ARTICLE III
BILL OF RIGHTS
SECTION 1. No PERSON SHALL BE DEPRIVED OF LIFE, LIBERTY OR
PROPERTY WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW, NOR SHALL ANY PERSON BE
DENIED THE EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS.
Q. What is the significance of the Bill of Rights?
A. Government is powerful. When unlimited, it becomes tyrannical. The Bill of
Rights is a guarantee that there are certain areas of a person's life, liberty,
and property which governmental power may not touch.
Q. What powers of government are limited by the Bill of Rights?
A. All the powers of government are limited by the Bill of Rights.
Q. What in general are these powers?
A. The totality of governmental power is contained in tliree great powers:
police power, power of eminent domain, and power of taxation.
Q. Why are these powers considered inherent powers?
A. Because they belong to the very essence of government and without them
no government can exist. A constitution^ can only define and delimit
them and allocate their exercise among various government agencies. A
constitution does not grant them.
Q. Name one major difference between the guarantees of the Bill of Rights and
the guarantees that are found in Article XIII on Social Justice.
A. The Bill of Rights focuses on civil and political rights, whereas Article XIII
focuses on social and economic rights. Moreover,
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the guarantees in the Bill of Rights are generally self-implementing, i.e.,
they can be appealed to even in the absence of implementing legislation.
On the other hand, the social and economic rights guaranteed in Article
XIII as also recognized in Article II generally require implementing
legislation.
Police power
Q. What is "police power?"
A. Police power has been characterized as "the most essential, insistent and
the least limitable of powers, extending as it does to all the great public
needs." Negatively, it has been defined as "that inherent and plenary
power in the State which enables it to prohibit all that is hurtful to the
comfort, safely, and welfare of society." Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel
Operators Association Inc. v. Mayor of Manila, L-24693, July 31,1967.
Q. What is the scope of police power?
A. Police power rests upon public necessity and upon the right of the State and
of the public to self-protection. For this reason, its scope expands and
contracts with changing needs. Churchill v. Rafferty, 32 Phil. 580, 602-603
(1915).
Q. Who exercises police power?
A. The national government, through the legislative department, exercises
police power. But police power is also delegated, within limits, to local
governments.
Q. Does Metro Manila Development Authority (MMDA) possess
police power?
. J Li
9' A. No. Not being a political subdivision but merely an executive
authority it has no police pow$r. Police power in Metro Manila is
exercised by the cities and municipalities. MMDA v. Bel-Air Village
Assoc., G.R. No. 135962, March 27,2000.
Q. May a municipality be prevented by COA from giving burial
assistance to indigents?
A. Police power is a broad concept covering efforts to contribute to
the comfort of the public. Moreover, the fact that not all receive t he dole
out does not make it less public because the drift of the law is in the
direction of public welfare and social justice. Binay v. Domingo, G.R. No.
92389, September 11,1991.
Sec. 1
ART. Ill - BILL OF RIGHTS
25
Q. May the state prohibit gambling?
A. The state may do so, if it so chooses, and make violation a
criminal offense. But gambling is not immoral per se. Magtajas v. Price
Properties, 234 SCRA 255 (1994).
Q. Is the law ordering the closure of commercial ttfoodbanks
valid?
A. Yes. It is a valid exercise police power to protect public health.
Beltran v. Secretary of Health, G.R. No. 133640, November 25, 2005.
Q. ABS-CBN has a legislative franchise to operate!£elevision
stations. It broadcasts from its Channel 2 and Channel 23. Philippine
Multi Media System Inc. (PMSI) also has a legislative franchise which
authorizes it to do Direct to Home service. Moreover, its franchise
includes a mandatory duty to carry the television signals of the
authorized television broadcast stations. For that reason it carries
Channels 2 and 23 OF ABS-CBN. ABS-CBN contends that PMSrs
unauthorized rebroadcasting of Channels 2 and 23 is a taking of
property for public use without just compensation.
A. Franchises are subject to police power and the mandatory rule
is not a form of taking but a form of police power regulation. ABS-CBN
Broadcasting Corporation v. PMSI, G.R. Nos. 175769-70, January
19,2009.
Protected rights; life
Q. What rights are protected by the Bill of Rights?
A. In veiy general terms, the right to life, liberty and property. The manner of
protecting these is elucidated in subsequent Sections.
Q. What is the right to "life?"
A. The constitutional protection of the right to life is not just a protection of the
right to be alive or to the security of one's Hmb against physical harm.
The right to life is the right to a good life. The emphasis on the quality of
living is found in Article II where Section 6 commands the State to
promote <a life of "dignity" and where Section 7 guarantees "a decent
standard of living."
Q. Do the unborn have a constitutional right to life?
A. See Article II, Section 12.
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Right to property
Q. What does "property" include?
A. Protected property includes all kinds of properly found in
the Civil Code. It has been deemed to include vested rights
such as a perfected mining claim, or a perfected homestead,
or a final judgment. It also includes the right to work and
the right to earn a living. A license to operate a cockpit is not
considered protected properly. It is deemed merely a privilege
withdrawable when public interest require its withdrawal.
In Tike manner it has been ruled that a certificate of public
COTlviiiience granted to a transportation company confers no
property right on the route covered thereby.
A mere privilege, however, may evolve into some form of
property right protected by due process, as for instance when
a privilege, in this case an export quota, has been enjoyed for
so long, has been the subject of substantial investment and
has become the source of employment for thousands. American
Inter-Fashion Corporation v. Office of the President, 197 SCRA
409(1991).
' Q. Is one's employment, profession, or trade "property" protected by the Constitution?
. A. Yes. Thus, an order of preventive suspension without
opportunity for hearing at all violates property right. Crespo v.
Provincial Board, 160 SCRA 66 (1988).
Q. A law limiting deployment of overseas workers to skilled
workers only was challenged as violative of the right to work. Decide.
A. No right is absolute, and the proper regulation of a profession, calling, business or trade has always been upheld as a legitimate
f
ct of a valid exercise of the police power by the state particuwhen their conduct affects either the execution of legitimate govental functions, the preservation of the State, the public health ana
welfare and public morals. Executive Secretary v. CA, G.R. No.
131719, May 25,2004.
Q. May the license of harbor pilots be cancelled without a
hearing?
A. No. Corona v. United Harbor Pilots Association of the
Phils., G.R. No. 111953,283 SCRA 31,43.
Q. When property is classified into historical treasures or
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ART. Ill - BILL OF RIGHTS
A. Yes, when classification "will involve imposition of limits on
ownership." Army and Navy Club of Manila, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 110223, April 8,1997.
Q. Do life and property enjoy identical protection from the Constitution?
A. No. The primacy of human rights over property rights is
recognized. In the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights of free
expression and of assembly occupy a preferred position as they
are essential to the preservation and vitality of our civil and political
institutions.
"The superiority of these freedoms over property rights
is underscored by the fact that a mere reasonable or rational
relation between the means employed by the law and its
object or purpose — that the law is neither arbitrary nor
discriminatory nor oppressive — would suffice to validate a law
which restricts or impairs property rights. On the other hand,
a constitutional or valid infringement of human rights requires
a more stringent criterion, namely existence of a grave and
immediate danger of a substantive evil which the State has
the right to prevent." Philippine Blooming Mills Employees
Organization v. Philippine Blooming Mills Co. Inc., 50 SCRA
189,202-3(1973).
Q. Glaxo Wellcome has a policy against employees marrying employees of competitor companies. This is well known to and is
accepted by employees. An employee who, after repeated warnings,
violated this rule by marrying an employee of Astra, a competitor
company, was dismissed. He challenges the policy as a violation of the
right to marry. Decide.
A. Glaxo has a right to guard its trade secrets, manufacturing
: formulas, marketing strategies and other confidential programs and
information from competitors. Glaxo and Astra are rival companies in
the highly competitive pharmaceutical industry. Duncan Association
of Employees Employees v. Glaxo Wellcome, G.R. No. 162994,
September 17,2004. Where, however, there is no reasonable necessity
for the prohibition, it is illegal. Star Paper v. Simbol, G.R. No. 164774,
April 12, 2006.
Q. What is the nature of the right to collect from a pension
plan?
A. In a pension plan where employee participation is mandatory, the prevailing view is that employees have contractual or vested
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rights in the pension where the pension is part of the terms of employment. Thus, where the employee retires and meets the eligibility
requirements, he acquires a vested property right to benefits that is
protected by the due process clause. GSIS v. Montesclaros, G.R. No.
146494, July 14,2004.
A law that orders discontinuance of a pension of a retired military
officer if he becomes a citizen of another country was held not to violate
equal protection. Pension of military retirees is purely gratuitous.
Parreno c. COA, G.R. No. 162224, June 7,2007.
Right to liberty
Q. The military detainees question the correctness of the
restriction on contact visits.
A. Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576 (1984), which reiterated Bell v.
Wolfish, upheld the blanket restriction on contact visits as this practice
was reasonably related to maintaining security. Contact visits make it
possible for the detainees to hold visitors and jail staff hostage to effect
escapes. Contact visits also leave the jail vulnerable to visitors smuggling
in weapons, drugs, ;and other contraband. The security consideration in
the imposition of blanket restriction on contact visits was ruled to
outweigh the sentiments of the detainees. In the Matter of the Petition
for Habeas Corpus, G.R. No. 160792, August 25, 2005.
Moreover, where the only limitation imposed upon police officers
is that their movements within the premises of the camp shall be
monitored, that they have to be escorted whenever the circumstances
warrant that they leave the camp, and that their estimated time of
departure and arrived shall be entered in a logbook, there is no deprivation of liberty. Manalo v. PNP Chief, G.R. No. 178920, October 15,
2007.
Q. Do people have the right to bear arms?
A. No. Only those authorized by law may bear arms. Even the
provision in the American Constitution has reference only to a collective
right of militia to bear arms. No similar provision is found in our
Constitution. United States vs. Villareal, 28 Phil. 390 (1914). Chavez v.
Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 157036, June 9,2004.
Two kinds of due process
Q. What are the two aspects of due process?
A. Due process has both a procedural and a substantive aspect.
As a substantive requirement, it is a prohibition of arbitrary laws;
because, if all that the due process clause
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ART. Ill - BILL OF RIGHTS
29
required were proper procedure, then life, liberty, or property could be
destroyed arbitrarily provided proper formalities are observed.
As a procedural requirement, it relates chiefly to the mode of
procedure which government agencies must follow in the enforcement
and application of laws. It is a guarantee of procedural fairness. Its
essence was expressed by Daniel Webster as a law which hears before it
condemns."
Procedural due process in courts in non-criminal cases
Q. What are the essential requirements of procedural due process in courts?
A. These are: (1) These must be a court or tribunal clothed with judicial power
to hear and determine the matter before it; (2) jurisdiction must be
lawfully acquired over the person of the defendant or over the property
which is the subject of the proceedings; (3) the defendant must be given
an opportunity to be heard; and (4) judgment must be rendered upon
lawful hearing. Banco EspaHol Filipino v. Palanca, 37 Phil. 921, 934 (1918).
Procedural due process in criminal cases is treated in Section 14
below.
The details of procedural due process for both criminal and non
criminal cases are spelled out in the Rules of Court.
Q. Does an extraditee have a right of access to the evidence
against him?
A. During the executive phase of an extradition proceeding an
extraditee does not have the right of access to evidence in the hands of
government. But during the judicial phase he has. Secretary v. Judge
Lantion, G.R. No. 139465, October 17,2000.
Q. Does a teacher in a school administrative proceeding have a
right to be assisted by counsel?
A. Yes. Due process demands this. Gonzales v. NLRC and Ateneo de
Davao, G.R. No. 125735, August 26, 1999. {Compare this with due
process for students in Judge Dames.)
Q. When is a law so "vague" as not to satisfy the due process need
for notice?
A. It is vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men "of
common intelligence must necessarily guess as to its meaning
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and differ as to its application." It is repugnant to the Constitution in two
respects: (1) it violates due process for failure to accord persons,
especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid;
and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its
provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.
But to be unconstitutional the law must be utterly vague on its
face, that is to say, it cannot be clarified by either a saving clause or by
construction. People v. Nazario, 165 SCRA186 (1988); People v. de la
Piedra, G.R. No. 121777, January 24,2001.
A statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely because
general terms are used therein, or because of the employment of terms
without defining them; much less do we have to define every word we
use. Besides, there is no positive constitutional or statutory command
requiring the legislature to define each and eveiy word in an enactment.
The Plunder Law under which former resident Estrada is being
prosecuted is not vague. The words "series" and "combination" of
crimes can be understood in their ordinary meaning. Estrada v.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 148560, November 19,2001.
Q. Article 202 of the Penal Code defines vagrants thus: "Any
person found loitering about public or semi-public buildings or places or
tramping or wandering about the countiy or the streets without visible
means of support..." The law prohibiting vagrancy is challenged as
vague.
A. The void-for-vagueness doctrine holds that a law is facially
invalid if men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its
meaning and differ as to its application. This is not such a law.
Romualdez v. Comelec, G.R. No. 167011, December 11, 2008.
Procedural due process in administrative cases
Q. What are the essential requirements of procedural due process before
administrative agencies?
A. Briefly, the following are required: "(1) the right to actual or constructive
notice of the institution of proceedings which may affect a respondent's
legal rights; (2) a real opportunity to be heard personally or with the
assistance of counsel, to present witnesses and evidence in one's favor,
and to defend one's rights; (3) a tribunal vested with competent
jurisdiction and so constituted as to afford a person charged
administratively a reasonable guarantee of honesty as well as
impartiality; and
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ART. Ill - BILL OF RIGHTS
31
(4) a finding by said tribunal which is supported by substantial evidence
submitted for consideration during the hearing or contained the records
or made known to the parties affected." Fabella v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 110379, November 28, 1997, 282 SCRA 256, 267 (citing Air Manila,
Inc. v. Balatbat, 38 SCRA 489, 492 [1971]); Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial
Relations, 69 Phil. 635 (1940).
Q. Is publication a requirement of due process?
A. Yes. The rule that requires publication for the effectivity of laws
applies not only to statutes but also to presidential decrees : and
executive orders promulgated by the President in the exercise of
legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the
legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the Constitution.
Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their
purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid
delegation. Republic u. Filipinos Shell, G.R. No. 173918, April 8, 2008.
Q. Is a respondent in an administrative case entitled to be
informed of the findings and recommendations of an investigating
committee created to inquire into charges filed?
A. No. He is entitled only to the administrative decision based on
substantial evidence made of record, and a reasonable opportunity to
meet the charges and the evidence presented against him during the
hearing of the investigation committee. It is the administrative
resolution, not the investigation report, which should be the basis of any
further remedies that the losing party in an administrative case might
wish to pursue. Pefianco v. Moral, G.R. No. 132248, January 19, 2000.
Q. What quantum of proof is need in administrative proceedings?
A. In administrative proceedings, the quantum of proof required is
only substantial evidence. Substantial evidence means such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.
Q. Are notice and hearing always required in administrative proceedings?
A. In quasi-judicial proceedings, yes; but in the performance of executive or
legislative functions, such as issuing internal rules and regulations, an
administrative body need not comply with the requirements of notice
and hearing.
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Q. Without conducting any hearing the National Telecommunications Commission ordered PHILCOMSAT to reduce its rates by
15%. Valid?
A. Changing existing rates is quasi-judicial in nature. Hence, it
must be preceded by a hearing. The fact of the order being merely
interlocutory does not alter the situation because for all practical
purposes it is final as to the period covered. PHILCOMSAT v. Alcuaz, G.R. No.
84818, December 18,1989.
Q. Police officer Torcita was charged on twelve counts of conduct
unbecoming an officer. The twelve counts were dismissed but he was
convicted of Simple Irregularity in the Performance of Duty of having
alcohol in his breath. Proper?
A. No. While the definition of the more serious offense is broad,
and almost all-encompassing, a finding of guilt for an offense, no matter
how light, for which one is not properly charged and tried cannot be
countenanced without violating the rudimentary requirements of due
process. Summary Dismissal Board v. Torcita, G.R. No. 130442, April
6,2000.
NOTE: See also cases on schools under Article XIV, Section 4.
Q. What kind of due process is required in deportation
proceedings?
A. Although deportation proceedings are not criminal in nature,
the consequences can be as serious as those of a criminal prosecution.
The provisions in the Rules of Court for criminal cases are applicable.
Lao Gi alias Chia, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 81789, December
29,1989.
Substantive due process
Q. When do laws which interfere with life, liberty, or property satisfy
substantive due process?
A. To justify the State in interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it must
appear, (1) that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished
from those of a particular class, require such interference; and, (2) that
the means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the
purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. The legislature
may not, under the guise of protecting the public interest, arbitrarily
interfere with private business or impose unusual and unnecessary
restrictions upon lawful occupations. United States v. Toribio, 15 Phil. 85
(1910).
Sec. 1
ART. Ill - BILL OF RIGHTS
33
Q. Is the requirement of substantive due process a rigid concept?
A. Definitely not. The heart of substantive due process is the requirement of
"reasonableness," or absence of exercise of arbitrary power. These are
necessarily relative concepts which depend on the circumstances of
every case.
Q. What is the presumption when the State acts to interfere with life, liberty, or
property?
A. Generally, the presumption is that the action is valid. (In rare cases, however,
as in the imposition of "prior restraint," to be discussed under Section 4,
there is a presumption of invalidity).
Q. Is the allowable scope of reasonable interference with property the same as
that with life or liberty?
A. No. See Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization v. Philippine
Blooming Mills, supra. Rarely has a law interfering merely with property
rights been declared unconstitutional.
Q. Ordinance No. 4964 of Manila reads: "It shall be prohibited for
any operator of any barber shop to conduct the business of massaging
customers or other persons in any adjacent room or rooms of said
barber shop, or in any room or rooms within the same building where
the barber shop is located as long as the operator of the barber shop
and the rooms where massaging is conducted is the same person." Does
this amount to deprivation of property without due process?
A. No. This is valid exercise of police power, under the general
welfare clause, for the protection of morals. Velasco v. Mayor Villegas,
G.R. No. 24153, February 14,1983.
Q. In an effort to curb immorality, the city of Manila passed an ordinance
which disallows "the operation of sauna parlors, massage : parlors,
karaoke bars, beerhouses, night clubs, day clubs, super clubs,
discotheques, cabarets, dance halls, motels and inns in the Ermita- Malate
area. Valid?
A. Conceding for the nonce that the Ermita-Malate area teems
with houses of ill-repute and establishments of the like which the City
Council may lawfully prohibit, it is baseless and insupportable to bring
within that classification sauna parlors, massage parlors, karaoke bars,
night dubs, day clubs, super clubs, discotheques, cabarets, dance halls,
motels and inns. This is not warranted under the accepted definitions of
these terms. The enumerated establishments are lawful pursuits which
are not per se offensive to the moral welfare
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of the community. City of Manila v. Judge Laguio, G.R. No. 118127, April
12,2005.
A Manila ordinance prohibits motels, etc. from offering shorttime admission, as well as pro-rated or "wash up" rates for such
abbreviated stays. The ordinance was invalidated as violative of the
right to property of motel operators (as in the Laguio case) and of liberty
of potential clients. The hotel operators were allowed to raise the issue
of liberty of clients by appealing to "third party standing." White Light
Corp v. City of Manila, G.R. No. 122846, January 20, 2009.
Q. An Executive Order issued by President Marcos read:
"Executive Order No. 626 is hereby amended such that henceforth, no carabao regardless of age, sex, physical condition or purpose
and no carabeef shall be transported from one province to another. The
carabao or carabeef transported in violation of this Executive Order as
amended shall be subject to confiscation and forfeiture..
The original Executive Order was for prohibiting the slaughter of
carabaos, except under certain conditions, for the purpose of preserving
them for the benefit of small farmers. Is the amendment valid?
A. No. Outright confiscation is not reasonably related to the
purpose. Moreover, it is unduly oppressive. The owner of the property
is denied the opportunity to be heard and the property is immediately
confiscated and distributed. Ynot v. Intermediate Court of Appeals, 148
SCRA 659 (1987).
Q. May the state prohibit candidates for board examinations from
attending review classes or similar exercises?
A. The Court said that the rule of the Professional Regulatory
Commission which restricts reviewees from attending review classes,
briefing conferences or the like, and receiving any hand out, review
material, etc. was unreasonable and arbitrary and violative of the
academic freedom of schools. Lupangco v. Court of Appeals, 160 SCRA
848(1988).
Q. The City of Butuan issues an ordinance prescribing that
children between the ages of 7 and 12 should be charged only half the
admission price in movie houses. Is this a valid exercise of police power?
A. No. For the benefit of parents then the cost is passed on to
cinema owners. There is no discernible relation between the ordinance
and the promotion of public health, safety, morals, and the general
welfare. Balacuit v. Court of First Instance, 163 SCRA 182 (1988).
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ART. Ill - BILL OF RIGHTS
35
NOTE: A Texas statute making it a crime for two persons of the
same sex to engage in certain intimate sexual conduct was held to
violate the Due Process Clause. Petitioners were free as adults to engage in
private conduct in the exercise of their liberty under the Due Process
Clause. Lawrence v. Texas, Decided June 26,2003.
Equal protection
Q. What is the meaning of "equal protection of the law?"
A. The equal protection clause is a specific constitutional guarantee of the
Equality of the Person. The equality it guarantees is legal equality or, as it
is usually put, the equality of all persons before the law. Under it, each
individual is dealt with as an equal person in the law, which does not treat
the person differently because of who he is or what he is or what he
possesses. The goddess of justice is portrayed with a blindfold, not
because she must be hindered in seeing where the right lies, but that she
may not discriminate against suitors before her, dispensing instead an
even handed justice to all."
Q. Does equal protection prohibit classification?
A. No, but the classification must be reasonable. And the classification, to be
reasonable, (1) must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) must be germane
to the purpose of the law; (3) must not be limited to existing conditions
only; and (4) must apply equally to all members of the same class. People
v. Cayat, 68 Phil. 12,18 (1939).
Q. R.A- 7227 is challenged as violative equal protection because it
grants tax and duty incentives only to businesses and residents within
the "secured area" of the Subic Special Economic Zone and denying
them to those who live within the Zone but outside such "fenced-in"
territory. Decide.
A. The Constitution does not require absolute equality among
residents. The real concern of RA 7227 is to convert the lands formerly
occupied by the US military bases into economic or industrial areas. In
furtherance of such objective, Congress deemed it necessary to extend
economic incentives to attract and encourage investors, both local and
foreign. Tiu v. court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127410, January 20,1999.
Q. Filipino teachers in the International School challenge the
legality of the school's practice of giving higher pay for foreign hires than
Fililipinos of equal rank. Is the practice constitutional?
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A. No. The principle of "equal pay for equal work" requires that
persons who work with substantially equal qualifications, skill, effort
and responsibility, under similar conditions, should be paid similar
salaries. While we recognize the need of the School to attract foreignhires, salaries should not be used as an enticement to the prejudice of
local-hires. The dislocation factor and limited tenure affecting foreignhires are adequately compensated by certain benefits accorded them
which are not eqjoyed by local-hires, such as housing, transportation,
shipping costs, taxes and home leave travel allowances. International
School Alliance of Educators v. Quisumbing, G.R. No. 128845, June 1,
2000.
Q. Petitioners theorize that Section 44 of RA 8189 is violative of
the "equal protection clause" because it singles out the City and
Municipal Election Officers of the COMELEC as prohibited from holding
office in the same city or municipality for more than four (4) years.
Valid?
A. Yes. The singling out of election officers in order to "ensure the
impartiality of election officials by preventing them from developing
familiarity with the people of their place of assignment" justifies the
distinction. De Guzman, Jr., et al. v. Comelec, G.R. No. 129118, July 19,
2000.
Q. A law prescribes that an appointive official who files a
certificate of candidacy is considered resigned. The law does not apply to
elective officials. Valid?
A. Yes. Appointive officials and elective officials do not belong to
the same class. Farinas et al. v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 147387,
December 10, 2003; Quinto v. Comelec, G.R. No. 189698, December 1,
2009.
Q. A law provides that "In case of termination of overseas
employment without just, valid or authorized cause as defined by law or
contract, the workers shall be entitled to the full reimbursement of his
placement fee with interest of twelve percent (12%) per annum, plus
his salaries for the unexpired portion of his employment contract or for
three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is
less." Other employees, however, are given full coverage for the
unexpired term. Valid?
A. It is discriminatory against overseas workers in a matter
involving fundamental right. Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Service, G.R.
No. 167614, March 24,2009.
Q. Executive Order No. 1 created the Truth Commission with
power to investigate graft and corruption committed during the Arroyo
administration. Valid.
Sec. 1
ART. Ill - BILL OF RIGHTS
37
A. No. It violates equal protection for focusing only of what
happened during the arroyo administration. Biraogo v. Truth
Commission, G.R. No. 192935, December 7,2010. See dissents.
NOTE: A different tax treatment for new brands of cigarettes was
justified on the basis of practicality and efficiency. That is, since the new
brands were not yet in existence at the time of the passage of RA 8240,
then Congress needed a uniform mechanism to fix the tax bracket of a
new brand. It is argued that the freeze provision violates the equal
protection and uniformity of taxation clauses because other brands are
taxed based on their 1996 net retail prices while new cigarette brands
are taxed based on their present day net retail prices. The Court said
that since this is not a case which involves suspect classification nor
impinges on fundamental rights, the rational test basis is what is
applicable. It has been held that "in the areas of social and economic
policy, a statutory classification that neither proceeds along suspect lines
nor infringes constitutional rights must be upheld against equal
protection challenge if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts
that could provide a rational basis for the classification." British American
Tobacco v. Camacho, G.R. No. 163583, April 15,2009. Reconsideration.
Q. Can a provision of law, initially valid, become subsequently
unconstitutional, on the ground that its continued operation would
violate the equal protection of the law?
A. Yes. E.g., with the passage of the subsequent laws amending
the charter of seven (7) other governmental financial institutions (GFIs)
removing limitations on employees, the continued operation of the
limitation on Central Bank employees under Section 15(c), Article II of
the Central Bank law constitutes invidious discrimination on the 2,994
rank-and-file employees of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP). This is a
case of relative unconstitutionality. Central Bank Employees v. Bangko
Sentral. G.R. No. 148208, December 15, 2004 (See dissents).
Q. What does the new Constitution say about equal rights for
women?
A. See Article II, Section 14.
Q. Does PT&Ts company policy of not accepting or considering as
disqualified from work any woman worker who contracts marriage
violate women's right against discrimination afforded by the
Constitution?
A. Yes. Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Company v. NLRC, G.R. No.
118978, May 23,1997,272 SCRA 596.
38
THE 1987 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION:
A COMPREHENSIVE REVIEWER
Sec. 13
Q. The following disqualification for local elective office found in
Batas Big. 52, section 4, is challenged as discriminatory:
Any retired elective provincial, city or municipal official who has
received payment of retirement benefits to which he is entitled under
the law and who shall have been 65 years of age at the commencement
of the term of office to which he seeks to be elected, shall not be
qualified to run for the same elective local office from which he has
retired.
A. The provision satisfies all the requirements of valid
classification. Dumlao v. COMELEC, 95 SCRA 392, January 22,1980.
Q. A law is passed prohibiting women from becoming licensed
bartenders. Valid?
A. The object of the law is to protect the morals of women. The
physical and psychological differences between men and women make the
distinction reasonably related to the valid purpose. Goesart v. Cleary,
335 U.S. 464 (1948).
Q. A law is passed prohibiting women from becoming teachers.
Valid?
A. No. The distinction between men and women serves no valid
purpose.
Q. A law is passed requiring courts to give free transcript of
records to indigent litigants. Valid?
A. Yes. The classification serves to equalize opportunities in courts
between rich and poor.
Q. A law is passed prohibiting indigents from running for public
office. Valid?
A. No. The discrimination against indigents serves no valid
purpose.
Q. Ormoc City imposes a tax on Ormoc Sugar Central by name.
Ormoc Sugar Central is the only sugar central in Ormoc City. Valid?
A. No. Should another sugar centred arise in Ormoc City, the
ordinance would be discriminatory against Ormoc Sugar Central which
alone comes under the ordinance. Ormoc Sugar Central v. Ormoc City, L23794, February 17,1968.
Q. P.D. 1486 creating the Sandiganbayan is challenged as violative
of the equal protection clause because rights under it, such as the right
to appeal to the Supreme Court, are less than in other proceedings.
Decide.
A. The question here is whether those coming under the special
compass of the Sandiganbayan merit special classification. The
Sec. 1
ART. Ill - BILL OF RIGHTS
39
constitutional call for the creation of the Sandiganbayan is a call for a
special solution to a special problem. It is already a recognition that
dishonesty in public service is a valid basis for classification. The
Constitution's call for this special court prevails over general provisions
of the Bill of Rights. Nunez v. Sandiganbayan, 111 SCRA 433, Januaiy 30,
1982. Makasiar, J. filed an extensive dissent which is worth studying.
Q. A law provides that a police officer under investigation may be
preventively suspended beyond the usual 90 days and until the case is
decided. Does the law deny equal protection to police officers?
A. The special law for police officers is justified by their status. In
upholding the provision the Court said that the "reason why members
of the PNP are treated differently from the other classes of persons
charged criminally or administratively insofar as the application of the
rule on preventive suspension is concerned is that policemen carry
weapons and the badge of the law which can be used to harass or
intimidate witnesses against them, as succinctly brought out in the
legislative discussions." Himagan v. People, 237 SCRA 538, 551 (1994).
Q. Does the equal protection clause merely prohibit the State
from passing discriminatory laws?
A. No. The clause also commands the State to pass laws which
positively promote equality or reduce existing inequalities.
SEC. 2. THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE TO BE SECURE IN THEIR PERSONS,
HOUSES , PAPERS, AND EFFECTS AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND SEIZURES OF
WHATEVER NATURE AND FOR ANY PURPOSE SHALL BE INVIOLABLE , AND NO SEARCH WARRANT OR
WARRANT OF ARREST SHALL ISSUE EXCEPT UPON PROBABLE CAUSE TO BE DETERMI N E D
PERSONALLY BY THE JUDGE AFTER EXAMINATION UNDER OATH OR AFFIRMATION OF THE
COMPLAINANT AND THE WITNESSES HE MAY PRODUCE , AND PARTICULARLY DESCRIBING THE
PLACE TO BE SEARCHED AND THE PERSONS OR THINGS TO BE SEIZED.
Q. What is the purpose of this provision?
A. The purpose of the provision is to protect the privacy and sanctity of the
person and of his house and other possessions against arbitrary
intrusions by State officers.
Q. Does the provision prohibit all searches and seizures? A. No. What it
prohibits are Unreasonable searches and seizures."