, and it is
time to say no to cultural relativism.
5
Analysis
If the content in the podcast program described above is compared with and
analysed in relation to how Islamophobia is defined by the Runnymede Trust,
it is likely that major parts of the content in the program could be described
as having a “closed attitude” towards Islam. For example, what is claimed to be
the true manifestation and essence of Islam is generally presented as monolithic, unchangeable, not open to interpretation or variation, and its outcome
is oppressive, patriarchal, and violent. So even if Walter says that it is not possible to talk about or lump all Muslims together as a single group, the ‘correct’
manifestation of Islam is not open to change, and there are no interpretations
of Islam. Neither the quotations from the Qur’an nor the prophetic literature
are discussed historically, nor does Walter pay any attention to how the selected
verses have been interpreted or understood by Muslim theologians, either in
history or at the present day. Hadith texts that demonstrate a certain point
are chosen, and the description rarely includes examples that could contradict the point or present the suggested conclusion in a new light. For example,
hadith texts are chosen to prove that Islam is a racist ideology and that Arabs
hate Africans. There is no doubt that some of these hadith texts could be
found within this literary genre45—that is not the point—but alternative readings and Islamic texts that, for example, talk about the principle of equality
is neglected in the podcast. The translation from the New Testament is taken from the
New International Version (NIV), www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=1+John+3,
accessed 16 April 2016.
45 See, for example, Lewis, Race, for a detailed discussion of this question.
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Larsson
between believers (no matter what their race or gender) are downplayed or not
brought into the discussion.46 Consequently, the selection is biased and the
intention is to demonstrate a preconceived point. Examples that could contradict the conclusion or bring it into question are therefore ignored. The podcast
also contains a number of strong statements about Islam (for example, that it
is a fascist religion that creates racism and that the religion can be compared
to Nazi ideology).
Nonetheless it is important to underline that Walter makes a distinction
between those she considers to be ‘true’ Muslims who read the Qur’an literally and others who are only Muslims by name. Among this second group it is
also possible to find secular persons and even atheists who are only nominally
Muslims and nothing more. Apparently, it is also possible to find Muslims who
used to practise Islam in Somalia before the downfall of the dictator Siyyad
Barre in this category. Nonetheless, members of this group are not considered
‘proper’ or ‘true’ believers of Islam. Muslims who opt for non-literal readings
and who argue that there are variations within and among Muslims both in
history and at the present day (for example, when it comes to interpreting and
applying the religion) are dismissed as liars or deceivers. It is only possible to
be Muslim in one way—variations, conflicts, and internal contradictions do
not exist in Islam, according to Walter. The only ‘proper’ Islam is that based on
a literal reading that produces oppression, violence, patriarchal structures, and
racism. Whereas it was necessary for Walter to leave Islam in order to defend
and “fight for freedom of expression, democracy, and freedom of religion,” this
freedom apparently does not include those who would like to remain Muslim.
The fact that Walter actually categorises Muslims into two groups is not recognised by the interviewers. Like Walter, they argue that Islam has a core of
belief that is unchangeable, and consequently it is the so-called true Muslims
who constitute a problem for Swedish society. The ‘real’ Muslims, for example,
were never present in Somalia, and the old men who used to visit mosques
before al-Shabaab arrived in the Horn of Africa were apparently not following the correct form of Islam, if we accept Walter’s distinction between ‘true’
and ‘nominal’ Muslims. For the interviewers, Walter’s narrative functions as
a testimony of truth, since, being an ex-Muslim, she knows what she’s talking about. From this point of view, Walter could be compared with, for example, the Dutch ex-Muslim Ayaan Hirsi Ali (b. 1969). It seems that both Walter
and Hirsi Ali’s critiques are viewed as a testimony of truth since both were
born and raised as Muslims and thus know what they are talking about. That
46 A number of examples of such perspectives are, for example, found in Safi, Omid (ed.),
Progressive Muslims: On Justice, Gender and Pluralism (Oxford: Oneworld, 2003).
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Walter’s story is a personal account informed by her own experiences, and not
a statement that can easily be made into to a representation of all Muslims and
all interpretations of Islam in both history and the present day, is not discussed
in the podcast. That the selection of data and the analysis proposed in the program are heavily biased and coloured by a negative understanding of Islam
does not take away the fact that Mona Walter’s experiences could be true for
her, and can therefore be seen as genuine renditions of her own experiences.
Consequently, if we return to the Runnymede Trust report and its eight
components (presented in Section 3) for measuring Islamophobia, we can
plausibly say that the interview with Walter fits components 1-4 and 8, but
that it is much harder to find a similar match when it comes to categories 5-7.
The eight components are as follows:
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Islam is seen a monolithic bloc, static and unresponsive to change.
Islam is seen as separate and other. It does not have values in common
with other cultures, is not affected by them and does not influence them.
Islam is seen as inferior to the West. It is barbaric, irrational, primitive
and sexist.
Islam is seen as violent, aggressive, threatening, supportive of terrorism
and engaged in a clash of civilisations.
Islam is seen as a political ideology and is used to acquire political or military advantage.
Criticism of the West by Muslims is rejected out of hand.
Hostility towards Islam is used to justify discriminatory practices towards
Muslims and the exclusion of Muslims from mainstream society.
Anti-Muslim hostility is seen as natural or normal.
For example, the interview does not contain any explicit discussion of Islam
as a political ideology that strives to ‘acquire political or military advantage.’
There is a discussion about Islam as an ideology, but this is not linked to its
political or military aspects. Nor does the program contain a discussion of
Muslims as critics of the West. Most importantly, neither Walter nor the program hosts try to argue that their critique of Islam should be used as an excuse
for excluding Muslims from mainstream society. On the contrary, it could be
argued that their aim in criticising Islam is to help individuals get rid of their
religion and thus have a better chance to be part of society. However, the urge
to ‘save’ individuals from Islam does not take account of the fact that some
individuals do not want to be saved, that their wish to remain Muslims is actually protected by the law concerning freedom of religion in Sweden, and that
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Muslim organisations are part of Swedish civil society (i.e. they have both
responsibilities and rights).
If I turn to the definition of Islamophobia advocated by the Swedish National
Council for Crime Prevention (BRÅ), it becomes clear that the content of the
podcast program I have analysed fulfils the first part of the definition used by
this Swedish government agency. Consequently, the program contains several examples and arguments that could be seen as representing a world view
driven by a ‘fear of, hostility or hatred towards Islam and Muslims’, but it is not
possible to prove that the program is actually ‘causes anti-Islamic reactions
targeting Islam, Muslim properties, institutions, or persons who are or are
perceived to be either Muslims, or representatives of Muslims.’ To prove that
individuals have been influenced by a certain world view or ideology and that
this motivates people to act upon this world view is in general much harder to
prove. This is a dilemma for both the police and the legal system, and this is
one of the major reasons that there are so few cases where the Swedish police
and the judicial system have been able to convict perpetrators of hate crimes
allegedly motivated by Islamophobia.47 However—and this is an important
objection—this does not take away or nullify the fact that many Muslims and
non-Muslims alike perceive the content of the program and the analysis proposed by Mona Walter as anti-Muslim, Islamophobic, or racist in nature.48
Although it is not possible to substantiate this without additional interviews
and further research, it is likely that Mona Walter has made a new career for
herself, or at least a name for herself, in the Swedish media and the blogosphere for her criticism of Islam. It is far from every individual leaving a religious tradition (or world view for that matter) who becomes a critic of his
or her former tradition, but it is likely that the change from one tradition to
another is a sensitive stage and that some individuals feel a strong need to criticise their former beliefs and world views; needing to rationalise and explain
to themselves and others why they belonged to the tradition in the first place
and why they have entered a new stage in their lives. For most individuals this
change is not that dramatic, but for others it may well become a cathartic process that includes strong criticism of earlier beliefs. It is also likely that some
of these individuals (i.e. those who change religious belonging and become exbelievers) can be exploited as witnesses telling the ‘truth’ about religious traditions. For some missionaries and critics, apostates and ex-members become
47 A lengthy discussion of this problem is found in Larsson and Stjernholm, “Islamophobia”.
48 See, for example, Abdullahi, Maimuna, “Walter drar rasistiska slutsatser av lösryckta
korancitat”, Nyheter24.se, 16 December 2014, http://nyheter24.se/debatt/785420-maimunaabdullahi-walter-drar-rasistiska-slutsatser-av-losrykta-korancitat, accessed 15 April 2016.
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important key informants able to demonstrate that they are right and that others are wrong. Ex-members are also presented as trustworthy because they are
born into a tradition of which they have first-hand experience that provides
credibility to those who criticise that specific tradition. In this article I have
analysed the testimony of one ex-Muslim, but a similar rule and function can
also be found among other ‘witnesses’ who, for example, have left so-called
new religious movements.
Without exaggerating the importance of this specific case study, it shows
that ex-members can function as witnesses telling what is purported to be
the truth about earlier traditions and belongings. This shows the necessity for
scholars of religion to pay greater attention to transitional phases, ‘in-between’
(or liminal) periods and changes, both conversion and ‘de-conversion,’ from
one tradition to another. Thus, I suggest that future research should focus on
both the specific situation of the individual who makes the change and how
the change is talked about, perceived, and is used in public debates. It is also
necessary to address why some critics gain prominence in public debates
and why some are regarded as more truthful than others. This indicates that
research on conversion also needs to address processes of de-conversion and
de-affiliation.
Acknowledgments
This study was prepared in the framework of a larger research project, ‘Leaving Islam:
Apostasy, Freedom of Religion and Conflicts in a Multi-religious Sweden’, funded by
the Swedish Research Council (Vetenskapsrådet). The author also would like to take
the opportunity to acknowledge his friends and colleagues Dr Simon Sorgenfrei of
Södertörn University and Associate Professor Daniel Andersson of the University of
Gothenburg, who both read a draft version of this text.
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