A.L. Ang Network, Inc. vs. Mondejar
G.R. No. 200804, January 22, 2014
Facts:
On March 23, 2011, petitioner filed a complaint for sum of money under the Rule of Procedure
for Small Claims Cases before the MTCC, seeking to collect from respondent the amount of
₱23,111.71 which represented her unpaid water bills for the period June 1, 2002 to September
30, 2005.
In defense, respondent contended that since April 1998 up to February 2003, she religiously paid
petitioner the agreed monthly flat rate of ₱75.00 for her water consumption. Notwithstanding
their agreement that the same would be adjusted only upon prior notice to the homeowners,
petitioner unilaterally charged her unreasonable and excessive adjustments.
Issue:
Whether or not the RTC erred in dismissing petitioner’s recourse under Rule 65 of the RRC
assailing the propriety of the MTCC’s decision in the subject small claims case.
Ruling:
No. The petition is meritorious. The decision shall be final and unappealable.
Considering the final nature of a small claims case decision under the above-stated rule, the
remedy of appeal is not allowed, and the prevailing party may, thus, immediately move for its
execution. Nevertheless, the proscription on appeals in small claims cases, similar to other
proceedings where appeal is not an available remedy, does not preclude the aggrieved party
from filing a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
Although Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provides that the special civil action of certiorari
may only be invoked when "there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in
the course of law," this rule is not without exception. The availability of the ordinary course of
appeal does not constitute sufficient ground to prevent a party from making use of the
extraordinary remedy of certiorari where appeal is not an adequate remedy or equally beneficial,
speedy and sufficient. It is the inadequacy – not the mere absence – of all other legal remedies
and the danger of failure of justice without the writ that usually determines the propriety of
certiorari.
Abad vs. RTC of Manila
G.R. No. L-65505, October 12, 1987
Facts:
The instant petition for certiorari originated from a complaint by the petitioners filed on August
18, 1978 against respondent Philippine American General Insurance Company, Inc. (PHILAMGEN,
for brevity) for the enforcement of contract and recovery of loss of money basically praying for,
among other things, payment of the money value of the respective accumulated sick leave with
pay of the separated employees of respondent company either thru retirement, retrenchment
or resignation. Instead of filing an answer thereto, PHILAMGEN moved to dismiss the complaint,
which the trial court granted in its order 1 dated February 16, 1979.
The case was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. Unfortunately fire destroyed
the sala wherein the entire records of Civil case No. 117708 were kept. However, the records of
the case were reconstituted on January 21, 1982 and the case was renumbered as Civil Case No.
82-1324.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent court erred in its dismissal of the complaint.
Ruling:
No. A provision not found in Sec. 44 of the Judiciary Act of 1948. It was the intention of the
legislative body to uncluttered the courts of cases which may be adjudicated, in the first instance,
by officials or bodies exercising quasi-judicial adjudicatory powers like the Labor Arbiters or the
National Labor Relations Commission a specialized body or bodies on labor related provisions
and are not restricted by the technical rules of pleading and evidence.
However, whereas before jurisdiction over money claims of laborers and employees appertained
to Courts of First Instance, the same are now to be taken cognizance of by proper entities in the
Department of Labor and Employment.
The rule of adherence of jurisdiction until a cause is finally resolved or adjudicated does not
apply when the change in jurisdiction is curative in character. Thus in the instant case, there is
nothing wrong in holding that Courts of First Instance /Regional Trial Courts no longer have
jurisdiction over aforesaid monetary claims of labor.
Abagatnan vs. Spouses Clarito
G.R. No. 211966, August 17, 2017
Facts:
Wenceslao Abagatnan and his late wife, Lydia Capote, acquired a parcel ofland designated as Lot
1472-B, with a total land of 5,046 square meters, and located at Barangay Cogon, Roxas City from
Mateo Ambrad (Mateo) and Soterafia Clarito (Soterafia), by virtue of a Deed of Absolute
Sale executed on August 1, 1967.
In 1990, respondents allegedly approached Wenceslao and asked for permission to construct a
residential house made oflight materials on a 480-square meter portion of Lot 1472-B. Because
respondent Jonathan Clarito is a distant relative, Wenceslao allowed them to do so subject to the
condition that respondents will vacate the subject property should he need the same for his own
use.
Notably, the Complaint alleged that prior barangay conciliation proceedings are not required as
a pre-condition for the filing of the case in court, given that not all petitioners are residents of
Roxas City.
Issue:
Whether the CA correctly dismissed the complaint for failure to comply with the prior barangay
conciliation requirement.
Ruling:
Yes. The CA ruled that the findings of fact of both the MTCC and the RTC are supported by the
evidence on record. It gave more probative value to the tax declarations and the Deed of
Absolute Sale submitted by petitioners, considering that only a copy of OCT No. 9882 was
presented by respondents in court and said copy contained clouded and blurred characters. The
name of the alleged registered owner, Francisco Clarito (Jonathan's father), is also not
decipherable on the title.
Afdal and Afdal vs. Carlos
G.R. No. 173379, December 01, 2010
Facts:
On 18 December 2003, respondent Romeo Carlos filed a complaint for unlawful detainer and
damages against petitioners, Zenaida Guijabar, John Doe, Peter Doe, Juana Doe, and all persons
claiming rights under them docketed as Civil Case No. 3719 before the Municipal Trial Court,
Biñan, Laguna (MTC). Respondent alleged that petitioners, Guijabar, and all other persons
claiming rights under them were occupying, by mere tolerance, a parcel of land in respondent’s
name covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-530139 in the Registry of Deeds Calamba,
Laguna. Respondent claimed that petitioner Abubakar Afdal sold the property to him but that he
allowed petitioners to stay in the property. On 25 August 2003, respondent demanded that
petitioners, Guijabar, and all persons claiming rights under them turn over the property to him
because he needed the property for his personal use. Respondent further alleged that petitioners
refused to heed his demand and he was constrained to file a complaint before the Lupon ng
Tagapamayapa (Lupon). According to respondent, petitioners ignored the notices and
the Lupon issued a "certificate to file action." Then, respondent filed the complaint before the
MTC.
Issue:
Petitioners raise the sole issue of whether the RTC erred in dismissing their petition for relief
from judgment.
Ruling:
Petitioners maintain that the RTC erred in dismissing their petition for relief. Petitioners argue
that they have no other recourse but to file the petition for relief with the RTC. Petitioners allege
the need to reconcile the apparent inconsistencies with respect to the filing of a petition for relief
from judgment under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court and the prohibition under the Revised Rule
on Summary Procedure.
Petitioners cannot file the petition for relief with the MTC because it is a prohibited pleading in
an unlawful detainer case. Petitioners cannot also file the petition for relief with the RTC because
the RTC has no jurisdiction to entertain petitions for relief from judgments of the MTC. Therefore,
the RTC did not err in dismissing the petition for relief from judgment of the MTC.
Asia Brewery Inc. vs. Equitable PCI Bank (now BDO)
G.R. No. 190432, April 25, 2017
Facts:
Within the period of September 1996 to July 1998, 10 checks and 16 demand drafts (collectively,
"instruments") were issued in the name of Charlie Go. The instruments, with a total value of
₱3,785,257.38, bore the annotation "endorsed by PCI Bank, Ayala Branch, All Prior Endorsement
And/Or Lack of Endorsement Guaranteed." All the demand drafts, except those issued by the
Lucena City and Ozamis branches of Allied Bank, were crossed.
In demanding payment from respondent, petitioners relied on Associated Bank v. CA, in which
this Court held "the possession of check on a forged or unauthorized indorsement is wrongful,
and when the money is collected on the check, the bank can be held for moneys had and
received.
Issue:
Whether or not the trial court seriously erred in dismissing their Complaint for lack of cause of
action.
Ruling:
No. a cause of action is not the same as lack of cause of action; the terms are not interchangeable.
It may be observed that lack of cause of action is not among the grounds that may be raised in a
motion to dismiss under Rule 16 of the Rules of Court.
If the Complaint fails to state a cause of action, a motion to dismiss must be made before a
responsive pleading is filed; and the issue can be resolved only on the basis of the allegations in
the initiatory pleading. On the other hand, if the Complaint lacks a cause of action, the motion to
dismiss must be filed after the plaintiff has rested its case.
Belen vs. Chavez
G.R. No. 175334 : March 26, 2008
Facts:
On 5 December 2000, Atty. Reynaldo Alcantara entered his appearance as counsel for
petitioners, stating that his legal services were retained at the instance of petitioners' relatives.
Atty. Alcantara subsequently filed an answer, alleging that contrary to private respondents'
averment. In view of petitioners' failure to attend the scheduled pre-trial conference, the RTC
ordered the ex parte presentation of evidence for private respondents before the branch clerk
of court.
Petitioners and Atty. Alcantara failed to appear at the rescheduled pre-trial conference. Thus, the
RTC declared petitioners in default and allowed private respondents to present evidence ex
parte. On 15 March 2003, Atty. Alcantara passed away without the RTC being informed of such
fact until much later.
Issue:
Whether or not he RTC acquired jurisdiction over the persons of petitioners through either the proper service of
summons or the appearance of Atty. Alcantara on behalf of petitioners.
Ruling:
No. In an action in personam, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is necessary for the
court to validly try and decide the case. Jurisdiction over the person of a resident defendant who
does not voluntarily appear in court can be acquired by personal service of summons as provided
under Section 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. If he cannot be personally served with summons
within a reasonable time, substituted service may be made in accordance with Section 8 of said
Rule. If he is temporarily out of the country, any of the following modes of service may be
resorted to: (1) substituted service set forth in Section 8; (2) personal service outside the country,
with leave of court; (3) service by publication, also with leave of court; or (4) any other manner
the court may deem sufficient.
BSP vs. Legaspi
G.R. No. 205966, March 02, 2016
Facts:
Petitioner BSP filed a Complaint for annulment of title, revocation of certificate and damages
(with application for TRO/writ of preliminary injunction) against Secretary Jose L. Atienza, Jr.,
Luningning G. De Leon, Engr. Ramon C. Angelo, Jr., Ex-Mayor Matilde A. Legaspi and respondent
Feliciano P. Legaspi before the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan. Respondent, together with his fellow
defendants, filed their Answer to the complaint. Thereafter, the RTC, on May 13, 2008, issued an
Order mandating the issuance of preliminary injunction, enjoining defendants Engr. Ramon C.
Angelo, Jr. and petitioner Feliciano P. Legaspi, and persons acting for and in their behalf, from
pursuing the construction, development and/or operation of a dumpsite or landfill in Barangay
San Mateo, Norzagaray, Bulacan.
Herein respondent Legaspi filed a Motion to Dismiss dated August 15, 2008 alleging that the RTC
did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner BSP because the suit is unauthorized
by petitioner BSP itself and that the counsel representing petitioner BSP is not authorized and
thus cannot bind the same petitioner. Respondent Legaspi also alleged that the RTC did not
acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action because the complaint is prima
facie void and that an illegal representation produces no legal effect.
Issue:
Whether or not the RTC of Malolos has exclusive jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
action.
Ruling:
The petition is meritorious.
Under Batas Pambansa Bilang 129, as amended by Republic Act No. 7691, the RTC has exclusive
original jurisdiction over civil actions which involve title to possession of real property.
In connection therewith, the RTC, therefore, committed no error in taking judicial notice of the
assessed value of the subject property. A court will take judicial notice of its own acts and records
in the same case, of facts established in prior proceedings in the same case, of the authenticity
of its own records of another case between the same parties, of the files of related cases in the
same court, and of public records on file in the same court.
Bustos vs. Lucero
G.R. No. L-2068, October 20, 1948
Facts:
The petitioner herein, an accused in a criminal case, filed a motion with the Court of First Instance
of Pampanga after he had been bound over to that court for trial, praying that the record of the
case be remanded to the justice of the peace court of Masantol, the court of origin, in order that
the petitioner might cross-examine the complainant and her witnesses in connection with their
testimony, on the strength of which warrant was issued for the arrest of the accused. The motion
was denied and that denial is the subject matter of this proceeding.
The fiscal and the private prosecutor objected, invoking section 11 of rule 108, and the objection
was sustained. Leaving aside the question whether the accused, after renouncing his right to
present evidence, and by reason of that waiver he was committed to the corresponding court for
trial, is estopped, we are of the opinion that the respondent judge did not act in excess of his
jurisdiction or in abuse of discretion in refusing to grant the accused's motion to return the record
for the purpose set out therein.
Issue:
Whether or not the Section 11 of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court infringes Section 13, Article 7 of
the constitution.
Ruling:
No. Before proceeding it is necessary to distinguish substantive law from procedure, for the
distinction is not always well understood. the argumentative conclusion that "we can not tear
down section 11 of Rule 108 on constitutional grounds without throwing out the whole code of
evidence embodied in these Rules," is evidently wrong, not only for the reason just stated, but
because our contention that the defendant can not be deprived of his right to be confronted with
and cross-examine the witness of the prosecution is a preliminary investigation under
consideration would not, if upheld, necessarily tear down said section. Our theory, is that said
section 11 should be so construed as to be valid and effective, that is, that if the defendant asks
the court to recall the witness or witnesses for the prosecution to testify again in his presence,
and to allow the former to cross-examine the latter, the court or officer making the preliminary
investigation is under obligation to grant the request. But if the defendant does not so ask the
court, he should be considered as waiving his right to be confronted with and cross-examine the
witness against him.
Cang vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 105308, September 25, 1998
Facts:
Petitioner Herbert Cang and Anna Marie Clavano who were married on January 27, 1973, begot
three children, namely: Keith, born on July 3, 1973; Charmaine, born on January 23, 1977, and
Joseph Anthony, born on January 3, 1981.
Thereafter, petitioner took an American wife and thus became a naturalized American citizen. In
1986, he divorced his American wife and never remarried.
Upon learning of the petitioner for adoption, petitioner immediately returned to the Philippines
and filed an opposition thereto, alleging that, although private respondents Ronald and Maria
Clara Clavano were financially capable of supporting the children while his finances were "too
meager" compared to theirs, he could not "in conscience, allow anybody to strip him of his
parental authority over his beloved children."
Issue:
Can minor children be legally adopted without the written consent of a natural parent on the
ground that the latter has abandoned them?
Ruling:
The allegations of abandonment in the petition for adoption, even absent the written consent of
petitioner, sufficiently vested the lower court with jurisdiction since abandonment of the child
by his natural parents is one of the circumstances under which our statutes and
jurisprudence dispense with the requirement of written consent to the adoption of their minor
children.
However, in cases where the father opposes the adoption primarily because his consent thereto
was not sought.
As a rule, factual findings of the lower courts are final and binding upon this Court. This Court is
not expected nor required to examine or contrast the oral and documentary evidence submitted
by the parties. However, although this Court is not a trier of facts, it has the authority to review
and reverse the factual findings of the lower courts if it that these do not conform to the evidence
on record.
Chu vs. Cunanan
G.R. No. 156185, September 12, 2011
Facts:
On September 30, 1986, Spouses Manuel and Catalina Chu executed a deed of sale with
assumption of mortgage involving their five parcels of land situated in Saguin, San Fernando City,
Pampanga.
Thereafter, the Chus executed a special power of attorney authorizing Cunanan to borrow
₱5,161,090.00 from any banking institution and to mortgage the five lots as security, and then to
deliver the proceeds to the Chus net of the balance of the mortgage obligation and the
downpayment.
Cunanan was able to transfer the title of the five lots to her name without the knowledge of the
Chus, and to borrow money with the lots as security without paying the balance of the purchase
price to the Chus.
Considering that the Carloses had meanwhile sold the two lots to Benelda Estate Development
Corporation in 1995, the Chus further amended the complaint in Civil Case No. G-1936 to implead
Benelda Estate as additional defendant.
Thereafter, on April 30, 2001, the petitioners herein brought another suit, Civil Case No. 12251,
against the Carloses and Benelda Estate. The petitioners amended their complaint in Civil Case
No. 12251 on February 4, 2002 to implead the Cunanans as additional defendants.
Issue:
Was Civil Case No. 12251 barred by res judicata although the compromise agreement did not
expressly include Benelda Estate as a party and although the compromise agreement made no
reference to the lots now registered in Benelda Estate’s name?
Ruling:
No. A compromise agreement is a contract whereby the parties, by making reciprocal
concessions, avoid a litigation or put an end to one already commenced. It encompasses the
objects specifically stated therein, although it may include other objects by necessary
implication, and is binding on the contracting parties, being expressly acknowledged as a juridical
agreement between them. It has the effect and authority of res judicata upon the parties.
In the construction or interpretation of a compromise agreement, the intention of the parties is
to be ascertained from the agreement itself, and effect should be given to that intention. Thus,
the compromise agreement must be read as a whole.
COMELEC vs. Quijano-Padilla
G.R. No. 151992, September 18, 2002
Facts:
Pursuant thereto, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) promulgated Resolution No. 00-0315
5 approving in principle the Voters’ Registration and Identification System Project (VRIS Project
for brevity). The VRIS Project envisions a computerized database system for the May 2004
Elections.
Private respondent Photokina Marketing Corporation (PHOTOKINA) pre-qualified and was
allowed to participate as one of the bidders. After the public bidding was conducted,
PHOTOKINA’s bid in the amount of P6.588 Billion Pesos garnered the highest total weighted score
and was declared the winning bidder. Thus, on September 28, 2000, the COMELEC issued
Resolution No. 3252 7 approving the Notice of Award to PHOTOKINA, which, in turn, immediately
accepted the same. The parties then proceeded to formalize the contract, with Commissioner
Mehol K. Sadain and Atty. Rodrigo D. Sta. Ana, acting as negotiators for the COMELEC and
PHOTOKINA, respectively.
However, under Republic Act No. 8760 8 the budget appropriated by Congress for the COMELEC’s
modernization project was only One (1) Billion Pesos and that the actual available funds under
the Certificate of Availability of Funds (CAF) issued by the Chief Accountant of the COMELEC was
only P1.2 Billion Pesos.
Issue:
May a successful bidder compel a government agency to formalize a contract with it
notwithstanding that its bid exceeds the amount appropriated by Congress for the project?
Ruling:
To spare PHOTOKINA the drudgery of a fruitless pursuit, we deem it appropriate to lay down the
principles governing government contracts and to apply them to the instant case. Meanwhile, as
PHOTOKINA will later on deduce from the discussion, the contract subject of this controversy is
one that can be slain in sight for being patently void and unenforceable.
Enshrined in the 1987 Philippine Constitution is the mandate that "no money shall be paid out of
the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law."cThus, in the execution of
government contracts, the precise import of this constitutional restriction is to require the
various agencies to limit their expenditures within the appropriations made by law for each fiscal
year.
Consular Area Residents Assoc vs. Casanova
G.R. No. 202618, April 12, 2016
Facts:
In 1992, Congress enacted Republic Act No. (RA) 7227, otherwise known as the Bases Conversion
and Development Act of 1992, which, inter alia, created the BCDA in order to "accelerate the
sound and balanced conversion into alternative productive uses of the Clark and Subic military
reservations and their extensions and "to raise funds by the sale of portions of Metro Manila
military camps." For this purpose, the BCDA was authorized to own, hold, and administer
portions of the Metro Manila military camps that may be transferred to it by the President.
On July 18, 2012, the Local Housing Board of Taguig City issued a Certificate of Compliance on
Demolition declaring that the BCDA had complied with the requirement of "Just and Humane
Demolition and Eviction," prescribed under Section 28 of RA 7279 otherwise known as the
"Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992," for the demolition of structures within the
JUSMAG Area. Consequently, respondent Casanova, as President and Chief Executive Officer of
the BCDA, sent a Letter dated July 20, 2012, informing petitioner and its members that they
should, within a seven (7)-day period ending on July 27, 2012, coordinate with BCDA officials
should they choose to either accept the relocation package being offered to them, or voluntarily
dismantle their structures and peacefully vacate the property.
Issue:
The main issue in this case is whether or not the demolition should be enjoined.
Ruling:
The
The
petition
Court
first
resolves
lacks
the
preliminary
merit.
concerns
raised.
For one, respondents Local Housing Board of Taguig City and the City Government of Taguig seek
the outright dismissal of the petition on the ground that it should have been filed before the RTC,
and not before the Supreme Court. As basis, they cite Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,
which provision applies to, among others, petitions for prohibition.
Coombs vs. Castaneda
G.R. No. 192353, March 15, 2017
Facts:
Petitioner Coombs narrated in the said petition that she is the owner of the real property covered
by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 6715 situated on Apitong Street, Ayala Alabang,
Muntinlupa City; that sometime in March 2005, when she tried to pay the real property tax due
relative to the real property covered by TCT.
Petitioner Coombs anchored her prayer for the annulment of the R TC Decision on the ground
that, since the owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. 6715 had never been lost as it had always been
in her custody, the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter.
In its assailed Resolution dated May 25, 2010, the Court of Appeals denied the said motion and
explained that the RTC has jurisdiction over all proceedings involving title to real property and
land registration cases.
Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred when it dismissed outright petitioner Coombs'
petition for annulment of judgment.
Ruling:
The petition is meritorious.
The Court of Appeals erred when it dismissed outright the petition for annulment of judgment.
Contrary to the findings of the Court of Appeals, the Petition for Annulment of Judgment filed by
petitioner Coombs was clearly grounded on lack of jurisdiction of the RTC over the subject matter
of the case, and not extrinsic fraud.
Cortal vs. Larrazabal
G.R. No. 199107, August 30, 2017
Facts:
Private respondent Inaki A. Larrazabal Enterprises (Larrazabal Enterprises) owned three (3)
parcels of land in Sitio Coob, Barangay Libertad, Ormoc City. These three (3) parcels were placed
under the Compulsory Acquisition Scheme of Presidential Decree No. 27, as amended by
Executive Order No. 228.
In 1999, Larrazabal Enterprises filed its Action for Recovery of these parcels against the
Department of Agrarian Reform and the petitioners before the Office of the Regional Adjudicator,
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB).
It assailed the cancellation of its transfer certificates of title and the subsequent issuance of new
titles to petitioners. It alleged that no price had been fixed, much less paid, for the expropriation
of its properties, in violation of the just compensation requirement under Presidential Decree
No. 27, as amended.
Petitioners then filed a Petition for Review before the Court of Appeals. In its assailed September
30, 2010 Resolution, the Court of Appeals dismissed their Petition for some errors.
Issue:
Whether or not the dismissal of petitioners' appeal was justified by the errors noted by the Court
of Appeals.
Ruling:
No. Appeal is the remedy available to a litigant seeking to reverse or modify a judgment on the
merits of a case. The right to appeal is not constitutional or natural, and is not part of due
process but is a mere statutory privilege. Thus, it must be availed in keeping with the manner set
by law and is lost by a litigant who does not comply with the rules.
Procedural rules "are tools designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases courts and litigants
alike are thus enjoined to abide strictly by the rules." They provide a system for forestalling
arbitrariness, caprice, despotism, or whimsicality in dispute settlement. Thus, they are not to be
ignored to suit the interests of a party. Their disregard cannot be justified by a sweeping reliance
on a "policy of liberal construction.
Danilo vs. Pedro
G. R. No. 155736, March 31, 2005
Facts:
The petitioners, Spouses Danilo and Cristina Decena were the owners of a parcel of land, with a
house constructed thereon, located in Parañaque, Metro Manila (now Parañaque City).
On September 7, 1997, the petitioners and the respondents, the Spouses Pedro and Valeria
Piquero, executed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA). It appears in the MOA that the
petitioners obliged themselves to transfer the property to the respondents upon the execution
of the MOA with the condition that if two of the postdated checks would be dishonored by the
drawee bank, the latter would be obliged to reconvey the property to the petitioners.
The petitioners, then residents of Malolos, Bulacan, filed a Complaint 3 against the respondents
with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan, for the annulment of the sale/MOA,
recovery of possession and damages.
Issue:
Whether or not venue was properly laid by the petitioners in the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan.
Ruling:
Yes. SECTION 1. Venue of real actions. — Actions affecting title to or possession of real property,
or interest therein, shall be commenced and tried in the proper court which has jurisdiction over
the area wherein the real property involved, or a portion thereof, is situated.
Since the petitioners, who were residents of Malolos, Bulacan, filed their complaint in the said
RTC, venue was improperly laid; hence, the trial court acted conformably with Section 1(c), Rule
16 of the Rules of Court when it ordered the dismissal of the complaint.
De Joya vs. Marquez
G.R. No. 162416, January 31, 2006
Facts:
Judge Marquez, respondent, erred in fighting the existence of probable cause of the case of De
Joya, the petitioner, that indicates the warrant of arrest against him together with his co-accused.
Hereafter, the petitioner filed for certiorari and prohibition that seeks the court to void and set
aside the warrant of arrest that was issued by Judge Marquez, respondent on which the same
way he also refuses to submit court.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner be allowed to obtain relief from the courts without submitting to
its jurisdiction.
Ruling:
No. It may not be amiss to note that petitioner is not entitled to seek relief from this Court nor
from the trial court as he continuously refuses to surrender and submit to the court’s jurisdiction.
Justice Florenz D. Regalado explains the requisites for the exercise of jurisdiction and how the
court acquires such jurisdiction, thus:
Requisites for the exercise of jurisdiction and how the court acquires such jurisdiction:
a. Jurisdiction over the plaintiff or petitioner: This is acquired by the filing of the complaint,
petition or initiatory pleading before the court by the plaintiff or petitioner.
b. Jurisdiction over the defendant or respondent: This is acquired by the voluntary
appearance or submission by the defendant or respondent to the court or by coercive
process issued by the court to him, generally by the service of summons.
c. Jurisdiction over the subject matter: This is conferred by law and, unlike jurisdiction over
the parties, cannot be conferred on the court by the voluntary act or agreement of the
parties.
d. Jurisdiction over the issues of the case: This is determined and conferred by the pleadings
filed in the case by the parties, or by their agreement in a pre-trial order or stipulation,
or, at times by their implied consent as by the failure of a party to object to evidence on
an issue not covered by the pleadings, as provided in Sec. 5, Rule 10.
e. Jurisdiction over the res (or the property or thing which is the subject of the
litigation). This is acquired by the actual or constructive seizure by the court of the thing
in question, thus placing it in custodia legis, as in attachment or garnishment; or by
provision of law which recognizes in the court the power to deal with the property or
subject matter within its territorial jurisdiction, as in land registration proceedings or suits
involving civil status or real property in the Philippines of a non-resident defendant.
De Leon vs. Court of Appeals
G. R. No. 96107, June 19, 1995
Facts:
The subject property in the case at bench involves two parcels of irrigated riceland covering an
area of 117,785 square meters located in Barangays Guintas and Bingke, Napnod, Leganes, Iloilo.
Jesus Jalbuena, the owner of the land, entered into a verbal lease contract in 1970 with Uldarico
Inayan.
Private respondent herein, bound himself to deliver 252 cavans of palay each year as rental to
be paid during the first ten days of January. Private respondent who was a godson of Jesus
Jalbuena, was allowed to continue with the lease from year to year. Petitioner Corazon Jalbuena
de Leon is the daughter of Jesus Jalbuena and the transferee of the subject property.
Although private respondent cultivated the subject property through hired men, the cavans of
palay were paid annually until 1983 when Inayan ceased paying the agreed rental and instead,
asserted dominion over the land. When asked by the petitioner to vacate the land, he refused to
do so, prompting the latter to bring an action in court.
Issue:
Jurisdiction and alleged that the lower court, acting as Court of Agrarian Relations, had no
jurisdiction over the action.
Ruling:
It held that while jurisdiction must exist as a matter of law, private respondent's attack on the
jurisdiction of the lower court must fail for he is guilty of estoppel. Despite several opportunities
to question the jurisdiction of the lower court, he failed to do so. Moreover, it was he who
insisted, through his misrepresentations, that the case, involving, as it does, purely agrarian
issues, should be referred to the Ministry of Agrarian Reform. Finally, the appellate court held
that since regional trial courts, by express provision of B.P. 129, Section 24, now have exclusive
original jurisdiction over agrarian cases, but still applying the special rules of agrarian procedure,
it was no error for the court below, even if acting as an agrarian court, to resolve a controversy
involving a civil lease.
De Lima vs. Guerrero
G.R. No. 229781, October 10, 2017
Facts:
The Senate and the House of Representatives conducted several inquiries on the proliferation of
dangerous drugs syndicated at the New Bilibid Prison (NBP), inviting inmates who executed
affidavits in support of their testimonies.
Pursuant to DOJ Department Order No. 790, the four cases were consolidated and the DOJ Panel
of Prosecutors (DOJ Panel), headed by Senior Assistant State Prosecutor Peter Ong, was directed
to conduct the requisite preliminary investigation.
The DOJ Panel conducted a preliminary hearing on December 2, 2016, wherein the petitioner,
through her counsel, filed an Omnibus Motion to Immediately Endorse the Cases to the Office of
the Ombudsman and for the Inhibition of the Panel of Prosecutors and the Secretary of Justice
("Omnibus Motion"). In the main, the petitioner argued that the Office of the Ombudsman has
the exclusive authority and jurisdiction to hear the four complaints against her. Further, alleging
evident partiality on the part of the DOJ Panel, the petitioner contended that the DOJ prosecutors
should inhibit themselves and refer the complaints to the Office of the Ombudsman.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Quash, mainly raising the following: the RTC lacks jurisdiction over
the offense charged against petitioner; the DOJ Panel lacks authority to file the Information; the
Information charges more than one offense; the allegations and the recitals of facts do not allege
the corpus delicti of the charge; the Information is based on testimonies of witnesses who are
not qualified to be discharged as state witnesses; and the testimonies of these witnesses are
hearsay.
Issue:
Whether or not the pendency of the Motion to Quash the Information before the trial court
renders the instant petition premature.
Ruling:
All things considered, this petition is premature. The CA has decided nothing and whatever
petitioner's vehement objections may be (to any eventual ruling on the issue of prescription)
should be raised only after such ruling shall have actually been promulgated.
Indeed, the prematurity of the present petition cannot be over-emphasized considering that
petitioner is actually asking the Court to rule on some of the grounds subject of her Motion to
Quash. The Court, if it rules positively in favor of petitioner regarding the grounds of the Motion
to Quash, will be preempting the respondent Judge from doing her duty to resolve the said
motion and even prejudge the case. This is clearly outside of the ambit of orderly and expeditious
rules of procedure. This, without a doubt, causes an inevitable delay in the proceedings in the
trial court, as the latter abstains from resolving the incidents until this Court rules with finality on
the instant petition.
Dee vs. Alliance Select Foods International, Inc.,
G.R. No. 224834, 224871, March 15, 2017
Facts: