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Community as a Response to Anarchy
The assumption that the international system is under a state of unchangeable anarchy
has long permeated the IR discipline. Structural realists such as (Waltz, 1988, p.618) have
defined anarchy as ‘the absence of a central monopoly of legitimate force’ and consider it to
be the driving factor behind states’ urges to accumulate power and ensure their own security.
To realists, the state of anarchy will continue to exist unless there is an overarching institution
to which the states in the system subordinate, which is highly unlikely. Such a grim view of
reality makes its theories of conflict deterring seem only temporary and not very hopeful of a
lingering peace. On the other hand, constructivism famously challenges the fixedness of an
anarchic system: ‘Anarchy is what states make of it’ (Wendt, 1992, 391). Structures, such as
the international system, are viewed as constructed through the values, norms and
assumptions historically developed within them. Constructivists would not deny the existence
of anarchy, but they would argue that different actors attribute different meanings to the
concept of anarchy based on their intersubjective understanding of it. Thus, ‘a continuum of
anarchies is possible’ (Hopf, 1998, p.174). The current paper will attempt to use constructivist
arguments about community in order to show that there is a possibility of overcoming or
transforming the current anarchic system. That is, through restructuring the identities of states
and expanding the range of their perceived choices within the international system.
Anarchy has been instated through the historical hostility shown by some states
towards others. ‘Predatory’ states are named as culprits of instilling into others the fear of
survival against neighbours (Wendt, 1992, p. 407). This is not to say that realism’s
assumption that every actor must be self-interested and predatory is correct, but that there are
situations in which such feelings arise in a nation (Schweller, 1996, p. 119). One predatory
state with expansionist ambitions which victimizes its neighbours is enough to create a
general atmosphere of distrust, especially in a system where states do not know and identify
with the other victims. This situation breeds insecurity and makes the idea of banding together
to defeat a common aggressor a very risky or unimaginable choice. States will be left in a
security dilemma, expecting the worst from all and acting accordingly. The current anarchic
system can be seen as such: it is the result of a continuation of choices which consequently
reproduce the structure and the identities of the actors. Even if the same structure is pre-given,
there is still a possibility of intervention into the choices which enable it. This will put in
motion the development of a different identity, compatible with a different structure.
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The way in which states come to have expectations and make choices is through
identities, as ‘they tell you and others who you are and they tell you who others are’ (Hopf,
1998, p. 175). That is, because identities encompass values and preferences and, thus, dictate
subsequent choices. However, identities are not fixed, they are ‘always in-the-making’ (Friis,
2000, p.7). Friis (2000) adopts the idea of self-identity as a process and understands it always
in relation to an other’s identity. So, distinguishing an independent sense of self will always
imply an imaginary border with an other, a border which is needed if we want to make sense
of the world. The problem arises when the other is portrayed as an antithesis to the self and
generalised to be fully distinct from one’s identity. This makes so that it does not come
naturally to identify with others, since their identities being different from yours are what
gives yours meaning. Sovereignty is an example of an identity which grants states freedom of
domestic action, while also limiting their behaviour towards their neighbours. The concept
implies ‘rigid spatial boundaries between the rights of self and other’ (Wendt, 1994, p. 388) in
order to assure autonomy, but it also limits how involved states can be with one another’s
choices. While sovereignty only encourages a self-interested approach to identity, it does not
cause it. Sovereignty by definition allows autonomy to states, which can be used with
collective purposes also (i.e., converging one’s norms and laws with the community’s). So
how can a change in identity perception be useful in changing the anarchic system?
An action only gains meaning through the (socially constructed) community’s
intersubjective understanding of it. And the advantage of being part of a community is that
members are privy to how their international actions will be perceived by the rest (Hopf,
1998, p. 178). This is true about an anarchic system also since its members choose to
understand their neighbours as potential threats in order to make sense of their ambiguous
intentions and respond (Ibid., p. 188). But since most states are considered to just strive for
their own security – and not for expansion –, communication and mutual understanding of
each other’s similar struggles should not be impossible. And consequently, at least they could
agree upon general respect and peace among themselves since they have other real threats to
face. By recognizing each other’s identities and norms, they can become more confident in
each other’s intentions, have more structured interactions and become more open to long
term, peaceful relationships. All these are preconditions for a community to emerge (Cronin,
1999, p. 1). States which recognize each other as sovereign, understand each other as nonexpansionist and develop common values, norms and institutions encompass a community.
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Nevertheless, not all international communities are built the same and the trust among
the members varies (Cronin, 1999, p. 4). A pluralistic security community implies that states
have a general understanding of maintainable peace amongst themselves (Adler & Barnett,
1996, p. 73); and have trust that the effectiveness of the communication channels will deter
the use of violence (Ibid., p. 75). Security communities are built as a response to a threat, lack
or potential for development, and they are the product of choices other than plain self-interest,
within the same anarchic system. They require intense interactions among members which
will create the need for strong guidelines of conduct. However, while a loosely coupled
pluralistic security community allows informal institutions and practices to govern the
relations among the states, a tightly coupled one creates uniformity within itself through
convergence of laws and institutions. Moreover, the latter has a stronger association in
identity among members, which makes it that security threats are identified relating to the
collective identity and responded against in unison (Adler & Barnett, 1996, p. 84). Thus, it is
only the tightly coupled community that can transcend anarchy, by giving states different
identities which provide them with more peaceful range of choices and expectations.
Constructivism proposes that structure gains power through intersubjective meanings
of it. It is also known that intersubjective meanings are created and sustained through the
power of social practice (Hopf, 1998). This suggests that there is a need of convergence in
interpretations of the world through practices in order for a structure to be replicated in its
entirety. However, as argued before, most states – apart from the predatory ones – are
apparently interested in nothing more but preservation of their identity as a sovereign state.
Hence, the anarchy we are experiencing today might be more a reflection of the
intersubjective meaning offered by the non-predatory states. These states do not want to pose
threats, and coupled with the interconnected world of today, it would be impossible for them
to not have a mean of communicating this to their non-enemies. Nowadays, most states do not
fear an attack from their neighbour (Schweller, 1996, p. 91) and might even have an open line
of communication with them. By Adler and Barnett’s (1996, p. 77) definition of peace – as a
mutual understanding that no one should fear disputes escalating into violent conflict –, many
states have achieved it. This expectation of peace might imply that a loosely coupled security
community is on its way in many regions. Thus, the anarchy we are presented with today has
more potential of change than a Hobbesian version would (Wendt, 1994, p.386).
Nevertheless, there are some considerations that need mentioning. Firstly, since
security communities are usually created amongst neighbours who share certain cultural
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elements and historical similarities, we might end up with a world segmented into
civilizations (e.g., EU, ASEAN, etc.). Bellamy (2004, p. 86) argues that whether a security
community becomes an exclusivist ‘fortress’ or an ‘integrationist’ force is based on the
malleability of the identity at the core of the community. As an example, it is mentioned how
the European Union has been extending its boundaries to encompass Eastern European states,
despite it being a Western project in the beginning. Membership is also not categorical, but it
has different degrees. For instance, Romania is part of the EU but not the Schengen area,
while Norway is not part of the EU, but it is in Schengen. These blurred demarcations make it
so membership can be extended to states even if they do not match the ‘European identity’ to
the fullest yet.
This being said, if regional security communities start being built, will they not fall
prey to the in-group/out-group dichotomy? Mercer (1995) considers that since individuals are
driven by the desire of positive group identification, there is a big possibility of creating
strong incentives for competition and a self-help structure. Considering how states have a
multitude of identities depending on who they are interacting with, one state can be part of
different communities at various levels of integration. Not only that, but it can be the bridge
between the groups it belongs to. For example, Turkey is involved with organizations such
African Union and ASEAN, but also created projects such as BLACKSEAFOR which aimed
to assure security and cordiality among the states around the Black Sea (Republic of Turkey
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, n.d.). Furthermore, Mercer (1995, p. 251) makes the case that it is
impossible to create a world identity since group cohesion decreases the bigger the group gets
and since we need demarcations in order to maintain the individuality of identity. He seems to
hint at the fact that communitarian practices are hard to use to create universalist results such
as a world community. However, due to the nature of these communities – interconnected and
blurred at the edges – an informal world identity and community might form (Koschut, 2014,
p.5). In addition, security communities were never imagined to be necessarily states, but
groups of people; and they can be fragmented (Ibid., p. 4). This means that if we manage to
create a world community, its identity will be juxtaposed to what is defined as a threat to its
security. For instance, it can be a rogue state which does not want to oblige by the desires of
the rest, or it can be issues such as international corporations harming the environment or
even human trafficking rings. A world identity would be reinforced every time the community
understand the security threat the same and have similar practices of dealing with it together.
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In conclusion, security communities are expected to create new imaginable avenues of
communication and conflict resolution. If states are used to choose their behaviour to be as
peaceful as possible, they will extend the same curtesy to the rest, and peace will become the
practice of international relations. This would give rise to new sets of practices and identities,
which in turn will modify the structure of the international system. The anarchy we are
confronted with nowadays has a strong potential to be changed in a different direction through
continuous peaceful practice. Unfortunately, as mentioned before, the current security
communities are at different levels of development (Cronin, 1999, p.4-5) and they influence
each other constantly. This might make the process of change seem more tumultuous in the
short run due to underdeveloped channels of communication. In addition, there is always the
concern of asymmetrical memberships becoming a point of contention (Belammy, 2004,
p.158). We have seen this recently in some of the late joiners of the European Union, like
Poland, who tend to present higher levels of Euroscepticism (Brazil, 2022). Nevertheless,
creating a security community is a long process and these might seem just like bumps in the
road in the future. Proponents of community as a response to anarchy have admitted that
changing the structure will not be easy by any means, but what is important is that is not
impossible. Creating even just the building blocks for a structure which encourages altruistic
practices among its units – instead of self-interested ones – is a very exciting prospect to have;
even if we will not be alive in the time when it is fully at play.
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