Politikon
South African Journal of Political Studies
ISSN: 0258-9346 (Print) 1470-1014 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/cpsa20
The State of Democratisation in Southern Africa:
Blocked Transitions, Reversals, Stagnation,
Progress and Prospects
Khabele Matlosa
To cite this article: Khabele Matlosa (2017) The State of Democratisation in Southern Africa:
Blocked Transitions, Reversals, Stagnation, Progress and Prospects, Politikon, 44:1, 5-26, DOI:
10.1080/02589346.2017.1278640
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Published online: 01 Mar 2017.
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POLITIKON, 2017
VOL. 44, NO. 1, 5–26
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02589346.2017.1278640
The State of Democratisation in Southern Africa: Blocked
Transitions, Reversals, Stagnation, Progress and Prospects
Khabele Matlosa
Department of Political Affairs, African Union Commission, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia
ABSTRACT
Southern Africa has experienced highs and lows in its efforts towards democratisation.
Following political independence of Southern Africa states, the germination of
democratisation was a rather slow process. A brief period of multi-party democracy
introduced through pre-independence elections quickly dissipated and was replaced by
one-party, one-person and, in some instances, military regimes. This era also coincided with
the height of the Cold War globally and the heyday of apartheid in which inter-state
conflicts had intensified. Since the late 1980s and early 1990s, a new dispensation has
emerged wherein multi-party democracy has re-emerged in the context of the post-Cold
War and post-apartheid dispensation, marked by relative peace dividend. However,
democratisation in Southern Africa remains a mixed bag today. Some countries have not yet
experienced the democratic transition. Others have managed to transition from one-party,
one-person and military regimes to multi-party democracies. In various others, there are
signs of reversal of democratic gains. This paper reviews the state of democratisation in
Southern Africa with a view to understand why the regional record is so uneven across
countries that form the Southern African Development Community (SADC). While the article
presents a regional snapshot, it also presents comparative insights from Botswana and Lesotho.
Introduction
Throughout the nineteenth century, theorists of democracy found it quite natural to discuss
whether one country or another was ‘fit for democracy’. This thinking changed only in the twentieth century, with the recognition that the question itself was wrong: A country does not have to
be deemed fit for democracy; rather it has to be fit through democracy. (Sen, 1999, 2)
The above quotation from a renowned Indian political economist and a Noble Peace
Laureate, Amartya Sen, captures the main concern of this article. The fundamental question being posed is not whether Southern African states are ‘fit for democracy’, but rather
whether they are increasingly becoming ‘fit through democracy’. From this standpoint,
therefore, this paper investigates the various trajectories of political transitions from
authoritarian rule and wars towards democracy and peace, pinpointing a number of
trends. While some countries have not even begun the democratic transition, others
have experienced reversals; some have stagnated, while a few have progressed. Thus, in
sum, the state of democratisation or ‘democraticness’, to borrow Georg Sorensen’s
concept, is a mixed bag, to say the least.
CONTACT Khabele Matlosa
khabelematlosa@rocketmail.com
Department of Political Affairs, African Union
Commission, Roosevelt Street, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia
This article was originally published with errors. This version has been corrected. Please see Erratum (http://dx.doi.org/10.
1080/02589346.2017.1310612).
© 2017 South African Association of Political Studies
6
K. MATLOSA
This discussion is informed by the previous works of this author on this subject since the
recent past (see Matlosa 2004, 2005a, 2007, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015) focusing on various
themes of democratic transition in Africa as a whole and Southern Africa in particular.
For the purpose of this paper, I will focus mainly on the state of democratisation in
Southern Africa with a view to establish whether the region (and individual countries)
has undergone democratic transition; whether the region (and individual countries) is
firmly set on the road to the consolidation of democracy, peace, political stability and
socio-economic development; whether the region (and individual countries) have also
experienced stalled/blocked transitions; and whether democratic transition in the
region (and in individual countries) is also extending to the sphere of economic transition
and socio-economic transformation or remains merely a procedural democracy, as it were.
Following the introductory remarks above, the article proceeds along three intertwined,
albeit distinct, sections before the concluding remarks. The first section provides the contextual and conceptual framework as a theoretical-cum-contextual platform upon which subsequent discussions are anchored. The second section presents a critical appraisal of the
state of democratisation in Southern Africa. The third section locates the regional discussion
of the democratisation process within a comparative analysis of two small states namely
Botswana and Lesotho, both of which, together with Swaziland, are former British Protectorates. The conclusion sums up the main arguments and observations from this discussion.
Contextual and conceptual framework
It was about 50 years ago that African countries attained their political independence from
colonial domination, exploitation and authoritarian rule. The majority of Southern African
countries attained their independence in the 1960s largely through negotiations while a
few countries such as Angola and Mozambique in the 1970s and Namibia and South
Africa in the 1990s attained their independence through armed struggles. As Bauer and
Taylor remind us:
In 1990, Southern Africa plagued by collapsing economies, long-standing single party authoritarian regimes in some countries and protracted warfare and social conflict in others … .
Namibia, which had won independence only in 1990 was emerging from a complex internationally brokered negotiation following a long liberation struggle. South Africa … was convulsed in the final throes of apartheid, the repressive and violent system that denied the
black majority citizenship rights in the land of their birth. (2011, 2–3)
Since the early 1990s, therefore, many Southern African states have been faced with a challenge of institutionalising democracy and peace, following transitions from various types of
authoritarian regimes and even civil wars in some instances. In a sense, a majority of these
states embarked on the road towards democratisation. Be that as it may, embarking on a
road to democracy is one thing and sustaining a democratic moment is quite another.
Put somewhat differently, it is easy to put together a democracy roadmap and begin a
journey on a democratic path, but rather difficult to ensure that the democratic momentum
is both sustainable and irreversible. Tom Lodge captures this dilemma poignantly as follows:
starting democracy is easier than keeping it. This contention is especially relevant to the early
history of post-colonial Africa. Between 1960 and 1970, about fifty states acquired independence as well as various kinds of liberal constitutional arrangements; by the end of the
POLITIKON
7
decade all but a fraction were governed either by military dictatorships or one party system
switch at best limited democratic pretensions. (1999, 1)
This was the first democratic reversal in Africa from multi-party democracy to various
shades and shapes of authoritarian rule.
Africa’s second transition has been underway since the late 1980s and early 1990s as
part of the third wave of democratisation (to borrow Samuel Huntington’s phrase). How
possible is it that the reversal of the immediate post-independence gains in democratisation and peacebuilding could repeat itself today in Africa as a whole and in Southern Africa
specifically? Be that as it may, is there a democratic wave underway after all? Democracy
and governance scholars are divided over whether or not what has been happening in
Africa since the 1990s amounts to democratisation. While some argue that the process
that has taken place is simply tantamount to political liberalisation devoid of democratic
content (Szeftel and Baylis 1992; Osaghae 2004), others, including this author, argue that
the recent political changes, although limited to merely procedural or formal democracy
and not substantive democracy, do amount to what is often referred to as democratic transition (Baker 1999; Haynes 2001; Landsberg and Mackay 2004; Bratton, Mattes, and
Gyimah-Boadi 2005; Matlosa 2005a, 2005b).
While recognising that Huntington’s third wave of democratisation has surely swept
through the Southern Africa in the last couple of decades, we are perfectly cognisant of
the reality that democratic transition is distinct from democratic consolidation, as will
become clear later in this discussion. As much of the region has been undergoing a
wave of democratisation, the democracy discourse has also experienced some paradigmic
waves. While in the early 1990s, the discourse focused principally on transitions, there has
been a paradigm shift towards inquiry into progress towards democratic consolidation
and an inquiry into then what type of ‘democracy’ each country has adopted. Thus, the
democracy debate has been both fascinating and dynamic, dominated initially by ‘transitologists’ (1990s) and ‘consolidologists’ (to date), to borrow the concepts used by Croissant
and Merkel (2004). While ‘transitologists’ investigate the ‘conditions and modes of transition from dictatorship to democracy’, ‘consolidologists’ inquire into causes, conditions
and models of the consolidation of young democracies’ (Croissant and Merkel 2004, 1).
In assessing the state of democratisation in Southern Africa, this paper is informed by
both discourses on political transitions and inquiry into the state of nurturing and consolidation of democracy in the region thus far.
Thus, a situational analysis of the state and quality of democratisation in each one of the
Southern African Development Community (SADC) member states is a useful guide or barometer for us to gather evidence and make informed judgments as to whether or not democratisation is consolidating, or whether there are possibilities for reversals or relapse into new
forms of authoritarian rule, behind the façade of democratic rhetoric. It will become clear in
the next pages that a few SADC member states are long-enduring and stable liberal democracies (Botswana, Seychelles and Mauritius); quite a majority of them have indeed undergone democratic transition in the recent past (DRC, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi,
Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe) and in one the transition was blocked right from the beginning and thus became a stillborn (Swaziland). In
addition, within each of these broad categories, there are crucial variations and nuances
on the process of democratisation and peacebuilding. Available evidence points to the
8
K. MATLOSA
reality that making broad generalisations about the state of democracy in Southern Africa
may be misleading. There are different patterns and trajectories of the democratisation
path each country has been taking, while some countries are still far behind on the road
of transition and consolidation. Even the two notions of transition and democratic consolidation are not only nebulous, but still remain problematic and hence controversy-ridden in
the current democracy discourse. The next section introduces the theoretical-cum-conceptual entry point of our discussion on democratisation.
Conceptual entry point
Although democracy is a nebulous term to grasp, there is a fair amount of consensus in the
literature in respect of its main features and its universal application. There are three main
ways in which we can better understand democracy both as a concept, political culture
and practice.
Firstly, a minimalist definition (explanation) of democracy locates the theory and practice of democracy around two principles or values namely political competition or contestation and participation. Robert Dahl built on this definition by identifying seven criteria that
are essential for democracy or what he termed ‘polyarchy’ as follows:
(1) Control over governmental decisions about policy constitutionally vested in elected
officials
(2) Relatively frequent, fair and free elections
(3) Universal adult suffrage
(4) The right to run for public office
(5) Freedom of expression
(6) Access to alternative sources of information that are not monoplised by either the government or any other single group
(7) Freedom of association (i.e. the right to form and join autonomous associations such
as political parties, interest groups, etc.) (cited in Menocal 2007, 1–2).
At the heart of the minimalist definition of democracy are the notions of competition or
contestation and participation. The notion of competition or contestation ‘captures the
uncertain peaceful competition necessary for democratic rule, a principle which presumes
the legitimacy of some opposition, the right to challenge the incumbents … the existence
of free and fair elections and a consolidated party system’ (Landman 2005, 20). The notion
of participation presupposes political control of the citizens over the people who govern
on their behalf. This notion ‘captures the idea of popular sovereignty which presumes the
protection of the right to vote as well as the existence of universal suffrage’ (Landman
2005, 20). This is what is often referred to as procedural democracy or electoral democracy
(Bratton, Mattes, and Gyimah-Boadi 2005).
Secondly, the liberal notion of democracy transcends procedural democracy and
extends its essence beyond just contestation and participation to include the protection
and promotion of political rights and civil liberties. It includes other institutional dimensions (guarantees) such as accountability, transparency, limited powers of leaders,
citizen representation, rule of law, property and minority rights. A key issue of debate
within the literature centres on the notion of accountability. There are four ways in
POLITIKON
9
which accountability is defined. These include (1) vertical accountability which enables citizens to hold their political leaders to account through the electoral channels at specified
points in time; (2) horizontal accountability which refers to accountability mechanisms
essential to give democracy substance; (3) societal accountability which refers to watchdog functions of civil associations, other NGOs and independent mass media over the
actions of the state; and (4) external accountability of the state to regional, continental
and international governance mechanisms (see Menocal 2007). Thus, the liberal notion
of democracy places high premium on institutional dimensions of democracy. This is
what liberal democracy is all about (Haynes 2001; Lumunba-Kasongo 2005).
Thirdly, the social-structuralist definition of democracy extends the theory and praxis of
democracy beyond both the proceduralist/electoralist and institutionalist dimensions
found in the earlier two ideations and introduces the socio-economic dimensions and
structural configuration of power. While maintaining the proceduralist and institutionalist
dimensions of democracy, the social-structuralist definition of democracy places a
premium on social and economic rights and social power relations in society. But to
confine democracy only to the above political values may amount to a minimalist definition of the concept. The essence of democracy is broader than just its intrinsic value
in the form of civil liberties and political rights. It extends to the socio-economic realm
wherein socio-economic and cultural rights are fundamental. Thus, a maximalist definition
of democracy is located within the framework of the democracy–development nexus. It is
within this democracy–development discourse that the instrumental value of democracy
can be discovered. There is a general consensus within both the policy and academic discourses globally regarding the symbiotic nexus between democracy, peace and human
development. Pursuit of democratisation in tandem with peace and development is the
defining feature of social democracy or what others would equally term developmental
democracy (see also Ake 1996; Ake 2000; Saul 2005; Landman 2006). This is the ideal
form of democracy that Southern Africa should aspire towards beyond the neo-liberal
model now embraced by a majority of countries in the region thus far.
In a nutshell, a useful approach to our understanding of democracy in Southern Africa is
to have in mind these three epistemological ideations, namely that (a) at the very
minimum democracy is simply just procedural and limited to elections; (b) at a slightly
higher level, the institutional dimensions of democracy have emphasised its liberal form
with emphasis on civil and political rights (as Freedom House does) and (c) at another relatively higher ideational level, social-structuralist perspectives of democracy conceive of the
system in its socio-economic characteristics and the concomitant social configuration of
power. While at a casual glance, a number of SADC countries have embraced multiparty democracy, at close scrutiny; there are variations of their state of ‘democraticness’.
It is, therefore, worth investigating whether following transitions in some SADC countries,
they are becoming fit through democracy or whether there are cases of blocked transitions, democratic stalemate/stagnation, reversals, progress and assess prospects for
democratic advancement.
The research problem of concern in this paper thus rotates around transition and
democratic consolidation. Simply stated, the problem is that while political transitions
have happened in some countries in the region, this has not happened in others. Even
in those countries where political transition has happened, countries still exhibit variations
in terms of their ‘democraticness’. This situation introduces a related problem, namely the
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K. MATLOSA
extent to which democracy is being nurtured and consolidated in countries where transition has taken place. While it is relatively easy to define transition as a change from
one condition to another and is continuous, controversy still surrounds the exact
meaning of the often nebulous notion of democratic consolidation. To be sure, a plethora
of literature on the democracy debate suggests that heated academic exchanges still rage
regarding exactly what constitutes consolidation in the democratic process (see Alence
2004; Croissant and Merkel 2004; Morlino 2004; Schneider and Schmitter 2004). While
some scholars would argue that a country could be said to have achieved democratic consolidation if it is able to hold more than two successive and successful elections that
produce a legitimate government (for instance Lindberg, 2006; Agyeman-Duah 2003).
Using the power-of-elections thesis, Lindberg subscribes to a view that the more a
country continually holds elections, them more its democracy gets consolidated overtime.
For his part, Agyeman-Duah (2003) suggests that there are basically three main typologies
of elections following a transition from an authoritarian to a democratic government,
namely (a) transitional elections, that is, the first election following dictatorial rule; (b)
the test of democracy elections in the form of the second election following the transition;
and (c) consolidating elections, that is, the third successive election subsequent to the
transition. Others scholars argue that the frequency and number of elections may not
be a sufficient condition, but rather that a country has to experience a smooth ‘regime
change’ or power alteration and still enjoy political stability (Huntington 1991).
Both types of ideation (namely the frequency of elections logic and regime change/
power alteration logic) have their own arguments canvassed in order to justify their
entry points in the current debate on the democratic process in Africa. According to
Diamond (1994), democratic consolidation intrinsically presupposes not only legitimate
and institutionalised governance, but also enhanced civil society participation in the governance process itself. He further argues that consolidation
involves behavioural and institutional changes that normalize democratic politics and narrow
its uncertainty. This normalization requires the expansion of citizen access, development of
democratic citizenship and culture, broadening of leadership recruitment and training, and
other functions that civil society performs. But, most of all, and most urgently, it requires political institutionalization. (15)
That institutions matter greatly for democratisation brooks no controversy today. Thus, the
idea of democratic consolidation as institutionalisation of democratic politics is quite
appealing compared to the frequency of elections logic and power alteration logic. This
is not a novel idea. In contemporary times, various scholars have emphasised the importance of institutions in governance including the seminal works of Samuel Huntington
(1968) and the recent works by Francis Fukuyama (2011, 2014). Both Huntington and
Fukuyama agree that without effective and robust political institutions political order in
affected countries is adversely affected resulting in political decay. In their recent book
entitled Why National Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity and Poverty, co-authored by
Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson (2012) make a strong case that many factors
explain failure or success of nations world-wide, chief among which are institutions, leadership, democracy and peace. During his recent visit to the African Union Headquarters
in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, the President of the United State of America, Barrack Obama
emphasised the critical importance of a rule-based governance system which is insulated
from personal ambitions in order to promote and protect national purpose and so doing
POLITIKON
11
criticised those African leaders who manipulate constitutions in order to stay in power
beyond their constitutionally mandated tenure in state house.
Well, appealing as it is the political institutionalisation logic also has its own limits, as it
down-plays the role of citizens or the people in the democratisation process. This compels
us to combine political institutions with political culture in order to see the bigger picture
of democratisation in Southern Africa. The political culture approach teases out public attitudes and values of the citizenry vis-à-vis democratisation, culture and practice. According
to the IDASA Southern African Democracy Barometer,
the basic assumption here is that regardless of how well designed its political institutions and
processes, a sustainable democracy requires people who are willing to support, defend and
sustain democratic practices. In other words, a democracy requires democrats; it requires citizens … . [I]If political institutions are the ‘hardware’ of a democratic system, what people think
about democracy and those institutions constitute the ‘software’ of that system. And as all
systems designers know, software is just as important as hardware. (2003, 3)
Yes, indeed Africa needs strong institutions and not strong men in order to progress on its
path towards democratisation, peacebuilding and development. But it also requires transformative and visionary leaders who will steer these institutions in such a way that
advances national interest uppermost over and above personal interest. Africa also
needs citizen engagement in governance and development so as to ensure not only
accountability of leaders and institutions but also to entrench a people-centred development. Besides strong and robust institutions that are effective and efficient, Africa as a
whole and Southern Africa in particular needs to satisfy two more conditions for sustainable democratisation process namely (a) the existence of a visionary and transformative
leadership and (b) a well-organised, meaningfully engaging and vibrant civil society
capable of mobilising society in order to entrench a broadly representative, responsive,
transparent and accountable governance.
In this paper, I am more inclined to the political culture argument above in our explanation of what democratic consolidation means in the African context. Be that as it may, I
propose that a political economy approach is even a much better conceptual framing for
our understanding of democratic consolidation. My entry point is, therefore, that consolidation of Africa’s current democratic process should be judged more by the extent to
which democracy itself improves the socio-economic well-being of the people irrespective
of the frequency of elections and/or whether or not there is power alteration in a given
country. In other words, institutions matter (the hardware of democracy) and political
culture matters (the software of democracy), but at the heart of democratisation should
be the socio-economic condition of ordinary citizens (political economy of democratisation). Is democracy improving socio-economic well-being of the people? This is one of
the most important yardsticks for us to measure if at all Southern African countries are
becoming fit through democracy.
Democratisation in Southern Africa: a critical appraisal
While generally transitions have taken place in a majority of states in the Southern Africa,
democracy and governance remain in a state of flux. Countries exhibit various regime
types with implications for the state of democracy and governance as will be demonstrated
shortly (Table 1). Following on previous research work (see Haynes 2001; Schedler 2002;
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K. MATLOSA
Bratton, Mattes, and Gyimah-Boadi 2005), I have classified SADC countries into four distinct
regime types as follows: (1) closed authoritarian regimes (i.e. unreformed autocracies); (2)
electoral authoritarian regimes (façade democracies, to use Jeff Haynes’ concept); (3) electoral democratic regimes (regimes that reduce democracy to simple electioneering); and
(4) liberal democratic regimes (regimes that allow for room for promotion of civil liberties
and political rights in between regular elections).
Through this classification, it becomes clear that in those countries that have not yet undergone transitions, democracy is lacking and autocratic governance remains the order of the
day. Swaziland is the only country that has not reformed its closed autocratic governance
model despite the democratisation wave that has swept Southern Africa. In closed authoritarian regimes or unreformed autocracies, governance is premised upon one person or a coterie
of the political elite wielding state power and running national affairs with minimum (if any)
public consultation, accountability and/or elections. Supreme power and decision-making rest
exclusively with one person or the small political elite. The second classification is that of electoral authoritarian regimes or liberalised autocracies. Also referred to as hybrid systems
(Haynes 2001; Schedler 2002; Bratton, Mattes, and Gyimah-Boadi 2005), liberalised autocracies
have experienced a transition from an unreformed autocracy but are neither electoral nor
liberal democracies. They conduct regular elections but remain autocratic. Some scholars
refer to this fuzzy category variously as grey zone democracies, ambiguous democracies, illiberal democracies, delegative democracies, semi-democracies, etc. (see Schedler 2002; Bratton,
Mattes, and Gyimah-Boadi 2005). Three countries can be placed in this category namely
Angola, DRC and Zimbabwe, for the simple reason that they operate what Haynes aptly
refers to as façade democracies, holding multi-party elections whose outcomes are not only
conflict-ridden and are marked by political violence. Furthermore, electoral processes in
these countries are marked by lack of procedural certainty (legitimacy of electoral procedures)
and lack of substantive uncertainty (credibility of election results). According to Mozaffar and
Schedler (2002), in order to ensure the quality of elections, electoral governance must be predicated upon procedural legitimacy and certainty, while at the same time guaranteeing substantive uncertainty. As they aptly observe:
The close association between procedural legitimacy and substantive uncertainty poses the
paradoxical challenge ‘institutionalizing uncertainty’ (…). The paradox is that substantive
uncertainty requires procedural certainty. It is this paradox that defines the central task of electoral governance: organizing electoral uncertainty by providing institutional certainty. Distinguishing between substantive and procedural uncertainty enables a more nuanced
understanding of variations in political actors’ risk-aversion. Authoritarian and democratic
actors, for instance, exhibit different attitudes towards uncertainty. While the former
attempt to reduce the uncertainty of outcomes, the latter attempt to reduce the uncertainty
of institutional rules. (11)
Democracy scholars and activists alike are agreed that if electoral governance is to be
democratised there is a dire need for institutionalisation of procedural certainty and substantive uncertainty. For Habib (2004),
the essence of democracy is political uncertainty, and it takes two distinct forms: institutional
and substantive. Institutional uncertainty - the uncertainty about the rules of the game implies the vulnerability of the democratic system to anti-democratic forces. Substantive
uncertainty - the uncertainty of the outcomes of the game - is about the perceptions of
ruling elites in a democratic system on whether they will be returned to office. (93)
POLITIKON
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Electoral governance in Angola, DRC, Madagascar and Zimbabwe lacks these fundamental
principles or elements which are crucial not only for political stability, but also for anchoring the country’s transition on a sustainable footing and in the process building foundations for democratisation.
I have classified the majority of SADC member states as electoral democracies. Electoral
democracies are those countries wherein the governance system has undergone transition from dictatorial rule and embraced a multi-party democratic dispensation. But the
type of democracy in place is not quite a fully-fledged liberal democracy. It is a narrower
form of liberal democracy that is confined primarily to the mere act of holding regular elections. Such a democracy, therefore, is reduced to electoralism. It is more procedural and
less substantive in both form and content. Countries that fall in this category include Tanzania, Zambia, Malawi, Mozambique and Lesotho. Although their political systems are
occasionally marked by political turbulence especially around election time, the political
systems in these countries are surely stabilising and, if they manage to institutionalise
the existing multi-party system, they have a great potential to become liberal democracies.
It is worth noting that recent political developments in Lesotho pose a serious threat to
the country’s democratisation, peace and political stability. Instability in Lesotho directly
threatens peace in South Africa and indirectly poses a challenge for Southern Africa.
Few SADC countries can be classified as liberal democracies. These are those countries
wherein the governance realm is institutionalised through regular and credible multiparty elections with a relatively fair amount of procedural certainty and substantive uncertainty. Constitutionalism and rule of law are entrenched and human rights are promoted
and protected. These countries include Botswana, Mauritius, Namibia, Seychelles and
South Africa. Their liberal democracies are stable and consolidating (but not yet
consolidated).
In liberal democracies, political transition has successfully taken place and democracy is
in the process of consolidating. These are the countries that are fairly advanced in the
democratisation path. They are progressively becoming fit through democracy. In electoral democracies, although transition has successfully taken place, democracy is progressively stabilising, but the consolidation process has not yet started. These countries have
taken initial steps in the process of becoming fit through democracy, but still need to institutionalise democratisation. In electoral authoritarianism, although transition may have
taken place, it has not yet reached successfully its logical conclusion. Countries hold elections, but election outcomes are contested and in many instances violently so. In addition,
in between elections, there are no visible indications, whatsoever, that democracy prevails
in such countries. There is therefore no political stability. In such situations, countries in this
category have not yet become fit through democracy. These countries are caught in the
Table 1. Classification of regime types in SADC.
Closed authoritarian
regimes
Swaziland
Electoral authoritarian
regimes
Zimbabwe
DRC
Angola
Madagascar
Electoral democratic
regimes
Tanzania
Zambia
Malawi
Lesotho
Mozambique
Liberal democratic
regimes
Botswana
Mauritius
Namibia
South Africa
Seychelles
Source: Adapted from Haynes 2001; Schedler 2002; Bratton, Mattes, and Gyimah-Boadi 2005. Updated to August 2015
14
K. MATLOSA
continuum of being unfit and becoming fit through democracy. In closed authoritarian
regimes, no transition has taken place or it has been stalled/blocked midway. Political
instability is rife. This instability takes the form of either overt/violent or covert/nonviolent conflict. Such countries have not yet started the process of becoming fit
through democracy.
Many SADC countries are confronted with the adverse social consequences of poverty.
The extent to which these countries are becoming fit through democracy should not only
be confined to progress in transition and the holding of regular election. It should also be
related to the extent to which deliberate social policies are crafted to eradicate the scourge
of poverty and improve the livelihoods of ordinary people. In a nutshell, so far, we have
canvassed the idea that a number of SADC countries have made some progress
towards democratisation, although this process in some countries has been stalled; in
others, it is fraught with various kinds of conflict/instability; and in others, the democratic
system is marked by political stability. However, while at the political plane, our prognosis
of the democratisation process in the Southern Africa is that procedural rather than substantive democracy seems to be the general political norm. Substantive democracy,
especially in respect of socio-economic transformation and the quest for social justice,
still lags far behind.
The tension between democracy on one hand and poverty, inequality and unemployment in Southern Africa brings into sharp relief, the fundamental limitations of the liberal
democracy model which has taken root in countries like Botswana, Mauritius, South Africa,
Seychelles and Namibia, despite the fact that they are the trailblazers of the democratisation process in the region. Liberal democracy reduces the value of democracy merely to
political rights and civil liberties. But the intrinsic value of democracy transcends civil liberties and political rights as defined by Freedom House. It extends to broader freedoms
especially economic, social and cultural rights and freedoms. Because of the concern
with civil liberties and political rights, democratic experiments in Southern Africa have
remained formalistic and procedural rather organically rooted in society and substantive.
Various scholars have canvassed the idea that a meaningful and people-centred
democracy is not liberal democracy, but social or developmental democracy (see Ake
1996; Ake 2000; Lumunba-Kasongo 2005; Matlosa 2012; Sen 1999). The compelling argument raised by these scholars is simply that Africa (and Southern Africa) does not have to
mimic the Western world by embracing liberal democracy with its western trappings; but
rather adapt liberal democracy within the peculiar Africa (Southern African) context with a
view to make it more development-oriented and turn it into an engine for socio-economic
transformation for the advancement of the livelihoods of the African peoples. It is in this
regard that a strong argument has been made that the type of democracy that Africa and
Southern Africa need is a social or developmental democracy that responds to the socioeconomic needs of ordinary Africans by tackling inequality, poverty and unemployment. It
is not only scholars that have acknowledged the important nexus between democracy
(freedom) and development (social well-being), but even some of the prominent
African political leaders. Julius Nyerere, former president of Tanzania, has argued aptly that
freedom and development are completely linked together as are chickens and eggs. Without
chickens, you get no eggs; and without eggs, you soon have no chickens. Similarly, without
freedom you get no development, and without development you very soon lose your
freedom. (cited in Matlosa 2013, 11)
POLITIKON
15
Nelson Mandela, former president of South Africa, corroborates the truism of Nyerere’s
observation above as follows:
When we took on the project to transform society, one of the rallying cries was ‘freedom from
want’. Our goal was to banish hunger, illiteracy and homelessness and ensure that everyone
had access to food, education and housing. We saw freedom as inseparable from human
dignity and equality … . We are fully aware that our freedom and iur rights will only gain
their meaning as we succeed together in overcoming the divisions and inequalities of our
past and in improving the lives of all, especially the poor. (cited in Matlosa 2013, 11)
From the scholarly works that have critiqued the suitability of liberal democracy in its
western form in Africa as well as the powerful pronouncements above by Nyerere and
Mandela, it is evidently clear that Africa (and Southern Africa) needs to push its democratic
transitions beyond the liberal form towards a more socially responsive developmental
democracy. Claude Ake concludes that Africa needs more than the crude variety of
liberal democracy which is currently being foisted on the continent through external
pressure in part linked to the politics of aid conditionality by the powerful industrialised
countries. Africa needs a
social democracy that places emphasis on the concrete political, social and economic rights, as
opposed to liberal democracy that emphasizes abstract political rights. It will be a social
democracy that invests heavily in the improvement of people’s health, education, and
capacity so that they can participate effectively. (Ake 1996, 132)
Advancing the argument further, Claude Ake has proposed that the ideal type of democracy that Africa needs is (1) a democracy in which people have real decision-making power
beyond formalistic procedural aspects of the process including elections; (2) social democracy that places emphasis on concrete political, social and economic rights as opposed to
liberal democracy that emphasises abstract political rights; (3) a democracy that puts as
much emphasis on collective rights as it does on individual rights; and (4) an inclusive
and participative democracy that accommodates the interests, demands and fears of all
key sections of society and not just the political (ruling) elite alone. This is precisely the
type of democratisation that Southern Africa has to aspire for and invest resources to
build. At its very core, developmental democracy will require the existence of a democratic
developmental state (see Matlosa 2008). In order to concretise the conceptual-cum-theoretical discussion above as well as the situational analysis that followed in this section, the
next section explores a comparative analysis of Botswana and Lesotho in respect of their
democratisation trajectories.
Dilemmas of democratisation in small states in Southern Africa: the case of
the Botswana and Lesotho
The discourse on democratisation and peacebuilding in Southern Africa has not really
given adequate attention to small states. Oftentimes, regional trends in democratisation
and peacebuilding are analysed through the prism of the hegemonising influence of
regional powers such as South Africa in the case of Southern Africa. The assumption is
that these regional hegemons have the power and responsibility to ensure a smooth
process of democratisation, peace and political stability. But it is worth noting that regional
hegemons also have the potential to destabilise the whole region as we witnessed during
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K. MATLOSA
the heyday of apartheid. We should not forget that in an interdependent regional political
economy such as Southern Africa, small states could play a major role in stabilising the
regional system if their domestic situation is democratic, stable and peaceful. They have
the potential to destabilise regional systems if they are not peaceful.
It is for this reason that I decided to add this brief section on case studies of two small
states namely Botswana and Lesotho in respect of democratisation and peacebuilding. A
comparative analysis of Botswana and Lesotho1 will also help understand some salient
dynamics that distinguish those countries we classify in this paper as liberal democratic
regimes and those we classify as electoral democratic regimes. Swaziland (which
belongs to the closed authoritarian regimes) has been left out of this section simply
because the country has not yet undergone political transition to multi-party democracy.
Botswana and Lesotho share a number of similarities and differences that make a comparison of their democratic experiments interesting. Both countries together with Swaziland were the British protectorates during the colonial era. Botswana attained its
independence on 30 September 1966, while Lesotho became independent on 4
October 1966. The population size of both countries is about two million people each.
Even though Botswana and Lesotho have the same population size, the former is
socio-culturally heterogeneous and diverse while the latter is homogenous. This is an
important distinction given that, in theory, socio-culturally heterogeneous societies are
considered not amenable to sustainable democracy and durable peace and stability. Conversely, socio-culturally homogenous societies are considered amenable to democracy,
peace and stability. Ironically, Botswana and Lesotho defy these theoretical claims. The
socio-culturally homogenous Lesotho is more unstable and conflict-ridden than Botswana, which is more socio-culturally diverse. This truism proves that socio-cultural diversity is not a problem in Africa. The problem lies in the institutional mechanisms for the
constructive management of diversity in society. It seems internal mechanisms for diversity management work relatively well in Botswana compared to the situation in Lesotho.
Beyond diversity management, the contrasts between Botswana and Lesotho are many
and varied.
Firstly, while in Botswana political institutions have been developed and work relatively
more effectively, in Lesotho institutions are relatively weak and ineffective. While in both
countries the executive arm of the state is predominant over the legislature (see for
instance, Sebudubudu et al. 2013), the judiciary exhibits more room for independence
in Botswana than in Lesotho. The public service and parastatal sector is more politicised
in Lesotho compared to Botswana. Political institutionalisation is also linked to leadership
of a country. Given strong and effective institutions, leadership in Botswana has tended to
focus attention on national purpose with a view to achieve the country’s socio-economic
advancement with remarkable success. In Lesotho where institutions are weak, leaders are
too strong as individuals. Besides the personality cult that results from this situation,
leaders in Lesotho hardly focus on national purpose, as they are often too pre-occupied
with self-interest. So, Botswana and Lesotho differ markedly when it comes to institutions
and leadership. This may explain their different experiences in the democratisation paths
with implications for peace, security, stability and socio-economic development of the two
small states.
Secondly, while Botswana is relatively stable, Lesotho’s political history is replete with
instability (Matlosa 1997). Political stability is one of the major factors for the nurturing
POLITIKON
17
and deepening of democracy, sustainable peace and socio-economic advancement in
Botswana. Botswana has never experienced violent conflict of such a magnitude as to
warrant intervention by the SADC. Instability has been (and still remains) a constant
threat to democracy, peace and socio-economic development in Lesotho. Violent conflicts
are a constant feature of Lesotho’s political landscape. Given deep-seated political polarisation in Lesotho, often internal mechanisms for mediation, negotiations and conflict resolution have limited success. Consequently, the country has tended to rely solely on the
intervention by SADC to resolve its internal affairs. For a long time since the political
crisis of 1994/1995, Lesotho was governed under the guardianship of four SADC countries
namely Botswana, Mozambique, South Africa and Zimbabwe designated as the guarantors
of Lesotho’s democracy. Presently, at the time of writing this article, SADC has instituted a
Commission of Inquiry into the current political crisis in the country including the alleged
mutiny within the army, abductions and kidnapping of soldiers, the killing of a prominent
opposition activist and businessman, fleeing of key opposition leaders into neighbouring
South Africa citing security concerns and the assassination of the former Commander of
the Lesotho Defence Force, Lt. General Maaparankoe Mahao in June 2015. Over and
above the Commission of Inquiry, SADC was also supposed to establish an oversight committee to monitor closely the security situation and intervene any time in case of serious
threat to security in Lesotho. Unfortunately, at the time of writing this paper, the SADC
Oversight Committee had not yet been established. Thus, Botswana and Lesotho also
differ in terms of political stability, with the former being relatively stable and the latter
being unstable. Botswana has never experienced large-scale instability inviting SADC
intervention. SADC has intervened several times to resolve Lesotho’s violent conflicts.
This is still the case at the time of writing this article. SADC interventions in Lesotho
have tended to denude Lesotho’s national sovereignty. They have also not been sustainable, as they are not organically rooted within the internal dynamics of the country’s political economy.
Thirdly, Botswana has a thriving economy with a booming natural resource (especially
diamond) sector and the country has a vibrant private sector too. While both countries
belong to the South Africa-dominated Rand Monetary Area and the Southern African
Customs Union, Botswana is less dependent on the South African Rand and SACU compared to Lesotho. Botswana has its own currency – the Pula which is not pegged to the
South African Rand. Lesotho’s currency – the Loti, is pegged to the South African Rand
on a one-to-one parity. Lesotho’s labour reserve economy feeds on the South Africa
economy, like a parasite. Botswana boasts an expansive natural resource sector especially
the diamond industry. Lesotho does not have a lot of natural resources except its water
that is currently being exploited largely to the benefit of South Africa through the
Lesotho Highlands Water Project that supplies fresh water to South Africa. Lesotho’s
water is yet to be fully exploited for purposes of the country’s own socio-economic transformation. Given Botswana’s vibrant economy, contestation over state power by the elite
is not a do-or-die affair hence elections in Botswana are often peaceful. Given constraints
of survival of the elite in Lesotho’s small private sector, all eyes are on the state as a site of
accumulation. Thus, contestation over the control of the state and its resources becomes
so fierce that elections become war by other means. Almost all elections in Lesotho (with
very few exceptions) have been accompanied by political violence. Thus, Botswana and
Lesotho differ in terms of their socio-economic advancement. Botswana’s economic
18
K. MATLOSA
prosperity has anchored its democratisation momentum. Lesotho’s poor labour reserve
economy has tended to increase the allure of the state as a key site for accumulation
by the elites, a situation that explains, in part, the entrenched culture of political violence
in Lesotho especially during elections.
Fourthly, political competition, participation and representation differ in both countries.
Botswana operates the zero-sum First-Past-The-Post (FPTP) electoral system. Lesotho used
the same system since independence until 2002 when it changed its system to the Mixed
Member Proportional electoral system. Botswana’s FPTP system, among other things, has
helped institutionalise the current dominant party system whereby only one party, the
Botswana Democratic Party has been in power for over 50 years now (Maundeni 2005;
Sebudubudu and Osei-Hwedie 2010). The dominant party system is not necessarily inimical to democratisation so long as institutions are strong enough to guard against abuse of
power. However, one of the criticisms levelled against Botswana’s dominant party system
relates to the automatic succession to the position of deputy president that has in practice
translated into a system of handpicked presidents. The Independent Electoral Commission
(IEC) of Botswana headed by the Secretary of election who is appointed by the President
manages elections in Botswana. The appointment of the Secretary by the President
remains a bone of contention regarding the independence of the IEC in Botswana.
Lesotho used the FPTP electoral system for a long period until 2002. Over this period,
the country experienced one-party system, military rule and dominant party system. The
IEC appointed through a competitive process involving political parties themselves
manages elections in Lesotho. Lesotho’s one-party system and military rule have been
costly to the country in terms of democratisation, peace, stability and socio-economic
development. Since 2012, coalition governments that have not been stable, thereby
posing a major threat to democracy, peace and stability, have marked Lesotho’s multiparty system. The first one which was led by the All Basotho Convention following the
2012 elections collapsed after about two years in power due to differences between
two major coalition partners namely the All Basotho Convention and the Lesotho Congress
for Democracy. The current one led by the Democratic Congress following the 2015 elections is confronted by an unprecedented security crisis in the country that has invited
SADC intervention. So, Botswana and Lesotho also differ in respect of the electoral,
party and political systems in place with differing consequences for their democratisation
trajectories, peace and stability.
Fifthly, perhaps the most important distinction between Botswana and Lesotho is the
role of the security establishment in politics. Historically, Botswana has had a professional
security establishment as a result the security forces have not been too involved in politics.
Only recently has Botswana witnessed direct involvement of the military in politics with
the then Commander of the Botswana Defence Force (BDF) Ian Khama assuming the presidency of the country and the appointment of various military personnel to ministerial
and other high-level positions. Be that as it may, strong institutions in Botswana have insulated its democracy from undue military influence. In Lesotho, the security establishment
was steeped into politics from the onset following the attainment of independence. To be
more precise, Lesotho’s army was a political creation and thus a political creature from its
mutation from the then Police Mounted Unit. Given this situation, Lesotho’s politics is militarised and the military itself is highly politicised. The worst thing that can happen to the
professionalisation of the security forces is a military coup and a resulting military
POLITIKON
19
government. With a military coup and military government, not only do discipline and
command within the army get compromised, but civil control over the military gets jeopardised. Lesotho is the only SADC country to have experienced a military coup and a military government between 1986 and 1993. This single development has had an enormous
effect on internal discipline, command and civil control over the army. Following the
return to multi-party democracy, efforts were made to professionalise the military in
Lesotho through various security sector reforms including through external technical
assistance from India, among others. But recent developments demonstrate that these
reforms have not been successful. Interrelationships among various security organs
(especially the army and the police) are marked by tension and conflict. The Lesotho
Defence Force itself is not a unified force. The kidnapping and abduction of more than
20 soldiers on allegation of an abortive mutiny is one indicator of factionalism within
the Lesotho military, which is also partly a result of politicisation of the army. Another,
perhaps most significant, indicator of the factionalism and politicisation of the military
in Lesotho is the assassination of the former Commander Lt. General Mahao by the
army itself. While the SADC Commission of Inquiry has completed its investigations
around Mahao’s assassination, its recommendations are yet to be implemented. Be that
as it may, it is evident that the instability within the Lesotho army has paralysed governance in the country. It represents a major setback to Lesotho’s democratisation project
since 1993.
As Lesotho embarks upon constitutional and institutional, in respect of the security
sector, two stark options face the country. One option is for the Lesotho political leadership and SADC to embark on security sector reforms ensuring that civil-military relations
are improved; intra-military relations are improved; inter-security agency relations
improve and that politics is demilitarised and the military is depoliticised. This is a minimalist programme of security sector reform with emphasis on entrenching a culture of civilian control over the military. The other option is a maximalist programme of wholesale
transformation of the entire security system in Lesotho beyond mere reforms to inquire
into the vexing question whether or not Lesotho needs an army given its geo-political
location within South Africa. It is plausible that Lesotho does not need an army that has
historically proved to be more of a destabilising force than a force for political stability,
peace and security. Lesotho needs a strong police force instead of an army which faced
by no external threat, either gets manipulated by the political elites to settle political
scores or manufactures internal enemies to justify its existence and a claim to the national
treasury. The impunity now reigning within the LDF currently seems to have left the new
coalition government in the horns of dilemma. Ordinarily, and in a democracy, the army is
accountable to an elected government. This is the situation in the context of Botswana’s
liberal democracy. But in Lesotho’s fledgling electoral democracy, the army does not seem
to be accountable to the elected government as its operations are undertaken without
due regard to prior authorisation by the civilian authority. Even after the military operations, the civilian authority is powerless to demand those responsible within the army
to account for the breakdown of the rule of law, political stability, peace and security in
the country. Thus, Botswana and Lesotho differ in respect of the role of their security
establishments, with the former having a track-record of professional security forces
that have contributed to the country’s political stability and the latter highly politicised
security forces and itself a destabilising force rather than a force for stability.
20
K. MATLOSA
Finally, given the above differences between Botswana and Lesotho, it is not surprising
that in terms of regional politics in Southern Africa, the former seems to have more influence that the latter. Botswana hosts the Secretariat of the Southern African Economic
Community (SADC) and thus has considerable influence in regional politics as well as continental politics by extension. Lesotho is totally landlocked within South Africa and with
less influence on regional and continental politics. Botswana has played an important
role in peacekeeping operations in both SADC and Africa. Interestingly, Botswana has
played a peacekeeping role in Lesotho itself following the political crisis of 1998. Botswana
has served as the guarantor of Lesotho’s democracy following the 1998 crisis. Botswana is
currently playing a key role as chair of the on-going Commission of Inquiry into the current
political crisis in Lesotho. As from August 2015, Botswana is the current Chair of the SADC
Summit with Swaziland as in-coming Chair and Zimbabwe as the out-going chair. In contrast, Lesotho could not get the position of chair of the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence
and Security Cooperation last year due to the political crisis in the country. This position
had to be given to South Africa instead. It was expected that South Africa would hand
over the position to Lesotho in August 2015. But as the political crisis in Lesotho continued
unabated, the chair of the SADC Organ has gone to Mozambique, with Tanzania as the incoming chair and South Africa as the out-going chair. Thus, given its stability, entrenched
democracy and robust economy, Botswana’s influence in regional and continental politics
make it a power to reckon with. Lesotho’s instability, fragile democracy and labour reserve
economy constrains the country’s foreign policy outreach severely both within SADC and
in Africa as a whole. Lesotho has to fix its own internal problems in order to become a
major player in regional, continental and international politics.
Conclusion
This article investigates the linkages (both causal and incidental) between political transitions on the one hand and democracy and democratisation on the other, in context
of Southern Africa. The main problem that the article seeks to address revolves around
whether or not political transition from authoritarian to multi-party democracy has
taken place in the Southern Africa. Where transition has not taken place, what factors
explain that situation and what is needed for transition to occur. In countries that have
undergone transition, we are interested in discovering what factors propelled the
process. We also probe into factors behind the variations between and among various
SADC states’ progress towards institutionalisation of democratisation. Are SADC countries
becoming fit through democracy or not? Why are states at varying levels of the institutional nurturing of democracy?
Democracy opens up popular demands and governance institutions respond to these
demands. In situations where these popular demands are adequately addressed conflicts
are resolved easily, as the case of Botswana above demonstrates. But in situations where
governance institutions fail to be responsive to popular demands or, even worse, respond
to these demands through means outside the rule of law and constitutionalism, political
instability sets in, hence the ‘Huntingtonian’ nightmare of ‘political decay or disorder’
(Huntington 1968). Under conditions of political instability and lack of constructive conflict
management institutions, as illustrated by the case of Lesotho above, prospects for
democracy to be derailed are greater. Thus, this reality suggests among the key conditions
POLITIKON
21
for sustaining and consolidating democracy lays political stability, peace and constructive
management of conflict. We need not bemoan political conflict as such; neither should we
wish it away. Rather, we should always yearn and search for institutionalised mechanisms
for managing such conflict constructively guarding against conflict escalating into a
violent encounter that generates instability that in turn has a potential to scupper democratic transformation.
The overall conclusion of this article is that the majority of SADC member states have
undergone democratic transitions from autocratic regimes of the yesteryear, although it
cannot be argued with certainty that these transitions are sustainable and irreversible.
We also found out that SADC countries exhibit varying trends of democratisation and
hence varying degrees of ‘democraticness’. While some cannot be said to be democracies, by any stretch of imagination, others are electoral autocracies, electoral democracies or liberal democracies. Thus, while some countries, especially liberal democracies
and to a lesser extent electoral democracies, are arguably becoming fit through democracy, the other countries (closed authoritarian regimes and electoral authoritarian
regimes) are evidently not becoming fit through democracy. Be that as it may, even
the liberal democratic model has limitations as it is confined to civil liberties and political
rights alone. We have therefore argued that Africa needs much more that liberal democracy; it needs a social or developmental democracy that is responsive to the continent’s
socio-economic transformation addressing such social ills as inequality, poverty and
unemployment, among others.
Based on the above concluding remarks, three main points are worth reiterating. Firstly,
democracy in Southern Africa means much more than the mere act of electing leaders
every so often. The intrinsic value of democracy notwithstanding, we emphasise the
point that its instrumental value should be felt by the people namely the promotion of
sustainable human development. As Manu Ndulo points out
the best form of government is that which tends to foster in the people such qualities as
initiative and inventiveness, and to steady improvement in their overall intellectual and
moral qualities, since on these depends in turn the success of government in maintaining
and promoting economic development and well-being of the society. (Ndulo 2006, 3)
Therefore, democracy perforce ought to be developmental. This, in part, means expanding
people’s freedoms as defined by Amartya Sen above; advancing, protecting and promoting these rights all times. Besides requiring a vibrant, active and organised citizenry, this
type of democracy requires a developmental state (see Mkandawire 2001) in many of
these countries. Andreasson (2007) posits that
hope for a way out of the current quagmire of underdevelopment in southern Africa is generally vested in the notion of the ‘developmental state’ – i.e. a national, society-wide transformation in the direction of broad-based development loosely based on the post-World
War 2 experiences of continental European social democracies, and more specifically, the
developmental trajectories of the East Asian Tigers. (6)
Taking cue from the experiences of developmental states in Europe (democratic corporatrist states) and East Asian Tigers (authoritarian corporatist states), Southern Africa
has to transform its state forms more and more towards democratic developmental (corporatist) states and deliberately avoiding the East Asian route of authoritarian developmental (corporatist) states.
22
K. MATLOSA
Secondly, for the region to realise this type of democracy, it requires strong institutions
(both state and non-state) that engage each other constructively in the governance process.
Key institutions of government (including the executive, the legislature, the judiciary, political parties, civil society organisations) must have the requisite capacity to play their rightful
role in the democratic process. So far, what we know is that of the three key organs of government, the executive tends to play a dominant role over the other legislature and the judiciary resulting in weak check and balances systems. Consequently, the legislature and the
judiciary in many SADC countries (with few exceptions) play a subservient role to the executive. In many countries, civil society organisations are weak, fragmented or dysfunctional and
the governance agenda is left to organs of government alone and organised social formation outside the state gets left out of the process. While generally civil society gets marginalised in the governance process, it is also evident that of all the social groups, women
and youth are the hardest hit by this marginalisation. This is happening despite the commitment of SADC member states to the 1997 Declaration on Gender and Development that
commits member states to achieving gender equality in all key organs of the state. Many
countries have not even achieved 30% women’s representation in key organs of the state
that was a target for 2005. Since 2005, SADC countries are supposed to aim for 50%
women’s representation in key organs of the state. Only South Africa, Angola, Mozambique
and Tanzania have achieved 30% of women’s representation in key organs of the state
(especially the legislature and the executive). Beyond numbers, SADC countries still face
the challenge of ensuring that quantity and quality of gender equality are mutually reconciled. Increasing numbers of women in key organs of the state has to be matched with their
political empowerment which will ensure that women in top positions are accorded the
requisite power and authority to effectively drive the democracy and governance agenda.
Commitment to gender equality in governance should go beyond mere tokenism and political lip service.
Thirdly, we have also canvassed the point that small states matter the same way as big
states in the advancement of democracy and peace in Southern Africa. It is incontrovertible that South Africa is the regional power with hegemonic influence across the region.
Whereas South Africa’s regional policy has the potential to destabilise the whole region
as we witnessed during the apartheid era, it is also true that internal instability within
small states have a huge potential to destabilise the region. We reviewed democratisation
trends in Botswana and Lesotho. We found out that the democratic advancement in Botswana has largely been anchored upon strong and effective institutions, prudent leadership, a thriving economy, a professional security establishment, among others.
Botswana’s democratic system has added enormous value to regional peace and stability
in Southern Africa.
In contrast, we have found out that Lesotho’s democratic path has been hampered
severely by weak and ineffective institutions, self-serving political leadership, a labour
reserve economy and a politicised security establishment, among others. Given Lesotho’s
instability and weak internal mechanisms for conflict resolution, SADC has had to intervene and play a major role in peacemaking and peacebuilding with serious implications
for not only the national sovereignty of Lesotho, but also for the sustainability of SADC solutions which are not organically rooted within Lesotho’s political economy. At the heart of
the democratisation and peacebuilding paths in Botswana and Lesotho has been the role
of the security establishments particularly the military. In Botswana, the military seems to
POLITIKON
23
have played a professional and stabilising role both in Botswana, Southern Africa and
Africa through, inter alia, peacekeeping operations. In Lesotho, the military seems to
have played an unprofessional and destabilising role within the country. Lesotho’s is a
highly politicised military with mutually parasitic relations with the political elite. These
mutually parasitic relations also shrouded within an embedded culture of impunity
account, in part, for the current political crisis in the country. Given its destabilising role
historically in the country and the country’s geo-political location, Lesotho has to
embark upon either a security reform programme or a major security transformation
programme.
The overall conclusion of this article is that since the 1990s, Southern Africa has made
considerable strides towards democratisation. These strides have registered some notable
achievements whereas challenges still remain that needs attention. The post-Cold War and
post-apartheid Southern Africa today enjoys a peace dividend in which inter-state conflicts
have ended, whereas intra-state conflicts (such as the ones in Lesotho, DRC, Madagascar,
among others) persist and are on the increase. There is an embedded culture of constitutionalism and rule of law overall with isolated cases of prolongation of presidential term
limits. The only successful extension of presidential term happened in Namibia and in
two other cases (in Malawi and Zambia) attempts to prolong tenure for sitting presidents
failed. Whereas the region has not experienced military coups and military governments
with the exception of Lesotho, some of the countries still face a challenge of politicisation
of the military and militarisation of politics with deleterious effects on democratisation,
peace and stability. While the noble ideals of separation of powers and checks and balances are entrenched in all the constitutions of Southern African states, the executive
arm of the state dominates over other arms and power is centralised with minimal
effort towards decentralisation and devolution. The holding of regular multi-party elections is now a norm in the region although the democratic quality of these elections
still remains work in progress under conditions of the prevalent dominant party system.
Few countries have made demonstrable achievement in respect of gender equality and
representation of women in decision-making structures, whereas a majority including
mature democracies likes Botswana, Mauritius and Seychelles lagging far behind on the
gender equality scorecard.
Despite the vibrancy of civil society in the democratisation process, African peoples
have not been put at the centre of politics as agents of change. Often leaders would
prefer to be closer to the people during elections in order to get votes in order to
capture state power. In between elections and upon capturing power, the linkage
between leaders and people tends to weaken with dire consequences for vertical accountability. Thus, the overall picture of the current state of democratisation and peacebuilding
in South Africa is mixed bag hence Bauer and Taylor’s (2011) argument that ‘while it may
be time for Southern Africa, the region stands only at the very beginning of the economic
and social transformation that will ensure a deepening of democracy’ (384). While some
countries in the region are surely becoming fit through democracy, others are not. In
respect of the two comparative cases of Botswana and Lesotho, it is evident that the
former is becoming fit through democracy, while the latter is not. Botswana’s political
stability has played a major role for the country’s fitness through democracy. In
Lesotho, conversely, protracted political instability and violence have severely constrained
the country’s democratisation path.
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K. MATLOSA
Note
1. It is important here to make clear the methodology used in selecting these case studies.
Within the SADC region, Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland are the smallest and landlocked
countries. The three of them are former British Protectorates. Their smallness is demonstrated
vividly, especially in terms of their population size, gross domestic product and land area. The
total population of Botswana is 2.2 million, its GDP is $15.81 billion and its land area is 226,012
square miles (585,371 square km). Lesotho’s total population is 1.9 million, its GDP is $2.2
billion and its land area is 11,718 square miles (30,355 square km). Swaziland’s total population
is 1.4 million, its GDP is $3.8 billion and its land area is 17,364 square km. Ordinarily, this study
would have included Swaziland as one of the cases. But Swaziland has been excluded simply
because the country has not yet undergone democratic transition towards a multi-party political dispensation. Thus, the study focuses on two case studies namely Botswana and Lesotho.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
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