Title: AZNAR VS. COMELEC
Date: May 25, 1990
Topic: Article 4, Section 1 – Citizenship
FACTS:
*In Nov 1987, respondent Emilio “Lito”
Osmeña filed COC for Provincial Governor of
Cebu Province for Jan 18, 1988 elections
*In Jan 1988, petioner, Cebu-CDP Laban
represented by Jose B. Aznar, incumbent
Provincial Chairman, filed PETITION FOR THE
DISQUALIFICATION of Osmeñaon the ground
that he is allegedly not a Filipino citizen,
being a citizen of the United States of
America
*In Jan 27, 1988, Aznar filed a FORMAL
MANIFESTATION submitting immigration
documents stating that Osmeña is an
American and a holder of Alien Certificate of
Registration and Immigrant Certificate of
Residence
*He also filed a SUPPLEMENTAL URGENT
EX-PARTE MOTION for the Issuance of
TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER to
temporarily enjoin the Cebu Provincial Board
of Canvassers from tabulating/canvassing
the votes cast in favor of Osmeña.
*Jan 28 1988 COMELEC en banc ordered the
board continued canvassing but suspended
the proclamation
*At the hearing before the COMELEC,
petitioner presented documents as a proof
that Osmeña is an American citizen and
other pertaining documents
*Osmeña at the other hand, maintained that
he is
- Filipino Citizen, that he is a legitimate
child of Dr. Emilio D. Osmena, Filipino son of
the late
President OsmeñaSr
- holder of a Philippine Passport
- continuously residing in the Philippines
and has not gone out of the country for
the past 6 mos
- Registered voter
* March 3, 1988 COMELEC directed the
board Canvassers to proclaim the winning
candidates and Osmeña was proclaimed as
the Provincial Governor of Cebu
* June 11, 1988 COMELEC DISMISSED THE
PETITION FOR DISQUALIFICATION for lack of
sufficient and timely proof that Osmeña is
not a Filipino Citizen.
*Other facts*
Under the Omnibus Election Code, petition
to question the qualification of running
candidates can be:
1. Before election – not later than 25
days from the time of filing of COC
2. After election –file petition for quo
warrant within 10 days after the
proclamation of the results of the
election
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT EMILIO “LITO”
OSMEÑA IS A FILIPINO CITIZEN
REASON FOR THE RULING:
*Petitioner failed to present direct proof
that private respondent had lost his Filipino
Citizenship by any of the modes provided for
under CA No. 63:
(1) by naturalization in a foreign country;
(2) by express renunciation of citizenship;
(3) by subscribing to an oath of allegiance to
support the Constitution or laws of a foreign
country.
Philippine courts are only allowed to
determine who are Filipino citizens and who
are not. Whether or not a person is
considered an American under the laws of
the United States does not concern the
court.
We consider that the renunciation needed
to lose Philippine citizenship must be
"express", it stands to reason that there can
be no such loss of Philippine 'citizenship
when there is no renunciation either
"'express" or "implied".
RULING:
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is
hereby DISMISSED and the Resolution of
the COMELEC is hereby
AFFIRMED
Title: PETITION OF MARTIN NG TO BE
ADMITTED A FILIPINO CITIZEN
Date: March 7, 1988
Topic: Article 4, Section 1 – Citizenship
FACTS:
*Martin Ng filed with the First Court of First
Instance of Cebu, APPLICATION FOR
NATURALIZATION AS A CITIZEN OF THE
PHILIPPINES, in accordance with
Commonwealth Act No. 473
*Assistant City Fiscal representing Solicitor
General opposed the petitioner’s request
without any specific grounds
*Lower Court, rendered that the petition
was well founded and adequately supported
by competent evidence and declaring the
petitioner to naturalization as a Filipino
Citizen subject to subsequent compliance
with the other requisites provided for in RA
530
*Upon the lapse of 2 year period required by
the statute for the finality of the decision,
the petitioner filed with the Court a
“MOTION TO SET CASE FOR FINAL
HEARING” – MOTION WAS GRANTED.
Petitioner presented the requirements
indicated by RA 530
*City Fiscal of Cebu in behalf of Solicitor
General FILED AN OPPOSITION on the
ground of petitioner’s lack of lucrative
business, trade or profession, stating that
Ng’s employment in “Man Bee Trading” is
not lucrative
*Court OVERRULED the petition stating that
the issue on the lucrative income should
have been ventilated during original hearing
*the rejected allegations against the
petitioners are:
(1) Petitioner’s omission to state that he
was, during WORLD WAR II, a resident of
Loboc, Bohol
(2) Failure to comply with the statutory
requirement for posting the petition and
notice of hearing
(3) failure to file a declaration of intention
one year prior to the filing of the petition
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONER,
MR. MARTIN NG SHOULD BE GRANTED
NATURALIZATION AS A CITIZEN OF THE
PHILIPPINES
RULING:
YES.
The Supreme Court finds no reason to
modify the Decision and Final Order
challenged in the appeal of Mr. Martin Ng
and therefore AFFIRMS the same.
REASON OF THE RULING:
The actuality of the posting of the petition
and the notice of hearing in a public and
conspicuous place in accordance
with law, was attested to by the Court's
Clerk-in-Charge whose certification to this
effect was duly submitted in
evidence. 11 The omission of the petitioner
to state in his application the circumstance
that he had for a brief period
during the last War stayed in Loboc, Bohol, is
not a fatal one. It was so ruled by this Court
in Tan v. Republic.
Moreover, the evidence shows that the
petitioner was brought by his parents to
Loboc at a time when he was only
two (2) years of age, and stayed there only
for four (4)years; and that he had no
intention whatever to hide the fact
of his sojourn at Loboc, or make it difficult
for the Government authorities to check up
on his activities, is satisfactorily
demonstrated by his having testified freely
and openly about it in the proceedings
below.
Finally, that he was exempt from filing a
declaration of intention, has also been
satisfactorily established by the unrebutted
proof, testimonial and documentary, that he
was born in the Philippines and completed
his elementary and secondary education in
schools recognized by the Government and
where Philippine History, Government and
Civics were taught without limitation as
regards nationality or race.
This Court is also satisfied that the evidence
adduced adequately established petitioner's
"lucrative income." 15 It is
also satisfied that the petitioner's character
witnesses — Messrs Bartolome Avancena
and Vicente Fernan — are
persons not merely of good standing but of
no title prominence in the community,
competent to speak of the
petitioner's person and reputation.
Finally, as to the petitioner's asserted failure
to prove that the law of his country,
Nationalist China, grant reciprocal
rights to Filipinos to become citizens of that
country, this Court has more than once ruled
it to be of judicial notice
that that reciprocity does exist
Title: PETITION OF FLORENCIO MALLARE
Date: April 29, 1968
Topic: Article 4, Section 1 – Citizenship
FACTS:
* The respondent, Florencio Mallare, was
admitted to the practice of law on 5 March
1962. In his verified petition to
take the bar examinations in 1961, he
alleged that he is a citizen of the Philippines
and that "his father is Esteban
Mallare and his mother is Te Na, both
Filipino citizens". (Personal Record, No.
17450, Bar Division)
*On 16 July 1962, the Acting Commissioner
of Immigration Martiniano P. Vivo
denounced the respondent to this
Court as a Chinaman masquerading as a
Filipino citizen and requested that the
matter be investigated thoroughly
and if the respondent fails to show that he
has legally become a Filipino, steps be taken
for striking his name from
the roll of persons authorized to practice
law.
*In Aug 1962, the said matter was referred
to the Legal Officer-Investigator for
Investigation and report
Claims of respondent-lawyer on being a
Filipino citizen:
(1) Supposed Citizenship of His father,
Mr. Esteban Mallare, alleged to be
Filipino citizen by choice since he is an
illegitimate son of Chinese Father and a
Filipina Mother, Ana Mallare
(2) Respondent’s mother, Te Na, a
Chinese, followed the citizen shop of her
husband upon their marriage
2nd theory of respondent:
(3) He was declared a Filipino Citizen in a
final judgment in 1960 by the Court of
First Instance of Quezon Province (Civil
Case No. 329-G)
(4) His birthcertificate, originally as
Chinese, corrected to Filipino by final
Judgements in Special Proceeding No.
3925 of the same court
There is no evidence that Ana Mallare
was an "inhabitant of the Philippine
Islands continuing to reside therein who
was a Spanish subject on the eleventh
day of April, eighteen hundred and
ninety-nine", as required by the
Philippine Bill of July 1, 1902 and she
cannot, therefore, be considered a
Filipina
*The Supreme Court finds the testimonies of
the brothers and sisters of the respondentlawyer more of a conjuncture than fact
* Esteban Mallare's registration as a voter
indicates his desire to exercise a right
appertaining exclusively to Filipino
citizens but this does not alter his real
citizenship, which, in this jurisdiction, is
determinable by his blood ( jus
sanguinis).
* all the five (5) known children of the
spouses Esteban Mallare and Te Na Artemio,
Esperanza, Florencio, Paciencia and
Raymundo, were registered at birth as
children of a Chinese father and a Chinese
mother and with the added detail that their
parents were born in China.
*also, in the birthcert of the sister of
florencio, Mr. Esteban identified his
citizenship as Chinese and that his own
death certificate who’s florencio’s brother’s
signature was affixed, declares that he is a
Chinese, born in Fookiang, China; that he
died on 5 June 1945, at the age of 42 and is
buried at the Chinese cemetery, having
resided in the Philippines for 28 years
* The entire family, consisting of the father,
mother and their four (4) children
(Raymundo was not yet born) were
registered as aliens in 1942 in the then
Division of Alien Statistics, pursuant to the
proclamation of the Commanderin-Chief of
the Imperial Japanese Forces in the
Philippines and Executive Order No. 25 of
the then Executive
Commission.
In addition, the respondent himself was
again registered as an alien in 1950, his
application thereto bearing his
thumbprints and stating therein that he is a
Chinese; that he belongs to the yellow race
and that he had used these
other names: "Tan JuaGae", "Enciong" and
"JuaGac" (Exh. "N"). He had been a teacher
in the Candon Chinese
School (t.s.n., p. 17, Oct. 3, 1962).
2nd Defense: Res Judicata
*Civil Case No. 329-G and Special Proceeding
No. 3925 are not modes of acquiring
Philippine citizenship; neither is
the Chinese citizenship of the respondent
converted to Filipino because certain
government agencies recognized
him as such. He remains, by jus sanguinis, a
Chinese until he is naturalized.
* The said judicial declaration was merely an
incident to the adjudication of the rights of
the parties to the
controversy over land ownership. Their
citizenship was not the thing adjudicated in
the judgment and the declaration
that they are Filipinos was but a necessary
premise for the court to arrive at a
conclusion that the sale of the realty
was valid as between the parties. Not being
the thing directly adjudicated, their declared
citizenship is not res
judicata, and cannot become conclusive.
because the proceeding was not instituted as
in rem and, under
no law had the state given its consent to be
party thereto. For this reason, the fiscal's
appearance was an
unauthorized one.
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT MR. FLORENCIO
MALLARE IS A FILIPINO CITIZEN AUTHORIZED
TO BE ADMITTED TO THE BAR AND PRACTICE
LAW
RULING:
NO.
Respondent Florencio Mallare is hereby
declared excluded from the
practice of law; his admission to the
Philippine bar is revoked and he is hereby
ordered to return immediately to this
Court the lawyer's diploma previously issued
to him.
Title: ANTONIO Y. CO VS. HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL
(HRET)
Date: Jul 30,1991
Topic: Article 4, Section 2 – Natural-Born
citizens are the citizens of the Philippines at
birth, without having the need to act in order
to acquire or perfect Philippine Citizenship.
FACTS:
Petitioner’s are Antonio Co and
SixtoBalanquit vs. Electoral Tribunal of the
House of Representatives and Jose Ong Jr.
*The petitioners ASKED FOR THE SETTING
ASIDE AND REVERSAL OF A DECISION OF
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL (HRET) on the
declaration of Jose Ong Jr. as Natural Born
Filipino Citizenand a resident of Laoang,
Northern Samar
ISSUE:
Whether or not Jose Ong Jr. is a Naturalized
born Filipino Citizen of the Philippines and a
resident of Laoang, Northern Samar and
Whether or not HRET acted with grave abuse
of discretion.
* On May 11, 1987, the congressional
election for the second district of Northern
Samar was held.
* Among the candidates who vied for the
position of representative in the second
legislative district of Northern Samar
are the petitioners, SixtoBalinquit and
Antonio Co and the private respondent, Jose
Ong, Jr., wherein Ong was proclaimed as the
duly elected representative of the 2nd district
of Northern Samar
The petitioners filed election protests against
the private respondent premised on the
following grounds:
1) Jose Ong, Jr. is not a natural born citizen
of the Philippines; and
2) Jose Ong, Jr. is not a resident of the
second district of Northern Samar
A motion for reconsideration was filed by the
petitioners on November 12, 1989. This was,
however, denied by the
HRET in its resolution dated February 22,
1989. Hence, these petitions for certiorari.
In the issue whether the Supreme Court has
a say on the judgment of the HRET:
The Supreme Court under the 1987
Constitution, has been given an expanded
jurisdiction, so to speak, to review
the decisions of the other branches and
agencies of the government to determine
whether or not they have acted
within the bounds of the Constitution. (See
Article VIII, Section 1, Constitution)
Yet, in the exercise thereof, the Court is to
merely check whether or not the
governmental branch or agency has
gone beyond the Constitutional limits of its
jurisdiction, not that it erred or has a
different view. In the absence of a
showing that the HRET has committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction, there is no
occasion for the Court to exercise its
corrective power; it will not decide a matter
which by its nature is for the HRET
alone to decide. (See Marcos v. Manglapus,
177 SCRA 668 [1989]) It has no power to look
into what it thinks is
apparent error.
In passing upon petitions, the Court with its
traditional and careful regard for the balance
of powers, must permit this
exclusive privilege of the Tribunals to remain
where the Sovereign authority has place it.
Thus, in the case at bar, the Court finds no
improvident use of power, no denial of due
process on the part of the HRET which will
necessitate the exercise of the power of
judicial review by the Supreme Court.
ISSUE ON THE CITIZENSHIP
*In the year 1895, the private respondent's
grandfather, Ong Te, arrived in the
Philippines from
China. Ong Te established his residence in
the municipality of Laoang, Samar on land
which he bought from the
fruits of hard work. As a resident of Laoang,
Ong Te was able to obtain a certificate of
residence from the then Spanish colonial
administration.
*Jose Ong Chuan, father of the respondent,
grew in Laoang, Samar and got married to a
natural-born filipina, and bore 8 children,
including the respondent.
*Unsure of his legal status, father of the
respondent FILED WITH THE COURT OF
INSTANCE OF SAMAR an application for
NATURALIZATION on February 15, 1954,
which on April 28, 1955, he was declared a
Filipino Citizen, thus Mr. Jose Ong Chuantook
his oath of Allegiance
*Respondent’s house was burnt when he
was at the age of 9, and that was their only
proof that laoang was their abode and home.
The same catastrophe happened in 1975, so
they constructed again
* For the elections of 1984 and 1986, Jose
Ong, Jr. registered himself as a voter of
Laoang, Samar, and
correspondingly, voted there during those
elections.
*when the opportunity came in 1987, he ran
in the elections for representative in the
second district of Northern Samar.
* There is no dispute that the respondent's
mother was a natural born Filipina at the
time of her marriage. Crucial to
this case is the issue of whether or not the
respondent elected or chose to be a Filipino
citizen.
* Election becomes material because Section
2 of Article IV of the Constitution accords
natural born status to children
born of Filipino mothers before January 17,
1973, if they elect citizenship upon reaching
the age of majority.
* To expect the respondent to have formally
or in writing elected citizenship when he
came of age is to ask for the
unnatural and unnecessary. The reason is
obvious. He was already a citizen. Not only
was his mother a natural born
citizen but his father had been naturalized
when the respondent was only nine (9) years
old.
We have jurisprudence that defines
"election" as both a formal and an informal
process.
* The respondent HRET has an interesting
view as to how Mr. Ong elected citizenship.
It observed that "when
protestee was only nine years of age, his
father, Jose Ong Chuan became a naturalized
Filipino. Section 15 of the
Revised Naturalization Act squarely applies
its benefit to him for he was then a minor
residing in this country.
Concededly, it was the law itself that had
already elected Philippine citizenship for
protestee by declaring him as
such." (Emphasis supplied)
* The same issue of natural-born citizenship
has already been decided by the
Constitutional Convention of 1971 and
by the BatasangPambansa convened by
authority of the Constitution drafted by that
Convention. Emil Ong, full
blood brother of the respondent, was
declared and accepted as a natural born
citizen by both bodies.
* The Constitutional Convention was the sole
judge of the qualifications of Emil Ong to be
a member of that body. The
HRET by explicit mandate of the
Constitution, is the sole judge of the
qualifications of Jose Ong, Jr. to be a
member
of Congress. Both bodies deliberated at
length on the controversies over which they
were sole judges. Decisions
were arrived at only after a full presentation
of all relevant factors which the parties
wished to present. Even
assuming that we disagree with their
conclusions, we cannot declare their acts as
committed with grave abuse of
discretion. We have to keep clear the line
between error and grave abuse.
ISSUE ON RESIDENCE
* Even assuming that the private respondent
does not own any property in Samar, the
Supreme Court in the case of
De los Reyes v. Solidum (61 Phil. 893 [1935])
held that it is not required that a person
should have a house in order
to establish his residence and domicile.
* To require the private respondent to own
property in order to be eligible to run for
Congress would be tantamount to
a property qualification. The Constitution
only requires that the candidate meet the
age, citizenship, voting and
residence requirements. Nowhere is it
required by the Constitution that the
candidate should also own property in
order to be qualified to run.
*The properties owned by the Ong Family
are in the name of the private respondent's
parents. Upon the demise of
his parents, necessarily, the private
respondent, pursuant to the laws of
succession, became the co-owner thereof
(as a co- heir), notwithstanding the fact that
these were still in the names of his parents.
RULING:
YES.
Jose Ong Jr. is a Natural-Born Filipino and a
resident of Laoang, Northern Samar.
Petitions are hereby DISMISSED. The
questioned decision of the House of
Representatives
Electoral Tribunal is AFFIRMED. Respondent
Jose Ong, Jr. is declared a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines and
a resident of Laoang, Northern Samar.
Title: PETITION OF FRANCISCO CO KENG TO
BE ADMITTED A CITIZEN OF THE PHILIPPINES
Date: July 3, 1966
Topic: Article 4, Section 3 – PHILIPPINE
CITIZENSHIP MAY BE LOST OR REACQUIRED
IN THE MANNER PROVIDED BY LAW.
FACTS:
* PETITIONER, Francisco Co KengFILED
AMENDED PETITION FOR NATURALIZATION
in the Court of First Instance of Manila
* He is alleged among others that he is a
merchant with an annual income of
P18,000.00, residing at No. 428 Sto. Cristo,
Manila; that he was born in Amoy, China, on
August 26, 1920; married to Yao SokTi alias
Dolores Yao, with whom
he has two children — Roberto and
Francisco, Jr., born on June 6, 1951 and
January 24, 1954, respectively; that he
speaks and writes English and Tagalog.
*Therefore he alleges to possess all the
qualifications and none of the
disqualifications for Philippine Citizenship
*On 31 October 1956, court RENDERED
PETITION FOR NATURALIZATION
*Two years after, upon proper motion of
applicant and there being no objection from
the Solicitor General, he was allowed to and
did take the oath of allegiance as a Filipino
citizen
*On 7 March 1961, the Solicitor General
FILED, in the same court of First Instance, A
VERIFIED MOTION FOR CANCELATION of Co
Keng’sCertificate of naturalization on the
grounds:
(1) The same was obtained fraudulently, by
making it appear that he was a resident of
Manila when actually, he was residing at No.
28, 12th Street, Broadway,Quezon City.
(2) Co Keng does not possess that norm of
behavior required of applicants to Philippine
citizenship when said petition was filed, by
reason of his habitual concealment of
taxable income and evasion of taxes due the
government, and his engagement in
questionable activities inimical to the
economic interests of the country.
*On December 11, 1961, THE MOTION WAS
DENIED
Co Keng replied to the disqualification
grounds:
(1) he was not the one who furnished
the information appearing in the birth
certificates of his two sons; the placing of
the Quezon City- house which he
allegedly bought for his sick father, as his
place of residence, was a "mistake"
committed perhaps by one of his
relatives; the appearance of the said
address in the corporate papers was due
to the fact that as he and his wife used to
take their lunch in that house in
Broadway every other day and he was
given a room therein for his use, his
friends formed the habit of looking for
him there. Appellee admits that he could
be reached in the Quezon City address,
but denies that it was a residence of his
respondent-appellee is making a
distinction between "residence" and
"address". Thus, it is his
argument that while No. 28, 12th St.,
Broadway, Quezon City may be one of his
addresses, it is not a residence of his.
(2) delinquency in payment of license tax
on liquor disqualifies an applicant to
become a Filipino Citizen. Failure of an
applicant to enter his true income in his
tax return has also been declared as
conclusive evidence of dishonesty,4
making him devoid of that good moral
character required by Section 2(3) of the
Revised Naturalization Law.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITION FOR
NATURALIZATION OF MR. FRANCISCO CO
KENG IS VALID AND THAT MR. CO KENG IS A
NATURALIZED BORN FILIPINO
RULING:
NO.
The order of the lower court appealed from
is set aside. The certificate of naturalization
issued to
petitioner Francisco Cokeng is hereby
revoked. Without pronouncement as to
costs.
Title: ANTONIO BENGSON III VS. TEODORO
CRUZ, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL
Date: May 7, 2001
Topic: Article 4, Section 3 – PHILIPPINE
CITIZENSHIP MAY BE LOST OR REACQUIRED
IN THE MANNER PROVIDED BY LAW.
FACTS:
* Respondent, Teodoro Cruz was a naturalborn citizen of the Philippines. He was born
in San Clemente, Tarlac, on April 27,1960, of
Filipino parents. The fundamental law then
applicable was the 1935 Constitution
*In Nov 5, 1985, respondent Cruz enlisted in
the United States Marine Corps and without
the
consent of the Republic of the Philippines,
took an oath of allegiance to the United
States. As a Consequence, he
lost his Filipino citizenship for under
Commonwealth Act No. 63, section 1(4)
* Whatever doubt that remained regarding
his loss of Philippine citizenship was erased
by his naturalization as a U.S.
citizen on June 5, 1990, in connection with
his service in the U.S. Marine Corps.
* On March 17, 1994, respondent Cruz
reacquired his Philippine citizenship through
repatriation under Republic Act
No. 2630.3 He ran for and was elected as the
Representative of the Second District of
Pangasinan in the May 11,
1998 elections. He won by a convincing
margin of 26,671 votes over petitioner
Antonio Bengson III, who was then
running for reelection.
*Mr. Antonio Bengson, FILED A CASE FOR
QUO WARRANT AD CAUTELAM with
respondent House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal (HRET) claiming that
respondent Cruz was not qualified to
become a member of the House of
Representatives since he is not a naturalborn citizen as required under Article VI,
section 6 of the Constitution
* On March 2, 2000, the HRET RENDERED ITS
DECISION DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR
QUO WARRANTO and declaring Cruz theduly
elected Representative of the Second District
of Pangasinan in the May 1998 elections
* The HRET likewise denied petitioner's
motion for reconsideration of the decision in
its resolution dated April 27, 2000
*The CASE AT BAR assails HRET’s decision on
the following grounds:
(1) The HRET committed serious errors and
grave abuse of discretion, amounting to
excess of jurisdiction,
when it ruled that private respondent is a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines
despite the fact that he had
ceased being such in view of the loss and
renunciation of such citizenship on his part.
(2) The HRET committed serious errors and
grave abuse of discretion, amounting to
excess of jurisdiction,
when it considered private respondent as a
citizen of the Philippines despite the fact he
did not validly acquire
his Philippine citizenship.
(3) Assuming that private respondent's
acquisition of Philippine citizenship was
invalid, the HRET committed
serious errors and grave abuse of discretion,
amounting to excess of jurisdiction, when it
dismissed the
petition despite the fact that such
reacquisition could not legally and
constitutionally restore his natural-born
status
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT TEODORO
CRUZ CAN STILL BE CONSIDERED A
NATURAL-BORN FILIPINO UPON HIS
REACQUISITION OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP
Petitioner asserts that respondent Cruz may
no longer be considered a natural-born
Filipino since he lost h is
Philippine citizenship when he swore
allegiance to the United States in 1995, and
had to reacquire the same by
repatriation. He insists that Article citizens
are those who are from birth with out having
to perform any act to acquire
or perfect such citizenship.
Respondent on the other hand contends that
he reacquired his status as natural-born
citizen when he was
repatriated since the phrase "from birth" in
Article IV, Section 2 refers to the innate,
inherent and inborn
characteristic of being a natural-born citizen.
*PETITION IS WITHOUT MERIT
There are two ways of acquiring citizenship:
(1) by BIRTH (natural-born citizens) - those
citizens of the Philippines from birth
withouthaving to perform any act to acquire
or perfect his Philippine citizenship
(2) by naturalization (naturalized citizens)have become Filipino citizens through
naturalization,
generally under Commonwealth Act No. 473,
otherwise known as the Revised
Naturalization Law, which repealed
the former Naturalization Law (Act No.
2927), and by Republic Act No. 530
To be NATURALIZED, applicant has to prove
that he possess all the qualifications and non
of the disqualification provided by the law to
become a Filipino Citizen.
The decision granting Philippine citizenship
becomes executory only after two (2) years
from its
promulgation when the court is satisfied that
during the intervening period, the applicant
has
(1) not left the Philippines;
(2) has dedicated himself to a lawful calling
or profession;
(3) has not been convicted of any offense or
violation of Government promulgated rules;
or
(4) committed any act prejudicial to the
interest of the nation or contrary to any
Government announced policies
REACQUIREMENT of Filipino Citizenship
(accdg to Commonwealth Act No 63)
(1) Naturalization
(2) Repatriation
(3) Direct act of Congress
REPATRIATION is for those who
(1) Desertion of the armed forces
(2) services of armed forces of the allied
forces in World War II
(3) service in the Armed Forces of the
United States at any other time
(4) Marriage of a Filipino woman to an
alien
(5) Political economic necessity
Ways to REPATRIATE
(1) Taking Oath of Allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippine
(2) Registering said oath in the Local
Civil Registry of the place where the
person concerned resides or last resided
*Respondent, TEODORO CRUZ, reacquired
his Philippine citizenship under RA No. 2630,
Having thus taken the required oath of
allegiance to the Republic and having
registered the same in the Civil
Registry of Magantarem, Pangasinan in
accordance with the aforecited provision,
respondent Cruz is deemed to
have recovered his original status as a
natural-born citizen, a status which he
acquired at birth as the son of a
Filipino father.
Petitioner's contention that respondent Cruz
is no longer a natural-born citizen since he
had to perform an act to
regain his citizenship is untenable. As
correctly explained by the HRET in its
decision, the term "natural-born citizen"
was first defined in Article III, Section 4 of
the 1973 Constitution as follows:
Sec. 4. A natural-born citizen is one who is a
citizen of the Philippines from birth without
having to perform any
act to acquire or perfect his Philippine
citizenship.
*1973 vs 1987 Constitution provisions on
natural born citizens were also discussed
* As respondent Cruz was not required by
law to go through naturalization proceeding
in order to reacquire his citizenship, he is
perforce a natural-born Filipino. As such, he
possessed all the necessary qualifications to
be elected as member of the House of
Representatives.
*Same with the CASE OF ANTONIO CO VS.
HRET, The HRET has been empowered by the
Constitution to be the "sole judge" of all
contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of the members of the
House.29 The Court's jurisdiction over the
HRET is merelyto check "whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction"
onthe part of the latter.
THERE IS NO SUCH SHOWING OF GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN THIS CASE.
RULING:
YES.
TEODORO CRUZ is a NATURAL BORN
FILIPINO CITIZEN DESPITE HIS
REACQUISITION OF THE OF THE PHILIPPINE
CITIZENSHIP AND THAT THE HRET DID NOT
SHOW GRAVE OF ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN
THE CASE AT BAR
PETITION IS HEREBY DISMISSED
Title: MOY YA LIM YAO alias EDILBERTO
AGUINALDO LIM and LAU YUEN YEUNG VS.
THE COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION
Date: October 4, 1971
Topic: Article 4, Section 3 – PHILIPPINE
CITIZENSHIP MAY BE LOST OR REACQUIRED
IN THE MANNER PROVIDED BY LAW.
FACTS:
*Petitioners seek the ISSUANCE OF A WRIT
OF INJUNCTIONagainst Commissioner on
Immigration filed at the Court of First
Instance of Manila in Civil Case No. 49705,
"restraining the latter and/or his authorized
representative from ordering plaintiff Lau
Yuen Yeung to leave the Philippines and
causing her arrest and deportation and the
confiscation of her bond, upon her failure to
do so."
*PETITION DENIED
*On 8 February 1961, Lau Yuen Yeng applied
for a passport visa to enter the Philippines
as a non-immigrant. In the interrogation
made in connection with her application for
a
temporary visitor's visa to enter the
Philippines, she stated that she was a
Chinese
residing at Kowloon, Hongkong, and that she
desired to take a pleasure trip to the
Philippines to visit her great (grand) uncle
Lau Ching Ping for a period of one month
* She was permitted to come into the
Philippines on March 13,
1961, and was permitted to stay for a period
of one month which would expire on April
13,
1961. On the date of her arrival, Asher Y,
Cheng filed a bond in the amount of
P1,000.00
to undertake, among others that said Lau
Yuen Yeung would actually depart from the
Philippines on or before the expiration of her
authorized period of stay in this country or
within the period as in his discretion the
Commissioner of Immigration or his
authorized
representative might properly allow. After
repeated extensions, petitioner Lau Yuen
Yeung
was allowed to stay in the Philippines up to
February 13, 1962
* On January 25, 1962, she contracted
marriage with Moy Ya Lim Yao alias Edilberto
Aguinaldo Lim an
alleged Filipino citizen.
*Because of the contemplated action of
respondent to confiscate
her bond and order her arrest and
immediate deportation, after the expiration
of her
authorized stay, she brought this action for
injunction with preliminary injunction
*In order for Lau Yuen Yeung, an alien
woman, deemed to be a citizen of the
Philippines by
virtue of her marriage to a Filipino citizen
only if she possesses all the qualifications
and none of the
disqualifications specified in the law,
because these are the explicit requisites
provided by law for an
alien to be naturalized
(1) Having been admitted as a
Temporary visitor only on Mar 13, 1961,
she lacks at least, the requisite length of
residence in the Philippines (Revised
Naturalization Law)
(2) He married MOY YA LIM, only a
Month prior to the expiry of her length of
stay
* In the case now at bar, the Court is again
called upon to rule on the same issue. Under
Section 15 of the
Naturalization Law, Commonwealth Act 473,
providing that:
SEC. 15. Effect of the naturalization on wife
and children. — Any woman, who is now or
may hereafter
be married to a citizen of the Philippines,
and who might herself be lawfully
naturalized shall be
deemed a citizen of the Philippines
*statutory construction was even mentioned
in the interpretation of the above mentioned
law
It may not be amiss to suggest, however,
that in order to have a good starting point
and so that the most immediate
relevant public records may be kept in order,
the following observations in Opinion No. 38,
series of 1958, of then
Acting Secretary of Justice Jesus G. Barrera,
may be considered as the most appropriate
initial step by the
interested parties:
Regarding the steps that should be taken by
an alien woman married to a Filipino citizen
in order to
acquire Philippine citizenship, the procedure
followed in the Bureau of Immigration is as
follows: The
alien woman must file a petition for the
cancellation of her alien certificate of
registration alleging,
among other things, that she is married to a
Filipino, citizen and that she is not
disqualified from
acquiring her husband's citizenship pursuant
to section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 473,
as amended.
Upon the filing of said petition, which should
be accompanied or supported by the joint
affidavit of the
petitioner and her Filipino husband to the
effect that the petitioner does not belong to
any of the groups
disqualified by the cited section from
becoming naturalized Filipino citizen (please
see attached CEB
Form 1), the Bureau of Immigration conducts
an investigation and thereafter promulgates
its order or
decision granting or denying the petition.
Once the Commissioner of Immigration
cancels the subject's registration as an alien,
there will probably be less
difficulty in establishing her Filipino
citizenship in any other proceeding,
depending naturally on the substance and
vigor of the opposition
RULING:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the
judgment of the Court a quo dismissing
appellants' petition for injunction is
hereby reversed and the Commissioner of
Immigration and/or his authorized
representative is permanently enjoined
from causing the arrest and deportation and
the confiscation of the bond of appellant Lau
Yuen Yeung, who is
hereby declared to have become a Filipino
citizen from and by virtue of her marriage to
her co-appellant Moy Ya Lim
Yao alias Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim, a Filipino
citizen on January 25, 1962. No costs.
Title: IN RE petition to declare ZITA NGO to
possess all qualifications and none of the
disqualifications for
naturalization under Commonwealth Act 473
for the purpose of cancelling her alien
registry with the
BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION, ZITA NGO
BURCA vs Republic of the Philippine
Date: January 30, 1967
Topic: Article 4, Section 3 – PHILIPPINE
CITIZENSHIP MAY BE LOST OR REACQUIRED
IN THE MANNER PROVIDED BY LAW.
* She avers that she is of legal age, married
to Florencio Burca, a Filipino citizen, and a
resident of Real St., Ormoc City; that before
her marriage, she was a Chinese citizen,
subject of Nationalist China,
with ACR No. A-148054; that she was born
on March 30, 1933 in Gigaquit, Surigao, and
holder of Native Born
Certificate of Residence No. 46333. After
making a number of other allegations and
setting forth certain denials, she
manifests that "she has all the qualifications
required under Section 2 and none of the
disqualifications required
under Section 4 of Commonwealth Act No.
473
* The Solicitor General opposed and moved
to dismiss the petition on two main grounds,
viz:
(1) that "there is no
proceeding established by law, or the rules
for the judicial declaration of the citizenship
of an individual"; and
(2) thatas an application for Philippine
citizenship, "the petition is fatally defective
for failure to contain or mention the
essential allegations required under Section
7 of the Naturalization Law", such as, among
others, petitioner's former
places of residence, and the absence of the
affidavits of at least two supporting
witnesses.
The judgment appealed from, dated
December 18, 1964, reads:
WHEREFORE, decision is hereby RENDERED
DISMISSING THE OPPOSITION, and declaring
that ZITA NGO BURCA
petitioner, has all the qualifications and
none of the disqualifications to become a
Filipino Citizen and that she
being married to a Filipino Citizen, is hereby
declared a citizen of the Philippines, after
taking the necessary
oath of allegiance, as soon as this decision
becomes final and executory.
* The controlling facts are not controverted.
Petitioner Zita Ngo was born in Gigaquit,
Surigao (now Surigao del
Norte), on March 30, 1933. Her father was
Ngo TaySuy and her mother was Dee See
alias Lee Co, now both
deceased and citizens of Nationalist Republic
of China. She holds Native Born Certificate of
Residence 46333 and
Alien Certificate of Registration A-148054.
She married Florencio Burca a native-born
Filipino, on May 14, 1961.
* in paragraph1, Section 15 of the Revised
Naturalization Law legislated the following:
Any woman who is now or may hereafter be
married to a citizen of the Philippines, and
who might herself be
lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a
citizen of the Philippines.
REASON FOR THE RULING:
*Petitioner failed to state in her petition,
her residence in Cebu where she studied for
1 year.
Section 7 of the Naturalization Law requires
that a petition for naturalization should state
petitioner's "present and former places of
residence". Residence encompasses all
places where petitioner actually and
physically resided
* Said petition is not supported by
theaffidavit of at least two credible persons,
"stating that they are citizens of the
Philippines and personally know
thepetitioner to be a resident of the
Philippines for the period of time required by
this Act and a person of good reputeand
morally irreproachable, and that said
petitioner has in their opinion all the
qualifications necessary to become acitizen
of the Philippines and is not in any way
disqualified under the provisions of this Act".
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT the petitioner possess all
qualifications and none of the
disqualifications for
naturalization under Commonwealth Act 473
for the purpose of cancelling her alien
registry with the BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION
RULING:
NO.
Petitioner does not possess all qualifications
and none of the disqualifications for
naturalization under Commonwealth Act 473
for the purpose of cancelling her alien
registry with the BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION
the judgment appealed from is hereby
reversed and the petition dismissed,
without costs. So ordered.
TITLE: ERNESTO S. MERCADO (Petitioner) Vs.
Eduardo Barrios Manzano and COMELEC
DATE: May 26, 1999
TOPIC: Article 4, Section 3 – PHILIPPINE
CITIZENSHIP MAY BE LOST OR REACQUIRED
IN THE MANNER PROVIDED BY LAW.
FACTS:
* Petitioner Ernesto S. Mercado and private
respondent Eduardo B. Manzano were
candidates for vice mayor of the
City of Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections.
The other one was Gabriel V. Daza III.
*The proclamation of private respondent
was suspended in view of a pending petition
for disqualification filed by a
certain Ernesto Mamaril who alleged that
private respondent was not a citizen of the
Philippines but of the United
States.
*In its resolution, dated May 7, 1998, the
Second Division of the COMELEC granted the
petition of Mamaril and
ordered the cancellation of the certificate of
candidacy of private respondent on the
ground that he is a dual citizen
and, under §40(d) of the Local Government
Code, persons with dual citizenship are
disqualified from running for any
elective position
* On May 8, 1998, private respondent filed a
motion for reconsideration. The motion
remained pending even until
after the election held on May 11, 1998.
*The motion was not resolved. Instead, on
August 31, 1998, the COMELEC en banc
rendered its resolution. Voting 4
to 1, with one commissioner abstaining, the
COMELEC en banc reversed the ruling of its
Second Division and
declared private respondent qualified to run
for vice mayor of the City of Makati in the
May 11, 1998 elections.
*He was also a natural born Filipino citizen
by operation of the 1935 Philippine
Constitution, as his father
and mother were Filipinos at the time of his
birth. At the age of six (6), his parents
brought him to the
Philippines using an American passport as
travel document. His parents also registered
him as an alien
with the Philippine Bureau of Immigration.
He was issued an alien certificate of
registration. This,
however, did not result in the loss of his
Philippine citizenship, as he did not renounce
Philippine
citizenship and did not take an oath of
allegiance to the United States
*WHEREFORE, the Commission en banc
hereby REVERSES the resolution of the
Second Division,
adopted on May 7, 1998, ordering the
cancellation of the respondent's certificate
of candidacy.
We declare respondent Eduardo Luis Barrios
Manzano to be QUALIFIED as a candidate for
the
position of vice-mayor of Makati City in the
May 11, 1998, elections.
ACCORDINGLY, the Commission directs the
Makati City Board of Canvassers, upon
proper notice to
the parties, to reconvene and proclaim the
respondent Eduardo Luis Barrios Manzano as
the winning
candidate for vice-mayor of Makati City
*1ST ISSUE: PETITIONER'S RIGHT TO BRING
THIS SUIT
COMELEC en banc DECIDED the merits of the
case, the present petition properly deals not
only with the denial of petitioner's motion
FOR intervention but also with the
substantive issues respecting private
respondent's alleged disqualification on THE
ground of dual citizenship.
* 2ND ISSUE: DUAL CITIZENSHIP
Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to
the situation in which a person
simultaneously owes, by some positive
act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual
citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is
the result of an individual's
VOLITION. By electing Philippine citizenship,
such candidates at the same time forswear
allegiance to the other country OF which
they are also citizens and thereby terminate
their status as dual citizens. It may be that,
from the point of view
of the foreign state and of its laws, such an
individual has not effectively renounced his
foreign citizenship
*3RD ISSUE:
The record shows that private respondent
was born in San Francisco, California on
September 4, 1955, of Filipino
parents. Since the Philippines adheres to the
principle of jus sanguinis, while the United
States follows the doctrine
of jus soli, the parties agree that, at birth at
least, he w
as a national both of the
Philippines and of the United States.
However, the COMELEC en banc held that,
by participating in Philippine elections in
1992, 1995, and 1998, private
respondent "effectively renounced his U.S.
citizenship under American law," so that now
he is solely a Philippine
national
*The filing of such certificate of candidacy
sufficed to renounce his American
citizenship, effectively removing any
disqualification he might have as a dual
citizen
*There is, therefore, no merit in petitioner's
contention that the oath of allegiance
contained in private respondent's
certificate of candidacy is insufficient to
constitute renunciation that, to be effective,
such renunciation should have
been made upon private respondent
reaching the age of majority since no law
requires the election of Philippine
citizenship to be made upon majority age.
*To recapitulate, by declaring in his
certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino
citizen; that he is not a permanent
resident or immigrant of another country;
that he will defend and support the
Constitution of the Philippines and bear
true faith and allegiance thereto and that he
does so without mental reservation, private
respondent has, as far as
the laws of this country are concerned,
effectively repudiated his American
citizenship and anything which he may
have said before as a dual citizen.
*RULING:
Petition DENIED for lack of merit
TITLE: PEDRO GALLEGO VS. VICENTE VERRA
DATE: NOVEMBER 24, 1941
TOPIC: ART 5, SECTION 1 AND 2 (SUFRAGE)
FACTS:
*CA AFFIRMED the RULING of Court of First
Instance of Leyte, which declared illegal and
with the petitioner's election to the office of
municipal mayor of Abuyog, Leyte, in the
general elections of December, 1940, on the
ground that he did not have the residence
qualification, ordered that he be ousted
from said office. Respondent Vicente Verra
(petitioner below) was the unsuccessful
opponent of the petitioner Pedro Gallego,
who was declared elected by the municipal
board of canvassers with a majority of nearly
800 votes
*Pedro Gallego is a native of Abuyog, Leyte.
After studying in the Catarman Agricultural
School in the province of
Samar, he was employed as a school teacher
in the municipality of Catarman, Samar, as
well as in the
municipalities of Burawen, Dulag, and
Abuyog, province of Leyte, and school
teacher of Abuyog, Leyte, and
presented his candidacy for municipal mayor
of his home town, but was defeated.
*After his defeat in that ELECTION, finding
himself in debt and unemployed, he went to
Mindanao in search of a job. He first went to
Oriental MISAMIS, but finding no work there
he proceeded to the sitio of Kaato-an,
municipality of Malaybalay, Bukidnon,
whereat he arrived on June 20, 1938, and
immediately found employment as
nurseryman in the chichona plantation of
theBureau of Forestry.
*He stayed in the chinchona plantation until
he resigned in September 1940. But during
the
period of his stay, there, his wife and
children remained in Abuyog, and he visited
them in the month of August of the
years 1938, and 1940
*Altho the Government offered him a free
house in the chinchona plantation, he never
took his
family there. Neither did he avail himself of
the offer of the Government of a parcel of
the hectares of land within the
reservation of the chinchona plantation. He
and his wife own real property in Abuyog,
part of which he acquired
during his stay in Malaybalay
*On October 1, 1938 he registered himself as
an elector in precinct No. 14 of Lantapan,
municipality of
Malaybalay, Bukidnon, and voted there in
the election for assemblymen held in
December, 1938
*The trial court noted that in his voter's
affidavit (exhibit B) he did not fill the blank
space corresponding to the length of time he
had resided in Malaybalay
*On January 20, 1940, he obtained and paid
for his residence certificate from the
municipal
treasurer of Malaybalay, in which certificate
it was stated that he had resided in said
municipality for one year and a
half
*PRIOR judgment was revoked,
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT PEDRO GALLEGO
HAD BEEN RESIDENT OF ABUYOG FOR AT
ONE YEAR PRIOR TO DECEMBER 10, 1940.
RULING:
YES
The term "residence" as used in the election
law is synonymous with "domicile" which
imports not only intention to
reside in a fixed place but also personal
presence in that place, coupled with conduct
indicative of such intention
(Nuval vs. Guray, 52 Phil., 645). In order to
acquire a domicile by choice, there must
concur (1) residence or bodily
presence in the new locality, (2) an intention
to remain there, and (3) an intention to
abandon the old domicile. In
other words, there must be an animus non
revertendi and an animus manendi. The
purpose to remain in or at the
domicile of choice must be for an indefinite
period of time. The acts of the person must
conform with his purpose.
The change of residence must be voluntary;
the residence at the place chosen for the
domicile must be actual; and
to the fact of residence there must be added
the animus manendi.
TOPIC: PHILIP ROMUALDEZ VS. RTC BRANCH
7, TACLOBAN CITY
DATE: SEPT 14, 1993
TOPIC: TOPIC: ART 5, SECTION 1 AND 2
(SUFRAGE)
FACTS:
The petitioner is Philip Romualdez, a natural
born citizen of the Philippines, the son of the
former Governor of Leyte,
Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez, and nephew
of the then First Lady Imelda Marcos.
Sometime in the early part of
1980, the petitioner, in consonance with his
decision to establish his legal residence at
Barangay Malbog, Tolosa,
Leyte, caused the construction of his
residential house therein. He soon thereafter
also served as Barangay
Captain of the place. In the 1984 Batasan
Election and 1986 "snap" Presidential
Election, Romualdez acted as the
Campaign Manager of the
KilusangBagongLipunan (KBL) in Leyte where
he voted
When the eventful days from the 21st to the
24th of February, 1986, came or were about
to come to a close, some
relatives and associates of the deposed
President, fearing for their personal safety,
whether founded or not, "fled"
the country. Petitioner Romualdez, for one,
together with his immediate family, left the
Philippines and sought
"asylum" in the United States which the
United States (U.S.) government granted.
While abroad, he took special
studies on the development of Leyte-Samar
and international business finance
In the early part of 1987, Romualdez
attempted to come back to the Philippines to
run for a congressional seat in
Leyte. On 23 March 1987, he finally decided
to book a flight back to the Philippines but
the flight was somehow
ABORTED.
On 25 September 1991, Romualdez received
a letter from Mr. Charles Cobb, District
Director of the U.S.
Immigration and Naturalization Service,
informing him that he should depart from
the U.S. at his expense on or
before 23 August 1992
Upon receipt of the letter, Romualdez
departed from the U.S. for the Philippines,
arriving on December 1991
apparently without any government
document
When Romualdez arrived in the Philippines,
he did not delay his return to his residence at
Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte.
During the registration of voters conducted
by the Commission on Election ("COMELEC")
on 01 February 1992 for
the Synchronized National and Local Election
scheduled for 11 May 1992, petitioner
registered himself anew as a
voter at Precinct No. 9 of Malbog, Tolosa,
Leyte. The chairman of the Board of Election
Inspectors, who had known
Romualdez to be a resident of the place and,
in fact, an elected Barangay Chairman of
Malbog in 1982, allowed him
to be registered.
On 21 February 1992, herein private
RESPONDENT Donato Advincula
("Advincula") FILED A PETITION WITH THE
MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT OF TOLOSA,
LEYTE, PRAYING THAT ROMUALDEZ BE
EXCLUDED FROM THE LIST OF VOTERS IN
PRECINCT NO. 9 OF MALBOG, TOLOSA,
LEYTE, UNDER BP 881 AND RA 7166
The respondent alleged that:
Romualdez was a resident of Massachusetts,
U.S.A.; that his profession and
occupation was in the U.S.A.; that he had
just recently arrived in the Philippines; and
that he did not have the
required one-year residence in the
Philippines and the six-month residence in
Tolosa to qualify him to register as a
voter in Barangay Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte
After due hearing, the Municipal Court of
Tolosa, Leyte rendered a decision 11 on 28
February 1992, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE PREMISES CONSIDERED, the
court finds the respondent to be a resident
of Brgy.
Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte and qualified to
register as a voter thereat. Hence, the
instant petition for
exclusion of Philip G. Romualdez from the list
of voter of Precinct No. 9, Malbog, Tolosa,
Leyte is
hereby ordered DENIED and petition
DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
On 03 April 1992, the respondent court
rendered the assailed decision, 12 thus:
WHEREFORE, this Court finds respondent
Philip Romualdez disqualified to register as a
voter for the
1992 elections and hereby reverses the
decision of the lower court in toto.
The Municipal Registrar of the Commission
on Elections of Tolosa, Leyte, is hereby
ordered to delete
and cancel the name of respondent Philip G.
Romualdez from the list of qualified voters
registered
February 1, 1992, at Precinct 9, barangay
Malbog, Tolosa, Leyte.
SO ORDERED.
On 7 May 1992, this Court issued a
temporary restraining order directing
respondent Regional Trial Court Judge
Pedro Espino to cease and desist from
enforcing questioned decision.
The petitioner has raised several issues
which have been well synthesized by the
Solicitor General into —
(1) Whether or not the MTC and RTC
acquired jurisdiction over, respectively, Case
No. 01-S. 1992 and Case No.
92-03-42, the petition having been filed by
one who did not allege to be himself a
registered voter of the municipality
concerned; and
(2) Whether or not the respondent court
erred in finding the petitioner to have
voluntarily left the country and
abandoned his residence in Malbog, Tolosa,
Leyte.
The petition is impressed with merit
Court’s Stand:
(1)"while lack of jurisdiction may be assailed
at any STAGE, a party's active participation in
the proceedings before a court without
jurisdiction will estop such party from
ASSAILINGsuch lack of JURISDICTION.
Furthermore, the question is not really as
much the jurisdiction of the courts below as
merely the locus standi of the
complainant in the proceedings, a matter
that, at this stage, should be considered
foreclosed.
In order, in turn, to acquire a new domicile
by choice, there must concur
(1) residence or bodily presence in the new
locality,
(2) an intention to remain there, and
(3) an intention to abandon the old domicile.
In other words, there must basically
be animus manendi coupled with animus
non revertendi. The purpose to remain in or
at the domicile of choice must
be for an indefinite period of time; the
change of residence must be voluntary; and
the residence at the place chosen
for the new domicile must be actual.
(2) The political situation brought about by
the "People's Power Revolution" must have
truly caused great apprehension
to the Romualdezes, as well as a serious
concern over the safety and welfare of the
members of their families. Their
going into self-exile until conditions
favorable to them would have somehow
stabilized is understandable. Certainly,
their sudden departure from the country
cannot be described as "voluntary," or as
"abandonment of residence" at
least in the context that these terms are
used in applying the concept of "domicile by
choice."
We have closely examined the records, and
we find not that much to convince us that the
petitioner had, in fact,
abandoned his residence in the Philippines
and established his domicile elsewhere.
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER PHILIP
ROMUALDEZ IS QUALIFIED TO VOTE
TITLE: KAHAYAAN ET AL VS. COMELEC
DATE: 26 MAR 2001
TOPIC: ART 5, SECTION 1 AND 2 (SUFRAGE)
FACTS:
Consolidated petitions (G.R. No. 147066 and
G.R. 147179) -exercise the right to suffrage
Invoking this right, herein petitioners representing the youth sector - seek to direct
the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) to conduct a special registration
before the May 14, 2001 General Elections,
of new voters ages 18 to
21. According to petitioners, around four
million youth failed to register on or before
the December 27, 2000 deadline
set by the respondent COMELEC under
Republic Act No. 8189 (Voter's Registration
Act of 1996)
Acting on the clamor of the students and
civic leaders, Senator Raul Roco, Chairman if
the Committee on Electoral
Reforms, Suffrage, and People's
Participation, through a Letter dated January
25, 2001, invited the COMELEC to a
public hearing for the purpose of discussing
the extension of the registration of voters to
accommodate those who
were not able to register before the
COMELEC deadline.
On February 8, 2001, the COMELEC issued
Resolution N. 3584, the decretal portion:
"Deliberating on the foregoing memoranda,
the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby
RESOLVES, to
deny the request to conduct a two-day
additional registration of new voters on
February 17, and 18
2001."
Aggrieved by the denial, petitioners
AKBAYAN-Youth, SCAP, UCSC, MASP,
KOMPIL II (YOUTH) et. al. filed before
this Court the instant Petition for Certiorari
and Mandamus, docketed as G.R. NO.
147066, which seeks to set aside
and nullify respondent COMELEC's
Resolution and/or to declare Section 8 of
R.A. 8189 unconstitutional insofar as
said provision effectively causes the
disenfranchisement of petitioners and others
similarly situated.
On March 09, 2001, herein petitioner
Michelle Betito, a student of the University
of the Philippines, likewise filed a
Petition for Mandamus, docketed as G.R.
No. 147179, praying that this Court direct
the COMELEC to provide for
another special registration day under the
continuing registration provision under the
Election code.
On March 16, 2001, the Solicitor General, in
its Manifestation and Motion in lieu of
Comment, recommended that an
additional continuing registration of voters
be conducted at the soonest possible time
"in order to accommodate the
disfranchised voters for purposes of the May
14, 2001 elections."
Thus, this Court shall determine:
a. Whether or not respondent COMELEC
committed grave abuse of discretion in
issuing COMELEC Resolution
dated February 8, 2001.
b. Whether or not this Court can compel
respondent COMELEC, through the
extraordinary writ of mandamus, to
conduct a special registration of new voters
during the period between the COMELEC's
imposed December
27, 2000 deadline and the May 14, 2001
general elections.
The right of suffrage ardently invoked by
herein petitioners, is not at all absolute.
Needles to say, the
exercise of the right of suffrage, as in the
enjoyment of all other rights, is subject to
existing substantive and
procedural requirements embodied in our
Constitution, statute books and other
repositories of law
RULING:
(1) we hold that Section 8 of R.A. 8189
applies in the present case, for the
purpose of
upholding the assailed COMELEC Resolution
and denying the instant petitions,
considering that the aforesaid law
explicitly provides that no registration shall
be conducted during the period starting one
hundred twenty (120) days
before a regular election.
(2) rule that the COMELEC in denying
the request of petitioners to hold a
special
registration, acted within the bounds and
confines of the applicable law on the matter
- Section 8 of R.A. 8189
Considering the circumstances where the
writ of mandamus lies and the peculiarities
of the present case, we are of
the firm belief that petitioners failed to
establish, to the satisfaction of this Court,
that they are entitled to the
issuance of this extraordinary writ so as to
effectively compel respondent COMELEC to
conduct a special
registration of voters. For the
determination of whether or not the
conduct of a special registration of voters is
feasible, possible or practical within the
remaining period before the actual date of
election, involves the exercise of
discretion and thus, cannot be controlled by
mandamus.
CELIA VS. COMELEC
Date: Jan 28, 1980
Topic: Suffrage (Sec 1 and 2)
ISSUE: whether or not section 3 of batas
pambansa blg 51 is constitutional on using
annual income of a given city as the basis for
classification of whether or not a particular
city is a highly urbanized city whose voters
may not participate in the election of
provincial officials of the province where the
city is geographically located
RULING: DISMISSED. PETION NO MERIT
FACTS:
* Sec 3 of batasang pambansa blg 51
provides the basis for a city to be considered
as a highly urbanized city which was then
became the basis of COMELEC in adopting
Resolution No. 1421 indicating that the
qualified voters of HUCs cannot vote for the
provincial officials to which the said HUC
geographically belonged
*Petitioners, civic and non-partisan group
known as DOERS) being taxpayers,
vigorously assailed Sec 3 of Btasn Pambansa
Blg 51 which uses annual income of the city
as basis for the classification of whether or
not a particular city is a highly urbanized
city whose voters may not participate in the
election of provincial officials of the province
where the city is
geographically located
*filed for petition restraining order be issued
"temporarily prohibiting the holding of
election for Provincial Governor and other
elective provincial officials in the province
where the 18 cities listed by the respondent
COMELEC are located, particularly Cebu City
and Mandaue City, and temporarily
prohibiting the National Treasurer to release
public funds and the COA to pass in audit
said funds in connection with and for the
purpose of holding local elections in said
provinces; and after hearing, to make the
injunction permanent declaring
unconstitutional and therefore void Section
96, Art. XVIII of the Charter of Mandaue,
otherwise known as RA 5519,"
*or if cancellation of eection is not possible,
DOERs requested for the Cebu and Mandaue
City to be able to vote for provincial
elections.
The petitioners contend that "Section 3 of
Batas Blg. 885 3 insofar as it classifies cities
including Cebu city as highly urbanized as the
only basis for not allowing its electorate to
vote for the provincial officials is inherently
and palpably unconstitutional in that such
classification is not based on substantial
distinctions germane to the purpose of the
law which in effect provides for and
regulates the exercise of the right of
suffrage, and therefore such unreasonable
classification amounts to a denial of equal
protection."
Until cities are reclassified into highly
urbanized and component cities in
accordance with the standards established in
the Local Government Code as provided for
in Article XI, Section 4(1) of the Constitution.
any city now existing with an annual regular
derived from infrastructure and general
funds of not less than forty million pesos
(P40,000,000.00) at the time of the approval
of this Act shag be classified as a highly
urbanized city. All other cities shall be
considered components of the provinces
where they are geographically located
The City of Baguio, because of its special
functions as the summer capital of the
Philippines, shall be classified as a highly
urbanized city irrespective of its income
The registered voters of a component city
may be entitled to vote in the election of the
officials of the province of which that city is a
component, if its charter so provides.
However, voters registered in a highly
urbanized city, as hereinabove defined shall
not participate nor vote in the election of the
officials of the province in which the highly
urbanized city is geographically located.
WHEREAS, the voters in the cities should be
accordingly informed if they are going to
vote for provincial officials or not, for their
proper guidance;
Reason of Ruling:
*The state shall guarantee and promote the
autonomy of local government units,
especially the barrio, to ensure their fullest
development as selfreliant communities."
*Corollary to independence however, is the
concomitant loss of the right to participate in
provincial affairs, more particularly the
selection of elective provincial officials since
these provincial officials have ceased to
exercise any governmental jurisdiction and
authority over said city. Thus, in the case of
Teves vs. Commission on Election this Court,
in holding that the registered voters of the
City of Dumaguete cannot vote for the
provincial officials of Negros Oriental
because the charter of the city does not
expressly allow the voters in the city to do
so,
*The revenue of a city would show whether
or not it is capable of existence and
development as a relatively independent
social, economic, and political unit. It would
also show whether the city has sufficient
economic or industrial activity as to warrant
its independence from the province where it
is geographically situated.
*The petitioners also contend that the voters
in Mandaue City are denied equal protection
of the law since the voters in other
component cities are allowed to vote for
provincial officials. The contention is without
merit. The practice of allowing voters in one
component city to vote for provincial
officials and denying the same privilege to
voters in another component city is a matter
of legislative discretion which violates
neither the Constitution nor the voter's right
of suffrage. In the case of Teves v.
Commission on Election 8 the Court said.
Petitioners assail the charter of the City of
Mandaue as unconstitutional for not having
been ratified by the residents of the city in a
plebiscite. This contention is untenable. The
Constitutional requirement that the creation,
division, merger, abolition, or alteration of
the boundary of a province, city,
municipality, or barrio should be subject to
the approval by the majority of the votes
cast in a plebiscite in the governmental unit
or units affected 10 is a new requirement
that came into being only with the 1973
Constitution. It is prospective 11 in character
and therefore cannot affect the creation of
the City of Mandaue which came into
existence on June 21, 1969.
Neither can it be considered an infringement
upon the petitioners' rights of suffrage since
the Constitution confers no right to a voter
in a city to vote for the provincial officials of
the province where the city is located. Their
right is limited to the right to vote for
elective city officials in local elections which
the questioned statues neither withdraw nor
restrict.
"Gerrymandering" is a "term employed to
describe an apportionment of representative
districts so contrived as to give an unfair
advantage to the party in power