Property Rights Design and Market
Process: Implications for Market Theory,
Marketing Theory, and S-D Logic
Journal of Macromarketing
31(2) 148-159
ª The Author(s) 2011
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DOI: 10.1177/0276146710397662
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Michaela Haase1 and Michael Kleinaltenkamp1
Abstract
This article highlights the relevance of property rights theory for the development of market and marketing theory from the
perspective of service-dominant (S-D) logic. The outcome that market actors promise to cocreate depends on the property rights
arrangement characterizing a transaction. Within the institutional framework of an economy, and based on an analysis of contract
types and transaction arrangements, the authors explain how property rights both enable and constrain the achievement of
the actors’ objectives. In addition, the authors discuss the consequences of property rights designs for the domain of marketing
theory and elucidate the implications for S-D logic that can be derived from a property rights perspective.
Keywords
property rights, ownership of resources, ownership of rights, resource integration, economic organization, contractual regimes,
uncertainty, institutional change
From the perspective of service-dominant (S-D) logic,
services are exchanged for services, and all organizations,
households, and individuals can be viewed as resource integrators that cocreate value with other entities (Vargo and
Lusch 2008). This perspective leads to the following questions: (1) How do such exchanges and processes of resource
integration take place in a market economy? (2) How does
each actor participating in such an exchange get access to the
other parties’ resources and service? (3) How can the parties
be assured that the exchange of service and the integration of
resources will actually take place? and (4) What are the
‘‘rules of the game’’ that lead to functioning and ongoing
exchanges of ‘‘service for service’’ observed in the daily
reality of markets?
This article highlights the relevance of property rights theory for the exchange and provision of service. Because both
S-D logic and property rights theory view exchange as central,
property rights theory offers a suitable theoretical basis for covering the issues mentioned and bringing them to an economic
analysis. Therefore, the main purpose of this article is to show
the contribution of property rights theory to S-D logic. The
authors argue that property rights theory offers a ‘‘logic’’ of
economic thinking that is compatible with that of S-D logic and
that no ‘‘service for service’’ can be exchanged without also
exchanging property rights to both operand and operant
resources. By bringing together the perspectives of S-D logic
and property rights theory, the authors provide a basis for the
development of a market-oriented marketing theory. So far,
marketing theory has developed more or less without a clear
understanding of markets, though marketing deals with
individuals and organizations acting in markets.
Furthermore, an important motivation for the authors’
undertaking is that both S-D logic and property rights theory
were developed from a critique of neoclassical economics as
a basic theory of markets. In this respect, S-D logic focuses
especially on the economic foundation of marketing theory and
developments based on it have contributed to what S-D logic
designates as ‘‘goods-dominant’’ (G-D) logic. In contrast,
property rights theory has been developed mainly as a stream
within the new institutional economics in an attempt to
overcome the unworldly assumptions about individual behavior
formulated in neoclassical theory. Through the treatment of economic organization, the authors connect both approaches. This
indicates that all activities in markets and organizations
(e.g., firms and households) call for transaction arrangements,
which enable an exchange of ‘‘service for service.’’
The authors distinguish between ownership of resources and
ownership of rights and reveal the common base of S-D logic
and property rights theory in social theory. In addition, they
acknowledge the impact of society on marketing (Layton and
1
Marketing Department, School of Business & Economics, Freie Universität
Berlin, Berlin, Germany
Corresponding Author:
Michael Kleinaltenkamp, Marketing Department, Freie Universität Berlin,
Otto-von-Simson-Str. 19 D-14195 Berlin, Germany
Email: michael.kleinaltenkamp@fu-berlin.de
Haase and Kleinaltenkamp
Grossbart 2006) and exemplify property rights arrangements
as boundaries ‘‘between marketing and social institutions.’’
With reference to the works of the ‘‘old’’ institutionalist John
R. Commons on transaction arrangements and property rights,
the authors highlight the relevance of economic organization
for the development of market and marketing theory. In the
process, they examine the connecting lines between (new)
institutional economics and economic sociology that become
apparent (Layton and Grossbart 2006).
After that, the authors show that the type of transaction
determines the outcome and not vice versa. Contracts based
on property rights arrangements specify transaction objects
that, in everyday language, are designated as ‘‘goods’’ or ‘‘services.’’ From these different compositions of property rights
bundles, the authors present a two-dimensional typology of
contracts. These different types of transactions redefine the
domain of marketing theory in a way consistent with S-D logic.
The transactional design is driven by the actors’ attempts to
identify, negotiate for, and realize their options for action. They
discuss how property rights influence the design of economic
activities, particularly transactions or relationships. It is the
actors’ task to prepare the adequate transactions designs and
put them into practice.
Finally, the authors identify the synergies between the theoretical perspectives of S-D logic and property rights theory.
Property rights theory can gain from a reflection on the meaning of the concept of service with respect to the understanding
of economic activities. The authors argue for the framing of
S-D logic as a market theory based on property rights theory.
From a micro-marketing perspective, the knowledge about the
pertinent property rights bundles required for the achievements
of the actors’ ends is among the most important operant
resources. From a macro-marketing perspective, property
rights are part of the institutional framework of society and thus
shape the range of action for actors.
Market Theory from the Perspective of
Property Rights Theory
This part of the article provides a short introduction to the main
concepts of property rights theory. The authors show that,
according to property rights theory, the economic outcome is
a social entity—a consequence of social relationships.
Ownership of Resources and Ownership of Rights to
Resources
According to property rights theory, neither a resource nor its
attributes are of importance; rather, it is how an actor makes
use of the resource or how the attributes serve him or her that
is important. Whether a resource or its attributes are of use to an
actor depends on the property rights to the resource: The property rights theory distinguishes four types of property rights to a
resource (Demsetz 1998; Eggertsson 1990; Furubotn and
Pejovich 1972): (1) the right to use it (jus usus in Latin); (2) the
right to appropriate the returns arising from exploiting it
149
(jus usus fructus); (3) the right to change the form, substance,
and place of it (jus abusus); and (4) the right to transfer all or
some of the aforementioned rights to that commodity to others
(jus successionis).
Within the framework of market transactions, the exchange
of property rights is characterized by the allocation of property rights to a certain resource and a certain economic actor.
In property rights theory, resources are not homogeneous entities but rather bundles of features with many but partly
unknown areas of use (Barzel 1997; Haase 2000). The respective property rights can be concentrated or attenuated to various degrees. A ‘‘full concentration’’ of property rights means
that one economic actor holds all property rights to a resource.
In contrast, ‘‘attenuation’’ means that various actors hold the
property rights to certain features and thus can realize the
resulting options.
In the simplest case of a market transaction, the seller gives
away the property right to ownership of a product in exchange
for the property right to the monetary equivalent of the product.
In many cases, especially in what is referred to as ‘‘services
business,’’ it is not the ownership of resources but rather the
ownership of other property rights that is of interest to the
customer and therefore is transferred (for a discussion of ‘‘nonownership’’ transactions within services marketing, see Lovelock
and Gummesson 2004 and Lovelock and Wirtz 2007). Regardless, an exchange will only take place if both the buyer and the
seller of the offering agree that the property rights bundle they
receive are of higher value than the one they give away.
In this sense we restrict our discussion to private property.
There is also property in the public domain, which relates to
defined property rights (rights to use public highways, rights
to pollute, and fishing rights), or common pool resources,
which relate to the tragedy of the commons (Hardin 1968;
Ostrom 2005). Despite the widespread use of the concept of
property or ownership in economics, no unified definition
exists. According to property rights theory, ‘‘ownership of a
resource’’ can be identified as a state in which an actor holds
all four types of property rights described previously (Haase,
Chatrath, and Saab 2008; Haase 2008). Ownership in this sense
does not mean that all four forms of property rights must be
made available to other actors: Without giving up ownership
of a resource, the owner can transfer jus usus, jus abusus, and
jus usus fructus to other actors if this transaction is considered
economically reasonable. In this case, the property rights to a
resource are ‘‘attenuated’’—that is, the ownership of property
rights, not of the resource, is divided. As the authors discuss
below, divided ownership of property rights is an important
presupposition, condition, and consequence of economic
action, as well as a source of transaction costs.
The Social–Theoretical Dimensions of the Exchange of
Property Rights
As part of an economy’s institutional structure, property rights
are action-enabling rights that emerge within a social context.
Property rights are classified into two groups: economic and
150
legal property rights. Economic property rights are individuals’
presuppositions and capabilities to make use of resources; legal
property rights pertain to the granting and enforcement of economic property rights by the state (Barzel 1997, 90). Economic
property rights are delineated within a given but changeable
social and legal order. So, the concept of property rights
does not cover illegal or socially unaccepted uses of
resources. With regard to what is acceptable or even legal,
however, a range of interpretations exist because of different cultures, norms, and routines (Levine 2005). Even
within one society, the range of allowed uses of resources
may differ.1 As Schmid (2004, 7) notes, ‘‘A property right
is not something a person has independent of the relationship that person has to others’’ (see also Furubotn and Pejovich 1972). The transaction object itself and its subjectively
estimated value, respectively, depend on that person’s relationship with other people and to society in general (Freyfogle 2007) and on the structure of legal property rights and
the way the person can influence that structure (see Levine
2005, 63 for the sharp distinction between civil law and
common law countries in this regard). In property rights theory, the analysis of small-scale interpersonal relations and
culture can be relevant. Zelizer’s (2011, 11) conclusion applies
to property rights theory: ‘‘Institutional economists have
plenty in common with institutional and economic sociologists: awareness of organizational processes, concerns about
contract enforcement, openness to culture, and more.’’
For economic activities such as value cocreation and
relationships building, S-D logic refers to reciprocity (Vargo
and Lusch 2008; Vargo 2009), which is a fundamental principle of social theory reflecting a social norm that yields social
stability (Gouldner 1960). Reciprocity is a basic informal institution that can reduce the uncertainty of actors. As Gouldner
(1960) argues with respect to one party in a social or economic
exchange, the norm of reciprocity imposes obligations on the
other party but only ‘‘‘when the individual is able’ to reciprocate’’ (p. 177). There is no guarantee that the other party will
accept the obligation; in this case, the other party can face sanctions related to the violation of the norm (see Bowles 2004).
S-D logic’s reference to social theory is shared with a
comparative stance in property rights theory. New institutional economics, of which property rights theory is a part, has
questioned the restriction of the older strands of neoclassical
theory to person–good relationships. In its place, it has
brought person–person relationships into focus. This focus
becomes apparent in what Commons (1931) calls a ‘‘bargaining transaction.’’ Market exchange is a process of cooperative
value creation, which depends on the joint efforts of both parties (Barzel 1985; Haase 2000). The consequences of such a
transaction, the offerings related to it, and the distribution
of the benefits accruing from it are sensitive to the efforts the
actors make and the way they negotiate for and then enforce
their interests. In institutional economics, the recognition of
person–person relationships has thus led to a shift in understanding of ‘‘the economic problem,’’ leading away from optimization toward interaction and cooperation. In property
Journal of Macromarketing 31(2)
rights theory, this is expressed through the characterization
of the offering as a relational entity.
A relational entity is something that is configured, negotiated for, and realized in the course of the interactions taking
place throughout a market transaction and are constrained and
enabled by the legal framework.2 In their value propositions,
buyers and sellers make promises regarding their service or
their contribution to the other party’s goals. What each party
to a transaction gets depends more or less on the cooperation
of the other party (at this point, the authors restrict the analysis
to a dyadic perspective).
From this derives a change of view on the subject of
exchange, the transaction object. A transaction object is a
resource for the value creation process or the resourceintegrating activities of the actors. Transaction objects can be
conceived as comprising outlined activities or combinations
of such activities with operant and operand resources, both tangible and intangible (e.g., goods, skills, and knowledge). As
Barzel (1997, 64) emphasizes, resources are many-attribute
assets. Which attributes are searched for, identified, and valued
depends on their contribution to the actors’ ends.
Thus, the effective economic good is the expected contribution of the transaction object to the achievement of the actors’
ends. From the customers’ point of view, the transaction
objects are exchanged for monetary equivalents because they
are considered contributions to problem solving. These contributions (their direct or indirect service) are derived from the
exercise of the property rights assigned to the outcome, transaction object, or offering.3 From this perspective, the utility
or benefit derived from any kind of offering depends on the
options for action for which the offering is an immediate or
mediate means. Both the contribution to and the achievement
of ends are determined by the attributes of the operant and
operand resources involved in this process (see Madhavaram
and Hunt 2008 for a discussion of resource categories and a
hierarchy of resources), the property rights bundles related to
them, and the joint value creation process undertaken by the
supplier and customer of the transaction object.
According to Commons (1931), but contrary to the understanding of the term ‘‘transaction’’ elsewhere in services
marketing (for discussions of the transactional vs. relationship
orientation in services or relationship marketing, see Grönroos
2000; Sheth and Parvatiyar 2000), transactions are ‘‘really
trans-actions instead of either individual behavior or the
exchange of commodities.’’ The actors involved in transactions
interact with each other to accomplish their ends. Although markets can be conceived of as exchange mechanisms, exchange
presupposes or entails ‘‘collaborative activity at many levels of
business’’ (Ballantyne and Varey 2008, 13). These interactions
are executed by individuals who act according to their interests,
which are not totally harmonious with each other and which are
directed at the configuration and accomplishment of action
opportunities. Conflicts emerge throughout the course of a transaction and are regulated or solved by the transaction parties’
joint efforts. Commons characterizes the transaction using the
terms ‘‘conflict,’’ ‘‘order,’’ and ‘‘mutuality.’’
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Haase and Kleinaltenkamp
Managerial and Bargaining Transactions
‘‘Exchange’’ is a central term in market theory and economics.
However, depending on extensions of the meaning of this
term (Bagozzi 1975), it can provide only a limited characterization of what the subject and objective of a transaction are.
According to economic theories developed as market theories,
exchange is still the main form of economic activity. From
a discussion of transactions and ‘‘made orders,’’ the authors
put emphasis on economic organization. The concept of
exchange is deeply rooted in early stages of economic theory
development, which barely addressed phenomena of economic
organization or the design of transaction regimes, let alone
organizations. Therefore, with regard to economic organization, Oliver Williamson, one of the first organization theorists
in the new institutional economics, referred to the transaction
as ‘‘the basic unit of analysis’’ (Williamson 1985, 18). This
implies that there are other units of analysis such as, for example, organizations and networks. S-D logic, which originated in
both market and organization theory (Hunt and Madhavaram
2006; Madhavaram and Hunt 2008; Vargo, Lusch, and Morgan
2006), deals with all units of analysis (i.e., dyadic relationships,
organizations, and networks).
In new institutional economics, as Furubotn and Richter
(2008, 16) emphasize, institutional order or the institutional
framework of an economy ‘‘became the object of research, and
attention was devoted to considering the implications of given
institutional arrangements for economic behaviour.’’ In this
respect, the focus was on ‘‘made orders’’ (or designed organization) instead of ‘‘spontaneous orders’’ (or spontaneous social
organization4). The transaction is an example of a made order.
Commons (1959) provided substantial contributions to the
understanding of the transaction as the unit of economic analysis: He considered the transaction ‘‘the ultimate unit of economic investigation, [or] a unit of transfer of legal control.
This unit enabled me to classify all economic decisions of the
courts and arbitration tribunals under the variable economic
factors involved in transactions as they actually are made’’
(Commons 1959, 4). In addition, Commons’ conviction that
transactions are characterized by a transfer of legal control has
found its way in both economics and business–economic analyses (Williamson 1985 refers explicitly to Commons’ 1931
work; cp. Coase 1984 for a negative reaction).
The transaction is the unit of analysis in which advisements
about the ends and means of activities, the interests of the
involved parties, the condition and composition of the involved
resources, the property rights assigned to them, the legal order
of the economy, ethical considerations, and so forth, are all
brought together. Thus, all resource-related decisions ultimately appear in changes of the property rights structure of
offerings. As a unit of analysis, a transaction is characterized
by institutional arrangements, organizational and technical
arrangements related to factor combinations, and the communication between the economic actors involved in the procedure.
Market transactions (or in Commons’ terms ‘‘bargaining
transactions’’) are characterized by the agreement of legal
peers on the transfer of property rights to resources, both
physical items and access to other people’s service (Commons
1931; Schneider 1995). They are palpably reflected in contracts
of purchase, employment, work and labor, service, and other
areas (Plinke 2000; Schneider 1995). Market transactions
should not be confused with managerial transactions through
which hierarchical relationships are organized (Schneider
1995). Market transactions are accomplished if the obligations of the exchanging parties, expressed through their value
proposals, are fulfilled. Both types of transactions require
some degree of organization and can be conceived of as
governance structures (made orders) for exchange and coproduction. Bargaining transactions change property rights structures, whereas managerial transactions result from these
changed structures. Managerial transactions always take place
within a framework set by the available legal system as well
as the relevant market transactions. The example of a dependent employment relationship illustrates this well. Through
the work contract, such as a bargaining transaction in the labor
market, a company or a superior receives, within the framework of the applicable labor legislation, the right to issue
directives to another employee to conduct certain actions. In
an enterprise, these actions (as managerial transactions) serve
to create the offerings the enterprise is bound by contract to
deliver to its market partners.
Resource integration is the economic counterpart to the
division of labor and as such it is also the basic connection
point between S-D logic and property rights theory. If all actors
are resource integrators, they need to understand how to access
each other’s resources. Property rights theory clarifies what
forms of access to operant and operand resources exist (note
that not all resources property rights are assigned to) and what
economic problems are related to them. In this article’s next
part, the authors present different types of contractual regimes,
or institutional orders, that result from different types of economic activities in which economic actors engage.
Market Transactions as Transfer of
Property Rights
Property rights theory neither starts nor ends with a goods–
services dichotomy. Property rights theory undermines the
goods–services distinction, even though it pays no attention
to services. From a different starting point in economic market
theory or generalized microeconomics (Eggertsson 1990),
property rights theory has reset the concept of good in its
conceptual framework, and the concept of services has no special place in it. In particular, from the property rights theory
perspective, the dichotomy between goods and services, or the
characterization of services according to the IHIP (intangibility,
heterogeneity, inseparability, and perishability) paradigm (Fisk,
Brown, and Bitner 1993; Lovelock and Gummesson 2004;
Zeithaml, Parasuraman, and Berry 1985), was never important.
Whereas services marketing came to the fore because of the need
to deal with the output category the IHIP list describes, property
rights theory gives rise to the distinction between different types
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Journal of Macromarketing 31(2)
Table 1. Resources and Action Options (Translation of Ullrich 2004, 173)
Actors conduct activities on their own
(residual rights of control, successionis
and abusus, usus, usus fructus)
Actors let activities be done by others
(abusus, usus, usus fructus)
Actors are Owners and Users of Resources
(Residual Rights of Control and Successionis)
Actors are not Owners but
Users of Resources (usus, fructus)
Case 1 ‘‘buy and make’’
Case 3 ‘‘rent and make’’
Case 2 ‘‘buy and let make’’
Case 4 ‘‘rent and let make’’
of transactions (based on different property rights arrangements)
that enable different ways to provide service. As the authors discuss, according to property rights theory, the type of transaction
characterizes the offering and not vice versa.
Basically, there are two types of transactions: transactions
that transfer ownership of resources and rights (exchange
type I) and transactions that lead only to the transfer of
ownership of rights but not to resources (exchange type II).
Although in exchange type II resources are transferred, no
ownership of the resource is transferred. Everyday language, and
consequently economics, refers to offerings related to the
exchange type II as ‘‘services.’’ Note that the distinction between
exchange types I and II does not replicate the goods–services
distinction from a different perspective. Ontologically speaking, there are no services in property rights theory. Nevertheless, commensurability exists between phenomena singled
out and addressed by services marketing approaches and property rights theory. Related to exchange type II are particular
economic processes that include particular needs for cooperation between provider and customer, which are not adequately
reflected in the G-D logic and the marketing approaches built
on it. The subsequently evolving IHIP approach also reflects
these inadequacies but is also somewhat mired in G-D thinking
to be able to fully grasp the ‘‘fresh perspectives’’ (Lovelock and
Gummesson 2004). In contrast, Lovelock and Gummesson
(2004) distinguish between ownership and nonownership transactions. Although this distinction is valuable, it does not refer
to property rights theory and therefore does not address ownership of rights and resources.
The combination of these options results in four cases, which is
shown in Table 1. The buy option is strongly related to operand
resources because it is impossible to become the owner of individuals’ mental or nonmental activities. An individual can
become the owner of a right that brings these resources into
action for his or her own benefit or that of another party. These
rights, mainly jus usus, are strongly related to the two let-make
options (cases 2 and 4).
Property Rights Structures and Action Options
The property rights structure of a certain resource at a certain
point in time is the result of (1) a property rights structure
assigned by the legal system and (2) all further market transactions that have been conducted up to that point for these property rights. This structure appears through a more or less strong
concentration or attenuation of the property rights to the
resource, that is, their assignment to one or more actors (see
Barzel 1997 for the reasons leading to these decisions; see also
Foss and Foss 2000; Ullrich 2004).
Which property rights are transferred in a market
transaction and in which particular form are the result of
the actors’ decisions about the action options they desire.
Two options have been subsumed under the heading
‘‘make-or-buy decision’’ (Ullrich 2004): First, economic
actors can acquire ownership of the resources they want
to use or they can leave the ownership to another actor.
Second, they can perform all activities associated with the
use of the resource themselves or let others perform them.
Case 1 (‘‘buy and make’’): The actors (want to) perform the
desired activities by themselves and with their own
resources. To do this, they must possess ownership of the
respective resources or acquire it.
Case 2 (‘‘buy and let make’’): The actors want certain
activities to be performed with their own resources not
by themselves but by others. For this, as in case 1, not only
is the possession or acquisition of ownership required but
the power of disposal over those human resources that are
to perform the activities is also required. There is no ownership of operant resources or activities but only of the
right to applications of skills, execution of performances,
and so forth.
Case 3 (‘‘rent and make’’): As in case 1, the economic actor
performs or wants to perform the activities by himself or
herself. In contrast with case 1, he or she is only interested
in jus usus or jus usus fructus but not in being or becoming
the owner of the resource. This is why the actor does not
need to own or acquire it.
Case 4 (‘‘rent and let make’’): Activities are performed by
others with external resources that are yielded for use. The
actor deciding this option must have both the legal disposal
of the rights to use from all other resource owners and the
property rights to the human capital of the persons acting on
his or her behalf.
As Table 1 shows, because of the different action options made
available by certain property rights structures, an actor needs to
hold a different set of property rights with regard to the operand
and operant resources he or she wants to use or to bring into
action. If the actor does not dispose of these options at a certain
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Haase and Kleinaltenkamp
Table 2. Exchange and Types of Contracts in Relation to ‘‘Buy,’’ ‘‘Make,’’ ‘‘Rent,’’ and ‘‘Let Make’’ (Translation of Ullrich 2004, 175)
Subject of the contract Contractual Form
Resources
Processes
Contract of Purchase
Hiring Contract, Leasing Contract
Property rights to be transferred Supplier receives: successionis on
in a transaction
money (purchase price)
Customer receives: unlimited in time
successionis on resources
Supplier receives: successionis on money
(leasing, hiring fee)
Customer receives: limited in time usus,
fructus, abusus on resources during
process
Non-human assets (physical and
non-physical capital)
‘‘Buy’’
‘‘Rent’’
Human assets (human capital)
‘‘Make’’
‘‘Let make’’
Supplier receives: successionis on
Property rights to be transferred Supplier receives: successionis on
money (charge, fee) and abusus on
in a transaction
money (wage, salary) and abusus on
resources during process
resources during process
Customer receives: limited in time usus
Customer receives: unlimited in time
on human capital during process
usus on human capital during process
Contractual form
Contract of employment
point in time—for whatever reason—he or she needs to
conduct market transactions with other actors to acquire the
missing property rights. This is possible because at every
point in time, there might be other owners of property rights,
who assess their resources differently (Foss and Foss 2000).
Therefore, they can assign resources for a limited or unlimited
time to those who want to acquire them, typically in exchange
for property rights to other resources.
Thus, property rights theory also enables an economic
understanding of the ‘‘modern’’ ways of division of labor that
have taken place and are still taking place mainly in the
business-to-business sector. It highlights the relevance of nonownership access to resources (i.e., the ownership of rights to
resources) as many of the restructuring processes appear in
sometimes complex property rights structures that have one
thing in common—namely, that the user of a resource is not its
owner and that ownership of rights to the performances of
resources dominates economic performance.
Types of Options for the Design of Contractual
Regimes
Depending on the kind and number of property rights to be
transferred, designs of exchange must be chosen or shaped.
We distinguish four basic ways to achieve the aspired exchange
of property rights (see Table 2):
The contract of purchase expresses the institutional dimension of the transaction for realizing the buy option of
resources, that is, the purchase of nonhuman, tangible and
intangible goods; capital goods; or financial assets. As a
result, the buyer receives the unattenuated jus successionis
(other property rights can also be attenuated as in the case
of the purchase of a rented apartment or machinery)—and
Contract for work and labor, contract
of service
all other property rights—to the resource, while the seller
receives the jus successionis to the payment.
Rental, leasing, and hiring contracts translate into the rent
case. The customer acquires the limited jus usus to the particular resources, while the provider receives the jus
successionis to the revenue (i.e., rent, lease, and the like).
Contracts of employment put the make option into operation. The provider receives an jus successionis to the remuneration (wage/salary) entitled to him or her for the work.
To perform the job, he or she also receives the jus abusus
to the necessary resources of the customer (i.e., the
employer). In return, the employer receives jus usus to the
human resources of the employee.
Finally, the let-make case is realized through what is called
‘‘contracts of service’’ or ‘‘contracts of work and labor.’’
The provider receives the jus successionis to his or her
remuneration. In return, the customer concedes the jus usus
to operant resources and their mental and nonmental activities or performances.
Table 2 shows that the choice or the development of a certain
form of contract is the result of considerations of the optimal
ownership of resources or rights (Ullrich 2004) with regard
to the action opportunities an actor desires. The optimal owner
of certain property rights may change depending on the
progress of market processes leading to new transactions and
property rights combinations (Ullrich 2004). In the case of a
contract of purchase, all property rights to a resource are
transferred, at which point the jus successionis is of decisive
relevance. Ownership of a resource means the legally guaranteed right to the transfer of the whole bundle of property rights
related to it.
Many forms of contracts exist in which certain property
rights to the relevant resources remain with the provider. Thus,
on conclusion of employment or a work and labor contract, the
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Journal of Macromarketing 31(2)
Table 3. Two Types of Transaction
Action opportunities
Ownership
Resource type
Contract type
Exchange type I
Exchange type II
Buy and make; buy and let make
Ownership of resources ownership of the full
property rights bundle to a resource
Operand resources
Contracts of purchase
Rent and make; rent and let make
Ownership of rights to resources Non-ownership of
the full property rights bundle to a resource
Operand and operant resources
Rental, leasing, hiring contracts
Contracts of employment; contracts for work and
labor; contracts for service
Note: The realization of the ‘‘let make’’ option requires a subsequent transaction.
lessor still remains the owner of the rental objects, and the lessee (employee) keeps his or her human and civil rights. Note
that one cannot become the owner of mental or non-mental
activities. Jus usus with respect to the operant resources of an
employee or freelancer is the right to realize the promise of the
other party expressed in his or her value proposal. This right
can be transferred, not the person who made the promise
(since the abolition of slave work, the jus successionis right
to human beings no longer exists). Table 3 presents an overview of the characteristics of exchange types I and II.
From the provider’s point of view, property rights to the relevant operant and operand resources are attenuated within the
framework of a transaction. The owner transfers at least the jus
usus of the rental object to the tenant, and employees or contractors concede to their employers or clients rights of access
or scheduling with regard to their working hours.5
With regard to such an attenuation of property rights to a
resource, its aspired use cannot be realized without the mandatory contribution of the customer. In such cases, which we refer
to as collaborative market transactions, the customer must allot
his or her part of the property rights and the provider the
remaining part of the same.
Collaborative Market Transactions and Bilaterally
Attenuated Property Rights
As an initial provisional result, collaborative market transactions opening up the action opportunities ‘‘rent,’’ ‘‘make,’’ and
‘‘let make’’ always involve an attenuation of property rights to
a resource the provider brings to the transaction. Thus, in these
types of transactions, a joint planning addressing the resource
integration process and its constituents (i.e., the relevant
resources to be supplied by the provider and customer) is
always necessary. During the course of the transaction, specified property rights (jus usus, jus usus fructus, and jius abusus)
are temporarily transferred from provider to customer, while
the right of ownership (jus successionis) remains with the original owner (i.e., the provider; Ullrich 2004).
From a property rights perspective, this characterization
specifies the types of resource and rights utilization and paves
the way to an analysis of the processes through which both the
provider and the customer bring resources to a transaction.
Though not the focus of this article, the customer must also
insert resources into the transaction to realize the value of the
temporarily attenuated ownership of property rights the provider transfers. To integrate the customer’s resources into the
operational processes of the joint value creation process, an
additional temporary transfer of property rights from the customer to the provider is necessary. For example, an object such
as a car, a bicycle, or a computer can only be repaired by a provider of repair capacities if jus usus and jus abusus are temporarily granted by the customer. An external training measure
can only succeed if the participants surrender their right to
organize their own time management to the provider of the
measure.
Thus, from a property rights perspective, collaborative
market transactions are characterized by both the temporary
attenuation of property rights to the resources the provider
brings to the transaction and the temporary attenuation of property rights to the resources the customer integrates into the
cocreation process (Fließ 2001; Kleinaltenkamp 1997a;
Kleinaltenkamp and Haase 1999). This means that the related
property rights to the resources from both transaction partners
are always attenuated bilaterally. Through this bilateral
attenuation evolves an often complicated net of activities of
alienation, retrocession, and safeguarding of property rights
with partly far-reaching consequences for the initiation, enactment, and control of transactions as well as the accompanying
production process in a narrower sense (for resulting consequences, see Fließ 2001).
Transactions, Uncertainty, and Institutions
The fundamental consequence of the understanding of a
transaction as a transfer of property rights lies in both the
uncertainty of the future value of the property rights and the
question of how to safeguard them. As mentioned previously,
property rights are transferred in a collaborative transaction
and their prolongation into a managerial transaction in two
ways:
Temporarily transferred property rights:
jus usus, jus abusus, and/or jus usus fructus to the provider’s
internal operant or operand resources that the customer uses
during the transaction, and
jus usus and/or jus abusus to the customer’s external operant and operand resources that are integrated throughout
the process of cocreation of value (during collaborative
production).6
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Haase and Kleinaltenkamp
Figure 1. Functional model of institutions (translation from Jacob 2002, 60).
Completely transferred property rights:
jus successionis to the remuneration that the customer owes
the provider and is usually paid at the end of the joint value
creation process, and
jus successionis to the provider’s internal resources, which,
after the end of the joint value creation process, are a part of
the result of the creation process (in which the customer
gains ownership) or are transformed into it.
Not all property rights that are of relevance to the fulfillment of
a particular contract are transferred to the other transaction
partner. This pertains to the jus successionis to the customer’s
external operand resources as well as the jus successionis to the
provider’s internal operand resources that remain the property
of the customer or provider, respectively, after the completion
of the transaction. For example, a car repair shop might ensure
that the car is owned by the customer but not stolen by him
or her. Conversely, the owner of the car in need of repair is
interested in the provider being the owner of the machinery
or having the rights to use it. Both constellations might be
important in the case of debt claims, but they do not necessarily
affect the activities necessary to perform the repair.
A large difference exists between ‘‘simple,’’ meaning noncollaborative, and ‘‘complex,’’ meaning collaborative, market
transactions: In a simple transaction, the property rights to a standardized good are exchanged with the property rights to a
respective remuneration. In contrast, a collaborative transaction
is, or must be, shaped by a mostly intricate net of intertwined
exchange processes of property rights. In the sense of the principal–agent theory, each transaction partner assumes the role of a
principal and the role of an agent with regard to the rights to be
transferred (Kaas 1991; Kleinaltenkamp 1992). The particular
‘‘role allocation’’ depends on the cocreation process itself or its
results. According to the typical principal–agent constellation,
the provider acts as agent and the customer as principal depending on the results of the cocreation process. If, for the generation
of a certain offering, the integration of external resources is necessary, the provider becomes the principal and the customer the
agent, who influences the provider’s scope of activities through
external resources (Kleinaltenkamp 1997a).
Ownership and nonownership also influence actors’
behavior. It makes a great deal of difference whether the user
of a resource is also its owner, which means whether or not the
property rights are attenuated. Nonownership is based on an
attenuation of property rights, leading to specific risks for the
holders of property rights that need to be addressed. Nonownership forms of access to resources are in need of specific transactions designs. The finding and shaping of such transaction
designs are important tasks for marketing theory and practice
in addition to the creation of offerings.
The more specific the agreements to meet a single case,
the greater is the uncertainty perceived by the transaction
partners and the transaction costs resulting from the desire
to control or reduce this uncertainty (for details and a comprehensive view, see Fließ 2001). In either case, institutional
regulations for the execution and settlement of transactions
must be found. Such institutions are characterized by their
capacity to influence or steer the behavior of the transaction
partners involved and, therefore, their capacity to reduce
a transaction partner’s uncertainty7 with regard to the
behavior of the other transaction partner (Jacob 2002, 51; see
Figure 1).
156
Institutions unfolding this effect typically comprise three
elements (Jacob 2002, 58; see Figure 1):
A rule or rules stating the consequences of a certain
behavior,
A sanction or several sanctions describing consequences of
behavior not abiding by the rules, and
A guarantee or guarantees securing the enforcement of
a penalty.
From this institutional–theoretical point of view, the task of
marketing is to shape an offering or a resources–rights bundle
as the object of agreement offered to a customer. Another, and
sometimes even more important and challenging, task of
marketing is to find or shape the right transaction design as an
institutional setting to facilitate the exchange of property rights
and thus make an exchange of ‘‘service for service’’ possible.
S-D Logic and Property Rights Theory:
New Perspectives for Market and
Marketing Theory
Resource integration, the counterpart to division of labor, is a
precondition for value creation. It also plays a fundamental
role in S-D logic because service is provided by means of
resource integration (Lusch and Vargo 2006, 284). All economic actors (e.g., firms and households) integrate resources
and cocreate value on this basis. If, for example, the customer
does not combine his or her operant and operand resources
with those of the provider, no cocreation of value can take
place. S-D logic states that the customer is always a cocreator
of value. Property rights theory links the concept of value
cocreation with the concept of transaction or, more generally,
with economic organization. On this basis, it can make specific claims about the degree of cocreation and how it affects
the governance of the cooperative activities.
The degree of cocreation required during a bargaining transaction depends on the transaction object or offering. Property
rights theory distinguishes between two forms of value cocreation: bargaining transactions and managerial transactions. A bargaining transaction is an (organizational) entity of the market
through which the interactions of the actors involved are framed,
while managerial transactions are organizational units that put
the results of a concrete market (bargaining) transaction into
practice. As our analysis shows, the alternatives are not ‘‘buy
or make’’ but rather ‘‘buy and make or buy and let make’’ and
‘‘rent and make or rent and let make.’’ This occurs within the
legal framework and organizational boundaries and with more
or less cooperative efforts of those who act for or in favor of
an organization, such as a firm, corporation, or household.
In addition, property rights theory is both more informative
and less general than S-D logic. Property rights theory is more
informative because of the analytical framework it brings to the
application of instances it shares with S-D logic. In the cases in
which it makes sense to analyze the transactional design, such
Journal of Macromarketing 31(2)
as the governance structure of a transaction with respect to
property rights arrangements, it make sense to apply property
rights theory. However, there are also exchanges beyond economic exchange that S-D logic can address but are not within
property rights theory’s range of application.
S-D logic’s first foundational premise states that service is
the fundamental basis of exchange. According to property
rights theory, property rights are also a ‘‘fundamental basis of
exchange.’’ With this formulation, however, the authors do not
suggest that there is, independent of the theoretical perspective,
an ultimate reason for economic activity. As the discussion
highlights, the neoclassical, the new institutional economic,
and the S-D logic viewpoints on this issue are often quite different because of the divergence in the theoretical conceptions
that lie behind these views. Regardless, property rights are not
the ‘‘final’’ purpose of economic activities, and its perspective
and that of S-D logic can be transferred to each other: Property
rights are a means for achieving economic ends (but not all
kinds of value creation are related to economic ends). Property
rights are also an expression of the constitution of society, a
presetting on the conduct in business and economic affairs.
S-D logic’s concept of service also refers to general presuppositions (interaction and relationship), means (resource integration, cocreation, and application of skills), and purposes of
economic activities (benefit).
S-D logic and property rights theory can inform each other
with respect to the means and ends of economic activities.
For the means, property rights theory points to the relevance
of transaction arrangements and the institutional framework
for any theory of markets and marketing. Only the disposal
of property rights to resources makes them usable for economic
actors; property rights open up the action opportunities,
which is the main reason for the actors’ economic activities.
Resources can only ‘‘serve’’—in the sense of S-D logic—if
actors have access to them. In a market economy, this is only
possible through an exchange of property rights in whatever
form. So, from a property rights perspective, the exchange and
reallocation of property rights is a necessary prerequisite for
the exchange of service in a way consistent with S-D logic.
A value proposition must be specified by an idiosyncratic property rights arrangement. From this analysis, the authors propose
that the ability to provide transaction designs suitable for the
exchange of property rights should be recognized as operant
resources to be executed.
For the ends of economic activities, S-D logic highlights
value creation or the benefits accruing from this. In contrast,
property rights theory emphasizes action opportunities that can
be translated into value creation or benefits. Note that both
approaches stress activities (value creation is something that
must be done; action opportunity is something that must be
identified or negotiated for). Action opportunities are made
available by the idiosyncratic bundle of rights to resources that
an actor holds. ‘‘Action opportunity’’ has a much broader connotation than ‘‘utility’’ (note that utility does not necessarily
need to arise from consumption or economic activities in general). This does not mean that actions are ultimately directed at
157
Haase and Kleinaltenkamp
Table 4. Connection Points Between Property Rights Theory and S-D logic
Preconditions
Means
Ends
Economic or marketing problem
General story
Property Rights Theory
S-D Logic
Formal and informal institutions (legal and economic
property rights, contracts)
Transaction arrangements (resource integration,
cocreation)
Resource-rights bundles (relational entities)
Action opportunities (translatable into value creation
and benefits)
Design of transaction arrangements (focus on
cooperation, dealing with uncertainty)
How to deal with division of labor?
Answer: property rights
Informal institutions (reciprocity)
the achievement of individual utility stemming from consumption or production, as assumed in neoclassical economics. The
actors’ intent can also be directed at completely different ends
than consumption and production (e.g., coping with uncertainty
and creating value). Consider, for example, the G-D view of
‘‘consumption.’’ As Vargo (2009) points out, consumption
does not destroy value. From a property rights theory perspective, consumption can be conceived of as a particular form of
user process through which action opportunities are realized,
and the realization of action opportunities can occur after the
bargaining transaction is terminated; then, the customers must
realize their action opportunities by themselves, or perhaps in
interaction with others or within networks, but usually not
with the cocreator of the respective resources–rights bundle
or offering. This field has not yet been explored by property
rights theory, but there is no basic hindrance to extend its
analyses to this field. Table 4 summarizes the discussion in
this article.
Conclusions
In summary, according to property rights theory, resources and
the rights assigned to them are important components for
understanding economic activity. Division of labor and the
subsequent division of resources, and the property rights they
imply, are the reasons why resource integration is needed to
create value for economic actors as well as societal prosperity.
The actors themselves will determine how the transaction
object, the resources–rights bundle, and the particular transaction arrangement contribute to their achievement of goals. The
actors’ reflection on the design of transaction arrangements, the
learning processes with their source in experiences related to
particular transaction arrangements, and subsequent processes
of evaluation and redesign are important motors of institutional
change. From the authors’ perspective, it is the visible hand
expressed in economic organization that provides the toehold
and edifice for the knowledge processes emphasized by the
invisible-hand tradition in Austrian economics (Hayek 1973).
The new institutional economics, in particular property
rights theory, provides a capable conceptual framework for the
analysis of service economies and, thus, a linkage between
social–theoretical issues, such as interaction and reciprocity,
Resource integration
Application of skills
Offerings (relational entities)
Value creation, benefits
Provision of service
How to deal with division of labor?
Answer: Resource integration
and economic issues, such as transactions, property rights, and
the economic order they create. New institutional economics,
and also marketing theory, argue for an analysis of economic
organization and thus for a ‘‘visible-hands view’’ of service
economies. Property rights theory provides a framework for a
comprehensive analysis that relates micro-level ends of actors,
meso-level interaction and cooperation, and macro-level
institutional framing.
In economics, property rights theory has already introduced
a new ‘‘logic.’’ From a rhetorical point of view, it tells a story
about the overcoming of neoclassical thinking, which is closely
related to G-D logic. Although the story is told in its own theoretical language, the authors argue that this view is highly
compatible with that of S-D logic, at least as they understand
it. They have argued that S-D logic, as a theory of markets,
needs to add a chapter about property rights and the consequences of property rights arrangements for marketing theory.
Without property rights, no exchange of service is possible;
without property rights-based analyses, every theory of markets and marketing is incomplete.
S-D logic is now characterized by debates about fundamental issues. S-D logic is not a straight theory-development project on a predetermined course; at the given point in time, it is
similar to an open source project, taking on more and more
people who are attracted by the opportunity to discuss fundamental issues of theoretical and practical concern in their
respective fields of study. The aim of this article was to compare S-D logic’s discourse with that based on property rights
theory and to emphasize how property rights theory-based
problem identifications and solutions could inform and
inspire S-D logic. Finally, the authors maintain that S-D
logic’s emergence in the field of marketing theory has proved
a source of reflection and inspiration for other approaches,
even in the field of economics.
Acknowledgements
We would like to thank Steve Vargo and our unknown reviewers for
their valuable comments on this article.
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to
the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
158
Funding
The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Notes
1. This opens a link between responsibility and marketing ethics,
which the authors do no explore herein.
2. Therefore, economics is a social science, not ‘‘social physics’’
(Iberall 1985).
3. The authors use these three terms synonymously. The term ‘‘transaction object’’ indicates that the perspective of institutional economics is ‘‘activated,’’ not that the transaction object is equal to
objects in the sense of a physical good. With regard to offerings,
the authors refer to Gummesson’s (1993, 250) proposal that customers do not buy goods or services; rather, ‘‘offerings . . . render
services which create value.’’
4. Austrian market process theory, particularly in the works by Hayek,
is the origin of theories of spontaneous orders. See Furubotn and
Richter (2008, 16).
5. What Freyfogle (2007, 6) notes with respect to private property in
general holds true for the owner of property rights to the use of
labor force: ‘‘Private property does enhance an owner’s liberty
by creating a sphere of private control; that half is true. But it does
so at the expense of liberty of others.’’ Every employee who sells
his or her labor gives away a part of his or her personal liberty.
6. Collaborative transaction refers to the bargaining transaction; collaborative production is its prolongation into the common value
creation process by provider and customer.
7. As Furubotn and Richter (2008, 17) state, ‘‘institutions act to reduce
the uncertainty of human interaction and, thus, the costs of cooperation.’’ The Janus-faced character of institutions is not overlooked within this analysis. In made orders addressing a transaction,
or a series of transactions, actors face the opportunity to learn and
immediately react to expectations that have proved false.
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Bios
Michaela Haase is the founder of the center for marketing and ethics
at the Marketing Department of the Freie Universität Berlin. Her
research focuses on the theory of the firm, institutional economics,
philosophy of science, and business and economic ethics.
Michael Kleinaltenkamp is a professor of Business and Services
Marketing at the Marketing Department of Freie Universität Berlin and
the director of its ‘‘Executive Master of Business Marketing’’ program.
Since 2004 he is also a visiting professor at the European School of
Management and Technology, Berlin and from November 2007 to
January 2008 he was a visiting professor at the School of Marketing of
the University of New South Wales, Sydney. From 2005 to 2007 and
from 2009 to 2010, he was the dean of the School of Business & Economics of the Freie Universität Berlin. His research focuses on business-tobusiness and services marketing as well as on marketing theory.