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C ontents
Your guide to Paper 2
1
Introduction
7
1
The Algerian War: Guerrilla war and decolonization
Exam-style questions and fur ther reading
16
36
Skills section: Understanding the question
37
2
39
The Falklands/Malvinas War: The failure of diplomacy
Exam-style questions and fur ther reading
3
The Vietnam War: Revolutionary war in Indo-China
Exam-style questions and fur ther reading
56
57
81
Skills section: Structuring your essay
82
4
84
The Spanish Civil War: Ideology and conict in the 20th century
Exam-style questions and fur ther reading
5
The First World War: Total war
Exam-style questions and fur ther reading
Skills section: Writing introductions and conclusions
6
106
148
149
The Second World War in Europe and Nor th Africa:
A return to total war
Exam-style questions and fur ther reading
7
105
The Second World War in the Pacic: Total war
Exam-style questions and fur ther reading
150
196
197
226
Skills section: Using the markbands
227
Conclusion
229
Index
232
v
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prescribed
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wars
Prescribed content
●
Economic, ideological, political, territorial and other causes
●
Shor t- and long-term causes
●
Types of war: civil wars; wars between states; guerrilla wars
●
Technological developments; theatres of war – air, land and sea
●
The extent of the mobilization of human and economic resources
●
The inuence and/or involvement of foreign powers
●
The successes and failures of peace making
●
Territorial changes
●
Political repercussions
●
Economic, social and demographic impact; changes in the role and status of women
impact on the outcome
Eects of war
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3
Pa p e r
2
Essay skills
Understanding
and
a
examiner
the
focus
looks
for.
of
a
question
There
are
is
vital
usually
as
two
this
or
is
three
one
of
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focus
skills
words
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question.
The
focus
words
are
identied
in
the
examples
below:
Example 1
Evaluate the signicance of economic factors in the rise to power of one
th
century authoritarian leader.
20
The question is asking about the impor tance of economic issues and crises in the
rise to power of an authoritarian leader.
A good answer would be expected to include a range of factors (popularity, threat
of force and weakness of existing political system) not just economic factors,
before making a judgment on the impor tance of economic factors in the rise to
power of the chosen leader.
Example 2
The outcome of Civil war is often decided by the actions of Foreign powers. To
what extent do you agree with this statement with reference to t wo civil wars
each chosen from dierent regions.
The question is asking you to consider whether the end of civil wars is usually
decided by foreign powers. Again you should consider a range of factors relevant
to your chosen examples. It is quite possible that the statement applies to one of
them but not the other.
Example 3
Evaluate the social and economic challenges facing one newly independent
state and how eectively they were dealt with.
The question is asking you to do two things – identify social and economic
problems and then assess the success and failures of attempts to solve
those problems.
The
tell
command
you
that
“the
the
4
what
you
term
you
tells
have
understand
demands
of
markbands
the
for
you
to
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write
of
these
question
Paper
2.
you
about.
are
and
have
to
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it
you
do
will
understood ”
and
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show
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the
focus
your
the
phrase
words
answers
examiner
that
is
that
used
in
Y O U R
G U I D E
T O
P A P E R
2
Markbands
Marks
Level descriptor
0
Answers do not reach a standard described by the descriptors below.
1–3
There is little understanding of the demands of the question. The response is poorly structured or, where there
is a recognizable essay structure, there is minimal focus on the task .
Little knowledge of the world history topic is present.
The student identies examples to discuss, but these examples are factually incorrect, irrelevant or vague.
The response contains little or no critical analysis. The response may consist mostly of generalizations and
poorly substantiated asser tions.
4–6
The response indicates some understanding of the demands of the question. While there may be an attempt
to follow a structured approach, the response lacks clarity and coherence.
Knowledge of the world history topic is demonstrated, but lacks accuracy and relevance. There is a supercial
understanding of historical context.
The student identies specic examples to discuss, but these examples are vague or lack relevance.
There is some limited analysis, but the response is primarily narrative or descriptive in nature rather than
analytical.
7–9
The response indicates an understanding of the demands of the question, but these demands are only
par tially addressed. There is an attempt to follow a structured approach.
Knowledge of the world history topic is mostly accurate and relevant. Events are generally placed in their
historical context.
The examples that the student chooses to discuss are appropriate and relevant. The response makes links
and/or comparisons (as appropriate to the question).
The response moves beyond description to include some analysis or critical commentary, but this is not sustained.
10–12
The demands of the question are understood and addressed. Responses are generally well structured and
organized, although there is some repetition or lack of clarity in places.
Knowledge of the world history topic is mostly accurate and relevant. Events are placed in their historical
context, and there is some understanding of historical concepts.
The examples that the student chooses to discuss are appropriate and relevant, and are used to suppor t the
analysis/evaluation. The response makes eective links and/or comparisons (as appropriate to the question).
The response contains critical analysis, which is mainly clear and coherent. There is some awareness and
evaluation of dierent perspectives. Most of the main points are substantiated and the response argues to a
consistent conclusion.
13–15
Responses are clearly focused, showing a high degree of awareness of the demands and implications of the
question. Responses are well structured and eectively organized.
Knowledge of the world history topic is accurate and relevant. Events are placed in their historical context,
and there is a clear understanding of historical concepts.
The examples that the student chooses to discuss are appropriate and relevant, and are used eectively to support
the analysis/evaluation. The response makes eective links and/or comparisons (as appropriate to the question).
The response contains clear and coherent critical analysis. There is evaluation of dierent perspectives, and
this evaluation is integrated eectively into the answer. All, or nearly all, of the main points are substantiated,
and the response argues to a consistent conclusion.
5
Pa p e r
2
Common weaknesses in exam answers
Many
answers
answers
the
tell
demonstrate
the
knowledge
higher
Other
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lack
These
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Writing good essays
Good
essays
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combination
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three
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focus
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6
essay
your
and
on
information
book.
on
essay
skills
can
be
found
in
the
Skills
sections
throughout
I N T R O D U C T I O N
“It
is
well
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war
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Rober t E Lee
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7
C A U S E S
A N D
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O F
20 T H - C E N T U R Y
throughout
elite
in
their
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Prussia
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markbands.
themes
also
range
be
extended
answer
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and
history
Meaningful
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and
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warfare
examination
cover
is
in
concepts
immediate
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comparison.
elements
discussed
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it
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candidates
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from
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out
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format
marked
available
2
questions
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topic.
response
markbands
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24
each
questions,
the
answer
minutes
of
your
for
or
on
15
to
using
pre-set
teacher.
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the
relating
ve
to
minutes
the
topics
of
●
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the
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question.
each
in
the
your
reading
you
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command
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time
terms
out
to
consider
all
the
questions
studied.
of
the
the
key
question.
terms
and
be
sure
to
address
response.
13
C A U S E S
A N D
E F F E C TS
O F
20 T H - C E N T U R Y
●
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each
below)
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the
response.
differing
where
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a
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thesis
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historical
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disciplined
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each
completed
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the
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90
back
to
the
thesis/question.
events
allocation.
minutes.
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as
possible.
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leaves
exam
is
designed
approximately
45
to
be
minutes
for
response.
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each
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applicable.
use
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historical
simply
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In
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simply
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tell
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historical
story.
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events
question.
Historiography
Historiography
refers
accumulated
body
encompasses
schools
School,
as
historical
well
event
as
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said,
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not,
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of
of
weaknesses?
reected
way
It
Annales
name-dropping.
used
the
Understanding
“historiography”.
this
is
the
to
interpretations
and
argument.
in
and
given
as
some
major
your
your
historiography
way
the
that
any
such
historians.
requirement
requirement
only
on
strengths
mention
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of
history
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perspectives,
I N T R O D U C T I O N
Command terms
Command
the
task.
terms
Here
are
are
the
the
Command term
parts
of
command
a
question
terms
that
used
in
tell
the
you
IB
the
nature
history
of
course:
Task
Analyse
Break down in order to bring out the essential elements
or structure.
Compare
Give an account of the similarities between two (or
more) items or situations, referring to both (all) of them
throughout.
Contrast
Give an account of the dierences between two (or
more) items or situations, referring to both (all) of them
throughout.
Discuss
Oer a considered and balanced review that includes
a range of arguments, factors or hypotheses. Opinions
or conclusions should be presented clearly and suppor ted
by appropriate evidence.
Make an appraisal by weighing up the strengths and
limitations.
Examine
To what extent
L TA
Evaluate
Thinking skills
Use each of the command
Consider an argument or concept in a way that uncovers
terms in the table to write
the assumptions and interrelationships of the issue.
extended response questions
Consider the merits or otherwise of an argument or
concept. Opinions and conclusions should be presented
clearly and suppor ted with appropriate evidence and
for the material in this chapter.
Share your questions with other
classmates to answer each
other ’s questions.
sound argument.
Fur ther reading
Black,
Jeremy.
Edited
by
Clausewitz,
Howard
Dyer,
London,
Tsu.
Oxford
“What
Swanson,
von.
Peter
Gwynne.
2004.
Edited
Wars?”
On
War.
Princeton
War:
2005.
by
Wins
p.143–148.
1976.
Paret.
Thomas.
History.
Sun
Carl
and
Palaima,
in
2005.
Harriet
The
“Why
Harriet
in
Big
Edited
and
University
New
Do
Edition.
Wars
Swanson,
Questions
Jonathan
Cape.
in
translated
Press.
Begin?”
by
House.
in Big
UK.
Michael
Princeton,
Random
p.129–134.
History.
London,
USA.
Canada.
Questions
Jonathan
Cape.
UK.
1971
The
University
Townsend,
University
Art
Charles.
Press.
of
Press.
War.
Translated
Oxford,
2005.
Oxford,
The
by
Samuel
B.
Grifth.
UK.
Oxford
History
of
Modern
War.
Oxford
UK.
15
1
THE
A LG E R I A N
WA R
AND
WA R :
GUERRILLA
D E C O L O N I Z AT I O N
Global context
The
Algerian
of
20th-century
a
many
the
War
signicant
war
policies
was
of
historic
partially
France
relationship
1954–1962,
guerrilla
between
decolonization
a
and
and
as
war,
such
to
in
the
helps
nationalism,
warfare
with
example
developments.
response
as
an
the
wars
colonial
the
imperialism,
20th
profound
In
strategy
First,
illustrate
its
France.
highlights
century
and
type
for
in
of
this
and
tactics
both
so
effects
section
the
doing
warfare
on
we
involved
guerrilla
explore
for
both
also
all
in
and
the
those
Algeria
examine
ghting
regular
brutal
and
the
guerrilla
forces,
nature
involved,
of
this
including
non-combatants.
Timeline
1945
VE Day celebration riots and massacres
May
1954
November
FLN launches rst coordinated attacks
1955
Philippeville massacre
August
1956
September
Battle of Algiers begins
FLN leaders, including Ben Bella, taken
October
from airliner and imprisoned
1958
Battle of the Frontiers
January–July
Pied-noir protesters storm
May
government oces
De Gaulle comes to power and visits
June
Algeria
September
French Fifth Republic declared
FLN forms government in exile
November
General Challe takes command of French
December
troops in Algeria
16
C H A P T E R
1 :
T H E
A L G E R I A N
W A R :
G U E R R I L L A
W A R
A N D
D E C O L O N I Z A T I O N
1959
De Gaulle calls for self-determination
September
in Algeria
19 60
Week of the Barricades; OAS begins terror
January
campaign
19 61
The Generals’ Putsch
April
French cease oensive operations;
May
FLN does not
FLN and French government negotiate
19 61–19 62
at Evian
19 62
March
Ceasere declared
France ocially recognizes the
July
independence of Algeria
▲
Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) ghters captured by Foreign Legion troops
17
1.1
Guerrilla war
Conceptual understanding
Key questions
➔
How does guerrilla war dier from conventional war?
➔
What factors lead a movement to use guerrilla war?
➔
What challenges does guerrilla war pose for occupying forces?
Key concepts
➔
Change
➔
Perspective
What is guerrilla warfare?
The
term
was
originally
of
Spain
“guerrilla”
in
involved
Tactical,
refers
workers
are
one
nor
both
appear
The
very
the
on
and
until
the
the
a
and
an
are
are
and
not
ghters
to
for
all
“little
involves
closely
war”
Napoleon’s
established
restrict
regular
in
its
of
nal
the
related
and
occupation
irregular
regular
forces
army.
in
and
soldiers
They
most
the
Such
phases
end
as
grows
ghters
Mao’s
“hit
of
the
a
and
model
the
case
size
Guerrilla
run”
grow
and
may
China
or
Algeria,
of
wear
may
in
to
farmers
struggle
process
in
in
belonging
be
base.
movement
was
war
to
as
can
seldom
identiable
guerrilla
by
( FLN)
of
next.
any
guerrilla
stages
recognized
themselves
a
army.
later
Nationale
widely
Guerrilla
in
success,
wrote
varies
depending
20th-century
In
these
Guerrilla
will
cost
or
and
independence
control.
bring
of
voluntary,
the
will
their
the
and
continuum,
sophistication.
however,
revolutionary
war
of
local
This
generally
overall
not
is
no
but
advantage
enjoy
can
a
be
as
is
the
instead
longer
Relying
in
war
as
and
do
not
pushed
European
one
of
endurance
kind
of
decisive
the
on
the
to
and
support,
limitless
a
enemy
benets
the
depending
seemingly
goals.
concentrated
harass
worth
they
political
have
from
strategy
engage
populations
armies
movement’s
movements
demise,
withdraws.
guerrilla
the
liberation,
forces
pursuing
soldiers.
or
on
guerrilla
cases,
about
power
training,
potential
18
generally
armies.
organization
to
the
late
occupying
military
word
resistance
had.
strategy
the
that
coerced
It
goals
that
achieves
Libération
nuisance.
battle
Spanish
with
concentrated
small
and
reach
national
colonial
forces
Zedong
Minh
of
it
small
de
not
Guerrilla
Many
political
they
similar
starts
Viet
century.
struggle
moment
As
Mao
Front
would
the
Spanish
professional
are
strength
Vietnam.
which
to
generally
engagements.
in
and
from
the
19th
ongoing
full-time,
uniforms,
units
early
to
movements.
“Irregular”
or
an
strategic
guerrilla
ofcial,
the
in
comes
applied
logical,
on
formal
supply
of
although
C H A P T E R
awful,
extreme
weaknesses
an
adequate
the
second
supply
half
movements
forces
with
bent
by
on
of
tactics
to
of
from
can
the
be
and
or
tactics,
for
involved.
are
given
munitions
capture
various
by
to
can
the
both
funds
for
weapons.
many
considered
also
operations.
forces
to
a
Chief
difculty
was
often
rather
ironic
among
in
for
of
W A R
the
obtaining
overcome
sponsorship
such
the
to
are
that
bear
on
are
the
one
of
horric
live
in
guerrilla
those
guerrilla
can
for
the
pay
and
just
this
arms
fact,
many
movements
The
Viet
any
operate
especially
to
lead
to
for
obtain
what
governments,
involving
or
Minh,
tribesmen
law,
can
the
from
augment
many
protection
anti-guerrilla
again
of
take
furnish
the
which
size
can
of
Supply
can
by
this
part
market
constrained
support,
the
forces
of
steal
Muong
rings
enemy
can
by
crime
lightly
they
purpose.
occupying
more
activity.
will
what
many
and
small
grown
organized
on
they
units
with
global
illegitimate
on
guerrilla
by
conventional
strengths
atrocities
These
The
key
what
generally
the
indistinguishable
strain
the
of
off
states
are
of
fewer
often
simplied
opium
of
Attacks
strength
suspected
sponsor
really
run
is
forces.
and
law
to
units
schemes
Not
stealth.
population.
Recognizing
access
This
psychological
lead
from
rice
the
soldiers.
is
the
forces
fact,
civilians
forces
movements
restricting
the
in
occupying
sold
and
brought
general
guerrilla
–
before
guerrilla
guerrilla
money-making
liberation
be
This,
receive
example,
on
mobility
guerrilla
the
with
states
withdraw
against
Many
they
from
weapons
drug
on
can
but
child
weapons.
century
population,
force
of
movements
G U E R R I L L A
liberation.
Because
general
logistics
units
modern
wealthier
overwhelming.
regular
conscription
guerrilla
20th
and
enemy
guerrillas.
guerrilla
the
rely
strike
the
of
the
larger,
designed
armed
in
national
Guerrilla
forces
the
inherent
1 . 1 :
tactics
added
and
involve
hardship
non-combatants.
Although
forms
of
guerrilla
war
have
been
practised
since
the
decolonization
19th
century,
it
seemed
to
reach
a
zenith
with
the
victory
of
Mao’s
The global movement in the second
people’s
army
over
the
Chinese
Nationalists
in
1949.
Ever
since
Mao
half of the 20th century toward
so
ably
mobilized
his
initially
meagre
resources
to
conquer
and
rule
independence for territories that had
the
third
largest
country
in
the
world,
using
a
well-honed
model
of
been ruled as colonies of European
revolutionary
war,
independence
movements
have
been
trying
to
states. The movement was especially
emulate
his
example.
This
approach
enjoyed
success
in
the
period
of
prevalent in South Asia and Africa during
mid-20th-century
decolonization
–
a
success
that
has
been
difcult
to
this period. Decolonization could be
duplicate
since.
A
ne
example
of
the
success
of
guerrilla
movements
accomplished by either peaceful or
against
European
colonizers
can
be
found
in
the
Algerian
War
of
violent means.
Independence
often
referred
to
simply
as
the
Algerian
War.
19
1
C A U S E S
A N D
E F F E C TS
O F
20 T H - C E N T U R Y
W A R S
20th-century guerrilla wars
War
Chinese Civil War,
Guerrillas
Communists
Opponents
Nationalists
1922–1949
Result
Communists gained more and more
suppor t, transforming the war into more of a
conventional war. The communists won in 1949.
French Indo-China War,
Viet Minh
France
1945–1954
Vietnam War,
The Viet Minh forced the French colonial
administration to quit the country in 1954.
Viet Cong
1965–1973
USA , South
With the help of regular soldiers from Nor th
Vietnamese army
Vietnam, the Viet Cong were able to force
the USA from the country in 1973 and then
defeated the South Vietnamese army in 1975.
Algerian War,
FLN
France
1954–1962
After a bloody war, Algeria declared
independence in 1962 with the FLN forming
the new government.
Afghan Resistance,
Mujahadeen
USSR
1979–1989
With American aid and after 10 years of
guerrilla ghting, the Mujahadeen forced the
Soviets from Afghanistan. This led to a civil war
between Mujahadeen factions.
Indonesian War of
Republicans
The Netherlands
After four years of negotiation and ghting, the
Independence,
Netherlands recognized the independence of
1945–1949
Indonesia.
Mau Mau Uprising (Kenya),
Mau Maus (KCA)
Great Britain
1952–1960
Although intensely violent, the revolt collapsed.
Eventually the British administration would
recognize an independent Kenya.
Malaysian Insurgency,
MNL A
Britain
1948–1957
The guerrilla campaign was not widely
suppor ted and was defeated by the British
army. Britain recognized an independent
Malaysia of its own accord in 1957.
Cuban Revolution,
26th July
Cuban national
After a progressively more successful military
1957–1959
Movement
army
campaign, Castro’s guerrillas were able to force
the surrender of the government forces.
20
1.2
Causes of the Algerian War
Conceptual understanding
Key questions
➔
What role did socio-economic conditions play in the causes of the war?
➔
What inuence did the French defeat in Indo-China have on the outbreak
of the Algerian War?
Key concepts
➔
Cause
➔
Consequence
➔
Perspective
Long-term causes
Algeria
had
military
and
more
take
become
campaigns
control
advantage
governments
culturally,
of
it
also
and
and
meant
while
that
the
by
Muslims
in
the
to
10%
daily
the
of
by
many
the
the
pied
ways,
resistance
and
the
The
rst
two
the
at
feared
of
world
wars.
reject
On
the
the
for
of
the
20th
a
the
with
rate.
With
by
a
of
systems
that
a
had
century.
on
process
military
Some
French
campaigns
European
Algeria
nine
twice
the
was
illnesses,
declining
inequalities
population
million
that
birth
rate
in
was
Algerian
number
country
inequalities
lay
in
were
ten
the
the
hands
made
worse
times
coming
lower,
years.
In
disenfranchisement
cause
expose
French
a
and
the
of
the
Algerian
of
as
these
as
to
brought
society
to
occupation
wars
government
desire
a term given to French settlers and
descendants of French settlers in Algeria.
French
well
pied noirs
Literally meaning “black feet”, it was
War
employed.
defeat
was
the
As
to
French
investment,
attacks
Muslim
the
came
regime.
poverty,
tactics
would
the
of
long-term
consequence
there
19th
of
Muslims
colonization,
both
and
Economic
of
economic
century
social
of
wealth
overrun
as
late
colonial
among
humiliating
hand,
and
the
guerrilla
impulses
one
values
birth
seen
and
The
contradictory
large.
be
the
victory
the
75%
These
being
pattern
can
increasing.
settlers
France.
of
more
Successive
accompanying
people,
of
of
technology
the
series
administratively
part
population
with
out,
90%
both
a
exerted
European
guerrilla-style
its
native
through
France
combination
with
was
of
integral
with
The
million
Muslim
rationale
half
a
Over
population.
this
and
broke
Algeria
an
As
opportunities.
throughout
settlers.
the
oods
job
Unemployment
over
high
noirs
disastrous
settlers
it
possession
1840s.
European
discontent
war
underemployed.
of
more
population
Arabic.
ran
make
1870s
Muslim
time
illiterate
assimilate
settlement,
the
settler
and
assimilation
European
aggravated
By
more
the
and
territory,
land
to
brought
European
the
to
colonial
1830s
the
cheap
aimed
resisted
the
over
of
attracted
troops
French
the
attempting
assimilation
natives
a
in
break
France
was
and
to
the
the
a
the
reected
French
with
both
in
in
society
past
brink
and
of
21
1
C A U S E S
A N D
E F F E C TS
O F
20 T H - C E N T U R Y
destruction.
and
power
evident
desire
to
A
in
to
French
Tunisia
any
to
and
for
a
The
The French government from 1946 to
deep
in
1958. It was created by a constitution
Marshall
after the Second World War.
would
political
a
Aid
a
plunging
prots
be
for
war
of
from
other
were
against
of
little
friction
ferocity
that
in
a
the
which
clear
no
War
were
era.
The
independence
holdings
saw
mid-1950s.
the
and
in
vision
less
and
She
Republic
after
forced
French
Algeria.
was
than
close
20
into
would
ended.
to
both
In
to
different
be
On
strictures
–
France
while
faced
the
French
money
–
aid
stumbled
to
fund
another
hand,
the
blood,
of
an
war
potential
governments;
and
on
that
strikes,
trying
with
one
a
Dependent
debilitating
the
the
in
its
recovery
all
reected
liberation.
ination,
growth,
had
with
by
Fourth
years
high
cost,
granting
inuence
1954.
tempting
the
World
economic
sluggish
glory,
impulses
the
guided
the
10
eventual
the
Algeria
weighed
the
Indo-China.
as
the
the
post-Second
in
scene
to
typied
perpetual
and
the
policy
1945
in
recapture
contradictory
Indo-Chinese
political
years
her
in
soon
her
reconstruction
exports
as
of
in
in
to
These
relatively
seen
colonial
that
desire
manifest
with
malaise
period
escalating
to
chaos
a
France.
policy
was
control
the
underpin
almost
past
fractured
in
economic
in
also
was
Morocco
the
governments
Four th Republic
past
coherent
impossible
was
colonial
the
maintain
case,
along
there
19th-century
reject
longing
tried
But
of
W A R S
this
had
keeping
it.
Shor t-term causes
The
end
of
the
immediate
outbreak
Second
cause
nine
years.
May
1945
When
This
the
the
pieds
event
and
noirs
War
the
strong
acted
the
as
a
fourth
anticipated
movements,
Manifeste
within
visions
a
It
from
left-wing
that
the
the
fuelled
The
MTLD
led
most
by
older
in
war
by
was,
and
its
Ahmed
of
The
( pied
people
involved
at
the
number
army
–
the
of
in
pieds
of
would
times
be
when
expense
revolting
such
Union
equality
it
of
against
the
1945
the
riots
for
Bella,
law.
the
a
A
the
Ulema,
hybrid
reverence
the
of
for
emerge,
These
of
these
two
Democratic
traditional
from
Organisation
Algerian
du
autonomy
independence
would
for
Democratique
Triumph
aspirations.
conditions
nationalist
and
nationalism,
Islamic
branch
nationalist
a
were
many
complete
Ben
were
French
violence
combined
militant
economic
as
Movement
and
staged
come.
goal.
strand
Nazi
settlers
6,000
become
openly
negotiated
which
agenda
and
to
later,
there
and
of
nationalists
European
interests
point
surrender
government,
there
the
more
the
dead.
would
own
traditional
the
Algerian
poor
the
by
a
preceded
the
weeks
part
providing
it
Algerian
French
brutality
sought
1945,
social
its
as
were
which
one
The
on
–
that
most
method
based
after
FLN,
encompassing
were
by
some
government,
at
of
when
the
movement
expression
(MTLD)
a
(OS)
state.
of
the
and
(UDMA)
statehood
Islam,
was
fractured
French
sides
protecting
orders
nationalist
found
Liberties
22
side,
marking
soldiers
later:
French
viciousness
Algérien
favoured
for
government.
the
Algerian
three
seen
confronted
subsided
nationalists,
the
government’s
metropolitan
The
of
turn
years
Although
arm
in
be
although
violent
French
the
nine
Algerian
organizations.
were
and
can
War,
Celebrations
turned
violence
revealed
Algerian
noirs
and
War
Algerian
in
demonstrations
Muslim,
World
the
by
Germany
noirs).
of
France.
Spécial
eventually
aspirations
Arabs,
income
C H A P T E R
differentials
and
the
accompanying
inaccessibility
1 . 2 :
of
C A U S E S
land
O F
T H E
A L G E R I A N
W A R
ownership.
Class discussion
While
Arab
various
Muslims
Berber
aspirations.
groups
to
Outside
the
to
a
The
the
in
of
in
in
at
nationalists.
the
increase
disaster
at
Dien
the
Unlike
in
the
Viet
the
and,
It
a
interests
Phu,
or
Minh,
timing
in
with
two
the
nationalist
main
nationalist
leadership
of
the
lustre,
that
was
FLN
related? Had there been economic
prosperity across Algerian society, would
there
United
be
after
were
began
the
very
States
possible.
withdrawal
guerrilla-style
FLN
of
plan
French
few
and the French army between March and
attacks
to
Dien Bien Phu
Site of a battle between the Viet Minh
for
a
military
similarities
May 1954. This Viet Minh victory drove
the French from Indo-China and led to the
par tition of the country into Nor th and
South Vietnam.
situations.
the
How are nationalist and economic issues
taken
opportunity
the
shortly
the
might
subsequent
historic
been
outbreak
having
ghting
anything
Algeria,
though
Algerians,
there have been a nationalist movement?
their
a
had
of
these
later,
and
attacks
even
the
grew
present
occupation
of
group
collective
though
there
non-colonial
war.
years
as
Phu
to
Although
in
only
three
of
the
role
Bien
of
important
concept
seemed
seemed
causes
an
the
coordinated
Bien
two
also
example
Dien
French
marked
to
majority
throughout
played
1949
also
the
balance
Mao’s
defeat
throughout
between
also
up
were
led
Korea.
Indo-China
Algerian
●
FLN
1954.
China
French
to
organization
standstill
from
need
inuences
hostilities
control
ethnicities
The
within
guide
made
did
not
have
any
particular
ideological
orientation.
●
While
the
China,
●
While
more
●
●
Minh
FLN
had
Indo-China
difcult
French
were
Viet
the
law
no
Algeria
was
ofce
colonial
and
inefciencies
Nevertheless,
This
it
the
FLN
the
a
start
of
was
a
a
remote
of
a
major
from
part
in
power,
France
Indo-China,
French
of
colony.
There
conscripts
Metropolitan
The
combination
and
thus
war
of
in
no
there
Algeria.
France
Indo-China,
military,
were
but
in
such
foreign
bureaucratic
War.
the
of
of
close.
conscripts
use
ofcials.
judged
the
sponsorship
integral
Algerian
number
of
the
been
by
ofce
the
use
on
an
had
managed
in
conducted
marks
Algeria
the
considered
Indo-China
the
aid.
geographically
restrictions
therefore,
1954
was
such
support,
prohibited
such
was
whereas
to
enjoyed
no
time
to
be
coordinated
Algerian
right
bomb
and
on
attacks
1
November
across
Algeria.
War.
23
1.3
C ombatants
Conceptual understanding
Key questions
➔
What were the relative strengths and weaknesses of the two sides?
➔
What role did foreign powers play in the war?
Key concepts
➔
Signicance
➔
Perspective
The FLN
The
FLN
and
organized
the
commanders
district.
its
This
military
country
in
each
wing
into
six
Wilaya
included
the
military
were
military
Armée
de
Libération
zones
–
responsible
operations,
but
Nationale
Wilayas.
for
all
also
The
FLN
(ALN)
FLN
activity
recruiting,
in
the
political
SPAIN
Philippeville
MEDITERRANEAN
SEA
Tizi
Collo
Ouzou
Böne
Bougie
ALGIERS
W3
La
Calle
Constantine
Tenes
Palestro
A
R
H
A
D
Kabylie
Setif
W2
Sakiet-
Orléansville
Mostaganem
Sidi
Youssef
Rummel
Melouza
IS
EN
RS
A
U
O
Chélif
Oran
Boghari
Batna
Mascara
Tébessa
Nemours
W4
Tiaret
TUNISIA
Sidi
Bel
W1
Abbès
AURÈS
Tlemcen
Biskra
Djelfa
Saïda
Marnia
Nemencha
Thélepte
N
W5
E
I
R
A
H
A
S
Redeyef
S
A
W6
L
T
A
Touggourt
Aïn
Sefra
MOROCCO
0
Approximate
demarcations
Main
between
▲
24
The Algerian War
Wilayas
in
1954
guerrilla
regions
200
km
C H A P T E R
indoctrination,
inghting
these
districts,
structure
for
landscape
The
Central
Wilaya
to
a
these
1954
The
the
further
in
the
would
borders
the
of
end
fractured
of
the
the
its
15
000
leak
the
the
1957
to
20
havens
into
full-time
ghters
Morocco
grew
000
of
Algeria
to
good
were
of
cells.
8,000
When
the
FLN
1959.
reaching
35
the
four-man
as
FLN
by
war
with
the
guerrillas
the
troops
losses
FLN
000
the
each
the
maintained
fell
on
army
war
sealed
strength
heavy
cells,
battalions,
unit
they
the
however,
throughout
The
havens
For
full-time
The
rugged
war
safe
this,
and
French
tribal
of
goals.
dramatically
combat
inicting
by
into
000
guerrillas.
large
Wilayas.
After
15
Morocco
needed.
states,
the
varied
a
times
of
operational
roughly
and
at
these
companies,
common
had
of
and
C O M B A T A N T S
organizational
portion
From
Ethnic
effectiveness
across
and
divided
other
formations
continuously,
effective
activities
operations
around
a
part-time
as
ghting
ung
Morocco.
the
Tunisia
French
fell
fairly
or
an
was
sections,
they
neighbouring
aggressive
spent
most
these
intimidation.
the
composition
ghters
into
the
of
that
both
FLN
and
limited
proved
operations
being
In
in
direct
ghters
FLN.
they
Tunisia
and
attacks
of
often
movement
strength
safe
with
more
the
coordinate
company
progressed.
troops
was
combined
fortunes
in
guerrilla
ignorant
110-man
and
but
assassinations
Wilayas
neighbouring
November
cell
the
Command
in
attempted
each
a
and
sheltering
1
taxation,
within
1 . 3 :
in
and
the
off.
the
With
FLN,
Tunisia
and
1962.
Class discussion
What are the advantages and
disadvantages of having the FLN
leadership located outside Algeria
in Tunisia?
▲
ALN soldiers from Wilaya 4, 1962
legionnaires
Soldiers in the French Foreign Legion,
The French
an elite formation within the French
The
French
outset
stayed
bag.
of
of
the
war,
constant
Elite
the
forces
units
ghting
conscripts
and
in
Algeria
but
for
this
the
such
as
numbered
number
duration
the
strength,
irregular
some
quickly
of
the
the
bulk
formations
of
of
rose
conict.
legionnaires
but
74
and
the
000
to
soldiers
around
The
force
400
was
paratroopers
French
sympathetic
forces
at
the
000
a
mixed
were
were
Algerians
–
army. The Legion, created in the 1830s,
and
the
core
accepts volunteers from foreign states,
but also contains substantial numbers of
French citizens.
reservists,
harkis.
harkis
Algerian Muslims who fought for the
French during the Algerian War.
25
1
C A U S E S
A N D
E F F E C TS
O F
20 T H - C E N T U R Y
Throughout
the
W A R S
war
the
French
had
difculty
manning
its
army
Class discussion
in
Algeria.
Conscription
What may have motivated the harkis to
unpopular
ght for the French against the FLN?
about
and
war.
15%
of
leadership
Increasing
increased
ability
with
the
the
and
their
The
it
size
was
crucial
likely
of
was
the
not
for
but
The
arrogance
constant
on
in
to
and
divide
the
rest
the
morale
of
during
the
its
of
army
the
that
only
quantities.
may
morale
between
an
training
months
for
the
fact
made
sufcient
27
nothing
sharp
and
strain
available
did
so
soldiers
conscripts
it
more
commitment
professional
always
force,
it.
unpopular,
troop
of
service
decreased
a
always
up
and
of
the
attendant
disillusion
of
made
length
size
was
the
have
or
ghting
elite
with
its
French
units
growing
forces.
Ad vantages and disad vantages of conscription
Ad vantages
Disad vantages
Increases the pool from which to draw soldiers
Soldiers may lack motivation
Makes the size of the army predictable
Subjects the military to all the social factions in a country
Can spread the burden of military service across social
Can breed resentment in the population as a whole as a
classes and groups
form of governmental control and interference
Can integrate the military into society more thoroughly
Military losses are felt throughout the population
Increases civic par ticipation and sense of civic
Constant turnover of troops can make training expensive
responsibility
Requires close cooperation between military and civilian
authorities.
Equipment
The FLN
The
FLN
and
weapons
were
hunting
all.
on
the
from
ries
At
While
this
open
form
of
of
After
with
1956
made
the
from
The
the
like
eld
terrorist
Algiers
and
to
–
to
small
weapons
cast-offs,
350
small
them
Algerian
initially
begin
of
grenades
purchase
furnish
French
arms
War
to
with
not
and
about
funds
however,
despite
mostly
Algiers
short
and
efforts
arms
weapons
with
arms.
Muslims
translate
to
stolen
ow
to
from
stop
consequently
and
into
it.
any
Egypt
These
keeping
the
small.
units
of
the
small
Wilayas
arms
bazookas
troops.
Mass
animals,
were
were
light
virtually
transport
small
fairly
including
vehicles
well
equipped
machine
unheard
too
was
and
the
rare,
of
with
age-old
guns.
unless
most
form
of
feet.
activities
required
these
would,
did
bombs
World
kinship
this
war,
the
constantly
war
gun
sponsor
Egypt’s
the
were
the
Second
both
struggle,
even
French
–
in
–
national
of
were
of
machine
lacked
War-era
and
limited
movement
FLN’s
cities
later
ALN,
throughout
sources
Material
regular
captured
a
FLN’s
World
the
outbreak
points
FLN
and
aid.
mortars
of
much
however,
the
arm,
the
occasional
the
market
Artillery,
troop
the
operations
Second
movement
26
variety
sources
FLN
At
various
and
with
armaments,
size
a
at
practical
other
military
kinds.
stage
Nasser
sympathy
and
her
all
assembled
gathered
in
of
were
that
concentrated
different
types
manufactured
of
in
on
urban
ordinance
hidden
targets
that
bomb
in
were
large
used
“factories”.
in
C H A P T E R
1 . 3 :
C O M B A T A N T S
Foreign suppor t for guerrillas
War
Guerrillas
Suppor ter (s)
Algeria
FLN
Egypt
Vietnam
Viet Minh and Viet Cong
USSR, China
Afghanistan
Mujahadeen
USA
Angola
MPL A
Cuba
Nicaragua, 1974–1979
Sandinistas
Cuba
Nicaragua, 1981–1987
Contras
USA
Pakistan
Mukti Bahni
India
The French
The
French
and
they
far
more
Algeria
than
it
had
with
parachute
the
had
in
belly
for
that
that
the
the
help
more
Smaller
support
could
or
days
the
in
French
around
use
in
a
the
the
of
armour
forces
the
Algeria
T-6
to
and
army
arms
terrain
were
of
mechanization
carriers
and
achieved
were
rode
the
into
war
could
truck
to
ground
P-47
in
some
battle
the
shift
respond
provide
Texan
The
there
of
that
Small
Algeria.
was
forces
end
battleeld
could
in
While
modern
and
weapons
Indo-China
By
FLN.
Indo-China.
airborne
gunships
as
in
on
transport.
helicopters
such
well-equipped
French
helicopters.
helicopter
a
bear
half-tracks,
to
lacked
the
of
to
effective
Tanks,
even
aircraft
early
helicopter
of
transport
country
the
French
of
part
implies
available
much
situations.
as
than
far
were
this
troop-carrying
120
the
a
widely
drops,
of
about
around
Algeria
all
Indo-China.
were
mobility
Algeria
in
standardized
allowed
transport
The
units
brought
in
French
troops
emergent
forces
with
Thunderbolts.
27
1.4
Strateg y and tactics
Conceptual understanding
Key questions
➔
How did French strategy change over time? Why did it change?
➔
How did FLN strategy change over the course of the war?
➔
What role did materials play in the strategy of each side?
Key concepts
➔
Continuity
➔
Change
The FLN
As
previously
and
in
survival
the
early
overall
more
civilian
–
FLN’s
both
in
European
FLN
from
civilians
and
effort
stuck
it
French
the
the
not
and
strategy
urban
of
the
the
of
to
marginalize
equally
the
ALN
strategy
was
phases.
to
of
and
the
the
involved
bombing
among
avoid
the
a
sympathetic
Algeria.
This
terror
retaliation,
Muslim
stage
As
administrations
the
inicting
French
alienate
“offensive”
guerrilla
protect
sympathizers
parallel
administered
brutal
further
nor
people
that
administrators.
create
brutal
controlling
outposts
suspected
ghters
dictated
demonstrate
to
French
survives
demonstrations
small
noir
it
FLN
partly
administer
These
targeted
pied
goal
sought
to
would
in
noir.
always
tried
the
reached
guerrilla
FLN
if
equipped
centres
the
with
concerns
attacking
French
succeeds
meagrely
effectively
pied
patrols,
provoke
was
doctrine
armed
did
end
whom
never
movement
the
Material
as
and
believed
as
of
campaigns
the
to
goal
could
Muslim
through
guerrilla
that
coordination
operational
better
To
Terror
leadership
model,
tactics
non-military
far
a
the
war.
population
leaders
worked
The
and
targets.
villages
FLN
the
convoys
Muslim
local
of
administration
ambushing
The
indeed
territory.
population
in
days
strategy
than
French
the
mentioned,
was
of
the
which
the
population.
Mao’s
such,
effort
against
revolutionary
main
confrontation
with
larger,
formations.
The French
French
were
forces
comprised
countless
posts
Algeria
mostly
spread
and
restrict
was
encountered
“paras”
search
FLN
were
modied
28
in
and
of
out
in
across
in
the
destroy
and
strength,
or
divided
reservists
movement
own
later
were
war
in
when
missions.
and
the
mobile
to
two
deal
airborne
main
conscripts
country.
inuence
the
trucked
into
in
their
with
and
These
reserve
forces
elite
deployed
were
If
forces
the
to
This
their
in
observe
enemy
legionnaires
threat.
used
Sector
were
posts
sector.
of
the
types.
and
strategy
mobility
was
during
C H A P T E R
Taking
to
heart
Mao’s
famous
doctrine
that
“the
guerrilla
1 . 4 :
must
S T R A T E G Y
A N D
T A C T I C S
move
Class discussion
amongst
drain
were
areas
the
that
people
sea.
Whole
relocated
now
anyone
to
a
sh
“free
there,
swims
villages
camps.
became
found
as
–
These
re
the
sea”,
eventually
in
that
had
the
to
French
600
villages
which
they
the
some
abandoned
zones”
reasoning
in
000
and
to
Algerians
–
surrounding
French
be
sought
would
re
on
Why do nationalist movements tend to
be fractured? How does this aect the
post-colonial administration of successor
states?
guerrillas.
TOK discussion
To what extent did the French learn from
their experience in Indo-China? What
does this tell us about the degree to
which we learn from history?
▲
French soldiers work with Algerians. Why was it impor tant to the French to work with
Muslim Algerians?
Elaborate
material
defensive
from
the
lines
two
were
designed
neighbouring
to
states
cut
of
the
ow
Morocco
of
men
and
and
Tunisia.
29
1.5
Operations
Conceptual understanding
Key questions
➔
To what extent was the Morice Line eective?
➔
What role did technology play in the French ability to ght the FLN?
➔
What was the signicance of the Battle of Algiers?
➔
What role did terror play in the war?
Key concepts
➔
Continuity
➔
Change
➔
Signicance
1955
The
attacks
and
government
they
failed
Lacking
could
a
of
to
major
supply,
no
such
Algeria
was
bolstered
retaliation
FLN
for
to
of
12
the
was
of
made
on
civilians,
the
by
the
The practice of holding all members of a
FLN
population responsible for the actions of
the
enemy.
a few of its members.
the
violence
30
and
evident
the
principle
city
military
forces
of
obtain
in
of
of
pieds
claimed
estimates.
throughout
was
it
the
was
meted
1,200
had
victims
type
of
war
out
and
by
both
that
sides
was
unit
its
to
and
activities.
fell
an
on
guerrillas
had
left,
retaliation
estimates,
an
example
both
brunt
on
In
pressure
The
discourage
the
the
fell.
FLN
was
by
by
in
civilian
guerrillas
own
adopted
bore
of
the
into
non-combatants
wars
murdered.
by
attacks
brutal
on
deep
emerged
discourage
their
French
and
and
pattern
often
retaliation
designed
civilians
to
that
the
bit
retaliatory
time
been
clear
end,
campaign
guerrilla
a
it
of
French
paratroopers
about
put
the
The
that
success,
for.
state
bombings
made
brutal
It
hoped
a
posts
some
assassination
both
when
By
responsibility
the
a
noirs.
other
1955
noirs,
This
of
provoke
would
pieds
and
such
To
This
information
FLN
the
this
August
collective
Again,
the
so.
wars,
had
1955.
Paris
army
with
the
sending
tactics
Philippeville.
and
in
campaign
would
FLN
that
into
supporters.
vicious
terrorize
hardship
outside
collective responsibility
to
and
Algeria,
a
stations,
met
actions,
remain
guerrilla
attacks
use
support,
Muslim
French
000
FLN
and
FLN
most
would
such
in
the
weapons
small
would
police
attacks
that
government
and
presence
in
the
to
1954
conducted
As
FLN
the
The
suspected
1955.
civilians
much
descended
123
then
who
and
limited
70
these
uprising
throughout
military
coerce
Algerian
state
was
France
leadership.
during
This
of
who
army,
that
FLN
against
French
effort
sponsor
targeted
Although
general
limitations.
Algeria
support
the
mostly,
their
1954
buildings.
the
part
legionnaires
the
November
trigger
infrastructure
had
1
both
French
support
of
it.
of
and
for
Because
European
C H A P T E R
and
Algerian
radicalized
theirown
FLN
in
populations,
the
moderates
terror
greater
the
on
campaigns
Philippeville
both
sides.
against
massacres
Pied
noir
Algerians,
and
gangs
who
in
1 . 5 :
O P E R A T I O N S
aftermath
conducted
turn
joined
the
numbers.
1956
The
French
during
FLN,
administration
1956.
It
sometimes
same
time
campaign
transport
tactic
This
in
to
that
it
In
FLN
some
such
some
previously
into
as
ways,
enjoyed
support
approach
ghting
a
million
30
000
irregular,
became,
last
to
in
all
longer,
in
terms
a
conduct
and
the
to
by
in
in
out
the
some
military
helicopter
ghters,
10
to
a
at
alleviate
FLN
regular
the
while
aggressive
forces
years
rely
major
force
during
Egypt.
a
later.
less
on
guerrilla
the
The
despite
By
reached
blow
that
operations
which
in
issues,
Algeria
signicant
to
an
used
removed
the
to
Vietnam
supply
mobility
to
year.
against
the
the
400
FLN,
France
a
force
receiving
end
1956,
This
which
was
of
of
000.
lost
using
half
about
question
side
sustaining
will
leaders,
guerrillas.
ghters.
of
root
government
occupations,
support
gave
strength
dealt
both
thereby
plagued
strength
guerrilla
as
material
the
soldiers
and
adopt
anti-guerrilla
the
Nasser’s
over
its
be
military
coordinated
half
use
by
Algeria
supporting
reforms
paratroops
areas
and
by
imprisoned
and
throughout
actively
supplemented
allowed
their
efforts
of
economic
would
roads
to
from
French
was
remote
only
continued
however,
limited
States
seemed,
infrastructure
and
legionnaires
United
its
suspected
villages,
approach
move
the
Helicopters,
target.
whole
which
intensied
those
implementing
grievances.
The
moved
could
adequate
continue
war.
The Battle of Algiers
In
1956–1957,
cities,
most
“Battle
of
attacks
by
and
the
to
gain
to
support
betrayal
used
the
to
is
this
began
to
became
opinion
more
danger
of
far
in
in
a
more
and
the
rely
more
As
more
began
to
By
by
hoped
is
you
that
it
need
of
French
terrorizing
to
extract
out
French
against
moving
and
The
torture
most
as
this
French
the
FLN
military
and
France,
The
terror
possibility
city.
torture,
in
turn
The
the
women,
move
rooting
the
on
known
a
FLN
using
eventually
Algiers.
the
to
leadership
because
people.
against
of
attention
such
in
series
military.
FLN
city
greater
a
war
Algiers.
including
French
the
the
capital,
international
fact
in
moved
the
was
the
hide
information,
to
cities,
population
ghters
FLN
guerrillas,
by
the
The
harder
the
FLN
more
support.
is
Algiers”
reprisals
war
the
notably
war.
fact
public
▲
French ocers interrogate an Algerian woman. What diculties could French
soldiers face in obtaining information?
31
1
C A U S E S
A N D
E F F E C TS
L TA
Thinking skills
O F
20 T H - C E N T U R Y
W A R S
The Morice Line and the Battle of the Frontiers
When
France
granted
independence
to
Morocco
and
Tunisia
in
Alan Dershowitz, a legal scholar, has made
1956and1957,
it
inadvertently
supplied
the
FLN
with
a
valuable
the argument that the limited use of tor ture
resource
–
a
place
to
hide.
To
neutralize
this
resource,
the
French
can be necessary in democratic states.
military
constructeda
barrier
between
Tunisia
and
Algeria.
The
Morice
If tor ture is going to be administered
Line,
as
it
became
known,
consisted
of
an
electried
fence,
reinforced
as a last resor t in the ticking-bomb
with
anti-personnel
mines,
artillery
and
80
000
soldiers
patrolling
its
case, to save enormous numbers of
length.
A
similar
line
attempted
to
insulate
Algeria
from
Morocco.
lives, it ought to be done openly, with
Despite
the
complexity
of
the
line,
the
FLN
continued
to
launch
attacks
accountability, with approval by the
from
both
Tunisian
and
Moroccan
sides
of
the
lines.
One
such
attack
president of the United States or by a
led
to
a
French
air
strike
on
the
Tunisian
town
of
Sakiet.
The
FLN
Supreme Cour t justice.
continued
Source: Interview with Wolf Blitzer,
CNN, 4 March 2003. http://edition.cnn.
com/2003/L AW/03/03/cnna.Dershowitz
the
Morice
the
war
French
faced
1
to
build
Line
itself,
and,
it
the
a
force
signicant
although
posed
military
with
up
a
it
never
question
would
question
of
conventional
of
need
played
whether
to
whether
be
military
a
signicant
the
Morice
permanent.
ornot
force
Algeria
Line
Again,
was
behind
role
in
and
the
France
worth
was
such
an
What does Dershowitz mean by a
ongoing
effort.
“ticking-bomb case”?
The
2
presence
of
sympathetic
border
countries
is
a
dilemma
faced
by
Do you agree with Dershowitz? Why or
many
counter-insurgency
efforts.
The
Ho
Chi
Minh
trail
in
Vietnam
why not?
that
3
ran
from
North
Vietnam
to
South
Vietnam
through
neighbouring
Would Dershowitz advocate a similar
Laos
and
Cambodia
would
frustrate
the
American
effort
throughout
use of tor ture by authoritarian
thewar
and
Evenin
the
lead
to
the
disastrous
invasion
of
Cambodia
in
1971.
regimes? Why or why not?
4
Does his justication for tor ture apply
role
to the French in Algeria?
withsuch
in
early
21st
theconicts
support
in
century,
both
always
such
Iraq
carry
refuge
and
has
played
Afghanistan.
with
them
the
a
signicant
Efforts
danger
of
to
deal
widening
thewar.
The
ALN
The
French
January
increased
to
forces
July
efforts
met
1958
to
these
–
the
bring
arms
efforts
Battle
across
with
a
the
series
border
of
of
the
Frontiers.
in
the
battle,
from
Tunisia.
engagements
The
ALN
from
were
losing
Morice Line
around
3,200
men
a
month
early
the
French
about
350.
By
The Morice Line was a for tied barrier
July
the
ALN
had
lost
about
20
000
and
abandoned
the
attempt
to
move
between Algeria and Tunisia designed to
troops
in
signicant
numbers
across
the
border.
keep FLN ghters and supplies in Tunisia
from getting to Algeria.
Guerrilla
degree
in
campaigns
to
which
Algeria
was
government
noirs
and
control
the
plan,
what
seen
a
and
by
In
who
France
as
a
the
best
left
interests
however,
was
intereststo
A
before
in
a
force
of
would
of
Republic
of
of
the
should
trusted
ahead
of
constitution
it
him
de
De
Gaulle
army
on
to
he
was
their
president.
part,
was
him
him
De
birth
not
generals’
as
as
a
control.
would
believed
the
pieds
take
French
who
The
the
the
trusted
trusted
under
about
as
of
Gaulle
squabbling.
what
brought
rebel
action
someone
political
fall
formed,
the
noirs
remain
the
goals.
insurgency
conspiracy
of
The
the
conspired
Gaulle.
pieds
as
about
be
The
further
de
to
After
Algiers
stability.
point,
with
off
political
tied
could
Algeria.
stave
circumspect
and
in
Charles
Algeria
right
1958.
one
and
was
component
political
that
France
new
May
commanders
At
that
and
military
France
new
important
said
himself
be.
FrenchFifth
An
man.
believed
the
illustrated
and
resurrection
formermilitary
leader
32
they
political
fate
administration
Algeria.
many
wed
of
military
civil
to
the
Paris
leading
of
traditionally
political
clearly
in
restricted
was
the
act
on
Gaulle,
those
of
the
C H A P T E R
▲
1 . 5 :
O P E R A T I O N S
French soldiers search for ALN ghters
Technology and war: helicopters
Experiments with ver tical take-o and landing aircraft
unpredictability. In Algeria this potential was realized.
had been ongoing throughout the post-First World War
Once ground forces made contact with ALN troops,
period, but a mass produced model was not available
French airborne troops, generally 20 to a helicopter,
until near the end of the Second World War. As a combat
could be rapidly deployed, reinforced and evacuated
vehicle, the helicopter began to come into its own
as the situation dictated. By the end of the war, small
during the Korean War, providing versatile extraction
mobile reconnaissance ground units would track and
of wounded soldiers from combat zones. The French
locate ALN units and call in helicopter troops to engage
believed they saw in the helicopter an answer to one of
the enemy. Smaller helicopters armed with machine
the chief problems that had plagued them in Indo-China
guns could provide re suppor t to ground or airborne
– their inability to transpor t troops on shor t notice to
troops. In 1960 the French forces had 120 helicopters
remote areas and then to extract them. The helicopter
that were moving 21 000 troops in and out of combat
freed the French of their dependence on road systems
each month. The United States army would fur ther
and meant they could match the guerrilla’s mobility and
develop helicopter warfare in Vietnam.
The Challe Plan
A
new
French
French
destruction
to
Algeria
of
the
and
throughout
that
to
the
and
east
villages
adjacent
the
of
and
it
then
territory
manned
by
1959.
Challe
000
troops
the
from
would
harkis.
this
be
the
the
of
north
the
French
Challe
of
of
also
and
Challe’s
move
comparatively
would
the
projects
housing
agriculture.
capture
sweeps
operation
through
strategy
renewal
country
long-term
an
of
low-rent
for
was
forces
Plan
of
renewed
brink
military
urban
the
and
the
new
land
ALN
conduct
phase
secured
The
a
to
construction
where
these
Challe,
Algeria
with
hectares
in
strongest.
Once
in
brought
work
as
west,
Maurice
forces
to
such
250
the
was
countryside.
swept
points
Plan
from
were
FLN
intended
concentrate
systematically
to
was
reclamation
was
commander,
brought
Constantine
the
plan
military
initiatives
was
through
for
the
complete,
construction
called
weak,
towns
of
strong
increased
naval
33
1
C A U S E S
A N D
E F F E C TS
O F
20 T H - C E N T U R Y
L TA
patrols
to
W A R S
intercept
weapons
shipments.
The
Challe
Plan
was
largely
a
Thinking and research skills
success.
Ho Chi Minh, leader of the Viet Minh forces
shrank
The
ALN
steadily
ghting
units
throughout
and
the
Challe’s
territory
that
they
controlled
offensive.
and later Nor th Vietnam in its struggle
against France and the United States,
Terror attacks and the Week of the Barricades
once said:
Despite
its
weakness
in
Algeria,
the
FLN
continued
to
launch
terrorist
You can kill ten of my men for every one
attacks
in
France,
making
the
cost
of
the
war
more
evident
to
French
of yours I kill, but even at these odds,
civilians.
Throughout
the
war
there
were
some
42
000
terrorist
attacks
you will lose and I will win.
in
1
Explain why Ho thought this to be true.
who
a
2
France,
claiming
appears
temporary
to
2,800
have
success
civilian
seen
in
lives.
Challe’s
Such
victory
attacks
over
an
endless
conict.
the
process
of
De
the
affected
FLN
Gaulle
in
was
de
the
also
Gaulle,
eld
as
acutely
What disadvantages are there for
aware
that
since
1945
decolonization
was
accelerating
guerrilla forces in pursuing a strategy
around
the
world
and
that,
as
a
result,
the
age
of
European
colonialism
of attrition?
was
3
waning.
He
decided
to
put
the
issue
of
Algerian
independence
Is Ho’s statement valid for all guerrilla
or
self-determination
to
a
referendum,
in
both
France
and
Algeria.
wars? Why or why not?
Believing
4
Research two other guerrilla wars, each
the
taken from a dierent region. Does Ho’s
noirs
claim apply to these conicts?
passed
de
streets
and
took
and
to
pieds
Algerian
had
Challe
them
and,
the
Gaulle
refused
down
the
betrayed
of
their
horror
noirs,
de
to
of
take
own
the
Gaulle
them,
action
accord
French
set
pieds
about
a
noirs
set
against
week
military
up
barricades
them.
later.
The
The
referendum
commanders
negotiating
the
in
pieds
in
future
of
Algeria
an
state.
attrition
In military terms, the doctrine that seeks
to weaken the enemy by depleting and
destroying their resources, human and
material, to the point that they surrender
or otherwise abandon the ght.
This
in
development
the
cause
seemed
of
near
Henry
not
win.
this
and
illustrates
national
defeat,
dormancy
especially
As
of
that
it
was
the
frightened
threatening
Kissinger
A
an
given
would
guerrilla
important
independence.
army
prospect
de
Gaulle
the
later
wins
of
say,
it
it
and
military
if
point
Even
“A
about
though
aring
the
rest
presence
up
of
of
conventional
does
not
lose”.
guerrilla
the
after
a
period
France.
the
FLN
army
De
war
insurgency
This
in
loses
Gaulle
was
Tunisia.
if
it
does
understood
Class discussion
Keeping Kissinger ’s words in mind, what
that
determined
cost
appeared
that
to
be
Algeria
was
not
never-ending
worth
guerrilla
the
cost.
For
de
Gaulle
war.
would it have taken for the FLN to “lose”?
There
were
still
difcult
negotiations
ahead.
Complicating
matters
What about other guerrilla forces in other
was
the
fact
that
the
FLN
did
not,
in
the
end,
speak
for
all
Algerian
guerrilla wars?
nationalists,
of
Algerian
including
support
Algiers
in
and
known
bomb
with
34
fact
some
of
the
the
attacks
both
60
who
000
and
of
it
shootings
Algerian
Muslims
in
seems
the
de
in
military
ofcers
Organisation
and
served
the
not
le
military
complicated
remained,
who
noirs,
though
rank
some
as
further
pieds
1961,
conscripted
noirs
a
Muslims
the
a
the
Finally,
a
military.
support
in
Algeria
of
1961,
and
army
as
to
With
coup
much
France,
the
in
of
desperate
terrorist
The
thousands
loyal
short-lived
(OAS).
French
of
degrees,
deadly
secrète
throughout
the
hundreds
French
staged
formed
and
the
varying
with
army.
l’armée
by
the
pieds
organization
OAS
France
their
conducted
until
1962,
targets.
1.6
Eects
Conceptual understanding
Key questions
➔
What was de Gaulle’s reasoning in agreeing to negotiations with the FLN?
➔
What were the eects of the war on French society?
➔
How did the war aect the pieds noirs and the harkis?
Key concepts
➔
Continuity
➔
Change
➔
Perspective
As
in
all
wars,
the
Counting
the
especially
difcult
records
the
of
dead
their
troop
far
own
civilian
a
between
is
also
in
a
immediate
difcult
a
guerrilla
strength
from
easy.
casualties
challenge
civilian
and
is
in
war.
the
caused
by
even
soldiers
this
is
is,
not
reasons,
interests
those
also
the
by
be
so
in
form
all
armies
which
both
of
the
a
to
enemy
accurate
counting
for
morale
in
civilian
conict
blurred.
becomes
keep
under-report
value
Counting
denition,
casualties.
and
seldom
sides
guerrilla
of
wars
makes
propaganda
in
always
the
of
enemy.
more
in
task
Guerrilla
over-report
can
was
political
security
There
and
and
necessary
It
and
purposes.
for
effect
and
and
over-reporting
deaths
when
Accurate
is
the
line
census
L TA
likewise
is
casualties
propaganda
the
most
dead
Thinking skills
data
Compare and contrast the perspectives
available.
below on the eects of the Algerian War.
Algeria,
from
500
French
years
a
by
all
000
military
remained
the
After
time.
camps
were
for
The
of
legacy
of
others,
of
the
the
it
as
a
“the
pieds
of
for
40
harki
was
War
wounded
1962,
who
and
it
after
it
●
FLN
●
pieds-noirs
●
French military
●
Harkis
the
in
the
conducted
suspected
the
range
war.
had
Estimates
in
FLN
1962,
there
reprisals
as
many
France
in
the
to
French
harkis
the
society
also
French
ran
it
of
terms
to
at
of
FLN
These
housed
while
Evian Accords
An agreement signed on 18 March 1962
the
housing
poverty.
30%
mass
the
France.
and
at
a
many
population,
unemployment
descendants
put
wake
in
ed
was
forced
between the French government and
the FLN. The agreement established
a permanent ceasere in the Algerian
War and the removal of French forces. It
guaranteed the religious and proper ty
rights of French citizens who remained in
In
the
an independent Algeria.
9.7%.
is
guerrilla
the
000
in
records,
cofn”,
from
chronic
53
their
Estimates
000.
of
the
000
to
power
ghting
on
conict.
Muslims
150
ed
segregated
Algerian
stands
or
and
to
during
Fear
strain
Some
whole
dead
those
to
costly
According
came
the
noirs
among
and
regime
suitcase
suffering
power
000
FLN
harkis.
signicant
years,
18
ended
and
million
a
deaths.
against
Accords
noirs
brutal
campaign
generally
France
example
the
a
French
this
unemployment
for
both
a
the
programmes.
rate
For
to
When
of
pieds
putting
social
2000,
to
choice
Close
refugees
in
of
million
retribution
Evian
the
victory,
and
one
was
experienced
fatalities
the
face
of
loyal
migration
to
to
1954–1962.
campaign
put
accounts,
ambiguous.
war
brutality
in
that
the
For
some,
cause
guerrilla
of
it
stands
national
war
can
as
an
liberation.
engender
in
sides.
35
Exam-style questions and fur ther reading
Exam-style questions
1
Discuss
the
2
Evaluate
3
Examine
4
To
5
Evaluate
what
the
role
the
technology
FLN’s
the
use
extent
the
Algerian
of
use
of
did
of
in
the
guerrilla
terror
by
both
war
sides
socio-economic
relative
strengths
outcome
and
of
against
in
issues
the
in
the
the
Algerian
French
Algerian
Algeria
weaknesses
of
Algeria.
War.
cause
the
in
War.
the
war?
combatants
in
War.
Fur ther reading
Evans,
Press.
Horne,
Press.
Martin.
Oxford,
Alistair.
New
Shepard,
the
36
2011.
1977.
York,
Todd.
Remaking
Algeria:
France’s
Undeclared
War.
Oxford
University
UK.
of
A
Savage
War
of
Peace:
Algeria
1954–1962.
Viking
USA.
2008.
France.
The
Invention
Cornell
of
Decolonization:
University
Press.
The
Ithaca,
Algerian
USA.
War
and
Understanding the question
An
effective
what
the
seem
very
are
essay
response
question
some
broad,
steps
starts
requires.
but
that
they
you
with
Paper
2
require
can
go
a
a
thorough
questions
specic
through
to
are
and
help
understanding
tricky
in
detailed
make
that
of
they
response.
this
Here
transition.
Step 1: What are the command terms in the question?
As
the
do.
name
You
rst
suggests,
task
is
to
a
command
determine
term
what
is
the
what
the
question
command
term
requires
requires
Command term
you
of
to
you.
Task
Analyse
Break down the topic in order to bring out the essential elements or structure.
Compare
Give an account of the similarities between two (or more) items or situations, referring to both (all) of
them throughout. A thematic approach is the best way to tackle these questions: this means that you
must rst decide on which common components or themes you are going to conduct the comparison.
These common components will be used to compare both elements of the question.
Contrast
Give an account of the dierences between two (or more) items or situations, referring to both (all) of
them throughout. A thematic approach is the best way to tackle these questions: this means that you
must rst decide on which common components or themes you are going to conduct the contrast.
These common components will be used to contrast both elements of the question.
Discuss
Oer a considered and balanced review that includes a range of arguments, factors, or hypotheses.
Opinions or conclusions should be presented clearly and suppor ted by appropriate evidence.
Evaluate
Make an appraisal by weighing up the strengths and limitations.
Like compare and contrast questions,
this command term requires you to identify the criteria against which you are evaluating the subject of
the question.
Examine
Consider an argument or concept in a way that uncovers the assumptions and interrelationships of the issue.
To what ex tent
Consider the merits or otherwise of an argument or concept. This requires you to examine multiple
perspectives on the argument or concept. Opinions and conclusions should be presented clearly and
suppor ted with appropriate evidence and sound argument.
Step 2: What concepts apply to the question?
This
course
explores
six
major
historical
concepts:
●
Continuity
●
Cause
●
Perspective
●
Change
●
Consequence
●
Signicance
Because
sense
these
that
approach
concepts
of
your
concepts
they
an
are
exam
apply
to
response.
concepts
you
central
question,
the
the
therefore,
means
chosen.
to
IB
components
question.
This
have
are
important
These
that
You
do
history
in
you
IB
must
concepts
each
not
decide
then
paragraph
need
to
curriculum,
assessment.
which
form
should
address
all
it
makes
When
the
you
these
focus
refer
the
of
to
the
concepts;
37
SS
S K I L L S
S E C T I O N
in
fact,
cause
and
one
and
can
or
two
are
usually
consequence
be
considered
or
as
sufcient.
continuity
a
pair
in
Some
and
some
of
the
change,
concepts,
tend
to
go
such
as
together
cases.
Step 3: What curriculum topics and content are being
assessed?
Each
world
history
●
topics
●
prescribed
●
suggested
One
way
content”
you
be
to
learn
named
referred
the
these.
to
refer
this
to
is
The
the
learn,
material
in
effects
of
and
stated
causes
important
content
are
elements
must
question
“long-
explicitly
short-term
these
you
required
and
the
at
The
the
as
“causes
you
studying
is
divided
into:
examples.
what
in
that
content
look
are
topic
of
thing
and
is
that
“topics”
therefore
your
the
For
you
to
of
a
a
examples”
is
content”
studied
in
a
question
question
could
explore
how
can
explicitly
20th-century
can
you
understand
be
example,
You
war
“prescribed
“prescribed
wars”,
causes”
and
“suggested
need
curriculum.
20th-century
that
“topics”
and
response.
20th-century
short-term
in
any
question
in
is
whereas
on
explicitly
war,
the
and
as
long-
and
choose.
which
topics
and
prescribed
requires.
Step 4: Does the question require discussion of more than
one region?
Paper
you
the
2
to
focuses
exam.
from
You
and
For
First
can
than
use
a
used
Second
you
to
to
of
the
it
in
a
each
than
World
perfectly
Europe
the
a
use
balanced
from
some
two
your
regions.
wars,
the
two
that
wars
different
of
in
fashion.
but
Remember
examine
as
require
map
examples
question,
causes
to
Pacic
to
often
the
cross-regional
wars
the
will
on
region.
are
acceptable
and
in
any
one
War
on
sure
region
requiring
question
shown
be
answering
more
Second
Questions
as
questions,
in
questions
is
history.
regions,
discuss
region
answering
War
these
examine
and
region,
world
different
and
one
answer
when
World
one
region
than
War
different
Step 5:
one
require
be
from
choose
more
World
comparative
events
you
example,
from
the
If
more
can
questions
the
on
examine
each
causes
of
wars.
What wars are you going to use to address
the question?
The
curriculum
wars.
Rather,
concepts,
it
topics
understanding
examine
the
exams,
38
the
previous
so
guide
does
requires
and
the
choose
You
steps.
the
stipulate
you
prescribed
question
question.
four
not
that
is
use
content.
choosing
need
to
you
This
the
that
detail
you
study
20th-century
means
wars
understand
Remember,
examples
that
any
and
the
will
war(s)
depth
understand
are
in
specic
wars
that
that
the
any
to
study
last
best
as
it
step
help
in
you
applies
important
depth
the
and
in
to
IB
detail.
2
THE
FA L K L A N D S / M A LV I N A S
THE
FA I L U R E
OF
WA R :
D I P LO M A CY
Global context
The
Falklands/Malvinas
of
uncertainty
in
the
midst
spearheaded
Party.
high
for
of
a
by
both
major
Deregulation
Argentina
and
military
Junta
that
destruction
of
supporters.
The
against
its
was
took
left-wing
own
as
unrest
by
an
one
a
The
time
resulted
and
its
“dirty
war”
citizens.
aims
and
of
the
and
the
hard-line
the
Thatcher
natural
force
the
1979
of
against
t
with
US
to
as
Ronald
to
made
it
lurched
invasion
brought
Reagan
power
common
policy
coming
to
a
brought
in
the
cause
states
also
anti-communist
The
of
détente
communist
foreign
the
Junta.
up
Soviet
had
Reagan
Reagan’s
Argentina’s
heat
anti-communist
States.
world.
to
The
election
a
terror
began
decade.
halt
with
their
War
last
in
United
labour
key
its
Afghanistan
a
in
unpopular
of
Cold
into
was
Conservative
organizations
was
a
restructuring
privatization
social
at
Britain
Thatcher’s
ruled
result
came
economic
Margaret
unemployment,
strife.
conict
combatants.
around
seemed
stance
conict
of
would
choose.
Timeline
1982
Argentina begins military preparations
12 January
Britain develops military plans in case
8 March
of invasion
Argentine scrap metal merchants arrive in
19 March
South Georgia and plant Argentine ag
HMS Endurance arrives in South Georgia
24 March
with 24 Royal Marines
Britain sends three submarines to the
29 March
South Atlantic
31 March
Britain asks US to mediate with Argentina
Argentine forces invade Falkland/
2 April
Malvinas Islands
United Nations pass Resolution 502
3 April
demanding Argentine withdrawal
British task force sets sail for the
5–9 April
South Atlantic
US Secretary of State Alexander Haig
8 April
begins mediation
European Economic Community (EEC)
10 April
imposes economic sanctions on Argentina
22 April
British forces recapture South Georgia
British task force arrives in the South Atlantic
25 April
Royal Navy sinks Argentine submarine
Organization of American States (OAS)
28 April
Sante Fe
votes to suppor t Argentina in dispute
39
2
C A U S E S
A N D
E F F E C TS
O F
20 T H - C E N T U R Y
W A R S
US formally suppor ts Britain in dispute
30 April
Britain proclaims Total Exclusion Zone (TEZ)
1 May
Royal Navy sinks ARA General Belgrano
Air war begins
2 May
4 May
Argentine air force sinks HMS Sheeld
British forces land on San Carlos
21 May
Argentine air force sinks HMS Ardent
12–29 May
Battle of Fitzroy
8 June
11–14 June
Argentina surrenders
▲
40
Battle of Goose Green
Battle of Stanley
14 June
The wreckage of an Argentine armoured vehicle destroyed during the Falklands/Malvinas War
2.1
Causes of the Falklands/Mal vinas War
Conceptual understanding
Key questions
➔
To what extent was both Argentine and British policy toward the Falkland/
Malvinas Islands ambiguous?
➔
To what extent were the actions of both Argentina and Britain inuenced by
domestic concerns?
Key concepts
➔
Cause
➔
Consequence
➔
Perspective
Long-term causes
Located
in
coast
South
of
the
South
group
of
sheep
farming.
islands,
occupied
leaving
When
claim
not
the
home
the
to
but
won
islands,
necessarily
Ocean
2,000
France,
none
for
her
some
with
a
people,
Spain
a
committed
miles
them
to
the
the
Great
deal
stretch
from
of
in
of
km)
are
a
off
in
have
enthusiasm,
the
18th
in
While
the
even
century.
1816,
the
the
rocky
involved
Britain
Spain
Malvinas.
occupation
(480
Islands
mostly
and
great
50-year
independence
calling
300
Falkland/Malvinas
about
unoccupied
Argentina
to
the
Historically,
islands,
them
Atlantic
America,
she
laid
British
islands,
were
which
they
Class discussion
regarded
as
having
government
edgling
control
was
South
over
not
about
American
the
continuously
negligible
islands
occupied
strategic
to
have
republic.
in
by
1833,
the
its
A
or
economic
foreign
small
from
British,
policy
British
which
value,
time
although
dictated
force
they
the
the
British
by
Why is civilian occupation an impor tant
a
reasserted
have
aspect in a country’s claim to a territory?
been
Argentines
have
TOK discussion
never
relinquished
predating
and
the
By
need
1981,
Junta
restore
Junta
for
ve
order
to
on
as
regime.
30
000,
pressure
150
base
the
years,
their
important
had
years.
during
the
and
a
far
all
been
The
case
and
territory.
upon
for
It
is
which
war
in
immediate
these
both
1982.
events,
the
Argentines
There
background
were,
factors
time
ruled
elements
estimates
as
of
put
the
was
increasingly
political
the
as
an
power
such
anyone
known
Argentina
by
took
deep
and
eventually
Some
of
What role does history play in a country’s
claims to territory? What are the
strengths and weaknesses of basing
claims on history?
Junta
right
collectively
within
to
considered.
repress
intellectuals
the
more
be
claims
some
would
some
to
by
Argentina
was
power
war
British
however,
that
the
their
used
left
–
who
a
coup
designed
instability.
its
was
of
suspected
this
compounded
by
a
Junta
to
of
“dirty
This
severe
the
authoritarian
political
disappeared”.
military
Ideologically,
extensive
unions,
victims
“the
in
unpopular
parties,
A committee or council that rules a country.
The term often applies to military rulers of
Latin American countries.
criticizing
war”
as
extreme
high
social
economic
41
2
C A U S E S
A N D
E F F E C TS
O F
20 T H - C E N T U R Y
crisis,
stemming
thataquick
W A R S
from
patriotic
crippling
war
foreign
would
help
debt.
The
galvanize
Junta
public
calculated
opinion
behind
thegovernment.
In
terms
regimes
power
the
of
in
was
most
was
broader
foreign
Argentina,
dependent
important
Antarctica.
policy
considered
on
control
position
The
1959
aims,
that
of
upon
the
the
the
South
which
Antarctic
Junta,
position
many
control
which
previous
Argentina
Atlantic.
such
Treaty,
and
of
as
a
Geographically,
depended
essentially
Antarctic Treaty
internationalized
and
demilitarized
the
Antarctic,
meant
that
Argentina
A treaty by which the signatories pledge
would
have
to
look
elsewhere
more
authority
for
an
anchor
in
the
South
Atlantic.
As
to keep the Antarctic a demilitarized
Chile
asserted
over
Tierra
del
Fuego
(a
group
of
islands
and nuclear weapons-free zone and to
off
the
southern
tip
of
South
America
separated
from
the
mainland
cooperate in the promotion of scientic
by
the
Straits
of
Magellan),
the
Falklands/Malvinas
became
vital
to
inquiry in the Antarctic.
Argentina’s
relations
position
with
both
anti-communist
settling
of
in
its
the
northern
president
accounts
South
with
Atlantic.
In
neighbours
Ronald
Britain
Reagan,
over
the
1980,
and
the
with
the
improving
USA,
time
and
seemed
its
new
right
for
a
Falklands/Malvinas.
L TA
Research and thinking skills
As we have seen, the Falklands/Malvinas are not the only disputed territories
in the world. Choose one of the territories from the list below and answer the
following questions.
1
What are the arguments for each side’s claim of ownership?
2
What steps have been taken to solve the problem: war, negotiation,
third-par ty arbitration?
3
What is the probability that the situation will escalate into a war?
Justify your answer.
●
Arunachal Pradesh—India and China
●
Cyprus—Greece and Turkey
●
Kuril Islands—Japan and Russia
●
Ogaden—Somalia and Ethiopia
●
Hans Island—Denmark and Canada
Economic
war.
to
instability
Prime
ght
Minister
ination
widespread
also
played
Margaret
through
a
role
austerity
privatization,
in
Thatcher’s
the
measures
anti-union
British
economic
that
legislation
decision
policies,
would
and
to
go
to
designed
involve
higher
taxation,
privatization
caused
deep
divisions
in
the
country.
These
policies
led
to
a
sharp
rise
in
The economic practice of selling
unemployment
in
Britain
in
the
years
leading
up
to
the
Falklands
War.
government assets to private owners.
Thatcher
Reagan
a
hard
Irish
line
austerity
42
fervent
against
the
the
measures,
with
her
a
States’
USSR,
Army
against
permanent
anti-communist
United
necessitated
protect
a
a
the
Republican
sanctions
turn,
was
and
(IRA)
Argentina
prisoners,
Apartheid
however,
regime
meant
re-evaluation
armed
forces.
diplomatic
and
approach
of
Such
solution
to
to
in
the
she
in
staunch
the
Cold
Falklands
did
not
South
downsizing
what
a
the
the
Falklands
Ronald
she
conict
took
and
economic
Thatcher’s
military,
British
of
While
support
Africa.
re-evaluation
the
supporter
War.
could
which,
determined
question
in
realistically
that
needed
to
C H A P T E R
be
found.
The
leaseback,
be
in
most
administered
practical
sense,
government
British
workable
which
by
it
and
citizens
the
would
While
to
untenable
included
in
appeared
a
O F
to
to
be
T H E
F A L K L A N D S / M A LV I N A S
some
form
Argentina,
solution
some
once
the
C A U S E S
belong
such
unacceptable
became
were
solution
islands
Britain.
was
2 . 1 :
seemed
hardliners
in
representatives
negotiations
with
but
to
the
of
would
make
the
of
W A R
British
the
islands’
Argentine
government.
Britain
did
not
initiate
Thatcher
planned
concerns
did
Thatcher’s
lead
for
the
else.
British
a
after
out.
coal
Nothing
challenge
This,
the
to
This
to
conict,
and
her
is
and
also
be
she
many
As
in
to
and
the
in
because
but
the
rst
her
of
domestic
woman
a
to
reputation
would
or
when
was
career
would
that
crisis.
governance
Falklands
that
say
opposition
Thatcher
Thatcher
partially
the
to
forging
later
that
sovereignty
of
support,
approach
bombings
cannot
response
was
criticism
suggested
image
we
public
considered.
state,
to
IRA
past
for
bolster
unyielding
and
the
therefore,
Thatcher’s
western
British
however,
to
approach
strikes
in
war
and,
dictate
must
industrialized
broke
Minister.
conict
the
help
uncompromising
war
from
use
indeed
personality
large,
an
the
in
a
to
the
evident
as
Prime
back
down
anywhere
emerge
largely
sovereignty
The ability of a country to act
independently of any outside authority.
it.
Short-term causes
Although
negotiations
attempted
once
and
the
a
at
again
in
pressure
1982.
the
member
of
Argentina’s
the
This
his
the
was
not,
British
early
wanted
Had
he
was
diplomatic
that
by
small
The
in
to
recalled
March
do
South
Argentine
time.
ice
of
Marines
force.
deal
him
to
to
military
no
sense
entice
taking
to
hide
force
1976
his
to
was
1982,
anti-leftist
the
the
to
a
what
began
into
by
one.
a
preparations.
question
in
Galtieri
military
British
The
abandon
Malvinas
that
but
the
and
government.
Reagan
the
dispute,
pressure
to
of
Galtieri,
administration.
suggesting
the
decided
US
situation
Galtieri
fervent
been
down
General
from
critics
to
for
to
domestic
a
had
broke
situation.
was
the
they
Junta,
Junta
secrecy,
solution
had
the
He
enough
of
the
left-wing
preparations
made
Junta
force
1982.
strong
the
it
to
of
military
against
any
use
navy
1982,
They
The
patrol
they
the
vessel
confronting
aboard,
The
a
British,
for
their
in
the
Argentina,
the
party,
part,
was
to
failed
It
seems
means
and
from
the
greeted
provoke
to
little
a
the
Stanley,
from
full
to
of
another
to
the
the
effort
go
for
British
leave
to
when
be
capital
Argentine
genuine
to
British
island
the
soon
South
and
the
the
notify
refusing
Endurance
by
on
opportunity
dispatch
Argentines
made
merchants
the
merchants
and
Endurance
were
metal
Junta
deliberately
silence
of
evict
small
however,
to
response
HMS
to
the
transported
ag
British
scrap
gave
seemed
travelled
planting
so.
Argentine
Georgia,
Falklands/Malvinas,
Instead
ruling
involving
island,
government,
the
the
dispute
second
asked
just
to
deteriorating
to
settlement
century,
action.
disputed
when,
great
solution,
1982,
military
ahead.
not
wanted
a
20th
members
endeared
Military
a
the
With
1981
war”
stance
amid
Falklands/Malvinas
in
decided
however,
ally.
1982
from
“dirty
ideological
bond
Junta,
Junta
a
hard-line
of
directed
a
early
from
on
points
leader
leading
A
various
of
Georgia.
Royal
occupation
to
defuse
the
43
2
C A U S E S
A N D
E F F E C TS
O F
20 T H - C E N T U R Y
South
Georgia
incident.
intelligence,
suggested
preparing
take
to
indicating
picture
that
the
a
of
Junta
out
It
on
2
both
they
Did
the
ordered
seem,
want
that
to
with
to
by
Or
and
clear
on
with
with
that
of
the
time
the
in
was
the
was
like
of
Atlantic,
a
Believing,
South
complete
as
Atlantic,
the
military
already
South
anything
action.
to
Argentine
Britain
action
of
way
faulty
that
with
plan
its
they
most
essence
Falklands/Malvinas
were
impression
in
a
actions
and
to
of
the
were
unclear
in
to
as
wanted
did,
in
on
be
in
carried
the
situation.
war
as
that
it
the
to
lack
wanted
the
quo.
was
of
but
this
was
situation.
table
and
hard
to
it
the
in
the
clarity
from
the
the
the
to
war
was
avoid.
the
stall
for
did,
opted
South
abandoning
bolstered
urgency
relationship
Argentines
When
an
islands
the
of
was
to
the
proceeded,
became
response
government
sense
preparations
they
status
military,
Malvinas?
resolving
this
clarity
Did
negotiating
lease
on
Britain
uncertainty
seriously
a
of
start.
negotiations,
When
what
the
would
inject
bring
these
this
indications
British
to
lack
into
unclear
intelligence,
response
other
also
a
the
operation
further
was
solution?
nonetheless
the
of
to
and
diplomacy
or
negotiations
of
It
and
military
they
want
designed
actual
Their
militarily,
goal
over
government
planning
a
by
from
government
simply
solution,
the
that
spite
to
caused
unclear
sovereignty
British
British
the
posturing
though
misconception
way
likewise
the
the
was
were
exercise
they
As
conict
goals
consistency.
faulty
Islands.
ambiguous,
this
the
did
its
little
follow
taking
Atlantic
acting
invasion
that
which
negotiate
British
incident
aggressive
therefore,
pressure
military
would
not
the
to
military
their
Falkland
by
occupy
want
combined
The
a
was
full
then,
meandered
between
order
a
negotiations?
pursued
Were
or
combined
Argentines
was
Argentinean
Argentina?
the
Junta
side
situation
concluded,
arrangement
into
the
substantial
neither
taskforce
sides.
they
from
This,
to
April.
would
on
that
British
26March
44
W A R S
the
time
leaving
for
an
Georgia
South
Argentine
2.2
C ombatants
Conceptual understanding
Key questions
➔
To what extent were both Britain and Argentina prepared for war?
➔
What role did geography play in the relative strengths and weaknesses
of each country?
➔
What were the relative military strengths of each country?
Key concepts
➔
Continuity
➔
Change
➔
Signicance
Great Britain
The
Argentine
Thatcher’s
including
the
task
forces
Nevertheless,
military
South
The
force
were
as
well
of
Britain’s
divided
This
HMS
the
be
force
Hermes,
carried
a
split
Island,
such
was
merchant
Queen
and
an
two,
a
II,
islands,
of
nd
them,
to
British
the
Navy
of
task
in
accordance
was
carriers
days
000
forces
reducing
and
the
its
South
and
with
its
Argentine
force
by
size,
Atlantic
invasion,
had
set
troops.
sail
solutions,
the
for
into
The
13
a
which
there
the
In
was
the
Argentine
all
voyage
at
an
they
and
Uganda
some
65
would
airstrip
continue
while
that
aircraft,
to
still
confused
approached
force.
and
ships
Ascension
conict
air
to
capabilities.
Invincible
would
carrier-borne
a
required
position
as
part
in
destroyers,
stop
USA
ambiguous
to
of
000-km
Nevertheless
limited
essentially
Canberra,
supply
The
regulars
trained
logistic
service.
land
important
HMS
liners
throughout
an
was
and
The
army
an
elements
consisting
military.
British
of
what
the
carriers,
making
on
of
specically
medical
pressed
force
that
all
passenger
Argentines.
third
it
soldiers.
formed
were
formed
aircraft
States
be
and
and
consisted
response,
two
Britain
the
and
artillery,
7,000
sailors
Marines
within
were
task
would
one
28
civilian
United
diplomatic
roughly
and
of
owned
the
angered
the
These
the
support
practical
to
when,
naval
capabilities
that
force
give
and
a
Royal
substantial
by
many
ve
brigades
The
included
with
island
some
including
administered
trying
time
Royal
aircraft
contained
ships,
Elizabeth
landing
in
its
two
reaction
operations.
as
of
into
operations,
task
frigates,
a
within
together
Marines.
rapid
and
on
put
consisted
Royal
amphibious
carry
had
at
the
Atlantic.
as
division
came
efforts,
decommissioning
icebreakers.
British
incursion
downsizing
about
the
42
Although
the
45
2
C A U S E S
A N D
E F F E C TS
O F
20 T H - C E N T U R Y
Harrier
Jump
as
did
they
not
as
fast
Jets
the
as
W A R S
used
ability
the
by
for
the
British
both
Argentine
were
traditional
Mirage
or
versatile
and
Super
aircraft,
vertical
combining
take-off,
they
were
Étendard.
FALKLANDS/MALVINAS
WAR
OF
1982
Para.
South
West
Falkland
British
land
Atlantic
Ocean
at
Pebble
Port
San
Carlos
Island
Port
Argentina
Braz.
San
Douglas
Carlos
Uru.
Port
Buenos
King
Aires
Roy
Teal
Cove
Louis
Inlet
San
George
Port
Howard
Carlos
Puerto
Tandil
No
Bay
Belgrano
Chile
d
Man’s
Stanley
Land
n
u
o
S
South
Queen
Atlantic
Charlotte
Fitzroy
Goose
Darwin
Green
Trelew
Bay
Ocean
Fox
Bay
Sound
n
a
Island
l
k
Rivadavia
Choiseul
Lafonia
d
Weddell
Comodoro
Falkland
North
Lively
l
a
F
Islands
Rio
Port
Gallegos
Arm
Adventure
Island
Stephens
Sound
East
Speedwell
Island
Bay
Falkland
of
Harbours
British
200-mile
Ushuaia
war
zone
Argentine
troop
concentrations
South
Argentine
air
force
0
Areas
Argentine
naval
Argentine
air
Atlantic
bases
of
conflict
40
mi
bases
0
British
46
20
Ocean
combat
advance
range
▲
The Falklands/Malvinas War, 1982.
▲
The Royal Navy ship HMS Ardent on escort duty during the Falklands/Malvinas War
30
60
km
C H A P T E R
2 . 2 :
Argentina
Argentina’s
C O M B A T A N T S
Class discussion
navy
had
the
ability
to
operate
in
all
three
major
aspects
of
What diculties did the location of the
naval
warfare:
submarine,
surface
and
air.
Although
her
vessels,
including
islands pose for the British military?
four
submarines,
strength
120
various
of
states
Junta’s
force
of
for
was
Étendards,
that
“dirty
US
and
armed
posed
forces
operations
The
the
Its
air
latter
against
threat
was
against
force
also
equipped
Carter
its
a
its
were
air
the
US-made
ammunition
President
war”
they
mixed.
upkeep.
Weapons
embargo
dated,
Argentine
available
the
Super
missile.
▲
the
aircraft
quality
and
of
were
the
force.
British
Skyhawks
had
with
British
It
had
task
the
limited
political
as
in
deadly
a
in
The
older
of
The
around
and
Mirage
Exocet
result
1976
forces.
force.
were
French-made
implemented
domestic
to
the
in
III
anti-ship
US
response
arms
to
the
opponents.
A French-built Mirage III similar to those used by the Argentine air force during the
Falklands/Malvinas War
47
2.3
Strateg y and tactics
Conceptual understanding
Key questions
➔
To what extent was British strategy determined by geography?
➔
How did Argentina seek to overcome its military weaknesses?
Key concepts
➔
Continuity
➔
Perspective
Great Britain
Faithful
to
British
government
Islands
the
on
12
The
Crisis
The
MEZ
vessel
the
stated
islands,
zone
any
the
the
reinforcing
air
the
Island.
the
air.
shelter
further
for
Class discussion
This
and
by
so
Time
far
operations
then
was
a
air
cover
force
in
the
was
bombers
as
the
task
Zone
the
military
(320
The
their
the
also
from
concern
effective
base
to
in
km)
notice
positions
rest
force
Missile
(TEZ),
primary
US
avoid
of
approached
Argentines
supporting
the
force
needed
by
Cuban
200-mile
carriers,
to
act
“blockade”.
target.
the
an
Argentine
Argentine
supported
essence
did
of
Falkland
(MEZ)
the
task
the
from
directly
be
it
Exclusion
aircraft
on
as
any
the
legitimate
raids
heavy
and
the
Total
found
operating
as
As
the
Zone
during
preventing
from
Bombing
of
a
Thatcher’s
instead
consider
target.
to
Adequate
task
Exclusion
concern
civilian,
years,
suggesting
would
aircraft,
Sound
on
be
were
Ascension
refuelled
invasion
of
the
could
would
task
not
in
force
operate
support.
would
moving
or
400
surrounding
“quarantine”
changed
bombers
the
area
same
British
difcult,
was
from
the
legitimate
limited.
of
the
Maritime
Operating
heavy
proved
a
term
any
air.
previous
of
permission
for
Falklands
out.
long
Land
was
a
was
forces.
Elements
in
the
British
it
had
military
the
the
“blockade”,
the
zone
MEZ
from
strength
word
that
same
British
undertaken
calling
used
vessel,
of
blockade
States
the
without
indicated
a
the
they
within
which
of
United
when
strategy
up
April,
semantics
war.
for
set
consist
against
the
of
establishing
Argentine
beachheads
forces
at
Goose
at
San
Green.
Carlos
The
What justication could the British
campaign
was
to
come
to
a
conclusion
with
the
capture
of
Stanley.
use for establishing their Maritime
Exclusion Zone?
Argentina
Initial
Argentine
respond
in
operations
leave
48
strategy
strength
too
Britain
and
difcult
with
little
relied
that
for
a
on
the
the
British
option
hope
South
but
task
to
that
Atlantic
force.
negotiate
the
British
winter
would
would
The
surprise
the
transfer
attack
of
not
make
the
would
islands.
C H A P T E R
The
growing
tensions
over
the
islands
in
early
1982,
2 . 3 :
however,
S T R A T E G Y
A N D
T A C T I C S
blunted
Class discussion
the
surprise.
either
advocate
launched
the
the
British
meant
Once
that
the
would
Falkland
of
aircraft
on
air
their
force
their
prolong
had
the
worst
advantages
aircraft
war,
of
army
the
to
as
the
the
decoys
ships
British
than
not
to
lure
the
others
would
be
weather.
The
and
on
smaller
to,
its
they
a
the
start
based on faulty assumptions? To what
degree was this obvious at the time?
also
reserves.
realized
that
proximity.
at
of
To what extent were Argentine plans
then
allowing
strategy
them
number
If
Junta
early
ships
allow
attacked.
to
hoped
British
would
forced
The
geographic
the
would
mobilizing
settled
and
on
superiority
had
invasion
power
attacks
while
they
they
States
neutral.
nished
force,
air
United
remain
full-scale
in
–
the
winter
had
launch
numeric
or
earlier
responding
would
that
resolution
committed
Their
from
assumed
months
the
were
Sound.
away
quick
Argentine
Junta
rely
a
avoid
the
British
Argentine
for
also
operation
to
that
the
some
Argentina
sea
to
The
and
in
deploy
British
Argentines
could
withdraw.
Source skills
the
The British response
naval
four
Prime
Minister
Margaret
Thatcher’s
speech
task
days
of
on
the
Falklands
Crisis,
29
to
the
South
Atlantic
aggression
within
against
the
to
Falkland
Parliament
force
Argentina’s
April
Islands.
1982.
What
incentive
would
there
have
been
for
the
http://www.totalpolitics.com/speeches/war/falklands-
Argentine
Junta
to
give
Mr.
Haig’s
ideas
more
than
war/34258/speech-on-the-conduct-of-the-falklands-
the
most
cursory
glance
if
Britain
had
not
under-
war.thtml
pinned
“.
.
.
step
us
the
that
to
Government
had
achieve
a
has
taken
reasonable
our
every
prospect
objectives
–
the
of
Argentine
occupation
of
forces
the
administration,
and
the
dispatch
not
make
islands,
and
a
the
of
their
restoration
long-term
acceptable
not
only
to
the
of
solution
House
of
the
Falkland
is
British
the
can
Government’s
achieve
those
most
but
We
have
to
Mr.
Haig’s
What
earnest
by
hope
a
about
means.
that
in
I
a
everything
attempts
shall
does
to
the
House
With
Mr.
Haig’s
way
if
the
mean
reasonable
to
have
our
by
“every
prospect
possible
of
helping
objectives”?
to
that
we
can
nd
a
solution
something
more
discuss
its
the
origin,
value
purpose
and
and
limitations
of
to
source
for
a
historian
studying
British
by
to
resolve
the
Falklands
crisis.
to
Using
this
source
the
Government
has
also
the
and
to
strengthen
our
initiative
would
British
extent
your
to
own
which
knowledge,
the
British
taken
pursued
both
diplomatic
and
diplomatic
never
have
options
Government
had
not
consistently
in
resolving
the
got
Falklands
under
a
reference
military
efforts.
will
what
moment.
knows,
measures
up
that
government
military
give
byforce.”
Thatcher
had
achieve
evaluate
As
Government
negotiated
3
say
Argentine
seized
that
efforts
diplomatic
with
persuasion
the
this
encourage
settlement
Gentle
Islands.
objectives
done
the
have
content,
settlement.
force?
Questions:
2
we
diplomatic
which
us
It
a
task
of
step
inhabitants
for
the
illegal
1
is
of
helping
withdrawal
end
search
the
they
the
its
possible
crisis.
sent
49
2.4
Operations
Conceptual understanding
Key questions
➔
What role did Argentine air power play in the war?
➔
To what extent were the British forces in the South Atlantic vulnerable
to air power?
➔
To what extent did the Argentines have a viable defence plan for the
islands once they occupied them?
Key concepts
➔
Cause
➔
Consequence
➔
Signicance
Operation Rosario and its aftermath
The
Argentine
tracked
capital.
small
the
British
islands.
force
Not
the
Royal
happen
much
the
a
were
responding
Thatcher’s
recent
negotiation
galvanized
the
Prime
Thatcher
was
by
the
could
their
the
the
the
their
of
so
could
they
have
Thatcher
and
and
State
a
at
task
the
Sir
force
hope
silenced
the
public
or
the
very
her
to
this
the
go
a
that
difcult
cabinet
mood
who
sail
in
that
was
assured
48
hours.
presented.
dissenters
her
to
and
Leach
ready
with
not
Minister’s
that
and
indicating
be
of
Henry
British
islands.
would
Prime
about
would
the
weakness
most
thus
by
reversed
the
the
along
invasion
that
was
capture
intended
the
Defence
persuaded
The
so
out
attack
landing
whether
for
and
to
with
the
seek
defended
realized
on
and
withdrawn,
the
order
over
they
be
to
island
were
were
economic
Admiral
grasped
Parliament
island
resources
recourse.
Lord
to
believed
divided
more
Sea
was
islands
positions
surprise,
current
only
cabinet
the
that
landing
airport
the
Argentines
force
Once
the
location
defended
500
The
amphibious
take
separate
evacuation
Secretary
First
he
of
with
far
a
an
to
impression
on
deeply
assurance,
face
islands.
the
them
Minister
and
WithLeach’s
and
force,
was
at
commander
location
for
was
that
invasion
unopposed.
islands
recapturing
the
reinforcing
from
the
land
some
give
combination
report
defending
and
in
cabinet
The
all,
whose
largely
began
to
called
force
negotiations.
different
landed
war.
of
for
This
Marines
In
to
force
to
Royal
wanting
way
Argentines
50
of
Marines
at
invasion
were
Governor.
occupation,
60
for
vehicles.
Commandos
the
paving
plan
landing
in
decision
her
to
cabinet
retake
C H A P T E R
▲
British Royal Marines about to go on patrol during the Falklands/Malvinas War
As
soon
war,
on
as
three
main
American
effort
by
general
Ford
was
of
States
the
force.
own
the
a
military
had
the
its
emphasis
The
charter
British
would
rst
The
the
Latin
crisis,
the
as
that,
before
this
the
and
the
up
British.
a
of
of
the
The
the
not
took
of
UN
Security
UN.
islands
Council
was
no
resolution
as
the
a
an
and
act
The
drafted
of
found
last
that
demand,
diplomatic
hand
bringing
withdrawal
be
of
for
members
ineffectual.
502/1982,
to
left
show
their
to
it
had
as
show
self-determination
islanders,
and
justication
to
This
army
Council.
force
initiative,
a
of
Strangely,
task
the
solution
the
an
Nixon
approaches
the
centred
mediation
was
the
forces.
want
any
Resolution
UN,
principle
to
of
hostilities,
of
Haig
both
military
tentative
diplomatic
charter
the
shooting
Organization
associated
did
and
April.
in
Security
the
were
cessation
the
left
the
therefore
secrecy
3
a
a
efforts
ineffectual
NATO
before
and
support
on
of
into
These
the
Haig.
invasion
before
and
but
posts
that
Argentines
principles
if
matter
believed
fury.
O P E R A T I O N S
with
pandering.
and
the
Falklands/Malvinas
passed.
The
British
had
won
the
round.
OAS
she
a
of
emphasizes
American
OAS
for
forces,
the
forever
The
the
of
Council
principles
on
knew
be
for
issues
held
escalate
a
(UN),
Alexander
commander
The
with
well-meaning
denunciation
Council
diplomatic
cause.
of
the
as
easily
Nations
State
invasion
called
could
erupted
Vietnam,
even
plans.
Argentinemilitary
respected
a
such
to
British,
of
in
brought
actual
no
resolution
by
Atlantic
Security
British
a
brought
seeking
the
and
and
it
it
United
intelligence
Argentina
regarding
the
served
that
like
stop
Secretary
had
South
to
(OAS)
Argentine
aggression,
of
US
who
looked
efforts
forums:
Argentina
the
her
crisis
administrations
Faulty
for
the
diplomatic
2 . 4 :
was
with
states
proved
both
a
a
of
the
OAS
troublesome
member
Argentina.
This
of
generally
forum
NATO
apparent
supported
for
with
the
USA
Britain
conict
of
the
Argentine
during
and
a
the
member
interests
was
51
2
C A U S E S
A N D
E F F E C TS
O F
20 T H - C E N T U R Y
compounded
signatories
regard
had
for
a
and,
The
by
the
most
attack
a
on
of
considering
was
of
more
with
paled
the
one
the
Junta
of
was
Dozo
the
logistical
as
in
USA
and
terms
the
was
to
with
and
all.
By
ways
not
the
difcult
for
British
in
Haig.
three
Anaya.
end
lined
more
of
for
than
There
of
the
the
start.
mediator
Argentines.
Britain.
the
no
Junta
mission
with
foreign
Dealing
appeared
Haig’s
calling
vote
resolution.
American
of
to
Argentina
the
the
a
–
and
from
from
of
for
leaders
clearly
April,
Britain
that
the
States
ignored
terms
As
bound
United
doomed
ideal
Admiral
intelligence
which
abstained
implications
the
up
the
aggressors,
failure,
the
of
the
denouncing
States
many
between
and
on
Pact,
United
States
proved
Galtieri,
end,
Rio
Argentine
process
material,
The
the
countries
attack
the
comparison
General
1947,
connected
an
decision-making
unsuccessful
an
United
also
of
Argentines
closely
in
as
under
mission
the
consequences
policy,
Pact
America
hostilities.
diplomatic
position
asit
Rio
Latin
resolution
cessation
Haig’s
The
an
won
–
W A R S
clear
–
General
came
Britain,
to
an
providing
support.
Class discussion
How did the war aect US inuence in
the region?
▲
The Royal Navy ship HMS Antelope explodes after being attacked by Argentine aircraft
The air war
After
easily
disabling
on
to
the
wasted
lost
the
retaking
the
Falkland
no
time
several
became
a
or
naval
Argentine
air
The
The
this
source
Argentine
of
Belgrano,
a
the
of
the
from
continue
For
Royal
the
a
321
on
1
proceeded
May,
of
with
her.
engagement
the
most
part,
from
that
HMS
who
torpedoed
sailors
point.
Shefeld
Super
success
it
defenders,
Navy
destroyer
have
process
force
rules
French-made
to
the
submarine
British
war.
in
arrived
taking
the
the
and
British
Argentine
Navy
sank
to
the
force
on
sinking
red
April,
Fé,
Royal
after
clear
would
25
task
which
better,
missile
force
the
conformed
stayed
fared
on
Santa
attacks
day,
controversy
Exocet
air
air
next
action
forces
force
Argentine
When
launching
cruiser
not
French-made
52
in
Georgia
submarine
Islands.
aircraft.
Argentine
Whether
South
Argentine
The
with
Étendard
against
the
a
jet.
Royal
C H A P T E R
Navy
ships
throughout
the
war,
especially
when
they
moved
into
2 . 4 :
O P E R A T I O N S
close
TOK discussion
quarters
around
attempts
to
at
retake
the
islands
mediation
the
by
to
support
Peru
and
Falklands/Malvinas
land
the
was
operations.
United
about
Nations
to
By
20
failed
May,
and
last
the
effort
What are the ethical implications of
selling weapons? What responsibility
begin.
does the seller have for the use of the
weapons once they are sold?
Operations on the Islands
Sheltering
landed
three
at
their
San
separate
meeting
little
combination
air
attacks
British
attack
on
began
to
staging
The
Goose
began
the
the
more
Green
27
for
and
May
and
surround
forces
of
the
to
after
to
garrison
not
and
in
its
a
it.
Stanley
and
at
moved
on
of
700
of
this
000
The
the
As
ashore,
a
Argentine
cost
of
invasion
the
one
eet
unsuccessful,
British
to
British
forces
harass
the
command
garrison
beachhead.
the
British
500
The
defenders.
forces
the
on
of
14
June
attack
forced
After
moved
strength,
eventual
at
attackers
engagements
position
survivors
the
Argentine
Argentine
compelled
at
the
British
inland.
the
smaller
attacks.
continued
ghting,
the
men
through
although
carriers.
force
secure
days
series
on
the
establishing
4,000
although
Stanley.
Fitzroy,
and
12
air
islands,
capital,
long-range,
attack
From
main
surprise
attacks
aircraft
further
the
putting
day,
British
two
two
diversionary
Air
one
was
and
and
the
approximately
blunder
capital
on
the
the
from
achieved
Argentine
limited
surrounding
moved
Argentine
with
British
the
Darwin
costly
the
ground
distant
and,
May
damaged.
days,
more
21
British
through
however,
a
island
missteps
two
inland,
objective,
on
on
Nevertheless,
surrender
high
and
several
move
opted
abortive
repulsed
between
the
The
Argentine
sunk
area.
rst
instead
beachheads
of
for
eet
across
resistance.
were
ship
continued
invasion
Carlos,
on
an
to
captured
the
British
surrender
of
the
1982.
53
2.5
Eects of the Falklands/Mal vinas War
Conceptual understanding
Key questions
➔
To what extent did the war change British policy toward the Falklands/
Malvinas?
➔
What were the domestic consequences of the war in both Argentina
and Britain?
Key concepts
➔
Consequence
What were the outcomes of the war?
Capturing
and
holding
Argentina
746
dead
dead
cost
this
were
gure
ships.
these
In
both
does
many
to
the
citizens,
light
of
held
that
a
and
only
immediate
while
In
at
1983
country’s
54
Junta
the
April
until
Almost
sank.
and
replacement
had
of
14
half
June
of
the
Recapturing
US$1.19
of
lost
ramications
post-w a r
same
Fund
debt
Alfonsín
dirty
to
war
to
the
pl ag ue
ti me
had
cost
Argentine
the
billion,
equipment
that
reached
a nd
agre e me nts .
to
a
islands
although
and
far
beyond
dirty
By
at
would
justice.
outrage
president
Political
war
1983
the
By
free
the
1986,
of
its
parties
that
into
elections
a
own
Reynaldo
emerged
head
begin
against
against
the
were
centre-left
process
of
pressure
bringing
from
the
stop.
we l l
was
wa s
Junta.
the
dis ma l
it
public
conducted
interim
power
ina ti o n
the re
Al fo nsí n
the
of
had
formed.
government
p e r i od
(I MF )
of
face
it
The
during
were
process
w o ul d
the
that
resigned.
parties
the
this
in
war”
dismantling
Raúl
President
Monetary
Belgrano
position
exace r b a te d
that
the
2
casualties,
the
war
“dirty
Alfonsín’s
brought
war
their
the
new
brought
situation
this
from
wounded.
the
770
underground
perpetrators
military
The
and
driven
day
and
include
military
government.
the
not
ways,
oversaw
been
when
dead
sustain
the
sea
islands
1,200
numbers.
war
Bignone
at
250
sterile
Unable
had
lost
Britain
the
and
 n an c i a l
in t o
wo u ld
lim it e d
for c e d
would
th e
e nd
to
up
si t u at i on
21 st
run
as
g ro wt h
ap pe al
h a vi n g
in
c e nt ur y.
hig h
in
to
to
the
the
as
Ar g e nt i n a ,
In
th e
90 0%
eco n om y.
In t e r na t i on a l
r e n a nc e
the
C H A P T E R
2 . 5 :
E F F E C T S
O F
T H E
F A L K L A N D S / M A LV I N A S
W A R
L TA
Research skills
Use the following table to explore Argentina’s economy before and after the war.
1981
1985
Ination rate
Gross national product
Defence spending
Unemployment rate
Possible conclusion:
While
failure
political
for
three
stabilize
years
a
radically
and
the
action
it
was
critics
meant
advantage
to
the
the
in
insulated
even
Whether
speeches
though
Argentine
case.
year,
to
It
they
was
to
on
the
the
and
been
this
been
and
with
point
of
and
have
the
marked
and
Air
for
case
party
patriotic
this
Force
from
drastic
to
It
the
public
preferred
is
not
and
into
the
an
British
that
election
society
without
invoke
certainly
the
increased
policies.
Despite
cuts,
the
such
measures
reductions
point;
cabinet
election
would
domestic
spending
meant
power
sentiment
it
within
public.
unpopular
Royal
the
She
by
who
her
won
it
in
unable
seen
parlayed
difcult.
to
been
Falklands/Malvinas
leader
divisions
she
Argentina,
had
the
over
wave
deep
Could
in
actually
islands
in
She
leadership,
decisive
control
privatization
Navy
had
from
a
was
have
ahead
of
victory
Her
Parliament
of
as
despite
woes.
would
push
Royal
of
Junta
this
capitalized
programme
the
the
recapture
War?
She
the
style
Britain’s
community
economic
condence
general
She
following
Falklands
discernible
former.
be
for
government.
L TA
a
to
the
enduring
victory
the
the
increased.
victory
little
negotiation.
perceived
defeat
Thatcher’s
economy.
international
accompanied
and
with
faltering
altered
political
for
conict
before
Thinking skills
Thatcher ’s Secretary of State for Defence
the
John Nott had drafted a repor t prior
invasion.
to the war that indicated the islands
Having
gone
to
such
great
lengths
and
expense
to
preserve
to
reassert
its
position
in
would be very dicult to defend with
the
South
Atlantic,
Britain
had
little
choice
but
her
presence
resources as they then stood. How did
there.
A
new
air
base
was
built,
garrisoned
with
some
1,500
troops
who
the Falkland/Malvinas War change this?
were
still
there
on
the
25th
anniversary
of
the
conict.
With
the
growing
What was the British military presence in
prospect
of
large
offshore
oil
deposits
in
the
South
Atlantic,
the
British
the islands in 2005? What percentage of
stance
in
1982
almost
seems
prescient.
Thirty
years
after
the
war
the
the British defence budget was taken up
British
government
spends
some
£200
million
per
year
on
the
defence
of
with Falklands’ defence?
the
islands.
55
Exam-style questions and fur ther reading
Exam-style questions
1
To
what
extent
was
the
Falklands/Malvinas
War
preventable
through
negotiation?
2
Examine
the
role
of
Falklands/Malvinas
3
Examine
the
role
of
Falklands/Malvinas
4
Examine
and
5
the
United
role
States
in
the
development
of
the
the
United
Nations
in
the
development
of
the
War.
relationship
consequences
Compare
the
the
the
War.
of
the
played
Falklands/Malvinas
between
domestic
concerns
Falklands/Malvinas
by
air
and
naval
and
the
causes
War.
power
in
the
conduct
of
War.
Fur ther reading
Aitken,
Jonathan.
Bloomsbury.
New
Middlebrook,
Sword.
Privratsky,
56
Margaret
Thatcher:
Power
and
Personality.
USA.
Martin.
2009.
The
Argentine
Fight
Martin.
2012.
The
Falklands
War.
for
the
Falklands.
Pen
UK.
Middlebrook,
Sword.
2013.
York,
Kenneth
UK.
L.
2015.
Logistics
in
the
Pen
and
Falklands
Sword,
War.
Pen
UK.
and
and
3
THE VIETNAM WAR: REVOLUTIONARY
WAR IN INDO-CHINA
Global context
As
of
with
the
order
the
into
Empire
spectre
and
an
likely
the
its
the
The
First
War
World
threw
collapse
army
situation
of
France’s
of
World
ux.
with
complex
more
end
Second
still
even
in
of
more
each
month
in
this
status
of
its
in
new
the
The
end
made
with
post-war
order
colonies
even
The
grew
so.
a
as
such
the
vulnerable
of
ideology
as
of
the
world
ally,
but
more
post-war
for
that
condition
was
was
combining
with
nationalism
opportunities
around
French
anti-colonialist,
instability
great
unclear
more
States,
implications
such
paradigms
period.
was
the
forces
a
The
order
United
moderately
Japanese
eld
world
world
former
the
international
uncertain.
ideological-based
place
the
the
War,
the
of
the
new
old
global
imperialism.
years
to
global
traditional
and
nationalist
sought
still
struggling
provided
movements
capitalize
imperial
on
the
powers.
Timeline
1945
Ho Chi Minh proclaims an independent
Vietnam and issues a Declaration of
September
Independence; street ghting in Hanoi
between French forces and Viet Minh
General Leclerc takes command of the
October
French forces in Indo-China
1946
Ho Chi Minh signs an interim agreement
March
with French administrators to end hostilities
Viet Minh attack French installation in
December
Hanoi – the war begins
1947
French forces launch Operation Lea against
October
Viet Minh stronghold in the Viet Bac
1949
French General Alessandri begins
September
operations designed to deny the Viet Minh
Moa Zedong proclaims the People’s Republic
local logistic and supply support
of China after claiming victory in the Chinese
October
Civil War; Chinese material and advisors
begin to ow to the Viet Minh
57
3
C A U S E S
A N D
E F F E C TS
O F
20 T H - C E N T U R Y
W A R S
1950
Viet Minh capture Dong Khe in rst large-
September
scale Viet Minh operation with coordinated
ar tillery
Battle of Route Coloniale 4
October
General de Lattre de Tassigny assumes
December
command of French forces in Indo-China
1951
Battle of Vinh Yen
January
March
Day River Battles
Battle of Mao Khe
May–June
December
Black River Battles
1952
General Salan assumes command of
French force in Indo-China; heavy ghting
January
on Route Coloniale 6
November
Battle of Na San
1953
Viet Minh invade Laos
April
General Navarre assumes command
June
of French forces in Indo-China
French launch Operation Castor – a
paratroop assault on the Dien Bien
Phu valley; the French begin to build
November–
December
their base
Viet Minh build siege force around Dien
1953–1954
Bien Phu
Battle of Dien Bien Phu opens with massive
Viet Minh bombardment; French strongpoint
1954
“Beatrice” is overrun
French strongpoint “Gabrielle” is overrun
March
Last ight out of or into Dien Bien Phu –
French base now dependent on parachute
April
drop or supplies
The French surrender Dien Bien Phu to
the Viet Minh; Geneva Conference on
Indo-China begins
58
May
Viet Minh siege of Dien Bien Phu tightens
3.1
Causes of the Vietnam War
Conceptual understanding
Key questions
➔
How did Ho Chi Minh combine nationalism and communism in the Viet Minh
movement?
➔
How did the end of the Second World War in the Pacic aect the beginning
of the war?
Key concepts
➔
Cause
➔
Consequence
➔
Continuity
C
H
I
N
A
Nanning
T
Dien
O
Bien
N
K
I
N
Phu
.
R
Hanoi
g
a
n
h
a
T
u
Haiphong
L
n
M
a
N
Louang
Chiang
Rai
phrabang
Hainan
e
Chiang
Mai
n
a
i
t
Vinh
n
e
i
T
h
V
Lampang
a
x
h
18º
e
n
Udon
Dong
Muang
TAK
Hoi
Loei
17º
Seno
Phitsanulok
Tchepone
Savannakhét
H
A
I
L
A
N
Tourane
D
S
T
Paksé
Ubon
Ta
Khli
Korat
M
Ban
Salavan
14º
Pleiku
Stung
Trêng
Tuy
French
Union
Hoa
Forces
Nha
Trang
R
Cobalt
battalions...300
Viet
Minh
Forces
g
n
o
m
e
M
Men.................612,500
Phnom
Penh
SAIGON
Men.................335,000
Cobalt
battalions...172
Viet
Minh
controlled
0
40
80
120
areas
Cochinchina
160
MILES
▲
Map of Vietnam, July 1954
59
3
C A U S E S
A N D
E F F E C TS
O F
20 T H - C E N T U R Y
W A R S
Long-term causes
France
By
asserted
1885
control.
groups
what
education
a
overly
complex
and
of
at
lack
Minh
of
the
expense
seen
of
The
the
against
a
In
continuation
on
western
affront
this
to
in
the
this
of
used
to
there
19th
sense
this
nationalists.
assimilation
were
Although
rule
organization.
as
an
authorities
Vietnamese
further
colony.
nationalist
French
emphasis
resources
French
period.
French
Vietnamese
aggravating
to
30–year
The
provided
Vietnamese
widespread
be
various
designed
a
centralized
control.
Church
further
uprisings
can
after,
westernization.
culture,
over
under
French
Catholic
Meanwhile
France
for
Viet
of
Vietnam
come
and
to
bureaucracy
rule.
signicant
failed
the
period
Roman
Vietnamese
metropolitan
they
the
over
had
resistance
programme
inefcient
number
control
Vietnam
this
armed
and
traditional
for
now
Throughout
staged
introduced
An
imperial
is
made
enrich
were
a
century,
Ho
Chi
nationalist
Minh
tradition.
Short-term causes
The
rst
amid
end
a
of
act
30-year
and
Second
to
adrift
in
trying
to
reassert
were
trying
to
use
not
the
been
defeated
explosions
of
in
thousands
territory
of
this
let
gap
nationalist
small
they
the
alone
stepped
party
for
the
received
French
proclaimed
Ho
of
Chi
Japanese)
send
on
In
that
the
months
Viet
Minh
north
between
of
the
what
re-occupation
of
an
no
country
he
of
the
results.
French
never
As
and
Ho’s
Viet
north
by
Vietnam
ratied
the
Minh
troops
the
on
French
of
the
French
rose
so
and
did
and
issuing
around
a
he
a
for
led
before
Hanoi
The
of
and
of
1776.
his
occupying
south.
Choosing
to
for
of
the
recognition
French
negotiations
Haiphong
and
Declaration
agreed
violence
a
the
which
and
interests
Union”.
of
transfer
Vietnamese
had
troops
exchange
of
the
document
the
Ho
further
levels
hundreds
transferred.
entered
competing
in
be
directly,
American
troops
left
administered
Minh
had
amounts
for
withdrew
occupying
South-East
cataclysmic
Minh,
1941
(who
evils,
In
plan
Nationalist
two
movements
vast
would
Viet
element
Defeated
Japanese
the
of
the
the
colonizers
situation
From
1945,
the
agreement
in
the
Viet
the
of
real
Japanese
Chinese
lesser
no
power
of
the
charge
Japanese
juggled
“within
frustration
that
the
French
the
strange
in
before.
states.
result
French
and
the
the
a
with
September
Ho
of
and
believed
independent
government
those
still
the
modelled
followed,
Party,
2
as
amorphous
pre-war
that
from
between
nationalist
fact
leadership.
As
the
developed
emerging
unseen
The
while
leader
Vichy
Ho
way
This
whom
against
troops,
deliberately
the
the
a
the
Pacic
Minh,
and
Independence
own
to
support.
independence
by
troops
the
situation
independent
rather
communist
against
American
could
and
Vietnam
relationship
chaos.
Nagasaki.
Japanese
idea
with
force
and
but
now
adding
in
authority
establish
eld,
Asia
an
politics
compounded
the
armed
to
is
complex
deteriorating,
power
ux
Hiroshima
of
guerrilla
colony
in
what
international
The
colonial
was
throughout
power,
Into
the
confusion
in
administrative
were
Asia
War.
was
traditional
were
conict
confusing
World
superpowers
ideology
empires
Class discussion
the
dynamic
the
victorious
of
of
yielded
between
Hanoi.
Open
To what extent was a war between the
warfare
erupted
in
December
with
the
Viet
Minh
retreating
to
their
Viet
French and the Vietnamese inevitable
Bac
stronghold
fromwhich
given the goals of each side?
struggle
60
against
the
French.
they
would
conduct
the
rest
of
the
nine-year
C H A P T E R
3 . 1 :
C A U S E S
O F
T H E
V I E T N A M
W A R
Source skills
The Viet Minh
Source A
Ho
Chi
Minh
Vietnamese
2
“All
men
certain
of
Declaration
September
are
created
unalienable
Happiness.”
Independence
means:
right
all
to
standard
of
oppressed
and
justice.
The
French
abdicated.
have
at
for
have
“The
the
earth
and
and
America
are
and
equal
years,
the
have
won
centuries.
in
from
Creator
Life
the
1776.
have
acted
and
with
the
pursuit
Declaration
In
birth;
a
broader
all
the
the
people
which
In
its
for
monarchic
place
has
to
of
capitulated,
chains,
independence
the
imperialists,
violated
contrary
our
have
broken
overthrown
of
in
French
Fraternity,
They
have
their
of
sense,
peoples
it
have
a
free.
Japanese
have
have
dozens
of
by
Liberty,
appeared
theyhavedeprived
ed,
them
are
statement
eighty
Equality
endowed
these
the
the
of
the
Bao
nearly
a
has
established
liberty…
Dai
has
century
Fatherland.
that
and
humanity
democratic
Emperor
for
abusing
Fatherland
ideals
every
regime
been
our
Our
people
reigned
the
present
Republic…
whole
determined
colonialists
happy
people
time
for
Democratic
the
than
are
States
fellow-citizens.
Our
same
supreme
more
on
Politically:
fettered
the
be
Liberty,
our
United
peoples
to
They
among
immortal
the
and
Nevertheless,
Independence ,
equal.
Rights;
This
of
the
live
of
1945
Vietnamese
to
to
ght
to
people,
the
reconquer
bitter
their
animated
end
by
against
a
common
any
purpose,
attempt
by
the
are
French
country.”
Source B
Ho
Chi
Minh
to
US
Pierre
Brocheux,
“First,
you
like
help,
not
One
must
One
also
a
is
a
One
Chi
in
doesn’t
in
fact
it
through
needs
a
set
of
Ofcer
A
that
task
things
gain
bible.
Minh:
understand
formidable
necessarily
contracts.
say
must
France
Intelligence
Ho
to
that
like
gain
gain
beliefs,
a
Fenn,
independence
cannot
arms,
be
1945.
but
in
gospel,
gave
the
by
apractical
that
a
From
great
without
nature
of
bombs
training
analysis;
and
you
power
some
advice
throwing
propaganda,
me
from
achieved
independence
organization,
Marxism-Leninism
Charles
Biography
outside
and
and
such.
discipline.
might
even
framework.”
Source C
Viet
1
Minh
Not
and
2
Not
or
to
do
what
belongings
to
insist
on
is
to
its
likely
of
the
soldiers
to
(1948)
damage
the
land
and
crops
or
spoil
the
houses
people.
buying
or
borrowing
what
the
people
are
not
willing
to
sell
lend.
3
Never
4
Not
in
directives
to
to
break
do
or
our
speak
word.
what
is
likely
to
make
people
believe
that
we
hold
them
contempt.
61
3
C A U S E S
A N D
E F F E C TS
O F
20 T H - C E N T U R Y
5
To
help
water,
6
In
them
W A R S
in
sewing,
spare
time,
Resistance,
7
Whenever
8
To
teach
their
to
but
tell
not
possible
the
daily
work
(harvesting,
fetching
rewood,
carrying
etc.).
amusing,
to
to
betray
buy
population
simple,
commodities
the
and
short
stories
useful
to
the
secrets.
national
for
those
script
who
and
live
far
from
elementary
the
market.
hygiene.
Source D
Ho
Chi
Ho’s
“Army
cadres
men
Minh,
Selected
cadres
with
He
work
1952
concern
themselves
administrative
standing
eld.
July
Writings
will
forms
on
not
a
components
one
be
truly
whole
come
leg.
jobs,
It
is
solely
Party
wrong
procient
which
would
with
for
a
be
with
cadre
because
not
military
cadres
to
army,
strong
affairs,
Party
be
acquainted
mass,
and
Government
business.
They
only
government
complete
are
with
and
should
like
one
party
one
of
its
tomiss.”
Questions
1
a
To
what
the
extent
chains,
and
have
is
Ho’s
which
won
for
contention
nearly
a
independence
“Our
century
for
the
people
have
have
broken
fettered
Fatherland”
them
[Source
A]
accurate?
b
2
What
With
reference
values
and
methods
3
of
Compare
Ho’s
4
Using
this
the
era.
It
Civil
of
sense
wars
of
of
Vietnam
ousting
pre-war
clock
of
world
back
and
to
and
add
For
over
power
and
for
Source
D?
content,
historians
analyse
the
studying
the
A
and
Source
D
tell
us
about
would
the
rst,
Cold
their
status.
In
War
sweep
along
was
the
the
with
the
of
ideology
played
a
and
a
in
the
Asia
way
were
Ho
and
the
French
and
the
the
years
by
to
in
role
the
the
ongoing
ideology
to
secondary
Viet
Minh
1945–1954
wanted
to
extension
French
willing
among
world
notion
part
Minh
evaluate
War
combatants.
control
that.
knowledge
Indo-China
that
the
own
of
strategy.
South-East
Viet
prevent
your
though,
foreign
the
what
French
main
French.
control
C
Source
Minh.
among
end
two
purpose
Source
guerrilla
the
be
of
by
independence.
would
the
the
the
numbers
62
also
In
free
imperial
Ho’s
conveyed
origin,
contrast
for
then,
that
motives.
its
Viet
sources
in
being
decolonization
would
War,
motives
the
and
the
to
is
limitations
strategy
ideology
In
message
and
the
role
to
mix
in
the
wanted
this
reassert
die
of
Chinese
reclaim
wanted
ght
rst
post-war
their
their
turn
in
a
meant
the
large
3.2
C ombatants
Conceptual understanding
Key questions
➔
How were the French hampered in the early years of the war?
➔
What were the advantages and disadvantages of the Viet Minh structure?
➔
How did political considerations aect both the French and the Viet Minh?
➔
What role did foreign involvement play for both the French and the Viet Minh?
Key concepts
➔
Perspective
➔
Signicance
The Viet Minh
To
say
and
the
that
this
late
scale
unit
is
guerrilla
Forces.
The
routes
well
moved
In
lookout
terms
of
sabotaged
they
Viet
organized
They
the
years
in
force
divisions,
which
operations
support.
level
armies,
–
and
these
using
grew
in
used
of
the
the
to
contained
all
of
the
artillery,
than
men
guerrilla
forces
was
or
hit
elements
supply
sub-divided
into
of
and
required
always
on
ambushes,
were
local,
Distinguish
next
forces
local
the
the
these
of
were
forces.
war.
Viet
run
level
that
In
Minh’s
tactics.
regional
regular
force
needed
and
in
units
As
forces
operations.
the
main
the
the
later
much
large-scale
regular
in
guerrilla
sophistication,
support
Minh
serve
be
units
command.
and
scavenged.
force
these
Popular
movements
force
force,
be
the
or
transportation
would
could
were
At
villages
and
larger
small
equipped
1,000
“traditional”
Minh
central
shouldered
and
the
that
to
small
regular
force
of
large-
Quong
positions
full-time
better
in
when
While
eligible
the
up
units
Viet
intelligence,
were
of
size
in
Viet
Minh
Dan
From
small-
forces
maintained
conducted
traps.
Minh
the
Quong
material
were
were
battalions
Divisions
Viet
you
enemy
Dan
Quong
–
inaccurate
local,
hierarchically.
and
movement
booby
the
and
local
on
is
forces.
maintaining
Viet
based
instance,
war
Minh
conduct
time
forces
and
Viet
to
The
porters
For
the
guerrilla
organized
as
organization,
operations
same
French
set
from
1946–1950
highest
the
Dan
and
level
occasionally
western
the
regionally
regular
were
The
this
military
the
intelligence
abandoned
directed
operated
military
the
for
ability
recruited
used
support
combat,
at
Minh
were
a
the
the
guerrilla
were
area,
to
at
of
capability.
neighbours.
transport
were
yourself
part-time
an
porters
had
while
strictly
design
components,
units
through
was
the
Minh
Quong
their
war
in
combat
providing
on
supply
and
local,
These
as
this
Viet
three
Dan
while
of
operations
into
were
hamlets.
the
the
organization
bottom
to
part
illustrated
1940s,
structured
as
any
well
was
to
and
As
in
organized
conduct
eventually
regiments
force.
most
into
large-scale
armour
and
battalions.
air
For
the
63
3
C A U S E S
A N D
E F F E C TS
O F
20 T H - C E N T U R Y
majority
10
000
were
of
the
men.
war
It
formed
began
is
in
pouring
Commanding
centred
on
a
a
no
the
Viet
Minh
period
south
these
division
coincidence
after
from
that
various
through
inter zone system
territories
Shor t for integrated zones, these were
more
administrative zones used by the
and
reected
Viet Minh. Within each zone, a central
The
interzone
committee coordinated ideological,
assassinations,
the
a
the
Viet
simply
Minh
all
taxation,
that
was
of
recruiting,
a
of
the
such
and
the
This
level
propaganda
structure
whole
regions
military
revolutionary
conict
military
into
system
was
organization
warfare.
including
and
around
divisions
expertise
interzone
of
of
as
China.
command
several
system.
philosophy
strength
equipment
controlled
another
aspects
a
units
conquered
grouped
interzone
than
managed
who
have
larger
when
recently
components
system
so-called
comprehensive
would
these
1949
Mao’s
commander-in-chief
organization
–
W A R S
elections,
supply.
political and administrative functions
The
total
strength
of
the
Viet
Minh
changed
over
time.
In
1947
Giap,
of the Viet Minh. There were six of these
the
Viet
Minh
commander,
had
about
50
000
regular
force
troops
zones in Vietnam.
and
about
this
strength
regional
Class discussion
Giap
40
000
had
and
popular
swelled
popular
commanded
popular
force
and
to
110
forces.
125
000
regional
As
000
the
troops
regular
war
regulars,
75
at
force
reached
000
his
disposal.
and
its
about
By
crescendo
regional
troops
1951
225
in
and
000
1953,
250
000
troops.
How might the Viet Minh recruit its
members?
Viet Minh equipment
Just
as
with
assortment
American
around
some
to
Each
other
called
two
per
the
sides
Viet
27
(PLA)
they
wasn’t
south
to
Viet
dramatically
Viet
Minh
the
of
a
the
to
the
of
War
of
Phu
artillery
Minh
willing
40
amount
with
share
of
planning
at
victory
000
the
it.
PLA
in
at
offered
People’s
and
were
In
their
the
to
period
in
the
4,000
tons
shipment
of
which
Phu.
new
clients.
Army
experience
sent
this
and
79ofcers
Although
1946,
Viet
territory
time
many
military
since
trained
a
the
risen
PLA
the
shipments
Liberation
the
such
Korean
munitions
Bien
logistics.
schools
By
as
would
on,
the
area,
ries,
Dien
1950
of
had
well
They
into
monthly
practical
In
1949.
soldiers
had
this
as
hands
during
month.
recoilless
Chinese
pieces.
tons
and
Minh
guns
their
base
number
victory
motley
Viet
weapons
250
down
a
Czech
ever-larger
main
each
and
warfare
to
trained
the
new
1952,
this
lay
captured
Minh’s
Hanoi,
assistance
PLA
’s
in
the
artillery
brought
wound
Viet
Minh
and
Viet
with
machine
could
brought
Early
the
1946
light
small
they
month
constant
had
six
armed
Japanese,
in
material
French
considerable
than
Viet
after
US
Bien
the
only
ghters
ofcers
about
China.
Dien
out
thousand
each
Korean
nearly
more
help
Minh
the
were
French,
weapons
quantities
gained
seemed
and
north-east
at
Minh
broke
few
reached
crucial
years
had
off
the
large
prove
Material
After
As
a
1950
from
Bac,
faced
month.
would
over
south
war
including
After
supplies
contained
of
victory
arsenal.
the
and
Viet
including
whatever
cast-offs
weapons
and
When
grenades
use
the
arms
ries
mortars,
Minh
of
000
Chinese
War.
French,
small
ries.
60
continue
as
the
of
handfuls
increased
1952–1953,
10
000
China.
The French
The
French
issues
every
fractures
64
forces
bit
ran
as
deep
in
Indo-China
daunting
in
as
post-war
suffered
those
faced
France.
political
by
the
and
Viet
Retribution
for
structural
Minh.
Political
collaborators,
C H A P T E R
ideological
Aid
made
Fourth
in
total
divisions,
a
unied
Republic
during
the
economic
approach
was
weakness,
to
plagued
course
of
the
by
this
war
weak
war.
and
in
dependence
Indo-China
coalition
The
fact
on
the
C O M B A T A N T S
Marshall
impossible.
governments
that
3 . 2 :
–
The
19
French
Four th Republic
Communist
Party
was
a
member
of
some
of
these
governments
The French government from
and
a
vocal
opponent
of
the
war
added
a
level
of
contradiction
and
1946–1958. It was created by a
confusion
to
the
situation
that
made
any
effective
military
action
close
constitution after the Second World War.
to
impossible.
Throughout
manpower.
French
from
the
zone
of
serving
all
the
had
French
tied
a
occupation
in
Expeditionary
from
war
Yalta
colonial
Corps
corners
of
forces
sizable
in
Germany.
theatres
was
what
of
cobbled
was
suffered
portion
left
of
war.
the
chronic
Conscripts
As
together
of
a
France’s
a
were
result
from
French
shortage
post-war
the
legally
French
diverse
Empire.
to
the
forbidden
Far
military
Only
of
army
East
units
about
42%
French Foreign Legion
of
the
French
forces
in
this
war
were
born
in
Metropolitan
France.
Instead
This is a formation of the French army
the
troops
came
from
France’s
North
African
Army
and
colonial
regiments
founded in 1831, made up of non-French
from
Africa
and
Asia.
The
legendary
French
Foreign
Legion
provided
a
nationals who wish to serve in the French
reliable
professional
formation,
as
did
the
regular
parachute
units
of
the
army. Initially the Legion’s ocers were
French
army.
The
French
attempted
to
augment
these
units
with
locally
French, but over time the ocer corps
recruited
but
French-led
auxiliaries
–
generally
local
tribesmen
who
had
contained many nationalities. Likewise
various
reasons
for
ghting
the
Viet
Minh.
These
auxiliaries
were
trained
many French citizens make up the rank
in
secret
camps
by
covert
western
operatives.
and le of the Legion. The Legion has
Local
units
Vietnamese
or
created
conscripted
at
the
generally
the
for
It
–
led,
the
increasingly
of
the
the
new
French
the
themselves
Vietnamese
Americans
lot
Viet
of
overlords
and
these
Minh
“ofcial”
who
Nixon’s
equipped
unenviable
and
nd
Richard
poorly
popular
collaborators
force
of
the
presaging
poorly
was
could
into
behest
“Vietnamized”
effort.
men
with
and
National
wished
1969
added
soldiers
their
often
enforcing
recruited
to
into
Army
see
policy.
little
to
be
system
equally
French
the
since 1831.
was
French
war
between
brutal
brutal
served in every major French conict
war
VNA
caught
of
(VNA),
the
The
to
army
retaliation
oppressive
conscription.
L TA
Thinking and research skills
As a condition of continued military and nancial aid,
●
Iraq 2010
●
Afghanistan 2010
1
What foreign forces were involved? What was the level
the United States insisted that the French turn more and
more of the ghting over to the Vietnamese National Army
(VNA), a process they called “Vietnamization”. President
of military commitment at its height?
Richard Nixon would use this same goal and name in
1969 as a plan for reducing the United States’ military
2
What were the motives of the foreign powers?
3
What were the tasks assigned to the local forces? How
commitment to South Vietnam. The notion of replacing
foreign occupying troops with local security forces was to
were local troops prepared for these tasks?
be used in other wars.
4
What challenges did the local troops face? What
Research the events of the following wars and answer the
challenges did the foreign troops face?
questions that follow.
5
●
Vietnam 1969
●
Bay of Pigs 1961
●
Yugoslav Civil War 1994
How did the foreign power disengage from the country?
How well did the local troops accomplish their security
goals?
65
3
C A U S E S
A N D
E F F E C TS
O F
20 T H - C E N T U R Y
At
the
beginning
W A R S
of
the
conict
the
French
forces
had
a
total
strength
Class discussion
of
115
000.
Why would the Vietnamization of the
(French,
war be impor tant to the United States
55
government?
to
000
In
is
last
Africans,
local
Asian
that
of
mobility,
by
a
of
and
and
these
compounded
degree
years
auxiliaries
remember
fact
the
the
Foreign
150
forces
the
war
000
were
nature
capability
of
this
Legion).
VNA
far
of
had
only
this
to
in
of
it
000
be
is
the
as
it
added
important
ghting
requiring
fraction
175
could
Again,
equal
war,
a
To
troops.
from
the
grown
ability.
did
French
a
This
high
forces.
French equipment
On
paper
situation
problem
was
was
small
to
was
and
not
eventually
The
was
and
using
more
250
and
for
of
of
more
about
275
by
roads
1950
they
the
The
by
of
what
newly
French
for
army
and
inserting
marches
this war?
from
be
66
the
war
variety
–
This
they
–
even
effort.
of
States
eld
of
the
began
would
weapons
crude
active
in
of
at
in
best.
cars
armoured
the
vehicles
of
place
French
armoured
effectiveness
of
On
and
which
the
south
and
forces
gun
personnel
was
country.
and
(Weasels)
known
to
into
used
made
to
in
France’s
war;
next
in
a
C47
that
would
be
the
Minh.
well
In
issue.
for
airplanes
when
hard
fact
dangerous
limited
learned
would
mobility
and
into
of
troops
This
French
the
mobility
but
further
be
Viet
worked
can.
the
war
dropped
the
same
were
1949–1954.
to
the
the
situation,
grueling
helicopters
Algeria
years
overcome
were
elements
half
these
areas
lesson
Indo-China.
other
helicopters
to
the
and
available
against
as
extract
remote
in
the
using
however,
capability
only
combat
that
mobility
frequently
rescue
paratroopers
troops
These,
by
partially
Throughout
were
such
air
option
solved
a
mobility
been
as
and
drops.
planes
way
of
French
have
operations
used
the
out
in
in
was
evacuations
this
The
fought
1950
topography
upon
units
effectiveness.
French
the
mobility
situations
troops
in
a
United
remained
their
could
be
paratroop
condemned
What was the relationship of primitive to new technology during
air
conduct
not
needed
that
number
medical
however,
Dropping
that
helicopters.
in
paratroop
reality,
could
forced
would
other
dangerous
American,
French
with
the
did.
material
States.
Indo-China
was
the
after
supply
the
when
British,
mobility
moved
were
As
material
situation
standardized.
The
by
its
war
into
French
pieces
amphibious
limited
only
forces
French soldiers improvise a raft for a river crossing in 1950.
units
developed
reserved
the
tanks,
the
armed
effort
and
steady
some
later
severely
The
a
limitations
terrain
of
way
be
system
hampered
United
to
keeping
plentiful
reality
personnel
sources.
its
French
road
armed
in
its
ammunition.
the
had
Amphibious
M29C
diverse
units
but
as
years
found
French
and
severely
rst
artillery.
a
the
way
artillery
mobile
carriers
▲
the
form
billion
however,
After
in
French
more
army,
same
equipment
US$3
unreliable
carriers.
scavenged
pieces
limited,
modern
the
acute
became
had
a
non-regulation
spend
French
these
had
much
Japanese
equipment
about
in
uncommon
arms
bankroll
and
French
especially
gathered
German
It
the
suffered
their
before
used
unknown
to
to
give
those
the
who
C H A P T E R
One
was
nominal
air
task.
Fast
for
bombers
the
bad
Phu
the
and
Small
artillery
and
everything
in
Morane
could
One
services
its
the
Hellcat
bombs,
be
of
without
aircraft
the
a
spring
more
could
but
as
metal
jellied
of
were
the
terrifying
–
their
strafe
and
often
Battle
of
weapons
petroleum
and
the
wood
larger
C O M B A T A N T S
enemy
sufcient
bombsights
number
useful,
napalm
of
over
seldom
any
made
were
very
in
enjoyed
was
ghter-bombers
but
the
was
French
however,
There
especially
demonstrated.
air
that
power,
spotting.
these
weather,
French
air
mounted
dubious.
used
This
Bearcat
underwing
was
advantage
power.
3 . 2 :
to
the
drop
accuracy
were
level-ight
hindered
Dien
by
Bien
employed
which
by
ignited
path.
Technology and war: paratroopers
Parachute technology existed from the First World War, but in the absence of
aircraft that could carry signicant numbers of soldiers, the idea of using it to
inject troops to places otherwise inaccessible by ground was debatable.
As such aircraft became more plentiful in the inter-war period, military thinkers
around the world began to imagine how paratroopers might be used in oensive
operations. In the Second World War paratroopers played signicant roles in the
German invasion of both Belgium and Crete. Allied paratroopers were integral to
the invasion of Normandy and Operation Market Garden, the ambitious plan to
capture the Rhine Bridges intact.
Paratroop
military
●
operations
ha d
a
nu mber
of
elements
t hat
wer e
a t tractiv e
for
planners.
An airdrop increased the possibility of surprise, expanding as it did the points
of possible attack .
●
Transpor t by aircraft minimized the eect of dicult terrain.
●
By landing troops behind the front line, the enemy would be forced to defend
in multiple directions.
Paratroop operations also had a number of serious drawbacks.
●
The number of aircraft required to transpor t large numbers of troops often
eliminated some of the element of surprise.
●
Because paratroopers operated independent of supply lines they would have
to jump with all the supplies required to sustain them as a ghting unit. This
often limited both the time paratroopers could operate without resupply from
the air or a link with ground forces as well as the size of munitions they could
use – ar tillery and armour were often beyond their capability.
●
In the brief period between exiting the aircraft and gathering into operational
units on the ground, the paratroopers were incredibly vulnerable to enemy re.
●
While paratroopers could be inser ted into a combat zone by airplanes,
airplanes could not extract them. This was a fact of life brutally evident to
French paratroopers operating in Indo-China.
67
3
C A U S E S
A N D
E F F E C TS
Class discussion
O F
20 T H - C E N T U R Y
W A R S
Technology and war: napalm
To what extent did the United States
Napalm is a jellied form of petroleum used in aerial bombs and amethrowers. Its
suppor t the French war eor t with money
name derives from its two principle components: naphthenic and palmitic acids.
and material? How and why did this
Developed in 1942, napalm was used in the Second World War and became a
suppor t change over the period 1946–
standard, if terrifying, element of all modern military arsenals. In Vietnam it was
1954?
generally used in close suppor t of ground troops. When dropped from aircraft
it produces a terrifying and deadly spectacle, incinerating large areas of jungle
and any people unfor tunate enough to be there. Far from a precision weapon
and fairly unpredictable once unleashed, napalm was the cause of many civilian
casualties during all phases of the Vietnam War.
. . . All of a sudden hell opens in front of my eyes. Hell comes from large egg-
shaped containers, dropping from the rst plane followed by others, eggs
from the second and third plane. Immense sheets of ame extending to over
one hundred metres, it seems, strike terror in the ranks of my soldiers. This is
napalm, the re that falls from the skies. . .[A] bomb falls behind us and I feel
ery breath touching my whole body. The men are now eeing and I cannot
hold them back . There is no way of holding out under the torrent of re, which
ows in all directions and burns everything in its passage. On all sides ame
surrounds us . . . I stop at the platoon commander . . . his eyes are wide with
terror. ‘What is this? The atomic bomb?’ ‘No this is napalm.’
Viet Minh Ocer
Bernard Fall, Street Without Joy: The French Debacle in Indo-China
(Harrisburg, 1961), 39–40 cited in Michael Burleigh, Small Wars, Faraway
Places: Global Insurrection and the Making of the Modern World,
(New York , Viking, 2013) 224.
68
3.3
Strateg y and tactics
Conceptual understanding
Key questions
➔
To what extent did the French have the requisite material to conduct
its strategy?
➔
To what extent did the French actually control territory in Vietnam?
➔
To what extent did eective strategy depend on political control of territory?
Key concepts
➔
Cause
➔
Consequence
The French
Despite
generally
advantage
material.
French
which
an
that
to
colonial
the
may
in
the
troops.
played
war
they
In
On
in
A
of
three
the
of
Coloniale
guerrillas
mentality
and
the
Areas
the
4
the
supply,
early
about
Viet
the
years
one
of
big
strategic
the
military
one
Minh
war
was
engagement
forces,
in
advantage,
thus
in
forcing
strong
a
surrounding
forces
French
the
In
1950
only
did
were
larger
control
and
the
easy
the
of
posts
“control”
created
the
prominently
smaller
and
ease.
in
the
the
Viet
outposts
daylight
one
–
such
war
of
targets
type
of
outposts
area
the
may
but
another
supply
outposts
the
light
posts
the
have
of
this
been
hazardous
specically
the
Minh
outpost
large
the
rejected
cities
countryside.
relatively
in
be
Route
Viet
controlled
controlled
aspect
routes
would
Battle
progressed,
French
Minh
hours,
instinct,
three
victory
the
in
interrupting
other
As
which
–
these
Minh
these
while
military
could
they
recruited
French
and
of
areas
fact
govern
observation
locally
Minh
Some
the
to
contradiction
detachments
Viet
gured
Viet
relative
during
armed
the
with
and
had
in
direct
indicated
Indo-China
Minh.
outposts,
them
neglected
done
a
blockhouses
1946–1950.
posts
situation
be
was
it
French
cover.
in
Between
with
of
plan,
the
this
outposts
French
large-scale
(RC4).
built
hands
large
could
poorly
the
sound
battle,
answer
manned
could
Viet
How
these
strategy
rst
created
The
the
decisive
years
but
such
moved
French
night.
to
the
bring
of
French
and
the
re
military
China
site
to
the
conventional
militarily
a
these
the
vulnerable,
French
in
that
bulk
They
map
into
mortar
from
a
reality
or
string
The
country
right
a
such
strategy.
artillery
of
of
sought
the
Indo-China.
wanted
less
inconsistent
enjoyed
use
been
for
militarily?
country.
were
defeat
have
battle”
and
make
planning
waiting
throughout
and
forces
war.
holdings
“big
to
would
control
their
order
the
this
haphazard
French
strategic
while
their
not
In
they
end
While
the
safe
for
extreme
by
the
at
Viet
69
3
C A U S E S
A N D
E F F E C TS
O F
20 T H - C E N T U R Y
Minh
itself,
units,
also
to
W A R S
commit
resources
to
the
rescue
of
trapped
and
isolated
Class discussion
To what extent was the Viet Minh victory
favoured
attrition-style
the
Viet
Minh
commitment
to
a
long,
drawn-out,
conict.
at RC4 a result of mistakes made by the
In
the
end,
the
French
needed
to
bring
the
war
in
Indo-China
to
a
French command?
resolution
could
an
not
quickly.
and
empire
The
in
French
Alessandri,
deprive
rice,
out
Minh
the
departed
and
areas
Minh
Unfortunately
against
the
and
from
they
the
of
the
these
the
in
war
in
General
and
a
social
far-ung
French
saying
struggle
and
100
an
any
situation
corner
over
victory
could
sought
sort
of
the
saw
if
the
The
political,
be
the
same
forces
to
work.
these
over
local
that
support
programme,
French
misery
war
Viet
by
areas
time.
precisely
as
a
were
as
they
method
Minh,
economic,
won
Viet
deny
to
hold
win
reform
that
territory.
only
to
was
to
for
destroy
seemed
strategy
They
integrated
to
to
effective
Minh
guerrillas
failing
to
social
and
concentrating
facets.
L TA
Thinking and research skills
Research the careers of the following French commanders in Indo-China and complete the following table. Remember,
before anything can be evaluated, it must be set against a criterion. Be sure to describe the criterion against which you
evaluate each commander.
Commander
Philipe Leclerc de
Hauteclocque
Jean-Étienne
Valluy
Roger Blaizot
Marcel Carpentier
Jean de Lattre de
Tassigny
Raoul Salan
Henri Navarre
70
Dates in Indo-China
of
General
sought
support
Viet
resources
much
years.
local
recruits
Minh
By
1949
crucial
push
population
expect
control
as
Viet
military
with
the
could
past
conict
to
so
system
the
approach.
themselves
the
by
on
In
region,
Alessandri
this
lacked
is
to
French
Gradually
military
that
troops
local
they
briey.
Tonkin
depended
re-inltration
the
only
the
support
French
support,
Vietnamese
for
strategy
using
administrative
saw
psychological
all
economic
protracted
Minh
French
a
essentially
regaining
a
local
Viet
then
conict
–
the
Using
and
the
more
experienced
however,
on
for
this
essentials.
Vietnamese
were
victorious
had
and
these
the
nothing
of
The
inevitable
Throughout
political,
Commander
taxes.
infrastructure
Viet
sustain
from
Minh
operations.
small
not
French
Viet
recruits
of
would
domestic
decline.
the
the
guerrilla
Their
Previous postings
Subsequent postings
Evaluation
C H A P T E R
3 . 3 :
S T R A T E G Y
A N D
T A C T I C S
The Viet Minh
Ho
and
his
military
comprehensive
with
the
adapted
war
French.
by
the
would
forms
of
be
of
this
aspect
people
of
the
the
the
effective
propaganda,
Viet
Minh
the
and
writings
of
situation.
integrated
political,
to
on
the
a
as
Mao
In
this
long
war
Zedong
a
and
vision,
deployment
civilian
gain
diplomatic,
enemy,
ensure
but
population.
the
support
indoctrination
could
developed
envisioned
of
the
two
non-military.
enemy
was
on
Giap
they
Vietnamese
inuence
plan
what
based
the
and
the
Nguyen
for
encompassed
social
even
through
support
by
Vo
plan
was
to
military
and
and
plan
men
power
psychological
population
two
–
detailed
The
won
force
Non-military
commander
and
their
and
army
of
economic,
also
The
the
the
Vietnamese
primary
intimidation.
a
objective
Vietnamese
supply
of
With
this
recruits,
Class discussion
food,
What would it be like to be a civilian
information
and
and
of
taxes.
For
example,
money
gained
through
direct
taxation
caught between these two sides
the
sale
locally
grown
rice
or
opium
was
used
to
purchase
weapons
during the war?
smuggled
Of
through
course,
the
lens
for
of
read
tried
to
to
had
a
place
for
a
their
The
for.
The
military
The
form
rst
revolutionary
occupying
direct,
actions
This
attacks.
watch
When
Minh
their
While
the
Viet
in
guerrilla
This
meant
supplying
out
Minh’s
phase
A
Ho
all
tactical
ranks.
of
French
to
from
Giap
his
Viet
saw
or
her
Minh
discussions
The
end
of
result
which
the
exactly
for
and
integral
context
the
Viet
they
recruits
or
units
and
commissars
of
Communist political ocers. In many
could
broader
what
the
the
safe
regional
the
mostly
of
this
each
struggle
is used to denote rather low-level
functionaries up to cabinet “ministers”.
were
the
communist governments, “commissar ”
US
to
than
force.
in
into
the
the
small
While
larger
to
prey
hunt
overgrown
the
outposts,
were
countryside
positions
vast
of
by
any
Ambushes,
forces.
the
the
avoid
repower
detachments
their
the
weaker
was
distinct
the
for
after
the
landscape,
a
well.
shouldered
Giap
from
Viet
up
away
fairly
that
characterized
French
small
by
force
war,
the
from
defeated
was
superior
was
holed
melted
three
objective
regional
plagued
very
Minh,
war
Giap’s
in
assumption
main
with
emerged
number
in
deployed
on
additional
knew
of
recruiting,
by
who
often
enemy
be
the
of
traps
and
French
were
as
distributed
immune
fact,
through
programme
members
knew
said
Giap’s
relatively
guerrillas
them.
to
case
end,
booby
were
the
they
landscape
the
carried
be
based
phase”
towers
mobile
not
not
In
the
the
the
soldiers
was
this
that
was
focused
nationalistic
them.
was
in
among
was
regularly
literacy
consciousness,
force,
within
effort
strongly
were
A
participated
confrontation
and
occupiers
very
Viet
To
generally
in
force
a
soldier
this
ghting
could
“guerrilla
assassinations,
French
of
force,
force.
who
follow
itself
each
ensure
Minh
phase
large-scale
French.
others
same
would
of
actions
Viet
tracts
army
informants
individual
who
phases.
the
of
motivated
independence.
ghting
To
and
with
indoctrination.
consciousness
system
non-military
albeit
population.
The
and
commissars
deeply
soldiers
issue.
propaganda
political
was
this
this
ideology,
illiterate
effectiveness.
operated
Minh
states.
pamphlets
largely
ideological
military
Viet
Political
a
address
ideological
the
the
communist
component.
and
neighbouring
steadily
the
regional
Minh
much
built
ofcers
his
forces,
were
of
the
ghting
regular
training
trained
force.
and
in
China
71
3
C A U S E S
A N D
E F F E C TS
O F
20 T H - C E N T U R Y
at
Mao’s
Bac.
In
combat
this
base
infrastructure
hand
Mao’s
almost
By
to
August
PLA
1950
the
ammunition,
eventually
The
mobile
Minh’s
Minh’s
Ho
weapons
established
that
a
and
food
strong
produced
drag
and
and
they
be
forces.
for
forces
stores
in
Viet
communication
small
would
arms,
mines
to
the
PLA
of
actions
Giap
grew
then
the
to
ow
the
and
it
be
ranged
easier
ability
to
including
success
of
emulate,
trekked
delivered
more
of
to
his
large
over
this
tied
the
they
tracts
It
was
to
of
land,
lines
isolated
harsh
were
around
Viet
supply
these
over
Viet
forces
As
division-size
strategy.
as
the
larger
destroy
artillery,
regularly,
everything
conventional
both
lengthening
move
south
Artillery,
supplied
opportunity.
thereby
China,
Indo-China.
war.
with
moved
of
in
south.
were
Chinese
phase
mainland
war
guns
the
targets
Giap’s
never
from
from
the
responsibility
along,
required,
could
short
the
experience
crucial
French
In
of
began
guerrilla
to
regular
It
also
“mobile”
mixed
was
looking
and
Forces
nature
anti-aircraft
link.
the
outposts.
supplies
the
phase
them.
absolutely
to
the
commanders
and
rail
French
and
Nationalist
Material
arms
territories
to
80
Minh.
move
war
the
transformed
xed
to
isolating
that
stockpiled
and
“factories”
swept
actions
formations
the
a
strength
seeking
was
even
small
regional
northern
all
Giap
Giap
about
Viet
on
needed
large-unit
and
and
instantly
advise
Giap
school.
area
grenades.
When
it
W A R S
a
units
and
landscape
capability
the
crude
Class discussion
road
system
or
paratroop
operations.
How is Mao’s doctrine reected in the
The
nal
phase
of
revolutionary
war
according
to
Giap’s
plan
was
a
general
organizational structure of the Viet
offensive
in
which
the
Viet
Minh
would
wage
pitched,
conventional
battle
Minh? What are the advantages and
with
the
French
and
sweep
them
from
the
country.
This
phase
would
disadvantages of such an approach?
broadly
correspond
to
the
campaign
at
Dien
Bien
Phu.
L TA
Thinking and research skills
Mao Zedong developed a model of revolutionary war that directly and indirectly aected the thinking of revolutionary
leaders from Giap to Castro. For each of the following wars complete the table below, outlining the phases of
revolutionary war as adapted by Ho and Giap. Based on this comparison, discuss with a par tner the extent to which
the model is eective.
War
Algeria
1954–1962
Cuba
1957–1959
Congo Crisis
1960–1965
Nicaraguan Revolution
1974–1979
72
Guerrilla phase
Military
Non-military
activities
activities
Protracted/mobile phase
Military
activities
Non-military
activities
Oensive phase
Military
activities
Non-military
activities
3.4
Operations
Conceptual understanding
Key questions
➔
How well did Viet Minh operations correspond to their strategy?
➔
How well did French operations correspond to their strategy?
➔
How did the nature of combat in Vietnam change as the war wore on?
Key concepts
➔
Continuity
➔
Change
1946–1950
When
it
would
moving
the
their
Bac
the
After
regular
where
the
their
would
paratroopers.
support
Ho
it
out
would
would
Vietnam,
urban
of
be
such
their
war
the
harm’s
areas
base
subsided
these
awaiting
and
Viet
way.
as
not
Minh
This
Hanoi
negotiation
concentrated
meant
into
operations
had
disengaged
narrowly
in
rivers
nish
and
force
The
the
that
on
retreating
the
from
wilderness
north
were
slipped
not
an
and
for
of
the
While
they
to
would
on
top
link
up
Clear
rest
this
the
for
an
Viet
the
would
Viet
Minh
success,
survival
up
Viet
soldiers
while
the
ambush
The
to
In
motorized
with
moving
more
the
of
amphibious
foot.
lost
of
initial
constant
try
attempt
River
surprised
ghting
the
on
would
depended.
column
trucks
by
by
land
a
the
After
island,
navigable
over
up
drop
hampered
journey
away.
road
capture.
armour
progress,
their
a
paratroop
The
right
Meanwhile
up
French
strategy
paratroopers
moving
became
the
their
virtually
Bac.
escaped
column.
sluggish
French
kilometres
paratroopers
The
to
225
Viet
1947
which
dropping
in
amphibious
relief
making
sabotage.
by
October
upon
1,000
movements.
the
the
Lea,
area
move
in
punch
enemy
An
himself
however,
they
of
force
knockout
headquarters
infantry
were
that
fate
codenamed
surprise
Minh
they
monsoon
the
operation
and
the
war.
achieve
to
evident
French-controlled
Viet
of
became
determine
road
and
forces
Minh
than
road
and
forces
the
Class discussion
French,
the
they
superior
December
or
the
French
1947
territory
There
achieved
were
no
major
and
repeat.
attempting,
interrupted
north-east,
forces.
yielded
goal
of
avoiding
Further
little
French
lasting
a
large-scale
operations
impact
on
Viet
in
battle
with
November
Minh
ghting
and
ability
What does the outcome of Operation Lea
indicate about the nature of the war?
controlled.
incessant
ambush,
their
Slightly
with
this
military
frustrating
varied
brutal
there
were
efforts
routine
larger
Viet
success,
routine.
28
large
to
On
by
of
either
side
guerrilla
Minh
regional
overrun
RC4,
or
French
the
ambushes
in
war
in
1948,
–
regular
outposts,
dominant
1948
simply
patrol,
road
alone.
pacify,
force
units
occasionally
in
the
French
General
73
3
C A U S E S
A N D
E F F E C TS
O F
20 T H - C E N T U R Y
Alessandri
supply
of
spent
food
threatening
The
a
major
series
Giap
Giap’s
French
began
advantage
in
large
road
This
ordered
hunted
down
stumbled
out
French
Viet
Giap
Ho
last
and
phase
prove
and
them
of
jungle
think
their
Dong
a
a
that
Khe
The
in
they
at
the
dense
the
bogged
only
Battle
of
Route
the
time
was
model.
the
600
them
on
to
two
RC4
was
all
the
Minh
last
survivors
Ofcially
missing.
Coloniale
4
move
battles
the
groped
Viet
or
of
had
Once
men.
ripe
The
push
narrow
it
the
dead
to
fort
down
When
of
war
as
the
then
8:1
one
a
evacuees.
forces.
He
his
of
up
results
4,800
perhaps
revolutionary
column
vegetation,
numbered
China.
efforts
evacuation
the
connected
leveraging
same
with
French
that
French
Minh’s
seriously
from
evacuating
column
up
the
the
with
Viet
September.
assaults,
column
link
road
in
planned
yielded
the
to
a
cumbersome
casualties,
victory
RC4,
the
sweeps,
approaches
coincided
jungle.
jungle
on
the
infantry
enemy
6,000
at
execute
destroyed
Minh
to
of
centred
guarding
isolated
the
listed
stunning
ght.
attack
to
the
the
were
of
and
moving
the
through
troops
move
Meanwhile
through
French
of
squeeze
pacication
wave
RC4
by
previously.
hopelessly
the
up
to
and
outpost
This
effort
attempting
patrol
1950
the
after
dominated
years
of
to
outposts
men.
column
1949
ability
shelling
wave
of
extensive
operation
of
outposts.
most
by
unleashed
a
W A R S
of
This
tempted
to
the
1950
would
wrong.
1950–1954
Flush
with
decided
new
to
take
surrounding
would,
end
de
of
1950
and
ghting
wave
after
a
and
assaults
Minh
air
started.
they
by
over
one
at
wet
for
the
nal
have
movement,
of
pillboxes,
in
total,
de
go
at
help
at
the
suggest
phase
of
the
that
to
the
Lattre
the
Viet
sought
blockhouses
to
and
dubbed
River,
in
The
Giap
In
the
but
leaving
relied
restrict
De
Giap
of
not
their
and
his
war
but
to
French
from
May
Lattre
Vicious
until
establish
threw
the
Viet
They
the
three
9,000
forces
the
destroyers
before
after
air
the
human
not
tried
model
French
de
1951.
Delta.
and
By
soldier.
repulsed
retreat,
casualties.
Jean
area
that
dead
behind.
were
and
power
rains
weeks
not
that
and
yet
while
heavy
centres.
strong
the
to
revolutionary
Minh
January
power
defenders
that
Delta
Vietnam.
General
March.
countryside,
urban
from
bombardment
Day
retired,
to
in
defences
the
seem
the
of
Minh
the
–
Undeterred,
end
Ho
counteroffensive”
air
Giap
and
Tonkin
experienced
Yen
naval
Viet
Minh
and
Giap
lowland
French
French
the
favoured
Viet
the
Vinh
French
along
“great
forcing
a
China,
the
commander
on
of
1,500
at
points
closer
inevitably
sweep
casualties.
controlled
ruled
Understanding
the
the
rst
in
the
new
Minh
weather
battles
a
be
aggressive
again
leaving
more
to
reliance
5,000
with
ghting
may
had
from
French
model,
Viet
Delta
several
three
ordinance
74
the
the
back
The
brutal
ready
in
was
clashed
Lattre’s
support,
had
attacked
These
French
supplies
the
demanding,
de
suffering
Minh
of
a
the
and
to
This
to
Lattre
and
foothold
Viet
the
–
de
ght
Hanoi.
according
Tassigny
Giap
weapons
the
on,
that
points
Lattre
and
were
very
movement
by
throughout
Line.
De
Lattre
good
at,
building
the
north
tried
to
–
a
line
1,200
tempt
C H A P T E R
Giap
into
none
of
suited
the
battle
it,
him.
French
weapons
carried
force
Much
and
to
the
complete
airstrip.
than
remote
prepare
base.
The
Viet
Minh
use
had
and
to
long
he
outer
the
of
took
be
too
the
be
a
while
the
the
their
have
situation
form
Viet
around
of
the
Minh
regional
110
000
amount
by
of
war,
massing
force
regular
modern
air,
the
his
patient
the
and
not
try
operation.
Bien
heavy
that
–
which
had
to
That
troop
the
more
of
large
them
overrun
high
overrun
ground
the
to
such
that
a
for
he
French
stockpiled
operation
from
strength.
entire
be
an
needed
artillery
to
and
ghting,
some
he
to
count
San
scheme
French
artillery
upon
Na
liberating
wanted
Supplies
at
hinterland
could
defences
new
learned
on
the
encounter,
surrounding
own
aireld
base
thereby
intelligence
of
a
after
this
he
in
support
outer
this
in
if
air
of
Minh-controlled
base
and,
Giap
thoroughly
hold
Viet
such
ring
from
depended.
in
a
heart
system.
and
a
and
November
took
vital
Dien
of
signicant
artillery
supplied
take
early
at
typical
and
would
when
ever-increasing
lessons
road
concept
1954
the
had
established
in
placement
would
defences
spring
of
accurate
eliminate
base”
–
to
the
Giap
artillery,
French
more
more
“air-ground
siege
sides
could
on
areas
monotony
They
San
dangerous
needed
an
established
Na
battleeld
observation
could
that
and
troops,
The
took
general
only
O P E R A T I O N S
Chinese.
areas.
000
Both
and
the
He
10
Minh
attack
secure
1952
advantage
attacked
Viet
to
engagements
By
frustrating
French
the
thereafter
coming
the
the
but
jungle
establish
disposal
others.
posts
crude
to
by
lowland
with
the
actions.
material
Giap
1951,
1952
for
his
the
repulsed.
useful
the
at
break
their
outside
was
men
supplied
countryside,
where
of
guerrilla
soldiers
Seeking
in
from
patrolling
out
weapons
again
emerging
3 . 4 :
base
would
for
and
a
its
come
in
Phu.
Dien Bien Phu
Most
discussions
between
the
need
truth
lies
March
off
praise
to
and
in
nd
May
the
the
a
victory
position
this
battle
had
and
armour
to
time,
of
A
make
deterring
sorties
his
a
been
it
to
to
in
French
the
a
oblige,
that
to
air,
had
jungle
had
long
sought
been
the
a
is
waver
and
history
that
Viet
large,
looked
in
1951
remote
for
May
allow
had
the
General
the
between
Minh
faced
invading
Ho
at
to
a
to
to
the
ght.
a
negotiate
naval,
the
Dien
sound
stage
air
French
Bien
change
over
method
neighbouring
to
a
and
demonstrated,
base
used
denied
1954
Navarre,
was
denitive
such
French
seemed
this
be
of
dispute
to
Minh
war.
which
also
seem
Viet
aspects
would
that
Phu
the
Vietnam
of
the
of
could
in
the
thinking
suggest
Giap
by
in
little.
his
all
who
force
picking
of
Geneva
battles
for
in
who
in
Bien
skill
not
in
of
Giap
region
Although
seemed
valley
French
As
is
battle
and
Dien
As
What
begin
counted
intentions
of
Ho
set
place
stand.
territory
the
sizable
resupplied
command
at
and
blame.
nal
was
strength.
take
logic
any
base,
into
of
to
remote
the
where
seemed
Navarre’s
strong
Minh
had
over
to
a
in
superiority
commander,
Phu
in
1954
negotiations
decisive
from
it
struggle
in-between.
1954
By
fateful
resourcefulness
Frenchman
French
war
engagement.
Peace
a
the
the
somewhere
against
Early
of
for
Laos.
large-scale
French
by
the
Viet
mobility.
75
3
C A U S E S
A N D
E F F E C TS
O F
20 T H - C E N T U R Y
▲
French soldiers at Dien Bien Phu. What role did ar tillery play in the Viet Minh victory?
When
the
attackers
5:1.
This
battle
1953,
numeric
Giap
supply
base
that
porters.
and
of
packed
the
in
highlands
attempts
power
the
to
supply
Giap
lines
base
at
easy
artillery
Dien
unusable
the
siege.
their
and
the
for
Bien
meant
that
unimaginable
the
to
to
wounded
fragile
airstrip,
Minh
effort
As
Viet
could
in
but
often
as
not
the
40
link
this
it
was
would
not,
more
of
evacuated,
battle.
In
i ts
a ll ,
Hanoi.
an
it
The
French
hills
have
the
a
t h at
important
the
and
later
to
and
was
in
drift
in
to
ammunition
airstrip
creating
was
o or.
frequently
the
a ir
t ro ops
designed
however,
loss
g un s
c a m o u a g in g
va ll ey
then
we r e
Fr e n c h
u si n g
into
a
sur r ou n din g
T h os e
became
dug
of
c om bat
she ll s
com ba t
th e
with
th e
infan t r y.
tr ai ls .
t h em .
of
u si n g
q u ar t e r
the
int o
0 00
in t o
positions,
be
of
effo rt
pu t
a lo ng
The
the
of
N o ve m be r
a
ro c ke t
j u ng l e
which
shrank.
fo r
a bo u t
p er i od
into
hil ls i de s.
gunners
for
in
ove r
sl ope s
d ug
air
l on g
c a r ri e d
wa s
the
needed
Minh
an d
su p ply
mat e r ia l
the
Viet
late
this
en e r gy
Fr e nc h
an
the
a
M i nh
of
bat t l e e l d”
and
s te ep
s up pl y
defenders
the
into
the
Vi et
f a c t or
b as e
th e
m a rc h
st e e p
the
perimeter
suffering
up
the
m o rta r
a
of
the
w er e
th e
by
pr odu c t
tru c ks
the
dug
the
parachute.
in
up
much
supply
the
defensive
the
on
had
for
of
inte rr up t
As
a g a i ns t
large
by
drifted
g uns
ca r r yi ng
Phu
target
the
then
a nd
1, 000
ro ute
1 954
“ pr e pa re
a rtil l er y,
d ra g ge d
depended
positions
food
as
the
re - occup ie d
on
und e r ta ki ng
Whatever
French
the
be
deplo y
supply
of
a nd
March
d efe nd er s
a mmunitio n
the
frui tl e s s .
human
would
French
to
discove r
proved
massive
a nd
a l o ng
service
13
wa s
Fr e nch
d e p e nde d
valle y
had
on
Fr ench
me thodi ca l ly
thous a nd s
to
themselves
the
to
Fo o d
cached
Hundreds
the
s up e r io ri ty
After
began
lines
million
co mme nce d
outnumb e r e d
preparation.
76
W A R S
as
also
scenes
of
C H A P T E R
3 . 4 :
O P E R A T I O N S
GABRIELLE
B.
Khe
Phaï
1
4
Nam
Youm
P
R
B.
B.
Hiss
Lam
Kéo
1
4
BEATRICE
Main
P
R
ANNE-MARIE
airstrip
DOMINIQUE
HUGUETTE
ELIANE
CLAUDINE
B.
Ong
Pet
Mt
Fictif
Mt
Chauve
1
4
Co
P
R
B.
B.
Pape
My
B.
muoY
maN
Lai
Secondary
airstrip
14
ISABELLE
Kho
1
KM
PR
▲
French defences at Dien Bien Phu. In what ways did the
The French positions at the outset of the Battle of
▲
battle resemble earlier conicts? What elements were new?
French
preparations
French
position
bases,
Gabrielle,
Dominique
ruins
of
support
were
got
the
and
each
to
the
be
While
used
the
enough
and
up,
Minh
too
far
itself
the
its
in
the
from
not
rains
that
for
from
began.
to
out
the
base
the
in
kept
in
in
The
the
timber
was
could
easily
French
support.
and
the
not
that
was
identify
of
placed
Viet
a
was
would
and
while
quickly
soupy
too
position
the
ght
battle.
far
and
as
an
Artillery
managed.
they
strong
wood
important
into
Isabelle,
central
The
built
sufcient
Isabelle
guns
they
position
inept.
defences
much
poorly
well-concealed
positions
camouage.
position,
for
was
were
available
hills
position
the
could
before
central
lacking
but
on
positions
outer
The
hilltop
peril.
and
southern
of
Claudine,
centred
assaults
position
artillery,
the
Huguette,
execution
central
anything
numbers
Giap’s
re.
Minh
thorough.
perimeter
these
cover
infantry
central
that
of
turned
The
Viet
were
outer
position
was
its
Minh’s
an
Isabelle,
position
local
the
of
artillery
sound,
support
timely
and
was
Minh
What
of
Viet
central
blunt
any
in
Viet
the
theory
reserve
surrounding
inadequate
take
or
been
drainage
artillery
isolated
A
and
the
much
Inadequate
was
could
have
reinforcement.
for
island,
break
hills
withstand
a
interlocking
to
counter-attack
the
as
consisted
Anne-Marie
position.
stripping
once
away
Phu
defensive
with
may
on
spotters
targets.
mess
to
plan
to
steel
used
other
sloppy
surrounding
The
designed
as
Bien
Beatrice,
Eliane,
central
fortications
were
Dien
village.
further
could
at
Dien Bien Phu
They
themselves
77
3
C A U S E S
A N D
E F F E C TS
O F
20 T H - C E N T U R Y
were
easy
targets.
obliterated
the
two
French
French
artillery
to
the
amassing
their
of
●
concealing
able
to
the
French
main
the
re
of
on
heavy
gunners
after
had
which
suicide.
a
woeful
Everything
surprises
Minh
positions,
that
and
negligent
Giap
did
seemed
guns
and
so
artillery
supply
these
effectively
attacks
on
the
as
on
guns
to
outlying
anti-aircraft
engineering
positions,
Although
the
casualties
in
guns
the
for
make
posts
to
hills
overlooking
weeks
them
before
severely
Viet
and
tunnels
attacks
of
on
the
or
the
on
end
invulnerable
assaulting
limit
and
them
the
use
trench
after
French
of
were
the
and
the
in
to
the
of
French
ever
closer
over-running
overrun
miserable.
in
positions,
next
the
French
to
15
The
massive
the
Viet
surrendered.
for
the
French
Minh
then
trenches
while
the
pleas
were
of
Giap’s
outcome.
March;
locations.
out,
once
start
digging
positions,
closer
Washington,
forces
by
nothing.
wounded
and
mounting
Unable
French
American
rejected.
By
Negotiations
to
get
situation
7
in
help,
May
L TA
Fo r
to aid the French at Dien Bien Phu?
ca t e g o r i e s
each
time
combat
changed
period
given.
stayed
analyse
What
the
(continuity
ca n
same
and
the
be
day.
nature
said
throughout
Strategy/tactics
Equipment
Leadership
combat
the
the
according
degree
war
and
to
the
which
to
the
the
degree
to
nature
which
it
change)?
1946–1950
Forces involved
of
about
1950–1952
the
Geneva
Thinking skills
Why did the United States not intervene
to
their
notwithstanding
defenders
signalling
these
or
and
inevitability
French
from
setbacks
battle,
March
sort
central
food
French
commenced
a
the
accomplished
debated
the
13
toward
helpless
although
the Viet Minh counter French air power?
tunnel
suffered
of
by
Gabrielle
periodically
ammunition
was
on
seemed
concentrated
and
Minh
course
erupted
counter-attacks
last
to
strangling
displayed
there
Beatrice
Viet Minh anti-aircraft guns at Dien Bien Phu. How did
capability
slowly
the
courage
battle,
of
a
included:
gunners
artillery
78
based
Viet
bases.
the
Class discussion
be
These
the
artillery
committed
opponents.
amounts
sufcient
French
outer
▲
to
battle
French
power
having
the
the
camp
having
●
seemed
their
support
concentrating
air
into
major
commander
defenders.
large
being
●
days
three
positions
●
●
the
preparations
surprise
the
Two
of
underestimation
●
W A R S
1952–1954
3.5
Eects of the Vietnam War
Conceptual understanding
Key questions
➔
What was the signicance of the French defeat for other wars of
decolonization?
➔
How did the French defeat aect the Cold War strategy of the United States?
Key concepts
➔
Consequence
➔
Perspective
The
complete
come
at
killed
dead
Ho
a
and
at
over
over
achieved
Geneva,
a
Chinese
united,
years.
a
be
one
pass.
the
in
Instead,
which
he
against
never
a
shore
Treaty
Laos
The
the
French
Africa
and
Morocco
of
to
did
the
Dai.
in
Indo-China
French
put
its
of
United
forces
the
had
were
Viet
Minh
fell
strength
States
short
and
of
in
even
giving
had
been
ghting
the
17th
parallel,
at
some
later
under
North
his
ed
the
date,
albeit
control
became
North
political
Cong
US
that
in
a
of
his
him
for
the
nine
thereby
with
Ngo
17th parallel
This is the demarcation line between
a
Nor th and South Vietnam decided upon
Dinh
communist
at the Geneva peace conference.
state
ingratiate
the
lost
its
region
to
him
to
the
to
the
never
secure
South
the
Vietnam,
the
to
who
were
came
US
to
to
support,
Vietnam
population
surrogate,
establishing
South
Geneva
ght
elections
these
within
the
operatives
non-communist.
French
by
guard
but
of
returned
continue
stance
position
and
wake
South
Unication
meetings,
his
the
military
would
sponsor.
communist
to
in
the
and
anti-communist
Having
in
the
ghters
Geneva
(SEATO)
Diem’s
–
US
South
he
anti-
was
sought
East
Cambodia
Asia
and
communism.
their
control
will
Tunisia,
The
as
its
the
little
of
position
they
at
placed
Minh
Viet
and
effectively
sapped
and
was
Viet
both
presence
a
the
however,
which
consolidate
leader.
spread
from
both
conict
behind
used
used
dismantled
had
the
Ho.
after
transferring
Phu
the
Bao
regime
Organization
fashion,
Bien
its
French
of
estimates
partitioned
Vietnamese
basis
policies
from
of
for
was
South
opponents,
up
of
stayed
Diem
popular
the
000
Some
negotiations,
many
years
then
his
Buddhist
to
the
of
80
frightened
country
The
million
the
over
wounded.
country
While
Diem
–
negotiating
Emperor
many
form
held
The
leadership
North,
against
of
that
resumption
the
the
to
the
enemy.
and
would
000
goal
strength
Conference.
the
his
collapse
cost
000.
independent
different
under
200
300
Instead
Diem
stunning
human
sponsors.
ensuring
Close
and
huge
administration
to
Diem’s
shrunk
to
both
France’s
ght
of
for
which
in
a
speedy
government.
colonial
other
and
orderly
defeat
holdings
colonial
negotiated
The
to
holdings
at
Dien
North
such
independence
as
shortly
79
3
C A U S E S
A N D
E F F E C TS
O F
20 T H - C E N T U R Y
after
the
French
W A R S
withdrawal
from
Indo-China.
The
noted
difference
was
TOK discussion
Algeria.
Dien
How might the defeat in Indo-China aect
nationalists
the French national self-image? How
guerrilla
might this have aected future decisions
lost
about their empire? How might this
seemed
defeat be viewed in light of past French
for
Bien
in
illustrated
particular
campaign
Indo-China
to
Phu
by
–
what
and
a
war
and
strengthen
to
could
willingness
their
the
Tunisia
resolve
world
be
to
and
in
achieved
suffer.
For
Morocco
when
general
it
came
with
the
at
and
having
negotiating
to
ght
Algeria.
military history?
▲
80
Algerian
determined
French,
the
time
a
–
Vietnamese General Giap briefs his ocers during the siege of Dien Bien Phu
table
Exam-style questions and fur ther reading
Exam-style questions
1
Evaluate
2
Compare
French
3
What
4
To
and
role
what
Discuss
French
defence
contrast
forces
guerrilla
5
the
in
did
power
was
the
Dien
military
Indo-China
air
extent
the
of
from
play
war
in
in
Bien
Phu.
strength
of
the
Viet
Minh
and
the
1946–1954.
the
war
in
Indo-China
Indo-China?
from
1946–1954
a
war?
the
reasons
for
the
French
defeat
in
Indo-China.
Fur ther reading
Duiker,
William
NewYork,
Fall,
Bernard.
Karnow,
Windrow,
in
2012.
1964.
Stanley.
McDonald,
Defeat
J.
Ho
Chi
Minh:
A
Life.
Hachette
Books.
USA.
Peter.
1983.
1993.
Martin.
Vietnam.
Street
Without
Vietnam:
Giap.
2004.
The
Weidenfeld
W
.
Last
Joy.
A
Stackpole
History.
W
.
Viking
Norton.
Valley;
and
Books.
Dien
Nicolson.
Press.
New
Bien
York,
Phu
London,
Harrisburg,USA.
NewYork,USA.
USA.
and
the
French
UK.
81
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and
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the
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of
technology
strategy
technology
played
also
a
in
one
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played
a
in
20th-century
the
vital
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role
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war.
victory
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in
land,
S K I L L S
S E C T I O N :
S T R U C T U R I N G
Y O U R
E S S A Y
Sample paragraph
Technology
Battle
of
allowing
allowed
The
improved
the
them
for
a
to
By
Technological
of
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surfaced
and
the
the
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Phosphorous
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higher
development
submarines.
the
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more
end
of
the
nd
submarines
rate
altimeter
war
the
allowed
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shells
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star
at
night.
of
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improved
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to
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vessels
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75
America
per
to
on
cent.
Europe.
Argumentative topic sentence related to the thesis and question
Detailed historical facts that suppor t the topic sentence
Concluding sentence linking back to thesis and elaborating on how the
preceding material suppor ts the thesis
General
Introduction
statements
exploring
Reminders
●
for
Support
structuring
your
your
assertions
with
the
question
essay:
detailed
historical
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statement
evidence.
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with
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each
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arguments
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Conclusion
▲
relation
command
terms
briefly
What the overall structure of the essay may look like
83
4
T H E
S PA N I S H
I D E O L O G Y
I N
T H E
C I V I L
A N D
2 0 T H
W A R :
C O N F L I C T
C E N T U R Y
Global context
The
or
Spanish
last
civil
Civil
war.
20th-century
derives
from
turbulent
history.
laid
its
the
time
to
world.
already
and
all
economic
was
laid
and
drought.
low
and
ideology
the
high
dislocation
international
and
What
rst
of
in
in
and
the
Britain,
ways
had
economies
tempted
United
new,
States
of
the
helped
stage.
on
post-war
bring
a
the
Fascism
cooperation
in
self-sufciency.
trend
in
international
relations
limited
to
took
the
to
new
regimes.
economic
and
Most
a
cure
for
their
economic
at
of
these
some
point
history.
form
in
Britain
the
19th
had
raised
at
was
and
divide
were
France,
the
were
exact
time
taking
were
ideologically
based
in
Countries
reluctant
hostile
a
hold
Germany.
outright
of
states,
to
toward
state,
–
the
out
coincidences
in
the
and
Spanish
contradictions
Civil
War.
were
Economic
isolationism,
isolationism
conict,
and
interventionism,
the
changing
balance
of
in
to
in
Europe
all
played
a
role
in
the
tragedy
an
that
art
this
or
conuence
isolation
power
their
and
other
many
industrialized
diplomatic
ills
Italy
In
never
the
Union.
ideological
as
of
–
as
that
depressed
ideology
dominant
depression,
powers
Britain
were
had
was
played
not
sides
third
Soviet
favour
US,
world
before.
unlucky
isolationism
such
with
an
with
of
world
This
All
uncooperative
both
engage
new
the
the
the
landscape
Three
importantly,
dealt
was
in
that
economically
into
ideological
world.
countries
more
never
1930s
states
new
War
ideologies
expansionist
other
the
World
and,
Some
including
had
War.
by
had
the
forces.
in
was
powerful
before
powers
modern
World
most
seen
new
post-First
controlled
were
Depression
was
the
the
unemployment
international
confrontation
the
large
signicance
1930s
First
of
so
Ideologically,
Great
the
depression
the
its
the
France
by
record
The
of
industrialized
like
being
loom
others
powerhouse
by
the
to
eschewed
of
few
savaged
The
years
the
from
it
context.
politically
like
Those,
been
far
does
Much
global
Economically
waste
was
why
history?
economically
a
War
So
became
the
Spanish
Civil
War.
century.
Timeline
1936
Popular Front wins national elections
16 February
12 July
Calvo Sotelo murdered
José Castillo murdered
13 July
17 July
Generals uprising
Nationalist troops own from Morocco to
27 July
mainland by Germans
Non-Intervention Committee meets
9 September
Franco named commander of
in London
Nationalist forces
1 October
Republican government evacuates Madrid
and relocates to Valencia
6 October
84
USSR renounces Non-Intervention Pact
C H A P T E R
9 October
Nationalists begin assault on Madrid
T H E
S P A N I S H
C I V I L
W A R
Popular Army formed
7 November
8 November
Italian “volunteers” arrive in Spain
4 :
International Brigades arrive in Madrid
22 December
1937
February
Battle of Guadalajara
Battle of Jarama
8–18 March
26 April
Guernica bombed
May Days (ghting between POUM/CNT
3–8 May
and PSUC/UGT militias) in Barcelona
Juan Negrin replaces Francisco Largo
17 May
Caballero as Prime Minister of the Republic
Republican government evacuates
14 December
Valencia and relocates in Barcelona
1938
24 July
End of Ebro campaign
Republican forces begin Ebro oensive
16 November
1938
26 January
Franco declares war ended
Barcelona falls to the Nationalists
1 April
85
4.1
Causes of the Spanish Ci vil War
Conceptual understanding
Key questions
➔
To what extent did the divisions within Spain reect political and ideological
divisions within Europe at the time?
➔
To what extent was there a non-military solution to the political problems
facing Spain in 1933–1936?
➔
What did each side seek to accomplish at the outset of the war?
Key concepts
➔
Cause
➔
Consequence
➔
Perspective
Long-term causes: a fragmented country
Divisions
cut
Regionalism
loyalty
to
groups
had
often
across
and
Spain
some
in
terms
regions,
These
divisions
parties
prior
and
to
of
Land
were
of
Civil
Half
century,
still
of
the
a
At
the
land
by
in
the
root
and
deal
of
end
by
of
other
parts
other
that
of
areas
peasant
political
the
anchored
was
the
trumped
many
differences
production
small,
Spain
countries,
was
and
While
dynamic,
myriad
Spain
were
methods.
In
landholders,
owned
by
the
in
by
traditional
the
a
forces
in
mere
of
the
right
in
relatively
50
000
secularism
society,
spectrum,
50years
conservative
political
Spanish
political
organizations,
throughout
concentrated
inuence
of
economic
direction.
often
estates.
across
rocked
and
Galicians
agricultural
army
Spain
conceivable
country
cooperation.
vast
country
in
other
and
many
though
great
the
in
and
dominated
took
church
Church,
education.
As
the
reasonably
was
reected
across
had
national
and
every
Catalans,
historic
industrial
War.
landowners,
Catholic
of
that
about
fractured
Basques,
dominated
were
ownership
families.
form
strong
ideologies
the
just
linguistic,
agriculture
others
in
any
in
localism
whole.
cultural,
while
The
a
economically
backward
triad
as
precluded
were
Spain
even
Spain.
few
individuals.
in
the
19th
especially
regionalism
anarcho-syndicalism
again
inuenced
the
formation
of
political
and
ideological
movements.
A political doctrine that advocates
In
industrial
areas,
such
as
Barcelona
and
other
parts
of
Catalonia,
a
form
replacing central governments with
of
anarchism
that
was
based
on
trade
union
principles
became
popular.
decentralized, worker-controlled
This
anarcho-syndicalism
advocated
decentralized,
worker
control
committees loosely based on a trade
of
factories,
as
well
as
the
other
stock
and
trade
of
unions
–
shorter
union model. Found in numerous
working
weeks,
higher
wages
and
better
working
conditions.
If
anarcho-
countries such as France and Italy,
syndicalism
was
largely
an
urban
phenomenon,
its
country
cousin
was
it achieved its greatest mainstream
more
traditional
anarchism.
This
movement,
strong
in
poor,
rural
areas
success in the Confederación Nacional
such
as
Andalusia,
sought
a
revolution
leading
to
a
vague
combination
del Trabajo (CNT) in Spain.
of
86
land
redistribution,
decentralized
authority
and
freedom
from
taxes.
a
C H A P T E R
This
revolution
spontaneous
Anarchism
Spain.
from
was
Variants
the
late
Stalinists
By
was
action
the
dizzying
not
of
of
of
the
the
about
by
creative
only
But
War,
even
had
the
C A U S E S
vague
the
T H E
combination
plying
its
were
views
trade
struggling
argued
political
O F
S P A N I S H
C I V I L
W A R
of
masses.
been
Marxists
different
and
of
ideology
Socialists
these
organizations
equally
socialism
Trotskyites.
Civil
an
potential
left-wing
and
century.
with
the
array
come
Marxism
19th
feuded
time
to
and
4 . 1 :
1930s
support
fractured.
with
had
in
for
trade
unionists.
produced
a
parties.
Short-term causes: the failure of the Second
Second Republic
The system of government that governed
Republic and the Popular Front
Spain from the abdication of Alfonso XIII in
By
April
1931,
popular
support
for
the
monarchy
had
been
completely
1931 until the end of the Spanish Civil War.
eroded.
into
When
exile
and
the
army
general
centre-left
parties
wasted
no
time
clerical
legislation.
collectives
new
to
and
many
the
those
on
dent
in
There
under
the
the
a
great
General
the
of
elections
politics,
strikes
of
and
Asturias,
a
Spanish
left
who
had
–
of
and
left
left
by
this
the
be
Azaña’s
nor
left
by
process
reached
and
resist
time
the
to
a
of
an
the
rise
the
to
in
govern.
strategy was especially popular in
made
for
furious.
left
more
to
it
well
response to the rise of Fascist and other
right-wing par ties during the 1930s.
Popular Front governments were formed
in France and Spain during this period.
the
than
a
with
Spain
Both
a
new
had
in
a
two
supported
not
1933.
of
government
wave
reforms.
short-lived
the
Morocco.
the
fate
years
defunct.
abandoned
interpretations
the
To
of
of
some
the
on
German
and
others,
the
The
declaration
region
earlier
To
in
rivals.
new
Azaña’s
in
of
faith
political
The
The
Spanish
enough
revolt
avoid
–
–
1932
government
were
new
their
from
Nazis
revolt
Civil
Republic’s
liberals
This
off
serious
to
the
the
nature
have
to
The
August
down
that
of
right
ignore
troops
the
put
founded.
or
in
throughout
power.
trust
attempt
of
thus defeat right-wing par ties. The
retired
enough
they
designed to prevent vote splitting and
order
anarcho-syndicalist
limits
setting
more
Asturias
left
easily
unstable
seemed
Spanish
In
course,
little
middle-class
crescendo
was
radical
trusted
a
the
reverse
far
cooperation between left-wing par ties
The
forcibly
government.
largest
to
left,
to
right,
opposition
the
perhaps,
began
hardened
to
the
right
of
rebellion
continued
coalition
the
was,
conservative
reected
were,
revolt
of
in
was
the
While
the
A political strategy of electoral
state.
far
Popular Front
anti-
changes
go
of
encouraged
divorces.
not
made
coalition
government
and
and
such
the
a
slunk
Spain.
rose
degree
and
right
he
eviction,
and
did
they
revolt
CNT,
disturbances
1933
Catalonia
that
not
the
legitimacy.
right-wing
the
failed
by
conrmation
could
and
immediately
left,
to
force,
the
denounced
crushed
were
also
disturbances
the
who
police
While
radical
the
by
rural
opposition
decision-making
autonomy
and
the
suspicions
of
as
labour
While
alienating
demonstrated
November
government
in
new
government
they
the
bringing
democratic
happy,
dissatised
of
new
rising
force
Neither
the
The
church
marriages
XIII,
brought
from
split
conservative
poverty
of
Azaña.
pensions.
succeed
year
tenants
civil
left
Alfonso
agricultural,
illustrated
immediately
unrest.
deal
Strikes
of
full
of
that
ofcially
army,
The
people
Sanjurjo.
it
the
left.
national
Sanjurjo’s
convinced.
The
–
and
of
Manuel
protected
political
cooperation
Republic,
was
of
by
sweeping
them
widespread
form
monopoly
of
support
June
recognize
reforms
ordinary
organization
the
the
did
with
faced.
of
its
in
led
laws
would
extreme
of
a
New
the
was
Guard,
enacting
granting
members
only
power,
inuence
ofcers,
majority
elections
cooperatives,
some
part
in
government
reduce
Not
to
withdrew
it
was
constitution
indicate
a
87
4
C A U S E S
A N D
E F F E C TS
O F
20 T H - C E N T U R Y
profound
rested.
lack
Either
entrenched
of
W A R S
faith
in
the
interpretation
that
no
democratic
seemed
democratic
to
system
point
process
could
to
upon
which
political
reconcile
the
Republic
differences
so
them.
Spanish political par ties 1936–1939
Left
Confederación
Anarcho-syndicalist
Centre
Right
Basque Nationalist
Par tido
Carlists
King–church par ty
Right-wing
par ty
union
Nacional del
Nacionalista Vasco
Trabajo
(PNV)
(CNT)
Unión Militar
Anti-fascist army
Confederación
Anarquista Ibérica
Republicana
ocers’ organization
Española de
(FAI)
Antifascista
Derechas
(UMRA)
Autónomas
Federación
Militant anarchists
coalition
(CEDA)
Par tido Comunista
Spanish communist
Par tido Sindicalista
Syndicalist par ty
Falange
Spanish fascist
par ty
par ty
(PS)
de España
(PCE)
Par tido Obrero
de Unicación
Marxist–socialist
Unión Republicana
workers’ par ty
(UR)
Spanish socialist par ty
Izquierda
Moderate Republican
Bloque
Anti-parliamentary
par ty
Nacional
par ty
Moderate Republican
Renovación
Monarchist par ty
par ty
Española
Marxista
(POUM)
Par tido Socialista
Obrero Español
Republicana
(PSOE)
(IR)
Unión General de
Socialist trade union
Fascist army
Unión Militar
ocers’
Trabajadores
Española
(UGT)
(UME)
organization
Par tit Socialista
Catalonian socialist
par ty
Unicat de
Catalunya
(PSUC)
Comintern
Immediate causes: the Popular Front and the
A shor t form for Communist International,
Generals’ uprising
an organization that originated in the
As
was
perhaps
predictable,
in
1936
the
pendulum
of
Spanish
electoral
Bolshevik seizure of power in Russia. Its
politics
swung
back
to
the
left.
The
Spanish
left
had
embraced
an
mission was to coordinate and promote
electoral
strategy
encouraged
by
the
Comintern
and
practised
in
the spread of revolutionary Marxist-
France,
known
as
the
Popular
Front.
This
strategy
took
the
lesson
of
Leninism throughout the world. Although
the
Nazi
rise
in
Germany,
where
inghting
among
left-wing
parties
it contained representatives from many
had
allowed
the
Nazis
to
elect
candidates
across
the
country,
and
countries, it was largely directed from
aimed
to
prevent
Azaña
and
it
from
happening
in
other
western
democracies.
Moscow and eventually became little
more than a tool of Soviet foreign policy.
88
Indalecio
Prieto,
a
leader
of
the
Spanish
Socialist
Party
C H A P T E R
(PSOE)
parties
wing
In
proposed
to
avoid
the
Spanish
candidates
not
other
new
was
a
any
that
and
no
not
but
When
Española
cabinet.
the
sought
to
that
had
had
did
The
unied
C I V I L
W A R
right-
deep
not
of
a
lack
both
to
the
political
go
at
run
cooperation
home
the
and
1930s.
extreme
of
able
did
of
the
a
It
right
in
was
from
election,
of
those
agree
want.
in
In
the
tactics.
thus
right.
not
directly
to
ideological
electoral
united
while
faith
democracy,
and
beyond
longer
they
not
electoral
combination
no
that
that
stop
beyond
were
did
moderate
parties
done.
problem
word,
of
particular
to
the
left-wing
part,
type
anarchists,
parties
had
settled,
Robles,
even
proving
Their
proposed
by
cooperating
encouraged
on
what
that
sense,
in
their
they
didn’t
the
democratic
traditionally
the
of
(CEDA)
alarm
in
Azaña’s
leader
though
April
in
a
Popular
the
system,
practised,
the
were
intensied
Front
right-wing
raised
there
1936,
no
could
alarm
no
of
Azaña
real
had
carried
Confederación
Marxists
when
despite
government
the
face
ofcers,
of
that
1936,
of
had
labour
some
in
a
Calvo
provided
The
an
on
impending
the
was
elevated
escalation
been
strikes
a
their
to
street
of
a r m y,
of
post
their
the
Carlists
bring
civil
ghting
military
while
and
other
scheme.
Azaña
bases
plotting
with
a
the
right-
were
The
fact
peace
and
between
rebellious
rival
cadre
of
required.
right-wing
pretext
from
from
and
able
the
remote
specically
was
Sotelo,
the
in
and
a r m y,
a
away
Falange
by
obstinate
contact
Generals
action
to
rebels
made
not
the
drastic
moved
three
Mola
the
posed
vocally
transferred
the
support.
support
Republic
most
were
stop
rising.
seeking
the
the
was
Franco
not
military
to
to
isolate
Moda
did
persuaded
July
threat
and
This
assassination
13
Gil
and
Goded
A z a ñ a ’s
junior
urgency
the
Autónomas
the
persuaded
parties
on
S P A N I S H
left-wing
more
concentrate
the
most
this
cooperate
to
out
dust
General
groups,
stability
The
T H E
Spain.
President
divide
organizing
both
O F
policy.
support.
wing
the
designed
still
to
vote,
developments
Hitler
policies
takeover
leadership.
Generals
to
the
born
in
for
centre-left
trusting
Derechas
of
as
The
Nevertheless,
post
a
of
on
was
not
Understanding
of
various
relatively
order
While
an
elections.
electoral
collectivist
it
solution
Predictably,
de
and,
strategy,
was
in
political
gave
vote.
freedom
communist
to
between
the
left-wing
cooperation
sense
to
seldom
the
day.
the
agreement
Front
preserve
1936,
participated
the
previous
members
the
against
other.
legitimately,
traditional
Popular
its
Europe
platform
in
members
want,
Spain,
short-term
electoral
Azaña
each
defensive
power
parties
be
in
of
a
differences
to
of
radical
organizationally
parts
There
more
against
essentially
taking
elections
and
cooperated
The
cooperation
splitting
C A U S E S
parties.
Republican
was
electoral
vote
4 . 1 :
for
the
monarchist
general’s
politician
Class discussion
military
What makes a government legitimate
insurrection.
Despite
planning,
the
insurrection
did
not
go
smoothly
in the eyes of the citizens? What can a
right
from
the
outset.
The
garrison
in
Morocco
rose
ahead
of
schedule
government do to increase its legitimacy?
and
had
to
wait
for
Franco
to
arrive
before
proceeding
further.
89
4
C A U S E S
A N D
E F F E C TS
O F
20 T H - C E N T U R Y
The
Republican
rebellion,
infancy.
arming
del
did
Trabajo
army.
the
Civil
such
Oviedo
fell
to
and
led
centre
and
local
Events
in
the
garrison
to
as
it
was
was
local
arming
a
the
This
in
price
the
city
of
country
of
battle
As
by
surrender.
The
control
90
the
From
the
of
as
in
city
industrial
Republic
the
and
rebels,
become
a
War.
the
obtain
condence,
Republic.
the
revolt
could
with
units
bring
the
of
of
and
cases,
thus
the
whether
the
loyalty
some
would
Civil
army
sufcient
the
the
in
elements
defeated
saved
garrison
and
If
would
town
wher e
discord.
the
rising,
round
under
the
for
parties,
the
on
the
of
the
a nd
a r ea s
of
In
the
help
of
loy al
ag a inst
p oi nt,
in
of
ci vil
the
12
wo uld
wa s
of
an d
the
and
and
the
seriously
l oyal is t
r e b el s .
the
impair
000
the
the
h el p
ho ld in g s
c o as t ,
Spa i n.
Th e
fou g h t
s ol di er s
of
lo y al is t s ,
u r ge d
be
the
In
e a st
th e
of
fro m
the
s t r on g ho ld
a
Anarqu i s t a
run n in g
the
lo cal
Gen e ra l
the
hea r t
g ov er n m e n t
of
e ar l y
i nc lu di n g
be n e t t i n g
Federación
gu a rd s,
w ou l d
c l ea r ;
government
militias
also
c on t r ol,
g ove rn m en t ,
a cce pt
event
militia
divisions
c en t r al
the
wit h
Ba r ce l o n a
ho we ve r,
in
a n a rc h o -s ynd ic a l is t
fa vou r
the
The
central
any
empowering
A n da l u c ia n
n or t h
conjuncti on
in
side.
re be l
of
with
of
government
moot
armed
would
ma i n t a in e d
he si tatio n
loy al .
in
whose
Republican
he ld
the
local
arming
strong
remained
was
the
the
rebels.
eventual
war,
pa tchwo rk
tur ne d
it
The
the
all
was
the
Madrid
re be l s
l a rg e
which
point
however,
for
in
manpower
however,
on
dislodging
parties.
Republican
limited
argued
so,
The
the
themselves
very
force
stormed.
p r i s o ne r
tha t
had
doing
throughout
of
facing
ofcers
of
victory,
s tr e e ts
pattern,
By
g o v e rnment
ti d e
a
of
these
a
a nd
C NT
the
then
only
for
its
Nacional
rebellion
In
and
militia
the
barricaded
Loyal
option
T he
the
with
through
himself,
them
dilemma
political
rema i ne d
(FAI),
fought
authority
government
this
of
depend
the
the
rebels
barracks
organiza ti o n
garrison.
Spain.
only
for
Seville ,
Barcelona,
Ibérica
the
the
organizations
local
momentum,
execute
times
prod uce d
also
to
thus
rebels
determine
the
had
Barcelona,
thus
workers’
who
off
a
in
hesitated
rebellious
factor.
the
in
Guards
could
monopoly
between
Madrid,
poor
with
hand
of
revolt
Confederación
and
stave
throughout
militias.
its
insurrection.
capital,
the
the
effectiveness
pattern
the
the
would
ghting
to
Barcelona
local
gain
2,500
in
variety
disagreements
Republic
to
party
the
and
The
of
sided
against
garrison.
up
rely
really
armed
control.
the
giving
governments
the
submit
July,
storm
be
action
anarcho-syndicalist
illustrate
When
19
various
would
the
also
the
the
determining
the
it
the
Nationalists.
Madrid
on
clear,
resist
warnings
crush
organizations
to
on
other
action
leaders,
ignoring
to
(UGT),
country
the
the
acted
allowed
political
of
the
himself.
If
became
left-wing
resistance
not.
they
after
enough
repower
Catalonia,
quick
would
was
government.
which
or
crisis
Guard
On
local
Goded
if
soldiers
however,
control
of
fast
Trabajadores
often
the
the
level,
successful
most
the
of
Madrid,
depended
were
Republican
weapons
the
de
throughout
instance,
local
of
other
Republic
General
the
and
Nationalists.
help
of
scope
General
actions
for
the
by
was
up
The
in
sufciently
insufcient
Guard
the
centre
On
but
cultural
with
the
(CNT)
their
act
Unión
manpower
the
government
not
Once
the
W A R S
G o de d
rebels
of
to
lo ya l is t
re t a in e d
n on - g over n m e n t a l
C H A P T E R
organizations
to
establish
forces,
the
or
in
p l a ce s
contro l .
As
a
governme nt
wher e
fo rm
wa s
of
the y
a rm y
cent r a l
4 . 1 :
was
C A U S E S
t oo
c on t r ol ,
O F
po or ly
eve n
o ve r
T H E
S P A N I S H
C I V I L
W A R
o rg a n iz e d
its
own
we ak .
L TA
Communication and social skills
Choose from one of the following three groups: “Left” parties, “Centre” parties and “Right”
parties. Draft a set of policies that you would enact if you were to form the Spanish
government in 1936. Be sure to have policies for each of the following categories:
●
Agriculture/land policies
●
Industrial policies (hours of work , factory ownership, etc.)
●
Education
●
Social/cultural policies, including policies on religion
Present your policies to the rest of the class.
Spanish Civil War, July 1936
Spanish
July
Civil
War
1936
Bilbao
FRANCE
BASQUES
PORTUGAL
Madrid
Barcelona
REPUBLIC
OF
SPAIN
BALEARIC
ISLANDS
Seville
Cadiz
Territory
held
by
Nationalist
Territory
held
by
Republican
forces
forces
MOROCCO
▲
Spain was divided quickly on the outbreak of the Civil War between loyalist and nationalist
forces. What factors might have aected which side would establish control of a region in
July 1936 before any major engagements had been fought?
91
4.2
C ombatants
Conceptual understanding
Key questions
➔
What were the relative strengths and weaknesses of each side at the outset
of the war?
➔
Which side had the advantage in terms of international suppor t? Why?
➔
To what extent did ideology play a role within each army?
Key concepts
➔
Continuity
➔
Change
➔
Perspective
At
the
well
start
of
matched
Nationalists
their
start
the
distinct
war
in
July
As
gained
across
war.
in
numbers.
steadily
opponent
of
difference
▲
the
in
From
training,
the
the
in
1936,
the
very
and
by
overall
forces
progressed,
numeric
country
skill
the
war
a
superiority,
third
beginning,
weapons,
within
18
the
months
there
Nationalists
was
of
a
having
the
large
the
advantage.
A Republican soldier keeps watch. To what ex tent were the Republican forces made up of
professional soldiers? What role did this play in the outcome of the war?
92
fairly
outnumbering
however,
the
were
however,
C H A P T E R
4 . 2 :
C O M B A T A N T S
The Republicans
The
Republican
remained
with
loyal
(POUM),
themselves
before
army.
the
strategic
a
the
and
for
a
of
revolution
was
factories
debated
thought
they
at
the
within
that
an
this
eliminate
by
ostensibly
the
PSUC
taking
the
The
and
the
could
POUM
not
serious
distraction
Localism
when,
albeit
military
structure.
to
the
of
of
that
these
this
the
500
Largo
as
the
Barcelona
the
in
in
PSUC/UGT
lay
dead
government
of
this
was
as
a
such
impossible.
In
Asturias,
the
have
of
both
committees
of
All
de
Moscow,
actions
Nationalists
regain
–
divisions
thus
members
action
could
relief
what
though
of
against
planning.
to
even
result.
was
however,
Unicat
escalating
Caballero’s
a
military
from
and
streets
militia
towns
war.
number
the
social
policy
Socialista
of
against
that
dangerous
POUM
a
Catalonia,
liberals,
Comintern
series
endless
cities,
Social
forces.
confused
victory
believed
the
Partit
ghting
or
very
Rival
and
over
attention
most
in
struggle
–
various
difcult
were
Countless
POUM/CNT
numbers
far
city
been
local
of
Oviedo,
more
more
important
example.
moved
Republican
Asturias
and
from
military
defence
for
A
very
initiating
Moderate
the
resigned
hard
their
the
in
Marxist
of
the
political
militias
goals
Republic
the
over
effective
militias
of
he
the
with
weapons.
of
scale.
plans,
winning
of
depleted.
sound
Madrid
units
ensure
number
in
the
years
Republican
was
overall
War.
ghting
business
long,
Caballero
system
The
a
and
and
hindsight,
objectives,
reorganized
The
in
Minister
ofcers
unied
of
members
the
the
committees.
from
ghting
the
the
energy
one
with
national
Communist
open
was
a
those
Republic.
pitted
of
split
from
deployed
haphazard
Days
fought
The
the
with
hampered
militias
effectively
Prime
made
also
for
days
the
perhaps
in
decisions
on
Civil
goal
from
faced
Ideological,
process
strategy.
diverting
direction
leadership
survive
inghting
miner
May
military
POUM
May
three
the
anti-Stalinist
ghting
removed
After
as
forces.
culminating
1937.
of
seize
them
independence
workers’
arm
turbulent
but,
between
Even
throughout
part
the
Unicación
to
members
operational
were
de
that
associated
Nationalists.
tactical
regional
local
was
Barcelona,
militias.
There
militias
to
them
supply
the
impossible
overarching
Republican
sought
and
over
leadership.
by
military
Obrero
managed
arm
to
the
managed
volunteer
negotiation.
folly,
the
(PSUC),
to
time
difference
the
by
to
fragmented
to
and
run
was
as
and
contradictory
integral
Catalunya
were
close
Anarchists
same
perceived
Ideological
and
Partido
coordination
strategic
prioritized
were
the
of
various
militias
they
began
exploited
contradictory.
Nationalists.
and
on
and
who
those
made
as
as
stockpiled
reluctant
training
was
well
such
had
eventually
compromise
times
with
chaotic
level
they
elements
as
These
enthusiastic,
developed
example,
the
that
FAI.
was
differences
was
local
at
it
and
consensus
committees
rounds
and
military
fact
Command
Gaining
and
weapons
crisis,
the
organizations
CNT
War
brave
lacked
difcult,
comprised
government,
government
growing
militias
on
with
Civil
The
Although
and
the
working-class
Marxista
the
forces
to
in
to
forces
new
address
September
into
a
Popular
soldiers
commissars,
the
of
more
Army
remained
who
were
increasingly
1936
when
traditional
would
hierarchical
have
ideologically
Spanish
he
political
“correct”.
communists,
93
4
C A U S E S
A N D
E F F E C TS
O F
20 T H - C E N T U R Y
increased
steadily
important
Stalinist
control
did
roles
to
the
to
Much
of
used
The
were
I-16
the
Soviet
was
its
used
had
by
was
the
the
refused
government.
command
militias
to
as
played
conduits
Popular
rift
he
for
and
Army,
but
which,
submit
The
expanded
came
from
facilities
where
little
weapons
to
the
widened
become
109,
sound
were
paper
the
combat
in
were
when
ever
it
right
more
tanks
the
aircraft
bomber
The
The
and
in
Soviet
comparable
to
by
sufcient
tanks
the
was
Polikarpov
outmatched
hands
and
hands.
As
and
medium
was
ries,
produced
Republican
aircraft.
aircraft.
generally
including
also
assembled.
SB-2
excellent
on
in
USSR
Republican
Tupelov
an
Although
Bf
the
ries
remained
armour,
generally
a
help
into
on,
CNT/FAI
Spanish-made
manoeuvrable,
the
the
Soviet-built
and
ghter.
bug”
and
did
ofcers
went
support.
Messerschmitt
“the
of
further
arsenal
The
class
sturdy
armed
and
factories
army
war
commitments,
artillery.
models.
of
a
numbers
tanks
up
Soviet
the
drawn
efforts
manufacturing
set
German
well
and
war.
as
were
Caballero’s
power
Spanish
fastest
the
communist
the
Soviets
that
Republican
guns
while
pre-war
the
on
the
machine
to
of
the
and,
reorganization
ideological
came
dependent
This
elements
authority
Negrin
advisors
coordinate
their
central
throughout
as
ideology.
of
little
true
W A R S
were
German
Nationalists.
The Nationalists
The
in
Nationalists
July
such
1936,
as
areas
the
they
numbers,
men
at
as
Falange
including
any
one
just
Catholic
as
Nationalist
who
that
The
only
was
Nationalists
The
to
be
Soviet
BT
the
military
end
Spain
from
By
of
and
by
frightened
and
able
to
militias,
the
The
units
war,
to
the
other
conscription
were
300
General
000
would
supported
seizures
political
the
overall
elements
land
under
the
in
their
Nationalists
conservative
coalesced
rebelled
approaching
Republican
eventually
had
organizations
increase
Nationalists
by
that
right-wing
introducing
were
Carlist
men.
the
the
87
in
the
number
as
dive
the
war
from
the
tanks
of
have
by
such
and
Franco,
leader
of
who
the
the
the
from
a
weapons
was
were
air
the
elite
more
somewhat
Moroccan
more
especially
unied
supplied
well
Messerschmitt
Bf
109
when
troops
in
the
command
the
Panzer
Republicans.
sent
later
I
Germany
by
ghter
superior
Germany
Although
by
matched
generally
force.
vehicles,
by
somewhat
progressed.
Nationalists.
used
was
changed
engagements,
weapons
bomber
ghting
This
benetted
these
the
forces
Nevertheless
Republican
with
excellent
series
as
of
such
Stuka
ght
a
also
benetted
quality
in
Nationalist
Republicans.
introduced.
Aircraft
counterparts
would
of
of
decisive
Italy.
Panzers
and
components
strengthened
Ju
Carlists.
military
Nationalists
and
Junkers
94
that
The
weapons.
in
the
Nationalists
million
were
the
ability
than
proved
north.
By
of
volunteers
forces.
conscription
often
the
the
These
both
ghting
uniform
a
up
by
Falange
Church
collectivization.
The
and
time.
over
landowners
emerged
made
controlled,
mobilized
the
were
augmented
its
to
Soviet
the
their
early
models
was
the
and
of
model
this
outgunned
tank
by
the
C H A P T E R
4 . 2 :
C O M B A T A N T S
The International Brigades
The
western
democracies,
policies
of
victory,
frightened
were
the
often
war
at
30
the
of
many
a
into
Spain
publicly
centre
to
Comintern.
on
the
the
extent
be
war,
to
the
crucial
the
were
presence,
times
such
never
as
the
in
an
most
numerically
other
during
disband
the
siege
the
was
of
the
national
the
spread
operated
smuggled
operated
into
the
by
battalions
from
the
based
Canada.
Brigades
and
By
fold
Army.
ghting
major
signicant
hand,
by
conrming
were
Battalion
effective
of
including
interpretation
again
divided
themselves
Comintern
volunteers
ght
some
Brigades.
against
an
the
and
stop
organized
battle
facility,
to
not
Comintern,
a
to
Spain
world,
1975.The
each
aid
smuggling
Europe,
Republican
were
fought
the
the
was
the
decided
the
Brigades
on
in
to
did
from
over
by
training
Brigades,
travel
policies
saw
authoritarian
ofcial
generally
western
here
against
Such
which
International
Mackenzie-Papineau
into
they
all
this
death
from
government
While
Brigades
Their
seven
the
volunteers
which
debated.
losses.
as
Republican
to
his
and
to
adopted
Nationalist
countries,
however,
were
that
rudimentary
were
from
ofcially
a
communism.
stopped
numerous
but
for
democracy
only
coordinated
until
of
these
intellectuals,
the
countries
and
Britain,
hoped
volunteers
and
of
Canada,
Paris
a
such
remaining
The
at
There
for
communism
held
of
in
prohibition,
one
and
spread
not
sympathizers
in
attend
nationality,
1938
in
organizations
Franco
the
defence
This
USA
opinion
policies
workers
and
Nationalist
recruiting
to
France
the
unofcially
of
illegal
cause.
Soviet-dominated
that
were
the
represented
Britain,
communist
it
enlisting
as
and
popular
of
made
mostly
and
Brigades
USA,
for
but
people,
Spain
The
terms
Republican
000
into
in
they
with
Non-intervention
Republicans,
for
as
odds
more
fascism.
such
non-intervention
an
force
and
of
suffered
important
Madrid.
continues
campaigns
While
the
heavy
morale
certainly
booster
not
a
Class discussion
long-term
solution
to
the
manpower
counter
to
the
heavy
issues
facing
the
Republicans,
nor
in
Why would civilians from all over the world
any
way
a
support
that
the
Nationalists
received,
the
travel to Spain to ght for the Republicans?
Brigades
did
buy
time
for
the
Republican
Army
in
several
key
battles.
Overseas support
German suppor t
Franco
sought
German
planes
to
were
carry
to
evident
that
stop
as
resources,
with
(air
was
the
formed
planes,
maintain
and
dispatched
of
give
those
of
arms,
the
planes
them.
was
in
Legion
and
The
to
from
North
that
later
the
Africa,
he
too
became
Spain’s
Spanish
The
the
most
The
instability,
a
natural
in
Spain.
bombers,
as
well
Legion
Nationalists
signicant
German
ght
Condor
It
that
transport
production.
aircraft.
to
in
Furthermore,
supplied
vehicles.
request
maintained
benet
arms
a
German
still
Europe.
access
for
then
border.
Germany
and
however,
Condor
transport
operate
war,
in
1936,
Twenty
Hitler
could
Germany
tanks
July
Franco,
southern
necessary
the
to
25
grant.
Publicly,
policy
France’s
could
as
to
communism
foreign
on
early
happy
mainland.
course
small
as
than
spread
contribution,
force)
ghter
the
the
especially
artillery,
material
to
victory
Throughout
Hitler
more
German
she
Nationalist
from
was
immediately
troops
wanted
situated
aid
leader
This
as
the
provided
Luftwaffe
consisted
personnel
the
of
to
Nationalists
95
4
C A U S E S
A N D
E F F E C TS
O F
20 T H - C E N T U R Y
with
a
distinct
match
and
it.
The
towns,
Guernica,
Second
Spain,
advantage,
operations
with
the
presaged
World
ghting
was
In
at
to
wore
as
of
the
the
resultant
the
War.
uctuating
contribution
the
W A R S
civilian
widespread
all,
any
around
one
prove
on
Republican
Condor
into
vital
to
1937
000
the
and
of
as
in
no
5,000
air
the
Basque
targets
personnel
and
Nationalists’
force
Republican
civilian
German
between
had
against
casualties,
bombing
12
time
forces
Legion
10
city
of
during
served
000
victories,
to
cities
men.
the
in
This
especially
as
1938.
Italian suppor t
Italian
Prime
politics
At
the
from
outbreak
personnel.
with
in
By
Franco,
case
of
a
(CTV),
by
as
important
Civil
war,
which
the
fought
in
as
70
in
for
the
war,
aid,
the
and
and
Spanish
monarchists.
material
a
secret
receive
tanks.
contributing
in
Truppe
included
in
a
and
agreement
Spanish
increase
Corpo
900
in
the
both
sizeable
men
hand
reached
would
a
aircraft
his
supporting
had
Spain,
000
700
throughout
such
dictator
return
to
had
further
Mussolini
army
units,
had
nancially
pledged
Italian
close
army
battles
he
1936,
Italian
number
Mussolini
War,
France
The
regular
formations
the
with
army.
would
well
of
Benito
the
November
war
Nationalist
as
Minister
before
support
aid
to
the
Volontaire
militia
These
volunteers
Italian
number
of
Guadalajara.
Soviet suppor t
Stalin
had
to
▲
did
in
not
enjoy
supplying
lead
the
the
their
forces
of
geographic
Spanish
world
advantage
allies.
socialism
He
and
was
a
that
also
Hitler
torn
distrust
of
and
Mussolini
between
the
a
socialist
desire
and
German pilots confer before a mission.
anarchist
elements
in
Spain.
Domestic
concerns,
Five-Year
Plans
and
To what ex tent did the German Condor Legion
the
purges
also
occupied
Stalin’s
energy.
Nevertheless,
by
October
aect the outcome of the civil war?
1936,
Soviet
forces.
material
Unlike
the
was
arriving
Germans
and
in
Spain
Italians,
to
who
bolster
the
allowed
Republican
the
Nationalists
Class discussion
to
What are some arguments for and against
German, Italian and Soviet intervention in
the Spanish Civil War?
purchase
aid
with
came
role.
material
Spain’s
from
the
Much
including
of
gold
the
inuence
of
ostensibly
the
to
the
create
same
Republicans
Most
and
Brigades,
with
the
Soviets
commissars
the
forces
on
The
recruiting
combined
Republican
credit,
reserves.
USSR.
political
development
on
also
the
of
responsible
was
and
for
at
Soviet
and
planes
organizational
Brigades,
ideological
Soviet
outright
times
for
tanks
important
the
by
pay
International
ideological
and
this
an
the
handled
broader
to
Republican
played
control
tension
side,
of
had
personnel.
divisions
conict
hindered
This
within
between
the
war
the
militias
effort.
The western democracies and non-intervention
In
evaluating
Civil
War
domestic
it
and
either
side
might
be
the
desire
own
fear
in
the
foreign
the
very
of
of
response
important
thought
proceeded
TOK discussion
is
its
a
in
a
of
avoid
resurgent
to
the
it
was
governed
than
any
altruistic
Popular
ally
offering
to
democracies
that
more
the
natural
Britain,
provoking
western
goals
Although
be
cautiously
ally,
the
remember
policy
war.
to
of
to
Front
their
any
largely
confrontation
Germany.
In
a
their
support
government
counterpart
support,
Spanish
by
with
in
in
because
misguided
France
Spain,
Italy
and
own
for
it
of
its
attempt
To what extent is intervention in foreign
to
limit
German
and
Italian
aid
to
the
Nationalists,
the
French
Popular
conicts an ethical issue?
Front
96
Prime
Minister,
Leon
Blum,
suggested
a
binding
agreement
C H A P T E R
between
nations
that
they
remain
out
of
Spanish
affairs.
The
4 . 2 :
C O M B A T A N T S
result
Neutrality Acts
was
the
creation
of
the
Non-Intervention
Committee,
which
effectively
A number of laws passed in the US
barred
the
sale
of
arms
to
either
side
in
the
Civil
War,
a
stipulation
that
Congress sought to establish the US as
was
upheld
by
Britain
and
France
and
ignored
by
Germany,
Italy
and
an ocially neutral country. The rst act,
the
Soviet
Union.
The
result
was
to
force
the
Republicans
to
rely
even
the Provisional Neutrality Act of 1935,
more
heavily
on
the
support
of
the
Russians,
exactly
what
the
British
was intended to expire in six months and
wanted
to
avoid.
The
US
also
refused
to
sell
arms
to
the
Republicans,
prohibited American citizens from trading
Roosevelt’s
hands
being
tied
by
the
Neutrality
Acts.
This,
however,
did
war materials with belligerents involved
not
stop
American
oil
companies
selling
oil
on
long-term
credit
to
the
in a war. Subsequent Neutrality Acts of
Nationalists,
as
oil
was
not
included
in
the
Neutrality
Acts.
In
the
nal
1936, 1937, and 1939 expanded and
analysis,
non-intervention
severely
damaged
the
Republican
war
effort
extended the 1935 law to include credit
but
had
no
real
effect
on
the
Nationalist
forces.
and loans. The acts did not, however,
include the sale of oil.
Foreign inter vention in the Spanish Civil War
Country
Association
Ar tillery
Armour
Germany
Nationalists
17 000
600
1000
200
Italy
Nationalists
75 000
660
1000
150
3000
1000
1550
900
USSR
Republicans
Personnel
Aircraft
International Brigades
United Kingdom
Republicans
2000
France
Republicans
10 000
USA
Republicans
2800
Republicans
1000
Czechoslovakia
Republicans
1000
Poland
Republicans
5000
Hungary
Republicans
1000
Yugoslavia
Republicans
1500
Germany/
Republicans
5000
L TA
Canada
300**
Thinking and communication
skills
Choose either the Republican or Nationalist
side. Write and deliver a speech persuading
Austria*
foreign powers to intervene in the war on
Italy*
Republicans
3350
your side. Be sure to include ideological
* Although the German and Italian governments ocially suppor ted the Nationalists,
considerations in your speech. Use any
the brigades were formed by volunteers who chose to ght for the Republicans out of
principle or ideology.
audio or visual materials you can to
enhance your plea.
** Purchased from French government before non-inter vention agreement
97
4.3
Operations
Conceptual understanding
Key questions
➔
To what extent did the Republican and Nationalist forces get stronger
or weaker as the war progressed? Account for the change.
➔
To what extent did foreign intervention play a decisive role in the battles
of the Spanish Civil War?
➔
To what extent did tactics and strategy inuence the course of the war?
Key concept
➔
Change
➔
Signicance
The
early
days
one
major
city
government’s
Morocco
would
the
when
carry
revolt,
increasing
were
the
early
After
would
be
no
old
scores
led
to
new
a
union
of
the
with
members.
to
Throughout
Bilbao,
the
several
attacks
conquer
98
on
rebellion.
of
sides
the
suffering
violence
in
in
used
to
–
early
November
forces
of
that
laid
troops
vital
to
there
took
to
the
settle
enemies.
This
conquered
Catholic
in
in
in
were
no
Granada
generally
repulse
to
form
was
war.
offensive
year.
clergy,
trade
the
Fame
militia
the
and
siege
and
legality
forces
1936
that
sides
and
violence.
Nationalist
September
Franco’s
sham
the
prove
cause.
communists
Republican
a
side
and
beginning
non-combatants.
Nationalist
Lorca
stop
of
one
the
the
slack
the
sides
personal
to
for
Moroccan
both
members
anarchists,
to
on
join
the
evident
respective
even
to
would
Nationalist
Citizens
loyal
transport
up
These
in
unlikely
messages
to
marking
and
the
anticipated
refused
became
Falange
García
the
it
or
legitimacy
war,
capital,
out
the
whenever
eventually
of
managed
city,
the
army
only
stranded
from
relay
take
of
remained
were
to
Spain.
their
political
retribution
sought
of
generals,
generally
Madrid
capital
success
of
that
planes
in
had
came
helped
mainland,
in
were
mainland,
mainland
Spanish
control
vigilante
of
Basque
the
the
Frederico
They
the
the
the
air
the
control
remained
generals
ships
transport
to
centres
uprising
Gibraltar
naval
Spanish
increasing
an
the
most
defensive.
to
were
Both
poet
in
the
the
take
troops
the
to
for
intervention
number
lend
from
the
of
violent
further
at
regulars
by
Nationalists
protection
the
of
the
eventual
end
any
targets
tribunals
executed
and
afforded
territory,
while
to
rebels
best
which
army
Navy
German
uprising
pattern
Republican
Africa
quick
navy,
Spanish
experienced
initial
opportunity
the
the
industrial
support
international
survival
the
Royal
Moroccan
most
major
Moroccan
Logistical
when
saw
Nationalists’
Spanish
ordered
the
All
The
elite
North
Hitler
transport
the
the
British
and
from
insurrection
Seville.
the
The
rebels
troops
of
–
the
hands.
government.
corners.
the
of
After
it.
the
rst
failing
The
on
towards
of
to
resistance
C H A P T E R
of
Madrid
rallying
would
point
Ibarruri,
for
known
Franco’s
army
German
troops
attacks
also
a
most
on
fell.
the
but
Clearly
each
of
could
not
war.
until
and
in
the
Basque
and
In
the
more
Barcelona,
against
Republicans
was
the
out
Bilbao,
battle
of
their
between
in
against
of
hold
capital,
tension
and
more
region
one
offensives
by
effort
two
would
its
pass!)
Italian
to
gained
communists
military
while
not
Basque
when
Delores
launch
region
launching
Republic.
more
to
O P E R A T I O N S
emotive
of
shall
leading
forces
undermined
organized
of
isolated
year,
1937,
the
words
(They
arrival
The
The
pitting
pursued
became
in
increase
the
June
the
warfare
be
the
this
Republican
were
of
by
failed.
effectively
parties
open
and
Passaran !”
used
early
the
improvements
into
1937
He
the
offensives
more
“No
which
progressed,
concentrated
Nationalists
of
atrocities
left-wing
broke
a
both
years
immortalized
in
materials.
Nationalists
ghting
these
three
Pasionaria,
bolstered
the
year
various
tension
at
of
for
Republic,
La
and
Nationalist
the
experience,
own,
as
was
notorious
As
the
Madrid,
target
against
continue
4 . 3 :
May
1937,
anarchists.
the
were
shooting
other.
San
Sebastián
France
France
Oviedo
Burgos
Burgos
Barcelona
Zaragoza
Barcelona
Madrid
Madrid
l
l
a
a
g
r
t
g
u
Cáceres
o
r
Valencia
t
u
Valencia
o
P
P
Badajoz
Córdoba
Córdoba
Granada
Sevilla
July
1936
August–September
1936
Bilbao
France
France
Burgos
Burgos
Barcelona
Barcelona
Belchite
Madrid
Madrid
l
l
a
a
g
g
r
t
u
r
Valencia
o
t
u
o
Valencia
P
P
Murcia
Málaga
March
1937
October
1937
International
Republicans
Nationalists
boundar y
▲
Republican and Nationalist held territory, July 1936–October 1937
99
4
C A U S E S
A N D
E F F E C TS
O F
20 T H - C E N T U R Y
W A R S
Bilbao and the north
In
of
March
Spain
1937
and
the
its
Nationalists
major
was
geographically
and
could
proved
difcult.
commanders,
Basques,
they
t.
defending
the
skies
This
From
the
Republicans’
unwilling
way
to
antiquated
the
and
the
both
to
its
June
the
could
defenders
have
artillery
By
the
over
a
reduced
10
city
June
to
by
the
a
as
the
command
of
advantage.
command,
around
the
the
pushed
distinct
this
Basque
of
campaign
Nationalist-held
defences
easily
re.
abandoned
The
forces
Enjoying
had
also
causes.
the
north
territory
personality
challenged
ying
region.
undermanned,
and
Bilbao.
the
region
control
practical
Nationalist
of
and
conducted
Nationalists
in
Basque
Republican-held
and
and
region
The
Command
independent
the
city
Basque
Bilbao.
other
Madrid
the
the
of
ideological
aircraft
Basque
the
ercely
to
force
risk
from
from
back
centre
reinforced.
the
region,
air
to
bombardment
and
had
March
Basques
over
was
its
be
orders
The
on
not
reecting
ignored
saw
isolated
therefore
captured
industrial
Bilbao
it
were
combination
defences
but
territory
were
of
aerial
collapsing
Nationalists.
Guernica
By
in
not
the
contesting
north
Condor
cities
the
although
it
Basque
did
German
commander
ying
German
and
a
half
the
city
the
elds
some
create
would
and
by
part
an
to
of
bridge,
carpet
explain
and
their
machine
from
many
300
massive
Spain
until
usual
city
it
city
roads
this
the
by
was
a
was
will
–
an
of
saw
Pablo
again
a
on
killed
in
that
military
in
spot.
the
The
the
democratic
were
in
a
There
is
the
untouched
the
own
goal.
The
the
city
decisions
some
not
of
allow
The
and
the
made
as
to
ranging
that
to
city
Germans
debate
numbers
horror
force
concocted
views.
of
also
with
would
republic.
not
air
formal
their
levelling
result
bombing,
artist
press
two
designed
factory
left
no
of
into
the
armaments
was
two
Although
German
destroying
immortalized
work
the
for
eeing
civilians
formed
these
city
First
Baron.
population
above.
of
the
Red
the
air
The
by
famous
the
the
Nationalist
was
out
the
an
undefended
purposes,
note,
terror
Basque
Bilbao.
Civilians
tactic
of
value
civilians
Picasso
a
the
as
from
bombing
between
the
a
Basques
indication
eeing
were
and
the
day,
targeting
targets
of
bombing
military
War.
to
region
German
launched
carried
5,000.
resist,
terror
led
cousin
gunned
for
World
1937
somewhere
the
to
military
However,
story
of
Basque
the
against
known
market
the
essentially
and
carpet
a
deliberate
Second
in
was
targeted
their
two
side,
26
over
allowed
Legion
that
Franco
machine
was
Guernica,
was
by
population
were
break
of
1,700.
taken
side
commanders
painting
important
April
partners
civilians
to
its
atrocity
Spanish
operational
how
ew
doctrine
gunning
The
Richthofen
only
lies
Guernica.
–
campaign
Condor
Richthofen,
propaganda
the
bombing
German
skies
von
bombing.
probably
the
default
von
in
the
of
by
Manfred
that
on
Luftwaffe
elaborate
reality
by
rely
–
Wolfram
the
and
the
was
Guernica
is
terror
later
the
the
view
terror
two
Because
past
that
a
of
city
bombers
beyond
argue
city
ace
hours.
swelled
orthodox
to
the
control
Republicans
April
dominate
bomb
The
the
26
to
War
Nationalist
conduct
On
decision
World
100
to
towns.
on
the
Spain,
Legion
and
attack
of
day
be
in
hung
his
in
C H A P T E R
4 . 3 :
O P E R A T I O N S
Source skills
What is evidence?
The
Spanish
Civil
bewildering
sides.
One
of
propaganda
▲
War
range
the
was
of
was
most
the
characterized
propaganda
distinctive
use
of
by
produced
genres
artistic
of
posters
a
by
convey
all
posters
this
political
from
messages.
the
Spanish
Look
Civil
at
the
War
following
and
answer
the
questions.
to
(From left to right) 1 L
’industria Tex til de Cara a la Guerra. Poster, 1937
.
A pro-union poster for the UGT (Unión General de
Trabajadores). 2 “And you, what have you done for victory?” Poster issued by the UGT and the PSOE (Spanish Socialist
Par ty). 3 Spanish Civil War poster, c. 1937
. “The farmer, too, is contributing to the war eor t.” Poster issued by the UGT and
CNT (the anarcho-syndicalist union).
Questions
1
What
messages
are
conveyed
by
these
posters?
3
Of
what
signicance
historians
2
Does
the
use
expressive
value
of
of
highly
effects
these
emotional
reinforce
the
language
studying
are
the
these
posters
Spanish
Civil
to
War?
and
propaganda
4
Choose
posters?
an
Spanish
support
organization
Civil
their
War
and
involved
create
a
in
the
poster
to
cause.
Madrid
Franco’s
during
forces
the
wrench
the
anarchist
were
war.
city
forces
from
and
Nationalists
back
1937.
that
to
the
From
capital
important
unable
Starting
the
the
again
point,
despite
rallying
in
to
dislodge
November
Republicans.
Republican
and
again
however,
the
point
fact
for
The
army
Franco
the
Republicans
the
from
Nationalists
International
combined
between
that
the
the
1936,
seemed
resistance
Republican
to
1936
satised
of
capital
to
Brigades,
forces
November
the
tried
to
Madrid
hurl
and
lay
was
the
January
siege
an
forces.
101
4
C A U S E S
A N D
E F F E C TS
O F
20 T H - C E N T U R Y
W A R S
Jarama
In
another
territory,
there,
in
effort
the
The
the
and
In
elements
US
the
their
14
of
had
The
been
losing
the
the
major
was
air
were
thwarted,
across
between
close
goal
but
the
of
the
fought
to
40
and
stop
20
000
tanks
000
and
strong.
Lincoln
infantry.
Understanding
both
link
They
sides
advance.
Madrid
unable
battle
was
from
counter-
fortied
between
were
The
including
Brigade
tanks.
River
hard
Nationalist
Nationalist
and
Republicans
and
Jarama
were
alongside
Soviet
the
River.
government
the
reinforcements,
the
ceased
cutting
Jarama
6,000
to
Republican-held
central
across
Abraham
power
had
the
Republicans
rushed
–
able
movement
of
artillery,
tanks
Brigades
and
the
Nationalist
force
–
rest
relocated
offensive
Republicans
Nationalist
back
and
including
Brigade
February
Nationalists
each
attacking
situation,
February
a
against
Legion
British
from
outnumbered,
International
the
position.
sides,
Initially
the
off
Valencia
launched
ground
the
the
on
end
Valencia
the
of
Madrid
from
Condor
of
and
attacked
By
gave
total
gravity
the
1937.
German
forces.
cut
Nationalists
February
pressed
to
specically
to
and
throw
costly
to
both
men.
Guadalajara
The
the
Battle
they
cut
off
not
Guadalajara
were
were
In
coordinate
were
able
Initially,
Once
the
ineffective
to
as
use
at
left
case
from
tank
air
equipment
for
similar
each
attacking
CTV
and
routed
force
Republicans
left
as
tanks.
air
The
the
battle
fact,
goal
that
was
Italians
the
to
50
000
did
tanks
Republicans
continued.
forces
counter-attack
6,000
they
the
cover
Again
the
In
meant
approximately
Republican
Republican
Italians
by
as
Jarama.
delays
Jarama
without
effectively
to
but
was
defences.
outnumbered
a
Like
supported
well
more
the
pattern
other,
actions.
established
arrived
The
the
the
attack
cover
Jarama,
ank.
a
support
the
against
reinforcements
Italian
to
independent
this
“volunteers”
proved
followed
intended
essentially
Madrid.
Italian
of
of
battles
casualties
gave
way.
crushed
and
a
the
great
deal
ed.
The Ebro oensive
The
Ebro
also
the
sound
early
Gandesa,
Popular
city.
and
the
Ebro
and
in
last
the
major
the
into
power
military
of
of
July
but
a
after
erce
the
to
the
were
war.
reached
and
unable
The
hammer
the
of
losses
occupy
Nationalists
the
was
With
gained
city
huge
to
It
1938.
Republicans
ghting
stalemate.
artillery
of
mid-November
advance
Brigades
bloody
and
operation
to
surprise,
Republican
International
settled
air
end
element
The
objective,
the
front
superiority
the
from
battle.
primary
Army
The
their
its
in
was
lasting
preparation
ground
Class discussion
offensive
longest,
the
the
used
Republicans,
who
Why would Negrin, the Republican
in
turn
were
ordered
to
hold
at
all
costs.
The
result
was
a
war
of
attrition
Prime Minister, use his army on costly
that
decimated
the
Popular
Army,
keeping
it
in
a
weak
defensive
position
oensives rather than building strong
for
the
rest
of
the
war.
In
the
end
each
side
lost
about
60
000
casualties,
defensive positions?
losses
102
that
the
Nationalists
could
weather,
but
the
Republicans
could
not.
4.4
Eects of the Spanish Ci vil War
Conceptual understanding
Key questions
➔
Why did the Republicans lose the war?
➔
How did the Nationalist victory aect European aairs between 1938–1945?
Key concepts
➔
Signicance
➔
Consequence
➔
Perspective
Why the Republicans lost
As
the
war
territory
large
of
1938,
but
of
and
Britain
2
The
April
and
ofcially
and
with
into
a
these
were
lost
and
often
able
notably
to
Moroccan
capability
militias
in
of
the
other
their
the
they
and
power
War
soldiers
had
of
to
the
the
the
gain
of
the
Republican
continued
the
1939
to
France
legitimate
surrendered
and
effective
For
with
their
they
Nationalists
whereas
valuable
the
was
in
1937,
Nationalists
received,
Legion.
The
efcient
the
The
Republicans
victory
part,
aid
the
primarily
Condor
fought
Stalinists.
forced
which
foreign
arms
Anarchists
fought
from
central
insufcient
offensives,
war,
these
over.
Lack
German
gave
beginning
forces
of
the
a
piece
November
February
as
to
smaller
defenders
capability
ineffective.
of
the
reconnect
to
which
in
downfall.
posture
use
last
regime
inghting,
to
of
reduced
much
July
Valencia,
reasons.
their
a
erosion
been
tried
from
the
was
attempt
of
and
Republican
military
did
had
capital,
Franco
the
in
defensive
effective
air
regular
from
and
expense
the
1939,
Marxist/Trotskyists
costly
make
role
Madrid
and
of
Civil
political
a
in
the
of
constant
Republicans
Madrid
last
a
they
offensive
Early
control
saw
1937,
of
The
several
played
Although
most
just
for
control,
all
east
Ebro
Spanish
inherent
were
the
The
predominantly
impossible.
of
The
communists
weaknesses
and
recognized
Spain.
1939.
materials
October
Barcelona.
with
leaving
Republicans
command
south
Republican
of
Republicans
By
unsuccessful.
fell,
Despite
government
on
the
control
were
strongholds
resist.
to
surrounding
areas
the
controlled.
territory
land
two
progressed,
they
use
ghting
Republican
experience
at
the
territory.
Aftermath and signicance of the war
The
immediate
people
died
majority
ed
the
cost
of
between
were
of
the
July
war
was
1936
non-combatants.
ideological
purge
that
devastating.
and
April
Over
followed
1939.
500
the
An
Of
000
estimated
these
Republican
Nationalist
500
deaths,
000
the
vast
supporters
victory,
settling
in
103
4
C A U S E S
A N D
E F F E C TS
O F
20 T H - C E N T U R Y
France,
take
of
South
decades
W A R S
and
to
Central
recover
America.
from,
a
fact
The
physical
exacerbated
destruction
by
the
would
pre-war
lack
development.
In
terms
of
its
broader
impact,
the
Spanish
Civil
War
has
been
Ar t and literature inspired by the
described
as
a
“dress
rehearsal”
for
the
Second
World
War.
It
is
true
Spanish Civil War
that
Ernest Hemingway,
For Whom the Bell Tolls (book)
George Orwell,
the
later.
to
Carpet
military
and
a
images
this
bombing
operations
infantry
clarion
of
made
call
for
war
of
become
civilians,
and
their
the
would
the
violent
integrated
debut
in
Spain.
international
left
commonplace
ideological
use
of
air
confront
a
reprisals
power,
Symbolically,
to
half
the
the
decade
linked
armour
war
threat
was
posed
Homage to Catalonia (book)
by
expansionary
fascism,
a
fact
Spain
realized
three
years
before
the
Pablo Picasso,
democracies
of
the
West.
Guernica (painting)
The
Nationalist
victory
strategically
weakened
the
western
democracies
Woody Guthrie,
in
the
region.
Britain’s
position
at
Gibraltar
and
thus
in
the
“Jarama Valley” (song)
Mediterranean
was
threatened
by
a
German
and
Italian
ally.
France
now
Ken Loach,
had
a
fascist
state
on
two
of
her
major
borders.
Germany
had
secured
Land and Freedom (lm)
preferential
Guillermo del Toro,
appearance
Pan’s Labyrinth (lm)
World
The Clash,
The
mining
on
rights
Axis
in
side
Spain
of
and
the
Spanish
Eastern
troops
Front
made
during
the
a
nominal
Second
War.
war
was
cast
“Spanish Bombs” (song)
perspective.
Herber t Read,
characterized
side
the
and
To
in
the
as
a
freedom
different
roles
intelligentsia
struggle
on
the
depending
of
the
between
other.
For
West,
the
the
on
one’s
the
forces
war
of
working
own
was
repression
classes
of
political
often
on
the
the
one
world,
“Bombing Casualties: Spain” (poem)
it
was
about
landed/industrial
interest
versus
workers
and
unions.
The Lowest of the Low,
Industrialists,
the
Texas
Oil
Company,
for
example,
saw
the
war
as
a
“Letter from Bilbao” (song)
struggle
against
economic
way,
the
proprietary
views
divisions
explain
and
expansionary
and
within
how
war
the
and
authoritarianism
interpretations
both
the
communism
of
Republican
captivated
the
the
and
the
that
war
particular
comes
reected
Nationalist
imagination
of
with
the
sides
the
brand
it.
In
of
this
internal
and
world
help
in
the
late
TOK discussion
1930s.
The
The British, French and US governments
such
did not come to the aid of the Republicans
Parker,
as
war
André
Paul
gures
prominently
Malraux,
Robeson
Ernest
and
in
the
works
Hemmingway,
Woody
of
writers
George
and
Orwell,
artists
Dorothy
Guthrie.
in their ght against fascism in Spain.
Strategically,
the
war
brought
fascism
to
both
of
France’s
major
borders
Within six months of the end of the
and
gave
the
fascists
direct
access
to
the
Atlantic,
so
vital
to
Britain’s
Spanish Civil War, France and Britain
interests.
In
the
event,
Franco’s
reluctance
to
wholeheartedly
throw
were at war with the Axis Powers and
his
lot
in
with
Hitler
and
Mussolini
spared
the
Grand
Alliance
of
the
two and half years later the US would
Second
World
War
the
reality
of
dealing
with
Spain
as
a
declared
enemy.
follow suit. How might the events of the
This
can
be
attributed
to
some
key
differences
in
fascism
as
practised
Second World War have changed the
by
Franco,
Mussolini
and
Hitler.
For
his
part,
Franco’s
regime
was
able
interpretation of the Spanish Civil War in
to
survive
into
the
1970s
by
a
mixture
these countries?
repressive
104
authoritarian
tactics.
of
broad
right-wing
support
and
Exam-style questions and fur ther reading
Exam-style questions
1
Examine
2
Evaluate
Civil
3
5
role
the
of
ideology
signica nce
as
of
a
cause
f or ei g n
of
the
Spanish
in t e r ve n t io n
in
Civil
the
War.
S pa ni s h
War.
Examine
Civil
4
the
the
reas o ns
for
the
R ep ubl ic a n
d efe at
in
the
Sp ani sh
War.
Evaluate
the
outcome
of
Compare
forces
at
effectiveness
the
and
the
Spanish
contrast
the
beginning
of
the
Civil
of
International
Brigades
to
the
War.
Republican
the
forces
and
the
Nationalist
war.
Fur ther reading
Beevor,
Antony.
Preston,
W
.W
.
Paul.
Norton
2007.
&
Radosh,
Ronald
Union
the
in
Rhodes,
the
New
Co.
it
Made.
Hugh.
York,
The
The
New
and
Spanish
Richard.
World
Thomas,
1980.
Spanish
Spanish
York,
Habeck,
Civil
2015.
2013.
The
War.
War:
Orbis.
Reaction,
London,
UK.
Revolution
and
Revenge.
USA.
Yale
and
and
Civil
Mary
War .
Hell
Simon
Civil
(eds).
Good
Civil
The
Toronto,
War
Spain
Press.
Company:
Schuster.
Spanish
2001.
University
(4th
Betrayed:
New
The
Haven,
Spanish
Civil
Soviet
USA.
War
and
Canada.
rev.
ed.).
Penguin.
USA.
105
5
T H E
F I R S T
T O TA L
W O R L D
W A R :
W A R
Global context
Some
historians
century
the
as
years
period
the
1789–19 1 4
than
the
Indeed
the
history
during
and
reaching
up
to
a
to
which
this
r efe r re d
1 9th
as
a
f o r ce s
impe r i a l i s m,
s o rts
Europ e a ns ,
thems e l v e s
all
mor e
a rb itra r y
p e r i o d,
of
others
to
in
in
the
s hould
1 9th
these
s e ei n g
widespread
they
mea n in g fu l
took
Eur ope a n
in
the
the
s een
l e ad in g
w hol e,
pr inci pal
a sp ir e .
s oc i e t y
Ye t
in
wh il e
held
It
the
was
1914.
history,
w i thi n
mater i a l
held
the
p o te nti al
importa nt
of
elements
and
of
f or
the
to
not
cha ng e
let
bl ind
of
“pr og r es s ”
con i c t
gr e at
Wa r
pr omis e
a nd
tha t
a nd
Eu r ope
wa t e r sh e ds
p rodu c e d
chan g e
p r opo rtio ns .
contin ui ty
post-1918
the
cour s e
e co nomi c
and
and
the
of
Wo r ld
and
however,
scale
l a tte r
one
Firs t
scope
the m
p r os pe r ity
thi s
As
political,
enormous
as
y e a rs
also
social,
mil ita ri sm ,
be
forces
disparity.
1 80 0– 19 00.
s pe ci ca ll y
ca n
on
the
Ce ntury” ,
indus tr i a l i za ti on,
zenith
1914.
considered
mo r e
domina nt
nationalism,
science,
ha v e
”Lo ng
the
us
be twee n
It
of
is ,
sh e e r
to
s cope
si g n i c a n t
the
pr e- 19 14
wo r l d .
Timeline
1914
Assassination of Archduke
Franz Ferdinand
June
Battle of the Frontiers; Battle
August
of Tannenberg
First Battle of the Marne; Race to
September
the Sea
October–November
First Battle of Ypres
1915
First use of gas on the Western Front;
Allied armies attack the Ottoman
April
Empire at Gallipoli
May
Italy launches Isonzo oensive
German U-boat sinks Lusitania
June
December
Allies evacuate troops from Gallipoli
1916
Battle of Verdun
February–December
June
Battle of the Somme
106
July–November
Brusilov oensive begins
C H A P T E R
5 :
T H E
F I R S T
W O R L D
W A R :
T O T A L
W A R
1917
Germany resumes unrestricted
February
submarine warfare; US receives copy of
Zimmermann Telegram
Tsar Nicholas II abdicates
March
French Neville oensive; Canadians
April
capture Vimy Ridge; Elements of the
French army mutiny
First US troops land in France
June
July
Battle of Passchendaele begins
1918
Wilson introduces the “14 Points”
January
Soviets sign Treaty of
March
Brest-Litovsk with Germany;
Germany launches Spring oensives
Allies launch Amiens oensive
August
Ottoman Empire concludes separate
October
peace with Allies
Kaiser Wilhelm II abdicates; Allies and
November
Germany sign armistice
▲
Arch Duke Franz Ferdinand (left) and his assassin Gavrilo Princip (right)
107
5.1
Causes of the First World War
Conceptual understanding
Key questions
➔
To what extent was the war preventable?
➔
How did the causes of the war inuence the nature of the war?
➔
What is the relative responsibility of each of the European powers for the
outbreak of the war?
Key concepts
➔
Cause
➔
Consequence
➔
Perspective
It
has
become
known
by
a
as
“spark”
they
also
choose,
and
the
July
of
causes
trends
often
causes
militarism
Militarism
A political, diplomatic and social
required
emphasis on military matters. Evidence
to
of militarism often includes increased
it
seek
did
was
larger
the
to
of
of
as
an
First
20th
the
work
militaries.
the
the
It
is
war
the
can
First
be
Whatever
can
through
century,
be
the
World
up
War,
causes)
trite
and
metaphor
broken
end
leading
ignited
boring,
you
down
into
of
the
19th
to
the
fateful
a
century
events
of
Crisis.
however.
industrial
in
of
(long-term
clichés
War
isolation,
on
keg”
truth.
World
July
in
causes
While
developed
dependent
of
of
“powder
essential
the
called
causes
a
cause).
the
that
not
speak
War,
(immediate
beginning
1914,
These
cliché
Great
encapsulate
the
number
a
the
this
itself,
They
capacity.
were
Colonial
interconnectedness
as
well
as
the
scope
interconnected.
possessions
that
of
the
we
can
war
begin
as
unfolded.
military spending, development of
military technology, a general suppor t for
Long-term causes
the goals and plans of a nation’s military
and the inuence of military leaders on
political decisions.
It
is
we
did
important
refer
not
talk
in
made
and
to
make
terms
war
capacity
108
to
think
the
of
First
likely.
of
a
big
empires
involving
World
two,
War
limited
maybe
in
mean
the
follows
is
developments
trend
the
three,
when
strict
inevitable.
European
The
we
are,
What
These
the
war.
what
causes
probabilities.
between
and
about
long-term
more
tension
probability
war
as
powers.
towards
Instead,
a
set
countries.
of
fuelled
of
a
say
not
in
“cause”.
causes
history,
–
What
they
we
developments
the
Further,
larger
likelihood
we
sense,
suspicion,
they
short,
fear
increased
militaries,
must
that
the
industrial
limited,
regional
C H A P T E R
Allied
5 . 1 :
C A U S E S
O F
T H E
F I R S T
W O R L D
W A R
Powers
Norway
0
Sweden
Central
Powers
500
0
Neutral
Miles
Moscow
Powers
500
Kilometres
North
a
Sea
e
Denmark
S
c
i
t
l
Great
Russian
Empire
a
B
Britain
Berlin
Neth.
German
London
Empire
C
a
s
p
Belgium
i
a
Lux.
n
S
e
a
Paris
Atlantic
Ocean
Austro-Hungarian
France
Switz
Empire
Black
Sea
Romania
Bulgaria
Serbia
Persia
Italy
Montenegro
Ottoman
Empire
Corsica
Albania
Portugal
Spain
Greece
Sardini
M
e
d
it
e
r
r
a
n
e
a
n
Cyprus
Sicily
S
e
Sp.
Morocco
a
(Br.)
NEJD
Tunisia
Algeria
Egypt
First World War – European alliances
▲
Militarism
Broadly
speaking,
emphasis
navies
On
at
the
many
the
is
that
less
if
likely
they
if
of
of
were
true
about
trend
militarism
towards
century
the
can
precise,
warship
the
the
that
at
powers
not
social
as
be
historian
aspects
troop
we
–
overall
in
and
two
that
ways.
appeal
concentration
should
the
societal
armies
highlighted
technical
hand,
an
massive
tonnage,
other
the
generals,
militaries
than
lost
If
its
the
the
of
that
would
that
the
be
to
remained
country
own,
was
the
the
last
largest
believed
held
had
a
turn
were
countries
before
Regardless,
–
On
to
growing.
you
19th
are
deterrence
faster
emptively
before
the
talk
The
consider
relation
of
to
and
those
the
military
society.
other
size
growing
of
there
historians
European
idea
the
end
appeal
wider
statesmen,
early
can
expenditure.
certainly
major
we
military.
hand
military
aspects
It
the
the
one
military
to
on
in
this
could
larger
static.
too
the
This
help
avoid
that
was
great.
might
big
rival
a
have
was
attack
the
use
the
This
the
been
state’s
short,
of
most
war.
military,
problem
a
to
In
militaries
Paradoxically,
country’s
The
worried
was
a
attack.
temptation
differential
century,
history.
true
rival
your
Actions or polices designed to discourage
an attack by making the consequences of
that
army
deterrence
was
the attack prohibitive.
pre-
army
it.
the
fact
r e ma i ns
tha t
the
mil it a r y
fo rc es
t ha t
t he
division
European
powers
ha d
at
the i r
di sp o s a l
in
191 4
we r e
im m e n s e.
T h er e
A military unit of around 12 000–18 000
were
approximate l y
200
a r my
divisions
in
Europe
in
191 4
i ncl ud ing
men. Divisions were designed to contain
reserves
(part-tim e
s o l d ie r s
cal le d
up
in
the
e v e nt
of
wa r) .
Th e se
within them all elements necessary to
massive
armies
we r e
fed
by
va r ying
de g re e s
of
c on sc ri pt i on
in
all
ght an engagement – infantry, ar tillery,
European
powers
w i th
the
e xcep ti on
of
G re a t
B ri ta in
(i n t ro du c e d
in
medical and logistic services, command,
1916).
Men
of
mil i ta r y
age
we re
re qu ir e d
to
s e rve
fr om
t wo
to
s ix
and communication and intelligence.
years.
In
fact,
the
te r ms
of
se r vice
w e re
i n c r ea s in g .
Fr a nc e
pa ss e d
th e
109
5
C A U S E S
A N D
E F F E C TS
O F
20 T H - C E N T U R Y
W A R S
Three
Ye ar
Law
mandatory
two
to
three
the
Russian
the
world.
some
these
to
ve
fact
As
they
on
case
that
all
report
of
of
for
wishful
would
reliably
call
military
rivals,
age.
aware
was
of
even
an
the
have
deceptive
they
size
before
of
was
also
technology
in
the
were
up
to
400
evident
meant
that
producing
10
to
miles
600
(16
of
80
to
as
their
army
not
by
great
that
these
To
July
in
of
In
likelihood
would
required
and
if
an
was
they
had
even
combination
massive
of
and
army
poor
poor
could
able-bodied
sword.
of
other
military
apparatus,
it
bigger
distance
depots
the
may
reected
conscripts
as
strength
men
To
of
her
states,
planners,
the
mobilization
could
the
theoretical
must
mobilize.
This
be
was
to
1914.
the
size
of
forces.
armament
could
the
Russian
Russian
enemy
wa s
numbers
double-edged
that
e nough
reality
created
the
the
military
these
hurl
kilometres).
Machine
per
In
minute.
a
on
meant
only
used
the
in
was
the
military
most
a
W hi le
wo ul d- be
contradiction.
The
a nd
mo bil ize
were
in
ar my
r e s e rv is ts .
the
duty
one-fth
focus
potential
artillery
rounds
equivalent
in
ramications
Militarism
about
behemoth.
the
any
the
picture
were
imposing
ominous
methods
Dreadnought
as
that
was
deciencies
actual
undertaken
service
This
inclined
Russia
or
into
meant
l ar g e st
m il li on
a ny
Russia,
have
between
organization
accounts ,
grow i ng .
infrastructure,
military
1.3
thinking
problem.
The HMS Dreadnought was revolutionary in all aspects: design, speed, armament,
materials and production methods.
fr om
s ta ndi ng
al a r mi ng
paper,
dangerous
the
▲
were
impressive
seem
a
to
more
all
the
co ul d
alone
pause
attackers,
By
was
million
gures
give
it
i ncr e a si ng
s e r v ice
tsar ’s
about
claimed
further
1913,
year s .
army
The
numbered
in
militar y
armies
By
foundries
a
guns
could
each
navies,
modern
of
one-tonne
practice,
and
1914,
Krupp
and
explosive
gun
Skoda
projectile
theoretically
machine
but
industrial
re
was
the
ries.
A class of battleship rst developed in
The
Anglo-German
naval
race
was
perhaps
one
of
the
starkest
the UK with the class name coming from
illustrations
of
militarism.
When
the
British
Royal
Navy
launched
the
the prototype for this type of ship, the
revolutionary
HMS
Dreadnought
in
December
1906,
it
instantly
ships,
obsolete.
made
HMS Dreadnought. It was faster and more
every
battleship
then
aoat,
including
British
If
a
heavily armed than any battleships that
country
was
to
have
a
modern
navy
after
1906,
it
had
to
spend
money
existed at the time. It immediately made
on
Dreadnoughts.
When
this
was
coupled
with
Germany’s
desire
for
every battleship aoat obsolete and
a
navy
to
rival
the
Royal
Navy,
as
expressed
in
the
Second
Naval
Law
became the standard against which all
of
1900,
it
created
an
arms
race
that
would
see
the
size
new ships were measured.
increase
110
by
a
combined
197%
between
1900
and
1914.
of
these
navies
C H A P T E R
5 . 1 :
C A U S E S
O F
T H E
F I R S T
W O R L D
W A R
Warship tonnage of the powers, 1880–1914
1880
1890
190 0
1910
1914
Britain
650 000
679 000
1 065 000
2 174 000
2 714 000
France
271 000
319 000
499 000
725 000
900 000
Russia
200 000
180 000
383 000
401 000
679 000
United States
169 000
240 000
333 000
824 000
985 000
Italy
100 000
242 000
245 000
327 000
498 000
Germany
88 000
190 000
285 000
964 000
1 305 000
Austria-Hungary
60 000
66 000
87 000
210 000
372 000
Japan
15 000
41 000
187 000
496 000
700 000
Source: Kennedy, Paul. 1988. Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic and
Military Conict from 1500 to 2000. London, UK . Fontana Press. P
. 261.
Large
or
even
engender
with
growing
suspicion
economic
likely.
Further,
and
rivalry,
it
militaries
fear
in
do
rival
imperialism
makes
a
large,
not
cause
states.
and
wars.
When
They
this
nationalism,
massively
do,
however,
suspicion
it
destructive
makes
war
is
coupled
war
more
more
likely.
Military and naval personnel, 1880–1914
190 0
1910
1914
Russia
791 000
1880
677 000
1890
1 162 000
1 285 000
1 352 000
France
543 000
542 000
715 000
769 000
910 000
Germany
426 000
504 000
524 000
694 000
891 000
Britain
367 000
420 000
624 000
571 000
532 000
Austria-Hungary
246 000
346 000
385 000
425 000
444 000
Italy
216 000
284 000
255 000
322 000
345 000
Japan
71 000
84 000
234 000
271 000
306 000
United States
34 000
39 000
96 000
127 000
164 000
Source: Kennedy, Paul. 1988. Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic and
Military Conict from 1500 to 2000. London, UK . Fontana Press. P
. 261.
Industrialization
Some
historians
equated
to
relationship
a
Great
the
massive
century
The
it
nature
Of
By
had
of
course,
than
this
large
that
all
the
by
in
war
1880;
to
in
do.
spread
the
industrial
There
more
likely.
was
not
the
far
rst
the
output
are,
taken
rest
of
war
does
however,
that
Among
uniform
these
a
of
not
the
root
role
the
of
in
20th
war
the
across
in
1914
is
any
a
the
For
the
century.
making
powers.
a
the
determine
more
consequences
in
is
19th
England
and
help
cause
strong
constituted
industrialized
would
a
disputed
half
consequences
among
is
what
Europe
certain
played
of
second
power
there
generally
had
more
total
while
matter
not
in
that
to
was
the
is
economic
that,
industrialization
manufacturing
increase
What
output
Europe
as
1900
concepts,
production
this
come
increasing
war
in
1870,
measures,
armies
increase
European
had,
two
by
contend
complex.
industrial
revolution
been
the
in
that
Others
these
more
increase
before
Atlantic.
than
was
contended
power.
between
Power
century.
have
military
of
general
fact
example,
111
5
C A U S E S
A N D
E F F E C TS
O F
20 T H - C E N T U R Y
while
iron
and
steel
approximately
in
Britain.
had
terms,
in
to
by
1913,
the
France
between
political
tension.
In
to
order
between
feed
point
had
was
These
the
for
and
the
disparities
massive
in
behind
in
United
had
same
all
States
actually
steel
period.
the
create
turn
industrial
the
it
Germany’s
the
helped
which
in
1913,
British,
329%
woefully
powers,
these
increased
1890
approximately
Austria-Hungary.
tension
production
242%
More
increased
W A R S
production
In
powers
machines,
absolute
except
competitive
increased
economic
diplomatic
the
by
decreased
powers
and
needed
neo-mercantilism
access
to
resources,
which
in
turn
created
a
neo-mercantilist
mindset
An economic doctrine that emphasizes
complemented
by
the
drive
for
colonies
in
the
second
half
of
the
the need to decrease impor ts by moving
19th
century.
This
thirst
had
been
momentarily
slaked
by
the
“scramble
toward self-suciency. This move often
for
Africa”
but
by
1900
that
well
had
gone
dry.
The
European
powers
requires an increase in colonial holdings
had
claimed
all
of
Africa,
with
a
few
small
exceptions.
Sources
of
raw
to supply raw materials and provide
materials,
not
to
mention
markets,
had
either
to
be
wrung
from
existing
markets for nished goods.
holdings
or
Not
had
only
total
of
to
navy.
It
did
artillery
not
once
shells
a
previous
rivalry
was
long
day.
year.
the
for
Even
The
increased,
to
1914
to
backward
artillery
connection
a
in
between
the
was
the
their
huge
protect
industrial
200
system
tenfold
economic
To
powerful
producing
a
the
lucrative
British.
factory
1916,
power.
1913
in
modern,
harness
Russian
shells
By
and
outsold
France
another
trade.
Britain
needed
powers
from
had
of
signicantly
By
the
so
that
Germans
the
began.
million
diplomatically,
equal
Germans
war
4.5
was
trade,
take
the
manufacturing
the
the
this
or
output
exports
market
increase
potential
forcibly
industrial
German
American
and
wrestled,
000
was
increase
rivalry
and
on
military
evident.
The alliance system
If
these
great,
and
the
end
long
at
the
split
before
end
into
of
countries
of
that
her
as
support
into
in
war
these
112
had
of
the
the
the
have
to
work
1871,
war.
His
policy
event
two
of
Cold
Eastern
Cold
treaties,
he
War,
wars,
War
to
Europe
These
two
then
a
in
dissolved
1914
alliances
and
NATO
disastrous
were
Europe
agreements
that
or
method
with
was,
to
either
was
were
alliances
the
with
of
the
in
to
create
The
Bismarck
in
each
had
of
To
two
this
The
to
by
means
carefully
intricate
was
Italy
a
became
to
major
part
the
Dual
embroiled
added
effect
isolate
diplomats
of
military
Bismarck
cumulative
set
between
turned
pledging
intended,
French
by
Alliance
1879,
state
other
it
an
Dual
addition
1887.
Empire
preserve
established
something
undo.
was
opponents.
Russia
as
German
to
deterrence.
years,
more
the
sought
Alliance,
Europe,
hard
of
alliances.
forging
of
three
Triple
Treaty
rest
nished
Within
agreements
from
of
the
large-scale
the
globe.
in
a
to
smaller,
set
caused
brought
states
Austria-Hungary,
against
Reinsurance
albeit
the
from
and
Similar
secondary
part
have
communist
iron”
shield.
Alliance
a
a
and
Germany
in
by
alliances
would
1980s.
rival,
Bismarck
shielding
of
the
around
“blood
alliances
Pact
the
two
connected
After
interlocking
Warsaw
were
the
of
France
going
to
C H A P T E R
This
work
loans
to
elected
too,
was
not
was
to
the
ever
German
While
when
it
been
nearly
as
this
erupted
from
as
a
however,
Russian
refused
of
notable
was
the
on
of
Canada,
to
war
earth.
should
guaranteed
militarily,
Russia
had
had
alliance
net
was
to
not
large
very
in
Colton
in
result
the
of
Britain
to
the
scope.
The
called
statesmanship
was
a
Russia.
race
Africa
tentative
and
was
then
the
a
result.
in
Africa
Signicantly,
in
the
affairs
differences
into
Alliance
with
the
as
of
the
Triple
the
British
one
linked
which
of
her
top
the
helped
web
this,
For
draw
of
with
largest
committed
almost
Entente
of
Two
dominions”
This
neutrality.
the
secret.
alliance
to
“white
county.
On
perpetual
agreements
some
automatically
another
war.
other
and
Britain’s
also
were
complicating
and
complex
“the
in
partners
since
her
her
into
treaties
1839
part,
an
and
1900–1914.
made
or
by
public
was
support
Balkans,
Britain
commitments,
old
Triple
independent
global
interlocking,
diplomacy,
have
the
further
it
and
on
Belgium’s
tension
war,
be
the
a
was
The
naval
differences
thought,
settled
it
action.
were
she
1904
military
when
The
begin
world.
The
Britain
century.
Japan
settle
aided
same.
France
metamorphosed
than
Zealand
war
no
of
the
complicated
so-called
New
period
this
the
but
declare
in
Serbia,
increase
subtle
the
would
interests
with
causing
were
result
Britain
to
the
alliances.
War.
to
or
isolation”
the
with
in
that
Kaiser’s
condition,
of
with
Cordiale
had
Cordiale
was
right
alliance
British
British
turn
closer
possibility.
ramparts
African
around
do
formal
Tensions
agreed
the
which
noted,
and
guaranteed
agreements
The
Even
Britain
that
the
of
the
seemed
military
systems
some
been
so
agreement
binding
involved
Australia
the
by
W A R
million
pledged
the
“splendid
of
a
France
if
W O R L D
German
culminated
distinct
watery
South
contained
or
her
rigidity
Entente
a
dangerous
her
an
France
Entente
rigid
any
alliance
already
1907
the
disputes
hand,
the
powers,
and
a
treasury.
time
attacked
F I R S T
Russia,
£400
Tsar
likewise
now
from
the
came
The
Cordiale
By
less
to
examples
empire
Britain
a
The
smaller
free
and
agree
has
of
Europe.
these
by
Japan
It
to
Britain
in
her
First
France.
Entente
Empire
Entente.
made
with
Britain’s
continental
war.
as
changed
victory
isolation.
number
the
preserving
her
had
Now
The
T H E
ofce
nurtured
friendship
do
O F
approve
totalling
1894.
was
behind
eschewed
1890.
ever
to
to
Austria-Hungary
war
emerged
retreated
into
agreed
helped
pressuring
agreement,
well
Each
by
was
rapprochement
By
and
new
in
Germany
isolation
She
however,
battered
emergence
saw
it.
statesmen
world,
Germany
in
if
in
C A U S E S
foreign
France
loans
This
formalized
or
refused
Treaty
1894,
offering
two-front
Russia
her
British
diplomatic
with
and
–
France
Russia
a
and
planning.
Germany
reveled
suited
prudent.
Russia
France.
of
Bismarck
post-Bismarckian
1890
Alliance,
attacked
France
the
Reinsurance
military
nightmare
traditionally
the
tsarist
attack
attacking
when
and
Between
with
would
in
forces
had
renew
coordinating
Italy
easier
1887
Franco-Russian
Russia
had
in
isolated.
relationship
and
made
Russia
5 . 1 :
it
secretive
suspicion
more
system
what
most
likely
was
forthcoming
in
the
and
also
historians
Olympian
and
fairly
between
arduous
to
that
of
of
alliances
powers.
it
Palmer
No
While
would
maintain,
Roswell
statesmanship”.
summer
set
great
ensured
Robert
of
rigid
the
be
requiring
and
such
Joel
level
of
1914.
113
5
C A U S E S
A N D
E F F E C TS
O F
20 T H - C E N T U R Y
W A R S
Imperialism/nationalism
nation
A nation is a group of people who share
It
a number of commonalities generally
people.
including language, culture, historic
two
development and territory.
generally
is
important
In
sides
Imperial
imperialism
high
in
A set of actions and policies by which
of
one national group dominates another
the
national group or its territory.
largely
of
the
same
tensions
has
been
the
mind
coin.
of
the
the
known
exploration
to
the
as
the
as
the
is,
of
of
one
in
Henry
heart,
nation
it
the
state
had
will
because
Until
of
1870s,
Stanley
of
are
dangerously
measure
Africa”.
interior,
group
dominates.
became
large
for
a
nationalism
exploitation
By
African
its
those
“scramble
areas.
at
and
powers
century,
subsequent
coastal
of
feelings
European
such
potential
nation
imperialism
19th
and
explorers
economic
The
a
imperialism
nationalist
half
limited
that
therefore,
the
become
European
in
between
second
entrepreneurial
to
keep
ways,
aggravate
the
what
to
many
1850,
Africa
had
however,
begun
touching
to
off
awaken
a
race
nationalism
by
European
states
to
claim
their
own
colonies
in
Africa.
The
potential
An emotional attachment to a group and a
of
this
“scramble”
to
bring
far-ung
powers
into
conict
should
be
desire for it to be politically independent.
obvious.
It
colonies,
out
the
rules
had
certainly
Bismarck
rules
would
no
want
interest
Despite
his
powers
new
of
efforts,
stay
Kaiser,
her
of
on
“place
the
in
by
some
the
II,
1890.
stage.
sun”
and
Part
game,
thought
world
the
in
colony
to
was
her
of
Young
his
over
the
of
Wilhelm
a
hammer
as
he
these
he
did
African
efforts,
African
to
war.
the
European
questions
lay
which
not
land
European
problem
result
insulting
developed
a
to
overseas
that
Just
colonies,
distant
of
for
1885
hopes
into
war
the
an
in
in
own
some
because
close
disdain
ownership.
dragging
ways
Berlin
her
in
his
Africa
over
powers
dangerously
retirement
in
exploiting
acquiring
other
in
Despite
conference
disagreements
and
Wilhelm
Germany
get
a
and
Germany
come
out
Bismarck.
Germany
new
would
to
off
in
Bismarck’s
desire
hosted
between
his
to
claiming
stave
disputes
jeopardize
after
for
was
in
was
Bismarck’s
what
the
under-representation
demanded
brash,
that
provocative
Germany
and
Weltpolitik
ultimately
The
foreign
policy
adopted
by
result
at
the
end
of
the
19th
centu ry
by
sought
to
asser t
her
to
the
this
Weltpolitik
ill-conceived
policy
(world
became
policy)
evident
to
in
achieve
1905.
it.
The
During
French-controlled
Morocco,
Wilhelm
boldly
proclaimed
a
state
that
the
inf lu ence
status
around
of
which
visit
she
dangerous
Germany
of
Morocco
should
be
re-evaluated
at
an
international
conference.
world.
Unfortunately
following
had
wished
between
entente
Agadir
the
assert
the
German
the
rest
to
he
Europe
The
the
isolated
and
held
in
served
of
the
Algeciras
While
process
only
to
German
travelled
France
by
to
feeling
a
wedge
the
and
Moroccan
into
ally.
that
Kaiser
drive
motives
the
her
the
the
strengthen
calling
supported
Crisis
at
territory.
and
Kaiser
pressure
Agadir
the
wary
unequivocally
and
dangerously
entente,
again
Britain
conference,
claims
authority,
of
stage.
once
Algeciras
this
French
world
to
claims.
becoming
Kaiser,
Anglo-French
1911
from
the
upheld
make
on
in
imperial
away
to
and
methods
for
year,
port
question
Wilhelm
Germany
of
her
came
was
victimized.
The Balkans
The
the
role
turn
that
of
was
populated
and
centred
domination
empires,
century,
114
nationalism
the
in
in
the
the
century
by
a
the
the
is
played
best
number
small
the
of
ethnic
independent
region
had
growing
and
inuence
nation
the
and
in
groups
traditionally
Austro-Hungarian
crumbling
in
demonstrated
international
the
broadly
state
been
of
of
split
Ottoman.
power
Balkans.
referred
Serbia.
the
the
end
Ottoman
to
at
region
as
Slavs
Political
between
By
tensions
This
two
of
rival
the
19th
Empire,
C H A P T E R
coupled
with
inuence
political
Balkan
living
this
Austria-Hungary’s
the
system.
under
the
Serbia’s
When
Italy
Serbia
saw
resources.
Macedonia,
to
went
with
the
time
sea,
was
when
Austrians
creation
of
Serbia
the
ten
It
of
is
months
European
empires.
wanted
anxiety
to
read
of
angered
to
at
countries
such
countless
African
European
as
whose
drama,
a
by
such
France,
Asian
drama
to
this
by
raw
was
shortly
an
to
of
the
this
and
a
twice-
authority.
The
massive
increase
by
from
the
size
in
global
hunger
Austria-Hungary
would
not
increasing
have
to
to
a
occur
the
–
mention
overlooked
become
the
was
emboldened
garnered
and
often
backed
Austro-Hungarian
her
Serbia,
are
by
when
total
simultaneously
and
who
in
access
result
sum
necessitated
expansion
and
Serbia
War
done
prodigious
Germany
1911,
claims,
schemes
materials
to
Montenegro
The
together.
the
while
Russia
peoples,
that
causes
as
an
reassert
in
Albania
claims,
nationalist
partially
holdings,
expense
Britain,
and
fed
was
added
spearheaded
had
a
attention
Balkan
The
in
volatile.
consequent
1908.
Albania.
possible
empires,
their
in
she
nationalist
background
countries
expand
those
of
the
Serbian
as
negotiation
determined
production,
expansion
territory,
pan-Slavic
made
of
state
grievance
intervention,
just
of
was
Second
and
not
Yugoslavia.
force
Bulgaria,
a
W A R
age-old
divided
prot
the
supporter
Kingdom
and
with
W O R L D
her
dangerously
by
F I R S T
European
lay
or
pan-Slavic
sultan’s
T H E
nationalists
future
Serbia
Bulgaria,
in
resolve,
pan-Slavic
these
was
a
a
The
Albania,
Slavic
war
stop
Empire
industrial
The
a
further
militaries
resources,
who
to
Russian
important
of
to
to
the
Russia
their
Ottomans
the
League
going
though
Bosnia,
the
from
Bulgaria
Austrian
that
of
in
O F
expand
of
pan-Slavic
becoming
Turkey.
on
and
Greater
leader
international
Independent
determined
European
for
with
determined
humiliated
share
by
Russia,
faced
with
a
was
from
Balkan
designs
thwarted
in
the
prot
defeating
Serbian
annexed
confusing
Empire
by
lion’s
radical
C A U S E S
part
reawakened
convinced
region
war
retrench
unstable
of
rather
Tripoli
the
to
region
but
to
to
very
numbers
the
wrest
Forming
she
Austria-Hungary.
down
the
a
become
situation,
addressed
This
to
desire
this
were
opportunity
Greece,
the
in
Habsburgs
tried
an
and
quickly
ux
Growing
ambition
and
to
The
made
Austria-Hungary,
frightening
1913.
region,
aspirations.
federated
With
in
5 . 1 :
global
in
this
tragedy.
Short-term causes
The July Crisis
When
most
asked
something
family.
As
to
Indeed,
his
they
one
1914,
itself
caused
two
that
ensuing
tumbled
them
crisis
the
shot
in
state
being
the
the
of
light
and
that
in
were
Rather,
the
powers
War,
will
it
scope
heir
visiting
their
of
of
fate.
it
was
four
was
an
the
The
the
the
inability
causes
years
of
28
royal
in
Habsburg
on
the
had
World
War.
throne,
June
Archduke
in
not
it
Austrian
First
Sarajevo
assassinated
No,
the
even
that
inadequate
the
to
with
reply
woefully
long-term
into
people
likely
member
is
Ferdinand,
while
unique
of
a
this
Habsburgs.
war.
European
scale
Franz
particularly
sparked
World
shooting
the
were
of
First
knowledge
however,
with
Archduke
heads
of
the
seen,
Sophie
not
eight
with
event
when
the
historical
have
an
wife
were
of
do
we
explaining
and
what
rudimentary
years
1914,
was
but
1881–
assassination
to
manage
outlined
the
above
that
disaster.
115
5
C A U S E S
A N D
E F F E C TS
O F
20 T H - C E N T U R Y
W A R S
Political assassinations, 1881–1914
1881
Alexander II of Russia, Emperor of all the Russias
1894
Marie François Sadi Carnot, President of France
1895
Stefan Stombolov, Prime Minister of Bulgaria
1897
Antonio Cánovas del Castillo, Prime Minister of Spain
1898
Empress Elisabeth of Austria
190 0
King Umber to I of Italy
1901
William McKinley, President of the United States
1903
King Aleksander of Serbia
1904
Nikolai Bobrikov, Governor-general of England
1908
King Carlos I of Por tugal
1908
Luiz Filipe, Crown Prince of Por tugal
1911
Peter Stolypin, Prime Minister of Russia
1912
José Canalejas, Prime Minister of Spain
1913
King George I of Greece
1914
Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria
Certain
group
it
members
“Union
appears
that
government.
the
general
Berchtold,
to
crush
with
A pledge of unconditional suppor t given
their
by Kaiser Wilhelm II of Germany to Franz
Cheque
Joseph in July 1914. The pledge was in
ultimatum
reference to Austria-Hungary’s dispute
designed
with Serbia and Russia.
aspects
ally,
in
ultimatum
has
of
for
war
be
It
on
to
the
previous
against
change
western
this
116
was
the
that
afforded
for
all.
nature
has
the
the
terms
offering
Bosnian
Hand,
the
by
This
from
the
and
chief
the
mean
Germany,
Austrians
the
of
the
the
did
ultimatum
affront
war
her
only
formulated
of
it
von
assassination
would
intent
of
of
Leopold
authorship
as
terrorist
although
Serbian
the
chancellor,
Cheque,
as
the
Black
specically
support
exact
accept,
capitulated
to
the
Blank
were
to
many
the
size
To
alliance
As
full
army,
a
directed
against
of
an
of
the
was
of
Serb
more
the
demands,
response
surprised
Serbia
The
29
so
much
within
“every
than
hours
reason
many
of
this
as
a
when
added
Tsar
obligations
increasing
the
that,
through
memory
ordered
partial
that
Germany
Sukhomlinov,
along
sense
Tsar,
Wilhelm
mobilization
mobilization
the
of
the
direct
two
mobilization
July.
Vladimir
cousin,
France,
Austrian
mobilization
forthcoming,
German
was
against
this
night
Minister,
his
most
the
1914.
the
to
to
with
he
war
humiliations.
War
that
that
Perhaps
went
order
not
The
seem
believed
on
frontier.
demanded
Serbs
July
Balkan
the
and
Blank
debated,
to
and
unlimited
Serbs.
been
frontiers.
Austria
Russian
of
once
the
throughout
ofcials,
opportunity
so-called
would
viewed
Understanding
the
the
pledge
away”.
their
seize
the
extend
as
sovereignty.
28
Russians
threat
not
Austrian
nationalism
the
Kaiser
drops
response
did
supported
known
Hotzendorff,
impossible
Serb
the
a
to
Austria-Hungary
The
to
military
commonly
support
years
itself.
to
Serbian
Conrad
After
Nevertheless,
for
this
wished
European
the
Nevertheless,
staff,
Serbia.
that
of
Death”,
South-Slav
Blank Cheque
so
of
of
cease
the
ordered
as
part
neutral
entire
panic
all
full
the
the
Austria,
the
of
Tsar
to
Russia’s
Kaiser,
preparation.
mobilization
Schlieffen
Belgium.
to
length
gripped
military
the
of
owed
persuaded
Plan,
he
When
of
the
was
C H A P T E R
Some
historians
Britain
was
would
never
Edward
of
did
until
Belgium
on
empire
out
serious
Grey,
action
her
a
believed
stay
3
that
the
the
very
August
what
to
last
For
now
a
part,
this
Britain’s
were
conict.
his
dispel
moment.
1914,
was
Germans
looming
possibility.
nothing
the
into
of
the
When
treaty
C A U S E S
clinging
Others
to
the
German
obligations
T H E
W O R L D
W A R
that
this
Secretary,
Britain’s
army
F I R S T
hope
that
Foreign
reserving
the
O F
thought
British
notion,
world
5 . 1 :
freedom
crossed
brought
her
into
and
war.
War plans
The
as
opening
“war
by
required
the
The
sole
fact
men
plans
control
France
to
in
the
composed
of
41
at
own
sluggish
cause
case
grand
At
of
of
by
the
a
a
major
their
of
these
glance
that
required
it
it
would
the
chief
he
in
arms
as
in
been
1914.
had
by
to
able
So
of
to
soldiers
vital
was
government
system
be
referred
millions
German
to
in
in
the
move
to
had
1880s.
millions
carry
great
the
out
a
plan
plan
against
arc
that
upon
that
to
in
war
would
start
the
a
German
for
a
itself
and
dangerous uncer tainty”. Think about all
the things that might go wrong with the
and
Schlieen Plan. How might the Germans
Paris
have accounted for these possibilities?
be
Russia’s
immediate
mobilizing
rst.
Germany’s
with
Historian John Keegan has said the
force,
would
an
Thinking skills
Schlieen Plan was “pregnant with
massive
This
forces
1914,
war
designed
against
conquer
armies
was
after
staff
Luxembourg
Germany
July
was
war,
France.
Austro-Hungarian
happened
that
called
Russian
Plan
named
general
two-front
through
Schlieffen
Kaiser
seem
a
Plan,
German
The
west
sweep
depended
as
of
east.
the
a
the
Meanwhile,
of
The
Schlieffen
of
conceived
the
would
France
Russia,
the
powers
so
nightmare
Russia
armies,
in
was
time
mobilization.
by
often
railroad
European
frontiers,
combination
war,
threat
have
mobilizing
that
German
plans
that
and
of
unprecedented
Schlieffen,
In
War
act
complexity.
mobilization.
strategy
rst
the
northern
held
the
entire
German
of
World
endeavour
Bismarckian
of
days
bay
the
von
seven
into
this
on
of
west
concentration
within
of
1905.
the
First
Indeed,
degrees
Alfred
with
Belgium
to
all
famous
1891
deal
that
varying
most
the
coordination
positions
creator,
from
to
of
of
system
was
to
of
L TA
The
its
level
railroad
taken
of
a
days
timetable”.
In
entire
France.
general
staff
also
had
élan vitale
a
hand
in
the
preparation
of
the
French
war
plan.
France’s
Plan
XVII
In
called
for
a
massing
of
French
armies
on
their
eastern
frontier,
the
context
doctrine
from
the
main
thrust
of
the
German
army.
These
troops
would
then
in
eastwards,
regaining
at
once
the
honour
of
the
French
the
was
built
territories
of
Alsace
meticulous
and
Lorraine.
timetabling
and
Whereas
the
organization,
Schlieffen
Plan
XVII
the
ideas
of
élan
vitale
and
the
offensive
spirit,
prompting
and
the
coordinated
assistance
of
the
British
at
the
the
expens e
Deficiencies
in
of
s ound
Plan
and
tactical
cons iderations
be
overcome
w ith
s u f ficient
Russian
enthusiasm
mobilization
at tack
rested
could
on
of
defence.
planning
on
m il itary
army
prudent
and
French
1914, élan vitale was
rush
preference
gallantly
of
away
and
vigou r.
army.
117
5
C A U S E S
A N D
E F F E C TS
O F
20 T H - C E N T U R Y
W A R S
Antwerp
BELGIUM
Ypres
Brussels
Liége
Somme
LUXEMBOURG
Aisne
Oise
Reims
Verdun
GERMANY
Marne
Paris
Nancy
Seine
Actual
German
troop
August–September
The
▲
Schlieffen
Plan
Widest
sweep
of
movements
1914
Schlieffen
Plan
Schlieen’s original plan called for the capture of Paris within 41 days of mobilization. How did Moltke’s decision to wheel
the rst army in front of Paris, rather than around it, change the nature of the entire war?
L TA
Thinking skills
Read the views of the following historians regarding how the First World War began.
Sidney Bradshaw
Fay was writing in response to the nding of the Paris Peace Conference that Germany
Fay. 1928. The
was solely responsible for the outbreak of the war. Fay maintained that it was a complex
Origins of the World
assor tment of causes, notably imperialism, militarism and alliances that pushed Europe into
War. New York , NY,
war. No one country plotted an aggressive war and many, including Britain and Germany, made
USA . The Macmillan
genuine, although unskilled, eor ts at mediating the July Crisis. In some ways, Fay and those
Company.
who agreed with him are par t of the larger movement that wanted to reintroduce Germany to
the community of nations in the spirit of the Locarno Treaty of 1925.
Fritz Fischer. 1976.
In the wake of the Second World War, German historian Fritz Fischer re-evaluated his country’s
German Aims in
role in causing the First World War. In contrast to Fay, Fischer found that Germany sought an
the First World War.
aggressive war of expansion in 1914. Germany was surrounded by hostile countries and her
New York , NY, USA.
economy, culture and inuence was in decline. A successful war of expansion would solve these
W.W. Nor ton.
problems and was therefore plotted and encouraged in the years 1912–1914. The July Crisis
was deliberately managed to this end. Fischer maintained that these attitudes and desires were
not held solely by a malecent and deluded leadership. After examining a broad cross section
of German society in 1914, Fischer concluded that these attitudes and aims had broad suppor t
from business interests, academics and all political par ties in Germany. It is not dicult to
understand why this was a contentious position in post-Second World War Germany.
118
C H A P T E R
5 . 1 :
C A U S E S
O F
T H E
F I R S T
W O R L D
W A R
Eric Hobsbawm.
Writing in the Marxist historical tradition, Eric Hobsbawm does not nd the causes of the war in
1989. The Age of
any one country or person, but rather in the system of industrial capitalism that dominated the
mpire. New York , NY,
economics of western Europe. Hobsbawm argues that industrial capitalism’s insatiable hunger
USA. Vintage.
for resources and markets fuelled the New Imperialism of the 19th century. While this need was
temporarily slaked by the “scramble for Africa”, it soon brought European countries into conict.
Further, within industrial powers, this competition required a close partnership between the
government and arms producers, for whom peacetime prots had to be maintained. These prots
were required so that the industry would be around for the next war, a war in which strength would
be measured not in military strength alone, but also in industrial capacity. By arguing a systemic
cause of the war, Hobsbawm and other Marxist historians bring a degree of inevitability to the war.
Regardless of who led the countries, or which countries were involved, they believe the system
would have caused a war eventually.
Niall Ferguson. 1999.
Niall Ferguson, like Fischer, blames one country in par ticular. For Ferguson, rather than
The Pity of War.
Germany, responsibility rests with the actions, and in some cases inaction, of Britain.
New York , NY, USA.
Ferguson believes that Fay was wrong, that anti-militarism was rising in Europe by 1914,
Basic Books.
secret diplomacy had solved many disputes, and that Germany and Britain were more than
capable of settling their dierences. Rather, he maintains that British political and military
leaders had planned to intervene in a European conict from 1905 and in fact would have
violated Belgian neutrality themselves had Germany not done it rst. Fur ther, he maintains
that Britain misinterpreted German intentions, seeing them as Napoleonic rather than as
essentially defensive. These leaders misled the British Parliament into a declaration of war.
John Stoessinger.
John Stoessinger nds liability for the war largely in the personal failings of those trying to
1999. Why Nations
manage the July Crisis. He believes that each of the leaders acted out of an over-inated
Go To War. 11th ed.
sense of both their own country’s weakness and their enemy’s strength. Fur ther, the
New York , NY, USA.
supreme leaders in Austria-Hungary and Germany failed to exercise sucient control over
Basic Books.
their subordinates, who actively conspired to provoke at least a regional war if not a general
European war. Once the “iron dice” were cast, none of the leaders had the nerve to order
a halt to the mobilization, even though this was a completely viable option. Had dierent
personalities been in positions of authority in July 1914, there may have never been a war.
1
Which historian has the most convincing thesis? Why?
2
Add your own row to the table. What do you believe caused the war? How might it have been avoided?
3
How might the era in which each of the above historians was writing have aected their views? Why is it impor tant for
students of history to understand the context in which historians write?
119
5.2
C ombatants
Conceptual understanding
Key questions
➔
What were the comparative strengths and weaknesses of the Allied Powers
and the Central Powers?
➔
What eect would the entry of the United States and exit of Russia have on
this relationship?
Key concepts
➔
Cause
➔
Consequence
Central Powers 1914
Of
a
population
divisions
in
advanced
efcient
that
of
fronts
war
system
Central
of
1.4
of
7.8
German
battleships.
control
force
defence
had
troops.
also
This
allowing
Seas
eet
Fleet
had
the
North
14
Sea
They
given
troops
By
to
Germany’s
army
an
exible
by
the
and
end
1.2
and
fact
internal
between
the
its
of
two
the
had
million.
and
advanced
able
146
had
Austria-Hungary
Bulgaria
Dreadnoughts
were
a
enhanced
while
and
for
adjacency
move
men
muster
army
made
operations.
technologically
communications.
in
to
million
had
was
geographic
them
could
German
which
efciency
million
2.9
The
control,
military
11
Turkey
Powers
troops.
enjoyed
mobilized
High
Central
and
combined
million,
This
and
in
the
million
command
Powers
engage
Germany
naval
million
communication,
and
mobilized
The
115
some
movement
the
lines
of
1914,
22
older
artillery
re
concentrate
relatively
this
fewer
colonial
responsibilities.
Allied Powers 1914
France,
in
Russia
1914.
Both
was
a
212
army
was,
and
volunteer
however,
in
army.
equipped,
could
The
size
small
and
as
120
it
thus
in
of
case
2.8
by
a
and
British
army
months
would
dragged
nor
of
In
of
in
poor
were
was
separated
the
1914,
powers
the
of
army,
265
while
could
eld.
quality
This
and
million
Britain’s
put
foward
number
insufcient
army.
swell
war.
likewise
large
from
coordinate
contribute
on.
these
men
army
would
population
conscript
control
French
the
a
Together
Russian
command
the
had
million
geographically
early
combined
equipment
the
concentrate
the
war
of
While
was
1914.
not
dominions
the
in
had
France
some
hindered
the
Communications,
Tsar’s
and
force
divisions,
quantities
the
Britain
Russia
greatly
her
their
during
Likewise
to
however,
the
they
and
Russian
forces
war,
its
antiquated
relatively
and
but
it
colonial
size
of
could
her
ally
in
well
and
operations.
remained
possessions
ghting
contribute
force
little.
C H A P T E R
For
example
1914,
but
armistice
The
US
April
them
Britain
army
military
Guard.
in
the
The
States
4.3
million
men.
10
The
a
States
Dreadnoughts
intended
to
British
massive
safe
being
so
was
had
and
at
She
a
Britain
a
older
200
of
of
in
had
was
or
a
concentrate
The
a
larger
short
War
the
that
mobilized
war,
with
Act
of
1916
years.
and
empire
was
advantage
in
in
In
National
months
Expansion
powers
forces
it
two-power
interests
naval
the
conscription,
of
of
of
The
enormous.
World
Naval
the
men,
million
standards.
19
outset
of
Italy.
Dreadnoughts
take
British
her
the
modied
20
8.9
C O M B A T A N T S
August
time
million
including
number
much
to
In
the
industrial
able
patrol
men
in
the
from
however,
First
at
her
had
42
French,
introduced
the
of
of
By
European
army.
navy
She
total
000
1917
the
course
food
to
by
soldiers
million
was,
battleships.
the
however,
Britain
5.6
affair
maintaining
in
of
and
States
Act
disposal.
agreed
could
a
them
combatant
over
6,000
overseas.
mobilized
about
size
mere
men
million
small
at
a
000
world-class
Navy,
her
lanes.
8.4
United
the
23
this
also,
who
had
Service
a
was
500
empire,
stood
self-sufcient
France,
that
her
the
was
Royal
eet
shipping
with
of
double
battleships.
not
and
increasing
United
United
Powers
army
the
army
sent
Russian,
Selective
dramatically
The
had
1917
potential
1917
it
Allied
of
from
Canadian
1918
the
12million
them
the
by
5 . 2 :
of
patrol
her
had
older
and
dependent
the
the
to
policy,
39
on
alliance
Mediterranean,
North
Sea.
L TA
Thinking skills
Look at the data in these tables.
Per capita levels of industrialization, 1880–1938 (Relative to Britain in 190 0)
1880
190 0
1913
1928
1938
Ranking
1 Great Britain
87
[100]
115
122
157
2
2 United States
38
69
126
182
167
1
3 France
28
39
59
82
73
4
4 Germany
25
52
85
128
144
3
5 Italy
12
17
26
44
61
5
6 Austria
15
23
32
–
–
7 Russia
10
15
20
20
38
7
9
12
20
30
51
6
8 Japan
Iron and steel production of the powers, 1890–1938 (Millions of tonnes;
pig-iron production for 1890, steel thereafter)
1890
190 0
1910
1913
1920
1930
1938
United States
9.3
10.3
26.5
31.8
42.3
41.3
28.8
Great Britain
8.0
5.0
6.5
7.7
9.2
7.4
10.5
Germany
4.1
6.3
13.6
17.6
7.6
11.3
23.2
France
1.9
1.5
3.4
4.6
2.7
9.4
6.1
Austria-Hungary
0.97
1.1
2.1
2.6
–
–
Russia
0.95
2.2
3.5
4.8
0.06
5.7
18.0
Japan
0.02
–
0.16
0.25
0.84
2.3
7.0
Italy
0.01
0.73
0.93
0.73
1.7
2.3
0.00
–
121
5
C A U S E S
A N D
E F F E C TS
O F
20 T H - C E N T U R Y
W A R S
Total industrial potential of the powers, 1880–1938 (Relative to Britain
in 190 0)
1880
190 0
1913
1928
1938
Great Britain
73.3
[100]
127.2
135
181
United States
46.9
127.8
298.1
533
528
Germany
27.4
71.2
137.7
158
214
France
25.1
36.8
57.3
82
74
Russia
24.5
47.5
76.6
72
152
Austria-Hungary
14
25.6
40.7
–
–
Italy
8.1
13.6
22.5
37
46
Japan
7.6
13
25.1
45
88
Energy consumption of the powers, 1890–1938 (in millions of metric tonnes
of coal equivalent)
1890
United States
147
Great Britain
190 0
1910
248
483
1913
541
1920
694
1930
762
1938
697
145
171
185
195
212
184
196
Germany
71
112
158
187
159
177
228
France
36
47.9
55
62.5
65
97.5
84
Austria-Hungary
19.7
29
40
49.4
Russia
10.9
30
41
54
Japan
4.6
4.6
15.4
Italy
4.5
5
9.6
–
–
–
14.3
65
177
23
34
55.8
96.5
11
14.3
24
27.8
Source: Kennedy, Paul. 1988. Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: conomic and
Military Conict from 1500 to 2000. London, UK . Fontana Press.
1
Using the information in the tables above, rank the countries according to
how powerful they were in 1914. What criteria are you using? What is your
denition of power in this context? What happens to your ranking if you take
into consideration the information in the tables on page 111?
2
What conclusions can you draw about the relationship between the
information and a country’s ability to conduct a war?
3
Compare and contrast each country’s pre-war and post-war gures. What
conclusions can we draw from the comparison? How did this aect your
“power ranking”?
122
5.3
Operations on the Western Front
Conceptual understanding
Key questions
➔
How did the war change from one of movement to a trench-bound stalemate?
➔
What was the relationship of oensive technology to defensive technology
on the Western Front?
➔
To what extent did technology break the stalemate?
Key concepts
➔
Continuity
➔
Change
➔
Signicance
Opening moves
As
the
for
by
month
peace
declaring
war
the
war
was
felt
that
they
what
been
they
as
July
or
on
were
into
system,
suspected,
if
1914
in
was
thought
forced
alliance
of
remained
came
Europe.
Russia
not
at
on
this
reacting
was
out
Germany’s
perceived
not
to
1
their
hand.
and
a
so
too
threw
1914.
acting
control.
From
powers
as
the
such
Kaiser
point
of
of
conclusion,
and
self-interest,
the
what
infamous
Regardless
To
that
ended
the
foregone
than
national
intended,
close,
August
point
rather
of
a
Germany
the
and
little
“iron
whether
the
leaders
embraced
the
sword
machinery
mobilization
Europe
hope
dice”
tumbled
of
had
the
operated
into
war.
Timeline
1914
Austria-Hungary declares war on Serbia
28 July
1 August
Germany declares war on France
Germany declares war on Russia
3 August
4 August
Germany declares war on Belgium
Britain and her empire declare war
4 August
on Germany
6 August
Serbia declares war on Germany
Austria-Hungary declares war on Russia
6 August
12 August
France declares war on Germany
123
5
C A U S E S
A N D
E F F E C TS
O F
20 T H - C E N T U R Y
W A R S
Britain and her empire declare war on
12 August
Austria-Hungary
23 August
Japan declares war on Austria-Hungary
25 August
28 August
Russia declares war on Ottoman Empire
Austria-Hungary declares war on Belgium
2 November
2 November
France declares war on Ottoman Empire
Japan declares war on Germany
Serbia declares war on Ottoman Empire
5 November
Britain and her empire declare war on
5 November
Ottoman Empire
1915
Italy declares war on Austria-Hungary
23 May
21 August
Italy declares war on Germany
Italy declares war on Ottoman Empire
28 August
14 October
Bulgaria declares war on Serbia
Britain and her empire declare war
15 October
on Bulgaria
16 October
Italy declares war on Bulgaria
France declares war on Bulgaria
18 October
19 October
Russia declares war on Bulgaria
1916
Germany declares war on Por tugal
9 March
15 March
Bulgaria declares war on Romania
Austria-Hungary declares war on Portugal
1 September
1917
6 April
Greece declares war on Central Powers
27 June
14 August
China declares war on Austria-Hungary
United States declares war on Germany
China declares war on Germany
14 August
United States declares war on
7 December
Austria-Hungary
124
C H A P T E R
Armies
from
Railways
past
wars,
and
but
horses
French
British
forces
Because
the
mass
toward
these
as
they
east
if
would
battles
to
the
west,
in
a
its
foot.
of
–
position
the
bring
men
on
to
in
their
the
beginning
them
and
foot
–
engage
to
of
Paris
animals
it
would
each
the
other
headed
million
Schlieffen
later.
moving
two
in
the
days
were
be
in
The
a
41
F R O N T
other.
of
and
over
W E S T E R N
men
bulk
France
part,
T H E
than
Alsace-Lorraine.
For
executing
worked,
and
The
O N
each
efcient
limits
on
of
toward
more
disembarked
frontier.
formations
the
trek
O P E R A T I O N S
move
reached
frontier
millennia
to
process
the
(BEF)
plan
for
be
of
began
this
soon
Belgian
the
had
of
nished
Force
the
massive
armies
major
and
moved
would,
powers
part
transport
rushed
soldiers
that
before
major
initial
Expeditionary
German
much
the
the
detrained
south-east,
Plan
all
made
5 . 3 :
weeks
the
rst
of
war.
Belgium
The
right
through
defend
wing
of
frontier
the
designed
were
built,
most
The
on
took
rst
the
the
city,
of
initial
a
attack,
Belgium
the
were
through
he l p
to
the
s he l l
Ge r m a ns
the
in
of
of
over
70
B e r t ha ” ,
cap t u r ed
the
a
th e
and
0 00
m e n.
small
in
a
by
the
string
These
the
time
they
commanded
men
T he
Ze pp e li ns
or de r
wou l d
420
to
–
a dv a n c e d
G er m an s
on e
us e
for t s,
11
of
the
n eu t r a li z e
m a ss ive
m il li m e t r e
Wi thi n
S ch li effe n
at
swing
would
Germany.
300
G e rm an s
ki lo m e t r es .
was
standards.
Liège
000
In
would
part,
heavily
existence
from
his tor y.
the
“B ig
12
ha d
s w e ep
of
on ly
plan,
their
army
any
bomb-d ro ppi ng
howe ve r,
incl ud i ng
kilog r a m
the
of
by
its
in
city
Belgium
the
for
invested
by
guns
the
co nsi s ti ng
manne d
While
had
imposing
around
to
Belgians,
could.
largest
b o mb a rd ment
fo r ts ,
according
The
Belgium
the
Ar my
to ta l
with
open
they
that
route
in
aerial
770
as
army,
Paris.
powers,
withstand
Seco nd
12
howitzers
hurled
best
to
concentrated
surrounding
siege
▲
to
accessible
forts,
uses
as
major
were
German
the
German
route
fortications
forts,
the
the
en
themselves
standards
of
of
Belgium
da ys
le a vi n g
of
gun
th at
the
the
r es t
of
Pla n .
One of the biggest guns of the war, the “Big Ber tha” could hurl a shell 12 kilometres
125
5
C A U S E S
A N D
E F F E C TS
O F
20 T H - C E N T U R Y
W A R S
machine guns to be red forward through the propeller and
Technology and war: aircraft
triplanes such as the Fokker, which, though more dicult to
Like many military innovations, the airplane was not
y, were far more manoeuvrable than two-winged planes.
immediately recognized by commanders as having any
Fighters were used to harass enemy reconnaissance
military potential beyond reconnaissance. This was
airplanes and balloons and later provide re suppor t for the
perhaps understandable given that early model airplanes
infantry while protecting their own bombing aircraft.
were little more than lacquered canvas stretched across
a wooden frame with a seat, engine and fuel tank . But
Bombers: Fewer models of bomber aircraft were
as with all completely new technology, advancements
produced, but these were constantly improved upon,
came quickly, with new models being churned out in a
namely their range and the weight of bombs they
matter of weeks in some instances. Very soon airplanes
could carry. Strategic bombing, whether by airplane or
were armed and ghting for domination of the sky, which
Zeppelins, targeted railroads and eventually factories in
meant impeding the reconnaissance of your enemy,
the enemy’s rear from 1915.
sighting for more accurate ar tillery re and eventually
Airships: Germany’s Zeppelins ew too high for most ghter
suppor ting the movement of ground troops with aerial re.
planes and as such could attack British cities at will early
Fighters: Designed for air-to-air combat, manoeuvrability
in the war. By 1916 better airplanes armed with incendiary
and repower were the key factors in a successful ghter.
ammunition curtailed the eectiveness of Germany’s
Innovations included the interrupter gear, which allowed
Zeppelin eet.
▲
A British Sopwith Camel. How did the role of the airplane change over the course
of the war?
The Battle of the Frontiers
As
to
Schlieffen’s
be
series
put
of
into
Plan
offensives
counteroffensives
126
unfolded
action.
The
mounted
by
the
in
Battle
by
the
of
the
German
north,
the
it
was
Frontiers
French
Sixth
as
and
time
was
part
of
Seventh
for
Plan
actually
Plan
XVII
a
XVII
armies.
As
and
early
as
C H A P T E R
7
August
the
French
had
started
operations
5 . 3 :
to
O P E R A T I O N S
recapture
the
O N
T H E
Alsatian
W E S T E R N
F R O N T
city
Class discussion
of
Mulhouse.
to
liberate
Prussian
the
its
The
Germans
The
French
At
rst
fell
exploit
result
advance
of
of
in
was
the
relying
and
was
advancing
their
the
at
not
was
defeat
and
with
like
for
it
on
the
units
to
cities
–
hopes
of
the
be
and
By
Plan
20
24
the
Why did Plan XVII fail? What are the
offensive
inherent problems with war plans?
well.
Mulhouse.
fact
the
opened
Germans
August.
the
Lorraine
Franco-
as
this
in
into
working
that
on
and
of
such
gaps
launched
French.
of
itself
doctrine
seemed
Sambre
the
the
humiliation
uniform
French
places
launched
retook
counteroffensive
happened
army
élan,
French
however,
the
halted
XVII,
and
French
after
boldness
back
which
the
taken
Plan
advance,
between
engagements
net
August
combination
gaps
would
14
territories
War.
and
up
On
Other
Ardennes,
August
the
the
French
XVII.
The Battle of the Marne (5–12 September 1914)
Plan
XVII
some
a
200
single
the
been
000
casualties
day
(22
Schlieffen
been
The
German
German
become
would
failure
including
August).
Plan,
This
unlike
armies
offensive
known
fall
its
for
75
the
000
staggering
French
French
dead,
defeat
25
army
000
seemed
counterpart,
was
resulting
of
them
to
in
killed
indicate
working
as
in
that
had
resumed
to
briey
as
plan
within
stiff
the
for
great
Mons,
Great
the
the
at
their
Belgian
but
Retreat.
Germans,
required
41
sweep
resistance.
then
Again,
but
days
it
through
The
pulled
all
back
seemed
remained
from
Belgium
BEF
to
delayed
in
to
be
what
be
after
the
would
going
seen
if
Paris
mobilization.
German troops dig in at the Marne
Ironically,
as
pulled
back
would
prove
As
they
the
Germans
toward
Paris,
benecial
retreated,
communication
●
massive
unexpectedly
according
●
a
intended.
subduing
▲
had
A
principle
beginning
the
need
to
the
known
to
tell
to
lines
as
on
garrison
pushed
a
forward
number
the
of
Anglo-French
the
the
Anglo-French
began
to
emerge
forces
that
defenders.
while
the
and
factors
the
shortened
Germans
“diminishing
Germans.
captured
As
power
they
territory,
their
extended
of
the
advanced,
physical
supply
and
theirs.
offensive”
was
casualties,
exhaustion
and
127
5
C A U S E S
A N D
E F F E C TS
O F
20 T H - C E N T U R Y
lengthening
W A R S
supply
lines
requiring
more
men
to
maintain
them
L TA
Thinking and communication
weakened
the
German
attackers.
The
further
the
Germans
advanced,
skills
the
weaker
their
force
became.
A vital component of the Battle of the
●
The
Belgian
resistance
had
afforded
the
military
governor
of
Paris,
Marne was the decision of Field Marshal
General
Gallieni,
time
to
cobble
together
a
new
army
to
defend
Sir John French and the British to commit
the
capital.
troops to General Jore’s plan for the
Marne. French took some persuading.
Choose to represent either Jore or French
and develop arguments as to why the BEF
should risk annihilation to help the French
and why they should not. How might
emotion have contributed to the nal
decision? How does this link with TOK?
When
of
a
Paris
its
French
–
right
and
ank
commander,
the
French
Germans.
turned
to
German
ght
stopped
Plan.
to
When
meet
the
cautious
he
at
The
his
an
of
army
opened
owing
to
itself
a
in
had
a
spelled
thus
the
end
picture
BEF
his
prepare
and
defences
65
ordered
of
to
the
Kluck,
the
join
These
the
actions
Schlieffen
Luxembourg
events
communications
situation
front
between
the
in
of
von
Army.
of
away
He
ank
General
gap
in
exposing
French
right
Fifth
the
far
stressful
Now
–
the
the
with
French
delayed
and
into
pleaded
the
wheeling
Paris,
50-kilometre
Moltke,
this
Army
intended
counteroffensive.
slam
tortured
failed.
had
commander,
a
thus
and
withdraw
Plan
up
von
to
to
with
and
imperfect
for
Joffre
along
Staff,
First
guarding
Army
Armies.
gap
revealed
Schlieffen
it
Paris
First
advance
Marne
nature
ordered
rear.
the
Chief
had
the
Army
defending
Second
German
Schlieffen
opportunity
German
German
the
as
Sixth
his
threat
into
German
headquarters,
unfolded
the
and
Paris
French
saw
Army
this
drive
The
the
Sixth
spotted
around
Joffre,
First
and
aviator
not
as
they
system.
on
9
His
September
kilometres
to
the
what?
The Race to the Sea
The
retreat
Second
and
Armies
topography
referred
An
in
as
enduring
them
It
to
of
with
was
just
France
probed
of
to
the
700
“The
such
now
did
the
front
were
a
motion
Race
to
a
the
and
their
west
likewise.
the
English
from
digging
for
for
This
of
the
rest
German
that
of
would
the
war
is
to
to
outank
that
which
way
they
the
The
around
one’s
three
French
the
and
German
of
movements
and
of
ground
was
a
Similar
more
Alps
or
to
operations
less
the
that
on
continuous
Channel.
in
major
series
the
and
determine
and
is
enemy.
defend
entrenching
in
First
the
sometimes
Sea”.
attention.
a
of
events
the
requires
Channel.
resulted
series
Front
manoeuvre
turned
by
entrenchment
manoeuvre
and
kilometres
sides
in
Western
military
accompanied
front
set
the
encirclement
north
Germans
subsequent
All
It
two
armies
British
ank.
the
front
operating
armies
The
counter
held,
threatens
directions.
movements,
extended
south-east
the
end
stretching
along
this
front
both
furiously.
Trench warfare
The
stalemate
complex
of
technologies
defensive
in
nature.
defenders
August
that
128
that
system
in
in
developed
This
which,
were
imbalance
this
context,
September
dominated
on
the
entrenchments,
nature
in
and
of
the
of
for
the
than
favoured
ghting
Western
be
majority
stronger
1914.
Western
can
the
to
Front,
seen
of
the
those
war,
Germans,
hold
on
to
seems
a
an
that
Paradoxically,
Front
as
massively
uneven
those
were
as
the
the
primitive
that
were
offensive
they
were
territory
defensive
in
clash
the
gained
in
technology
comparison
to
C H A P T E R
some
of
the
technologies
designed
to
5 . 3 :
overcome
O P E R A T I O N S
them.
O N
Defences
T H E
W E S T E R N
F R O N T
were
mines
based
on
the
shovel
and
barbed
wire,
later
augmented
with
concrete.
Explosive charges concealed
The
machine
gun,
of
more
use
as
a
defensive
weapon
early
in
the
war,
underground. Mines can be massive
is
an
exception.
Of
amethrowers,
trench
mortars,
gas,
mines
and
with tonnes of explosives dug into deep
tanks
only
the
latter
seemed
to
hold
any
hope
of
breaching
the
ever-
subterranean shafts or small antistrengthening
defenses.
personnel devices designed to maim a
Nor
was
strategy
Western
been
Front.
both
to
sides.
the
be
dangerous
options,
the
The
and
the
Second
abandoned
poison
on
April
Allied
the
gas
who,
lines
gas
By
the
had
5
the
to
absence
of
degree
the
single individual.
the
always
trenches
from
was
allow
were
denied
the
out
for
these
feasible
of
outanking,
enemy
yet
had
the
landings
only
a
that
the
not
Alps
of
troops
the
to
incredibly
strategic
alternative.
Germans,
It
is
to
resorted
for
Front.
ve
months
introduction
time
ground
suffered
Germans
to
by
of
was
in
after
the
the
west
the
north
to
close
called
Germans
of
a
70
half
000
as
shocked
a
to
blunted
to
6,000
had
halt
of
east.
to
the
But
around
it
casualties
In
new
had
weapon
the
–
salient
and
the
in
much
by
on
24
taking
pocket
of
the
troops
months of the war staggered even the
most hardened generals. How did the
casualties for August–September 1914
compare to the casualties in previous
wars (Franco-Prussian, Anglo-Boer,
dead.
men.
May
and Crimean)? What are possible
explanations for these dierences?
they
important
measuring
hands.
Battle
as
1,000
6,000
Research skills
The scale of the casualties in the rst
the
using
including
a
in
kilometres.
attack
Allied
Second
gap
Canadian
only
gas
toward
minutes
as
three
offensive
city
of
huge
arrived
German
remained
at
of
numbered
Ypres
a
chlorine
drifted
attackers
casualties,
their
of
it
matter
depth
newly
the
a
as
opened
the
a
tonnes
cloud
and
targeted
army
size
and
kilometres
close
suffered
ground,
Canadian
troops.
exploited
later
170
deadly
casualties
attack
only
losing
shrunk
8
the
released
the
colonial
Allied
days
Germans
the
sector
behind
French
some
masks
the
Ypres
000
two
peacetime
kilometres
had
gap
giving
signicantly
high
by
success
the
gas
the
10
attack
though
entire
in
held
The
and
improvised
The
and
erupted
the
of
did
the
Western
Ypres
with
ank
In
became
Feints,
continuous
Amphibious
taxing.
advancing
caused
lines.
second
army
1915,
had
defenders
A
of
rst,
basically
the
strategy
mobility
aircraft,
Allies,
the
of
geography
gas.
the
Allied
the
on
Battle
the
German
22
that
as
military
movement.
was
lines.
through
war
of
the
L TA
The
front
overcoming
degree
around
such
logistically
breaking
of
a
of
warfare,
form
front
getting
the
alternative
rest
some
the
task
siege
required
Because
over
the
of
Technology,
moved
this
on
all
Channel,
question.
to
Short
predicated
encirclement,
up
The
Ypres.
Allies
The
many.
TOK discussion
Fritz Haber was the German chemist who developed chlorine as a chemical
weapon. He later won the Nobel Prize in chemistry for the Haber–Bosch Process.
“ We should misjudge this scientist [Fritz Haber] seriously if we were to judge him
only by his harvest. The stimulation of research and the advancement of younger
scholars become ever more impor tant to him than his own achievements.”
Richard Willstätter
To what extent do you agree with Willstätter in terms of Haber ’s work with
chemical weapons?
129
5
C A U S E S
A N D
E F F E C TS
O F
20 T H - C E N T U R Y
W A R S
Technology and war: gas
Gas used in the First World War was generally of
Phosgene was a deadlier variant of chlorine that was hard
three types:
to detect. It was often mixed with chlorine, combining the
controllability of chlorine with the lethality of phosgene.
●
tearing agents
●
asphyxiants
●
blistering agents.
Mustard gas was the most common blistering agent. On
contact with the skin, especially moist areas such as the
armpits and groin, it would cause severe burns. If inhaled
The rst gas to be used was deployed by the German
it would burn away the lining of the lungs. Death would
army on the Eastern Front. It was a tearing agent and
often come some days or even weeks after inhalation.
although it briey incapacitated the Russians, it was
Mustard gas was heavier than air and would rest in the
generally ineective.
low areas of shell holes for days, impeding an enemy’s
movements on the battleeld.
Chlorine was the rst common gas used by both sides. It
was greenish in colour and caused irritation to the eyes
More than one million casualties were caused by gas
and corruption of the lungs. Death came by asphyxiation.
during the war.
▲
130
French soldiers and their mounts prepare for a gas attack
C H A P T E R
5 . 3 :
O P E R A T I O N S
O N
T H E
W E S T E R N
F R O N T
Source skills
Another
Chemical warfare
nine
Read
the
following
two
accounts
of
the
use
of
of
Balisan
her
warfare
and
answer
the
questions
that
were
Badriya
killed
in
Said
the
Khider
,
bombing
said
and
the
gas
military
in
resident,
relatives
sweep
afterwards,
including
her
parents,
two
follow.
brothers,
husband
and
son.
Kurds recall gas attack horror at Saddam Trial
A
BAGHDAD,
at
the
genocide
warplanes
weapons
into
Iraq
the
—
trial
A
of
Saddam
bombarded
in
1987
and
survivor
a
testied
Hussein
Kurdish
helicopters
hills
and
bombed
second
day,
survivors
Wednesday
that
village
Iraqi
with
pursued
he
chemical
those
man
who
ed
a
which
Saddam
the
1987–1988
the
Kurds
people
After
were
1988
the
stand
co-defendants
Iraq
in
a
are
in
trial,
charged
military
which
the
tens
sweep
of
in
over
thousands
an
survivors,
the
appeal
Adiba
dropped
of
bombs
his
of
trial
from
until
defense
chief
judge
Sept.
11,
lawyers
Abdullah
to
give
about
time
the
the
his
Bayez
her
that
close
my
described
village
spread
other,
tell
the
to
me,”
see
in
her
what’s
Bayez,
a
Narjis
eyes,
of
a
the
Balisan,
smoke
came
chest
wrong
mother
of
Kurdish
stand,
and
attack
guerrilla,
accounting
1988,
family
The
the
can
Aug.
16,
saying
that
1987
warplanes
smelled
“like
by
and
including
on
was
the
or
several
an
village
attacks
August
of
Ikmala
in
killed.
to
and
with
ve,
me,
her
,
she
Only
judges
(yards)
the
brother
eye
dead,
away
Abdullah
are
those
and
and
was
Saleh
hugging
my
Moussa.
heart
she
Tuesday
box.
as
“I
in
“I
that
can’t
saw
survivors
the
on
plaintiffs
to
le
and
God
village
trial.
in
Bayez’s
the
case.
Asked
complaint
against
everyone
blind
of
of
Tuesday.
her
complain
al-Majid
May
other
testied
wished
exclaimed,
Hassan
two
neighboring
Hama,
testifying
whom
of
the
testied
Mostafa
Bayez
my
ground
it.”
who
survivors
Ali
meters
the
them
Saddam
in
the
all.”
complaining
stomach.
said.
had.
Balisan
Ali
house,
on
Moussa
resembled
on
Wasan
against,
I
their
were
few
said
describe
accounts
the
a
wife,”
attack
The
outside
Shaaban
feeling
Hussein,
daughter
pain
former
weapons
[defendants’]
about
a
the
1987
ground
brother’s
Sheik
apples.”
“Then
be
brother’s
son
husband,
Oula
bombardment
and
each
against
legitimacy.
Earlier
,
rotten
took
campaign,
four
chemical
which
that
from
in
to
took
them.
killed.
adjourned
consider
court’s
six
northern
hearing
al-Amiri
to
of
and
Anfal
also
witnessed
“On
For
claiming
peshmerga,
When
threw
“When
I
up
I
all
took
Source:
got
over
her
in
www.msnbc.msn.com/id/14475531/
#storyContinued
to
Account of gas attack – 1916
wash
her
face
...
all
my
other
children
were
throwing
up.”
Arthur Empey was an American living in New Jersey when
“Then
my
condition
got
bad,
too.
And
that’s
when
we
war consumed Europe in 1914. Enraged by the sinking of
realized
that
the
weapon
was
poisonous
and
chemical,”
the Lusitania and loss of the lives of American passengers, he
she
said.
expected to join an American army to combat the Germans.
Bayez
“but
said
the
prevent
Like
my
the
In
villagers,
the
caves,
“All
the
she
knew
she
only
to
and
from
said.
I
“I
the
refuge
I
by
was
When America did not immediately declare war
, Empey
mules,
mountains
the
gas,
blood,
to
see,
scream,
I
We
she
couldn’t
slight
kids
away
from
his
do
lines.
breeze
warning
villagers
camp,
with
her
and
her
were
Bayez
died.
swollen
children’s’
eyes
he
sits
Conditions
been
in
are
from
passed
a
trench
perfect
the
peering
for
enemy’s
along
to
be
a
gas
towards
attack
direction.
on
the
–
a
The
lookout:
had
a
new
man
at
the
periscope,
on
this
afternoon
in
me.’”
taken
said
On
eyes
as
blowing
has
question;
The
story
take
We
my
join
German
tight
‘Don’t
boarded a ship to England, enlisted in the British army and
was soon manning a trench on the front lines.
many
holding
couldn’t
was
on
anywhere.”
vomiting
that
did
caves
bombed
blinded
were
was
thing
nearby
taking
was
people
I
children,”
anything,
ed
came
villagers
burns.
ve
villagers
helicopters
many
said.
had
the
the
with
by
four
fth
her
swollen,
the
military
people
day
in
ngers
their
kept
jail,
to
skin
to
in
she
see,
a
the
same
pried
and
when
prison
“I
blackened,”
room
open
saw
she
my
said.
he
yellow
I
called
cloud
coming–”
which
was
banging
to
I
empty
At
on
the
the
me:
shell
same
the
for
from
re
step,
“There’s
along
waited
detached
an
periscope.
out
rolling
But
was
sitting
no
the
case,
a
sort
ground
more,
rie,
I
which
instant,
cleaning
of
out
was
gongs
front,
the
my
it’s
bayonet,
alarm
hanging
started
rie,
greenish,
in
grabbing
gave
my
by
near
ringing
the
down
131
5
C A U S E S
the
or
trench,
smoke
must
or
A N D
the
signal
helmet,
not
lose
twenty
E F F E C TS
as
any
seconds
for
O F
Tommy
to
don
we
call
it.
time;
you
generally
in
which
to
Gas
20 T H - C E N T U R Y
his
travels
adjust
have
your
I
respirator
,
quietly,
so
about
gas
W A R S
you
eighteen
trained
bullets
bayonets
a
helmet.
my
were
large
snout
gas
helmet
is
made
of
cloth,
treated
with
are
two
windows,
or
glass
eyes,
in
it,
you
can
see.
Inside
there
is
a
which
goes
in
the
mouth.
You
breathe
nose;
the
neutralized
exhaled
gas.
gas.
Each
at
helmet,
pull
it
in
a
is
carries
one
out
off,
the
in
good
even
take
old
of
tube
the
for
the
ve
of
hours
them
bag.
placing
one,
the
new
air
is
being
so
spoke,
in
the
loose
ends
under
the
the
outside
of
the
strongest
around
must
your
one
a
air
this
defective
a
minute,
trench,
pandemonium
Tommies
running
dugouts
here
with
adjusting
and
there,
xed
reigned
their
and
of
your
your
my
dry,
my
the
bayonets,
were
to
in
and
Our
machine
gun
ammunition
gun’s
on
crew
the
from
parapet
the
of
busy
and
I
The
the
the
re
gas
is
heavier
of
was
They
the
air
dugouts…
on
our
sank
the
gas
We
had
right
to
the
spasmodic
with
was
an
to
work
soon
quickly,
too
ground,
infantry
slow
in
twistings,
went
attack.
getting
clutching
at
West
his
but
over
new
their
ones
on
as
the
Fritz
took
the
It
mad
rush.
barbed
loud
“crack”
wire…
pressure
leaking.
to
burst
began
on
the
The
trench
horrible;
I
sank
my
from
my
be
onto
esh,
throat
warned
gun
started
to
a
swim,
lungs
Turning
appeared
pricking
to
over
to
the
that
to
No.
wind
like
oating
then
got
me
re
in
the
step,
a
air.
needles
blackness.
awakened
How
by
one
A
delicious
of
my
strong
told
I
me
wind
that
was
I
that
mates
had
had
cool,
removing
fresh
arisen
been
and
“out”
air
felt
my
in
smoke
dispersed
for
three
my
the
gas.
hours;
they
dead.
examined
it
my
on
rst
and
was
the
smoke
left
helmet,
side,
just
a
bullet
grazing
my
had
ear
,
gone
the
had
penetrated
Out
of
through
the
hole
made
in
the
gas
cloth.
our
crew
That
of
six,
night
we
we
lost
two
buried
killed
all
of
and
the
two
dead,
excepting
trenches
in
No
Man’s
Land.
In
death
there
is
not
much
generally
helmet;
throat,
[died].
that
extra
company
his
stop
the
up
lls
A
could
step.
mounting
bringing
and
our
head
helmets.
be
distinction,
follows
horrible
machine
communication
those
and
and
bursting
heaps,
seemed
my
sandbags
was
to
thought
dugout.
than
was
and
noise
head
heavy
changed
lungs.
out
a
wounded.
German
some
ries
came,
have
head,
bombers
turning
man
out
was
was
in
Nothing
reached
Then
helmet
through
trenches.
like
which
tunic.
our
helmets,
men
pouring
down
fallen.
my
ear.
snake,
I
Reinforcements
looked
trench,
shrapnel
went
Germans
seemed
breath,
over
in
2,
his
wear
change
collar
of
helmet.
For
our
They
Suddenly,
I
tucking
respirators,
its
they
is
of
He
hold
foul
tube
slung
To
helmet,
The
this
inhaling
sleeping.
new
cloth
mouth,
canvas
while
the
chemicals.
the
two
waterproof
times,
through
prevents
helmet
you
the
action
the
Tommy
all
passing
the
that
One
shoulder
bag
by
through
constructed
or
gas,
they
our
and
over
through
The
your
their
trench
Then
rubber-covered
place
tube,
front,
along
their
through
heads.
which
In
on
parapet.
chemicals.
guns
There
in
All
gun
the
glistening.
nightmare.
A
machine
raking
friend
and
foe
are
treated
alike.
man
Source: Eyewitness to History, www.eyewitnesshistory.
he
after
a
horrible
com/gas.htm
few
to
see
Questions
him
die,
but
we
were
powerless
to
help
him.
In
the
corner
1
of
a
traverse,
a
little,
muddy
cur
dog,
one
of
the
Compare
being
pets,
was
lying
dead,
with
his
two
paws
over
his
nose.
animals
dogs,
cats,
that
and
suffer
rats,
the
they
most,
having
the
no
horses,
helmets
mules,
to
gas,
or
smoke
helmet,
as
it
is
called,
at
the
save
best
attacked
the
thing,
headache
from
and
it
is
wearing
not
long
before
one
them.
2
is
a
in
eighteen-pounders
an
effort,
re
by
step
the
was
were
artillery,
lined
What
can
Iraqi
gets
a
and
bombs
near
bursting
to
in
disperse
No
the
Man’s
with
crouching
gas
men,
Gas
was
wars
Land,
Our
artillery
German
keep
132
back
lines,
to
at
had
try
you
surmise
forces?
How
might
you
account
What
about
were
the
the
goals
goals
of
of
the
army?
hand
to
repel
the
put
a
barrage
of
not
after
and
reinforcements.
break
up
used
1918.
extensively
Why
might
in
this
20th-century
be?
clouds.
Construct
a
table
comparing
the
advantages
disadvantages
of
gas
as
a
weapon.
Is
expected
curtain
re
any
more
their
attack
or
less
“humane”
than
on
weapons?
the
gas.
bayonets
gas
attack.
by
violent
and
xed,
of
it.
4
The
accounts
vile-
3
Our
two
differences?
German
smelling
the
cattle,
the
A
contrast
It’s
for
the
and
company’s
and
Explain
your
answer.
other
C H A P T E R
5 . 3 :
O P E R A T I O N S
O N
T H E
W E S T E R N
F R O N T
The Battle of Verdun (February–October 1916)
The
German
centred
on
attempt
the
to
French
operation
was
Erich
Falkenhayn.
von
ferocity
white”
later
in
would
13
that
to
year,
kilometres
that
▲
his
require
reserves
To
they
use
the
and
had
feed
brainchild
could
the
of
these
the
guns
the
he
wanted
surrender,
Like
attack,
of
a
in
code
Germans
General
French
“bleed
of
at
the
of
rst
the
French
Judgment,
Along
plus
enormous
weeks
million
such
Somme
divisions
the
The
Staff
with
resources.
eight
some
2.5
Front
Verdun.
Operation
deploy
amassed
the
attack
amount
the
of
the
would
named
during
city
of
attack
they
including
had
Western
the
British
would
Belgium
the
Chief
to
that
the
massive
pieces,
on
around
German
Germans
artillery
effective
stalemate
the
phrase.
German
front
so
not
stockpiling
1,200
been
of
Initially
chilling
the
the
entrenched
of
the
guns
war.
shells.
German ar tillery at Verdun. What role did ar tillery play in the German plan at Verdun?
The
opening
French
to
of
hour
and
intention
territory.
Pétain.
–
was
hard
changed
single
the
as
defence
then
of
to
to
keep
hands
every
for
move
the
track
up
in
by
down
guns
as
giving
It
held
alone.
which
the
what
The
rather
to
the
to
torn
The
French
never
the
seize
General
active
with
their
difcult
for
landscape.
which
defence
ground.
trenches
as
than
of
the
shells
counter-attack
them
hills,
the
000
dugouts,
increasingly
active
to
100
advance,
only
and
key
–
doctrine
across
Germans
allowing
21February,
entrusted
the
way
forts
of
their
was
became
doctrine
side
in
hammer
forward
of
on
defenders
possible
use
to
weather,
cautious
environs
series
The
for
would
continued
a
March
Verdun,
its
of
erupted
French
called
infantry.
heavy
which
nally
the
ground,
with
attack.
of
and
of
because
soldiers
French
part,
ringed
times
supplying
bit
their
was
French
city
it
hunkered
however,
the
their
German
13
the
that
follow
Verdun
When
defenders
many
kill
postponed
smashing
to
of
road
to
plan,
contesting
of
focus
close
German
Germans,
and
city
on
was
defences.
determined
Germans
The
the
The
The
artillery
the
was
He
defence
later.
The
battle
their
came
rained
forts.
the
bolster
bombardment
an
the
break
army
became
meant
village
that
of
resistance
managed
to
it
Vaux
was
a
cut.
133
5
C A U S E S
A N D
E F F E C TS
O F
20 T H - C E N T U R Y
From
front
April
and
problem
Falkenhayn
so
continued
was
exact
thing
army
was
W A R S
that
into
he
beginning
casualties
sporadic
ghting
side
▲
would
lose
was
which
German
ordered
to
to
press
now
he
on
around
a
itself
par
Verdun
approximately
army
to
draw
white.
that
attack
into
the
By
the
a
the
end
last
–
of
of
whole
spring.
The
attrition,
the
the
German
June
about
until
the
the
battle
French
French,
would
000
along
throughout
drawn
with
350
to
French
being
wanted
bleed
were
his
the
200
the
000.
December,
In
the
each
casualties.
Canadian infantry on the front lines in April 1916
Technology and war: communications
wires were generally cut within the rst minutes of a
battle. Wireless sets were huge and unreliable, not to
Directing the movement of groups of soldiers in as close
mention easily intercepted by the enemy. And so tactical
to real time as possible has always been both the key to
communication in this modern war rever ted to methods
victory on the battleeld and a considerable challenge.
used for hundreds of years in some cases.
When armies and formations were relatively small, runners
or riders could carry commands verbally, the speed of
Trench runners: All armies employed soldiers whose
communication limited only by the speed of the carrier and
sole responsibility was to convey messages through the
the distance travelled. As armies and battleelds grew in
labyrinthine trench system. This was very dangerous work
size and complexity, sound (bugles, drums, or pipes) or
and required a good knowledge of the trench system,
visuals (usually ags) were used. The amount of smoke
a system that could change regularly.
and noise produced in a Napoleonic or American Civil War
Flags: Semaphore ags were used by all services.
battle, however, made such advances impractical once a
Competent signalers could send up to 12 words a minute
large engagement commenced. The telephone held some
if visibility was uninterrupted, which was a complication
promise, but was dependent on stable wires.
by the very nature of trench warfare.
The massive armies and immense battleelds of the
Heliographs and lamps: Heliographs communicated Morse
First World War brought all these issues into sharp relief.
code by concentrating sunlight, making them useless at
Generals were often miles to the rear of fronts that
night. Paran and later battery operated lamps overcame
themselves stretched for miles – the Germans attacked
this limitation, but were still limited by line of sight.
along 13 kilometres of front at Verdun. The Somme front
Carrier pigeons: Pigeons were a remarkably reliable
on 1 July 1916 was twice as long. Timely information to
communication method during the war. The British army
a Brigadier General about the progress of his men could
had some 22 000 pigeons in service at any one time
take hours and therefore the tactical situation could be,
during the war and by the end had used some 100 000.
and often was, entirely dierent by the time new orders
Only about 2% of those released failed to return.
reached those who had to carry them out. Telephone
134
C H A P T E R
5 . 3 :
O P E R A T I O N S
O N
T H E
W E S T E R N
F R O N T
The Battle of the Somme (July–November 1916)
The
epitome
Western
of
massive
held
in
into
the
of
open
the
This
to
the
end
spent
to
nor
by
the
logical
with
the
men.
place
little
It
French
of
The
–
decided
along
the
●
1,500
●
3
●
11
200
kilometres
of
buried
●
69
000
kilometres
of
above
●
thousands
●
100
●
lodging
●
300
The
A
artillery
million
000
plan
of
for
1916
of
had
wire
infantry
advance
would
the
barrage”
shield
that
left
The
the
had
interim
British
17
be
would
drive
to
to
itself.
it
as
close
attack
would
be
required
army
referred
swelled
the
would
would
advance
of
that
to
jointly
require:
railheads
sizes
telephone
ground
by
the
from
cable
cable
that
mind,
this
1
July
“mines”
As
be
of
which
18
the
land”
they
a
theoretical
unscathed
breach
to
“creeping
provide
trench
metres
attacking
trenches
a
be
the
would
man’s
them
enemy
would
tunneled
by
would
delivering
such
detonation
their
“no
with
On
the
artillery
oppose
lines.
preceded
both
the
assault
German
rushing
The
Army”
lines.
In
would
to
the
General
be
lled
▲
by
this
Picardy
guns
there
to
infantry.
across
destroyed
Haig’s
and
laboriously
rose
be
and
north
to
men
targeting)
artillery
the
suited
pigeons
target
underground
been
under
decided
famously
total
more
artillery
would
effect
supplemented
massive
various
with
“New
a
a
the
straightforward.
nothing
this
000
week-long
(counter-battery
advance
with
on
trucks.
seemed
devastating
of
these
carrier
400
barbed
virtually
for
lines
Cavalry,
pour
and
land
Champagne
thought
army
River.
and
was
the
horses
bombardment
German
rail
pieces
shells
water
massive
new
south
on
combination
infantry.
lines,
movement
sides
1916.
had
of
a
undertakings.
they
started
this
Somme
the
of
until
British
that
●
building
both
with
sodden
the
massive
Kaiser
the
the
through
resources
the
waves
in
the
in
generals
lines
restoring
land
1915,
process
–
with
Neither
postponed
army”
was
rear,
such
Allied
breach
Verdun
for
the
enemy’s
up
the
rocky
from
standards
“contemptible
2million
broken,
be
the
front.
enormous
stalemate.
pre-war
the
operations
the
which
followed
exploit
centre
would
to
breach
enemy’s
to
the
the
war
the
the
left
wasteful
the
in
then
warfare
amassing
break
Tiny
as
to
pounding
elds
of
strategy
was
would
front
Amiens
After
a
artillery
style
strategy.
to
offensive
aspired
reserve,
familiar
end
of
Front
British
cavalry
to
a
British wounded at the Battle of the Somme
distance
135
5
C A U S E S
A N D
E F F E C TS
O F
20 T H - C E N T U R Y
of
11
kilometres
thought
The
asked
the
was,
and
more
operation
Joffre
off
a
not
took
gunners
the
and
it
into
were
second
lines
line.
force
When
of
not
the
wave
and
the
100
they
in
were
the
cut
accounting
were
casualties
to
the
vast
with
before
20
the
of
from
were
of
these
wave
of
the
were
units
(support)
with
of
their
force
attacking
Some
their
000
of
and
attacking
second
reached
little
pounding
Germans
losses.
the
too
them
bombardment
upon
choked
60
“crept”
machine
the
the
it
around
incredible
the
but
pressure
offering
wave
transpired.
though
it
whole
when
completed,
000
erce
majority
they
take
German
horric
this
August,
to
thus
though
attack
was
–
to
the
Rawlinson
of
threw
the
elements
trenches
down
on
them:
as
some
land
ordered
and
it
and
equal
of
order
as
operational,
trenches,
man’s
forward
were
grim
000
no
barrage
infantry
them
While
in
much
amazed
toward
exist.
as
week
but
None
beginning
month
were
saw
General
likely.
bombardment,
creeping
dazed
enemy
the
a
advancing
dugouts
out,
more
wire
horrendous
What
because
wounded
The
subordinate
at
by
The
barbed
the
stopped
up
Verdun.
the
advancing
did
His
was
launched
moved
at
this
day.
advance
German
them.
guns
rst
be
be
clamoured
make
trench
the disastrous rst day at the Somme?
The
during
soldiers
of
to
further.
British
troops
What role did poor communication play in
it
over
did
it
army
passed
machine
Class discussion
was
outstripping
protection.
they
the
destroy
jumbled
quickly,
on
modest
that
French
did
W A R S
the
dead
own
an
front
attacking
dead.
Technology and war: machine guns
The
quintessential
killing
as
develop
the
an
American
rounds
a
–
weapon
assembly
line
automatically
Hiram
minute
Maxim
of
the
was
industrial
to
mass
repeating
–
powered
who
by
weapon
designed
the
age,
gas
the
machine
production.
a
in
the
19th
weapon
discharge
Many
from
gun
had
century,
that
could
those
was
to
mass
at tempted
but
fire
same
it
up
to
was
to
an
600
rounds.
By the outbreak of hostilities in 1914 all modern armies had versions of Maxim’s
innovation. These were large weapons, which required a crew of four to six men
to operate. Jamming and overheating were constant problems in the trying
environment of trench warfare. Never theless, by the end of the war they could
re 1,200 rounds per minute and were mainstays of trench defences with ranges
of up to 1,000 metres. Smaller, more por table machine guns were developed
such as the Lewis gun or small Vickers machine guns. These could be mounted
on aircraft and carried forward in infantry assaults.
Haig
until
the
and
British
Germans
136
the
British
November.
had
500
would
The
suffered
000.
resume
furthest
420
their
advance
000
attacks
was
12
casualties,
on
the
Somme
kilometres.
the
French
By
194
front
November
000
and
the
C H A P T E R
5 . 3 :
O P E R A T I O N S
O N
T H E
W E S T E R N
F R O N T
Source skills
“It
The Battle of the Somme
was
valour
,
a
magnicent
and
its
display
assault
only
of
trained
failed
of
and
success
disciplined
because
dead
Source A
men
General
battle,
Douglas
Haig,
December
dispatch
1916.
summary
of
bombardments
points
on
the
were
rest
of
also
our
John
carried
front,
out
and
daily
during
Keegan,
from
the
24th
June
to
1st
July
gas
was
good
line,
upon
fteen
effect
a
at
more
frontage
miles.
Some
than
which
70
forty
in
raids,
places
total
there
infantry
between
too,
along
amounted
were
Gommecourt
our
to
at
the
in
one
was
of
Ypres
these
during
kept
dispositions,
me
the
well
week
preceding
besides
informed
serving
as
other
to
useful
exception
of
1
July
to
the
1916,
unrelievedly
it
High
Command
…
had
was
been
that
the
gravely
alarmed
of
sector
the
…
British
ground
attack,
had
particularly
been
lost.
…
because
Falkenhayn
by
extreme
the
the
any
results
scale
of
the
German
General
Staff]
reacted
to
that
loss
left
peremptory
fashion,
relieving
the
[commander]
in
attack,
whose
and
War
over
in
north
World
our
undertaken
and
First
discharged
[Chief
our
The
at
German
with
further
.”
the
disastrous
period
no
Source D
“If
different
advance
the
(http://www.rstworldwar.
com/source/haigsommedespatch.htm)
“Artillery
can
sector
it
had
occurred
…”
enemy’s
Questions
purposes.”
1
a
What
does
Keegan
mean
by
“the
scale
of
Source B
the
Private
Tomlinson,
1/7th
Sherwood
in
John
Keegan,
The
Face
attack”?
of
we
got
to
the
German
wire,
I
was
What
is
General
to
see
it
intact,
after
what
we
had
been
Colonel
and
I
took
cover
behind
a
With
reference
small
after
a
bit
the
Colonel
raised
himself
on
his
knees
forehead
to
by
see
a
better.
single
Immediately
he
in
his
was
to
analyse
its
the
origin,
value
purpose
and
and
limitations
hit
B
for
a
historian
studying
the
of
British
hands
attack
and
implying
C]
bank
Source
but
Lisle
told.
content,
The
de
[Source
absolutely
2
amazed
D]
Battle.)
statement?
“When
[Source
Foresters.
b
(Quoted
British
in
on
the
Somme
in
1916.
the
bullet.”
3
Compare
reveal
and
about
contrast
the
what
Sources
bombardment
that
A
and
B
preceded
Source C
the
General
de
Lisle
in
a
report
to
the
4
Minister
of
Newfoundland
British
describing
the
the
Using
the
Newfoundland
Regiment,
which
casualties
on
1
July.
(Quoted
in
Horror
The
of
Battle
of
the
Somme:
Somme.
The
sources
the
role
and
that
your
the
own
knowledge,
bombardment
in
the
failure
of
the
British
attack
on
Martin
the
Gilbert,
the
suffered
played
92%
on
efforts
evaluate
of
attack
Prime
Heroism
Somme,
1
July
1916.
and
War .)
Passchendaele (July–November 1917)
After
the
great
exhaustion.
Provisional
the
of
Tsar
mutiny,
more
not
of
Government
many
they
in
only
the
ways
from
though.
the
that
the
as
of
had
Allies
control
French
but
for
as
The
British
the
Third
Somme
was
no
a
of
at
goal.
point
abdication
in
various
army
in
had
the
the
any
a
but
route
British.
Battle
had
of
not
Expectations
Instead
of
states
bent
Caporetto,
left
of
Russian
participate
Ypres)
earlier.
the
the
at
That
assault
year
longer
to
the
the
were
Italian
assault
Battle
near
was
after
refusing
Venice.
the
as
divisions
assaults.
before
were
collapse
Austro-German
the
breakthrough
the
near
taken
Fifty
halted
known
of
was
trenches,
an
been
Battle
1916,
fruitless
strategy
(also
the
The
in
face
of
army
1917.
saw
barely
Passchendaele
much
of
remaining
what
had
Russian
February
broken
that
In
in
bloodletting
The
the
evolved
had
British
137
5
C A U S E S
A N D
E F F E C TS
O F
20 T H - C E N T U R Y
would
had
advance
preceded
move
the
intensity
ring
the
tank
The
of
twice
four
attack
no
–
at
man’s
sight.
and
and
as
many
more
do
before
shells
surprise
seemed
was
rain
the
Tanks
became
as
long
and
offensive
to
to
it
grab
again.
the
a
The
well
to
in
A
the
the
barrage
German
barrage
with
narrower
defenders.
work
artillery
on
Somme
across
the
intense
and
differed
twice
front.
new
dry,
as
than
trenches,
only
many
Needless
element
though
of
in
guns
to
say,
warfare
rough,
–
surface
land.
progress
soft
longer
forward
no
rst
a
Somme
as
times
was
torrential
so
after
the
artillery
–
the
of
W A R S
short-lived.
made
mud
so
became
close
to
any
A
sort
German
of
oppressive
bogged
that
down
counter-attack
advance
impossible.
men
and
the
were
said
and
The
to
movement
the
sink
of
onset
ground
out
artillery
was
of
pieces
impossible.
Technology and war: tanks
A vehicle that could withstand withering machine gun re
as armoured shelter for advancing soldiers. Following
and traverse the moonscape that was no man’s land could
behind the tanks the British infantry was able to advance
theoretically lead to the breakthrough of which both sides
3,500 metres with limited casualties at which time the
dreamt. On paper the tank seemed to deliver exactly this. First
unreliability of the new innovation began to tell. It was not
developed by the British, the rst tanks, so called to preserve
until 1918 that the idea of massing tanks with coordinated
secrecy and because of their resemblance to water tanks,
ar tillery and air suppor t was implemented. This approach
posed as many problems as they solved. First introduced at
worked very well and presaged the tank’s use in the
the Somme front late in 1916, they were usually crewed by
Second World War. In the end the Germans were the least
eight men, choked by the diesel and cordite fumes. These
enthused about the new technology, only producing about
early tanks travelled 6 km/h and broke down frequently.
20 tanks of their own, but using captured Allied tanks when
they could. The French, on the other hand, produced over
How to use these monstrosities? The Allies tended to
4,000 of various models and the British about 2,600.
divide the tanks up among infantry units and use them
When
the
battle
engagements
larger
in
gains
little
German
it
back.
called
they
a
on
October
than
the
and
on
the
some
270
Germans
the
of
and
New
The
Although
around
within
and
the
the
the
gures
taking
the
units
to
Haig
only
have
were
now
are
attempt
forces
to
its
the
the
and
would
have
the
infantry
attack,
assault
non-existent
disputed,
resulted
exhausted.
resume
resumed
to
assaults
British
then
village
defending
smaller
These
ground,
forces
Corps
captured
of
General
and
British
Zealand
000
series
stalemate.
ground
casualty
200
a
take
Canadian
casualties
a
Passchendaele.
same
November
000
of
front
the
won
encouraged
September
effect.
6
British
that
village
pound
end
little
the
stalemate
of
Australian
to
Passchendaele.
lost
the
a
section
artillery
By
did
resumed
September
toward
more
bombard
in
the
which
on
village
Allied
surrounding
take
Haig
26
of
Powers
territory,
it.
1918
The
dawn
staring
had
some
troops
hope
138
at
of
1918
each
reason
fresh
in
another
1
to
from
stemmed
arriving
on
other
million
Western
hope.
the
from
France
the
across
now
the
each
on
a
The
Germans
thousands
way
–
of
over
by
the
saw
three
moonscape.
non-existent
week
the
Front
battered
would
soon
Russian
American
300
000
by
summer.
exhausted
Both
being
front.
The
however,
seeing
For
soldiers
March
armies
sides,
the
who
1918
German
new
Allies,
were
with
army
knew,
C H A P T E R
however,
society
States.
new
that
could
For
the
forces
thereby
The
by
A
moving
Storm
units
20
casualties
going
able
to
time
and,
not
ports
they
however,
they
could
casualties,
By
felt.
August
blow.
that
On
8
not
“The
black
the
as
war
the
back
replace.
with
was
tank
on
day
the
Hundred
toward
of
Days,
where
monarchy
asked
for
on
November
an
war
they
and
were
ill
a
the
line.
of
They
to
Allies
had
jointly
inux
lost
turn
the
to
a
the
not
to
a
the
the
of
They
channel
armies.
troops
similar
They
that
number
losses
set
of
four
war
in
and
General
This
series
were
air
for
of
less
knockout
Amiens
on
this
the
rest
would
this
of
known
Germans
Once
fact,
a
called
the
collectively
pushed
earlier.
hostilities
a
of
support
tone
actions
years
with
front
Ludendorff
the
acknowledged
agreement,
by
goals
the
000
the
attack
progressively
started
government
end
infantry
German
In
a
troops
massive
army”.
250
were
were
but
armies.
taken
000
kilometres
overall
British
suffered
US
8
of
39
they
gains,
German
had
many
Allies
only
had
surrender
over
if
The
the
infantry
race.
try
artillery,
forces
had
of
lose
was
were,
the
the
taken
day.
and
points,
soldiers
in
German
it
“storm
lines
suffered
afford
halt
gains
had
rst
by
strong
British
resulted
had
was
speed.
traditional
lost
Front.
By
to
for
having
German
armistice.
their
March
contest
they
the
reach
launched
they
and
use
the
F R O N T
their
they
of
British
themselves
Allied
W E S T E R N
United
followed
and
forces,
Western
of
21
the
7,000
also
reverse
the
attempted.
the
even
T H E
the
required
French
Allies’
out
O N
was
before
the
steady
they
previously
army,
11
the
as
in
Germans
ground
the
was
these
over
could
on
than
Although
the
cases,
The
Germans
August
day
offensive
British
the
and
that
could
table
tactics
holes
Rather
separated
exhausted
coordinated
scale
the
not
–
Britain
British
leaving
they
beyond
up”
The
it
some
race
barrage
successes
impressive
had
not
but
the
soldiers.
offensive
As
had,
acutely
in
were
“rolled
and
areas.
the
the
a
new
punching
soldiers
on
the
artillery
of
be
knock
these
them,
of
economy
juggernaut
negotiation
struck
positions,
so,
German
Amiens.
end
British
doing
operation
had
the
to
their
O P E R A T I O N S
mobilization?
and
rear
speed
forward
slow
that
tactics
the
capitalize
the
from
the
to
At
would
the
US
bypassed
The
000
British
of
quickly,
into
take.
killed.
to
three-hour
Troopers
over
the
weight
moving
soldiers,
economic
1918
French
new
new
the
submarines
offensive
on
deep
to
been
of
the
debilitating
troopers”
their
the
German
predicated
the
outlast
Germans
and
force
crushed
despite
not
5 . 3 :
the
the
cease
German
Germans
at
11:00
am
1918.
139
5.4
The war beyond the Western Front
Conceptual understanding
Key questions
➔
How was the nature of combat on the Eastern Front dierent from that on the
Western Front?
➔
What role did naval forces play in the war?
➔
In what ways did the Home Front contribute to the war eor t?
Key concepts
➔
Cause
➔
Consequence
➔
Perspective
The Eastern Front
In
its
some
ways
author
the
assumption
of
under
many
expected.
the
in
fact
and
Plan
west
and
was
Russians
20
“a
1914
manage
the
German
prominence,
the
not
cooperating.
the
Russians
train
and
combined
The
result
Battle
army
by
of
defeat
effort
strength,
was
the
suffered
Germans,
army
which
two
was
30
000
General
two
the
1916
that
deep
–
than
to
casualties
Samsonov
and
to
of
the
the
J oh n
Th os e
vastly
end
of
the
their
than
000
war,
face
their
their
the
soldiers
suicide.
and
troops
Army
that
rise
were
between
Samsonov
to
saw
would
armies
animosity
Tsar
a
which
who
Second
95
After
east
having
committed
of
Gumbinenn
Russian
greater
had
Sch l ie ffe n
w ord s
transport
his
A ug u s t
un c e r t ai n t y” .
Generals
Russian
report
of
the
two
without
the
G e rm a n s
e nd
ofcers
personal
armies
be for e
v i c t or y
Th e
that
in
until
the
F ir st
we ll
qu ic k
defenders.
two
wh a t
R us s ia n
a
the
battle
the
to
the
w a r.
armies
command
turn
of
the
the
considerably
encirclement
Rather
in
Germans
in
th at
In
on
P rus si a
the
da n g er ou s
At
the
ea s t.
at
time
bloodied
from
the
the
e as t
e a rl y
with
was
the
f ac t
E as t
Fr a n c e .
wi th
realized
there
allowed
each
in
Hindenburg,
War
In
op pos ite
bas e d
en vi si on e d
in
the
German
Germans
fact,
ha d
the
be e n
in va de d
defenders.
the
had
same
ve r y
invaders
and
Tannenberg.
had
the
This
the
Germany
of
e xa c t l y
war
in
Ma rne
p re g na nt
commanding
Rennenkampf.
by
In
at
the
e vid e nt
the
Ludendorff
out
s ucce s s
German
reorganization
Generals
at
plan
invaded
August
Schli e ffen
1 9 14,
beca me
the
d id
pl a n
mobi li z a t io n .
d ra wn
great
Septemb e r
hasty
to
l o ng
unravell i ng
outnumbered
on
a
was
uncertainties
The
F ur the r,
hav e
Pl an
e ntir e
R e nne nk amp f
early
it
The
R us s ia n
Gene r a l
would
Keegan,
140
slo w
Army
in
S chl i e ffe n
envisio ne d .
own.
at
the
Russian
captured
C H A P T E R
One
week
Russian
later,
First
Hindenburg’s
95
000
his
from
last
After
the
army
regrouped
not
nearly
autumn
This
of
came
though
When
Italy
press
the
almost
and
the
entered
as
war
to
on
of
east
ensured
the
the
on
and
side
troops
in
lost
of
judged
the
the
on
Front
war
the
one
La ke s ,
pr ot e c t
of
into
a
the
Front.
Russian
forces
point
in
were
the
Hungary.
stalemate,
become.
in
1915,
Germans
be
movement
Western
through
had
to
His
previous
to
Austrian
at
Allies
the
this
south.
F R O N T
i n ic t i n g
Lakes,
The
and
the
W E S T E R N
the
Ma s ur i an
the
had
settled
facing
wi t h
T H E
fo ll owed .
sweep
Western
the
front
to
Front
de a l
w it h dr e w
Masurian
allies
B E Y O N D
the
that
it
W A R
G er m an y
offensive.
Brusilov
territory
than
German
move
his
fro m
to
of
Ge rm a n s
Eastern
as
a rm y
Ba t t le
threatened
the
bound
the
the
Front
to
their
General
Germans
the
T H E
R e n ne n ka m pf
Tannenberg
and
obliged
miles
of
Eastern
Russians
trench
Russian
100
of
his
inv ad er s
a nd
returned
nothing
were
The
the
defeats
1914
as
the
e ne my.
space
on
successful
to
not
Austrians
front.
as
the
whe el ed
s ubs e que n t
s we pt
on
and
longer
twin
the
enci r cl e me nt
topography
would
At
forc e s
casualties
army
The
H i nd e nburg
Army.
5 . 4 :
a
good
offensive
the
to
the
Italian
time
to
regained
year.
Gallipoli
With
the
seems,
new
and
stalemate
in
front
the
in
hindsight,
in
another
British
France
only
were
becoming
obvious
theatre
of
exploring
that
war.
such
more
the
By
intractable
Allies
would
November
options.
Over
1914
the
by
the
seek
to
both
week,
open
the
objections
it
a
French
of
the
Class discussion
commanders
on
the
Western
Front,
a
plan
to
attack
the
Ottoman
Empire
What were the strategic benets of
began
to
take
shape.
attacking the Ottoman Empire at the
The
original
plan
was
for
a
squadron
of
older
model
battleships,
both
Dardanelles?
French
Straits
as
two
land
the
went.
xed
hours
third
British,
with
they
Turks’
of
and
and
the
Gallipoli
Australia
and
managed
to
but
nothing
the
25
New
intelligence,
decisive
action
president
with
third
By
a
third
it
end
the
be
1915
and
Bay,
surrounded
the
made
Suvla
The
Allied
plans
British
which
by
on
the
tried
by
the
These
to
he
–
by
southern
soldiers
spot
a
neutralized
two
of
terrain
when
the
Within
reduced
be
on
of
tip
the
landings
hills,
bad
and
the
Mustapha
became
break
succeeded
only
the
in
the
stalemate
creating
a
forces.
acknowledged
all
elusive.
surrounding
rough
Turkish
withdraw
and
defenses
destroying
combination
very
leadership
to
a
Ataturk
by
later
(ANZAC).
commander
Kemal
Turkey.)
at
enclave
as
to
landed
beach
at
was
have
days
by
navigation,
Turkish
known
landing
of
was
of
Corps
Turkish
proved
squadron
forces
stopped
at
Dardanelle
successful
would
of
narrow
guns
four
patches
were
poor
post-war
narrow
the
what
of
to
British
Army
small
They
the
guns
followed
Zealand
out
more.
(later
shore
1915
the
pounding
mobile
operation
The
up
moderately
defenders’
the
way
sweepers,
were
Peninsula,
carve
their
mine
April
military
Kemal
of
retired.
On
force
they
starting
had
forces.
help
While
guns,
of
to
their
forces
the
asco
from
the
for
Class discussion
Gallipoli
Why are amphibious landings so
Peninsula.
Between
28
December
1915
and
6
January
1916,
the
British
dangerous for the attacking forces?
and
the
ANZAC
most
cost
the
forces
abandoned
successful
Allies
300
military
000
their
positions.
operation
casualties
and
of
the
the
The
evacuation
campaign,
Turks
250
000
a
was
perhaps
campaign
that
casualties.
141
5
C A U S E S
A N D
E F F E C TS
O F
20 T H - C E N T U R Y
The
it
war
would
economic
Empire,
drag
and
which
separate
W A R S
on
social
in
descended
peace,
the
the
east
pressures
Treaty
into
of
as
that
in
the
west.
would
revolution
in
Brest-Litovsk,
The
prove
war
too
1917,
would
great
for
eventually
abandoning
the
bring
the
with
Russian
signing
a
conict.
L TA
Research skills
1
With
the
German
signing
army
of
was
Brest-Litovsk
free
to
the
The War at Sea
transfer
It
all
its
units
from
the
Eastern
is
one
of
between
to
the
Western
Front .
How
were
war,
ironies
and
the
of
the
German
war
that
Empire
while
was
a
the
naval
major
arms
long-term
race
cause
the
massive
eets
created
by
this
same
race
clashed
only
of
once
transferred?
during
2
great
Britain
many
the
soldiers
the
Front
the
war.
How did this aect the balance of
There
were
two
critical
problems
that
faced
the
German
High
Seas
Fleet
forces on the Western Front?
and
3
How long did it take the ow of American
soldiers to nullify this increase?
therefore
pre-war
of
the
Royal
happened
all
ships
second
geographical.
was
to
the
sink
Channel,
34
full
run
of
defeats
before
1914
engage
the
and
at
Heligoland
inicting
the
brought
eet
to
decrypted
German
the
Sea.
North
The
with
both
safer
ammunition
to
inict
their
Navy
Fleet
more
eet,
in
sides
claiming
and
damage
command
not
giving
than
of
North
for
the
Admiral
them
In
was
Royal
efcient
Navy.
once
to
of
less
a
hit
the
in
the
but
Royal
new
began
Navy
large
battle
not
a
sortie
in
Germans
to
risk
the
leaving
German
and
were
rest
the
High
into
history
communications
the
war.
between
than
Scheer
a
the
Navy.
before
of
For
English
however,
bases,
The
the
Sea
1915,
naval
that
their
in
the
Unwilling
again.
remainder
in
notice
battle
meant
returned
Sea
1916
the
Royal
ports,
other
ocean.
resulted
1916,
largest
The
adopted
Rheinhard
May
the
North
the
retire
had
and
economic
bombard
open
ports
Bank
In
to
Fleet
cruisers
advantage.
ambitions
wage
through
by
and
advanced
storage
Germans
the
emerge
the
force
the
the
its
strategy
to
was
of
Seas
from
enemy.
naval
was
and
Dogger
action.
More
propellant
the
their
clash
victory.
This
and
attitude.
for
High
battle
precluded.
controlled
emerge
1914
subsequent
however,
would
new
looking
lanes
lanes
Dreadnought
in
numerical
this
frenzied
advantage
engagement
31
was
advantage
advance
on
eet
narrowest,
arrive.
in
1.6:1
accomplish
German
Navy
a
her
numerical
eet
had
German
shipping
would
could
ciphers
on
shipping
its
the
eet
damage
a
sea
at
despite
the
advantage
surface
bottlenecks
Blight
some
to
the
major
2:1
numerical
wide
Royal
a
that,
of
Navy
enjoyed
of
these
1915
Fleet
a
was
short
only
Royal
had
way
in
to
both
The
the
Grand
commander
taking
Scotland,
approach.
force,
bulk
ships
access
rst
fell
weighed
goal
One
kilometres
and
Throughout
only
the
the
It
that
end
The
still
Navy
Navy’s
merchant
the
and
The
Royal
18.
Royal
enemy.
the
time
1916
disadvantage
Germans
Norway
142
the
was
something
the
in
Germany
The
on
strategy.
Germany
By
Jutland
and
other
warfare
naval
Navy.
at
battleships
in
her
shipbuilding,
able
of
Royal
Seas
C H A P T E R
5 . 4 :
T H E
W A R
B E Y O N D
T H E
W E S T E R N
F R O N T
Technology and war: submarines
The submarine, or U-boat, seemed to hold out the promise
brought new ethical dilemmas to naval warfare. They were
of blockading an enemy without the expense of a massive
unable to take on survivors of their attacks and lost all their
surface eet. This was especially attractive to Germany
advantage if they surfaced and warned their targets, as
whose surface eet could not match the British Royal
maritime law demanded they do. If the U-boats practised
Navy and was in fact holed up in its Nor th Sea por ts for the
so-called “unrestricted” submarine warfare and attacked
vast majority of the war.
any ship deemed to be headed to an enemy por t, however,
they proved deadly. Unrestricted submarine warfare also
The German Imperial Navy began the war with about 30
solved the perpetual problem of having to accurately
functional U-boats. These were deployed both against the
identify targets and from which country they sailed.
Royal Navy and the British merchant eet plying the waters
between Nor th America and Britain. Early models were
While the U-boat menace was very real, countermeasures
equipped with one torpedo tube, but later models could
such as convoys, depth charges and rudimentary sonar
discharge multiple self-propelled torpedoes. The U-boat
turned the tide in favour of the Allies.
The Home Front
By
in
the
time
the
November
belligerent
feeding,
an
nations.
clothing
undertaking
As
we
all
resources
have
nancial
cultural
war
The
Home
the
all
that
the
manage
Board
of
the
The
was
occupied,
Britain
it
and
and
countries
of
not
these
was
feed
at
France,
In
and
a
the
physically
of
undertaking
–
mobilizes
resources,
resources,
World
The
War
deadly
are
of
this
logic
being
can
used
of
in
free
the
In
of
such
Act
and
so
to
as
the
Britain
and
directly
Industries
Canada
raw
across
in
economy
War
certain
vital
coordinate
established
the
such
market
and
Realm
the
identify
that
legislation
were
States
acted
we
belief
the
the
control
supply
a
manage
of
a
drastic
the
Munitions
materials
national
as
high
a
hand,
United
to
level
result
had
of
be
of
for
borders
in
war
war
such
as
production.
imported.
steel
the
goods
to
States,
the
increase
had
consumer
by
nation
but
sweeping
fairly
partly
affected
halt
the
Board.
was
other
the
to
Defence
United
process
a
countries.
First
shared
procurement.
of
a
to
by
targets.
whims
domestically
army,
the
Front.
agencies
Munitions
of
resources
directly
the
massive
agricultural
agencies
agencies
expense
from
the
say
a
ground
mobilized
industrial
countries,
steady
a
to
was
which
In
powers
the
the
activities
its
on
all
to
more
maintain
the
munitions
not
these
in
Home
passed
and
produced
to
left
ensured
one
War
been
number
military
Government
Imperial
able
and
to
a
these
in
countries
production
be
of
major
be
for
includes
the
government
production.
the
result
production
food
citizens.
Sometimes
of
could
not
armies
resources.
as
all
The
World
had
resources,
become
Canada
Commission
case
Germany
in
is
This
different
each.
Many
coordinated
net
What
also
First
men
vast
war
if
of
much
effort.
governments
its
production.
total
that
could
Act
too
human
various
wartime
Resources
in
to
Front.
allowed
is
the
understatement
these
known
looked
activity
Measures
lives
and
will
Front
created
Home
War
they
be
educational
became
common
economic
would
a
of
millions
arming
war
however,
effort,
they
the
resources
of
proved
resources,
war,
aspects
It
and
that
in
machine
tens
discussed
mobilization
total
terrible
1918,
foreign
and
import
and
food
vast
Australia,
While
coal
territories
for
amounts
Canada
it
civilians.
and
of
other
war.
143
5
C A U S E S
A N D
E F F E C TS
O F
20 T H - C E N T U R Y
W A R S
UK Munitions Production, 1914–1918
1914
Ar tillery pieces
1915
91
Tanks
1916
3390
–
1917
1918
4314
5137
8039
150
1110
1359
–
Aircraft
200
1900
6100
14 700
32 000
Machine guns
300
6100
33 500
79 700
120 900
Source: Kennedy, Paul. 1988. Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: conomic and
Military Conict from 1500 to 2000. London, UK . Fontana Press.
This
increase
and
this
reallocation
the
of
ranks
took
The
it
of
of
life
cruel
been
the
there
been
its
and
its
800
000
–
and
is
to
a
this
part,
ow
shipping
of
airships
British
meaningful
was
The
disruption
to
In
turn
to
the
died
of
war
of
the
the
1.5
The
its
two
all
the
toll
on
years
at
one
for
bomber
the
production.
and
effort
This
lled
18%
civilian
women
to
war
the
for
the
and
in
1917
such
as
the
to
disorders.
conduct
to
cut
Her
the
of
reducing
her
eets
Gotha,
but
army
estimated
tonnes
casualties
still
This
Britain
related
country.
–
Germany.
an
attempted
million
was
only.
German
war
had
While
materials
issue
started.
the
took
blockade
war
bound
both
enemy
years.
technology
whole
5,000
your
Powers
300
use,
of
15
point
aircraft,
close
in
contraband
eet
over
to
between
ships
military
sinking
and
war
men
million
naval
for
undernourishment
food
As
places
Central
war.
once
back
new
the
rationed.
well.
important
defence
submarine
inicting
in
is
and
blockading
take
to
be
population
over
non-military
last
used
Britain,
later
cities
for
as
their
differentiate
meaningless
began
the
and
to
–
to
war.
Allies
permitted
eet
reserve
the
had
France’s
Britain
national
German
to
In
reallocated
food
military
during
destined
Germans
supplies
weeks’
level
be
workforce
of
something
the
1909
law
civilians
throughout
on
in
blockade
the
if
Britain’s
population.
warfare.
six
Zeppelin
goods
surface
German
their
new
effort
the
the
during
Both
to
even
20%
women.
that
of
however,
civilian
economic
144
war
target.
an
massive
Eventually
only
a
to
–
joined
by
had
and
armies
jobs
International
designation,
bombs
of
cornerstone
disputed.
vital
lled
warfare
contraband
For
were
goods
applied
massive
population
logic
had
resources
resources
the
become
economic
used
that
consumer
“non-traditional”
must
to
of
Germany’s
walks
meant
meant
of
dropped
causing
no
5.5
Eects of the First World War
Conceptual understanding
Key questions
➔
How did the war change the global balance of power?
➔
Why did the war aect society so deeply?
Key concepts
➔
Continuity
➔
Change
Political
By
the
time
the
functionaries
the
on
war
had
Europe.
Germany
Dual
already
The
had
for
a
few
information,
Paris
would
of
to
a
in
had
state
1919.
redesign
of
In
a
urry
itself
and
a
rocked
had
of
other
peace
split
rule
by
changes
Russia.
revolution.
into
with
competing
in
its
a
structure
of
The
constituent
communist
interests,
communication
power
settlement,
political
its
experiment
imperfect
map
various
to
signicant
and
would
and
way
beginning
was
collapsed
and
the
their
was
and
Hungary
goals,
economists
grope
number
republic
part
weeks
to
a
Austria
its
confused
try
Paris
Bolshevik
become
For
diplomats,
in
imposed
new
Monarchy
components.
state
leaders,
gathered
the
incomplete
leaders
at
Europe.
L TA
Research and communication skills
Choose one of the following:
●
Germany
●
Great Britain
●
Austria-Hungary
●
France
United States
●
Repor ters
●
For those representing a country, research your country and the Paris peace
settlement according to the following categories:
●
Economic, social, military condition in November 1918
●
Military provisions of the treaties
●
Territorial provisions of the treaties
For the repor ters, research the terms of the treaties and generate a series of
questions that attempt to elicit the motivations of the countries and what they
think the strengths and weaknesses of the treaties are for their country.
Conduct a press conference in which:
●
each country makes a presentation to outline its research ndings
●
the reporters ask each country representative questions and follow up questions
●
the country representatives answer the questions.
Discuss and analyse the treaties and evaluate the Paris peace settlement.
145
5
C A U S E S
A N D
E F F E C TS
O F
20 T H - C E N T U R Y
W A R S
Economic
The
First
involved
Empire
World
with
spent
Germany
money,
that
When
$23
supply.
created
physically
brought
of
the
war.
of
it
was
to
by
do
war
off
of
is
the
northern
the
many
so
of
war
and
The
historians
In
to
would
of
to
believe
not
the
that
the
$17
time
billion.
expanded
blight
return
peace
to
and
the
expansion
eastern
the
British
this
short
to
high
signicant
devastation
amount
pay,
schedule
of
Europe
treaties
economic
ability
Likewise
it
the
and
the
have
the
this
brought
terms
The
billion
spend
standard
France
countries
not
demand,
Germany’s
doubtful.
debt.
gold
contribution
within
$9.3
did
managed
skyrocketing
own
was
it
all
States.
spent
countries
amounts
the
for
United
France
these
mid-1920s.
their
the
Demobilization
areas
the
disastrous
of
war,
went
with
ravaged
them
the
in
ination.
imposed
requiring
payments
was
Huge
Although
reparations
on
countries
until
with
exception
Because
Coupled
disastrous
productivity
economically
staggering
States
unemployment.
were
billion
incurred
United
belligerent
money
was
possible
$19.9billion.
each
the
War
the
the
of
of
the
wisdom
reparation
unrealistic.
Social
As
a
watershed,
Women
always
ooded
they
Middle-class
before.
into
many
of
wartime
expand
▲
an
take
the
the
entered
this
When
the
had
like
of
and
of
to
income
women
and
in
in
out
political
many
came
shrank
work.
on
by
numbers
a
degree
of
to
society.
women
workforce,
millions
of
effects
While
monopolized
greater
also
demand
themselves
women
before.
country’s
dumped
male
the
war
men.
than
of
social
workers
peacetime
Nevertheless
necessities
had
combined
levels,
the
to
countries.
British women at work in a steel factory. Why was it that many of the gains that woman
had made during the war were shor t-lived?
146
each
workforce
industrial
found
wide-ranging
never
traditionally
demobilization
women
franchise
part
independent
contributions
the
War
occupations
economy
these
World
workplace
important
up
women
With
independence.
back
First
into
composed
required
ever
the
C H A P T E R
As
reections
affected
by
of
the
the
war.
movements
such
Dix
works
and
the
Siegfried
Sassoon
experiences.
Robert
an
In
Graves
intriguing
States
with
1920s
the
jazz
becoming
and
the
and
the
post-war
Erich
of
it
of
is
war
years
Maria
music,
surprising
trenches
that
The
poets
emotional
on
the
uniquely
popular
in
the
that
German
such
personal
E F F E C T S
as
to
bear
very
The
American
cafés
of
arts
artist
on
by
entry
music
of
W O R L D
W A R
were
and
wartime
likes
of
and
the
form,
and
F I R S T
Otto
their
the
T H E
artistic
Owen
popular
France
O F
new
Wilfred
memoirs
were
war.
the
spawned
power
Remarque
information
wildly
not
the
Surrealism.
British
brought
and
world
horrors
Dada
of
source
brought
it
as
wider
The
5 . 5 :
remain
United
to
Europe,
Germany
in
the
1930s.
L TA
Thinking skills
On an outline map of Europe in 1914 draw the borders of the following successor
states:
●
Latvia
●
Yugoslavia
●
Lithuania
●
Hungary
●
Estonia
●
Poland
●
Czechoslovakia
●
Finland
1
On what basis did the diplomats and leaders at Versailles draw these borders?
Did the same principles apply to territories outside of Europe? Why or why
not? Give an example.
2
Which 1914 countries would have objected to these boundaries? Why?
3
Identify points of potential conict based in the 1919 map.
147
Exam-style questions and fur ther reading
Exam-style questions
1
Examine
the
role
of
2
Evaluate
the
role
technology
World
3
To
extent
World
4
Discuss
5
Evaluate
First
the
7
To
8
Discuss
9
Compare
what
did
in
causing
the
the
outcome
First
of
World
the
War.
First
determine
the
outcome
of
the
causes
importance
of
of
sea
the
First
power
World
in
the
War.
outcome
of
the
War.
the
strengths
extent
the
was
role
and
Western
Examine
strategy
economic
World
Evaluate
10
played
in
War?
the
6
the
concerns
War.
what
First
domestic
of
and
the
the
weaknesses
First
World
United
contrast
War
States
military
of
in
the
a
Schlieffen
total
the
operations
war?
First
on
Plan.
World
the
War.
Eastern
Front
and
Front.
the
failure
of
both
German
and
Allied
offensives
in
1916.
Fur ther reading
Ferguson,
Books.
Fromkin,
1914?
War.
Holger
Keegan,
House).
Kennedy,
Military
and
H.
First
Toronto,
World
Strachan,
Oxford,
War
I.
Basic
Last
Summer:
Who
Started
the
Great
War
in
and
Modern
Memory .
Oxford
University
New
Lawrence.
War.
Hew.
The
of
the
Somme:
Toronto,
Marne,
World .
1914:
A.
Heroism
and
Horror
of
Canada.
Random
War.
The
The
Opening
House.
Knopf
New
of
World
York,
(distributed
by
War
I
and
USA.
Random
Rise
and
to
Fall
2000 .
2013.
The
of
the
Great
London,
War
That
Powers:
UK.
Economic
Fontana
Ended
Peace:
and
Press.
The
Road
to
1914.
Canada.
Margaret.
UK.
World
USA
Battle
World
1500
Margaret.
First
Explaining
USA.
1988.
from
House.
The
the
Allen
Sondhaus,
War:
War
Stewart.
MacMillan,
Random
York,
Great
2011.
The
Paul.
MacMillan,
148
The
2006.
York,
Conict
Lane.
of
Europe’s
New
Changed
John.
New
Pity
UK.
McClelland
that
2004.
1975.
Martin.
Battle
The
USA.
Knopf.
Paul.
Herwig,
the
David.
Oxford,
Gilbert,
1999.
York,
Alfred
Fussell,
Press.
Niall.
New
2002.
York,
2014.
Cambridge
2003.
The
Paris
1919:
Six
Months
That
Changed
the
World .
USA.
The
Great
University
First
World
War
at
Press.
War.
Sea:
A
Naval
Cambridge,
Oxford
History
of
UK.
University
Press.
the
Writing introductions and c onclusions
Introductions
they
and
generally
high-stress
to
make
of
the
conclusions
receive
situations
sure
task.
that
such
should
and
are
key
attention.
as
IB
everything
There
Introductions
little
be
exams.
you
no
conclusions
elements
This
is
When
write
in
any
especially
time
is
contributes
“throwaway”
essay
true
a
to
and
in
factor
the
sentences
yet
timed,
you
need
completion
or
paragraphs.
count.
Introductions
The
introduction
your
thesis.
must
be
The
the
Generally
focus
in
Balance
the
the
average
is
a
the
can
rest
go
to
the
of
the
back
beginning
essay,
of
the
try
of
the
with
While
the
the
of
the
the
essay
question
sentences
the
these
thesis
not
be
as
in
–
and
used
While
to
go
your
your
sentences
question.
essay
It
students
writing
is
should
enough
have
to
are
last
general
context
into
is
elaborate
question.
leaving
you
element
answer
structure
should
often,
leaving
you,
once
rest
your
essay.
address
the
Too
important
specic,
introduction.
not
for
the
specic.
introduction
your
of
to
still
of
most
should
most
paragraph.
concern
rest
you
context
introductions,
the
essentially
the
should
relative
constructing
is
general
the
they
important,
on
from
being
nature,
detail
of
speaking,
introduction
sentence
contains
thesis
room
get
time
just
the
the
important
slightly
carried
for
your
for
nished
also
be
the
rest
body
of
and
of
of
your
writing
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then
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the
when
than
away
rest
thesis
less
essay.
their
If
proceed
introduction.
essay
and
ll
this
with
You
in
the
introduction.
Conclusions
If
students
opposite
tend
is
management
repeat
what
should
do
a
and
●
Summarize
Include
●
Indicate
the
same
general
start
by
on
partially
been
the
the
any
more
said
of
a
much
time
This
is
function
in
the
rest
on
their
partially
of
of
using
the
a
introductions,
function
the
essay.
of
conclusion
A
good
the
time
simply
to
conclusion
things:
thesis
arguments
the
overarching
signicance
way
that
statements
with
too
–
not
the
evidence
–
and
how
they
relate
thesis
●
In
spend
conclusions.
number
Refocus
the
of
has
●
to
to
true
a
specic
general
to
you
task
of
the
should
more
required
topic
to
structure
specic
statement,
by
the
other
your
statements,
usually
some
command
term
events.
introduction
the
form
from
conclusion
of
the
thesis,
should
followed
statements.
149
6
T H E
S E C O N D
E U R O P E
A
W O R L D
A N D
R E T U R N
T O
W A R
N O R T H
T O TA L
I N
A F R I C A :
W A R
Global context
It
is
to
some
Second
of
the
First
First
political,
been
of
War
1930s
untouched
poverty,
other
this
a
by
that
period
to
of
that
the
social
It
was
and
the
out
of
of
this
The
three
Europe
fascism
ways
one
context
of
became
made
on
Europe
these
the
far
more
US
and
during
and
mutually
incompatibility
uncompromising
had
ideologies
eastern
many
this
the
the
dependence
and
in
on
in
democracy,
the
country
totalitarian
central
grew.
climate
No
ideologies
the
ashes
impression
Europe.
it.
say
out
Nevertheless,
deep
and
in
dominated
during
War.
humiliation
countries
which
cliché
erupted
left
economic
and
a
War
World
World
1920s
extent
World
was
and
likely.
volatile
the
period
by
–
incompatible.
coupled
with
expansionist
ideologies,
more
this
communism
namely
This
the
introverted
–
When
the
nature
fascism,
dangerous
isolationist
stance
liberal
were
of
of
conict
mix
was
policies
France
of
and
Britain.
dominant
Timeline
1939
German forces invade Poland
1 September
27 September
Soviet Red Army invades Finland
Poland surrenders to Germany
30 November
1940
9 April
German forces invade Norway and Denmark
German forces invade Belgium, the
Netherlands, Luxembourg, France
10 May
Winston Churchill becomes British Prime
Minister
15 May
Belgium surrenders to Germany
28 May
3 June
France surrenders to Germany
The Netherlands surrender to Germany
Norway surrenders to Germany
22 June
August–
Battle of Britain
September
Italy invades Greece
150
28 October
CHAPTER
6:
THE
SECOND
WORLD
WA R
IN
EUROPE
AND
NOR TH
AFRIC A:
A
RE TURN
TO
TOTA L
WA R
1941
11 March
German forces invade Yugoslavia and Greece
6 April
22 June
Soviet counter-attack halts German advance
Roosevelt signs Lend-Lease Act
German forces invade USSR
5 December
11 December
Italy and Germany declare war on the US
1942
Stalin and Churchill meet in Moscow
12 August
September
Battle of El Alamein begins
Battle of Stalingrad begins
23 October
8 November
US troops land in Nor th Africa
1943
Casablanca Conference
January
5 July
Italian fascist regime falls
Battle of Kursk begins
25 July
1944
January
Allies land at Normandy in France
6 June
25 August
Allied airborne attack on the Netherlands
Soviet Red Army enters Poland
Paris is liberated
17 September
16–27
Battle of the Bulge
December
1945
Soviet Red Army captures Warsaw
17 January
16 April
Adolf Hitler commits suicide
Soviet Red Army begin nal assault on Berlin
30 April
7 May
All German forces surrender to Allies
151
6.1 Causes of the S ec ond World War
Conceptual understanding
Key questions
➔
To what extent did Hitler plan a war?
➔
What responsibility do France and Britain bear for the outbreak of the war?
➔
What alternatives were there to the policy of appeasement?
➔
What is the relationship of the First World War to the outbreak of the Second
World War?
Key concepts
➔
Cause
➔
Consequence
➔
Signicance
Long-term causes
The legacy of the First World War
It
has
become
popular
unsatisfactory
evidence
to
this
were
themselves
near
were
sliding
chaos
power
aims.
only
was
The
to
little
Versailles,
as
relations,
suggest
of
three
Marshal
Insofar
the
the
they
that
are
19th
eschewed
looked
to
its
that
it
was
rst
the
not
of
the
that
in
to
is
it
For
of
to
as
its
it
First
were
sought
them
to
former
helped
this
in
of
of
20
any
its
key
the
war
which
the
to
and
she
French
the
war
of
the
treaty
years”.
international
World
War
recreate
the
of
signing
for
it
came
from
during
end
the
victors
Powers
with
one
itself
the
certainly
the
Party
outstanding
to
and
empire
Britain
at
issues
continent
its
as
in
Versailles
commander
armistice
politics
and
of
war
the
is
US,
Nazi
this
civil
that
the
issues
the
insofar
leader
of
The
had
War
Central
verdict
said
address
brought
return
an
there
the
extracted
The
he
of
Versailles
the
Russia
victors
of
at
World
and
other
countries.
when
to
War
the
recognized
these
the
had
country.
seat
outcome
of
and
politics.
It
Second
exception
devastating
peace.
politics
natural
mother
of
fought
Nations
a
in
international
the
World
programme
Foch,
a
the
reversing
Europe
some
empire
League
to
of
the
their
of
years
Indeed
century
of
military
often
least
enjoyed
denied
government
unsatisfactory
at
First
With
European
is
roots
Germany
promise
stability
wars
the
and
Ferdinand
“This
the
future
more
combatants.
had
the
a
from
Britain
in
the
on
to
the
view.
ruin.
subsequent
face
brought
all
in
Bolshevik
ostracized
army,
of
into
say
partially
Germany’s
see
conclusion
support
meaningful
152
to
seems
for
the
to
some
if
not
conditions
commanding
positions
economics.
after
Versailles
position.
to
and
desire
It
conrm
this
to
and
would
its
empire
return
instead
take
part
worldview
should
to
the
–
serve
balance
C H A P T E R
of
the
19th
disputes
tool
of
Such
century
could
be
diplomacy
an
in
issues
the
remained,
dissatised
be
if
with
it
replaced,
be
by
return
used
it
as
in
in
last
no
in
of
the
Mus s ol i ni
m or e
be
T H E
S E C O N D
W O R L D
W A R
international
e xpe c t e d
ma ny
f orm s .
m a s si ve
to
War
to
as
a
of
s a me
wa s
Ver s ai l le s
in c o m e
pu bli c
re s olve
the
p ol it i c s.
powe r.
I t a li an s .
of
Ger m a n y
wor l d
s ou rc es
came
the
that
O F
compromise.
A nd
and
th e s e
the
belief
and
1 914 .
Na zis
a nd
the
C A U S E S
resort.
al te re d
a nd
l ig ht
o nce
to
Eur op e a n
col onie s
especi a l l y
a
coul d
co ul d
s ome wha t
p l a ce
i ts
riled
discussion
to
in
underto o k
Balkans
a
out
tha n
its
of
meant
ho we ve r,
1930 s
stripped
Germany
the
was
approach,
issues
had
also
sorted
6 . 1
ne e de d
s pe n di n g
th a t
N a t ion a l is m
N a t ion a l is m
to
a ls o
in
TOK discussion
pos e d
To what extent can the citizens of a
a
threat
to
more
es ta b l i s he d
emp ir e s
su c h
as
t he
Br iti sh
a nd
F re n c h .
country be held accountable for the
The
Soviet
Union
ca n
be
s ee n
as
an
e xc e pt i on .
Ru s s ia ’s
po si t io n
a nd
actions of its government? To what extent
interests
were
mo r e
of
an
e ni gma
to
th e
We s t
than
it
had
be e n
in
can they be held accountable for the
1914
and
she
was
ce r ta inl y
not
the
con t in e n t al
p ower
sh e
had
be e n
actions of governments in the past?
in
1914,
still
although
1930s
This
was
1919.
they
and
could
was
also
be
and
the
and
thu s
her
for
bellicose
looked
with
a
the
sense
popular
m il it a r y
po t en t i a l
wa s
legacy
and
diplomatic
any
would
of
power
of
of
faced
to
to
an
the
in
economic
the
them
such
its
market
in
do
so
the
of
1929.
Japan
in
strategically
up
in
Africa
was
to
1914.
Europe
or
–
Asia
expensive
adequately.
limited
only
by
health.
crash
leading
empires
to
world
and
conict
collide
their
them
Italy
years
large
the
asset,
into
afford
using
leaving
of
to
stock
could
could
third
Germany,
had
issues
a
vital
economic
bring
with
thus
the
ma ny
une a s e
for
military
diplomacy
to
to
police
maintain
ge ne r al
a
a pp ro ach
Wor ld
Wa r,
po pula t i on .
s i tua tion
in
19 14,
of
the
Th i s
neutr a li ty
in
In
we st e r n
t oo k
many
US
the
wa s
co nt r a st
int e r- wa r
the
to
c h a n ge
to
the
to
k ey
the
E u ro pe an s
pe r io d
fo rm s ,
fr om
st u de n t - le d
pe a c e
Euro pe .
World
War
This
challenge
such
Fi rs t
pa cis m.
o f ci al
First
g ove r nm e nt s’
the
Euro pe ans
a nd
weakness.
to
provide
they
Protecting
inte r na ti onal
the
been
country
a fter
throug ho ut
The
as
w e ster n
attitud e
of
after
denied
little
as
interests.
situa ti o n
support
movements
were
mark e d
the
years
colonial
empires,
attitude
on
–
Europe.
international
continuity
have
controlled
empire
have
liability,
neither
their
international
word
a
France
defend
the
may
France
1930s
in
its
advantage
may
destabilizing
in
their
of
and
France
saw
true
an
colonies
countries
Britain
and
it
and
country
especially
Britain
thus
Britain
each
While
While
If
them
and
course,
say
i ndustri a l
massive.
Between
Of
he r
in
western
weakness
it.
The
rise
power
and
expose
of
Europe
was
was
obscured
fascism
that
in
the
one
by
of
the
1920s
military
absence
and
1930s
weakness.
Fascism
The
the
catastrophe
conviction
of
democracy
were
the
of
one
benet
from
a
of
rose
First
others,
many.
of
Two
perspective
to
the
World
that
incapable
the
class
perspective,
the
fore
War
political
convinced
systems
organizing
ideologies
and
in
the
the
and
that
other
many,
based
on
governing
rejected
from
dislocation
of
an
and
conrmed
liberal
modern
liberal
states
to
principles,
ultra-nationalist
the
First
World
War.
153
6
C A U S E S
A N D
E F F E C TS
O F
20 T H - C E N T U R Y
Fascism,
into
In
its
Italy,
unrest
this
in
into
and
for
but
a
that
certain
pressures.
A
Lebensraum,
was
it
was
in
to
Italy,
people
Austria,
expansionism
war
of
in
its
built
in
Germany
Jews
and
to
east.
and
expression
Nazi
of
the
was
built
into
of
The
and
1935
the
a
racial
Nazism
were
The
policy
Italian
Italy
process
political
rhetoric
virility.
kind,
and
inferior
of
military
Initial
invaded
destabilizing
fact
of
of
the
lethal
Germans
need
provided
this
a
racist
expansion,
military
strength.
that
and
more
demographic
national
national
The
but
superiority
preached
tool
modern
Nazis’
with
further.
Czechoslovakia
to
was
of
ideology.
in
in
Mussolini’s
Empire
Mussolini’s
economic
Slavs
the
massive
to
and
own,
the
concepts,
response
and
socio-economic
of
strength
insufcient
its
ride
Part
substance.
national
premise
to
Roman
more
even
anathema
for
on
Europe
as
parts
the
in
a
an
fuelled
was
justication
be
as
also
in
that
of
of
expansion
terrritory
Germany
had
power.
empire
Darwinian
belief
to
an
took
expand
violence
Depression
take
proved
for
Taking
for
Great
expression
fascism
to
grandeur
the
situation
social
and
weakness
would
Balkans
justication
as
an
quest
execution.
Germany
ultra-nationalism,
theatre
the
with
as
the
in
form
its
on
used
rhetoric
diplomatic
The
was
invoke
expanded
Abyssinia
the
to
symbols,
forays
it
parliamentary
was
autarky
was
as
tenets.
Mussolini
and
theatre
and
based
central
W A R S
or
seen,
Restoration
of
German-speaking
Poland
were
ultra-nationalism.
not
The
part
means
of
and
Nazism.
Short-term causes
The Great Depression
After
the
First
economy
the
United
therefore,
A nancial aid package from the US to
economy.
Germany. The package was in response
a
to the French invasion of the Ruhr and
in
subsequent German hyperination. The
Reparations
plan provided US dollars to renance the
which
German currency as well as capital to
seemed
German banks and businesses.
began
then
to
to
the
German
into
and
in
tur n
work
recover
Wall
Hitler
cause
of
and
who
had
between
the
war
or
the
f o rm
a tt e nd an t
to
be
of
e c on om y,
that
on
Dawes
US
US
as
M o n ey
G e rm an y.
a nd
Br it a i n,
t r ia n gu l a r
w it h
the
Plan
tu rm oi l.
to
Th i s
of
y ea r s,
de pe n de nt
the
F ra n c e
US.
the
na t io n al
was
p os t-wa r
th e
to
the
19 24–1 92 9,
o nl y
e con om ic
f r om
Ger m an y
l oa ns
Ger ma n
y ea r s
look
Crash
of
in
the
sold
it s
s o- cal l ed
that
it
German
this
wave
brought
isolated
powers
helped
for
in
an
ne w
 ow
c u r re n c y,
G ol de n
of
fuel
into
countries
markets.
South
economic
can
be
Ag e
of
by
as
a
to
power.
protectionist
Germany
isolation,
into
long-term
ideology
China
Germany
1932
hardship
seen
increased
America,
diplomatic
as
recalled
plunging
adopting
such
This
banks
unemployed
expansionist
countries
US
securities,
were
Depression
prompted
that
cash-strapped
Germans
rode
Great
elsewhere
isolation
1929,
million
Nazis
European
Economic
T he
in
the
h ea l t hy
a dop t io n
owe d
fr om
investors
also
policies
to
the
Eight
sense
depression
economic
in
Street
and
this
the
r s t.
the
that
be
Repub l i c.
loans
In
at
shape
a nd
w ar ti me
to
re cov e ry
ca pi ta l
o wed
cle a r
cl ai m
with
C ri si s
a nd
b a ck
of
wa y,
true
R uhr
b eca me
wa y
ki nd
s o me
loa ns
paid
it
a ny
Any
in
the
of
Wa r
in
prov e d
depression.
ofce.
The
to
form
Weimar
After
154
would
This
solution
the
coul d
States.
Dawes Plan
the
Wo r l d
that
and
Japan,
economic
and
the
rivalry
Balkans.
especially
in
the
C H A P T E R
case
of
the
Economic
at
exactly
size
of
United
States,
hardship
the
their
time
also
the
which
6 . 1
emboldened
hampered
the
expansionist
C A U S E S
expansionist
rearmament
powers
O F
were
of
S E C O N D
W O R L D
W A R
powers.
the
rapidly
T H E
western
allies
increasing
the
militaries.
German expansion
With
the
ideological
manipulated
about
the
undoing
the
reaction
did
not
He
and
react
Treaty
of
the
responding,
This
would
was
push
of
he
to
the
rearmament
naval
said,
the
to
In
the
rst
signied
he
wait
of
Hitler
a
tore
he
of
the
French
approach
and
accelerated
tacit
up
Allies’
Britain
although
mandate,
set
Hitler’s
for
When
a
conscription
lengthening
and
1935,
for
and
Hitler
1935
example
programme
of
people,
announced
accordingly.
Agreement
building,
and
envelope
step
Socialism
German
Versailles.
be
to
his
National
the
treaty
his
Naval
next
of
from
judge
Anglo-German
German
was,
hated
terms.
West.
it
clauses
rearmament,
conscription
to
the
disarmament
and
justication
though
it.
seeming
approval
France
The
to
of
limit
German
rearmament.
In
1936
he
ordered
again
the
German
demilitarized
by
commanders
had
show
the
edgling
The
of
army.
next
year,
and
to
expansion
the
in
French
did
nothing,
intervened
while
its
across
intervene.
in
France
stance.
border,
If
the
1938,
and
would
of
an
Nazism
act
pushed
forbidden
by
for
the
was
the
use
recourse
whole
by
war
promises
within
Czechoslovakia.
in
any
as
approach
Agreement
borders
the
relations,
of
a
to
British
to
was
should
not
again
Civil
France
British
risk
his
on
the
side
upheld
ally
to
to
emboldened.
War
object
territory
German
want
rigorously
her
they
rules
last
resort
France
Hitler
than
of
had
the
was
did
not
German
and
no
it
a
was
he
to
unilateral
Germany
and
preferred
built
on
the
guaranteed
believe
that
to
agreements
response,
sand.
occupied
commitment
British
Perhaps
underpinned
treaties
ignored
and
Britain
reason
Allies’
of
for
If
Austria,
the
dead.
preference
than
when
annex
Again
clearly
assumed
relations
signing
to
negotiation.
sanctity
rather
illustrated
months
or
Britain
the
European
When
solid
that
like
Germany
Versailles.
Hitler’s
diplomacy
rules
were
six
response
more
did
Britain
German
response.
Rhine
Spanish
and
disturbingly
played
the
Hitler
Hitler
east?
ambitions
without
Versailles.
Allies’
Hitler
France
why
to
Rhineland,
the
Versailles
longer
was
back
to
the
for
objections.
ephemeral
of
pull
France
rebels
on
waited
no
international
her
re-occupy
and
to
Germany
in
to
commitment
raised
action,
and
When
the
West’s
inclination
the
territorial
more
no
orders
threats
Anschluss,
and
army
non-interventionist
respond
The
the
Versailles,
slightest
Franco
their
tested
then
Hitler’s
Munich
what
remained
Poland’s
this
commitment
Munich.
Appeasement
Very
simply,
conict.
appeasement
This,
appeasement
post-war
saw
as
however,
was
used
Prime
to
give
obscures
in
commentators
British
is
the
used
Minister
in
to
demands
in
order
the
great
complexity
1930s.
With
the
the
word
Neville
with
benet
disdain
Chamberlain’s
with
of
to
to
avoid
which
hindsight,
denote
naive
and
many
what
they
weak
155
6
C A U S E S
A N D
E F F E C TS
O F
20 T H - C E N T U R Y
approach
to
assessment
German
seems
to
foreign
hold,
appeasement
differently.
Appeasement
can
be
seen
●
based
on
discussion
●
based
on
Britain’s
●
considering
●
treating
●
avoiding
●
resorting
These
no
clear
each
war
to
threat
how
Japanese
the
war
the
costs
even
not
of
feasible,
threaten
it
and
her
its
and
of
own
in
applied
he
British
1930s.
recent
of
Supercially
scholarship
traditional
military
Britain’s
this
interprets
British
diplomacy:
strength
interests
merits
by
the
of
a
and
negotiated
each
could
for
to
be
movement
of
seen
so.
Hitler’s
to
if
as
it
a
be
less
such
crisis.
it
At
of
an
a
to
was
a
not
the
Sino-
Munich,
concern
than
intervention
Germany’s
toward
clearly
return
Certainly
globally.
foreign
was
Likewise
interests.
Britain
the
do
Rhineland,
sovereignty
end
to
autonomy.
intervention,
an
any
to
the
British
concern
Czechs’
as
British
German
British
shores
interest
re-occupied
interests
of
the
of
Britain’s
threatened
more
kind
late
negotiation
were
When
judged
the
more
possible
Anschluss
any
in
continuation
scope
situation
was
Chamberlain
if
were
to
a
and
on
when
normalized
as
global
war
policy
however,
economic
issue
adventures.
direct
more
the
principles
policy
Class discussion
W A R S
France
or
was
actions
did
Belgium
Is there a moral or ethical element
would.
It
did
not
threaten
their
sea
routes
and
communications
through
to appeasement?
the
Mediterranean.
Empire.
There
were
policy
L TA
Research and thinking skills
that
in
It
in
Rearmament,
to
two
terms
of
way
underlying
German
German
no
started
actions
leadership
impeded
1938,
central
the
the
when
Europe.
same
agreements.
operation
nevertheless
assumptions
in
held
international
in
values
The
it
This
as
came
rst
did
second
of
the
continued
to
British
in
Britain.
applying
assumption
Britain
and
assumption
this
was
France
was
that
For each of the following positions,
German
ambitions
could
be
satised.
Both
assumptions
in
the
end
research the views of the historians
proved
to
be
false.
Once
it
became
obvious
that
they
were
false,
and
listed. Each historian may either suppor t
the
British
rearmament
programme
was
close
to
putting
Britain
on
par
or reject the perspective. What are the
with
German
military
output,
war
became
a
more
feasible
solution
to
strengths and weaknesses of each
future
situations.
historian’s position?
This
interpretation
suggests
that
the
key
question
is
not
why
did
the
The policy of appeasement caused
Allies
not
ght
for
Czechoslovakia,
but
rather
why
did
they
ght
the war
for
●
Poland?
production
●
As
mentioned,
British
rearmament
had
reached
peak
RAC Parker
AJP Taylor
Globally,
menace
by
the
mid-1939
and
Sino-Japanese
British
holdings.
French
war
The
rearmament
seemed
to
Nazi-Soviet
be
was
sapping
progressing.
Japanese
Non-aggression
Pact
ability
Nazi ideology caused the war
the
●
USSR
as
a
deterrent
to
German
expansion.
In
the
end,
the
British
Eric Hobsbawm
abandoned
●
AJP Taylor
●
Hugh Trevor Roper
ability
to
interests
worked
156
their
affect
assumption
the
through
until
it
course
of
diplomacy
did
not.
that
Hitler
world
was
could
affairs
no
and
longer
be
by
sated
so
feasible.
and
doing
to
removed
thus
their
protect
Appeasement
their
had
C H A P T E R
6 . 1
C A U S E S
O F
T H E
S E C O N D
W O R L D
W A R
Source skills
Power
Chamberlain and appeasement
but
The
following
is
an
extract
from
the
memoirs
from
we
Halifax,
Chamberlain’s
Foreign
Source A
interest.
peace
other
element
that
gave
fuel
to
the
res
of
I
the
unhappy
phrases
which
Neville
the
stress
‘Peace
of
sentences
with
great
emotion
Honour’;
allowed
grated
harshly
‘Peace
on
the
for
ear
our
and
predominance
probably
the
in
Europe;
most
If
I
that
that
had
Power
ever
thought
be
was
dominated
quite
Europe,
surrender
in
favour
of
obviously
would
bring
surrender,
a
and
British
lasting
but
there
would
ever
be
peace
in
Europe
I
did
so
not
long
as
Chamberlain
himself
time’
–
ruled
in
Germany.
The
next
act
of
aggression
to
might
use.
with
criticism
Nazism
under
Power
to
should
believe
was
undue
faced
Secretary.
resistance
The
now
of
formidable
Lord
obtaining
were
be
one
that
it
would
be
far
harder
for
us
to
resist.
such
thought
of
Source D
even
those
closest
to
him.
But
when
all
has
been
said,
The
one
fact
remains
dominant
and
following
Second
When
war
did
come
a
year
is
an
extract
from
The
Origins
of
the
unchallengeable.
later
it
found
a
World
War,
written
by
British
historian
AJP
country
Taylor.
and
Commonwealth
convinced
to
that
every
way
of
the
wholly
conceivable
sparing
alternative
effort
Europe
remained.
Chamberlain
united
foundations
the
of
had
that
and
been
ordeal
And
within
soul
of
was
itself,
conscience
made
war,
the
to
and
best
The
nd
that
thing
the
no
settlement
policy,
which
triumph
that
did.
for
intentions.
cynical
at
Munich
had
Hitler,
Nor
British
peoples
or
against
Soviet
was
worked
who
was
it
had
triumph
to
started
merely
statesmen,
calculating
a
precisely
a
with
triumph
indifferent
that
Hitler
for
this
to
far
for
the
might
British
end;
be
not
less
selsh
fate
a
clear
of
or
far-off
launched
Source: Halifax, Edward. 1956. Fullness of Days. Dodd,
Russia.
It
was
a
triumph
for
all
that
was
Mead and Co. London, UK .
best
and
most
enlightened
in
British
life;
a
triumph
for
http://spar tacus-educational.com/PRchamberlain.htm
those
a
Source B
Churchill’s
Commons
12
It
on
November
fell
to
Neville
crises
of
the
speech
Neville
to
the
House
Chamberlain’s
for
a
Chamberlain
to
be
in
one
contradicted
in
his
hopes,
and
wicked
man.
But
which
he
was
disappointed?
which
he
was
frustrated?
of
by
the
supreme
events,
to
They
were
surely
of
to
be
deceived
a
what
were
these
hopes
the
peace,
toil
even
for
at
the
peace,
great
What
does
What
What
were
was
these
among
that
the
human
wishes
faith
most
heart
–
the
peril,
strife
and
for
that
noble
the
peace,
certainly
of
popularity
or
(Source
What
are
the
17
meeting
of
Source
D?
With
reference
to
discuss
its
the
origin,
purpose
strengths
and
and
weaknesses
Source
B
for
historians
studying
utter
role
in
the
war.
clamour.
Lord
of
1938
the
Admiralty,
describing
a
Diary
cabinet
Compare
Source
4
September
with
implications
pursuit
the
Source C
entry
by
B)
of
speeches/1940-the-nest-hour/neville-chamberlain
First
he
in
3
Cooper,
when
“contradicted
was
Source: http://www.winstonchurchill.org/resources/
Duff
mean
was
and
love
the
to
Churchill
Chamberlain
Chamberlain’s
disdain
harshness
in
of
of
the
and
content
peace,
denounced
Versailles.
Questions
2
instincts
had
peoples;
be
b
benevolent
of
between
War. Hamish Hamilton. London, UK
events”?
abused?
who
justice
Source: Taylor, AJP
. 1961. The Origins of the Second World
says
by
those
short-sightedness
equal
of
death,
1
cheated
preached
1940.
world
disappointed
had
triumph
and
Winston
who
A
and
contrast
and
Source
policy
of
Using
your
sources
B
on
perspectives
of
Chamberlain’s
appeasement.
own
evaluate
effective
the
foreign
kno w l e dg e
a nd
ap p e a se me nt
th e s e
as
an
p o l i cy.
Chamberlain.
157
6.2 C ombatants
Conceptual understanding
Key questions
➔
At what point could the western powers challenge the Axis Powers in terms
of military strength?
➔
What was the relationship of industrial power to military strength in 1939?
Key concepts
➔
Continuity
➔
Change
➔
Signicance
Axis Powers
The
the
Treaty
of
German
High
Command
undertook
War
and
a
structure
1930s.
1918
were
the
It
the
The
was
thi s
key
German
to
a na l ys is
thi s
lessons
for
the
b ot h
and
the
it
Eve n
for
T he
the
of
e xpa n d
st a ff
be for e
of
t ook
Hit l er
that
in
Wo rl d
wou l d
the
fro m
mi d-
the
b at t l e s
l e ad er s hi p
came
it s
of
c or ps
F ir st
c o m ba t
be yon d
si ze
Ve rs a il le s
do c t ri n e
to
a c t ive
e x pa nsi on
the
Ger m a n
of c e r
con t ex t
beg a n
and
on
t he
sm a ll
le s so ns
the
g e ne r al
initia t ive
pl a n
in
that
s u bs e qu e nt
when
wa rfa r e.
a
re s t ri c t i on s
howe ve r,
19 20 s.
Ge r man
e x i bi li ty,
ha d
the
of
a na lys i s
tha t
s ev e r e
me a n ,
Ge rman y
mi li ta r y
mo b i l e
army
pl ace d
not
dur ing
me a nt
wa s
that
ha d
di d
i d le
Germa n
were
the
T hi s
thoro ug h
what
restrictions.
of
Vers a i l l e s
army.
to
po we r,
Ver s ai ll e s
restrictions.
In
its
1935
100
103
conscripti o n
000
divisions
armoured
force,
eets.
army
while
so me
the
by
and
ghting
ght
over
productive
the
lo ng
By
mil l ion
clo se
to
k ee p
war,
and
cons umi ng
ov er
its
of
ove r
to
in
its
1 939
e con o m y
a nd
of
m a ny
GNP
.
it
di vi s ion s
The
and
men
in
i n c lu d ed
a ir
19 39.
s u bm a r in e
a
a nd
wi t h in
of
fro m
wa s
G e rm a n
in c a pa ble
c on q ue s t
its
army
193 9
m ai n t a in
wit h
wa s
in
a i rc r a ft
s u rfa c e
g o ve r nm e nt
15%
si x
t a n ks .
4, 00 0
b u il d
th e
Ge r m a n
wa r
Th e se
su pp li ed
witho ut
of
the
2,4 00
bot h
it
of
e ve
m e n.
to
thing
Ge r man
ha lf
the
bo as te d
one
te rm
Over
s tr e ngt h
e xp ande d
is
mo d e r n
land.
rearmament
it
ano the r
a
the
thr e e
b o a s ti ng
also
believe d
the
d ivi s ions.
Ve r s a il le s ,
navy
quite
r a i s ed
21
Neverthele s s ,
command
158
–
to
divisions
banned
Likewise
a
men
pe a c et i m e
m a t e ri a l
th e
of
Ge r m a n
s us t a in i n g
si g n i c a n t
e xpe n di t u re
we n t
to
C H A P T E R
Throughout
their
the
the
Italian
war
allies.
compensation
accompanied
dangerous
terror
of
vessels
as
of
and
she
entered
the
same
the
real
the
the
she
war.
weaknesses
to
to
with
The
European
the
Italian
new
exacerbated
up
to
Il
notion
Italian
navy
though,
powers,
economic
her
military/industrial
that
the
German
by
Duce
poor
to
in
militarism,
regaining
both
complex
military
in
Italy
was
all
had
did,
for
the
surface
obsolete
modernize
compensate
leadership
that
chaotically
because
to
by
crisis
his
of
C O M B A T A N T S
without
material
resources
territories
with
planning,
vague
the
War
economic
power,
economic
a
handicapped
World
The
to
Counter-intuitively,
weaknesses
indeed
First
her.
him
expanded
other
conquer
were
and
He
lacked
economic
ability
and
famously
the
Mussolini
ultra-nationalism,
Rome.
all
in
owed
brought
submarines.
before
were
suffered
deemed
peace
ancient
well
military
she
Germans
had
incompetence,
and
rearmed
rst
blend
and
glories
the
the
Italy
6 . 2
before
some
of
without
them.
branches
These
of
the
himself.
Axis ground forces (Europe, Asia, Africa and the Pacic)
Class discussion
Country
Maximum strength
Germany
Army: 6 500 000
Hitler stood by Mussolini to the end,
even having him rescued from a
Waen SS : 800 000
Italy
3 700 000
Japan
5 500 000
Romania
600 000
mountain prison. How can we account
for this loyalty in light of Italy’s military
shor tcomings?
Allied Powers
As
with
the
Axis
Powers,
the
legacy
of
the
First
World
War
deeply
Relative war potential of the powers
affected
military
expenditure
in
the
inter-war
period.
In
the
1930s,
in 1937
France
spent
nearly
accumulated
available
and
to
social
50%
between
rearm
in
malaise
of
1914
the
that
its
budget
and
face
1918.
of
settled
on
This
German
on
debt
and
meant
pensions
there
rearmament.
France
in
the
1930s
was
The
fed
less
economic
the
United States
41.7%
Germany
14.4%
money
deeply
USSR
conservative
army.
Tanks
theory
was
still
based
on
1918
Great Britain
Aircraft
navy
key
of
was
rival.
the
was
production
a
offensive
of
France
theoretically
war
she
had
distribute
In
much
defensive
Line.
the
as
and
this
was
public
among
period,
stability,
If
1920s
army.
if
she
dominion
and
The
there
to
was
1930s
reliance
90
she
call
been
up
her
It
in
of
the
the
of
case
the
British
and
the
support
it
1930s.
war.
At
she
and
1930s
the
had
in
inward,
bolster
of
in
precluded
1914,
France
4.2%
Japan
3.5%
Italy
2.5%
it
Maginot
million
of
Source: Kennedy, Paul. 1988. Rise and Fall
of the Great Powers: Economic Change and
were
outbreak
the
instead
to
Military Conict From 1500 to 2000. Fontana
Press. London, UK .
1918.
as,
of
indeed,
living,
turned
her
the
her
not
their
empire
in
the
colonies.
In
the
maintaining
rearmament.
idea
complete
preferring
governments
policy
in
expensive
standard
to
élan
the
10.2%
her
France’s
with
most
Five
divisions,
as
against
of
The
infantry.
was
a
use
Although
besotted
notions
nationalism
to
for
little
been
turned
poverty
abroad,
of
powers.
massively
of
into
policy
returned
crisis
public
on
had
divisions
was
look
was
vague
in
tanks
British
had
it
divisions
independence
economic
had
minded
which
to
force,
European
command
infantry
demanded.
attention.
of
the
for
other
dangerously
organized
European
face
by
muster
available
tanks
modern
statically
could
not
below
French
fueled
inter-war
voting
far
reasonably
As
expression
fell
14%
experiences.
anything
a
small
else,
Nevertheless
even
when
159
6
C A U S E S
A N D
E F F E C TS
O F
20 T H - C E N T U R Y
L TA
the
war
broke
W A R S
out
the
British
army
mustered
four
divisions
to
send
Research skills
to
France.
To what extent was Britain ready for
divisions.
war in:
the
By
British
Force
●
By
May
the
time
army
(RAF)
1940
conscription
the
smoke
numbered
had
900
of
some
bombers
had
the
1.6
and
raised
Battle
million
600
this
of
France
men.
ghters
number
The
with
had
to
settled,
Royal
which
50
Air
to
defend
September 1938
the
●
island.
The
Royal
Navy
was
the
largest
in
the
world,
although
still
March 1939
stretched
●
September 1939
and
thin
having
Singapore,
the
to
defend
outposts
Mediterranean
and
as
far
the
away
home
as
Hong
Kong
islands.
Rate each date between 1–10, with
10 being very prepared and 1 being
Allied ground forces (Europe, Asia, Africa and the Pacic)
completely unprepared. Do the same for
Country
Maximum strength
Great Britain
3 100 000
USA
8 200 000
USSR
6 900 000
France
5 900 000 (with reserves)
Canada
730 000
India
2 500 00
Australia
727 000
New Zealand
157 000
South Africa
255 000
France and the USSR.
1
How did the preparedness of each
country compare? What might be
some reasons for the dierences?
2
How did each country’s level of
readiness aect its foreign policy at
these three points in time?
Wartime production
John
Keegan
military
quick
victory.
of
the
Axis
of
the
United
by
the
forces.
were
fact
for
the
added
the
the
most
Germany
Germany
some
time
in
of
large
of
repower
centres
had
were
being
living
When
early
and
not
he
system.
bombing.
Initially
sufcient,
territory
not
became
an
its
the
after
to
began
to
but
as
when
war
the
and
rise,
were
time
the
production
in
used
went
size
bombing.
of
on
the
standard
face
of
of
the
Allied
meet
was
plummeted.
of
Production
control
Germany’s
goods
workforce.
War
help
this
out
German
Consumer
and
to
for
concentration
the
centralized
even
raw
1943
production
the
Axis
had
of
From
industrial
Armaments
of
onslaught
transported
supply
and
1942,
maintain
reach
production
targeting
augment
of
war
moved
Until
of
and
night
likes
exacerbated
luxury.
production.
to
territories
1944
and
none
the
German
its
its
for
fact
evacuation
to
day
Japan
war
attempt
production
war,
Thereafter
to
closer
maintain
out
the
In
with
was
down
This
such
making
Minister
occupied
of
to
of
any
ineffectual.
used
Production
especially
shrank.
in
to
it,
committed
were
demands
subject
offensives.
and
rationalized
economic
economic
was
mirrored
designed
attrition
well
torn
region.
enjoy
was
weakness
path
were
it
economy.
of
were
the
production
not
decentralized
fully
Speer
1942,
did
war
This
in
they
strategy
army
Japanese
long
facilities
lay
managed
difcult
a
mountain
these
produced
women
Albert
in
and
of
that
Soviet
Japan
Japan
the
Union.
when
Ural
complex
face
more
economy
still
and
the
the
economic
German
for
production
moving
industrial
said
Soviet
spared
and
the
withstand
factories
into
of
like
be
the
Allied
Germany’s
say,
can
and
part
way
that
to
could
Soviet
benet
Germany’s
is
same
States
harm’s
materials.
160
The
that
the
of
argued
that
economies
Even
out
Both
has
strategy,
far
the
from
occupied
C H A P T E R
Unlike
have
their
to
British
of
from
material.
three
went
production
North
roundsof
the
to
the
The
included
ammunition.
36
By
specically
production
gures,
America.
This
Allies,
consumer
production
impressive
aid
enemies,
sacrice
war
both
US
effort
a
yards
understood
production.
during
Britain
liberty
Britain,
war
economy
billion
1943
for
and
the
the
war.
of
cotton
ship
was
Despite
USSR
produced
a
it
About
cloth
being
and
41
C O M B A T A N T S
would
half
of
their
depended
staggering
6 . 2
on
amount
billion
completed
every
days.
Armaments production of the powers, 1940–1943 (billions of 194 4 dollars)
1940
Great Britain
3.5
1941
1943
6.5
11.1
USSR
(5)
8.5
13.9
United States
(1.5)
4.5
37.5
19.5
62.5
Total of Allied combatants
3.5
Germany
6
6
13.8
(1)
2
4.5
Japan
Italy
0.75
1
Total of Axis combatants
6.75
9
–
18.3
L TA
Research and communication skills
Research the production quantities for one of the following items for each of the
six major combatants in the years 1939–1945 (Germany, USSR, US, Britain,
Japan and Italy):
●
Aircraft
●
Tanks
●
Naval vessels
●
Merchant vessels
●
Trucks
Plot a graph depicting production quantities by year using a dierent colour for
each country. Compare your graph with others of dierent items.
▲
1
What patterns emerge from the graphs?
2
How do these patterns help explain the course of the war?
A tank is produced at a General Motors
assembly line in the US
161
6.3 Strateg y
Conceptual understanding
Key questions
➔
What was the signicance of the ABC 1 plan for the conduct of the war?
➔
To what extent were the German strategy and tactics feasible given its
material situation?
➔
To what extent did strategy contribute to the outcome of the war?
➔
What role did ideology play in strategic decisions for both Axis and
Allied Powers?
Key concepts
➔
Cause
➔
Consequence
➔
Signicance
Axis Powers
As
in
vaguely
the
east
Poland.
sketched
into
He
then
settlement
in
forces
other
to
to
do
two-front
Hitler’s
fascism
the
in
the
what
had
of
the
of
seen
as
a
162
of
his
air
for
the
on
had
to
been
could
what
sought
could
readjusting
alluded
it
Hitler
population
Europe
capture
British
and
be
the
taken
no
France
while
hated
not
at
Plan
was
avoiding
in
his
not
leaving
her
space
was
Versailles
would
quickly,
–
This
detailed
Allies
enemy
Schlieffen
Lebensraum
expand.
the
although
that
with
the
chiefs
his
of
with
Britain.
of
German
back.
In
designed,
the
effects
the
Hitler
but
of
a
of
in
not
of
been
fate
Führer
USSR
and
the
in
the
Baltic
RAF
defeated
but
in
of
can
be
and
in
rather
had
his
Union,
in
east
productive
east
he
Soviet
and
turn
States
choose,
the
accept
Regardless
While
the
not
the
secure
the
events.
did
formed
When,
German
with
army
destroy
had
the
Russia?
between
belief
France.
British
and
did
this
of
Napoleon’s
invasion
they
fall
conict
actions
to
struggle
and
defeat,
German
course
the
struggle
Once
the
the
southern
the
style,
the
and
their
risk
Soviet
for
desperate
before
of
he
history
Bolshevism
oil
leadership
plans
in
postpone
the
dictate
cataclysmic
Churchill
should
and
a
even
reality
aggressive
help
a
Or
he
be
point
strengthening
drafting
wage
the
accounts
Russia
to
invasion
be
Should
to
to
some
defeat,
to
supply,
True
was
at
thinking,
Isles?
response
force
there
France’s
believed
circumstances
military
–
strategic
ideological
Romania.
let
1914
western
ideology
that
accomplish
re-evaluate.
settle
elds
and
communism
his
wake
invade
to
in
sights
again
western
worldview
Hitler
to
to
his
–
Kampf,
war.
and
core
with
Mein
German
calculation
Poland
deal
words
failed,
In
in
west
His
in
the
turned
the
autobiography.
intervene
out
which
he
had
preparation
the
skies
C H A P T E R
over
Britain,
Soviet
From
the
Germans
1942
on,
German
particularly
Rommel’s
exploits
of
was
the
Middle
with
a
Germans
in
view
to
North
1943–1945
offensive
1944.
some
ways
a
forces
peninsula
to
German
States
German
–
mobile
massed
points,
isolating
follow
to
required
open
territory
The
the
east
the
Soviet
have
the
and
to
had
forever
the
This
which
the
invasion
open
would
in
war,
–
and
any
of
the
forces
only
in
to
German
as
it
6
by
forces.
Blitzkrieg,
precision
very
strong
would
Blitzkrieg
point.
panzers
Both
Red
spaces
dash.
In
Army.
existed.
It
went
of
open
could
channel.
the
had
June
relatively
the
into
Italian
and
enemy
had
these
as
the
on
infantry
conditions
but
her
German
with
end
Both
in
was
overreach.
integrated
against
army
with
Canadian
bypass
it
the
Bulge
added
resistance.
headlong
For
adopt
say
the
the
Russia,
Russia,
support
known
abundance,
the
of
attainable
these
to
dominated
air
forces
the
Normandy
Traditional
tanks
of
in
doctrine
Poland.
ran
one
might
burden
were
and
and
of
had
British,
were
in
actions
collapse
at
Thus,
for
Mountains.
front
the
for
quest
south
Battle
we
remaining
German
spaces
swallow
or
other
thrusts
Anglo-French
Polish
the
operational
a
rearguard
Italian
When
the
as
swung
massive
The
search
conquests.
Germany
success
denitive
however,
of
defensive
France
the
of
that
reduction.
up”
a
in
case
a
the
Caucasus
beachheads
the
later
and
retreating
their
to
army
series
Balkans.
Offensive
existed
pressed
wide,
and
early
by
previous
understood
the
a
defend
artillery”
for
be
posture
early
“mop
spaces
Union,
in
her
War”.
them
through
panzers
of
the
secured
armour.
conditions
oil
as
to
her
German
responsibilities.
“ying
secure
can
as
the
especially
“Lightning
dive-bombing
these
energy
dominated
seen
immeasurably
tactics,
so-called
and
armies
added
of
forced
Greece
it
be
defensive
function
were
was
the
the
thrusts,
The
in
1944
their
securing
Africa
When
can
conquests
United
and
securing
December
German
strategy
oil,
East.
occasional
in
all
S T R A T E G Y
Union.
resources,
oil
devoted
6 . 3
In
may
on
Napoleon’s.
The Allied Powers
Between
planners
January
secretly
approach
neutral.
nd
the
war.
followed
●
Italy
●
Allied
the
was
in
to
be
Powers
defeat
strategic
a
from
of
March
in
1941,
British,
Washington
Secrecy
planners
themselves
plan
●
to
US
and
met
had
war
was
already
with
these
would
paramount
both
as
US
discuss
developed
strategic
eliminated
to
quickly
concentrate
on
as
a
Canadian
common
given
a
Germany
schemes.
and
that
the
contingency
and
Japan,
According
US
was
should
and
to
military
strategic
the
the
still
they
ABC
1
plan:
possible
the
defeat
of
Germany
before
Japan
bombing
would
become
a
key
component
of
the
overall
strategy
●
For
British
the
and
most
throughout
seemed
all
working
part
the
the
on
US
an
holdings
the
war.
more
in
the
Pacic
broad-brush
The
Allies
justied
atomic
did
with
weapon.
would
strokes
of
prioritize
the
The
ABC
defended.
1
victory
suspicion
North
be
were
in
that
African
realized
Europe,
the
which
Germans
landings
and
were
the
163
6
C A U S E S
A N D
E F F E C TS
O F
20 T H - C E N T U R Y
subsequent
war
may
but
Sicily
although
have
they
differed
really
The Lend-Lease Act set up a scheme
through which the US sent aid to the Allies
during the Second World War. Immediate
payment was not required as the US was
“lending” the materials to the Allies. The
programme also provided US warships
(destroyers) to Britain in exchange for
the lease of a number of military bases
in the Caribbean. The US had Lend-Lease
agreements with a number of Allied
countries.
to
it
was
as
factories
relative
all
the
was
safety
Allied
in
December
of
the
the
afford
tanks
for
to
to
the
1941.
so.
of
the
multiple
production
The
on
States
to
ships
sink
the
in
the
the
the
had
to
Red
of
in
this
a
of
a
far
in
vital
concentrate
the
role
the
during
lost
could
54
000
given
that
production
all
their
front.
Tank
Country
Number Produced
Sherman
USA
49 300
T-34
USSR
57 000
Panzer IV
Germany
8500
Crusader
Great Britain
5400
Tiger I and Tiger II
Germany
1850
Churchill
Great Britain
7300
Pershing
USA
2200
in
war
excess
have
than
tank
in
ratio
they
wider
be
this
industrial
them
may
but
of
would
part
Tank production
164
Midway.
entered
rate
more
war
of
strategy
exchange
even
for
December
was
Army
the
efcacy
Battle
played
a
of
Allies
Pacic,
1,500
Kursk,
made
could
the
States
at
The
distribute
Soviets
over
out
The
implemented,
reassemble
produce
was
war
Allied
produced
The
in
policy
United
Battle
war.
mobilized
strategy
them.
would
gap
and
the
RAF
.
the
Union
Germany
while
were
to
This
fully
dismantle
once
be
defensive
in
of
This
to
forces
of
questionable
Lend-Lease
especially
000.
was
offensive
been
onslaught
Italian
theatre
and
the
had
Mountains.
Soviet
a
essentially
decision
ability
as
bombing
component
The
Germans
20
knocked
Italy
losses
United
favoured
war
one
key
Liberty
fronts,
on
the
Ural
the
go
the
German
U-boats’
Britain
did
economy
Soviet
victories,
than
do
a
heavy
won
enemy.
the
Germany’s
much
over
of
tanks
of
of
that
the
strategic
US
had
entry
of
German
Battle
more
The
campaigns
eliminate
how
their
their
ahead
not
through
they
clear
outproduce
strategy
on
after
the
Italian
did
war.
and
before
1941,
Lend-Lease policy
the
only
production
Even
and
they
persevered
throughout
but
W A R S
6.4 Operations
Conceptual understanding
Key questions
➔
What factors led to the early success of the Axis forces?
➔
To what extent did each side integrate land, air and sea power?
➔
To what extent did the Allies outproduce the Axis Powers?
➔
Why did the Allies win the war?
Key concepts
➔
Cause
➔
Consequence
➔
Signicance
Poland
Poland
would
seemed
the
allowed
relative
ideal
for
lack
to
be
of
Blitzkrieg.
the
Polish
regroup
made
of
Just
by
off
While
the
the
5
air
am
of
ground
infrastructure
roads,
rail
aspect
of
and
authorities
The
on
1.5
1
and
air
would
million
to
isolating
those
as
a nd
bombers
Germany’s
an
air
essential
after
power
element
would
which
it
allow
might
would
the
instead
anvil
of
the
Pact
be
driven
Soviet
Red
pla n e s
air
f or
a
L uft wa ffe
fa c il it i e s,
wh i c h
ra i ds
a ls o
m od er n
ce n t r es .
these
civi l ia n
r ai ds
p an i c
ha m p e r
the
la u nc he d
e r a dic at i n g
ma na g e d
ta rg e t ed
a r my
Te rr or
a l so
to
a
d el ibe r at e
t a rg e t e d
clog
op er a tion
get
t h o se
fu nc t ion :
wa s
w ou l d
it
to
of
Pol is h
the
ro a ds
bot h
c ivi li an
mil ita ry.
soldiers
divided
Warsaw,
that
into
driving
capital
dive
plains
The
Molotov-Ribbentrop
army
the
for ce
T he
s uch
thus
open
theoretically
against
193 9,
a ir
es s enti al
a nd
the
Poland
spoils.
P ol is h
r e s ulting
east,
same
Po li sh
P o l is h
were
the
hard
the
T hos e
German
to
up
of
Polish
co m muni ca tion
T he
toward
get
of
d e str oye d.
raids
quickly
drive
instead
come
Poland
Large,
Stuka
allowing
withdrawal,
codicils
surface,
formations.
operations,
of
The
tank
screaming
of
S e pte mb er
d a y.
the
September
then
1
refug e e s
and
the
the
tactics.
large
targets,
path
secret
eleme nts
towns.
eeing
to
of
ground
illusion.
portion
and
give
its
On
innovative
their
easy
the
we r e
lines
the
to
a g a i ns t
the
the
Blitzkrieg.
topography
an
on
raids
for
of
movement
with
the
only
its
trial
would
fairly
east,
east
end
the
with
a
prospect
before
cities
cover
claiming
massive
terrain
sightlines
army
mercilessly
Army,
rst
integrated
in
that
the
unrestricted
unobstructed
fully
be
crossed
two
behind
Polish
avoiding
while
formations.
at
army
large
the
This
is,
the
lines.
Polish
same
in
frontier
groups.
time
fact
One
The
into
Poland
went
main
formations,
encircling
what
north
attack
preferring
and
transpired.
Some
of
165
6
C A U S E S
A N D
E F F E C TS
O F
20 T H - C E N T U R Y
the
Polish
they
forces
would
set
W A R S
managed
up
a
to
disengage
defensive
and
perimeter
withdraw
around
their
to
Warsaw
where
capital.
German soldiers break down a barrier on the German–Polish border, 1 September 1939
▲
Following
the
main
force
were
units
of
the
Schutzstaffel
(SS),
the
Schutzstael (SS)
Death’s
Head
Regiments.
Hitler’s
orders
to
these
units
were
to
rid
Poland
Originally Hitler ’s personal bodyguard,
of
the
“enemies
of
Nazism”–
a
long
list.
These
regiments
rounded
up
the SS grew into a massive organization
Jews,
communists,
socialists
and
any
local
leaders
deemed
to
be
a
threat.
within the Nazi Par ty. Broadly tasked with
Whole
villages
and
towns
were
burned
to
the
ground.
Civilians
were
a
par ty and state security, the SS managed
deliberate
target
in
this
war
from
the
very
beginning.
domestic and foreign intelligence
gathering, the Gestapo, policing and racial
The
policies including the concentration camp
the
system. The Waen SS was the military
soldiers
branch of the SS, which fought throughout
Polish
siege
city
of
for
Warsaw
ten
the
began
days.
suffering
authorities
to
on
17
Although
that
the
September.
the
city
terror
surrender
the
was
bombing
city
on
The
Luftwaffe
defended
the
created
by
pounded
140
000
persuaded
Polish
the
27 September.
Europe alongside and in coordination with
True
to
on
September.
their
pledge,
the
British
and
French
declared
war
on
Germany
the German army, the Wehrmacht.
3
South
Africa
By
had
practical
aid
attacked
German
to
10
September,
followed
the
suit.
beleaguered
Canada,
But
this
Poles.
Australia,
meant
On
4
very
New
little
September
in
Zealand
terms
British
and
of
bombers
Class discussion
Frederick the Great of Prussia once said
“he who defends everything, defends
limited
frontier
damage.
with
ships
at
French
their
army
births
units
in
Wilhelmshaven
made
tentative
resulting
advances
in
across
the
Germany.
nothing”. To what extent does this apply
L TA
to the Polish army in September of 1939?
●
Thinking skills
What lessons might the French and British allies have taken from the brief Polish
campaigns that may have better prepared them to face the German army?
●
What challenges would a campaign in western Europe pose for the German
army that it had not encountered in Poland?
166
C H A P T E R
6 . 4
O P E R A T I O N S
Casualties: Polish campaign
Dead/missing
Wounded
Captured
Poland
70 000
133 000
700 000 in German hands
Germany
13 900
30 000
Civilians
25 000
217 000 in Russian hands
Battle for western Europe
Hitler
had
conquer
were
far
for
bolstered
that
the
spring
of
the
by
a
an
to
Germans
mo r e
the y
The
and
in
T he y
be
a r m y.
a
It
w est
kno wn
sol di e rs
the
qu ic k ly
a r g ue d
as
the ir
for
became
the
t hat
in
to
th e
Wa r
15 –2 0
M ag i no t
the
to
Hi s
to
bet t er
en e m y,
on e
h o we ver,
wa it
Br it a i n
r ai s e
to
t im e
e vid en t ,
h a ve
bec am e
for c e s
we st
Fr a nc e .
m or e
Phon e y
w a it i n g
to
t ur n e d
we a k
for m ida ble
wo u ld
r ei nf or c e
d eci e nci e s
and
m o re
Br i t is h
a nd
tr ansfe r
be
he s it a n t
to
the
fo r
r e s e r ve s
the
a
u n t il
or
to
“t h e
the
s om e
Sitskrieg ”,
d ivi si on s ,
L in e
a pp ar e nt
w es t e rn
and
in
the
the
the
fr on t .
Line
Siegfried
Line
Ardennes
Dyle
B ri ti s h
i nter i m,
a nd
coul d
be
ca utio us .
C a na di a n
corre ct
Maginot
to
b e li ev ed
oppor tuni ty
campaign
a rmy
a d v a nce
mobilize
to
hi s
believed
gro wi ng
1940.
British
provided
Polish
what
German
of
French
tha t
he
generals
prepare
hoped
what
Holland
Forest
Line
Front
on
Dunkirk
May
24
Defence
Perimeter
Amsterdam
Army
The
Group
B
Hague
Rotterdam
England
M
a
a
s
R
iv
e
r
Germany
London
Ostend
Dunkirk
Ghent
Nieuport
A
lb
e
Calais
Belgium
r
t
C
a
n
a
l
Cologne
Maastricht
BoulogneFort
Emael
h
e
Namur
Army
R
Arras
n
i
Eben
R
Liège
Lille
sur-Mer
Group
A
i
Noyelles
e
v
Dinant
r
Abbeville
Dieppe
St.
Valéry-en-Caux
Amiens
Meusa
Army
River
Group
C
Saarbrucken
S
e
i
Luxembourg
n
e
R
i
v
e
r
France
Paris
▲
Hitler ’s plan for the invasion of western Europe. Compare and contrast this plan with the Schlieen Plan
of 1914.
167
6
C A U S E S
A N D
E F F E C TS
O F
20 T H - C E N T U R Y
The
war
in
the
but
neutral,
Norway
of
troops
Stiff
landed
and
advance.
event,
That
send
a
smaller
north.
through
forces,
from
the
and
Maginot
as
Line
main
to
of
–
of
as
it
from
its
plodded
the
the
if
fortress
and
through
the
slim
far
plan
to
and
would
be
generals
that
–
in
a
forces
push
Allied
Maginot
proved
attacked
Line.
to
be
exposed
In
large
was
manning
the
Ardennes?
by
forces
Manstein,
garrison
and
would
British
the
von
in
off.
then
the
Ardennes
the
high
and
impenetrable
of
attack
Eric
if
be
British
German
French
German
bulk
the
What
paratroopers.
and
Netherlands
armour
would
What
not
resources
mountain
the
were
French
General
hoped?
and
bolder
thought
force
danger.
among
the
and
separating
third
slowed
could
important
the
French
success
pulling
German
ambitious
French
emerged
force
of
Ardennes
A
for
Belgium
the
tanks,
the
debate
an
German
by
western
ofcially
German
British
of
France
with
by
Navy,
the
into
secure
1940
reinforced
opted
hope
help
supported
prospects
some
in
the
with
the
March
drive
Although
navy
also
Royal
into
Hitler
France.
by
In
the
German
German
however,
thrust
of
a
Norway.
would
north
the
attack
1914
fraught
the
from
April,
end,
with
of
the
that
majority
devised
impenetrable
of
on
Norwegians,
object
forests
bulk
plan,
the
of
especially
daring
of
an
the
vast
the
in
support
end
with
Sweden.
the
force
repeat
The
from
expected
In
open
attack
provide
Narvik
was
Führer.
an
occupation
decided
the
thrust
seeming
Its
from
the
their
The
at
had
not
would
strong
By
command
did
with
obtained
resistance
troops
any
rather
operation.
Germany
Class discussion
west
Europe,
base
W A R S
any
as
the
ank
event,
How did operation Sickle Stroke dier
Hitler
always
gravitated
to
the
bold
over
the
cautious
and
therefore,
this
from the Schlieen Plan?
was
his
The
French
mobile
1914,
To
of
kind
call
the
of
about
31
panzers
10
its
not
The
Countries
nine
push
they
prepared
from
began
dug
to
in
French
and
168
panic.
units
to
the
their
that
these
the
As
the
of
race
In
to
the
and
were
the
the
Poland,
the
the
as
equivalent
Ardennes.
on
the
of
The
the
horses
soldier
in
Germans.
exception
infantry
Sickle
it
on
had
19
rush
to
could
pull
move
Wehrmacht’s
Stroke.
and
done
May.
troops
Paratroopers
Belgium.
to
This
to
The
Warsaw
swing
the
some
into
north.
the
They
did
1914.
German
and
the
the
this
British
cross
took
the
Channel,
main
view
attack
became
for
did
advance
a
only
with
gained
River.
As
the
come
evident,
Force
prolonged
so
three
Meuse
would
Expeditionary
prepared
German
force
to
English
that
of
one
counter-attacks
the
of
their
again,
road.
what
to
deploy
relying
Netherlands
main
folly
of
positions
as
of
believed
units
off
the
Allies
the
the
with
foot,
an
off
they
Stroke”.
Once
hands
through
Operation
Ardennes
managed
fell
day.
and
north.
the
say
on
surrendered
the
still
north.
a
day
in
mistakes
begin
Some
a
and
Rotterdam
divisions
to
smash
“Sickle
Line
the
into
march
in
forts
Dutch
forces
the
around
even
to
forced
launched
do
not
in
counterpart
road
and
through
Anglo-French
a
prompted
panzer
to
is
road-bound
on
Maginot
right
would
kilometres
The
repeat
days
down
to
the
mobile
a
codenamed
reserves
played
that
On
canals
began
to
35
was
on
their
German
Germany
earlier.
want
its
was
artillery.
bridges,
months
Low
like
kilometres
Luftwaffe
rely
troops
divisions
covered
May
seized
to
plan
strategy
divisions,
much
On
was
French
army,
panzer
The
including
French
panzer
French
plan.
plan
troops,
the
the
of
the
ght.
little
Allies
(BEF)
Those
coordination
momentum.
C H A P T E R
This
momentum
commanders.
support
and
lowland
of
against
ordered
his
by
Dunkirk
Hermann
the
report
German
such
Close
400
000
to
pocket.
Dynamo
665
key
to
the
German
By
Of
4
–
100
tanks
French
of
000.
The
assured
of
in
Hitler
the
soldiers
head
that
of
of
his
infantry
in
the
British
disarray,
decision.
prospects
The
his
their
mired
With
forces
British
negligible.
some
getting
France.
controversial
French
plan
of
to
of
beaches
of
222
trawlers
is
Belgian
them
home
Royal
Belgian
Dynamo
time.
and
get
some
British,
shing
British
June,
over
110
337
000
through
proclaimed
British
the
a
and
outstripping
The
Hitler
best
trapped
a
sea
the
wet
army
German
within
evacuation,
Luftwaffe,
aircrew
could
and
to
Dunkirk
Navy
Dutch
the
First
RAF
and
its
of
all
to
approaches
as
of
the
as
and
sizes,
yachts.
the
keep
in
Operation
well
sailing
halt
able
trapped
named
shapes
private
the
was
were
code
vessels
–
luxurious
twofold.
Second,
troops
was
The
panzers
the
relatively
skies
clear
over
of
aircraft.
these
France
at
himself,
consisted
boats
exposed
his
and
number
were
British,
success
the
the
–
Hitler
were
O P E R A T I O N S
rescue.
The
commercial
bought
the
and
civilian
from
put
Goering
and
stop
perimeter
any
Dunkirk
to
about
Belgium
coast
estimates,
prevent
divisions
worried
coastal
panzers
intelligence
concerned
panzer
Hitler
areas
trapped
the
actually
The
6 . 4
by
army,
secure
the
it
000
were
Allied
French
ports.
British
had
come
soldiers
soldiers
Although
media
at
had
who
a
and
the
been
taken
quickly
“Miracle
preserved
the
off
the
returned
of
beaches.
to
Dunkirk”
ghting
was
ability
of
the
cost.
The Battle of Dunkirk : British losses
Dead/missing
11 000
Captured
40 000
Tanks
475
Vehicles
38 000
Motorcycles
12 000
Anti-tank guns
4 000
Heavy ar tillery
1 000
Bren guns
8 000
Ries
Now
90 000
on
fortify
a
Maginot
and
a
was
too
the
late.
extended
60%
surrender.
of
north,
ank
was
military
France,
would
effort
in
a
the
zone
of
to
close
Alps
and
to
and
military
west
could
German
broken
Marshal
terms
French
east
that
the
was
the
including
be
of
nearly
under
The
of
running
hedgehogs
resistance
government,
of
remnants
so-called
Morale
concerted
terms
the
encampments
–
continued
French
●
own,
of
Line
attack
little,
for
their
line
form
“sickle
the
pockets
Pétain
the
from
of
stroke”.
It
was
17
June,
the
too
required
Although
Maginot
to
to
resistance
infrastructure
non-existent.
along
attempted
perpendicular
Line,
signed
there
the
the
included:
Paris,
the
German
Atlantic
coast
and
the
industrial
occupation
169
6
C A U S E S
A N D
E F F E C TS
O F
20 T H - C E N T U R Y
●
40%
of
puppet
●
the
●
French
W A R S
France
and
her
government
French
army
would
prisoners
captivity
with
colonies
with
of
no
its
be
war,
the
French
would
●
the
French
navy
have
over
was
to
to
1.5
of
pay
be
at
reduced
guarantee
●
would
capital
be
to
100
million
their
controlled
000
men,
Pétain’s
men
would
be
kept
in
release
“occupation
turned
by
Vichy
over
to
costs”
Germany.
Technology and war: Enigma and codebreaking
Enigma was an encoding machine used by the German
military throughout the war. Enigma had a keyboard
attached to three rotors. Each keystroke turned the rotors
encrypting the message. An associated code key was
required to decipher the message at the receiving end.
By 1939 with the help of Polish mathematicians, the
Allies were beginning to decipher German military code
keys. The British mathematician Alan Turing developed
a mechanized deciphering machine, which accelerated
the process considerably. When the Germans created
a four-rotor Enigma machine, the British modied their
machine to decipher these codes as well. There were,
however, hundreds of Axis code systems that were used
and changed with varying degrees of regularity, making
the task of the codebreakers vastly more complicated.
The program which deciphered and analysed the
intelligence derived from Turing’s machines was
▲
known as Ultra and at its height was deciphering over
The Enigma machine. What were the challenges presented
by this technology for both sides?
2,000 messages a day. In a way the success of the
each had their own cryptographic systems and shared
program posed its own problems. Ensuring that the
intelligence regularly. It was Ultra intelligence on
2,000 decoded messages were analysed for their
Japanese intentions in nor thern China, released to
military impor tance and sent to the units to which the
the Soviets on Churchill’s orders, which persuaded
information was the most use in a timely fashion was
Stalin to allow his Siberian divisions to be transferred
an enormously complex under taking. Allied leaders had
to the west . These divisions played a major role in the
to be careful which intelligence they acted on and how
counteroensive of December 1941 that threw the
they did so for fear of tipping o the enemy who could
Germans back from the outskir ts of Moscow.
then change the encryption system. The Allied militaries
Barbarossa to Stalingrad
While
the
ghting
east
–
autumn
in
the
Germany’s
in
modern
of
territorial
It
was
World
a
be
War.
This
this
conquest.
edice
a
Three
force
was
of
was
the
seemingly
attention
the
to
Hitler
and
massive
3,200-kilometre
allies.
170
to
1940
Hitler’s
invasion
history,
communist
of
skies,
Soviet
be
had
an
million
front
which
Union.
men
even
were
supported
included
To
to
by
of
by
to
tanks
extent
the
on
who
a
three
be
lived
of
army
men
the
unknown
war
destruction
million
would
vicious
simply
standards
in
1
the
focused
not
people
the
attack
close
3,350
the
an
war,
envisioned
enslavement
with
increasingly
ideological
long
undertaking
consumed
was
the
of
the
under
it.
Second
groups
from
supported
along
her
by
C H A P T E R
7,000
such
artillery
a
forced
pieces
formidable
to
Europe
use
artillery
from
Opposing
reeling
ofcers
tanks
including
in
tanks
in
the
total)
aircraft.
was
the
Red
a
and
25
its
outt
were
from
from
Red
all
over
France.
Army
purge
still
of
its
humiliating
Finns
Army
50tank
O P E R A T I O N S
Czechoslovakia,
trucks
and
To
Germans
comprehensive
against
infantry,
the
from
and
1937–1938
Nevertheless,
2,000
equipment
Germans
the
performance
million
and
tanks
Norway
the
from
and
invasion
6 . 4
in
1940.
numbered
divisions
mechanized
some
(about
24
3.2
000
divisions.
Stalin’s purge of the Red Army
Rank
Executed or imprisoned
Marshall
60%
Army Commander
87%
Divisional Commander
56%
Brigadier
46%
Deputy Commissar of Defence
100%
▲
Total ocers purged
German dispatch riders take a break during Operation Barbarossa. What
36 671
role did communications play in Blitzkrieg tactics?
German
start
Planned
advance
line
(21
June
1941)
Front
line
Actual
(late
July
1941)
advance
Moscow
Moscow
Riga
Riga
Memel
Smolensk
Memel
Smolensk
Vilnius
Minsk
Soviet
Union
Under
by
Warsaw
Kiev
Warsaw
the
attack
Red
Army
Kiev
Front
line
December
Odessa
Odessa
Budapest
Budapest
Bucharest
Bucharest
German
Occupation
▲
1941
German
250
km
Occupation
Operation Barbarossa
171
6
C A U S E S
A N D
E F F E C TS
O F
20 T H - C E N T U R Y
More
than
leader’s
proper
Hitler
was
to
all
mobilizing
Smolensk,
The
Blitzkrieg
German
sorties
3,000
they
aircraft
quickly
and
artillery
were
in
the
the
weeks
encirclement,
made.
to
As
believe
its
the
Not
Field
late
that
three
as
wanting
a
that
few
to
offend
Stalin
had
no
before
amiss,
army
the
despite
been
toward
wash
no
Germany
having
groups
were
the
was
Russia
army
Germans
to
Pact,
hours
anything
and
Soviet
that
commanders
showed
Germany
send
The
ensured
Molotov-Ribbentrop
clearly
frontier.
was
to
up
air
four
the
again.
the
force
of
entire
the
divisions
cut.
Leningrad,
over
Within
to
river
pour
marked
four
days
after
The
3
Minsk,
many
crossings
across
by
of
the
began
destroying
of
these
were
the
massive
the
am,
Luftwaffe
immediately,
operation,
and
began
were
Shortly
front.
almost
Bridges
campaign
“cauldrons”.
used
days
ground.
panzer
be
along
Army
rst
the
of
very
Army.
Tallin.
Red
on
been
the
Red
invasion
mobilization.
route
opened
the
still
and
opening
to
En
blueprint
against
of
the
coming
had
between
was
Kiev.
Riga
the
refused
wires
plan
and
that
along
Stalin
German
Moscow
the
spirit
“provocative”
telephone
The
the
intelligence
onslaught,
handicapped
to
preparation
violate
any
to
purge
blindness
military
forbade
access
Stalin’s
willful
or
W A R S
frontier.
battles
attack,
while
secured
The
of
Army
Group
Army Group Centre
Centre
had
encircled
and
captured
300
000
Soviet
troops,
destroying
The German army group tasked with
some
2,500
tanks.
Such
battles
were
to
be
repeated
throughout
the
rst
advancing toward Moscow during
months
of
the
war.
Operation Barbarossa.
By
midsummer
her
panzers
lines.
east.
up.
Fuel
Perhaps
collapse.
with
would
bullet
or
a
planners
small
the
by
●
higher
●
the
●
rapid
●
gaps
to
than
logistics
of
Russian
●
poor
●
exhausted
●
efforts
dealing
still
the
the
about
360.
than
for
In
had
keep
that,
a
squad
German
German
June
they
divisions.
By
casualties,
variety
been
ring
anticipated
a
not
complete
between
German
slowing
of
who
initiative.
200
moved
was
certain
estimates.
higher
was
of
–
had
mid-
though
400
000
reasons:
casualties
with
so
infantry
and
per
panzer
railway
quality
were
advance
and
take
eld
encountered
sign
As
supply
could
planners
difference
intelligence
could
no
army.
their
advance
horses
Commanders
little
to
the
by
military
mistakes
began
German
many
prisoners
fuel
between
●
and
as
showed
ght.
was
the
outstripped
dragged
Army
its
in
common
German
there
anticipated
of
Red
Army
had
The
for
their
show
quickly
being
making
standards,
August.
use
of
bullet,
Red
more
nding
doubt
Germans
32kilometres
172
fear
the
to
they
guns
gured
the
Soviet
of
was
Russian
the
end
badly,
it
follow
that
and
distressing
the
began
estimated
August
fact,
begun
Russia,
became
foot
most
beaten
In
paralysed
that
on
had
into
shortages
Infantry
although
cracks
raced
day;
tracks
panzer
could
units
units
not
be
(infantry
moving
80
used
roads
infantry
required
to
and
panzer
supply
three
troops
full
army
moving
kilometres
groups.
per
day)
by
C H A P T E R
At
this
point
Convinced
with
Sweden,
advance
could
units
in
provide,
mud
of
While
had
the
formed
soldiers
What
a
froze
the
divisions
to
for
force
T-34tank.
as
the
the
Army
lack
–
not
Zhukov,
what
recaptured
armies
froze
and
was
This
that
was
wore
of
wet
the
the
Ukraine
Operation
lost
–
the
dug
on
tank
and
When
snow
citizens
the
began
of
traps
while
weather
winter
anti-freeze
to
two
dug
had
to
C.
the
weeks
lost
in
Red
been
Chief
−25º
territory
the
partially
equipped
Army
happened
then
with
the
panzer
for
been
October
Women
lack
that
were
Red
After
6
Meanwhile,
stiffened.
for
assist
arrived
and
German
clothes.
dipped
the
after
defence.
defences
had
campaign.
routes
that
sending
O P E R A T I O N S
approached.
November
warfare
the
had
rst,
its
As
know
east
temperature
Both
to
Moscow.
winter
the
at
to
return
time
the
trade
grain
by
could
winter
of
secure
the
centre
valuable
the
course
Centre
with
units
quagmires.
winter
encirclement.
had
Typhoon.
of
Group
the
these
of
engines
did
in
in
Germans
summer
into
units.
behind
attack
snow
Army’s
tank
trained
Japanese
force
Red
Army
Moscow,
mobilized
Germans
massive
the
the
time
smoothly
militia
German
of
the
would
concerned
weakened
on
and
changed
Leningrad
part
the
roads
been
deteriorated,
force,
By
went
all
Moscow
in
further
autumn
and
of
Equally
advance
turning
men
diverted
he
Typhoon
fall,
capture
north.
Kiev.
the
the
interceded
the
he
the
toward
Typhoon,
to
Hitler
that
6 . 4
to
of
Army
guarding
with
Staff,
new
Soviet
Red
Army
of
vicious
the
endure
Siberian
against
aircraft
plan
to
repeatedly
ghting,
do
in
the
of
a
and
this
was
beginning
the
assembled
of
unleashed
The
since
had
composed
the
Red
Operation
winter.
Stalingrad
The
Russian
autumn
until
days
had
May
of
before
safety
fell
the
and
German
that
1942.
they
as
was
Army
moved
the
ank
Volga
as
it
Germans
to
guard
German
23
the
ever
effect
on
of
Army
on
that
left
Don
it
in
the
of
River,
German
being
the
Caucasus
Romanian,
of
By
on
the
the
ensuing
the
the
city
by
a
As
a
the
was
his
army.
of
the
relative
city
production
of
Red
Group
Mountains.
the
the
Sixth
Stalingrad
Army
and
to
Mountains
Again
of
tanks,
the
army
German
secure
weeks
frantic
west
As
Italian
August
A
’s
the
troops
the
sprawling
city
of
River.
massive
pile
months.
battle.
last
in
again
the
winter,
It
Hungarian
outskirts
Volga
the
The
the
to
the
Caucasus
through
heralded
of
the
In
producing
ordered
onslaught.
goal
them
men.
city
advance.
was
the
of
the
move
in
now
the
ghting
the
its
000
Hitler
across
for
factories
were
that
the
winter.
use
used
bank
much
issue
the
losses
500
1942.
German
on
reassembled
the
oilelds
quagmire
not
during
factories
some
in
would
and
their
was
city
nature
the
they
west
the
higher
the
the
where
south
the
urgent
of
and
replacing
short
and
was
dismantled
These
Baku
toward
ank
on
assault
August
pile
pushed
an
had
strategy
the
front
down
drove
Stalingrad
The
in
River
Sixth
still
mud
army
rebuilt
hands
Despite
were
becoming
withered
on
German
secure
Army
had
Soviets
German
same
German
Mountains.
weapons.
to
the
The
armies
the
into
divisions
south
oil
Both
Ural
dominated
drive
brought
delivered.
Barbarossa
of
aircraft
spring
of
This
bombing
rubble.
The
destruction
streets
became
raid
rubble
had
ever
a
on
would
curious
more
173
6
C A U S E S
A N D
E F F E C TS
O F
20 T H - C E N T U R Y
impassable,
armour.
unit
in
would
ght
with
▲
the
Germans
essentially
actions
Army
to
It
W A R S
for
which
tell,
The
the
house,
it
the
hard
to
use
Battle
of
Stalingrad
tenacity
evening
every
rubble.
found
turned
the
factory,
Germans
and
odds
growing
somewhat.
sewer
referred
its
to
or
it
advantage
into
expertise
The
ditch,
as
great
all
a
of
Soviet
of
series
the
–
War
were
of
small
Red
strategy
which
Rattenkrieg
in
of
was
lled
the
Rats.
A Red Army soldier ghts in the ruins of Stalingrad. How did the German
success in destroying the city work against them?
The
Soviets
city
that
city
were
their
of
the
Stalin
be
to
city.
August
form
while
of
in
a
the
the
less
It
river.
thrusts
the
by
Paulus
to
and
from
Army
German
the
a
halt
for
Army
these
21
the
to
troops
forces
was
as
bring
to
fresh
the
The
Sixth
those
potent
of
the
order
it
who
constant
to
was
turned
the
river
east
attack
bank
from
re.
three
from
effort,
Army
and
on
the
the
orders
job
bank
areas
with
A
of
of
defended
without
west
artillery
shrank
troops
who
whose
down
under
defence
citizens
Backward”
units
the
itself
tanks.
and
Step
staging
with
city
of
in
defences.
all
retreated
gun
from
steadily
and
well
up
to
treacherous
the
fortify
One
who
cling
September
infantry
and
society
thousand
motivated
creation
would
perimeter
Germans
hundred
“Not
anyone
defended
The
Stalingrad
fear
famous
advancing
Red
resupply
tanks.
the
his
and
ordered
resupply
Such
called
he
of
Two
entrenchments
provided
The
Red
70
exhausting
dig
aspect
name.
survival
issued
behind
Luftwaffe
than
also
ee.
trying
Initially
had
which
line
to
to
patriotism,
arrested.
around
every
leader’s
organized
mixture
in
174
mobilized
bore
divisions
the
however,
was
commander
supplies
and
repeated
for
von
another
C H A P T E R
push.
the
This
river.
one
last
The
city
Stalin’s
to
of
line
to
a
Hitler
fought
of
the
force
be
supplied
fell,
so
the
too
Germans,
wounded
shrank
had
in
way
air
the
the
von
perished
it
300
As
only
the
Paulus’s
tonnes
of
of
supplies
captured.
captivity.
estimated
The
nal
Since
that
the
His
that
280
30
2,000
the
1945
were
beginning
and
of
the
in
on
19
have
version
an
outside
meanwhile
at
three
were
temperature
surrounded
to
evacuate
1943.
the
east,
west
Germans
and
Ninety-one
1955
in
the
gradually
the
1955
Stalingrad
allies
and
own
landing
released
her
then
began
would
and
tanks
and
could
perimeter
January
German
Italian
Germans
involved
the
Unable
was
complete.
his
000
reached
day.
supplies,
Germany
day
he
south
Army
had
deteriorated
per
on
was
troops
which
north
which
a
tried
strategy.
2,200
Uranus
scheme
About
Between
the
Sixth
Führer
the
the
drive
drive
Operation
supplies
weather
tonnes
which
as
and
month,
would
position,
perimeter.
the
in
of
Meanwhile
where
producing
would
the
Order”.
surrendered
were
and
Boss”
Romanian
encirclement
but
ammunition
Paulus
force
Soviet
possible.
a
metres
Army
available
“The
500
theatres
Sixth
the
his
force
were
Army.
Paulus
of
all
300
O P E R A T I O N S
failed.
Stalingrad
building
point,
70
prisoners.
in
is
von
German
maintain
5,000
August
to
amount
Germans
days
part
inferior
Army
Sixth
von
that
by
Stalingrad
Backwards
cauldron.
did
or
at
with
averaging
and
thousand
released
by
few
of
the
too
persuaded
Russians
Red
a
within
gone,
this
smallest
various
of
but
been
north
were
the
south
him,
out
the
the
them
absolutely
defended
German
Step
its
with
force
massive
a
use
however,
1942
within
within
in
was
only
to
Germans
the
One
had
took
strength
Russians,
been
city
and
ghting
the
huge
force
way
ghting
its
among
allowed
“Not
caught
a
This
and
their
airelds
the
the
encircle
October
Zhukov,
and
divided
4
itself
September
November
Had
west
smaller
to
half
had
gather
ghting.
while
bid
city.
while
be
on
dislodge
defend
By
month,
were
a
the
bowed
to
over
to
Stalingrad
would
troops.
had
came
inclination
known,
a
With
time
defend
they
push
6 . 4
suffered
Russians
–
the
rest
operation
500
Class discussion
000
To what extent did tanks aect the nature
casualties.
The
Red
Army
suffered
1.1
million
casualties
of
which
some
of the Second World War compared to the
485
000
were
dead.
Stalingrad
was
the
furthest
point
to
the
east
the
First World War?
German
army
would
reach
during
the
war.
Technology and war: tanks
Tanks had originated in Britain during the First World War.
power it to over 50 kmh. Wide treads made it more versatile
Initially small numbers of tanks were assigned to infantry
in snow and its 76 mm gun, though not as big as some
units. Later, the Germans and British pioneered the idea of
medium tanks, was more than sucient. Perhaps one of the
massing tanks in their own divisions with supporting infantry.
greatest attributes of the T-34 was that it could be readily
Coordination between large formations of tanks was made
produced in huge quantities. More T-34s were manufactured
more practical with advances in wireless radio technology.
than any other model of tank in the war – over 57 000.
Tanks were generally classied according to size and
While the T-34 and Sherman were both relatively simple
armament – light, medium and heavy. Medium tanks such
tanks to produce, the German heavy tanks were more
as the US Sherman with a 108 mm gun and the German
complicated. The Tiger I and Tiger II were fearsome weapons
Panzer Mark IV were excellent machines and the workhorse
designed to outmatch the T-34. The intricate mechanics,
of their armies. The Soviet T-34 was perhaps the best
however, made for cumbersome manufacturing and
all-round medium tank of the war. Sloped armour made it
dicult repair. By the end of the war the Germans had only
dicult to pierce with anti-tank shells. Its diesel engine could
produced about 1,350 Tiger Is and less than 500 Tiger IIs.
175
6
C A U S E S
A N D
E F F E C TS
O F
20 T H - C E N T U R Y
W A R S
North Africa
The
war
in
North
Africa
between
three
location,
topography,
Africa
determined
obstacles,
on
the
sand
limit
in
War.
dust,
mobility
conned
to
Libya
Italy
the
attack
along
The
in
could
Sea
63
an
of
coast
the
not,
manpower
to
to
a
elite
ghting
panzer
supremely
had
his
A
The
aid
wasted
food,
no
which
fuel
and
effort
time
Crusader,
to
back
By
recovered
This
time
captured
defences
British
where
May,
force
the
city.
the
Eighth
commander,
came
them
was
at
of
to
a
came
try
new
Bernard
a
war
a
of
the
650
In
case
a
get
It
become
supplies
would
under
to
would
German
this
its
counter-
complete.
that
in
1940
kilometres
managed
the
troops
consolidate
British
maintain
halt,
to
to
in
try
not
and
army
the
was
Germans
become
an
condent
to
to
was
men
the
and
his
and
the
break
turn
dug
Tobruk
hurled
to
the
his
the
through
the
as
dig
in
the
largely
east.
Germans
to
material
in.
attempt,
German-Italian
of
retire
and
they
outstripped
troops
siege
and
out
his
where
Another
again
hold
to
too
pushing
again
again
he
where
nothing.
them
It
back
where
relieving
could
Halfa.
the
hell.
September
to
and
British
succeeded
would
Alam
the
albeit
Italian
In
seemed
that
April,
forcing
Tobruk
amassed
General
the
3
ready
of
would
control
000
tried
ally.
Corps
–
this,
on
of
Rommel.
started,
British,
it
and
division
Afrika
by
200
reasons
not
particular
mobility,
British
Italian
throwing
had
Rommel
Battle
could
North
interminable
own
Egypt.
victory
for
in
Depression,
depression
retreating
advance
Erwin
eventually
the
Army
the
done
and
they
fortress
the
at
in
had
Rommel
at
force
rapid
infantry
as
dislodge
force
Tripoli
–
absence
route.
short-lived
the
and
Despite
some
Italians
The
Qattara
depend
which
thereof
mechanization
its
or
western
advancing
as
general,
he
Operation
process.
and
water
to
a
here
supply
after
was
the
the
extreme
see
in
lack
battle
geographic
there.
climate
would
would
army
as
for
coast.
of
feasible
the
far
the
also
beleaguered
known
competent
started,
British
its
it
the
Italian
such
division
force
sent
as
such
war
one
Egypt
advancing
of
be
or
highland
along
to
Egypt
When
get
sustain
the
sent
Rommel
roads.
sea,
–
running
Pacic,
combat
harsh
waging
soldiers
on
into
1940
however,
commonplace.
coming
attack
retreating
roads,
the
war
British
expedition
of
only
African
000
of
a
the
vegetation
features
theatre
the
was
and
environment
strip
prove
a
as
December
the
ahead
As
–
1943
nature
made
were
narrow
North
launched
gains.
a
mobility.
facing
lack
to
Russia
and
the
perfect
The
would
Mediterranean
Initially
a
there
Africa
in
impassible
however,
obstacles
North
for
of
1940
As
climate
much
seems
World
and
What
except
surface
Second
from
combatants.
in
under
its
British
the
new
Montgomery.
El Alamein
The
resulting
Rather
this
a
than
point,
more
176
attack
punched
exploit
the
would
ght
and
Montgomery
plodding
infantry
had
battle
the
a
battle
breach
–
in
a
pivotal
would
of
supported
hole
be
dash
rely
attrition.
by
the
on
German
the
of
North
the
his
war
numeric
the
similar
his
to
plan
was
Once
massed
1916
campaign.
desert
up
superiority
bombardment.
defences
more
African
in
Montgomery’s
massive
strategy
in
nature
a
to
massed
his
troops
armour
than
to
to
ght
would
1942.
C H A P T E R
He
wanted
withdraw
in
the
rear.
Rommel
southern
became
until
▲
to
and
inict
The
position,
the
only
to
be
plan
where
and
in
Rommel
weak
worked.
the
Tripoli
on
too
defend
option
reached
losses
thus
British
committed
they
such
would
his
the
that
Forbidden
by
was
a
German-Italian
compelled
strong
Hitler
position,
eventually
January
he
establish
northern
British
late
to
to
forces
O P E R A T I O N S
to
position
retreat,
weakening
broke
6 . 4
through.
would
his
Retreat
not
stop
1943.
German soldiers advance toward El Alamein in 1942. What challenges did ghting in the
deser t pose for the combatants?
L TA
Research and thinking skills
1942 is often viewed as the turning point in the war for the Allies. The years and
months up to mid-1942 had been marked by Axis success – the conquest of
Poland, France and western Europe, western Russia, Hong Kong, Singapore,
the 1942 and its consequences
1942 is often viewed as the turning point in the war for the Allies. The years and
months up to mid-1942 had been marked by Axis success – the conquest of
Poland, France and western Europe, western Russia, Hong Kong, Singapore, the
Philippines. Three impor tant battles in 1942, Midway, Stalingrad and El Alamein,
stopped Axis progress. From that point the Allies began to push them back .
Complete the following table to explore the consequences of Stalingrad and El
Alamein in more detail.
Battle
Eect on Axis
Eect on
Other
Long-term
troop strength
Axis material
shor t-term
consequences
strength
consequences
El Alamein
Stalingrad
177
6
C A U S E S
A N D
E F F E C TS
O F
20 T H - C E N T U R Y
Over
the
would
in
course
be
and
like
two-thirds
May
The
of
that
it
275
months,
anvil
and
of
was
acute
only
Navy’s
a
of
the
US
they
the
had
matter
to
German-Italian
army
supply
dominance
needed
000
the
although
their
material
last
few
the
Pass,
Royal
the
The
next
Morocco,
meant
surrendered.
in
the
against
Kasserine
manpower
strength.
of
driven
Algeria
places
W A R S
Axis
of
some
time
the
the
forces
had
in
forces
landed
successes
shortages
in
sustain
that
and
before
at
dwindling
they
Mediterranean
Germans
North
at
Africa
sunk
ghting
surrendered
1943.
Sicily and Italy
The
invasion
“soft
from
the
British
Sicily
two
of
July
the
Peninsulas
fr o nt
a nd
1943 .
German
in
are
In
The
to
obstacles
mountains
divide
and
concentrate
defended.
Italian
of
that
After
ran
south
a
of
down.
of
of
outank
do
so
Anzio
a
in
became
to
enter
forces
of
January
the
the
On
the
to
a
Gothic
remainder
of
from
Although
It
would
before
second
Line,
the
this
it
from
British
such
as
shore
and
another
Se pt e m be r.
and
forces
Allies
of
Unable
opted
Rome
surprise,
Allied
the
abbey
Sangro.
south
300
but
around
the
Canadian
the
on
bogged
months
would
va l ua ble
peninsula
the
the
The
US
Allies
German
kilometres
conduct
to
at
advance
for
Normandy.
line
invas i on
Naples,
the
around
strategic
l ig h t ly
an d
All ie s
9
place
another
defensive
they
on
was
time
ve
t he
of
shore,
at
to
c on d uc t
capture
and
this
landings
which
wit h
Ortona
to
t he
c om m i t
took
strongpoint
p eni n su l a
Si ci li an
fr om
to
advance
achieved
take
the
that
fo rc e s .
cen t r e
wo u ld
to
d efe n c e
r an g e
the
the
breadth
war
landing,
prepared
war.
the
success
the
north
the
pr e li mi n ar y
Ge r m a n s
pe nin s u la
the
ank,
amphibious
days
the
where
places
stretched
a r m i st i c e
raced
a
l e ave
ha ve
in
bu t t r es s ed
de fe n di ng
up
abo ut
and
la n de d
n a rr own es s
the
Ge r m a n s
on
of
to
di st r a c t io n
running
eastern
exploit
down.
two
an
Line,
in
a
the
mo u nt a i n
a nd
US
al l ,
in t e rl oc k in g
m ovin g
woul d
th e
ghting
Gustav
1944.
to
Allies
Line,
ghting
that
failed
retreated
the
of
Gustav
bitterest
another
Rome,
Rome,
for
the
the
as
the y
in
S ep t e m be r.
T h ei r
c ove r
hes i tan t
l a nde d
line
a
th e
for c es
Mus s ol in i’s
di vi s ion s
wa s
in
a ll owin g
a nk s
s ig ne d
the
by
All ie s
e ve nt,
tr o ops
defensive
line
bogged
a ny
Si c i ly
as
G e rm a n
Tun is ia ,
I t a li an
and
and
co a sts ,
w as
ag a in s t
di v is i on s
for c e s.
s pl it
the m
I ta l ia ns
heavy
through
commander
In
of
vi e we d
dive r t
f r om
10
d ifc u l t
the
Br iti sh
to
pe n in s u la
fo rce s
which
Salerno,
Cassino.
encountered
to
at
anchor
Monte
i nto
Allie d
Rome,
Some
western
v i e wi ng
th e
strong
ca ptu re
the ir
co mm and
resource s .
landing
into
on
o ff
ineffe c t u a l
wa s
the
t he
r e vo lt
tro ops ,
a tta ck in g
for ce d
up
a
Se tt in g
I ta li a n
a tta cki ng
fo r ce s
Europe
September.
T he
the
for
fur the r
US
as
fa ce d
p e ni ns ul a
to
their
defence
of
what
d es i gn e d
fo me nt
ma no euvr es
operations,
and
T he y
adv a nce
The
western
men
3
the
to
at
wa s
r e gi me .
dif cul t
easier.
It
a mp hib io us
d i v i s i ons.
outanking
Italy
a ime d
a nd
inva s i o n
makes
offered
wa s
Eur o pe ”.
unpo p ul a r
airborne
in
stroke
178
S i ci l y
eastern
increasingly
by
of
underbelly
their
north
defence
C H A P T E R
6 . 4
O P E R A T I O N S
Normandy
The
grand
been
in
Allied
one
hard-pressed
complained
front
was
designed
thereby
in
the
battleeld.
5,000
the
raid
to
were
surface
teach
planning
of
open
●
attack
sand
beaches
at
●
land
●
absolute
●
landing
the
by
landings.
drive
all
three
Britain
had
Gold,
on
front
this
the
make
was
The
Stalin
second
eastern
Although
to
and
partially
the
from
or
war.
this
of
was
from
Army.
Stalin
France
Dieppe
Of
city
the
than
were
Raid
of
not
the
force
a
front
Allied
pressing
difference
to
be
formidable.
of
August
Dieppe
5,000
half
to
would
A
1942.
probe
Canadians
returned.
that
as
established
could
after
this
not
get
Italy,
on
but
its
and
number
A
force
be
of
defences.
1,000
Nevertheless,
employed
the
in
the
ports
traction
drops
men
on
the
shale
be
the
national
armies.
to
of
the
The
in
on
the
of
establish
days
break
Paris.
a
after
out
French
an
between
of
would
resistance
leadership.
the
and
Such
that
–
France
population
build-up
French
The
beaches
coordination
civilian
the
logistical
coast
the
would
and
ve
the
and
advance
with
Free
on
ow
force
support
coordination
inclusion
navy.
enough.
attack
–
lines,
would
cooperation
mobilized
and
German
and
the
simple
would
invasion
by
operations
unprecedented
respectively
coast
of
amphibious
seemed
armies
material
the
secure
operated
take
plan
behind
level
three
to
the
a
and
Juno
and
securing
take
Contact
was
and
are
during
would
The
Canadian
beachhead
of
have
necessary
Overlord
and
beaches
improved
Sword
east,
would
is
the
build-up.
which
and
there.
than
tanks
be
of
paratroop
branches
necessary
Italy
material
second
lessons
rather
–
to
size
British
would
happen
and
Red
and
port
less
won
tanks
material
From
north
in
the
the
superiority
into
undertaking
of
the
Utah,
beachhead
beaches
craft
and
supported
insistent
divisions
States,
two-front
establishment
Sicily
satisfy
United
a
Overlord.
disaster.
hard
the
in
Dieppe
air
States,
Omaha,
a
at
the
the
main
force
by
landed,
beaches
bulk
operation
United
was
that
on
to
the
in
of
more
divert
troops
enough
landed
for
of
Overlord:
attack
planning
divert
landing
it
to
pressure
Operation
some
●
An
–
date
entry
German
ever
invasion
highlighted
soldiers
did
not
the
involve
became
the
Regardless,
Canadians
British
did
was
France
obstacles
these
On
it
The
since
to
Germans
some
Italy
Soviets,
of
when
the
relieving
in
Union
postponed.
force
had,
another
Soviet
the
The
or
bitterly
to
operations
rather
strategy
way
was
Intelligence
Free French
including
troop
dispositions
and
maps
of
the
objectives
would
have
to
French soldiers and citizens who
be
gathered.
Huge
amounts
of
material
would
have
to
be
produced
and
escaped occupied France and organized
stored.
All
of
this
would
have
to
be
kept
secret
from
German
intelligence.
themselves into military formations
Any
commander
overseeing
such
an
operation
needed
to
be
adept
under the leadership of Charles de Gaulle.
at
logistics,
diplomacy
and
strategy.
US
General
Dwight
Eisenhower
These formations fought with the Allies
was
chosen
as
Supreme
Commander.
The
British
General
Bernard
against the Axis Powers.
Montgomery
The
defences
command
He
of
disagreed
was
given
were
the
tactical
formidable,
Atlantic
with
command
his
Wall
but
(as
superior,
during
troubled.
the
Field
the
landings.
Rommel
German
Marshall
had
positions
von
been
were
Rundstedt,
placed
in
known).
on
how
179
6
C A U S E S
A N D
E F F E C TS
O F
20 T H - C E N T U R Y
best
to
defend
sought
had
to
yet
enemy
with
a
a
the
ordered
them
to
they
distance
that
his
would
split
the
the
The
to
an
obvious
they
to
could
the
notion
route
that
de
this
went
“dummy”
paratroopers
The
was
Normandy
was
of
belief
going
to
take
concentrated
By
an
Pas
the
de
time
●
1.5
●
5
●
12
●
1,000
●
20
The
to
place
more
the
of
at
tonnage
than
Allied
of
the
of
the
The
US,
British
the
tonnes
of
invasion
force
●
2,500
naval
●
4,000
landing
●
170
de
●
1,000
bombs
in
force
was
1942
Canadian
where
force
and
the
personally
further
ordered
without
weak
did
and
take
in
area
a
at
its
fake
conveyed
place.
Allies
The
dropped
Normandy.
the
paratroopers
the
actual
would
The
was
everything
aircraft
trafc
the
that
ready
in
May
soldiers
paratroopers
transport
of
come
entire
Channel
would
and
the
to
craft
paratroop
and
tanks
radio
drops
drops.
included:
000
the
constructed
when
Calais
craft
18
cover
command
conclude
cars.
soldiers,
the
to
intervened
discovered
supplies
itself
from
have
English
false
locomotives
railroad
to
cover
invasion
Allies
actual
Allied
May
and
was
increasing
would
delayed
wooden
aircraft
000
an
a
force
estimation
muster:
million
000
to
was
Allied
move
air
around
drop
out
forces
and
east
of
Normandy.
invasion
From
to
generals
Allied
moment
Pas
around
the
inland
beaches
thereby
effort
invasion
would
real
have
an
two
Germans
the
and
million
obstacles
invasion
tide,
Hitler
against
the
last
they
the
assembly.
million
000
fake
the
barracks,
the
of
A
landing
enough
sort
belief.
ahead
once
ahead
Calais
impressive
managed
that
would
Deliberately
the
slow
moved
Normandy
the
low
where
and
where
until
were
Normandy
the
on
was
to
they
that
exposed
Normandy.
was
empty
Calais.
the
If
at
of
guaranteed
at
that
on
required.
used
Calais,
deception
at
180
with
be
as
strengthened.
not
some
almost
encourage
Pas
so
was
were
wanted
them
defensive
was
defence
reserve.
craft.
forces
a
they
instead
number
main
landing
de
in
land
between
not
This
Pas
to
there
and
could
Allied
complete
the
the
place
invasion
the
opposite
landing
while
destroy
obstacles
have
forces
order.
the
favoured
beach
defences
exposed
front
tank
narrowest,
army,
the
and
kept
and
These
wreck
take
reserve
personal
response
coastal
laid
Rommel
the
Rundstedt
force
Obviously
2,600-kilometre
and
forces.
would
that
on
defence
Nevertheless,
armour.
landings
the
were
increased.
waterline.
from
their
armoured
designed
avoid
coastline.
enemy
beach
month
drastically
were
the
mobile
mines
long
the
muster
with
Rommel
the
destroy
to
W A R S
aircraft.
May
1944
of
the
1944
Allies
it
was
had
C H A P T E R
▲
6 . 4
O P E R A T I O N S
General Eisenhower talking with paratroopers before they drop into France ahead of the
Normandy landings. What role did the paratroopers play in the D-Day invasion?
The
invasion
divisions
to
of
secure
drops
were
their
forces
were
Normandy
Omaha
heavy
Gold
of
at
Beach:
airborne
evening
●
be for e ,
dr op pe d
that
w it h
th re e
be h in d
m i xe d
se e m e d
e xpe r ie n c e s
to
of
gr i p
the
e n em y
su c c e s s.
the
l in e s
The
de f e n di ng
a mph ibi ou s
to
push
tanks
most
High
at
British
from
were
Sword
the
clear
the
on
000
landing
in
of
at
US
craft
the
off
seas.
that
Omaha
of
the
and
course.
German
The
was
troops
the
at
landing
approaching
had
of
casualties.
troops
much
the
end
197
Confusion
the
invaders
west
a
infantry.
established
a
casualties.
of
British
the
positions
fortied
some
moving
and
34
Utah,
suffering
different.
re
on
extreme
overlooked
thousand
one
casualties
the
foundered
centre
their
Nevertheless
the
of
many
banks
4,650
the
behind
on
landed
resistance,
experienced
ghting
of
that
considerably
Twenty-ve
beach
beach
limited
Germans
cost
troops
experience
the
day.
US
Juno
of
soldiers
Normandy
disoriented
village
the
inland
the
and
a
stout
units.
linking
The
British
the
The
inexperienced
provided
attacking
beaches.
attacked
invasions.
up
By
defence
the
with
the
suffered
close
to
casualties.
Juno
and
The
ni g ht
po in t s
confusi on
sandy
was
the
a
heavy
attackers
400
stra teg ic
met
heavy
drops
defenders.
of
The
by
giving
8-kilometre
causing
T he
p ar a tr oo pe r s
000
Sherman
that
day
beachhead
23
conspired
Normandy
●
the
stretch
Omaha
seas
a
US
194 4.
r e s po ns e.
The
defended
After
by
Beach :
at
beaches
June
o the r
landings,
“swimming”
also
a nd
sl o w
Beach:
landed
6
varied .
5-kilometre
●
on
a nd
helped
and
Utah
Britis h
bridges
forces
●
bega n
Beach:
at
zones
been
rst
on
The
met
the
unable
Canadians
stiff
beach
to
stormed
resistance,
and
clear.
By
the
primarily
landing
obstacles
evening
they
beaches
from
that
had
with
21
pre-sighted
the
moved
000
engineers
inland
men
killing
to
had
link
181
6
C A U S E S
A N D
E F F E C TS
O F
20 T H - C E N T U R Y
up
with
British
suffered
Class discussion
●
Sword
of
the
W A R S
some
forces
1,200
Beach:
landings
The
from
Gold
casualties
23
000
Beach.
with
troops
encountered
On
close
that
the
to
came
little
resistance,
tank
forces.
day
350
ashore
but
the
Canadians
dead.
at
once
the
far
ashore
east
did
end
face
How might the Germans have repelled the
a
counter-attack
by
German
Allied
air
superiority
blunted
Normandy invasion?
this
attack.
In
all,
the
British
suffered
600
casualties
at
Sword.
The Road to Berlin
From
the
Army
strength
by
surrender
continued
the
it
evident
their
The
had
as
around
history.
forces
German
defensive
only
the
served
higher
by
the
The
losses
of
its
the
Allie s
to
and
the
4
of
Kursk.
as
they
their
The
victory.
the
The
of
they
had
and
was
the
this
terror
Red
growing
been
occupied
that
becoming
motivation
result
the
ensuing
that
and
men
the
and
the
more
shaping
Soviet
massive
the
Red
into
an
tank
the
As
the
elaborate
counter-attack
Army
the
tanks
such
could
victory.
October
4,000
largest
pounded
advance.
drawn
claim
By
and
was
attack,
for
a
engagements
the
still
enemy.
planned
were
Massive
point
their
and
mustered
forward
million
we r e
p o r ts
in
devastation
fueling
With
as
They
Red
Kursk
suffer
were
Army
reaching
was
Warsaw
1944.
cap tur e
Rhine
Stalingrad,
that
occupation
nished
opponent
the ms el ve s
s uch
the
armo ur e d
objectives
across
over
channel
at
material.
territory
forewarned
destroyed.
home
August
not
city
moved
their
with
of
attempt
were
Army’s
drive
than
western
airborne
advanced,
artillery
and
The
their
Army
and
occupation.
Soviets,
tanks
Sixth
men
1941.
during
outproducing
west
end
Captured
An
with
both
reconquering
Soviet
The
Red
to
dramatically
pushing
the
system
completed
on
however,
battle
German
in
June
out
Russians
advance
1,900
since
attitudes
Germans,
German
the
west,
meted
the
own
in
of
grow
marched
Germans
Germans
to
the
m ak in g
Ant we rp
Rhi ne
br i dg es
ope r atio n
S e p te mbe r
into
as
intact
k no w n
1 944
Ge rma n
s tr ide s
a ll owe d
which
as
t o wa r d
for
t h r ou g h
Mar ke t
wou ld
he a rt l a n d
a
c o or di na t e d
tha t
ha ve
Re ich .
s u ppl y.
G ar de n
m ea n
wou l d
the
ea s ie r
to
f e ll
t he
wai t
s h or t
pus h
until
spring.
Berlin
itself
advance
their
would
through
fall
the
to
the
city
Red
from
Army
all
in
early
directions.
May
On
2
after
May
a
the
methodical
city
was
in
hands.
The war at sea
Battle of the Atlantic
The
Battle
food,
elds
of
million
and
and
by
182
the
North
14
a
of
massive
this
was
German
refers
men
–
to
imports
ships,
Britain.
each
the
generally
navy.
to
across
merchant
merchant
1941
the
Atlantic
and
America
tonnes
had
every
of
munitions
the
the
The
week
eet
ongoing
Atlantic
of
Royal
island
to
nation
survive
over
Navy
sufcient
effort
from
to
3,000
had
deal
–
to
the
ships
one
its
to
do
this.
vessel.
threat
–
and
over
overall
escort
the
supplies
factories
required
half
with
bring
a
need
–
For
In
1939
provided
C H A P T E R
6 . 4
O P E R A T I O N S
An Allied tanker burns and sinks after being torpedoed. To what ex tent was
▲
Britain dependent on impor ts to sur vive?
The
Kriegsmarine
vessels
the
early
eet
the
during
such
German
–
as
1942,
boats
which
boats,
would
at
the
sinking
the
also
and
in
radio
reaching
Multiple
to
the
be
the
on
eet
the
a
the
its
had
–
and
hope
a
of
contact
boats.
convened
it
on
far
and
the
successful
strangling
300
out
across
an
When
the
in
lone
adopted
with
more
her
vessels
than
eet
made
in
Bismarck
Rather
U-boat
other
surface
surface
more
of
peak
stretch
made
large
convince
would
to
vessels
entire
battleship
helped
the
the
on
continued
Germany’s
success.
own,
eet
U-boat
vessels,
in
reached
location
attacking
that
affordable
of
their
Once
protect
to
Scheer,
expanded
which
40
strategy
losses
more
height
their
concentration
a
state-of-the-art
U-boat
lines.
a
battleship
that
attacking
would
vessels
the
should
strategy
times
escort
of
marked
saw
period,
Spectacular
“pocket”
shipping
attack.
known
war.
Germany’s
Pack”
they
was
command
hunting
convoy
it
rearmament
programme
established
the
of
enemy.
“Wolf
of
the
high
U-boat
island
a
years
scuttling
as
the
Allied
sufcient
convoy
they
difcult
for
convoy.
L TA
Research skills
The armies that moved across Europe and Nor th Africa
Resource
Source
Strategic implication
during the Second World War consumed enormous
Food
amounts of natural resources. At the same time, land and
Iron
sea operations made the impor t and expor t of materials
Coal
very tenuous. In fact, the need to secure these resources
often dictated overall strategy. To get an idea of the
Oil
needs of the combatants, complete the following table
Which
country
was
in
the
be st
s itu ation
in
terms
of
for Germany, Britain, the USSR, the USA and France and
resources?
Which
wa s
in
the
w ors t?
answer the questions that follow.
How does the information in the table help to explain the
strategic decisions made by each country during the war?
183
6
C A U S E S
A N D
E F F E C TS
O F
20 T H - C E N T U R Y
Over
of
time
the
production
mobilized
for
components
were
than
eventually
range,
Allied
all
war
fast
convoys.
the
German
the
far
By
US
Allies
could
as
U-boat
Once
innovations
the
and
were
sink
ASDIC
improved.
reaching
as
and
the
such
defeated
technology.
around
U-boats
technology
as
Allies
and
developed
the
W A R S
such
the
Germans
into
form
end
the
of
could
submariners
had
as
to
building
The
of
been
Liberty
the
coast
shipping
and
aircraft
the
replace
the
limitations
Atlantic
1943
through
to
of
in
far
faster
anti-submarine
depth
charges
air
sinking
end
were
increased
effective
the
built
was
assembling,
tonnage
were
By
combination
industry
ship,
for
steadily
give
Allies
them.
a
shipbuilding
sonar)
Anti-submarine
out
threat
US
shipped
them.
(a
the
of
their
cover
to
U-boats
the
war
twice
75%
of
killed.
Technology and war: radar
In the mid-1920s experiments had established that it was
on aircraft to nd targets at sea. It was placed on ships to
possible to measure the distance to an object by timing the
discover surfaced submarines. It was used to aim anti-
return of radio waves bounced o the object. The military
aircraft guns and nd bombing targets through cloud cover.
applications were soon evident. By the time the war broke
As with all military technology, each advance in radar
out, Britain and Germany had developed radar stations
prompted the development of countermeasures.
to detect incoming aircraft. Radar ’s accuracy was rened
Ar tillery shells that burst in the air releasing fragments
throughout the Second World War as was the scope of its
of aluminium presented multiple reective surfaces for
application. Developments such as the cavity magnetron
the radar to bounce o thus confusing it. Radar detectors
allowed for the reading of higher frequency radio waves,
mounted on aircraft could aler t crews as to when they
which proved more accurate. Eventually radar was placed
were being hit with radio waves directing anti-aircraft re.
Technology and war: anti-submarine warfare
Anti-submarine warfare can be divided into detection/
detectors that could detect the change in magnetic elds
defensive technology and oensive technology. The
caused by a submarine hull to nd their prey.
Allies had discovered the defensive benets of the
Once detected, escor t vessels would launch an attack on
convoy system during the First World War. It allowed a
the submerged U-boat. The primary weapon used by the
comparatively small escor t force to protect a greater
Allied navies was the depth charge, a waterproof explosive
number of ships. By the end of the war, Allied convoys in
charge detonated by a pressure fuse. Early in the war
the Atlantic grew to over 150 ships. The move by Allied
depth charges were dropped o the stern of ships or
navies toward larger convoys came from the statistical
thrown by single charge launchers, requiring the attacking
analysis that suggested the number of sinkings in a
ship to pass over the submarine several times in order to
convoy attack depended on the number of U-boats
either sink it or force it to the surface. The Hedgehog was
attacking rather than the size of the convoy, theoretically
an improvement in that it red 24 projectiles 80 metres
allowing for larger convoys.
ahead of the ship and detonated on contact. This meant
Submarine detection initially relied on ASDIC or sonar
that the U-boat had far less time to escape once its own
developed during the First World War. Although ASDIC
hydrophone heard the approaching ship.
was relatively successful in detecting submerged
Long-range aircraft, which could spot and attack U-boats,
submarines, it could not do so with surfaced U-boats.
were highly eective in protecting convoys. As the war
Escor t vessels were eventually equipped with maritime
progressed the range of aircraft such as the Sunderland
radar sets, which made this easier. Hydrophones were
Flying Boat and the PBY Catalina increased, as did their
listening devices that could pick up faint sound waves
ability to attack U-boats. Devices such as the absolute
emitted from submerged U-boats. Anti-submarine aircraft
altimeter meant that aircraft could y at far lower altitudes
used advanced technology such as magnetic anomaly
with safety, increasing the accuracy of their attacks.
184
C H A P T E R
6 . 4
The air war
O P E R A T I O N S
Class discussion
Battle of Britain
To what extent should merchant marine
sailors (civilian sailors who crewed the
When
France
surrendered
to
Germany
in
June
1940,
the
German
high
cargo and tanker ships) be entitled to the
command
expected
Britain
to
ask
for
terms
of
peace.
Churchill,
now
the
same benets and honours as sailors in
Prime
Minister,
would
hear
none
of
this.
To
say
that
Britain
was
alone
the navy?
does
her.
a
disservice
Nevertheless,
military
solution
became
known
Sealion
planned
it
a
plan
is
and
the
to
the
preventing
underway.
From
the
the
British
●
The
the
This
radar
negotiate
to
be
was
that
found.
RAF
Even
have
an
stood
meant
That
it
by
that
a
solution
the
to
operate
the
c e r t a in
of
across.
also
task
once
Battle
that
given
resources
ability
call
resources
force
channel,
RAF’s
been
naval
mammoth
the
e njoy ed
the
To
planning
had
had
the
the
become
Britain.
invasion
they
forces
of
meticulous
and
given
would
invasion
not
get
eliminating
British
109
The
had
could
suffered
Spitre ,
was
a
of
to
to
prerequisite
destroying
operate,
the
to
Hitler
and
invasion
was
Britain.
a dva n t a ge s
o ve r
detect
greater
incoming
losses
in
the
aircraft.
Battle
of
France
than
numbers
aircraft
much
of
salvage
of
was
the
for
Germany
centres
sized
if
although
quickly.
at
the
a
fe wer
not
aerial
in
n u m be r
s up er io r,
to
the
th a n
the
Ge rm an
of
inferior
all
the
ghter,
British
could
be
produced
outproduced
the
in
Germans
in
25:7.
combat
aircraft
took
and
place
recovery
over
of
or
close
pilots
to
was
Britain,
easier
than
it
Luftwaffe.
had
or
an
In
rate
damaged
level
“ying
tho ug h
eq ua l ,
Messerschmi tt.
Hurricane,
ghter
As
installations
Luftwaffe
large
●
to
islands
ground
the
who
RAF
.
The
Bf
●
of
attempt
beginning
Hurricane,
●
Luftwaffe
the
did
believe
the
defences,
not
have
entailed.
enough
over
ability
lacked
had
Germany
however,
would
would
Zealand
Luftwaffe.
●
●
the
Britain
New
Sealion.
Sealion
long
and
amphibious
operations
did,
The
that
resistance
Germany’s
required,
coastal
Australia
Operation
airspace
invasion.
Britain’s
as
fact
her
channel
Goering
control
the
to
other
attention
control
Canada,
generous;
Germany’s
the
to
no
heavy
industrial
ight
artillery”
bombers
facilities.
bombers
of
suited
The
to
destroying
Luftwaffe
designed
to
would
support
large
rely
ground
on
urban
medium-
forces
–
the
Blitzkrieg
185
6
▲
C A U S E S
A N D
E F F E C TS
O F
20 T H - C E N T U R Y
German Bf 109 Messerschmitts over England in 1940. How did
W A R S
An
▲
rearming after Germany give Britain a technological advantage?
●
Because
amount
her
the
of
time
bomber
British
The
July
abandoned
important
exchange
180
On
13
7
rate
losses
could
beginning
September
an
Class discussion
effort
table.
the
the
and
to
Luftwaffe
targets.
British
the
also
placed
to
to
bases
target
leaving
radio
qual ity
a nd
in
France,
area
these
to
the
protect
aircraft
transmissions.
radar
some
was
was
installations
success,
complete,
throughout
the
telling.
they
leaving
battle.
The
it
was
focus
and
burden
they
of
always
unclear
against
were
attack
bomb
the
The
Germans
lost
to
the
the
long
airelds.
shift
to
to
the
RAF
battle
on
ports
greater
how
its
sea
through
producing
them
allowed
of
airelds,
continue
were
onslaught
than
RAF
would
losses
London
the
the
coastal
it
attack
aircraft,
morale
attacks
the
battle
pattern
the
the
its
achieving
before
the
German
faster
ordered
over
functional
began
total
be tween
70.
This
resist
ghters
Hitler
it
of
from
Luftwaffe
eliminate
of
lost
far
minutes,
Although
part
British
relationshi p
production ?
operation.
decipher
to
the
stay
15
each
system
this
to
operation
although
break
but
the
to
could
of
could
was
aircraft
operating
limited
August.
terms
lose
Shifting
rebuild,
during
continue
to
was
portion
of
What
British
ghters
was
warning
in
in
attempted
early
strategic
September,
RAF
a
part
and
August
British
7
this
early
other
for
rst
and
aircraft
and
her
eets
Intelligence
Germans
during
Spitfire.
Luftwaffe
unprotected
●
RAF
quantity
to
than
the
It
was
them.
On
London
in
conference
to
recover
the
and
shoulders
of
These weapons were in par t designed to
the
citizens
of
London.
It
pushed
the
RAF
hard
and
on
15
September
it
spread terror as well as destruction. How
committed
all
its
reserves
to
repulsing
a
massive
raid
against
the
capital.
eective is terror bombing as a strategy?
The
attack
was
met
and
defeated.
Daylight
bombing
raids
continued
To what extent does its eectiveness
into
October,
causing
damage
that
was
far
outweighed
by
the
cost
to
depend on whether the target country is a
the
Luftwaffe.
Germany’s
air
war
against
Britain
liberal democracy or a dictatorship?
terror
186
bombing
campaign
of
urban
centres.
would
now
focus
on
a
C H A P T E R
6 . 4
O P E R A T I O N S
or from the ground. Once the preset distance had been
Technology and war: pilotless weapons
covered, the engine would stop and the bomb would fall
The Germans had been working on pilotless aircraft,
out of the sky. This meant that it was not a very accurate
specically rocket technology, throughout the 1930s. By
weapon. The Luftwae red 8,500 V1s, about half of which
the end of the decade the programme had grown to the point
were destroyed before they landed.
where a permanent test facility was developed, however, it
was not until 1942 that a rocket was successfully tested.
The V2 was a ballistic missile that carried the same
The test facility was severely damaged in an air raid in 1943,
explosive power as the V1, but because it was propelled
further delaying the deployment of an operational weapon.
by a rocket, it could travel six times faster than the V1 and
was thus more dicult to defend against. About 1,300
V1 bombs were ying bombs that carried about 900 kg of
V2s landed in London, their primary target, killing 2,400
explosives, could travel about 300 km, and were powered
civilians and wounding many more.
by a jet engine. They could be launched from aircraft
The Blitz
The
Blitz
targets
the
refers
Blitz
were
Churchill
Failing
both
The
that,
fate
civil
of
high
and
the
bombs
masks
to
make
For
of
had
with
suffering
surveying
into
a
the
a
in
gas
or
the
A
a
to
do.
to
make
adapted
that
the
were
that
war.
production.
civilians
the
to
the
On
cost.
existing
enemy
such
to
most
issue
famous
as
in
Many
structures,
might
enforced
of
1939
preparations.
authorities
regulations
end
September
from
government,
fear
war
British
From
morale
an
terrible
industrial
throughout
use
aerial
many
an
gas
attempt
difcult.
nights
was
of
point.
000
unrelenting.
bombing.
to
made
victims.
civilians
At
British
Churchill
talking
40
began
British
at
and
goals
civilian
negotiate
warning
prompted
campaign
than
but
centres
German
crush
to
could
built
from
more
to
impede
failure,
Britain
rallying
More
to
urban
1941.
have
ample
were
and
was
bombing
Blackout
damage
sites.
designed
given
poison
consecutive
out
goal
on
May
would
was
direction
targets
months
and
underground.
could.
nding
rst
aerial
shelters
without
57
were
campaign
London
the
bombing
raids
bombing
1940
The
authorities
sizes
they
eight
endured
the
Warsaw
lled
as
sustained
government
explosive
sometimes
being
his
the
defence
types
the
September
twofold.
and
counts,
what
to
between
The
were
one
point
London
propagandists
a
point
royal
killed
of
turned
being
family
during
seen
even
the
toured
Blitz.
Strategic bombing
Strategic
bombing
importance
categories.
structures
was
the
the
Area
in
an
designed
target
The
to
areas
to
Luftwaffe,
They
would
inicted
area,
limit
as
was
the
to
out
have
losses
aerial
on
the
of
of
and
thereby
ground
of
fell
strategic
into
bombing
of
Precision
concentrate
lines
force
deep
although
Bomber
this
value.
railway
bombing
ability,
targets
general,
strategic
support
British
In
indiscriminant
sectors,
heavy
this
bombing
effort.
damage,
industrial
carry
never
heavy
the
war
regardless
designed
to
to
bombing
such
machines
refers
enemy’s
and
their
the
bombing
it,
on
smaller
ports.
action,
into
two
all
never
enemy
night
developed
territory.
ghters
initially
Command.
187
6
C A U S E S
A N D
E F F E C TS
O F
20 T H - C E N T U R Y
W A R S
large numbers in both theatres, with a number of models
Technology and war: long-range bombers
produced by a variety of companies. Eventually over
When the German Luftwae switched from attacking radar
12 000 B17s were produced. Nicknamed the Flying
installations and airelds during the Battle of Britain it did so
For tress, the B17 had a range of 3,000 km and could carry
without the basic requirement of strategic bombing: longbetween 2,000 kg and 3,600 kg of bombs depending
range, level ight heavy bombers. The Allies, being more
on distance to target. Equipped with the precise Norden
committed to long-range strategic bombing, devoted more
bombsight, the B17 dropped approximately 40% of all aerial
resources into developing models capable of delivering large
bombs dropped by the US during the war. The B24 Liberator
payloads of explosives to Germany’s industrial heartland,
was designed to replace the B17 and was produced in
delivered by the British RAF and the US Army Air Corps by night.
greater numbers than any other bomber in the war. The
The British hit upon its most durable design in 1942 with the
B17 was still preferable to aircrew and the B24 augmented
mass production of the Avro Lancaster. Its range was 4,000
rather than replaced the B17 even though it carried a larger
km and was manned by a crew of seven. Its bomb capacity
payload. The B29 Superfor tress only saw action in the
was 14 standard 1,000 lb bombs. It was very versatile in
Pacic. Its range, ceiling, speed and ordinance all made it
terms of possible payloads with a bomb bay that could
the most advanced long-range bomber when it rst ew.
be easily conver ted to carry a wide range of ordinance,
The Allied strategic bombing campaign made use of many
including the “bouncing bombs” of the Dam Raids and the
types and sizes of bombs. The type of target generally
22 000 lb. “Grand Slam”. Navigational aids such as the “Gee”
determined the type of bomb used. All-purpose demolition
system and later “Oboe” allowed for precise navigating at
bombs ranged in size from 45 to 1,350 kg and were used
night, essential for the British bombing strategy.
against industrial targets, railroads and cities. Fragmentation
The Boeing Corporation designed a series of very eective
bombs were generally used against ground troops and
long-range bombers for US forces in both Europe and the
defences. Incendiary bombs were designed to start res and
Pacic. Initially developed in 1937, the B17 was used in
were used against cities in both European and Pacic theatres.
Class discussion
Is there an ethical dierence between
re-bombing cities with incendiary
bombs and demolition bombing cities
with high explosive bombs?
▲
A B1
7 Flying For tress. What role did strategic bombing play in the Allied victory?
British
into
the
operational
enemy
fact
that
protection
Bomber
damage
May
188
doctrine
territory.
the
to
its
British
1942,
German
1,000
no
eets.
aircraft
cities
British
advocated
cover
had
bomber
Command’s
on
The
in
of
night
night
bombing
was
partially
long-distance
As
the
size,
increased,
area
bombers
it
was
bombing
attacked
ghters
number
able
to
could
range
inict
For
German
deep
overcome
that
and
missions.
the
missions
to
offer
of
ever-greater
example
city
of
in
Cologne,
C H A P T E R
setting
600
acres
commander
bombs
what
of
would
was
be
not
of
the
city
Bomber
salted
blasted
ablaze.
Command,
in
among
would
be
This
highlighted
Arthur
high
a
“Bomber”
explosive
new
tactic
Harris.
bombs
to
of
6 . 4
O P E R A T I O N S
the
Incendiary
ensure
that
burned.
TOK discussion
For each of the following targets write arguments for and against attacking it with aerial
bombs during a time of war. In groups of three or four discuss your arguments and make
the decision whether or not the target should be bombed.
●
Ball bearing factories
●
Munitions factories
●
Por ts
●
Cities
●
Railroads
1
On what basis did you make the arguments for and against aerial bombing?
What were the most impor tant factors in coming to a decision?
2
To what extent did your decision dier from the decision made during the Second
World War? How do you account for any dierence?
Bomber production
Bomber
Country
B17 Flying For tress
USA
12 730
B29 Superfor tress
USA
3970
Avro Lancaster
Britain
7377
Dornier Do 217
Germany
1900
Heinkel He 111
Germany
6400
Junker Ju 88
Germany
15 000
The
arrival
different
with
an
of
the
excellent
precision.
These
way
deep
into
way
out
Air
escorts
were
enemy
Force
available.
equipped
far
into
By
with
the
it
Germany
The
and
its
US
the
that
This
targets
States
allowed
so
that
proved
area
in
any
for
brought
were
more
and
ght
bombing,
Air
ghter
Luftwaffe
ght
and
was
but
Belgium
Force
the
its
ghter
seen
lack
and
could
of
the
(USAAF)
which
their
their
long-range
bombing
a
tted
targeting
could
disastrous
until
France,
Army
1942
they
payloads
Mustang
outmatched
in
bombers
precision
night-time
P-51
US
missions
daylight
United
Force
The
their
deep
attacking
excellent
Air
armed
drop
protection.
limit
British
to
1944
the
heavily
airspace,
ghter
Eighth
bombing.
bombsight
were
would
limited
Netherlands.
States
strategic
daylight
complementing
protection
to
B17s
without
Eighth
as
United
approach
Number produced
was
operate
ghter.
189
6.5 Eects of the S ec ond World War
Conceptual understanding
Key questions
➔
How did the end of the Second World War compare to the end of the
First World War?
➔
To what extent did the Allies hold the Axis Powers responsible for the conduct
of the war?
➔
To what extent did the global inuence of Europe change as a result of the war?
Key concepts
➔
Continuity
➔
Change
Immediate eects
Taken
won
as
by
a
whole,
the
USSR
superpowers.
won
from
by
a
the
period.
events
The
effects
this
of
a
European,
is
the
the
of
case
rest
it
of
African
States.
means
insofar
as
Europe
European
that
the
for
history
They
the
Soviet
the
in
and
Pacic
emerged
war
in
Union
majority
the
as
two
Europe
had
of
post-war
theatres
the
the
era
was
been
were
global
not
isolated
inter-war
would
be
fact.
so
vast
complete
civilization
effect
North
United
power
the
war
was
European
immediate
in
course
by
devastation
of
this
European
governed
The
If
the
and
of
the
in
–
was
war
scope
human,
are
clubbed
was
the
impossible
cultural,
by
the
human
to
detail.
economic;
war.
all
Perhaps
The
aspects
the
most
cost.
European war dead
Country
Military deaths
Belgium
12 100
74 000
25 000
320 000
217 600
350 000
Czechoslovakia
France
Germany
Civilian deaths
5 533 000
1 067 000–3 267 000
Great Britain
383 600
67 100
Netherlands
17 000
284 000
3 000
6 500
240 000
5 360 000
Norway
Poland
USSR
8 800 000–10 700 000
15 200 000–13 300 000
Source: “By the Numbers: World Wide Deaths”, The National World War II Museum http://
www.nationalww2museum.org/learn/education/for-students/ww2-history/ww2-by-the-
numbers/world-wide-deaths.html
190
C H A P T E R
The
damage
Aerial
Warsaw
at
its
120
in
although
a
this
raids
lengths
the
of
much
as
the
the
was
the
demolished
damage
that
surrender
direct
in
so
St
the
capitals
retreating
with
lost
standing,
suffer
London,
being
but
hit
one
army.
and
be
The
limited
all
German
could
W A R
were
in
after
Danish
they
out.
would
Cathedral
Florence
before
city
war
W O R L D
continent.
Cologne
burning
S E C O N D
buildings
remained
The
the
the
the
burned
of
itself
hits.
rst
T H E
immense.
across
were
city
lucky,
was
O F
centuries-old
Paul’s
1940.
prompted
their
its
survived
not
by
of
cities
Dresden
While
Blitz
of
cathedral
masterpiece,
during
continent
cathedral
several
war.
Cathedral
institutions
to
shelter
weeks
other
the
parts
and
the
of
such
while
by
the
E F F E C T S
It
then
by
of
was
French
devastated
above.
Cultural
and
to
centre
raid
Wren’s
of
cities
during
bridges,
authorities
from
city
of
architecture
destruction
air
bombs
type
heritage
the
damaged
Coventry
storied
just
of
before
French
Wales.
eastern
were
of
those
art
during
the
did
Europe.
invasion,
by
years
broadens
to
German
war
were
works
of
by
forces.
stolen
began
to
the
from
locations
in
works
remote
in
central
destroyed,
Add
many
to
either
these
cultural
as
thousands
pieces
high-ranking
the
theft.
Louvre
secret
war,
by
and
them
stashed
art
the
extraordinary
from
countless
destroyed
the
to
hide
curators
save
the
and
collections
systematically
before
went
holdings
however,
occupying
been
their
Museum
addition
cities
destruction
moved
deliberately
had
seven
European
from
German
not,
In
or
pilfered
the
war
the
British
This
that
many
museums
damage
more
in
collections
countryside.
collateral
of
single
air
incendiary
in
the
Christopher
her
the
German
heavily
200
damage,
In
of
cultural
devastated
centre.
hectares
over
the
endured
city
leveled
Sir
to
bombing
6 . 5
Nazis
devastation
immeasurably.
Recovery
One
of
First
its
the
own
to
industrial
The
political
as
at
1944
trade
and
Allies
from
aid
the
war,
world’s
in
the
industrial
was
in
was
on
the
it
of
1947
capacity,
soon
1918,
as
In
and
European
but
the
they
the
to
and
poured
had
which
it
by
in
to
The
upon
As
as
crash
of
on
over
post-war
the
1929
the
into
much
of
globe.
60%
period,
US
a
long-
emerged
economy
be
a
timely
any
produced
could
as
early
western
avoid
economy
from
and
1918.
re-establish
to
regained
the
on
many
1930s.
market
US
immediate
loans
extent
wanted
dominant
supply
economy
seen
and
to
left
areas
been
ceased.
stock
be
urban
depended
the
not
had
planned
also
The
the
gold
it
was
hostilities
settlement
could
1920s
leaders
as
Nevertheless
world’s
fuel
the
economy
but
than
period
of
Allied
awed
infrastructure,
economy.
output.
food,
the
US
in
the
of
the
Europe
widespread
global
that.
had
of
as
of
that
inter-war
Europe,
the
out
economy
the
the
of
industrial
form
By
of
in
folly
as
more
global
that
came
destruction
far
Woods
possible
the
that
realization
currencies
two-thirds
Europe.
It
Bretton
dependence
held
the
weak
sound
proved
The
instability
the
as
the
was
understood
recovery
term
lessons
was
recover.
of
It
War
centres
product
had
many
World
of
direct
western
its
lost
self-sustaining
doubt.
to
planning
answer
or
economic
this
pressing
economic
despair
in
issue
nationalism
Europe
that
and
as
the
a
to
remove
potential
US
central
answer
announced
the
economic
to
any
resulting
Marshall
Plan
191
6
C A U S E S
A N D
E F F E C TS
O F
20 T H - C E N T U R Y
in
1947.
Aid
free
trade,
The
United
replaced
a
W A R S
credits
allowing
condition
States’
with
deteriorating
of
economy
European
US/Soviet
for
the
Marshall
also
made
benetted
recovery
relations
improvement
Aid,
demand.
and
was
as
infrastructure
more
wartime
The
a
of
recovery
plan
major
and
efcient.
demand
was
exacerbated
accelerant
in
the
ColdWar.
L TA
Research and communication skills
Choose one of the following cities and research the steps taken to rebuild it after
the Second World War. What was the extent of the damage? How were historic
buildings restored? Were any buildings left as they were? How did the countries
pay for the restoration and rebuilding of their cities?
●
London
●
Berlin
●
Hiroshima
●
Warsaw
●
Dresden
●
Tokyo
●
Cologne
●
Shanghai
●
Nagasaki
Illustrate
your
your
findings
w ith
photographs
and
p resen t
you r
resear ch
to
classmates.
1939–1944
(Post-First
World
War
boundaries)
Estonia
r
e
m
a
n
s
Latvia
G
0
USSR
1
To
1,2
00
,0
ã
Siberia
00
Poles
Poland
7
3
0
,
0
0
0
G
e
r
m
C
ze
ch
o
slo
va
k
ia
Austria
Ukraine
a
n
s
Hungary
Romania
Yugoslavia
Bulgaria
0
▲
400
miles
European population migration, 1939–1944. How do you account for the migration
patterns in the map?
192
200
C H A P T E R
6 . 5
E F F E C T S
O F
T H E
S E C O N D
W O R L D
W A R
1945–1950
(Post-Second
World
War
boundaries)
Estonian
3
0
0
,0
0
0
s
t
l
a
B
S.S.R.
B
a
Latvian
lt
s
0
0
S.S.R.
0
Byelorussian
Lithuanian
Russian
S.F
.S.R.
S.S.R.
2
3
S.S.R
0
0
0
0
0
East
ans
rm
e
G
R
u
ss
ia
n
s
0
0
an
d
Uk
rai
nians
0
0
6
1
1
Poland
Germany
4
,
5
a
0
0
West
,
0
a
T
0
im
0
P
o
Germany
0
0
5
000
3
l
e
Ge
rm
a
n
s
s
S.S.R.
0
80
1
Czec
ho
5
0
0
,0
0
0
K
Ukrainian
slo
vaki
0
0
0
k
U
ra
s
n
ia
in
c
e
s
k
c
u
lm
a
K
a
Moldavian
G
e
rm
a
n
s
To
Siberia
S.S.R.
Austria
Hungary
Romania
Yugoslavia
320 000
Jews
to
Israel
Bulgaria
(1945–1950)
120 000
91 000
0
200
400
from
from
Poland
Romania
37 000
from
Bulgaria
33 000
from
Turkey
22 000
from
Czechoslovakia
17 000
from
Hungary
miles
Post-war European population migration. What eect would this migration have on the
▲
opening years of the Cold War?
War crimes
Allied
leaders
had
discussed
leadership
responsible
on
occasions.
several
had
been
dismissed,
representatives
the
accused.
the
SS,
The
were
●
planning
●
carrying
●
war
●
crimes
The
of
the
and
trials
an
decided
start
holding
the
and
conduct
on
a
of
the
war
summary
execution
tribunal
approach
in
powers
more
German
of
individuals
or
the
suggestion
occupying
one
of
of
as
would
well
the
sit
as
in
which
judgment
collectives
of
such
as
following:
war
aggressive
war
with
humanity.
were
as
continued
War
an
determined
held
well
States.
into
The
intensied.
increasingly
that
needed
in
as
Nuremburg,
in
but
combatant
others
countries
were
such
also
as
held
France,
Canada.
United
Cold
they
with
the
Stalin’s
both
aggressive
against
and
trials
the
out
was
four
accused,
Germany
Belgium
The
it
the
charged
an
both
Once
issue
crimes
main
around
of
for
the
the
they
1949,
although
political
The
will
trials
aggressive
needed
convictions
the
of
to
had
mostly
never
Soviet
support
by
then
under
continue
been
Union,
of
West
minor
the
the
dissipated
popular
the
in
United
Germans
Nazi
auspices
trials
States
more
ofcials.
as
Germany
than
▲
Herman Goering looking bored at his trial for
war crimes. What arguments did the accused
use in their defence?
193
6
C A U S E S
A N D
E F F E C TS
O F
20 T H - C E N T U R Y
W A R S
War crimes verdicts
Name
Position
Sentence
Karl Dönitz
Admiral
10 years imprisonment
Wilhelm Frick
Minister of the Interior
Death
Hans Frank
Governor-General of occupied Poland
Death
Hans Fritzsche
Propaganda ocial
Acquitted
Walther Funk
Minister of Economic Aairs
Life imprisonment
Herman Goering
Commander of the Luftwae and Deputy Führer
Death
Alfred Jodl
Chief of German Armed Forces Operations Sta
Death
Rudolph Hess
Deputy Führer until 1941
Life imprisonment
Wilhelm Keitel
Chief of Armed Forces
Death
Kostantin von Neurath
Foreign Minister and later Governor of occupied
15 years imprisonment
Bohemia and Moravia
Franz von Papen
Vice chancellor and later Nazi ocial in Turkey
Acquitted
Joachim von Ribbentrop
Foreign minister
Death
Erich Raeder
Commander-in-Chief of the navy
Life imprisonment
Hjalmar Schacht
Economic minister
Acquitted
Alfred Rosenberg
Minister for the Eastern Territories
Death
Mar tin Bormann
Head of Par ty Chancellery
Death
Baldur von Schirach
Leader of the Hitler Youth
20 years imprisonment
Ar thur Seys-Inquar t
Reichskommissar for the Netherlands
Alber t Speer
Architect and Minister of Armaments
Julius Streicher
Editor of anti-Semitic magazine Der Stürmer
Death
20 years imprisonment
Death
Long-term eects
The Cold War
The
the
Grand
Axis
together.
Union
Alliance
Powers.
In
and
terms
the
entering
closer
the
the
There
Cold
●
The
Second
The
more
●
Stalin
The
194
or
had
against
between
the
was
a
shared
nothing
the
of
Allies
the
the
singular
the
Germany.
cause
aspects
that
to
the
take
invasion
eastern
interpreted
in
As
one
common
the
Cold
War?
of
came
That
the
of
is
war
defeating
held
the
prior
defeat
again
of
that
worldview,
once
course
purpose
thing
it
Soviet
to
the
United
Germany
to
far
the
too
that
drew
fore.
simplistic.
made
the
war
had
visited
on
the
Soviet
Union
reparations.
of
the
Soviet
Union
caused
Stalin
to
look
for
Europe.
the
p ol icy
of
a p pe a se men t
as
an
an t i -
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origins
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The United Nations
It
is
the
a
testament
League
of
international
powers
hand,
why
could
A
veto
was
would
powers?
not
had
provided
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their
and
other
principle
role
a
the
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it
four
way
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for
in
would
United
country
join
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the
be
they
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to
their
gave
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counted
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dominate
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to
of
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the
as
room.
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persuaded
General
of
other
organization
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and
some
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new
Security
which
voice
view
absence
that
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a
not
security
operations.
vote
powers
(UN),
the
its
most
was
did
collective
respected.
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vote,
if
by
balance
powers
inuence
of
in
impediment
understood
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that
understood
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was
vision
experiment
was
important
found.
and
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another
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leaders’
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to
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simply
balance
the
cooperation.
major
smaller
to
Nations
them
Assembly
under
powerful
the
states.
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This
was
powers.
intact,
the
The
but
second
British
weakened.
contributions
colonies
World
the
to
began
War
force
surrendered
extent
World
Asia
the
to
that
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in
Ho
the
victory
for
United
could
contributed
to
empires
and
to
gain
the
to
the
a
other
more
Algerians
the
States.
no
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longer
wave
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the
no
and
their
the
the
their
old
once
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the
swept
by
for
with
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colonial
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other
ignored
agitation
empires,
decolonization
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Japanese
War
their
and
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imperial
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used
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longer
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weakening
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aftermath
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dominions
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declaration
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endured
autonomy
treatment.
spent
devastate
had
independence
Minh
drafted
post-war
generation
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and
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Canada
cries
and
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French
expect
British
independence.
the
the
to
India’s
weakened
guerrilla
war
and
his
Japanese
powers
to
Second
Africa
and
period.
195
Exam-style questions and fur ther reading
Exam-style questions
1
To
what
extent
was
ideology
a
cause
of
the
Second
World
War
in
Europe?
2
Evaluate
3
Discuss
4
Examine
World
5
To
of
the
7
Compare
Second
8
an
the
resources
of
air
diplomatic
to
power
in
the
to
policy.
German
the
military
outcome
of
strategy.
the
Second
Discuss
strengths
and
capacity
determine
the
outcome
Europe?
Allied
the
Second
industrial
in
effective
signicance
in
of
War
as
War
success
battle
10
the
Allied
contrast
World
Examine
9
did
World
Blitzkrieg
and
effective
Europe.
extent
Evaluate
an
of
importance
in
Second
6
as
importance
the
War
what
the
appeasement
military
and
strategy.
German
use
of
naval
power
in
the
Atlantic.
of
the
World
North
African
campaign
to
Allied
War.
weaknesses
of
German
strategy
during
the
Stalingrad.
Compare
and
Operation
contrast
the
German
offensive
in
western
Europe
and
Barbarossa.
Fur ther reading
Beevor,
New
Antony.
York,
Stalingrad:
Gilbert,
Martin.
1989.
Second
Haslop,
Dennis.
2013.
Britain,
A
Comparative
Keegan,
Germany,
Overy,
Europe,
Taylor,
Study.
John.
Kershaw,
The
Ian.
2011.
1944–45.
AJP
.
1961.
UK
The
Fateful
The
End:
The
Viking.
The
New
World
The
Press.
Siege,
New
of
Stoddart.
and
War.
New
and
York,
the
the
York,
Deance
Bombers
Origins
War.
Germany
Second
Penguin
2014.
1940–1945.
World
Bloomsbury.
1990.
Richard.
London,
196
1998.
1942 –1943.
Viking.
USA.
Battle
of
the
Canada.
Atlantic:
USA.
Viking.
and
York,
the
Toronto,
New
York,
Destruction
of
USA.
Hitler’s
USA.
Bombed:
Allied
Air
War
Over
USA.
Second
World
War .
Hamish
Hamilton.
7
T H E
S E C O N D
W O R L D
T H E
PA C I F I C :
T O TA L
W A R
I N
W A R
Global context
As
with
war
in
the
the
ideological
The
Great
sought
Second
Pacic
and
refuge
of
global
these
a
the
in
the
states
of
most
This
look
deance,
such
as
a
all
of
situation
adversely
policies
and
in
by
Japanese forces invade China
of
The
catastrophe
situation
were
the
by
fostered
and
at
some
the
by
racist
Asia
the
that
and
of
long
time
other
a
way
was
the
existence
the
An
was
its
further
as
they
anti-imperialist
tomanipulate
Asian
a
the
European
simmering
building
of
depression.
Pacic
of
and
out
underpinned
been
attempted
same
expansion
as
philosophies.
had
Japan
expense
in
administration,
sentiment
of
saw
neo-mercantilism
imperial
ultra-nationalism.
Timeline
ultra-nationalists
sort
complicated
that
isolated
turn
in
Many
many
The
economic
1930s.
affected
eventually
of
the
caused
which
form
the
complex
countries.
trade
isolation
and
Europe,
the
context
inward
Japan,
in
of
affected
economic
states
to
War
out
protectionist
depression.
sense
states
economic
Depression
exacerbated
some
World
erupted
own
in
the
this
region
while
empire
at
the
nations.
1937
7 July
1941
7 December
Japanese forces attack Pearl Harbor
US and Britain declare war on Japan;
8 December
Japanese begin advance on Singapore
Japanese forces invade Philippines and
10 December
capture Guam
Japanese forces invade Burma
11 December
18 December
British in Hong Kong surrender
Japanese forces invade Hong Kong
25 December
1942
15 February
Battle of the Java Sea
25 February–1 March
6 May
Battle of Midway
British surrender Singapore
US forces in the Philippines surrender
4–5 June
7 August
US forces invade Guadalcanal
197
7
C A U S E S
A N D
E F F E C TS
O F
20 T H - C E N T U R Y
W A R S
1943
Japanese forces begin withdrawal from
1 February
Guadalcanal
Japanese commander Admiral Yamamoto
18 April
is killed
US invades Bougainville
1 November
20–23 November
Battle of Tarawa
1944
Allied air forces begin aerial bombing
June
campaign
15 June–9 July
US invades Guam
19 July
24 July
US forces land in Philippines
Battle of Saipan
US invades Tinian
20 October
1945
19 February–26 March
Allies recapture Manila
3 March
9 March
Battle of Okinawa
Atomic bomb dropped on Nagasaki
30 August
2 September
198
Atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima
8 August
9 August
British re-occupy Hong Kong
Philippines recapture is completed
16 July
6 August
USSR declares war on Japan
Allies re bomb Tokyo
1 April–22 June
5 July
Atomic bomb successfully tested
Battle of Iwo Jima
Japan surrenders to Allied forces
7
.1
Causes of the S ec ond World War
in the Pacic
Conceptual understanding
Key questions
➔
To what extent was Japanese foreign policy driven by economic and
nationalistic concerns?
➔
To what extent could diplomacy have avoided a war in the Pacic?
➔
To what extent were the issues in the Pacic linked to the European
tensions?
Key concepts
➔
Cause
➔
Consequence
Long-term causes
The First World War
Although
the
western
exports
to
by
the
of
and
agricultural
the
erected
Japan
Paris
and
those
of
Peace
north
but
of
claims.
She
was
the
concessions
China
had
conference
the
against
a
the
Axis
was
claimed
the
“awarded”
had
this
also
Germany
argued
gave
that
half
all
of
be
to
such
the
to
global
in
of
her
China
territory.
They
manufactured
economybegan
the
war,
compete
1920s
their
with
and
own
products.
Japanese
her
commodity
the
protect
and
gave
Likewise,
not
falling
Japanese
and
its
after
War,
the
expanded
exporter
the
Japanese
disappointed
to
all
a
the
of
the
prices
1930s,
edgling
This
would
in
all
German
from
of
concessions
set
possessions
to
to
to
the
be
the
in
supportsuch
war,
trading
while
abolished.
Japanese
the
those
extra-territorial
prior
the
to
eventual
mandates
should
to
the
Britain
the
China
concessions
delegation
with
Nations
pledge
claim
enjoyed
these
within
of
Imports
had
Pacic
could
the
policy
League
despite
had
as
World
course.
right
hoped
the
First
expense
war.
competition.
attempts
partners,
the
the
and
scale,
US
the
the
production
and
cheaper
to
in
However,
small
at
Japan
concessions
West
in
with
war.
renewed
collision
future
the
civilian
mostly
barriers
on
were
materials
Foreshadowing
equator,
Japan
from
of
Conference
settlement.
Pacic,
its
to
during
markets
colonies
for
raw
Allies
her
they
Asia.
back
still
tariff
China
of
eastern
farming
industrialization
as
demands
suffered
mid-1920s.
the
German
importer
sector,
efcient
China
Like
21
to
300%during
switch
manufacturers
of
by
occupying
key
aid
expanding
occupied
throughout
recover
more
busy
powers,
ultimatum
became
goods
provided
was
increased
inuence
an
Japan
country
The
thereby
199
7
C A U S E S
A N D
E F F E C TS
O F
20 T H - C E N T U R Y
satisfying
to
neither
enshrine
Asia
was
equal
side.
racial
demonstrating
to
Likewise
equality
to
be
W A R S
her
in
that
treated
as
as
a
Japan
the
far
was
frustrated
covenant
as
the
retainer
at
of
the
western
the
in
her
League
powers
imperial
attempts
of
Nations,
were
table
concerned
rather
than
an
partner.
Washington Naval Conference
In
an
and
effort
Japan
East
to
in
avert
the
concerns
made
to
signicant
growth
of
them.
the
of
ratio
at
5:5:3
in
the
at
Pacic,
inuence
under
for
ship
the
were
it
of
these
US
in
and
that
of
the
steps
inequities
and
restrictions.
the
treaties
Japan
quo
in
treaty.
China’s
toward
Japan
in
The
Nine
Japan
60
Japan
that
did
working
in
the
ratio
peace
place.
As
the
in
the
bridled
should
renew
also
these
increasingly
not
possess
Treaty,
While
a
ships
established
fortications
Power
Versailles
Far
future
could
naval
establishing
grew,
the
over
powers
of
Britain
with
Washington
limiting
sovereignty.
at
at
Washington
these
argued
and
and
States,
involved
signed
terms
established
refused
United
destroyed
signed
nationalists
When
US
the
nations
eachof
status
guaranteed
the
The
Treaty
tonnage
nine
disarmament
Britain,
the
between
1921.
Power
duration
militarists
and
race
invited
naval
important
froze
equal,Britain
in
US,
Five
Washington,
agreements
the
The
The
in
re-established
Pacic
signed
arms
the
inroads
capital
and
naval
Washington
navies.
between
a
Pacic,
be
treaty
1936.
Ultra-nationalism
On
the
surface
emperor.
government.
and
This
the
was
necessary
As
the
in
to
Samurai
reality
was
turn
were
and
the
was
Japan
as
in
oil
in
turn
the
that
heart
buying
large
to
to
of
the
an
families
economic
falter
in
preaching
part
in
the
of
of
who
nished
also
was
was
to
revival
East
serving
the
be
and
product.
held
to
and
bit
the
only
the
Asia.
an
in
country,
empire
fundamentalist
ways
of
the
anti-western
hard
This
was
into
important
answer
to
The
politically
the
already
evaporated
government
the
problem
a
saw
periphery,
centre
–
would
Japan
later
rich
–
and
nd
To what extent was Japanese ultraexpression
in
the
vague
organization
called
the
Greater
nationalism similar to fascism?
Prosperity
200
Sphere
–
in
fact
a
tool
of
imperial
control.
of
ultra-nationalism
expansion
envisioned
relationship
navy
inuence.
goods.
government
target.
the
the
an
doctrine.
industrialized
This
a
the
army
subsequent
It
of
nished
1920s,
the
divine
with
health
for
“new”
1929
ofcers
in
the
a
economic
empire,
return
and
inuence
this
a
this
army
Crash
along
and
markets
by
responsible
expanding
and
to
for
Ultra-nationalism
Street
leader
overseen
political
civilian
resources,
its
began
China
of
of
materials
expansion
and
natural
other
closely
important
Wall
democracy
mechanism
deal
closely
Japan.
military
markets
the
great
adherents
the
argued
at
and
an
no
importance
economy,
serving
shrinking
that
After
Japanese
ministries
raw
pre-Meiji
found
liberal
number
a
linked
in
movement
frail
a
economy
grew
sentiments
powerful.
a
linked
provide
and
was
however,
exercised
Japanese
movement
Class discussion
was,
In
army
inuence
which
Japan
There
East
Asia
Co-
C H A P T E R
7. 1 :
C A U S E S
O F
T H E
S E C O N D
W O R L D
W A R
I N
T H E
P A C I F I C
Short-term causes
Great Depression
As
the
grew
Great
Depression
higher,
the
began
Japanese
to
spread
government
around
the
responded
world
with
and
tariff
decit
walls
nancing.
decit nancing
The
ultra-nationalists
and
militarists
in
the
government
demanded
that
Government spending that is dependent
much
of
this
borrowed
money
go
to
rearming
the
military,
which
they
on loans, thus pushing the government’s
would
then
argue
was
the
tool
by
which
the
economic
crisis
could
be
budget into a decit.
solved.
When
assassinated.
was
the
on
Prime
By
1937
armaments.
lands
of
Minister
China
over
This
Takahashi
two-thirds
radical
appeared
to
tried
of
the
curtail
Japanese
expansion
be
to
of
source
the
in
a
this
spending,
government
military
sort
of
had
he
was
expenditure
to
be
fed
and
neo-mercantilism.
Japanese expansion
The
lack
of
civilian
began
to
in
Chinese
the
tell
in
it
was
the
The
act
supported
of
rail
a
of
the
1930s.
Mukden
line
reality
of
the
early
city
Japanese-owned
Manchuria.
control
the
rogue
that
the
far
and
Manchukuo
under
The
government
by
puppet
and,
alleged
the
Japanese
an
Chinese
military
of
unit.
had
the
of
a
set
a
government
Japanese
explosion
act
military
1932
indeed,
murder
staged
from
Japanese
expansion
the
and
gave
is
military
The
on
a
pretext
Chinese
emperor
a
to
Tokyo
protectorate
Pu
occupy
aggression,
Nevertheless
up
ofcer
nearby
called
Yi
Pu Yi
The last emperor of the Manchu dynasty
Chinese
complained
bitterly
to
the
League
of
Nations.
in China. Pu Yi came to the throne in 1908
While
there
seemed
a
political
will
on
the
part
of
the
smaller
members
at the age of three and was emperor until
of
the
League
to
act,
they
had
little
means
to
do
so.
The
US
urged
he abdicated in 1912. After the Japanese
the
League
to
enforce
the
Kellogg-Briand
Pact
to
which
both
China
invaded Manchuria in 1931 they installed
and
Japan
had
been
signatories.
Unwilling
to
commit
any
troops
to
him as the emperor of a territory renamed
Manchuria,
the
League
sent
the
Lytton
Commission
to
investigate
and
Manchukuo.
compile
a
Japanese.
to
be
also
report
League
failed
to
weaker
given
last
fragile
war
Japanese
other
to
and
the
affairs.
US
recognize
any
Japanese
illustrative
1930s.
of
1930s,
the
the
This
was
to
that
set
back
states
clear
of
1932,
on
stage
and
them
would
for
treaties
up
with
choose
of
China
the
the
all
US
were
force.
of
the
In
protect
12
for
rights
US
in
declaring
all
the
to
as
Amau Doctrine
A doctrine of 1930s Japanese foreign
and
policy that reserved the right of Japan
policy
would
for
insofar
an
the
on
Door”
inability
the
a
likewise
economic
the
a
after
League,
relations
at
had
of
powers
years
calling
difcult
trade
the
Doctrine
that
useful
the
to
“Open
West’s
only
result
security
was
and
Chinese
stated
the
a
expense
the
Amau
commercial
and
As
support
only
powers
both
which
the
Garnering
international
to
at
unpalatable
of
the
Manchukuo
Treaty.
Collective
inuence
from
rejection
Manchuria
the
of
of
and
League.
expand
of
Chinese
territory
weakness
issuing
sphere
infringed
of
part
the
Power
test.
were
state
themselves
Doctrine
invasion
and
a
to
essential
further,
Japanese
both
the
economy.
economic
remove
major
force
remote
the
Nine
from
sanctions
a
on
resulting
the
rst
global
went
Agreements
willing
the
to
treaty
was
were
of
the
of
using
defend
the
Stimson
The
the
to
given
within
its
from
Economic
state
blame
withdrew
failed
state
government
be
violation
Understanding
countries
political
and
a
placed
however,
in
Japanese
adventure
impossibility.
China
and
clearly
prevent
the
report
found,
the
had
The
neighbour.
military
the
It
illegitimate
ofthe
The
report.
not
to act unilaterally to preserve “order ”
in East Asia.
region.
stop
the
it
rest
of
countries
economic
expense
times
of
201
7
C A U S E S
A N D
E F F E C TS
O F
20 T H - C E N T U R Y
national
Powers,
to
to
self-determination.
but
which
each
of
see
W A R S
not
US
and
these
how
the
future
Japanese
countries
they
It
was
Allied
policy
continue
would
not
a
lesson
Powers.
in
the
along
come
into
learned
It
also
region
its
was
foreign
some
by
sort
the
future
illuminated
Axis
degree
contradictory.
policy
of
the
path,
it
Should
was
hard
conict.
Sino-Japanese War and US reaction
In
February
Army
Prime
were
of
Minister
causing
the
army
in
of
city
to
threatened
which
the
war
with
day.
This
strategic
war
US,
the
in
the
ate
up
one
on
for
Jieshi’s
the
of
Japanese
assassinate
the
perpetrators
consequence
government,
policy
issues
250
entire
000
which
would
and
resources
had
take
in
steel
weeks
the
quantities.
Japanese
after
of
the
clearly
to
Jiang’s
Japanese,
Eventually
over
to
the
much
loans
with
prove
of
aggression
government
the
the
Polo
Japanese
out
captured
This
Marco
The
him
prompted
concessions.
the
extended
and
would
propel
on
invasion.
civilians
larger
Japanese
control
more
forcing
they
oil
for
dispute
full
army
and
traded
would
a
a
north-east.
region
larger
political
forces,
Japanese
the
US
that
of
foreign
and
strange
government
pretext
also
in
cost
Imperial
number
the
ever-greater
some
the
businesses
to
the
be
$5
a
the
million
serious
government
a
and
to
US.
the
keep
Japanese
what
and
back
determined
they
Dutch
could
journey
Philippines.
killing
would
to
Jiang
year
a
had
concessions,
a
interests
liability,
British
as
its
invaders
Japanese
their
a
and
control
Chinese
to
China
essence,
to
and
its
in
government
answers.
the
of
failed
solutions
further
work
ofcers
civilian
however,
close
US
the
coup
tighten
used
dependence
with
order
was
junior
the
military
refused
and
US
government.
to
the
Within
coast
The
military
of
Nanjing,
of
incident,
pressure
short
fell.
group
diplomatic
Beijing
made
Chinese
In
that
Nanjing
capital
the
This
ascendance
Bridge
a
overthrow
Okado.
over
Japanese
When
to
military
ensure
precedence
the
1936
executed.
helped
This
of
attempted
had.
holdings
take
to
This
from
the
Something
in
the
home
would
that
they
expansion
south-east
region
islands
needed
would
China.
would
by
eventually
the
be
US
have
to
expand
eventually
Any
resources
threatened
on
protectorate
to
in
threaten
in
the
give.
War plans
There
was
is
no
competition
exception.
attempted
navy,
rabid
the
coup
more
The
a
greater
Japanese
land
division
202
the
1936,
of
it
but
the
is
thus
against
was
engaged
tested
a
Mongolian
it
was
All
and
share
in
border.
for
Soviets.
the
late
force
The
in
a
military
sullied
never
the
the
of
summer
Japanese
the
of
that
Japan’s
the
powerful.
of
to
The
the
want
interest
and
to
thus
resources.
emphasized
known
1939
command
were
and
by
taken
military
distribution
plan,
the
very
really
national
solution
This
under
any
been
politically
had
to
of
had
branches
vital
argued
Soviet
still
branch,
more
the
branches
reputation
army.
the
inuence
army
operations
programme”
on
that
the
army’s
conservative
nationalism
demonstrate
claim
of
between
The
as
the
when
of
a
“north
Japanese
Georgi
overwhelmed
Zhukov
and
C H A P T E R
withdrew.
From
the
for
The
search
“south
navy.
The
It
of
point,
also
France
“south
more
clash
June
C A U S E S
into
S E C O N D
the
of
would
was
in
the
the
W A R
I N
T H E
P A C I F I C
push
dominant.
inuence
interests
signing
W O R L D
which
planning
western
and
T H E
Indo-China
strategic
with
1940
O F
programme”
hegemony
gave
likely
in
the
and
programme”
would
fall
that
resources
7. 1 :
to
the
region.
Tripartite
Pact
Tripar tite Pact
with
Italy
and
Germany
seemed
to
open
the
way
for
the
expansion
of
An agreement signed on 27 September
Japanese
inuence
into
the
French
colony
in
Indo-China.
With
her
right
1940 by Japan, Germany and Italy. The
ank
protected
by
a
non-aggression
pact
with
the
Soviets,
Japan
had
by
pact pledged its signatories to mutual
the
summer
of
1941
occupied
the
entire
colony.
aid should any of them be attacked by a
country not then at war.
Pearl Harbor
The
months
Hawaiian
United
States
integrity
as
be
be
July
1941
British
effect
of
the
were
before
he
In
Admiral
understood
hoped
the
could
win.
that
event
be
of
Yamamoto
on
Pacic.
could
hand
The
in
the
between
that
nor
Chinese
have
the
territorial
Japanese
to
were
their
just
strategic
for
of
necessary,
perimeter
avoid
six
little
Japanese
they
a
war
to
studied
the
strategic
act
they
quickly,
could
the
view
in
the
US
potential;
States.
Japanese
Should
that
thinking
oil
the
United
the
year.
the
military
military
that
a
was
chief
with
had
Japan’s
faster
This
by
Japanese
and
the
condence
would
which
had
and
were
be
supported
clock.
and
believed
months
had
from
Navy
to
the
steel
coming,
strength
he
its
the
Yamamoto
come
cut
impossible.
Imperial
could
embargo,
of
and
Japanese
claimed
This
on
was
combat
the
they
an
US
US
industrial
Yamamoto
as
much
the
the
Indo-China
Japan.
and
with
Yamamoto.
did
of
that
ordered
oil
made
war
all
time
with
Japanese
outline
tasked
and
naval
was
on
at
from
on
in
Pearl
the
in
A
the
the
they
in
war
could
the
fall
expanding
negotiate
US
the
Washington
gave
larger
force
of
their
from
was
and
the
to
of
such
the
for
US
Japanese
a
had
thereby
vital
would
would
was
that
It
overpower
Waves
eet
Pacic,
plan.
and
operation
carriers
Surprise
Sundays
attack
land
Harbor.
aircraft
damage
gains.
of
the
would
Islands.
focus
base
to
its
negotiations
be
army
operations
consolidate
down
developing
Wake
main
launch
goal
could
with
Japanese
The
US
carry
standing
surprise
be
Guam
the
The
to
its
successful
the
The
would
not
ongoing
of
was
on
bombers
a
base
a
strength.
Philippines.
attack
same
with
awesome
that,
war
assaults.
outposts
of
war
the
gains,
intercepts,
trade
government
defensive
position
80%
such
formed
Should
empire’s
three
his
that
the
all
Isoroku
its
beyond
This
1941.
of
reopened.
occupied
radio
shortages
reasonably
continue
the
fuel
army
negotiations
if
naval
approval.
Roosevelt
and
US
wrangling
determined
be
faith.
on
the
recent
at
over
low
trade
plans
the
commander
planner,
and
from
was
their
through
Dutch,
on
diplomatic
US
free
forfeit
Japanese
good
putting
reserves
better,
in
and
off
of
the
attack
of
The
western
military
negotiating
military
to
the
urry
and
not
learned,
developing
the
to
to
a
Japan.
restored
subject
Roosevelt
up
saw
and
determined
plans
In
leading
Islands
torpedo
an
Pacic
US
in
aerial
and
dive
across
extent
giving
this
the
land
surprise
snuck
contain
the
that
Japan
operation.
Fleet’s
the
a
it
free
The
tradition
condence
that
this
achieved.
203
7
C A U S E S
A N D
E F F E C TS
O F
20 T H - C E N T U R Y
The
US
Pacic
available
little
two
Fleet
ammunition
of
others.
and
200
end
of
2,000
was
anti-aircraft
waves
three
▲
W A R S
Twelve
day
were
those
that
to
sink
other
were
the
surprised.
went
bombers
aircraft
the
for
indeed
guns
were.
four
vessels
destroyed,
US
had
Over
unmanned
It
of
suffered
took
a
battleships
varying
most
of
there
little
and
sizes
them
2,700
two-thirds
and
on
over
were
casualties
the
precious
an
heavily
the
of
was
hour
also
damaged
ground.
of
for
damage
which
By
just
the
over
dead.
Ships of the United States navy burn at Pearl Harbor. What are the moral implications
of attacking before a formal declaration of war? To what ex tent are such declarations
anachronisms?
While
the
damage
unqualied
during
hit
on
the
7
Harbor
the
raid,
were
much
been
it
an
the
is
December
that
in
not
the
1941.
heavily
in
US
is
a
stunning,
it
aircraft
The
to
the
it
was
Despite
consider
had
that
Pearl
and
far
been
US
Harbor
industrial
was
was
in
could
and
repair
from
what
what
not
the
dockyards
that
vessels
testament
to
carriers
order.
fuel
be.
meant
ensuring
to
to
signicant
short
able
was
needed
survival
damaged,
it
raid
more
their
base,
Indeed
the
The
and
Pacic
operational
damaged.
by
Japanese
perhaps
morning
initiative
tanks
Class discussion
caused
success
Pearl
was
oil
still
that
strength
hit
not
regain
huge
those
the
of
very
had
the
What role did luck play in the events of
US
that
of
the
four
battleships
sunk
at
Pearl
Harbor
that
7 December 1941?
were
204
raised
and
repaired
within
two
and
a
half
years.
morning
two
7
.2
C ombatants
Conceptual understanding
Key questions
➔
How did the military potential of Japan and the Allied Powers compare
in 1941?
➔
What role did geography play in the relative strengths of the combatants?
➔
What inuence did the fact that Japan was ghting in one theatre of war
and the Allied powers were ghting in multiple theatres have on the relative
strength of the combatants?
Key concepts
➔
Continuity
➔
Change
➔
Signicance
Allied forces
In
1939
the
Australian
ofcoastline
varying
had
to
sizes.
The
army
another
air
80
force
armed
The
of
forces
holdings.
vital
Only
some
about
defending
of
General
Jiang
another
spread
the
lines
survived
the
units.
over
of
3,000
levels
of
training.
of
various
By
the
end
This
of
force
the
had
cruisers
war,
of
men
and
The
Australia’s
served
in
all
major
casualties.
the
initially
garrisons
were
up
war
retreat
garrison
back
at
be
concentrated
Kong
The
of
India.
of
would
captured
in
Atlantic
the
British
army,
and
Like
was
in
other
these
Indian
supported
to
and
the
as
bulk
its
Singapore
force
in
Europe
units
poorly
this
would
in
Isles.
of
though
were
Hong
concentrated
of
British
made
in
trained.
those
mostly
number
troops
made
over
Singapore
after
surrender.
nationalist
fought
weak,
the
force
assets
000
amount
permanent
Eventually
80
the
six
theatre
the
British
given
were
outbreak
for
small
vessels
men.
with
Navy
000
forces
and
Pacic
after
Chinese
around
regular
000
strong,
Percival’s
300
50
30
army
army
million
were
000
Jiang’s
tiny
Burma
these
Jieshi’s
war.
both
17
Of
communist
the
Royal
incredibly
largest
machines.
1
the
a
Singapore,
Burma,
Indian
000.
250
supply
defending
eventually
130
in
and
Mediterranean
werethe
up
of
Its
reservists
suffering
forces
Burma
smaller
had
numbered
war,
was
defend.
potential
consisted
British
India,
and
000
forces
theatres
navy
it
close
to
consisted
forces
2
of
million
about
under-equipped,
country.
guerrilla
Mao’s
as
and
army
formations
well
as
Mao
Japanese
230
000
poorly
grew
during
to
soldiers
effective
led
the
Zedong’s
and
about
throughout
troops
trained
400
000
with
divisions
troops
in
war.
205
7
C A U S E S
A N D
E F F E C TS
O F
20 T H - C E N T U R Y
The
United
during
men
the
during
stood
at
3
October
23
States
war.
the
65
would
Marine
war
By
battleships,
army
The
aircraft
1941.
W A R S
and
had
carriers,
the
9
end
its
20
grew
own
the
air
and
war,
26
divisions
to
battleships,
of
cruisers,
deploy
Corps
to
The
cruisers
US
Pacic
divisions
corps.
8
the
eet
six
US
operations
485
Pacic
and
Pacic
and
40
000
Fleet
destroyers
Fleet
had
grown
in
to
carriers.
Japanese forces
When
24
the
Japanese
divisions
swelled
130
this
Harbor
4,400
produced
industry
Harbor,
States
by
between
were
the
of
a
only
but
year.
United
close
aircraft
army
army
to
as
be
had
the
to
twice
by
was
the
Allies.
50
000
aircraft
that
personnel
aircraft
its
a
the
the
forces
in
war
in
war’s
while
year.
in
were
the
the
000
end
The
US
Pearl
1941,
Japanese
United
to
be
ghting
Japanese
political
the
fewer
lion’s
By
1945
in
Did Japan overreach its military
any
position
to
capabilities?
home
206
islands.
offer
resistance
to
the
Allied
forces
moving
is
divided
whereas
The
The
received
far
aircraft
on
by
equipment.
but
who
differential
had
war.
China
men
attack
the
Pacic.
the
China,
as
26
had
on
producing
Japanese
the
over
replacement
men
of
attack
million
was
the
production
throughout
and
million
time
year,
3
combined
the
many
that
By
per
which
over
of
Japan
as
about
indoctrination
navy
eve
producing
000
had
and
and
1939
11
thin
it
the
access
By
concentrated
spread
1.8
On
nearly
was
US
in
ensured
reinforcement
Japanese
to
1937
army
problem
from
theatres
could
had
was
The
States
out
slightly
The
aircraft.
marginally
risen
in
Conscription
training.
This
demand
various
the
of
had
only
1941.
military
period.
nonetheless
of
by
increased
the
China
aircraft.
12–24
levels
same
pushing
Japanese
share
Japanese
wartime
the
inuence
Class discussion
divisions
production
was
invaded
5,000
between
varying
the
had
misleading,
forces
of
whereas
buoyed
aircraft
50
aircraft
in
army
about
the
received
over
the
to
squadrons
Pearl
had
and
toward
the
7
.3
Strateg y and tactics
Conceptual understanding
Key questions
➔
What inuence did geography have on strategy?
➔
What were the relative strengths and weaknesses of Allied and Japanese
strategy?
➔
What role did strategy play in the outcome of the war?
Key concepts
➔
Cause
➔
Consequence
➔
Signicance
Japanese war plans
Understanding
the
industrial
Japanese
strategists
period
offensive
island
of
bases
Indonesia.
Dutch
widening
the
(in
the
the
drawing
the
US
still
eventually
gained
had
perimeter
Such
and
a
plan
doctrine
the
the
some
Pacic
like
no
Admiral
long-range
crew
by
US
the
the
–
time
the
and
the
joint
naval
the
elite
and,
high
had
Yamamoto
of
a
of
table.
conict
eet’s
As
not
was
in
repower.
Imperial
to
a
the
The
The
Japanese
it
of
by
1945
could
narrowly
islands.
army
relatively
the
Japanese
Navy
effort
and
operational
The
and
aircraft
Should
war
line
make
carrier
to
further
Japanese
Japanese
would
history.
aircraft
spring
home
common.
however,
the
the
between
the
New
According
planned,
that
further
thus
needed
still
Allied
By
of
and
Islands
maintained
thought
initial
and
conict.
was
the
shrunk.
of
war
the
be
surrounding
part
Burma.
US,
which
Kurile
resources
the
the
Kong,
through
to
into
reduced
British
during
the
attrition
fact,
training
in
the
command
was
carrier,
the
of
cooperation
saw
again
An
Malaya
Hong
west
widen
could
in
been
from
Zealand
war
negotiating
close
aircraft
other
enclose
the
follow
of
perimeter
into
and
Islands,
north
strategy.
force
running
New
defend
to
would
necessarily
immediately
require
army
perimeter
Japanese
opinion
extension
were
would
potential
strategic
Singapore
then
point,
initial
islands
bases
probably
that
to
as
Marshall
and
re-evaluated
the
of
the
the
also
coordination
technology
adopters.
their
its
would
This
for
and
the
the
southward
fortication
Indies
would
the
be
that
in
around
navy.
new
–
to
and
such
military
defensive
Pacic
perimeter
It
ghting
forcing
realistically
drawn
this
momentum,
mid-1943
the
East
a
extend
of
through
thus
essentially
require
reinforce
south
the
period
Australia
be
the
would
A
empire.
into
and
would
strongholds
would
around
the
of
war.
strategists
sustain
by
latter
out
north)
Guinea,
to
The
Japanese
the
developed
operations
eastward
forces
might
its
were
in
early
planes
carriers
and
war
a
and
considerable
207
7
C A U S E S
A N D
E F F E C TS
O F
20 T H - C E N T U R Y
time
and
rening
for
resources
their
still
planes,
After
limiting
their
became.
Iwo
the
war
they
were
these
tactics
included
a
the
were
to
about
rst
in
the
rst
be
by
on
US
the
six
war
to
one-
the
defended
until
loyalty
In
no
and
two-seat
days.
Pearl
Harbor
later
as
on
such
stages
defenders
often,
they
Islands
the
the
operations.
stronger
approaches.
bunkers.
navigation
clear
after
into
distance
and
defensive
defences
beach
and
Aircraft
for
months
in
and
operational
relatively
involved
erce
construction
the
kilometres.
of
these
tunnels
would
their
1941
operations
covered
of
inspired
attacks
300
years
primarily
pillboxes
defences
into
December
strengthen
warren
were
poured
7
was
in
successes
had
suicide
By
long-range
forces
Concrete
Jima
These
safe
initial
land
longer
been
aircraft
rudimentary
Japanese
The
had
operation.
carrier-borne
was
W A R S
were
as
of
left.
Saipan,
units.
US strategy: Island Hopping
Yamamoto’s
a
strategic
predicted
defeat
Japanese
would
offensive
initiative
to
make.
Should
small
and
Which
they
service,
the
route
the
but
many
at
least
it
some
MacArthur
The
that
fact
prompted
was
not
he
the
the
two
theatres
Command
Nimitz
By
Together
and
a
of
while
theatre.
power,
ego.
the
1943,
they
central
to
as
stronger
they
would
cover
was
based
bombers
Japanese
were
of
to
bear
no
a
on
could
army
be
chosen.
the
especially
taken
to
to
General
opponents
however,
which
one
split
have
Pacic.
navy,
forces,
occupy
sufcient
would
in
The
its
vital
and
had
Roosevelt’s
of
ofcer,
army
ofcer
Pacic.
therefore
decision.
the
which
its
Domestic
with
the
Pacic
the
theatre
was
given
to
Admiral
Chester
command
of
the
south-west
was
given
command
of
the
entire
that
Japanese
them
next
get
the
The
a
US
US
man.
This
forces
then
system
close
naval
or
air
islands.
that
On
them
that
the
would
these
to
support.
bring
air
heavy
against
Allies
sea
bypass
overlapping
campaign
and
positions
would
allow
of
air
strategy
enough
bombing
islands
strength,
This
Pacic
Pacic.
defensive
forces
smaller
would
garrisoned
on
strong
invasion
capture
strategic
without
last
US
that
island.
the
initiate
value
to
and
airstrips
played
strength,
Hopping”.
defences
islands.
strategic
with
the
US
islands?
with
with
conquer
The
route
command
was
strategy
build
eventually
home
in
Pacic
navy
to
navy,
military
home
populated
the
the
decisions
given
defend
with
to
the
some
was
“Island
islands
power
US
in
the
while
drawbacks.
the
1942
south-west
him
an
role
Pacic.
connected
Pacic
Nimitz
adopted
known
to
and
make
had
Japanese
Pacic
After
Midway,
war.
minimizing
willingness
with
over
decision
a
in
central
the
leave
Corps,
play
forces
senior
handing
The
islands
air
to
the
now
south-west
would
along
the
MacArthur
while
become
in
of
get
politically
Marine
MacArthur’s
into
was
also
the
should
was
President
interested
included
not
the
months.
at
perimeter
US
central
six
defeat
advantages
land
across
The
toward
the
route
enough
role
Douglas
would
Pacic
did
take
its
only
defensive
US.
through
had
lasted
crushing
the
across
or
politics
it
a
their
to
would
islands
but
over
route
lacked
little
manpower
play
it
success
and
behind
islands,
central
of
Sea
directly
Each
inter-service
Choosing
sit
went
move
islands?
year
Coral
now
garrisoned
larger
208
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land-
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A N D
S T R A T E G Y
7. 3 :
C H A P T E R
209
7
C A U S E S
A N D
E F F E C TS
L TA
Thinking and communication
skills
O F
20 T H - C E N T U R Y
W A R S
Strategic bombing and commercial warfare
By
of
9
July
their
1944
Pacic
the
US
was
strategy
able
into
to
begin
action.
The
putting
capture
the
of
second
Saipan
component
brought
the
Even though they were on the same side,
Japanese
home
islands
within
range
of
the
newest
US
long-range
bomber,
there was an intense rivalry between
the
B-29
Superfortress.
Two
months
earlier
the
Philippines
had
come
General MacAr thur and Admiral Nimitz.
within
range
of
the
heavy
bombers.
The
US
believed
that
the
B-29s
could
Each argued for a strategy that would
reduce
much
reduce
these
of
Japan’s
urban
areas,
built
as
they
were
out
of
wood.
To
highlight their respective service.
cities,
the
US
would
use
incendiary
bombs
designed
to
start
MacAr thur argued for a strategy that
res
rather
than
high
explosives
designed
to
blast
buildings.
would take a southern route and prioritize
the recapture of the Philippines, relying
on the army. Nimitz countered that the
navy should take the lead and island
hop across the central Pacic, taking the
most direct route to the Japanese home
islands.
Along
the
with
US
imported
merchant
no
devastating
navy
their
to
the
plan
shipping
A
taking
for
Japanese
interrupt
resources.
shipping,
coherent
Atlantic
sought
its
ability
their
submarine
advantage
defence
in
to
produce
shipping
campaign
of
the
lines
the
fact
way
the
war
along
savaged
that
the
Allies
material,
which
they
Japan’s
Japanese
protected
had
their
lanes.
Choose one of these approaches
to champion. Develop and deliver a
Fighting in the Pacic
presentation to the class presenting your
The
Pacic
Ocean
is
over
160
million
square
kilometres
in
size.
To
case. Once all the presentations have
say
that
locating
enemy
ships
in
such
a
vast
expanse
is
a
challenge
is
been made, vote as a class on which was
an
understatement
of
the
rst
order.
Naval
warfare
until
this
point
in
the best option.
history
much
had
to
enemies
as
in
the
do
been
with
conned
the
generally
case
relatively
of
small
fact
to
that
occupied
Rome
and
areas
and
for
the
relatively
much
same
Carthage,
congested.
Not
of
close
the
the
and
intervening
the
landfall.
history
continent,
so
to
Pacic.
of
naval
when
is
of
the
had
warfare,
they
body
This
This
did
water
reason
not,
was
that
Class discussion
the
To what extent was Japan more
dependent on maritime commerce
than the US was?
aircraft
While
before
they
carriers
▲
could
could
kilometres.
rage
carrier
battleships
became
had
start
carry
The
to
on
vast
reconnaissance
the
indispensable
generally
pounding
also
weapon
within
other
against
placed
in
the
kilometres
with
the
a
20
their
enemy
premium
at
big
Pacic
of
guns,
distances
on
war.
each
reliable
other
aircraft
of
200
long-
aircraft.
A US Lockheed Lightning. To what ex tent did the Allies have a technological advantage
over the Japanese in the Pacic war?
210
each
operations
distances
get
C H A P T E R
Any
land
entail
difcult
until
operations
amphibious
enterprises.
they
secure
landed
exposed
the
to
then
offensive
as
it
The
while
troops
of
the
supply
they
moved
either
air
so
or
the
were
incredibly
until
was
ships
supported
Japan
landings
were
moderately
Command
operation.
attack
by
Amphibious
Landing
and
beachhead.
amphibious
undertaken
landings.
troop
Allies
A N D
T A C T I C S
would
notoriously
established
for
a
and
a
successful
transports
landings
S T R A T E G Y
vulnerable
essential
and
the
they
7. 3 :
were
while
supplying
inland.
Technology and war: aircraft carriers
Early in the 1920s militaries around the world were
Never theless, the eectiveness of the aircraft carrier
experimenting with aircraft taking o from and landing on
was demonstrated early in the war with the British Royal
a ship. The rst aircraft carriers were conver ted cruisers
Navy attack on the Italian eet at Taranto in 1940 and
and other vessels with ight decks built on the existing
the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. From that point
hull. By the 1930s all the major maritime powers had
carrier production and tactics evolved quickly. An aircraft
some form of purpose-built aircraft carriers.
carrier was only as eective as its aircraft. The Japanese
star ted the war with one of the best carrier-borne ghters
The aircraft carrier made imminent sense in naval
of the war, the Mitsubishi A6M Zero. By 1942 the US
warfare. Aircraft dramatically increased the combat
navy had the Grumman Hellcat which was itself an
eectiveness of surface eets to the extent that the
excellent carrier-borne ghter. Throughout the war most
Battle of Coral Sea, early in the Pacic war, became the
nations created smaller aircraft carriers, escor t carriers,
rst battle in history in which the opposing surface eets
designed to protect invasion otilla and be generally more
never laid eyes on each other. Never theless, adopting
manoeuvrable.
the new technology did not come easily to senior sta
who had been trained to believe that the battleship
The increased impor tance of aircraft carriers placed a
was the king of the sea and whose tactical training and
greater emphasis on their protection. Fleet carriers were
experience had been moulded in this tradition. Likewise
accompanied by a wide range of escor t vessels and were
the air arm had to learn new and dangerous skills, namely
armed with the latest in anti-aircraft weapons to keep
taking o and landing from a tiny, bobbing speck in the
attacking planes at bay. Inventions such as the proximity
middle of a vast ocean, not to mention navigating to and
fuse, which detonated an anti-aircraft shell when it
from targets with initially rudimentary instruments, the
was near an airplane, rather than requiring a direct hit,
whole time judging fuel consumption to ensure there was
improved aircraft carrier defences immensely.
enough to return to the carrier.
211
7
.4
Operations
Conceptual understanding
Key questions
➔
What role did industrial production play in the war?
➔
What factors led to the halt of the Japanese advance?
➔
How did land, naval, and air forces coordinate their actions?
➔
What role did technology play in the outcome of the war?
Key concepts
➔
Continuity
➔
Change
➔
Consequence
Japanese advance – Philippines, Singapore,
Hong Kong
The
attack
on
December
Hawaiian
assault
1941,
on
British
prioritized
home
racist
its
terms
This
that
defences
more
up
by
than
the
the
naval
Pearl
The
British
defending
extended
Japanese
had
the
it
East
and
hold
of
Wales
in
Indies
was
centred
material,
Africa
based
or
and
the
the
and
in
planners
air,
the
of
the
size
HMS
no
torpedo
the
at
armour.
bombers
to
region
were
garrison
and
Three
the
part
weight
The
there
naval
task
days
descended
of
the
to
shore
was
the
the
felt
would
force
note
after
on
on
to
British
dispatched
power
of
Command
defend
little
A
was
air
the
garrison
bay.
no
the
the
High
Japanese.
of
on
Fleet,
the
strategy
gave
Repulse
Critically
of
on
need
on
attack
in
machine.
British
its
part
Japanese
and
had
resources
war
initiated
Pacic
its
Malaya.
garrison
The
the
US
fuel
sea
to
the
to
military
Singapore
operations
While
debilitate
North
was
the
signicant.
to
conquest.
land,
Japanese
defence
a
Singapore
their
anks
turned
the
pushed
giving
into
the
British
forfeited
vigorously,
was
outnumbered
peninsula,
reached
been
of
They
defenders
defended
before
in
of
attack
two
ships
them.
incompetence.
British
at
on
defences
and
sank
it
Prince
Harbor,
and
the
men
British
enough
HMS
dispatched
on
be
of
one
Japanese
priority
generalizations.
ability,
led
in
operations
islands.
the
the
of
but
most
one
by
presence
In
the
was
designed
was
needed
ghting
be
212
was
Malaya
Singapore.
Harbor
albeit
Islands
desperately
The
Pearl
Singapore.
onto
the
them
a
of
have
By
As
a
Falling
the
of
with
in
result
of
the
of
that,
and
had
the
These
were
they
neglect
ghting,
had
Japanese
January
Singapore.
this
before
peninsula
end
singular
troops
advantage
back
forestalled
the
island
enemy
decided
jungles.
anks.
much
would
conducted
their
it
the
the
been
advance
defenders
defences
soon
C H A P T E R
crumbled
hands.
over
as
The
a
well
million
surrendered
Singapore
On
8
and
held
vessel
in
in
the
resources
the
ank
Asian
US
hands.
and
45
had
US
landed
would
30
to
000
the
of
the
Japanese
a
General
Australian
British
the
by
Burma.
city
of
Percival
troops
colony
islands
the
The
of
get
end
Dutch
Java
Sea,
of
of
of
and
by
Japanese
would
the
the
if
and
Hong
Kong,
Wake,
Guam
December.
The
surrendered
a
classic
their
surface
the
they
loomed
to
run
islands
were
150
the
and
All
Philippines
troops,
The
by
have
home
had
government.
Philippines.
were,
US
sizes.
Philippines
the
to
islands
of
Japanese
108
aircraft
right
their
defended
deployed
carrier-borne
gauntlet
the
remained
aircraft,
Any
East
in
by
a
tanks
two
and
battle-
heavy
them.
heralded
on
8
island
US
the
of
nothing
the
were
May
in
Indies
to
supported
by
the
December
of
were
siege
last
6
for
as
defenders
The
East
was
MacArthur
The
on
and
Battle
based
varying
main
forced
enduring
surrendered
of
the
Filipino
ground
soon
surrendered.
out
dominated
be
well
Peninsula.
were
it
dislodge
the
on
22December
into
defending
February
Likewise
planning
the
if
was
landings
on
fell
with
onslaught
after
forces
from
Sea
vessels
Japanese
aircraft
pushed
strategic
divisions,
vessels
In
Indian
attacked
Japanese
important
naval
surface
US
the
of
supply
faced
water.
December.
Indies
gauntlet
As
no
was
gunnery.
China
force
hardened
The
of
conquests
meager
25
also
extracted
this
water
British,
Japanese
East
of
with
000
the
overall
South
of
the
was
presence
large
city’s
O P E R A T I O N S
Japanese.
to
the
struggle
80
until
fell
army
holdings
of
the
out
Tarawa
British
The
to
the
commander
people
over
December
which
and
British
7. 4 :
Luzon.
to
his
forces,
Within
Another
defensive
pushed
conditions.
destruction
1941.
to
By
the
major
fallback
tip
of
the
of
to
days
landing
on
the
the
troops
onto
the
island
in
of
all
they
on
Bataan
peninsula
April
crowded
close
two
and
Bataan
had
Corregidor
1942.
Guadalcanal
With
the
passed
defeat
over
to
re-conquest
an
of
important
was
in
and
the
from
the
the
the
and
the
United
the
lost
but
the
a
lost
The
made
more
ve
on
The
past
both
Marine
of
of
the
several
to
The
was
a
troops
initial
the
was
lost
cruisers
and
and
the
a
for
the
provided
the
assault
eet
brawl
to
carrier;
several
the
to
the
naval
run
of
troops
which
men
important
course
the
000
in
the
but
off
30
2,000
the
against
successful,
trying
navy
staging
ashore,
another
was
Over
with
once
about
navy
which
Guadalcanal
support
several
initiative
target
allowed
six-month
island
destroyers
As
Nimitz
target
island
blockade.
four
region.
the
rst
Solomons,
the
Corps
the
their
committing
Japanese
US
battleships,
of
Midway,
as
fell
against
result
The
the
the
difcult.
on
at
the
task
choice
island,
coast
fought.
cruisers,
two
the
and
the
in
in
the
eet
chose
resupply
garrisoned
army
were
island
theatre,
months.
Off
They
operations
navy,
marines
000.
carrier,
an
counter-attacked
six
carrier
States.
Division.
reinforcements
US
for
Pacic
troops
States
20
engagements
and
of
the
next
Japanese
base
Zealand,
Japanese
over
air
Japanese
island
Japanese
United
Marine
responsibility
2,000
the
Guadalcanal,
central
1st
New
of
the
six
supplies
months
Japanese
destroyers.
▲
US dive bombers head toward Guadalcanal.
To what ex tent did both US and Japanese
land operations depend on air power?
213
7
C A U S E S
A N D
E F F E C TS
O F
20 T H - C E N T U R Y
The
victory
against
the
Australian
the
US
navy,
Guadalcanal
Japanese
armies
under
forces
had
at
made
Allied
support
of
defences.
drove
steady,
their
Throughout
success.
forces
forward
Rabaul
paved
stronghold
at
Admiral
strengthened
intensity.
W A R S
it
slow,
and
campaign
constructed
operations
and
its
a
Guinea
drove
Since
both
and
and
was
airstrips
that
in
the
a
March
while
The
Japanese
fanatical
to
were
naval
and
Solomons.
essential
Japanese
captured
with
US
Britain
the
Guadalcanal
these
advance
the
New
through
combat
countless
were
two-pronged
MacArthur
defended
air
against
garrison
for
New
Halsey,
progress.
positions
this
way
Rabaul.
through
William
if
the
at
Allied
then
units
used
and
in
land
1944.
Alaska
Soviet
Union
N
Mongolia
Manchuria
W
E
S
Tokyo
China
Midway
3–6
Pacific
India
Hong
June
1942
Ocean
Kong
Hawaii
Taiwan
Burma
Mariana
Bataan
Is.
Wake
I.
Pearl
7
Harbor
Dec
1941
French
Marshall
Is.
Philippine
Area
under
Is.
Japanese
Caroline
control,
1942
Is.
Allied
Gilbert
Powers
Neutral
Is.
nations
Borneo
Singapore
Allied
response
Major
battle
falls
Guadalcanal
15
February
1942
Coral
Sea
0
7–8
Indian
May
Coral
Australia
▲
500
1,000
miles
1942
Ocean
0
Sea
500
1,000
kilometres
The Second World War in the Pacic – Allied response at Guadalcanal
The Gilbert and Caroline Islands
The
amount
Allies
to
Pacic
Rabaul
route
up
of
in
at
the
in
to
islands
southern
large,
November
the
with
Marines
the
as
Gilbert
Halsey
Pacic.
the
with
000
had
island.
out
and
This
suffered
The
B-29
the
troops.
US
The
US
factories
Caroline
and
Marine
ght
The
Corps
was
lost
the
the
the
central
driving
up
toward
the
Japanese
campaign
assault
1,000
over
in
open
desperate
casualties,
had
were
would
attacking
bombers.
allowed
Islands
MacArthur
offensive
3,000
Japanese
of
and
Philippines
land-based
1943
18
streaming
the
time
recapturing
capturing
214
material
through
same
the
with
Tarawa
days
of
move
of
4,000
on
and
home
opened
the
after
them
island
two
dead,
defending
it.
in
C H A P T E R
7. 4 :
O P E R A T I O N S
The Marshall and Marianas Islands
In
January,
capturing
against
Once
in
Biak,
the
Saipan
their
in
turned
the
the
were
remaining
put
island
14
the
eet
In
the
Another
two-thirds
carriers,
the
suicide,
they
a
the
ensued,
defence
and
and
one
survivors
death
toll
B-29s.
against
struggle
aircraft
5,000
their
moved
of
advanced
bitter
their
remaining
bringing
range
desperate
After
of
Islands,
MacArthur
within
control,
casualties.
lost
Marshall
south,
Philippines
group.
committed
to
the
Allied
000
Japanese
two
garrison
attention
under
suffered
the
his
Kwajalein.
would
Marianas
US
which
Japanese
and
which
Marshalls
in
which
battle
Nimitz
Eniwetok
to
of
30
air
of
the
000.
Technology and war: amphibious and landing craft
Amphibious landings are incredibly dangerous for attacking forces. The landing troops
are exposed to re as they approach the beach and once they are on the beach.
Amphibious landings were attempted in most major theatres of the war, North Africa,
Sicily, Italy and Normandy. It was in the Pacic, however, that they became a regular
feature of combat. Developing a durable landing craft that protected soldiers until
they were released on to the beach became a vital priority for the US military. Landing
craft varied widely in size and construction, carrying from 25–200 men. Some were
armed. Perhaps the most versatile was the Higgins Boat. Developed in New Orleans
and named for its creator. The Higgins Boat was 11 m long, could carry 36 soldiers
and travel at 22 kmh. It was designed with a long ramp at the bow that oered some
protection to the troops and when dropped served as a disembarkation ramp.
Other vehicles, such as the US DUKW or Alligator, were designed to travel from the
water up onto the beach and continue toward the defences. Others such as the DD
Tanks (Duplex Drive) were tanks modied to “swim” to shore. These met with varied
success throughout the war as they were easily damaged by high seas.
The Philippines
The
Japanese
about
the
of
250
occur,
the
000
complex
Lyete,
the
70
US
15
000.
moved
the
to
end
main
been
recaptured.
until
July
troops
in
island
to
the
It
defeat
the
and
the
US
last
island.
cost
Japanese
troops
Luzon
capital,
would,
islands.
October
small
the
of
island
would
Japanese
the
and
1945,
the
In
with
throughout
smaller
landings
month
casualties
February
US
the
on
a
out
the
000.
and
forces
January
the
of
On
15
for
Philippines
spread
initial
only
raged
000
In
the
landed
their
ghting
the
islands.
had
forces
reinforced
The
troops
of
where
they
US
defended
and
Manila,
however,
of
the
by
had
take
Japanese
▲
US General MacAr thur wades ashore in the Philippines. To what ex tent
were the Philippine Islands strategically signicant to the Allies?
215
7
C A U S E S
A N D
E F F E C TS
O F
20 T H - C E N T U R Y
W A R S
Burma
It
is
important
ghting
the
in
ghting
Meanwhile
had
no
been
air
1943.
India
to
and
Joe”
the
In
Burma
liberate
weakly
the
that
supply
were
over
after
the
85
Mandalay
troops
months
went
Allied
to
force
the
the
in
a
bulk
vital
southern
Burma.
poorly
of
the
role
in
sector.
Burma
trained
completed
retake
from
Burma
the
west,
Burma
known
the
and
with
arduous
the
than
the
quarter
ghting.
would
and
of
into
an
effort
Road.
February
invaded
that
Starting
push
in
Burma
and
of
General
China
1942
offensive
a
consisted
while
from
as
November
erce
forces
of
on
played
India.
on
Less
of
parts
into
in
carried
army
division,
China
back
soldiers.
US
Japanese
this
British
thrust
Japanese
and
the
single
into
thrown
Slim’s
other
attempt
would
route
in
1942
African
000
three
William
of
would
West
a
of
the
Australian
ghting
by
spring
safety
while
the
and
were
Stilwell
March,
with
Guinea
relative
attempts
General
▲
In
that
Pacic,
British
forces
East
reopen
These
New
the
the
Allied
“Vinegar
to
on
defended
to
British,
remember
Central
support.
retreat
The
to
the
in
returned
late
Burma
1944,
and
Rangoon.
Australian soldiers advance in New Guinea. What challenges did island ghting pose
for soldiers?
Iwo Jima and Okinawa
With
aerial
capture
the
bombers
from
The
returning
which
the
from
short-range
were
positions
would
of
home
20-square-kilometre
Japanese
these
216
bombing
capture
dug
with
the
raids
with
ghters
deeply
concrete
island’s
islands
island
a
place
could
into
intensifying,
of
Iwo
to
rocky
emplacements.
high
ditch
support
the
ground,
Jima
the
the
to
as
well
as
bombing
terrain
and
Although
Mount
US
decided
provide
a
the
base
missions.
had
Suribachi,
to
damaged
supported
Marines
within
C H A P T E R
four
days
of
campaign,
Japanese
The
next
Okinawa
would
the
the
suffered
step
over
suicide
25
19
by
100
attacks
000
000
Japan
defended
to
itwould
US
over
toward
was
swell
airborne
invasion,
costing
000.
another
month
6,800
of
to
nish
them
O P E R A T I O N S
the
dead.
The
dead.
was
70
take
casualties,
7. 4 :
the
000
heavily
troops
Desperate,
against
the
fortied
well
the
invasion
dug
island
in,
a
Japanese
force.
of
Okinawa.
number
that
unleashed
The
kamikaze
kamikaze
attacks
sank
over
30
ships
in
the
invasion
force.
The
US
armada
pounded
Literally “divine wind” in Japanese.
the
defences
for
a
week
ahead
of
the
50
000
invasion
force
that
landed
Kamikaze attacks were suicide attacks
on
1
April
1945,
a
prelude
to
the
200
000
that
the
US
would
place
on
by Japanese aircraft on enemy ships
the
island
during
the
course
of
the
struggle
which
continued
until
during the Second World War.
22
June.
In
the
end
dead.
Unwilling
failed
defence
continued
Japanese
US
suicidal
▲
island.
operations,
To
them
in
or
it
also
US
110
As
played
how
000
as
an
it
to
000
of
only
550
casualties.
atomic
This
–
in
the
a
was
from
role
in
taste
kamikaze
vision
them
Okinawa
kilometres
provided
islands
of
died
as
psychological
Okinawa
home
7,000
soldiers
important
important
the
use
casualties,
Japanese
did
thinking
monstrous
and
65
strategically
sitting
invasion
and
not
suffered
strategic
the
defences
whether
US
surrender,
the
islands,
decisions.
awaited
of
US
to
of
the
to
the
future
of
what
attacks,
coloured
all
talks
weapons.
US Marines inspect a destroyed pillbox on Iwo Jima. What was the military signicance of
small islands such as Iwo Jima?
The war at sea
Coral Sea
In
April
1942
indicating
Guinea.
to
the
they
Nimitz
intercept
the
US
were
sent
Magic
programme
manoeuvring
the
aircraft
Japanese
for
carriers
invasion
decoded
an
attack
USS
force.
The
Japanese
on
transmissions
southern
Lexington
resulting
and
New
USS
battle
Yorktown
was
the
217
7
C A U S E S
A N D
E F F E C TS
O F
20 T H - C E N T U R Y
rst
naval
each
the
280
blows
the
a
the
USS
carrier
the
has
it
Japanese
was
had
90.
a
to
had
a
the
and
struggled
of
for
the
the
US
had
The
the
the
never
as
the
Japanese
Battle
US
the
it
US
of
the
had
had
on
crippling
Coral
USS
lost
eyes
traversed
deliver
of
lost
The
laid
planes
to
Battle
damaged.
numerically
eets
carrier-borne
damaged.
carrier
victory
New
surface
end
known,
been
While
in
be
the
1942
eets
By
heavy
strategic
landings
May
the
ships.
come
which
in
between
Yorktown
and
in
days
enemy’s
Japanese
draw,
history
four
kilometres
on
the
light
in
Over
encounter
and
to
battle
other.
W A R S
lost
70
Coral
Sea,
as
Lexington
one
aircraft
Sea
prevented
was
the
Guinea.
Midway
After
preventing
Coral
the
Sea,
Magic
Japanese
was
on
to
the
to
a
attack.
lure
the
conrmed
Nimitz
in
to
the
a
repulsed,
Enterprise
Japanese
a
navy
the
was
into
at
the
a
from
if
he
would
such
an
an
where
attack
attack
them
capture
clever
attack
Nimitz
opportunity
nd
their
A
attack
about
the
could
battle
Harbor.
Japanese
by
at
major
the
encouraged
which
wanted
decisive
of
worried
and
Guinea
through
another
place
tempted
force
Pearl
that
were
position
New
decoded
exact
perhaps,
Japanese
lone
eet,
but
to
US
with
and
a
The
the
late
four
the
L TA
Within
the
of
as
the
steaming
too
ve
US
before
of
Midway
they
could
deciphering
the
low
US
base
minutes
trick
at
altitude
sink
of
to
the
later
were
found
US
the
rst
were
USS
ight
decks
carriers.
defend
four
in
The
the
their
still
the
Japanese
the
two
would
from
with
with
Japanese
Midway.
the
strike
three
would
the
they
plane
squadron
to
second
carriers
attack
carriers
an
a
out
believed
toward
to
preparing
fourth
and
seek
reconnaissance
Japanese
at
to
they
dive-bomber
four
was
carrier
squadrons
bombers
cover
one
Midway
presence
carriers
arriving
ablaze,
of
long-range
refueling
ghter
with
Japanese,
dive-bomber
discovered
were
force
north-east
them.
bombers.
carriers
a
carrier
the
carriers
task
surprise
with
torpedo
to
however,
that
position
A
torpedo
littered
Francisco
started
US
surprise
be
Japanese
Research and thinking skills
a
Hawaii.
US
had
US
but
Washington
east
part,
aircraft
the
southern
trafc,
Island.
and
indeed
San
Japanese
their
they
for
US,
in
of
radio
imminent,
Nimitz,
dispatched
carriers
eet
US
convinced
carriers
major
For
what
Midway
his
invasion
Japanese
Politicians
repelled.
destroy
nish
in
was
continental
be
Japanese
programme,
offensive
withdraw
the
the
increase
unknown.
could
to
an
The
against
Japanese
day.
The
Find the perspective of three dierent
Japanese
managed
to
launch
an
attack
that
claimed
one
US
carrier,
sources on the following question.
the
USS
Yorktown .
Within
seven
months
of
the
Japanese
attack
on
Analyse each perspective and come to
Pearl
Harbor
the
US
had
succeeded
in
evening
the
odds
in
the
Pacic.
a conclusion of your own. Be sure to cite
From
this
point
the
industrial
the
Pacic.
juggernaut
of
the
US
would
overwhelm
the bibliographic details for each source.
the
Japanese
in
In
this
sense,
the
Battle
of
Midway
can
be
To what extent was the US victory
seen
as
changing
the
course
of
the
war
against
Japan
in
the
same
way
at Midway the key event in the defeat
that
Stalingrad
and
El
Alamein
later
that
same
of Japan?
turn
218
of
the
tide
in
the
war
against
Germany.
year
would
mark
the
C H A P T E R
7. 4 :
O P E R A T I O N S
The USS Yorktown lists heavily before sinking after the Battle of Midway. To what extent were
▲
aircraft carriers vulnerable targets?
Leyte Gulf
In
an
effort
launched
left
of
lure
battle
US
the
the
to
an
group
which
the
US
on
the
Japanese
larger
ships,
stop
attack
US
they
naval
carrier
vessels
fought
though
landing
their
force
into
way
outgunned,
withdrew,
a
in
Philippines
supporting
approached
ght.
to
the
the
the
from
the
troops
north,
rest
defended
to
Japanese
landings.
the
Japanese
invasion
the
the
Meanwhile
lightly
fought
leaving
the
force
of
was
attempting
the
invasion
a
eet
What
force.
standstill
to
Japanese
The
from
unmolested.
Technology and war: Magic, cryptology and the code talkers
Magic refers to the information decoded from Japanese
In their own search for an unbreakable code, the United
diplomatic communications from 1940. In 1939, the
States Marine Corps looked to the Navajo nation of the
Japanese diplomatic corps began using a new machine
south-western United States. The Navajo language is
to code their communications. In 1940 the US Signal
unwritten with no symbols, and is extremely complex
Intelligence Service deciphered the codes and built their
with multiple dialects. Navajo “code talkers” could code,
own version of the Japanese encryption device. The
transmit by wireless or telephone and decode a message
resulting intelligence was codenamed Magic while the
in 20 seconds when it would take machines 30 minutes.
Japanese navy’s code was named JN-25. The Japanese
About 400 Navajo code talkers served with the US Marines
would periodically change the code requiring US
in the Pacic. They were assigned to each of the six
cryptographers to star t again with decryption. Intelligence
marine divisions and took place in all major operations.
from Magic and the JN-25 code helped lead to impor tant
The Japanese never broke their code.
information such as the location of the attack on Por t
Moseby in May 1942 and on Midway Island in June 1942.
The air war
Bombing campaign
Once
the
group,
bombing
subject
set
US
the
cities
ablaze
devastated
deaths
captured
campaign
the
them
had
Japanese
to
began
high
and
Japanese
approached
home
Saipan
and
islands
were
in
earnest
explosives,
attacked
air
300
force
000
at
low
had
and
other
in
the
the
US
level
no
over
islands
within
spring
Army
with
answer.
half
of
in
range
of
the
of
1945.
Air
By
the
B-29s.
Rather
Force
incendiary
the
Marianas
US
decided
bombs.
summer
country’s
This
than
to
The
civilian
urban
centres
219
7
C A U S E S
A N D
E F F E C TS
O F
20 T H - C E N T U R Y
had
burned.
On
W A R S
the
one
hand,
although
the
human
toll
was
terrible,
TOK discussion
the
raids
did
To what extent do you agree that the true
it
history of the Second World War will not
industrial
had
been
little
to
damage
throughout
economy
the
had
Japanese
country.
precious
industrial
On
little
the
capacity,
other
capacity
hand,
dispersed
the
as
Japanese
left.
be written until after the last veteran of
the war has passed away?
Manhattan Project
The
conquest
those
had
it
faced
Japanese
islands
to
a
were
then
put
Japan’s
question
in
when
the
the
unconditional
re
bombing
that
to
a
was
were
the
weapon,
assemble
begun
1942.
and
their
The
own
such
the
the
had
project
of
the
By
summer
they
the
had
been
effect.
time
to
a
this
of
going
to
as
its
a
helped
as
and
develop
opportunity
When
to
for
use
the
maximum
the
some
and
weapon
told
he
how
to
before
other
the
as
any
effect.
petitioned
would
any
US
to
1945
a
Einstein
it
how
into
would
British
had
project
in
Oppenheimer
Enrico
the
to
Fermi,
efforts
New
British
to
Mexico,
Columbia
miners
the
to
to
some
it,
surrender.
only
nature
other
to
the
best
them
Japanese
the
saw
scope
weapon
with
no
that
Japanese
the
blood
the
weapon.
on
Truman
without
to
scientists
the
with
had
scientist”.
weapon,
the
the
give
attacked
he
of
of
Discussions
Others
in
and
told
giving
weapon,
of
test
was
weapon
used
summoning
felt
baby
could
Truman
Conference.
use
Truman
he
they
Seventy
were
that
“cry
to
weapons
in
a
that
Alamos,
they
their
than
as
closer
March
Albert
The
the
clerks
Potsdam
to
they
into
against
no
deciphering
Bethe,
desert.
advocated
lethal
called
8
from
While
prototype
deployed
Truman
him
a
the
from
before
Los
from
Mexico
as
On
Robert
Tennessee
demanding
rather
be
maximum
as
had
New
in
home
time.
Japanese
differed
dismissed
effect.
the
Some
then
surrender
weapon
of
from
was
harnessing
with
Hans
alternative
the
unleashed
of
and
Szilard.
the
home
civilians.
word
Dr
Pacic
campaign
programme
it
Bohr,
Leo
people
time
the
should
the
000
000
to
only
of
of
the
the
government
chemistry.
by
centred
attending
warn
Oppenheimer
President
in
capacity,
with
was
a
and
fused
and
plan
capable
motion
Niels
programme
so
that
such
as
80
ssion
directed
The
Allies.
receiving
but
working
125
surrender?
destructive
warning
to
on
weapon
and
were
minds
while
demonstration
itself,
the
the
they
consider
project,
process
over
physics
Feynman
over
did
in
this
the
of
isolation
campaign
by
Germany
set
of
35%
in
similar
bombing
Japanese
nuclear
in
luminaries
scientic
test
Should
minds
elements
1945
in
forces
men.
total
strategic
killed
casualties,
US
invasion
000
the
bombing
After
of
Truman
ssion
successfully
successful
left
efforts
employing
greatest
Tokyo
the
efcacy
the
000
the
topography
for
250
was
demanded
reaction
Richard
weaponize
re
brought
weapon
scientic
Franck,
London,
scientists
chain
over
The
alternative.
greatest
included
James
centres.
against
President
the
of
65
time
in
concentrated
cities
US
rst
strength
navy,
surrender
another
there
initiate
the
a
the
the
projections
intensive
wooden
raid
in
range
by
urban
cost
been
The
the
with
largely
had
had
army
forth
the
There
It
islands.
combined
against
220
Okinawa
Japanese
home
invasion,
islands
of
committed.
his
hands,
decided
warning
and
to
C H A P T E R
7. 4 :
O P E R A T I O N S
L TA
Social and thinking skills
Choose one of the following positions on whether or not to drop the atomic bomb
on Japan. Write an argument in suppor t of your position. Be sure to suppor t it with
detailed evidence. Exchange arguments with someone who has chosen the other
position. After reading it, write a rebuttal to their argument and they will do the same
for your argument. Once you have exchanged rebuttals, discuss the strengths and
weaknesses of each argument.
To what extent does your knowledge of post-war history aect your outlook on
the question?
Position 1:
The United States was right to drop the atomic bombs on Hiroshima
and Nagasaki in 1945.
Position 2:
The United States should have not dropped the bombs on Hiroshima
and Nagasaki in 1945.
The
targeting
as
the
in
order
After
possible
to
the
runways
Boy.
of
370
50
000
was
of
toll
Emperor
2
a
its
later,
on
then
surrendering
and
two
After
to
no
city
to
of
1945.
Allied
a
to
1944
the
the
were
US
in
an
of
Navy
the
throughout
30
Island.
Fat
which
and
above
with
the
another
days.
Little
city
the
attack.
bomb
with
The
the
Japanese
formalized
army
September
a
another
instantly
was
Japanese
potential
payloads
following
following
Kyoto
The
the
Man
metres
000
of
Hiroshima,
instant
weeks
killing
the
580
city
surrendering.
heavier
on
centres
Construction
forthcoming,
surrender,
units
of
Tinian
bomb
the
was
in
imperial
nicknamed
in
industrial
accommodate
detonated
000
general
the
of
capable
Those
rst
dead
Nagasaki,
50
to
off.
bombs,
wounds
forces
and
structure
lift
bomb
Active
number
Tokyo
surrender
nearly
a
neighbouring
dropped
the
on
lengthened
atomic
their
when
the
July
on
payloads
B-29
ordered
to
in
runways
inhabitants
climbing
September
omitted
Saipan
be
succumbing
days
but
settled
government
heavier
people.
000
had
reinforced
August
dropped
death
on
6
000
80
Three
with
of
a
four
eventually
On
city,
built
were
B-29s
would
targets,
maintain
capture
Battalions
for
committee
and
continued
October.
A post-war model of “Little Boy”,
the atomic bomb that exploded
over Hiroshima, Japan,
at the end of the Second World War
221
7
C A U S E S
A N D
E F F E C TS
O F
20 T H - C E N T U R Y
▲
W A R S
The devastated city of Hiroshima after the dropping of the atomic bomb. Were there viable
alternatives to dropping the bombs?
Technology and war: nuclear weapons
In October 1939 President Roosevelt received a letter
under the control of the army, the scientic activity was
signed by Alber t Einstein, Eugene Wigner and Leo Szilard,
conducted primarily by civilians headed by the physicist
all eminent physicists. They aler ted the President to the
Rober t Oppenheimer. Security was incredibly strict, but this
possibility of using nuclear ssion to create a weapon and
did not stop the Soviets from placing a spy, the physicist
that the exper tise to do so was present in Germany. In
Hans Fuchs, deep within the project. Facilities were
fact all of the major combatants, the USSR, Britain, Japan
created in Oak Ridge, Tennessee and Hanford, Washington
and Germany, had teams exploring the creation of nuclear
to manufacture the material required for the explosion.
weapons. Nuclear ssion was rst achieved in Germany
Columbia University, Berkeley and the University of
in 1938. In an eor t to stymie this eor t the Allies helped
Chicago all conducted research as par t of the Manhattan
remove Norway’s stocks of heavy water, necessary for
Project. Eventually two types of weapon were developed,
managing the reaction, before the German invasion of
one using uranium 235 and the other using plutonium. The
March 1940.
uranium bomb was detonated by ring a radioactive piece
at the critical mass of uranium. Using TNT to implode on the
Once the US was at war, the task of developing a nuclear
ssionable material detonated the plutonium bomb.
weapon in the US was turned over to the Army Corps of
222
Engineers. General Leslie Groves assembled a team of
In the summer of 1945 the team assembled a tower at the
physicists who were eventually concentrated at Los
test site in Alamogordo, New Mexico from which to drop a
Alamos, New Mexico. While the project as a whole was
prototype of the plutonium bomb.
7
.5
Eects of the S ec ond World War
on the Pacic
Conceptual understanding
Key questions
➔
What practical issues did the Allies face in the wake of Japan’s defeat?
➔
What role did the dropping of the atomic bombs have on the
post-war situation?
Key concepts
➔
Continuity
➔
Change
Democratization of Japan and US occupation
Unlike
and
Germany,
thus
its
Japan
occupation
General
MacArthur.
a
democracy
liberal
Specically
the
punishment
●
disbanding
●
a
●
disbanding
●
the
in
land
of
to
the
primarily
US
and
for
its
Japan
economy
the
the
United
appointed
were
based
occupation
by
on
to
free
States
governor
see
it
develop
market
as
principles.
were:
criminals
and
military
large
had
the
goals
an
military
former
defeated
US
with
war
the
emperor
role
●
on
of
fell
The
terms
●
ban
was
to
disarmament
ofcers
from
corporations
renounce
his
holding
called
political
ofce
“zaibatsu”
divinity
and
accept
a
gurehead
government
reform
that
broke
up
large
holdings
in
favour
of
smallhold
tenants
●
the
US
was
permitted
to
maintain
military
bases
on
Okinawa
and
inJapan.
Between
the
1945
and
heightened
location
that
the
the
country.
In
the
terms
the
of
parliamentary
1950
US
spending
capital
1952
aid
the
poured
Korean
required
the
peace
of
US
did
democracy
for
and
with
a
Japan,
and
economic
occupation
not
into
War
of
Japan
take
Japan
it
off
was
a
market
not
resulting
really
formally
remained
ourishing
but
Japan’s
until
strategic
owed
ended
into
although
demilitarized
economy.
Cold War
The
US
was
the
rehabilitation
determined
divided
Taiwan.
by
among
The
sole
and
the
the
USSR
occupying
political
US.
power
direction
Japanese
Allied
took
Japan
the
imperial
Powers
control
in
of
the
China,
north
half
thus
was
holdings,
including
of
and
country
the
largely
however,
which
of
were
received
Korea,
Sakhalin
223
7
C A U S E S
A N D
E F F E C TS
O F
20 T H - C E N T U R Y
Island
and
Outside
of
half
of
The
Soviet
war
with
the
Kurile
the
home
Korea
Union
on
Hiroshima.
the
bomb
the
might
with
no
need
economically
the
occupation
of
Stalin
and
in
peace
the
US
United
his
they
arms.
escalation
of
of
(UN)
the
Cold
rehabilitation
of
the
War
both
that
of
and
given
France
them,
in
an
during
and
atomic
were
no
with
West
This
An
had
defeat
no
been
Japan
the
US
position
occupation
appetite
mind,
for
the
distrust
from
any
of
place
arms.
important
the
certainly
growing
Truman’s
in
conict.
bomb,
in
of
bomb.
to
Britain’s
had
of
the
the
drop
Germany
Truman’s
force
came
the
enter
help
Stalin
second
as
to
Soviet
of
south
Mongolia
bombing
essential
China
Soviets.
provided
Japan
much
seemed
advent
by
the
to
of
decision
out
Kong.
the
islands.
Yalta
occupation.
Japan
help
at
accept
of
of
invasion
the
Soviets
especially
earned
Japan
the
to
Hong
smaller
atomic
of
of
control
made
the
dropping
the
operations
it
Part
the
Likewise
left
not
in
Britain
precluded
had
after
keep
divided
Japan,
This
pledge
simultaneous
share
With
control
took
assorted
reluctance
to
help.
and
day
Allied
Germany.
occupation
Nations
had
allies’
policies
US
a
States
related.
precipitous
when
Japan.
the
effort
occupy
in
it
the
and
are
the
with
plan
its
parallel,
1945,
on
recovered
United
honoured
an
was
to
responsibilities
the
as
conventional
longer
The
and
this
38th
events
hinged
explain
Britain
the
declaration
two
Japan
but
the
August
occupation
divided,
Islands.
islands
had
Its
bombing
also
earlier
7
The
had
defeating
saw
below
Japan.
happened
W A R S
base
Korean
the
War.
Korean
for
In
War
US
and
fact,
the
accelerated
Germany.
Imperialism and decolonization
The
cost
reduced
global
of
the
and
superpowers
inuence.
global
Yet
When
in
this
difculty
ascendance
of
in
political
Britain
some
a
colonial
responsible
would
Other
be
British.
The
The
war’s
did
army
made
the
units
for
after
on
two
a
Japanese
army.
brief
40
but
000
vicious
War
than
would
war,
Hong
the
a
there
was
in
a
erupt
to
in
the
in
July
communist
again
after
and
the
there
grew
of
commander
Mountbatten,
British
India.
to
the
1946.
proceeded
Asia,
of
coming
active
no
as
Japanese
provisions
demobilization
to
the
Soviets
left
for
Soviet
lost
8,000
Jiang
ghters
the
war
Allied
in
been
the
being
the
holdings.
reverted
haphazard
which
two
regained,
British
1945,
of
Asia
had
recently
Louis
number
the
political
independence
the
end
by
and
the
the
surrendered
weapons
Mao’s
of
Kong
in
Pacic
scattered
Lord
war’s
large
some
ght
had
independence
as
and
result
their
cost
Eventually
holdings
of
explosions,
dead,
the
independent
eld
or
power
government
the
the
colonial
The
had,
the
eclipsed
illustrated
contemplating
such
nature
the
with
during
and
powers,
geographically
India.
Manchuria
rather
Civil
as
became
the
in
In
begin
Asia
still
Labour
negotiate
surrender.
forces
Chinese
of
still
such
holdings
nuclear
were
to
French
Because
their
nationalist
The
colonial
Philippines
Japanese
Army
the
with
to
Britain
Europe
economic
1940–1942
combined
such
both
strength,
Attlee’s
will
western
effect
differently.
it
was
holdings
for
British
defend
Clement
dispatched
of
in
second-rate
and
events
to
War
to
military
France
The
trying
World
France
in
both
empires.
difculty
224
Second
Britain
in
of
Red
and
Jieshi’s
some
interruption
cases.
of
the
C H A P T E R
Second
World
Indo-China
used
and
the
to
the
of
northern
of
Indo-China
Viet
and
Soviets
forces
and
lead
and
to
also
to
of
the
to
years
nine
T H E
occupied
order.
Chi
French
its
O F
the
undermanned
Ho
resume
French
E F F E C T S
maintain
annoyance
Indo-China,
this
Minh
The
surrendered
Japanese
much
years
War.
units
7. 5 :
Kurile
British
Unlike
the
Islands.
had
assumed
they
would
as
revolutionary
it
seized
had
warfare
O N
T H E
P A C I F I C
In
in
in
turn
India,
portions
regain
in
W A R
who
British
who
activities
W O R L D
units
Minh,
imperial
of
S E C O N D
the
control
pre-war
between
the
forces.
L TA
Thinking skills
Complete the following table comparing the war in the Pacic with the war in Nor th Africa and Europe. Once you have
done that develop two generalizations about the nature of warfare in the Second World War.
Impor tance of . . .
Europe and Nor th Africa
Pacic
Naval power
Air power
Land forces
Technology
Generalization 1:
Generalization 2:
Source skills
rst
The Franck Repor t
the
The
following
is
from
the
summary
section
of
revelation
world.
of
the
Committee
on
Political
and
Manhattan
Project
University
of
Chicago,
11
June
Franck
of
other
nuclear
weapons
countries
may
to
have
bombs,
destroy
each
an
of
which,
urban
area
weighing
of
more
less
than
than
ve
a
ton,
square
In
the
war
to
which
such
an
armaments
race
is
1945
likely
(The
years
“Metallurgical
miles.
Laboratory”,
possession
ten
Social
could
Problems,
our
the
nuclear
Report
of
Within
to
lead,
the
United
States,
with
its
agglomeration
Report).
of
Members of the Committee:
population
metropolitan
compared
to
and
industry
districts,
the
will
nations
in
be
comparatively
at
whose
a
few
disadvantage
population
and
industry
James Franck (Chairman)
are
scattered
over
large
areas.
Donald J Hughes
JJ Nickson
Questions
Eugene Rabinowitch
1
What
do
the
authors
mean
by
“an
armaments
Glenn T Seaborg
race”?
JC Stearns
Leo Szilard
2
What
does
this
relationship
Nuclear
bombs
cannot
possibly
remain
a
of
source
science
tell
us
and
about
the
international
“secret
relations?
weapon”
more
at
than
the
a
exclusive
few
years.
disposal
The
of
this
scientic
country,
facts
on
for
which
3
their
construction
is
based
are
well
known
to
With
and
of
other
countries.
Unless
an
effective
reference
content,
of
nuclear
explosives
is
instituted,
a
race
armaments
is
certain
to
origin,
are
the
purpose
strengths
ensue
of
the
source
for
and
historians
of
studying
nuclear
its
what
international
weaknesses
control
to
scientists
following
the
US
decision
to
drop
atomic
the
bombs
on
Japan
in
1945?
225
Exam-style questions and fur ther reading
Exam-style questions
1
Examine
in
2
3
Japanese
Compare
and
Japanese
forces
Discuss
the
4
the
decision
to
go
to
war
with
the
United
States
1941.
the
war
in
Evaluate
contrast
in
the
the
the
forces
in
the
Pacic
with
the
Pacic.
signicance
the
Allied
of
the
Battle
of
Midway
to
the
outcome
of
Pacic.
US
decision
to
drop
atomic
bombs
on
Hiroshima
and
Nagasaki.
5
Compare
and
contrast
the
signicance
of
sea
and
land
power
in
the
Pacic.
6
Examine
Pacic
7
To
the
causes
of
Japanese
success
in
the
rst
six
months
of
the
war.
what
extent
did
the
Second
World
War
affect
Japanese
society?
Fur ther reading
Costello,
York,
Martin.
Keegan,
The
John.
Cynthia
Birth
of
Historians.
Stille,
the
The
Pacic
UK.
1989.
Second
War,
World
1990.
The
C
Rhodes,
and
Atomic
Black
Mark.
Oxford,
226
1985.
1941–1945.
Harper
Perennial.
New
USA.
Gilbert,
Kelly,
John.
Dog
2014.
Second
Bomb
and
The
in
War.
World
War.
Richard.
the
Words
Leventhal.
Imperial
Stoddart.
Viking,
2009.
of
New
Japanese
Its
The
Toronto,
New
Navy
in
York,
Manhattan
Creators,
York,
Canada.
USA.
Project:
Eyewitnesses,
and
USA.
the
Pacic
War.
Osprey.
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SS
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229
C A U S E S
A N D
E F F E C TS
O F
20 T H - C E N T U R Y
At
its
heart
the
W A R S
tasks
of
comparing
and
contrasting
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activities
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TOK discussion
analysis.
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There are a number of assumptions
event
concept
in the idea of developing historical
more
knowledge through comparison of
relationships
events. Star ting with a real-life situation
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based on the study of 20th-century wars,
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develop a knowledge claim. Explore this
For
knowledge claim and develop it fur ther
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into a knowledge question. Share your
need
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address it.
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●
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●
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strategy to use as a common basis for
comparison, they are by no means the only
factors across which you could compare
and contrast 20th-century wars.
How
many others can you think of? Choose
three of these and use them to compare
and contrast two 20th-century wars.
230
how
and
Japan
meaningful
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intellectually
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of:
C O N C L U S I O N
The
cognitive
skills”
plays
skill
component
a
role
in
the
of
of
analysis
the
other
self-management
skills.
help
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wars
you
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develop
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ATL
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important
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research
activities
and
in
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think
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It
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skills
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fashion.
L TA
Thinking skills
Compare and contrast the signicance of the factors below in determining the
outcome of the Second World War in Europe and the Pacic.
●
strategy
●
industrial production
●
technology
L TA
Thinking skills
Broadly speaking a thesis or thesis statement is your position on a given topic or
answer to a question.
While there are a number of ways to write one, strong thesis
statements all have some things in common.
A thesis statement should contain
the following.
●
Your position/answer to the question: indicates a focus on the task .
●
Any qualication to that position/answer: because few historical issues/
questions have a straightforward “yes” or “no” answer, some qualication
is generally required.
about the task .
A qualier also indicates that you are thinking deeply
A qualier is par ticularly impor tant in responding to a task
involving the idea of “to what extent”.
●
An indication of how you will suppor t your position/answer: this provides
structure to your response and an indication to the reader of the direction the
response will take.
In terms of a compare and contrast essay a thesis might look like this:
QuestionCompare and contrast the role of technology in the Algerian War and the
Falklands/Malvinas War.
Thesis statement: Technology played an impor tant role in transpor ting troops
and materials in the Algerian War and Falklands/Malvinas Wars, but had limited
eect on land combat
Addresses the task
An indication of how the position will be suppor ted
A qualication to the position
Write a potential thesis statement for each of the following questions.
●
Compare and contrast the causes of the Indo-China War and the Algerian War.
●
Evaluate the Allied strategy in the Pacic theatre of the Second World War.
●
To what extent did militarism and nationalism cause the First World War?
231
economic
effects
of
First
World
War
147
Falange
(Spanish
fascist
party)
88,
89,
94,
98
Index
El
Alamein
fall
A
Afghanistan
Africa
113,
aircraft
114,
115
127
airships
ghter
aircraft
planes
planes
carriers
Alessandri,
Algerian
1955
30–1
1956
31
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127,
191,
70,
North
16–17
causes
short-term
and
Battle
of
the
Frontiers
attacks
and
the
Week
of
amphibious
Canada
alliances,
First
landing
craft
Carlists
218
in
Falklands
CEDA
47
in
Europe
naval
1914
personnel,
110–11
World
Battle
Attlee,
of
1880–1914
Australia
114,
Gallipoli
Second
216,
217,
July
Crisis
188,
208,
211,
114,
Cold
124–5,
88,
90,
ballistic
missiles
Belgium
talkers
War
Coral
of
outbreak
Berlin
Blank
Blum,
War
Dien
Cheque
Leon
Britain
113–14,
115,
88,
84,
94–5,
naval
115,
151,
of
Britain
Battle
race
Derechas
of
the
(5–12
Jiang
September
1914)
of
and
US
164,
204–5
reaction
170,
188,
205–6
190
Nacional
del
Trabajo)
107–8,
151
121–2
115–16
Frontiers
Battle
of
the
Marne
the
Somme
of
127–8
(5–12
September
1914)
Battle
of
Verdun
Belgium
Powers
Eastern
Front
effects
Crisis
of
opening
30
95
147
110
116–18
the
First
causes
(BEF)
126,
Evian
F
War
153–4,
202–3
110–12
moves
Race
to
124–6
(July–November
effects
the
1917)
146
Sea
129
causes
effects
warfare
war
at
sea
war
plans
16,
129–30
production,
1914–1918
145
143–4
118
21–2,
151,
116–18
147–8
munitions
57–8,
79–80,
84,
95,
113,
226–7
Battle
of
the
Frontiers
Battle
of
the
Marne
156,
the
Somme
Battle
157
of
127–8
(5–12
September
1914)
of
(July–November
136–7
Verdun
(February–October
1916)
134–5
19,
198,
conscription
226–7
economic
204
Fourth
23,
110–11
effects
Franco-Russian
75–8
Free
111
of
Republic
French
First
22,
World
War
147
65
Alliance
1894
114
182
industrialization
outbreak
Dwight
182,
Vichy
184
113
in
Spanish
Franco,
118
101,
Cordiale
Franz
114
your
essay
the
introductions
Accords
35
and
Francisco
103,
105,
forces
equipment
82–3
question
strategies
37–8
conclusion
150
First
Ferdinand,
French
13–14
of
French
Civil
War
in
89,
War
118,
forces
94,
95,
96,
98–9,
156
Archduke
Algeria
108,
116
25–6
27
in
Indo-China
64–6
66–7
69–70
Foreign
124–5
173
28–9
equipment
French
World
Government
strategies
128
World
109–16
128–9
understanding
Force
115
112–13
138–9
115,
135
110
structuring
(July–November
121
144–5
Passchendaele
UK
155
Phu
1914
141–2
industrialization
France
26,
1916)
142–3
Front
trench
225–6
technology
(February–October
126
Central
social
197–8,
(July–November
136–7
short-term
93
170–1
writing
110
90,
148
the
militarism
226–7
Manchuria
172
vitale
Entente
190
conscription
88,
113–14
1914
literature
long-term
Jieshi
208,
War
93,
nancing
Enigma
136–7
Expeditionary
84,
of
legacy
102
essays
Somme
(FAI)
96–7
élan
188–9
Marne
Ibérica
Battle
July
222
Eisenhower,
111
128–9
British
de
E
200,
156–7
Battle
154–5
imperialism/nationalism
94
220
Bien
Ebro
the
57,
non-intervention
appeasement
Blitz
89,
71
Plan
Dunkirk
117
Anglo-German
of
88,
170–1
dreadnoughts
118
226–7
1916)
party)
96
39–40,
Battle
181,
156–7
responsibility
deterrence
Otto
54–5
Balkans
Battle
decit
117–18
100
Bismarck,
see
113,
decolonization
126
World
185
Bilbao
169,
D
Belgium
and
1916)
190
First
168,
222
39,
Sea
Dawes
of
144
117
114
invasion
139,
89
202,
92,
Czechoslovakia
115–16,
War
system
political
conscription
88–9
B
114,
135,
11
cryptology
Balkans
50–2
53
134–5
Española
Winston
communication
142
87,
occupation
Sir
Comintern
116
116–18
87,
aftermath
43–4
War
Powers
Home
88,
71–2,
commissars
Manuel
its
139–40
Gallipoli
(Confederación
collective
121,
165,
Neville
codebreaking
142–3
218–19
War
130,
182–5
king–church
86,
Kai-shek
war
code
144
168,
122,
45
Church
Churchill,
civil
146
World
Azaña,
117
185–6
113,
war
causes
Anarquista
1916)
93
135
Jimmy
64,
87,
War
Austria-Hungary
First
1881–1914
CNT
landings
114,
(Confederación
China
226
World
collapse
the
139,
218–19
Largo
War
Sino-Japanese
222–4
Clement
216,
198
pigeons
Chiang
116
assassinations,
bomb
art
45–6
125
landings
196,
Japanese
assassinations
232
108,
Autónomas)
112
atom
211,
Chamberlain,
and
121,
(Spanish
Catholic
54–5
48–9
divisions
Falklands
the
and
islands
151
World
alliance
1917)
the
World
economic
carrier
Carter,
forces
strategies
Atlantic,
First
122,
94
86–7
42
41–2,
(July–November
Francisco
95,
188,
armies
political
118,
48
Normandy
World
39–40
military
War
Allied
208,
Second
and
39,
Argentinian
army
World
41–3
93
Battle
205
Treaty
Junta
92,
179
1918
in
on
of
84,
Federación
182–5
campaign
First
116,
Caballero,
anarcho-syndicalism
Argentina
fascism
War
C
the
110
doctrine
Rosario
128–9
34
European
Antarctic
Civil
22–3
113–14
War
of
forces
Bulgaria
causes
Operation
short-term
Spanish
landings
Africa
strategies
21–2
the
causes
Barricades
Amau
in
39–40
52–3
outcomes
172
138–9
British
war
1982
long-term
Second
Passchendaele
31
War
operations
181
114
Dunkirk
Normandy
72–3
Burma
of
at
Italy
96–7
33–4
Line
alliances
Sicily
non-intervention
32
map
and
outbreak
Algiers
long-term
terror
208
invasion
of
air
215–16
Pacic
113
214
35
Morice
the
industrialization
losses
192
188–9
211–12,
1954–1962
Plan
effects
in
124–5
of
Challe
127,
Marcel
War
Singapore
isolationism
127
bomber
of
forces
39
Falklands
179–81
Legion
25,
65
100,
I N D E X
Front
de
Libération
equipment
organization
strategies
Nationale
(FLN)
Vietnam
22–3
interzone
24–5
Italy
28
84,
El
Galtieri,
gas
landings
Germany
support
52
84,
94,
Group
Iwo
113–14
naval
race
Centre
of
the
Frontiers
Battle
of
the
Marne
of
the
Battle
September
economic
El
(February–October
First
1916)
German
of
First
World
War
after
invasion
of
First
World
invasion
of
Normandy
Sicily
Africa
Operation
outbreak
and
Italy
Barbarossa
of
First
War
117–18,
124–5
Passchendaele
(July–November
1917)
road
to
siege
effects
of
for
Tripartite
Vo
Gilbert
global
and
Great
Pact
context
16,
in
Spain
95
Gulf
74–6,
Islands
57,
172,
151,
200
Marianas
206
Pact
plans
206,
Islands
war
12,
and
US
reaction
205–6
guerilla
wars
foreign
support
for
what
guerilla
warfare?
20
guerillas
Partido
Partit
211–12
88,
Jieshi
Crisis
205,
208,
222–4
Battle
219–20,
of
Empire
Bill
see
Pearl
143
II
of
pieds
219
135
Leach,
Sir
Harbor
50
25
policy
142
García
de
Catalunya
(PSUC)
(July–November
von
1917)
138–9
177–8
Army
207,
(PLA)
213,
216,
64,
72
217,
218,
226
noirs
21,
22,
28,
30–1,
32,
34,
35
135
weapons
190
167–8
of
Popular
Army
Popular
Front
PSOE
98
Marxista
206–7
privatization
166
Unicat
206,
casualties
Frederico
125,
93
Liberation
pigeons
142
Henry
115–16,
Unicación
92,
Friedrich
Poland
lamps
225
108,
93
221,
Germany
de
88,
Socialista
Paulus,
Wilhelm
Ataturk
222,
107,
67
Obrero
Philippines
Lorca,
179
179–81
Passchendaele
226
116–18
Lend-Lease
100
184
170
(POUM)
203
102
legionnaires
27
18–19
184
campaign
paratroopers
pilotless
16
20th-century
182–4
217–18
L
216–17
220
P
Tripartite
Kemal
204
217,
185
weapons
Ottoman
War
kamikaze
200,
Beach
Okinawa
221
220–1
Kaiser
216,
184–5
Alamein
nuclear
216
O
K
107,
212,
Beach
Beach
People’s
188
155–6,
1941–
77–8
217
84,
Pacic,
209
Sino-Japanese
Jutland,
71–2,
the
211,
184
Beach
Norway
204–5
in
219
Midway
July
El
215–16
102
Guadalcanal
Guernica
forces
and
Jiang
forces
Kong
188,
65
landings
Africa
168,
142–3
210
Marshall
war
146
176–8
39,
Hermann
is
Hong
North
Philippines,
97
139,
landings
Beach
Utah
223–4
the
114,
Chester
Omaha
217
113
(US)
Richard
Sword
on
expansion
Jarama
64,
Depression
guerilla
War
206
Caroline
Guadalajara
World
Nationalist
Nguyen
Goering,
First
185
Stalingrad
support
Giap,
of
Berlin
Zealand
Juno
Islands
Nagasaki
and
93
Acts
Normandy
US
202–3
ultra-nationalism
138–9
political
Juan
Gold
expansion
Leyte
and
216–17
and
kamikaze
173–6
Japan
222
75
111–12
Nimitz,
225
advance
Japanese
181
179
World
navies
Nixon,
Japanese
1942
182–5
campaign
96
Gallipoli
Japanese
126
landings
Spain
talkers
Henri
neo-mercantilism
Caroline
Singapore
War
113
Belgium
in
205
War
and
Japanese
156
industrialization
North
World
Hiroshima
147
179–81
expansion
forces
220
Guadalcanal
141–2
effects
Alamein
code
Negrin,
of
non-intervention
115
Navarre,
200–1
doctrine
Sea
Gilbert
Front
114,
and
113
Navajo
142
219–20
democratization
(July–November
134–5
Eastern
125,
206
occupation
Verdun
120,
181
Nationalist
Pact
212,
57,
Amau
1914)
136–7
of
107,
Allies
New
Japan
127–8
(5–12
Somme
NATO
J
Coral
1916)
nations
160
Neutrality
128–9
Battle
155,
111
175
Battle
Jima
War
for
Tripartite
Anglo-German
Army
43,
131
116,
179–81
by
96
democracies
96–7
64
113,
World
invasion
142–3
Leopoldo
warfare
94,
support
western
112–13
systems
Alamein
First
G
Gallipoli
Italian
59
industrialization
26
the
campaign
169
102
87,
39,
(Partido
Polish
93,
88–91,
96
42
Socialista
Obrero
Español)
88–9
Pu
M
H
Haig,
Alexander
Halsey,
harkis
William
25,
Harris,
33,
Ho
Madrid
“Bomber”
89,
164,
178,
180,
Dreadnought
Chi
198,
Hong
Minh
60,
Mao
79,
Maxim,
Midway
227
Kong
208,
211,
216,
and
mines
Marianas
Ibarruri,
Dolores
imperialism
India
208,
115,
216,
Indo-China
War
1950–1954
74–8
effects
of
Phu
the
long-term
war
causes
57–8,
227
Rommel,
Line
code
Mussolini,
79–80
60
60–2
111,
Eastern
First
135
Benito
105,
154,
155,
160,
and
non-intervention
11–12
165,
113–14,
97,
Front
World
180,
182–3
206,
212,
224
182–3
116,
revolution
117,
1917
118
143,
146
141–2
War
121,
124,
Alliance
industrialization
181
179,
D.
von
Franco-Russian
226
96,
war
Gerd
Bolshevik
182
32
Louis
92–4
94–5
96
Franklin
Rundstedt,
110–12
179–80,
Brigades
Erwin
Roosevelt,
Bernard
43
Spain
democracies
revolutionary
217–18
Russia
Mountbatten,
227
Islands
42,
in
96–7
128–9
137
125,
1894
138,
139
114
113
S
N
75–8
causes
short-term
226,
1945–1954
73–4
Bien
Morse
226–7
218–19,
1946–1950
Dien
Morice
99
1914)
39,
forces
support
western
226
130
Montgomery,
I
Soviet
208,
220–1
109,
Ronald
International
170
71–2,
September
Hiram
militarism
226
187
222–4
von
64,
(5–12
Marshall
75,
Eric
Zedong
Marne
74,
radar
R
137
Project
Manstein,
73,
204
Manhattan
173–5,
72,
Yi
225
Republican
155,
71,
218,
204–5
172,
111
217,
Manchuria
105,
188–9
111,
216,
Reagan,
220,
98,
96,
183,
62,
guns
212,
101
169–70,
95,
168,
Douglas
222
Magic
192
135
Adolf
156–7,
176,
machine
217
33
heliographs
Hitler,
MacArthur,
52
35
Arthur
helicopters
HMS
51,
napalm
67,
nationalism
Nationalist
German
Schlieffen
68
115,
forces
203
in
support
Spain
95
94
Plan
141,
164
map
of
117,
Schlieffen
Schlieffen,
Alfred
118,
Plan
von
126,
127,
128–9,
119
118
233
Schutzstaffel
Second
151–2,
air
(SS)
World
57,
95,
188–92,
ground
Allied
Powers
Allied
Powers’
armaments
strategies
powers,
forces
Powers
159–60,
strategies
to
western
of
Britain
Battle
of
the
Europe
Atlantic
Cold
Spain
185–6
decolonization
198,
democratization
Alamein
of
European
war
154–5
ghting
in
dead
Pacic
Jima
Japanese
advance
and
on
of
200,
the
Philippines,
215–16
in
the
World
War
long-term
causes
153–5,
long-term
effects
197–8
Manhattan
map
of
Project
Second
tips
in
the
Pacic
220–1
Normandy
North
Pearl
Harbor
Philippines
relative
to
the
powers
in
155–7,
204–7
tank
long-range
and
US
reaction
Magic,
bombing
production
Pact
190–92,
ultra-nationalism
Nations
strategies:
island
US
strategies:
strategic
234
war
at
war
crimes
sea
hopping
warfare
185–8,
trials
212
bombing
213
220–2
196–7
island
strategic
and
Harbor
tanks
a
good
essay
War
tank
production
166
war
trench
landing
warfare
see
97
warfare
212
bombing
and
213
206–7
Soviet
and
War
and
US
reaction
Union
V2s
190
(February–October
Minh
1916)
134–5
63–4
64
71–2
59
at
the
Clausewitz,
17th
Carl
parallel
Philipp
79
Gottfried
7
7
craft
of
wars
continue?
why
do
wars
end?
why
do
we
Pact
Weltpolitik
Wilhelm
33
111,
118,
191
the
code
144
113
II
of
the
powers,
1880–
112
Naval
Conference
203
115
of
124,
women
137
and
7–18
(Canada)
tonnage
Washington
170–1
Act
8
10
111
1914
135
ght?
Measures
warships
187–8
10–12
do
Warsaw
218
9–10
wars
warship
bombers
weapons
Germany
108,
114,
115,
136
and
the
First
World
War
147
talkers
224
Yamamoto,
Isoroku
Yugoslavia
116
67
weapons
Z
190
Zeppelins
Zhukov,
144
178
Margaret
39,
11
warfare
trench
hopping
why
War
214
113
guns
139,
War
W
13–14
187
Thatcher,
total
Civil
182–5
strategies:
partition
12–13
131
submarines
198
US
commercial
radar
Spanish
217–18
Y
pilotless
203
in
strategies:
Von
codebreaking
paratroopers
166
206
181
Islands
Pacic
Vietnam
187–8
assessment
68
nuclear
222
217
14
cryptology
napalm
176–8
Italy
Marianas
landings
equipment
222
Tripartite
United
and
Islands
Pacic
V1s
219
15
and
warfare
machine
181
War
220–1
types
111,
helicopters
185
causes
205–6
Stalingrad
strategic
197–8
127
Enigma
gas
Italy
Joe”
warfare
and
communication
of
and
Midway
strategies
carriers
artillery
potential
Marshall
Viet
“Vinegar
anti-submarine
161
and
182,
9–10
amphibious
Sino-Japanese
177,
178
206–7
147
221
technology
aircraft
War
209
and
Verdun
terms
aircraft
Berlin
103
144
179
194–5
short-term
lost
115
World
World
139–40
216–17
Sicily
Gulf
US
V
174,
writing
Second
Pacic
113
USSR
87–8
162
170,
overview
139,
First
Caroline
of
and
205–6
causes
Joseph
of
122,
invasion
Pearl
86–7
176–8
technology
218
war
1937
Sicily
217–18
167–9
recovery
road
Islands
182–5
Africa
Poland
Marianas
the
and
commercial
T
tanks
Midway
88–91
200–1
Japan
industrialization
war
War
204
and
Civil
222–4
World
Marshall
Spanish
of
War
Sino-Japanese
Henry
for
in
151,
225
effects
Normandy
historiography
202–4
the
88,
155
non-intervention
Republicans
command
221
in
(UGT)
220
World
Leyte
102
anti-submarine
153–4,
105
100
98–9
submarines
211–12
94–5,
Plan
Gilbert
war
102
causes
Josef
Stilwell,
206,
104,
north
causes
Albert
Stalin,
Stanley,
Pacic,
210
plans
First
Speer,
the
syllabus
Gulf
the
Trabajadores
198
84,
Sea
forces
84–5
of
101
Stalingrad
204–5
202–3
Leyte
1936–1938
91
outbreak
Kong
57,
First
88
102
1936
why
Nations
39,
economic
1936–1939
203
de
democratization
96
100
long-term
204
219–20
the
Hong
expansion
war
Spain
97
short-term
Japanese
1941–1942
the
142
93
Dawes
173
in
87
parties
intervention
Madrid
Okinawa
expansion
legacy
July
217
193–7
Japanese
Japanese
Islands
226–7
Singapore
Army
forces
signicance
offensive
Jarama
155–6,
effects
and
Red
General
Guadalcanal
immediate
216–17
imperialism
War
and
Guadalajara
213–14
121,
Coral
176–8
the
literature
War
195–6
156
Caroline
Depression
immediate
of
political
Guernica
the
Guadalcanal
migration
193
expansion
and
US
Republican
and
foreign
179–81
fascism
and
Bilbao
US
Ebro
population
Great
and
225
European
Gilbert
art
226–7
Japan
116,
226
Britain
United
173–6
185
103–5
220
occupation
90,
94
Republic
Civil
222–3,
170
occupation
aftermath
225–6
see
86
Spanish
197–8,
Sea
German
for
S.
Alan
ultra-nationalism
Barbarossa
purge
Spanish
192
UK
136–7
168
Stalingrad
support
218–19
War
Coral
of
114
Harry
U
1916)
Unión
39,
206
215–16
43
Berlin
Second
production
Burma
to
Stalin’s
169–73
188–9
190
bomber
114,
Union
siege
173–6
Turing,
124–5
219
Africa
road
164–5
211,
(July–November
Operation
209
Stalingrad
Battle
South
Soviet
160
Truman,
117,
Pact
Entente
Turkey
208,
sovereignty
Powers’
Iwo
the
162
Axis
El
of
Triple
203
135
115–16,
William
Somme
Axis
for
Slim,
165–6
156–7
Tripartite
162
Conference
181
Singapore
208–9
Naval
ags
114,
Sicily
161
160–1,
1940–1943
Barbarossa
Serbia
production
ground
production
Washington
105,
222–4
forces
appeasement
Blitz
104,
semaphore
Allied
battle
100,
200–1
war
Axis
wartime
168
War
129–30
runners
135
42–3,
45,
50,
55
127
Georgi
176
207,
211,
212
117,
C AUS E S
OF
AND
E F F EC T S
20 T H - C E N T U R Y
WA R S
Authors
Written by leading examiners and IB educators, this course book most
David M. Smith
comprehensively covers World History Topic 11 from the syllabus for first
examination in 2017. Enabling learners to critically explore historical concepts,
the student-centred approach enables big-picture understanding and
strengthens results.
O xford course books are the only DP resources developed with the IB.
This means that they are:
➜
The most comprehensive and accurate match to IB specifications
➜
Written by exper t and experienced examiners and teachers
➜
Packed with accurate assessment suppor t, directly from the IB
➜
Truly aligned with the IB philosophy, equipping learners to tackle key
concepts, ATL and TOK
A scene of conflict
Build a critical and thematic understanding,
strengthening assessment potential
Embed the key skills and enable confident
understanding of the Paper 2 assessment,
suppor ting results.
Also available, from Oxford
Print and online pack
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978 0 19 835490 1
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