The Jungle and Meat Inspection Act Case Study Questions
1. Was federal regulation of the meat industry needed in 1906? Why or why not?
Yes, it was. Despite how Sinclair’s accounts in The Jungle likely were exaggerations, it
was found that many large meatpacking companies were selling outdated and spoiled
products as well as providing poor and unsanitary working conditions to their employees.
The companies themselves were not planning to do anything about it, so federal
intervention was necessary in order for rectification.
2. Why couldn’t the meat industry self-regulate?
Prior to the discoveries of the Neill-Reynolds commission, the meat industry likely knew
about its unsanitary products and work environments. Self-regulation of something
unknown to the public would have simply been a waste of money (wasted costs to
acquire spoiled meat, costs to dispose of spoiled meat, costs of sanitation upkeep, etc.).
After the discoveries of the commission, President Roosevelt rejected meatpackers’ offer
to self-regulate. He instead called for regulations backed by legislation so that the wrongs
committed by meatpackers would not happen again.
3. Why couldn’t the states take charge of any necessary regulation?
The meats were considered interstate commerce, and by the ruling in Gibbons v. Ogden,
states cannot regulate interstate commerce; only the federal government can.
4. Prior to 1906, did big meatpacking companies support or oppose mandatory federal
regulation?
Prior to the proposed Beveridge amendment in 1906, large meatpacking companies
supported federal regulation. They hoped a federal stamp of approval on their product
would ensure European customers that their meat did not contain any diseases and that
this would lead to the lifting of the European embargo on American processed meats.
5. How did meatpacking companies get what they wanted? What did George Stigler
say about how industrial interests get regulators to do what they want?
One component of Stigler’s theory of regulatory capture is that industries will seek
political power in order to sway regulation to favor them. Meatpacking companies were
able to get what they wanted because they had powerful friends and representatives in
Congress (Wadsworth and Lorimer were former cattle herders and representatives of the
Chicago meatpacking industry). These people were able to deter federal attempts at
regulation (such as when Roosevelt initially compromised by agreeing to
Wadsworth-Lorimer rather than the Beveridge amendment).
6. What changed in 1906? Why did Stigler’s theory of regulatory capture appear to
break down? Does this breakdown appear in all contexts, or just some?
The representatives of the meatpacking companies were not present in Congress at the
time. It became evident that a majority of Congress was not interested in meatpacker
interests. Modifications to Wadsworth-Lorimer that increased the regulation of
meatpacking companies were added. More compromises were made later when
Wadsworth and Lorimer returned and denounced the new changes.
7. What was the role played by the press? Why did muckraking arise when it did?
The press sensationalized the issues presented by the meatpacking industry and spread it
to the public (the stories of embalmed meats during the Spanish-American war, claims
from The Jungle, leakage of Neill-Reynolds in the New York Times). This increased
public sentiment for regulation of meatpacking. Muckraking arose during this time
because of the increased access to more modern printing equipment. Progressive
crusaders were able to spread the alarming discoveries of investigative journalism to new
and wider audiences.