We humbly ask for peace
in our hearts, our bodies, our minds, and our
souls, as we wait patiently and confidently.
Not once did you leave us despite our failures and sins.
We recognize and accept the death of your Son, Jesus on the
cross, as a symbol of your unconditional love for us. We thank
you for the assurance of eternal life upon acceptance of Jesus
as our Savior.
Father, we humbly come before you as one family to ask that for your
Divine providence we implore the help of the Holy Spirit to work in
the hearts of those who are preparing for the 2021 Bar
Examination, especially members of our Bedan family.
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ALL RIGHTS RESERVED
CRIMINAL LAW
I.
BOOK I [Articles 1-99 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC)] ............................. 1
A. General Principles .............................................................................................. 1
B. Felonies ................................................................................................................ 7
C. Penalties ............................................................................................................ 27
D. Execution and Service of Sentence ............................................................... 34
E. Extinction of Criminal Liability ....................................................................... 37
F. Civil Liabilities in Criminal Cases .................................................................... 40
II.
BOOK II [Articles 114-365 of the RPC] and RELATED SPECIAL LAWS .... 40
A. Crimes Against National Security and
Laws of Nations (Arts. 114-123) ..................................................................... 41
1. Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery (PD 532).................................. 42
2. Anti-Terrorism Act of 2020....................................................................... 43
B. Crimes Against the Fundamental Laws
of the State (Arts. 124-133) ............................................................................ 45
1. Anti-Torture Act of 2009 (RA 9745) ........................................................ 46
C. Crimes against Public Order (Arts. 134-160) ............................................... 47
1. Comprehensive Firearms and Ammunition
Regulation Act (RA 10591) ....................................................................... 49
D. Crimes against Public Interest (Arts. 161-187) ............................................ 50
E. Crimes Relative to Opium and other Prohibited Drugs ............................. 53
1. Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002
[RA 9165, as amended by RA 10640; Section 21
of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) Only] .................... 53
F. Crimes against Public Morals (Arts. 200-202) .............................................. 56
1. Anti-Gambling Act (PD 1602, as amended by RA 9287) ...................... 57
G. Crimes Committed by Public Officers (Arts. 203-245) ............................... 57
1. Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (RA 3019, as amended) ........... 61
2. Anti-Plunder Act (RA 7080, as amended by RA 7659) ......................... 66
3. Prohibition of Child Marriage Law (RA 11596) ..................................... 67
H. Crimes Against Persons (Arts. 246-266) ....................................................... 67
1. Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003
(RA 9208, as amended by RA 11862) ..................................................... 82
2. Anti-Violence against Women and their
Children Act of 2004 (RA 9262) ............................................................... 85
3. Anti-Child Pornography Act of 2009 (RA 9775) .................................... 88
4. Special Protection of Children against
Child Abuse, Exploitation, and Discrimination
Act (RA 7610, as amended) ...................................................................... 89
I. Crimes against Personal Liberty and Security (Arts. 267-292) ................. 92
1. Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012 (RA 10175)................................... 96
J. Crimes against Property (Arts. 293-332) ...................................................... 97
1. Anti-Fencing Law (PD 1612) ...................................................................106
K. Crimes against Chastity (Arts. 333-334, 336-346) .....................................108
1. Anti-Photo and Video Voyeurism Act of 2009 (RA 9995) .................112
L. Crimes against the Civil Status of Persons (Arts. 347-352) .....................114
M. Crimes against Honor (Arts. 353-364) .........................................................115
N. Criminal Negligence (Art. 365) .....................................................................117
1
I.
BOOK I [Articles 1-99 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC)]
A.
GENERAL PRINCIPLES
MALA IN SE AND MALA PROHIBITA
(1) M invited N to join their fraternity. N, as a recruit, was subjected to initiation rites before he can be
admitted to the brotherhood. N suffered physical injuries from the hazing activities and died as a result.
M and his companions who attended the hazing activities were charged with violation of the AntiHazing Act of 2018. M claimed that he had no intention to kill N and hence should not be held criminally
liable.
(a) Is M’s contention tenable?
No, M’s contention is untenable. Criminal intent is not required for conviction of crimes mala prohibita. The act
of hazing is punishable by a special law founded upon the principle of mala prohibita. It is not inherently
immoral, but the law deems the same to be against public policy and must be prohibited. Hence, as a crime
mala prohibita, the existence of criminal intent is immaterial, and the defense of good faith cannot be raised in
its prosecution (Dungo v. People, G.R. No. 209464, July 1, 2015).
(b) Are M and his companions entitled to the mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to commit so grave
a wrong?
No, they are not so entitled. Anti-Hazing Act of 2018 expressly provides that any person charged with any
violation thereof shall not be entitled to the mitigating circumstance that there was no intention to commit so
grave a wrong. Being charged under the Anti-Hazing Act, M and his companions are not entitled to the said
defense (R.A. No. 8049, Sec. 4, as amended by RA 11053, Sec. 14).
Note: The better approach to distinguish between mala in se and mala prohibita crimes is the determination
of the inherent immorality or vileness of the penalized act (Republic v. Sereno, G.R. No. 237428, May 11,
2018). When the acts complained of are inherently immoral, they are deemed mala in se, even if they are
punished under a special law. Accordingly, criminal intent must be clearly established with the other elements
of the crime; otherwise, no crime is committed. On the other hand, in crimes that are mala prohibita, the
criminal acts are not inherently immoral but become punishable only because the law says they are
forbidden. With these crimes, the sole issue is whether the law has been violated. Criminal intent is not
necessary where the acts are prohibited for reasons of public policy (Garcia v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
157171, March 14, 2006).
(2) R was charged for both the crimes of Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale and Estafa. The five (5)
complainants uniformly alleged that they heard either from a radio advertisement or from a friend about
an employment opportunity in East Timor linked to R, who represented that she is authorized to recruit
workers in the Philippines for said employment opportunity. Thereafter, complainants left the
Philippines for East Timor. After the lapse of three (3) months in East Timor, complainants were never
issued their work permits. During trial, the prosecution presented the testimony of L, a senior Labor
and Employment Officer from the POEA, who confirmed that R was neither licensed nor authorized to
recruit workers for employment abroad. Is proof of criminal intent necessary to convict R for both
crimes?
No, criminal intent is only necessary in the case of estafa, not for illegal recruitment in large scale.
In illegal recruitment in large scale, the criminal intent of the accused is not necessary for conviction because
said crime is malum prohibitum. A person or entity engaged in recruitment and placement activities without the
requisite authority is engaged in illegal recruitment (R.A. No. 8042, Sec. 6). Meanwhile, in estafa, such intent
must be established because it is malum in se. Estafa under Article 315, par. 2(a) of the RPC is committed by
any person who defrauds another by using fictitious name, or falsely pretends to possess power, influence,
qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions, or by means of similar deceits
executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of fraud (People v. Racho, G.R. No. 227505, October
2, 2017).
Note: When the crime is punished by a special law, as a rule, intent to commit the crime is not necessary. It
is sufficient that the offender has the intent to perpetrate the act prohibited by the special law. Intent to
commit the crime and intent to perpetrate the act must be distinguished. A person may not have consciously
intended to commit a crime; but he did intend to commit an act, and that act is, by the very nature of things,
2
the crime itself. In the first (intent to commit the crime), there must be criminal intent; in the second (intent to
perpetrate the act) it is enough that the prohibited act is done freely and consciously (Fajardo v. People,
G.R. No. 190889, January 10, 2011).
(3) T is the President of Looney Tons (“Looney”), a company engaged in mining operations in the province
of Cagayan Valley. Looney had been storing tailings from its operations in a pit. At the base of said pit
ran a drainage tunnel leading to the Cagayan River. It appears that Looney had placed a concrete plug
at the tunnel’s end. One day, tailings gushed out of or near the tunnels’ end. Eventually, the said pit
had discharged millions of tons of tailings into the Cagayan River. Looney was separately charged
with violations of the Water Code (P.D. No. 1067), Philippine Mining Act (RA 7942), National Pollution
Control Decree (P.D. No. 984) and Art. 365 of the RPC for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage
to Property. T moved to quash the Informations on the ground of duplicity of suits as there were
multiple charges arising from a single act. Decide on T’s motion.
The motion to quash the Informations shall be denied. The filing of multiple charges against Looney, although
based on the same incident, is consistent with the settled doctrine that a mala in se felony (such as Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property) cannot absorb mala prohibita crimes (such as those violating
PD 1067, PD 984, and RA 7942). What makes the former a felony is criminal intent (dolo) or negligence (culpa);
what makes the latter crimes are the special laws enacting them. Thus, the Informations separately charging
Looney with violations of PD 1067, RA 7942, PD 984 and violation of the RPC shall not be dismissed (Loney
v. People, G.R. No. 152644, February 10, 2006).
SCOPE AND CHARACTERISTICS
Generality
(4) An information for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act was filed against M, an Iranian National. The
criminal charge followed a "buy-bust operation" concluded by the Philippine police narcotic agent in
the house of M where a quantity of heroin, a prohibited drug, was said to have been seized. The narcotic
agents were accompanied by S, a special agent of United States Drug Enforcement Administration (US
DEA), who would, in due time, become one of the principal witnesses for the prosecution.
Subsequently, Presiding Judge rendered a decision acquitting M. M filed Civil Case before the RTC for
damages on account of what he claimed to have been trumped-up charges of drug trafficking made by
S. S filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that, being a special agent of the United
States Drug Enforcement Administration, he was entitled to diplomatic immunity.
(a) Is S entitled to diplomatic immunity?
No. S contends that the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, to which the Philippines is a signatory,
grants him absolute immunity from suit being an agent of the US DEA. However, the main yardstick in
ascertaining whether a person is a diplomat entitled to immunity is the determination of whether or not he
performs duties of diplomatic nature. The Vienna Convention lists the classes of heads of diplomatic missions
to include (a) ambassadors or nuncios accredited to the heads of state, (b) envoys, ministers or inter nuncios
accredited to the head of states, and (c) charges d' affairs accredited to the ministers of foreign affairs. The
Convention defines "diplomatic agents" as the heads of missions or members of the diplomatic staff, thus
impliedly withholding the same privileges from all others. S asserted that he was an Assistant Attache of the
US diplomatic mission. Attaches assist a chief of mission in his duties and are administratively under him.
These officials are not generally regarded as members of the diplomatic mission, nor are they normally
designated as having diplomatic rank. Thus, S is not entitled to diplomatic immunity (Minucher v. CA, G.R. No.
142396, February 11, 2003).
(b) If S is not entitled to diplomatic immunity, is he exempt from criminal liability? If yes, on what
grounds?
Yes, S is still exempt from criminal liability. While the diplomatic immunity of S might thus remain contentious,
it was sufficiently established that, indeed, he worked for the US DEA. If it should be ascertained that S was
acting well within his assigned functions when he committed the acts allegedly complained of, the present
controversy could then be resolved under the related doctrine of State Immunity from Suit. While the doctrine
appears to prohibit only suits against the State without its consent, it is also applicable to complaints filed
against officials of the State for acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their duties. The official
exchanges of communication, certifications from officials, as well as participation of members of the Philippine
Narcotics Command may be inadequate to support to support the diplomatic status of S but they give enough
indication that the Philippine government has given its imprimatur to the activities of S. It can hardly be said
3
that he acted beyond the scope of his official function or duties. All told, S is entitled to the defense of state
immunity from suit (Minucher v. CA, G.R. No. 142396, February 11, 2003).
(5) C, a Chinese national employed as an Economist by the Asian Development Bank, was charged with
grave oral defamation for allegedly uttering defamatory words against F, C’s Filipino secretary. The
MeTC judge received an "office of protocol" from the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) stating that
C is covered by immunity from “legal process with respect to acts performed by him in his official
capacity except when the Bank waives the immunity” under Section 45(a) of the Agreement between
the ADB and the Philippine Government. The MeTC judge, without notice to the prosecution, dismissed
the criminal case based on the immunity under said protocol communication. He had not given the
prosecution an opportunity to rebut the claim of immunity.
(a) Do you agree with the MeTC judge?
I disagree. The immunity granted to officers and staff of the ADB is not absolute, and is subject to the exception
that the act was done in "official capacity." It is therefore necessary to determine if C’s case falls within the
ambit of Section 45(a). Thus, the prosecution should have been given the chance to rebut the DFA protocol
and it must be accorded the opportunity to present its controverting evidence, should it so desire. The slander
of a person, by any stretch, cannot be considered as falling within the purview of the immunity granted to ADB
officers and personnel. As an Economist, slandering a person could not possibly be part of C’s official duties.
Our laws also do not allow the commission of a crime, such as defamation, in the name of official duty (Liang
v. People, G.R. No. 125865, January 28, 2000).
(b) Assuming C is a diplomatic agent, may he successfully invoke the blanket diplomatic immunity?
No, C may not invoke said immunity. The immunity mentioned under Sec. 45(a) of the Agreement between
ADB and the Philippine Government is not absolute, but subject to the exception that the acts were done in
“official capacity”. It is therefore necessary to determine if C’s case falls within the ambit of Sec. 45 (a) (Liang
v. People, G.R. No. 125865, January 28, 2000).
In addition, under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, the general rule is that a diplomatic agent
enjoys immunity from criminal jurisdiction of the receiving state, except in the case of an action relating to any
professional or commercial activity exercised by the diplomatic agent in the receiving state outside his official
functions (1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Article 31, 1(c)). The commission of a crime is
not part of official duty (Liang v. People, G.R. No. 125865, January 28, 2000).
(6) Who are bound to follow the Philippine penal laws?
As a general rule, penal laws and those of public security and safety shall be obligatory upon all who live and
sojourn in the Philippine territory, subject to the principles of public international law and to treaty stipulations
(CIVIL CODE, Art. 14). However, this is subject to exceptions under the following: (1) principles of public
international law, (2) treaty stipulations, and (3) laws of preferential application (CIVIL CODE, Art. 14; RPC,
Art. 2).
The following persons are not subject to the operation of our criminal laws: (SCAMR)
1. Sovereigns and other heads of state;
2. Charges d’affaires;
3. Ambassadors;
4. Ministers plenipotentiary, ministers resident; and
5. Other Representatives accredited to the host heads of the State Ministers resident (2021 REYES, Book
One, supra at 153).
Note: The following special penal laws also have extra-territorial application (not an exclusive list):
1. Cybercrime Prevention Act (RA 10175, Sec. 21);
2. Anti-Terrorism Act of 2020 (RA 11479, Sec. 4); and
3. Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003 (RA 9206, Sec. 26-A, as amended by RA 10364).
4
Territoriality
(7) While on board a Malaysian-owned, MARINA-registered merchant vessel, I, an Indonesian crew,
stabbed U, a Ukrainian crew. U died. If the stabbing incident occurred beyond 200 nautical miles from
the Philippine baselines, may I be prosecuted before a Philippine court?
Yes. Under Art. 3 of the UNCLOS, the territorial sea extends up to twelve (12) nautical miles from the baseline,
within which all penal laws apply (Magallona v. Ermita, G.R. No. 187167, August 16, 2011). Under the Principle
of Extraterritoriality, the provisions of the RPC shall be enforced outside the jurisdiction of the Philippines
against those who should commit an offense while on board a Philippine ship or aircraft (RPC, Art. 2, par. 1).
It is the registration of the vessel in accordance with the laws of the Philippines, not the citizenship of her
owner, which makes it a Philippine ship (U.S. v. Fowler, G.R. No. L- 496, December 31, 1902). Here, the
stabbing incident occurred outside of the Philippine territory. However, since the vessel is registered with the
Maritime Industry Authority (MARINA), I was considered to be on board a Philippine ship at the time of the
commission of the offense. Hence, Philippine courts have jurisdiction.
(8) B left his wife, G, and their children in their home in Quezon City to work abroad. A few years later, B
acquired a permanent resident status abroad. One day, G received an e-mail from B’s mother showing
pre-nuptial photos of B and his live-in partner abroad. Aggrieved, G filed a complaint before the RTC
of Quezon City against B for violation of RA 9262. G claims that B’s marital infidelity constitutes
psychological violence and has caused her mental and emotional anguish. When B came home to the
Philippines to buy wedding souvenirs, he was arrested. For his defense, B claims that the local courts
do not have jurisdiction over the case because the acts complained of transpired abroad.
(a) Is B’s defense tenable?
No. While it is true that penal laws only apply within the Philippine territory, RA 9262 contemplates that acts of
violence against women and their children may manifest as transitory or continuing crimes. Under Sec. 7 of
RA 9262, cases may be filed where the crime or any of its elements was committed at the option of the
complainant. A person charged with a continuing or transitory crime may be validly tried in any municipality or
territory where the offense was in part committed. Psychological violence is an indispensable element of the
offense but equally essential is the element of mental and emotional anguish which is personal to the
complainant. Here, the marital infidelity was committed by B abroad while its effects of mental and emotional
anguish to G occurred here in the Philippines. Thus, B may be validly tried before the RTC of Quezon City
where G and their children reside (AAA v. BBB, G.R. No. 212448, January 11, 2018).
(b) Assuming instead that the case filed against B was for the crime of bigamy, does RTC Quezon City
have jurisdiction?
No, B cannot be prosecuted for bigamy before the local court because the bigamous marriage was contracted
abroad. Following the Principle of Territoriality, penal laws are only enforceable within the Philippine territory,
subject to the principles of public international law and to treaty stipulation (CIVIL CODE, Art. 14). The Principle
of Extraterritoriality does not find application in this case because the act complained of is not one of the
instances under which Philippine penal laws may apply to crimes committed outside of its territorial boundaries
(RPC, Art. 2).
Prospectivity
(9) In 1996, V was charged with illegal possession of firearm and ammunition under P.D. No. 1866. While
the case was pending before the trial court, P.D. No. 1866 was amended by R.A. No. 8294 in 1997, which
imposed an additional fine of Php15,000, but lowered the the period of imprisonment to prison
correcional in its maximum period from the previous penalty which was reclusion temporal in its
maximum period to reclusion perpetua. In affirming V’s conviction, the CA applied the penalty
provided for in R.A. No. 8294. Is the CA correct?
Yes. As a general rule, penal laws should not have retroactive application, lest they acquire the character of
an ex post facto law. An exception to this rule, however, is when the law is advantageous to the accused.
According to Mr. Chief Justice Araullo, this is "not as a right" of the offender, "but founded on the very principles
on which the right of the State to punish and the commination of the penalty are based, and regards it not as
an exception based on political considerations, but as a rule founded on principles of strict justice." In the case
at bar, although an additional fine of ₱15,000.00 is imposed by R.A. No. 8294, the same is still advantageous
to the accused, considering that the imprisonment is lowered to prision correccional in its maximum period
from reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua under P.D. No. 1866 (Valeroso v. People,
G.R. No. 164815, February 22, 2008).
5
PRO REO PRINCIPLE
(10) A burned the house of V, with the main objective of killing the latter and his daughter, D, resulting in
their deaths. What is the doctrine of pro reo and how may it be applied to the crime/s committed by A?
The doctrine of pro reo advocates that penal laws and laws penal in nature are to be construed and applied in
a way lenient or liberal to the offender, constant to and consistent with the constitutional guarantee that an
accused shall be presumed innocent until his guilt is established beyond reasonable doubt.
The single act of A resulted in the complex crime of double murder. Following the doctrine of pro reo, under
Art. 48 of the RPC, crimes are complexed and punished with a single penalty (i.e., that is prescribed for the
most serious crime and to be imposed in its maximum period). The rationale being, that the accused who
commits two crimes with single criminal impulse demonstrates lesser perversity than when the crimes are
committed by different acts and several criminal resolutions. Applying the doctrine of pro reo, A should be
sentenced to suffer a single count of reclusion perpetua for both deaths (People v. Comadre, G.R. No. 153559,
June 8, 2004).
(11) What is the rule of lenity?
The rule applies when the court is faced with two possible interpretations of a penal statute, one that is
prejudicial to the accused and another that is favorable to him. The rule calls for the adoption of an
interpretation which is more lenient to the accused.
The time-honored principle is that penal statutes are construed strictly against the State and liberally in favor
of the accused. When there is doubt on the interpretation of criminal laws, all must be resolved in favor of the
accused. Since penal laws should not be applied mechanically, the Court must determine whether their
application is consistent with the purpose and reason of the law (Ient v. Tullett Prebon PHL Inc., G.R. No.
189158, January 11, 2017).
(12) D was charged before the trial court with violation of R.A. No. 9262, or the Anti-Violence Against
Women and Their Children Act of 2004 (Anti-VAWC). D claims that he may only be held liable for slight
physical injuries under Art. 266 of the RPC which imposes a lesser penalty than violation of the AntiVAWC Law. Considering that the penalty imposable under the RPC is more favorable to D, may the
rule of lenity be applied in this case?
No. The rule of lenity may not be used to construe R.A. No. 9262 because there is no ambiguity that would
necessitate any construction. The rule of lenity is intimately intertwined with the in dubio pro reo principle. The
in dubio pro reo rule means that “a court, in construing an ambiguous criminal statute that sets out multiple or
inconsistent punishments, should resolve the ambiguity in favor of more lenient punishment” (People v.
Temporada, G.R. No. 173473, December 17, 2008). While the degree of physical harm under R.A. No. 9262
and Art. 266 are the same, there is sufficient justification for prescribing a higher penalty for the former. Clearly,
the legislative intent of R.A. No. 9262 is to purposely impose a more severe sanction on offenders to promote
the protection of women and children (People v. Dabalos, G.R. No. 193960, January 7, 2013).
EX POST FACTO LAW
(13) What is an ex post facto law? (MACECE)
An ex post facto law is one which:
1. Makes criminal an act done before the passage of the law and which was innocent when done, and punishes
such an act;
2. Aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was when committed;
3. Changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime when
committed;
4. Alters the legal rules of Evidence, and authorizes conviction upon less or different testimony than the law
required at the time of the commission of the offense;
5. Assumes to regulate Civil rights and remedies only, but in effect imposes penalty or deprivation of a right for
something which when done was lawful; or
6. Deprives a person accused of a crime of some lawful protection to which he has become Entitled such as
the protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of amnesty (Benedicto v. CA, G.R. No.
125359, September 4, 2001).
6
INTERPRETATION OF PENAL LAWS
(14) In case of doubt and ambiguity in the language used, what is the rule on the construction of penal
laws?
In case of doubt and ambiguity in the language used, the following rules are followed in construing penal laws:
1. Penal laws are to be construed strictly against the State and liberally in favor of the accused. They are not to
be extended or enlarged by implications, intendments, analogies or equitable considerations. They are not to
be strained by construction to spell out a new offense, enlarge the field of crime or multiply felonies. Hence, in
the interpretation of a penal statute, the tendency is to subject it to careful scrutiny and to construe it with such
strictness as to safeguard the rights of the accused (People v. Sullano, G.R. No. 228373, March 12, 2018).
This interpretation can only be invoked where the law is ambiguous and there is doubt as to its interpretation
(REYES, Book One, supra at 27);
2. In construing the Old Penal Code and the RPC, the Supreme Court had accorded respect and persuasive, if
not conclusive effect to the decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain interpreting and construing the 1850 Penal
Code of Spain (People v. Escote, Jr. G.R. No. 140756, April 4, 2003); and
3. In cases of doubt in the interpretation of the Revised Penal Code, the Spanish text should prevail (People.
Samonte, G.R.No. 36559, July 26, 1932).
(15) What is the purpose of the liberal construction in favor of the accused?
The purpose is not to enable a guilty person to escape punishment through a technicality but to provide a
precise definition of forbidden acts (People v. Sullano, G.R. No. 228373, March 12, 2018).
RETROACTIVE EFFECT OF PENAL LAWS
(16) When can penal laws be applied retroactively?
Under Article 22 of the RPC, penal laws are applied retroactively:
1. When the law is favorable to the accused, who is not a habitual criminal; and
2. When the law decriminalizes an act (RPC, Art. 22).
(17) What are the instances where the new statute will not be given retroactive effect for the accused, even
though it is more lenient or favorable to him?
Retroactivity does not apply to the following instances:
1. The new law is expressly made inapplicable to pending actions or existing causes of actions (Tavera v.
Valdez, G.R. No. L-922, November 08, 1902); or
2. The accused is a habitual criminal (RPC, Art. 22).
(18) May the provisions of R.A. No. 10951 (An Act Adjusting the Amount or the Value of Property and
Damage on Which a Penalty is Based and the Fines Imposed under the RPC) be given retroactive
effect?
The answer must be qualified. As a rule, penal laws should not have retroactive application, lest they acquire
the character of an ex post facto law. An exception to this rule, however, is when the law is advantageous to
the accused (Valeroso v. People, G.R. No. 164815, February 22, 2008). The amendatory effects of R.A. No.
10951 are either favorable or prejudicial to the accused. If a provision of said Act is favorable to the accused,
it shall be given a retroactive effect. If a provision of said Act is prejudicial to the accused, it shall be given a
prospective effect. RA 10951 expressly provides that said Act shall have retroactive effect to the extent that it
is favorable to the accused or person serving sentence by final judgment (R.A. No. 10951, Sec. 100).
Note: An example of a provision which is prejudicial to the accused is the imposition of a minimum penalty of
prision mayor for estafa by postdating check punished under Art. 315, par. 2(d) of the RPC (R.A. No. 10951,
Sec. 85). Prior to R.A. No. 10951, estafa by postdating a check was punishable by a minimum penalty of
arresto mayor, which is a penalty lower than prision mayor.
7
(19) May an accused who is a habitual delinquent benefit from the retroactive application of favorable
provisions of R.A. No. 10951?
Yes. It is well-settled that penal laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the persons guilty of
a felony, who is not a habitual criminal, as this term is defined in Rule 5 of Article 62 of the RPC, although at
the time of the publication of such laws a final sentence has been pronounced and the convict is serving the
same (RPC, Art. 22). However, this rule does not apply when the subsequent law expressly provides for
retroactive application. Here, R.A. No. 10951 can still be given retroactive effect because it expressly provides
that for cases pending before the courts upon its effectivity where trial has already started, the courts hearing
such cases shall not lose jurisdiction over the same by virtue of said Act (R.A. No. 10951, Sec. 101).
Note: When exceptional circumstances exist, such as the passage of the instant amendatory law (R.A. No.
10951) imposing penalties more lenient and favorable to the accused, the Court shall not hesitate to direct the
reopening of a final and immutable judgment, the objective of which is to correct not so much the findings of
guilt but the applicable penalties to be imposed (Hernan v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 217874, December 5,
2017).
B.
FELONIES
CRIMINAL LIABILITIES AND FELONIES
(20)
Other than performing all elements of a crime defined and penalized by law, how is criminal liability
incurred?
1.
2.
Criminal liability shall be incurred:
By any person committing a felony although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended.
By any person performing an act which would be an offense against persons or property, were it not for the
inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or on account of the employment of inadequate or ineffectual
means (RPC, Art. 4).
(21) J was convicted for the crime of murder for killing his cousin, K. The trial court’s decision was
anchored on purely circumstantial evidence carved out principally from the testimonies of A, Police,
and Doctor. A said that a week before the commission of the crime, he saw J armed with a knife. Police
said that J went into hiding but was present during the wake of K. Doctor said that K’s death could
have been due to a stab wound in the chest. On appeal, J claims that the trial court erred in convicting
him because the prosecution failed to prove any motive on his part in order to implicate him in the
murder of his cousin. Assuming there is no eyewitness to the commission of the crime and there is
doubt as to whether J committed the crime, how will you rule on the appeal?
The appeal is meritorious. As an accepted principle, proof of motive in criminal prosecutions is neither
indispensable nor necessary if the guilt of the accused is otherwise established by other competent evidence,
as the absence of motive or the apparent lack of it is not proof of innocence. When there is no eyewitness and
there is doubt as to whether the accused is or is not the person who committed the offense charged, as in this
case, the question of motive becomes important. Proof as to motive is essential when evidence on the
commission of the crime is purely circumstantial or inconclusive. Thus, in the absence of other competent
evidence sufficient to sustain the conviction and lack of proof of motive, J must be acquitted (People v. Abillar,
G.R. No. 134606, November 29, 2000; Ubales v. People, G.R. No. 175692, October 29, 2008).
(22) R was ordering bread at Aling N’s store when V suddenly appeared and without uttering a word,
stabbed the left side of Ross’ body using a sharpened bamboo stick and immediately fled. The bamboo
stick broke and was left in R’ body. Aling N and Mang C brought R to Tondo Medical Center and was
treated as an out-patient. R went home and continued to work as a carpenter. Twenty-five (25) days
later, R was brought to the San Lazaro hospital due to abdominal pains and convulsions. The following
day, R died. The medico-legal report showed that R died of severe tetanus infection secondary to stab
wound. V was then arrested and prosecuted for the murder of R. For his defense, V claims that the
severe tetanus infection was an efficient intervening cause resulting to R’s death and that the stab
wounds he had inflicted twenty-five days earlier was just a remote cause.
(a) What is a proximate cause?
Proximate cause has been defined as that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by
any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred. It
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is that cause acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion all
constituting a natural and continuous chain of events such that the person responsible for the first event should,
as an ordinarily prudent and intelligent person, have the reasonable ground to expect at that moment of his act
or default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom (Urbano v. IAC, G.R. No. 72964,
January 7, 1988).
(b) May the severe tetanus infection be considered an efficient intervening cause? Explain.
Yes. To be considered efficient, an intervening cause must be one not produced by a wrongful act or omission,
but independent of it, and adequate to bring the injurious results. Any cause intervening between the first
wrongful cause and the final injury which might reasonably have been foreseen or anticipated by the original
wrongdoer is not such an efficient intervening cause as will relieve the original wrong of its character as the
proximate cause of the final injury (Sps. Abrogar v. Cosmos Bottling Company, Inc., G.R. No. 164749, March
15, 2017). Considering the lapse of twenty-five days and the fact that Ross worked as a carpenter, he might
have contracted the severe tetanus infection which was not there at the time of the stabbing incident. Here,
the severe tetanus infection was distinct and foreign to the stab wounds inflicted by Victor hence it may be
considered an efficient intervening cause.
Note: The SC in Urbano v. IAC discussed the nature of tetanus. The incubation period of tetanus, i.e., the time
between injury and the appearance of unmistakable symptoms, ranges from 2 to 56 days. However, over 80
percent of patients become symptomatic within 14 days. A short incubation period indicates severe disease,
and when symptoms occur within 2 or 3 days of injury, the mortality rate approaches 100 percent. Mild tetanus
is characterized by an incubation period of at least 14 days and an onset time of more than 6 days. Moderately
severe tetanus has somewhat shorter incubation period and onset time. Severe tetanus includes a short
incubation time, and an onset time of 72 hours or less.
Classifications of Felonies
Grave vs. Less Grave vs. Light Felonies
(23) Classify felonies according to gravity and explain each.
As to gravity, felonies may be classified as grave, less grave or light. Grave felonies are those to which the law
attaches the capital punishment (i.e. death; but note that RA 9346 prohibits the imposition of death penalty and
reduces the sentence to reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole) or penalties which in any of their
periods are afflictive in accordance with Art. 25 of the RPC.
Less grave felonies are those which the law punishes with penalties which in their maximum period are
correctional in accordance with Art. 25 of the RPC.
Light felonies are those infractions of law or the commission of which the penalty of arresto menor or a fine not
exceeding Php40,000.00 or both is provided (RPC, Art. 9, as amended by R.A. No. 10951, Sec. 1).
(24) When is a fine considered an afflictive, correctional or light penalty?
A fine, whether imposed as a single or as an alternative penalty, shall be considered an afflictive penalty, if it
exceeds Php1,200,000.00; a correctional penalty, if it does not exceed Php1,200,000.00 but is not less than
Php40,000.00; and a light penalty, if it be less than Php40,000 (RPC, Art. 26, as amended by R.A. No. 10951,
Sec. 2).
Note: The classification of felonies as grave, less grave and light is relevant in determining:
1. Whether felonies can be complexed or not. Art. 48 of the RPC excludes from its operation a light felony as
a component part of a complex crime (RPC, Art. 48);
2. Prescription of the crime (RPC, Art. 90);
3. To determine the duration of subsidiary penalty to be imposed (RPC, Art. 39(2)).
4. To determine whether an accused is liable. Only principals and accomplices are liable for light felonies (RPC,
Art. 16);
5. To determine whether the felony committed is punishable. Light felonies are punishable only when they have
been consummated, with the exception of crimes against persons and against property (RPC, Art. 7);
6. To determine the duration of the detention in case of failure to post the bond to keep the peace (RPC, Art.
35);
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7. To determine whether or not the person in authority or his agents have committed delay in the delivery of
detained persons to the judicial authority (RPC, Art. 125); and
8. To determine the proper penalty for quasi-offenses (RPC, Art. 365).
Aberratio Ictus, Error In Personae, and Praeter Intentionem
(25) A was staying with his two-year old granddaughter, BBB at the terrace of the house. Suddenly, Z
appeared and started attacking A with a panabas. While A was able to evade Z’s blows, the latter
nevertheless hit BBB on her abdomen and back, causing her instantaneous death. Is Z liable for BBB’s
death?
Yes. BBB’s death is a case of aberratio ictus. The fatal blow was delivered by mistake as it was actually A who
was the accused’s intended target. In this regard, the accused's single deed actually resulted in two felonies:
(a) Attempted Murder of A; and (b) Consummated Murder of BBB. This may be classified as species of complex
crime defined under Art. 48 of the RPC, particularly, a delito compuesto, or a compound crime where a single
act produces two (2) or more grave or less grave felonies. In relation to Article 4(1) of the RPC, a person shall
be criminally liable if he committed a felony although the wrongful act done be different from that which he
intended (People vs. Umawid, G.R. No. 208719, June 9, 2014).
(26) B was riding his motorcycle when he chanced upon C, who was also on his motorcycle. B overtook C
but the latter flagged him down and an intense argument occurred between them. C drew his gun and
fired at B. B was hit at the back of his left arm and right wrist. Meanwhile, T, an 8 year-old boy was hit
on the head by one of the bullets fired by C. B survived but T died. Is C liable for the death of T?
Yes. Under Art. 4 of the RPC, criminal liability is incurred by any person committing a felony although the
wrongful act done be different from that which he intended. The author of the felony shall be criminally liable
for the direct, natural and logical consequence thereof, whether intended or not. For this provision to apply, it
must be shown that (a) an intentional felony has been committed, and (b) the wrong done to the aggrieved
party be the direct, natural and logical consequences of the felony committed. The foregoing elements are
present in this case. C committed an intentional felony in shooting B, and the death of T was its direct, natural
and logical consequence. The death of T is an example of aberratio ictus under Art. 4 of the RPC (Cruz v.
People, G.R. No. 216642, September 8, 2020).
(27) A, B, C and D were on board a motor vehicle when a group of men, including E and F, fired shots at
them thereby killing A and B, while severely injuring C and D. An extrajudicial statement was made by
G, who testified that E and F mistook the vehicle of A, B, C and D as that of their rivals’. Hence, when
they saw the vehicle of the victims, shots were fired. The court found them guilty of murder and
frustrated murder. Are E and F liable for the crimes charged?
Yes. The case is an error in personae or mistake in the identity of the victims. The fact that they mistook the
identities of the victim does not diminish their culpability. As held by the Court, the mistake in the identity of the
victim carries with it the same gravity as that of killing the intended victim (People v. Sabalones, G.R. No.
123485, August 31, 1998).
(28) A has been suffering from partial paralysis and has lost control of the movement of his right arm. A
learned that M got his daughter P pregnant. When P gave birth, M promised to give monthly allowance
to P and their child. However, he never did. Consequently, A went to the office of M and asked the latter
to marry P but M refused. A then stabbed M on his face and due to his lack of control of his arm, the
knife landed on M’s neck, which caused the latter’s death. A argued that he did not intend to kill M, but
merely to inflict a wound on the face of M. Is A liable for homicide?
Yes. Notwithstanding the fact that A never intended to kill M and that the stabbing resulted in the fatal wound
at his neck was due solely to the fact that A did not have control of his right arm due to paralysis, A is still liable
for homicide. However, the mitigating circumstance of lack of intention to cause so grave an injury as the death
of the deceased should be taken into consideration in favor of A (People v. Alburquerque, G.R. No. 38773,
December 19, 1933).
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Impossible Crime
(29) A, B, C and D discussed and agreed to kill Z. Upon reaching Z’s house, C struck Z on the nape then
hacked Z’s body on the side. Z lost consciousness. After five minutes, B stabbed Z. B then opened Z’s
chest and took out the heart. C took out Z’s liver. The organs were fed to a pig. B contends that he did
not kill Z for the latter was already dead when C stabbed him. Is B guilty of an impossible crime?
No. An impossible crime is attendant when the act performed would be an (1) offense against persons or
property, (2) that the act was done with evil intent, and (3) that its accomplishment was inherently impossible,
or the means employed was either inadequate or ineffectual. To be impossible under the third element, the act
intended by the offender must be by its nature one impossible of accomplishment. There must be either: (1)
legal impossibility, or (2) physical impossibility of accomplishing the intended act in order to qualify the act as
an impossible crime.
Legal impossibility occurs where the intended acts, even if completed, would not amount to a crime. The
impossibility of killing a person already dead falls in this category. On the other hand, factual impossibility
occurs when extraneous circumstances unknown to the actor or beyond his control prevent the consummation
of the intended crime”. It was not shown that Z was dead when B stabbed him as Z was merely unconscious.
Thus, B may be held liable for murder and not for impossible crime (People v. Callao, G.R. No. 228945, March
14, 2018).
(30) X, Y and Z were employees of ABC Company and as such had free access inside the latter’s
establishment. X then unlawfully took the postdated check belonging to ABC Company. It was later on
discovered that the check was without value, as it was dishonored upon presentment. Discuss X’s
criminal liability.
X is liable for an impossible crime. The requisites of an impossible crime are: (1) that the act performed would
be an offense against persons or property; (2) that the act was done with evil intent; and (3) that its
accomplishment was inherently impossible, or the means employed was either inadequate or ineffectual. Here,
X performed all the acts to consummate the crime of qualified theft, which is a crime against property. X's evil
intent cannot be denied, as the mere act of unlawfully taking the check meant for ABC Company showed his
intent to gain or be unjustly enriched. It was only due to the extraneous circumstance of the check being
unfunded, a fact unknown to X at the time, that prevented the crime from being produced (Jacinto v. People,
G.R. No. 162540, July 13, 2009).
Stages of Execution
(31) Distinguish frustrated felony from attempted felony.
The distinctions between frustrated and attempted felony are summarized as follows:
1. In frustrated felony, the offender has performed all the acts of execution which should produce the felony as
a consequence; whereas in attempted felony, the offender merely commences the commission of a felony
directly by overt acts and does not perform all the acts of execution.
2. In frustrated felony, the reason for the non-accomplishment of the crime is some cause independent of the
will of the perpetrator; on the other hand, in attempted felony, the reason for the non-fulfillment of the crime
is a cause or accident other than the offender’s own spontaneous desistance (Palaganas v. People, G.R.
No. 165483, September 12, 2006).
(32) B hacked G with a bolo three times, hitting the latter twice on his face and forehead. Due to prompt
medical assistance, G survived and according to the report of the medico-legal officer, the injuries may
only possibly cause the victim’s death. The trial court found B guilty of frustrated murder. Is B liable
for frustrated murder?
No. It is a well-settled rule that in order to convict an accused for the crime of frustrated murder or homicide,
the nature of the wounds sustained by the victim should be fatal. Otherwise, the accused can only be convicted
of attempted murder or homicide. Any doubt as to the nature of the wound should be resolved in favor of the
accused. In this case, since the report of the medico-legal officer failed to categorically state whether the
wounds sustained by G were fatal, the crime committed is only attempted murder (Oliveros v. People, G.R.
No. 242552, March 3, 2021).
(33) AAA and BBB took 15 boxes of detergent soap without paying for their price and loaded them on a
pushcart. They were apprehended by the security guard hauling the pushcart at the parking lot and
11
loading the boxes in a taxi. AAA and BBB were convicted of consummated theft. On appeal, AAA and
BBB argued that they should only be held liable for frustrated theft since at the time he was
apprehended, they were never placed in a position to freely dispose of the articles stolen. Is their
contention correct?
No. The contention of AAA and BBB is wrong because there is no crime of frustrated theft. The ability of the
offender to freely dispose of the property stolen is not a constitutive element of the crime of theft. Here, with
intent to gain, AAA and BBB acquired physical possession of the stolen cases of detergent for a considerable
period of time that they were able to drop these off at a spot in the parking lot, and long enough to load these
onto a taxicab. Unlawful taking, or apoderamiento, is deemed complete from the moment the offender gains
possession of the thing, even if he has no opportunity to dispose of the same (Valenzuela v. People, G.R. No.
160188, June 21, 2007).
(34) Give examples of crimes which do not have a frustrated stage.
The examples of crimes which do not have a frustrated stage are as follows:
1. Rape, since the gravamen of the offense is carnal knowledge, hence, no matter how slight the penetration,
the felony is consummated (People v. Orita, G.R. No. 88724, April 3, 1990);
2. Indirect Bribery, because it is committed by accepting gifts offered to the public officer by reason of his
office. If he does not accept, he does not commit the crime. If he accepts, it is consummated;
3. Direct Bribery;
4. Corruption of Public Officers, because the offense requires the concurrence of the will of both parties,
such as that when the offer is accepted, the offense is consummated. But when the offer is rejected, the
offense is merely attempted;
5. Adultery, because the essence of the crime is sexual congress;
6. Physical Injury, since it cannot be determined whether the injury will be slight, less serious, or serious
unless and until consummated; and
7. Theft, because the unlawful taking immediately consummates the offense and the disposition of the thing is
not an element thereof (Valenzuela v. People, G.R. No. 160188, June 21, 2007).
Continuing Crimes
(35) What is a continuing crime?
A continuing crime envisages a single crime committed through a series of acts arising from one criminal intent
or resolution (Maximo v. Villapando Jr., G.R. Nos. 214925 & 214965, April 26, 2017). Also, since there is only
one crime committed, only one penalty shall be imposed on the perpetrator (REYES, Book One, supra at 689).
For example, the crimes of rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and crimes
or offenses committed in furtherance thereof or in connection therewith constitute direct assault against the
State and are in the nature of continuing crimes (Lacson v. Secretary Perez, G.R. No. 147780, May 10, 2001).
(36) What is a continued or continuous crime?
Continuous or delito continued are those where two or more violations of the same penal provisions are united
in one and the same intent or resolution, leading to a perpetration of the same criminal purpose or aim
(Santiago v. Garchitorena, G.R. No. 109266, December 2, 1993).
For example, the theft of thirteen (13) cows belonging to two different owners committed by the accused at the
same time and same place (People v. Tumblose, G.R. No. L-46428, April 13, 1939); and the taking of six
roosters from a coop in a single offense of theft as accused was animated by a single criminal impulse (People
v. Jaranilla, G.R. No. L-28547, February 22, 1974).
(37) A vehicular accident occurred on the national highway in Bulacan. Among the first to arrive at the
scene of the accident was Boy, who found one of the victims already dead and the two others
unconscious. Before rescuers could come, Boy, taking advantage of the helpless condition of the
victims, took their wallets and jewelry. The police who responded to the report of the accident caught
Boy. He was charged with three counts of qualified theft under Article 310 of the RPC. Is the charge
correct?
No. Only one crime of qualified theft may be charged as the case constitutes a continuing crime as the single
act consists of a series of acts but all arising from one criminal resolution. It was a continuous, unlawful act or
series of acts set on foot by a single impulse and operated by an unintermittent force. Although there are series
12
of acts, there is only one crime committed. The act of Boy in taking the properties of several victims was
motivated by a single criminal impulse of going on a thieving spree. Hence, only one penalty shall be imposed
(Mallari v. People, G.R. No. L-58886, December 13, 1988).
Complex Crimes and Composite Crimes
(38) What are the differences between a complex crime and special complex crime?
As to concept, a complex crime is made up of two or more grave or less grave crimes being punished in distinct
provisions of the RPC but alleged in one information either because they were brought about by a single
felonious act or because one offense is a necessary means for committing the other offense or offenses. On
the other hand, a special complex crime is made up of two or more crimes which are considered only as
components of a single indivisible offense being punished in one provision of the RPC.
As to penalty, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed in its maximum period in cases of
complex crimes, whereas the penalty specifically provided for special complex crime according to the rules on
imposition of penalty shall be applied.
(39) When A, B, and several companions saw the yellow pick-up service vehicle of Mayor X approaching
towards the waiting shed, they opened fire and rained bullets on the vehicle using high-powered
firearms. Two of Mayor X’s security escorts died while five others were injured. What crime, if any, was
committed?
The accused are liable for two counts of murder and five counts of attempted murder. When various victims
expire from separate shots, such acts constitute separate and distinct crimes. In a complex crime, two or more
crimes are actually committed, however, in the eyes of the law and in the conscience of the offender they
constitute only one crime, and thus, only one penalty is imposed. In this case, a complex crime was not
committed because the killing and wounding of the victims were not the result of a single discharge of firearms.
The accused opened fire and rained bullets on the vehicle boarded by Mayor X and his group. As a result, two
security escorts died while five others were injured. Moreover, more than one gunman fired at the vehicle of
the victims. Obviously, the accused performed not only a single act but several individual and distinct acts in
the commission of the crime. Thus, Article 48 of the RPC would not apply because it speaks only of a “single
act” (People v. Nelmida, G.R. No. 184500, September 11, 2012).
(40) A, a Filipino, is a transgender who underwent gender reassignment and had implants in different parts
of his body. He changed his name to Angelina and was a finalist in the Miss Gay International. He came
back to the Philippines and while he was walking outside his home, he was abducted by M and R who
took him to a house in the province. He was then placed in a room and R forced him to have sex with
him at knife's point. After the act, it dawned upon R that Angelina is actually a male. Incensed, R called
M to help him beat Angelina. The beatings that Angelina received eventually caused his death. Is R
liable for forcible abduction, rape, acts of lasciviousness and homicide, or kidnapping with homicide?
Explain.
R is liable for kidnapping with homicide. Abducting Angelina is not forcible abduction since the victim in this
crime must be a woman. Gender reassignment will not make him a woman within the meaning of Art. 342 of
RPC. There is no showing, moreover, that at the time abduction is committed with lewd design; hence, his
abduction constitutes illegal detention. Since A was killed in the course of the detention, the crime constitutes
kidnapping and serious illegal detention with homicide under Art. 267.
Since the victim is not a woman within contemplation of the law, it cannot be rape by sexual intercourse. Neither
can it be rape by sexual assault for R did not insert his penis into the anal orifice or mouth of Angelina or an
instrument or object into anal orifice or genital orifice, hence, this act constitutes acts of lasciviousness under
Art. 336. Since the acts of lasciviousness is committed by reason or occasion of kidnapping, it will be integrated
into one and indivisible felony of kidnapping with homicide M is liable for kidnapping with homicide as an
accomplice since he concurred in the criminal design of R in depriving Angelina his liberty and supplied the
former material aid in an efficacious way by helping him beat the latter (People v. Jugueta, G.R. No. 202124,
April 5, 2016).
(41) X and two (2) cohorts, armed with guns and a knife, robbed the house of Spouses Y during a birthday
celebration. After tying the hands of all the persons inside the house and divesting them of their
belongings, X and his co-accused, Z, proceeded to the maid’s quarters. Z held AAA at gunpoint and
proceeded to have carnal knowledge of her. X was convicted of robbery with rape together with Z, as
13
X had the opportunity but did not endeavor to stop his co-accused from raping AAA. Is the conviction
proper?
Yes, the conviction of X is proper as he is liable for the crime of Robbery with rape for failing to prevent the
commission of the rape despite having the opportunity to do so. Once conspiracy is established between two
accused in the commission of the crime of robbery, they would be both equally culpable for the rape committed
by one of them on the occasion of the robbery, unless any of them proves that he endeavored to prevent the
other from committing the rape. The rule in this jurisdiction is that whenever a rape is committed as a
consequence, or on the occasion of a robbery, all those who took part therein are liable as principals of the
crime of robbery with rape, although not all of them took part in the rape. Here, although X did not directly
participate in raping AAA, his failure to stop Z despite the opportunity to do so will make him equally liable for
the crime committed (People v. Belmonte et. al., G.R. No. 220889, July 5, 2017).
CIRCUMSTANCES AFECTING CRIMINAL LIABILITY
Justifying Circumstances
(42) When is there a justifying circumstance of self-defense?
There is a justifying circumstance of self-defense if the accused is able to establish: (a) that there was unlawful
aggression by the victim; (b) that the means employed to prevent or repel such aggression were reasonable;
and (c) that there was lack of sufficient provocation on his part. Of the three, unlawful aggression is the foremost
requirement. Hence, absent such element, self-defense, whether complete or incomplete, cannot be
appreciated (People v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 218946, September 5, 2018).
(43) When is the means employed in the act of self-defense considered reasonable?
Whether or not the means of self-defense is reasonable depends upon the nature or quality of the weapon;
the physical condition, the character, the size and other circumstances of the aggressor; as well as those of
the person who invokes self-defense, and also the place and the occasion of the assault. Perfect balance
between the weapon used by the one defending himself and that of the aggressor is not required, because the
person assaulted loses sufficient tranquility of mind to think, to calculate or to choose which weapon to use
(Remegio vs. People, G.R. No. 196945, September 27, 2017). What the law requires is rational equivalence
and the proportionateness thereof does not depend upon the harm done, but rests upon the imminent danger
of such injury (People v. Encomienda, G.R. No. L-26750, August 18, 1972).
(44) C was smoking at a nearby store when D and his companions approached him, slapped him in the
face, and held him by the neck. Due to the intervention of Tanod E, the altercation ceased and C was
able to run away. Thereafter, C returned to the store and stabbed D, leading to his death. May C claim
self-defense?
No. C may not claim self-defense because the primordial element which is unlawful aggression is not present.
To successfully claim self-defense, the accused must be able to prove that: (1) the victim mounted an unlawful
aggression against the accused; (2) that the means employed by the accused to repel or prevent the
aggression were reasonable and necessary; and (3) the accused did not offer any sufficient provocation. As a
rule, when unlawful aggression which has begun no longer exists, the one making the defense is not anymore
justified in killing or even wounding the former aggressor. Here, the unlawful aggression on the part of D ceased
to exist due to Tanod E’s intervention, negating C’s claim of self-defense (People vs. Ramelo, G.R. No. 224888,
November 22, 2017).
Note: Unlawful aggression and reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it are
common requisites of self-defense, defense of relative and defense of a stranger. These three justifying
circumstances differ as to their third element. In defense of relative, the third element is that in case
provocation was given by the person attacked, the one making a defense had no part therein. In defense of
a stranger, the third element is that the person defending be not induced by revenge, resentment or other
evil motive (RPC, Art. 11, pars. 2 and 3).
(45) G, a police officer and crime investigator, proceeded to the residence of V upon the report of several
bursts of gunfire from the direction of the rear portion of V’s house. G introduced himself as an
investigator to the group of V and asked the group who fired the gunshots. The group ignored him and
laughed. Without effecting an arrest, G admonished the group for their dangerous behavior
considering that they could have hit somebody. At that moment, V suddenly cocked and fired his pistol
at G but it jammed in the process. G immediately got hold of his gun and fired at V notwithstanding the
14
latter’s plea, ‘Huwag pare!’. V died on the spot. During the trial, G raised the defense, by way of
exoneration, that he acted in the fulfillment of a duty. Is the defense tenable? Explain.
No, the defense of G is untenable. In People v. Oanis (G.R. No. L-47722, July 27, 1943), the Supreme Court
set forth two requisites in order that fulfillment of duty and exercise of a right may be considered as justifying
circumstance, namely: (a) that the offender acts in the performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right;
and (b) that the injury or offense committed be the necessary consequence of the due performance of such
duty or in the lawful exercise of such right or office. Here, G was not performing his duties at the time of the
shooting because he was not effecting an arrest. At most, he was in the house of V to determine who had fired
the gunshots that were heard by the neighborhood. The fatal injuries that he inflicted on V was not a necessary
consequence of the performance of his duty as a police officer, thus negating his claim for exoneration (People
v. Catbagan, G.R. Nos. 149430-32. February 23, 2004).
Note: In the performance of his duty, an agent of the authorities is not authorized to use force, except
in an extreme case when he is attacked or is the subject of resistance and finds no other means to
comply with his duty or cause himself to be respected and obeyed by the offender. In case injury or
death results from the exercise of such force, the same could be justified in inflicting the injury or
causing the death of the offender if the officer had used necessary force (Yapyuco v. Sandiganbayan,
G.R. Nos. 120744-46, June 25, 2012).
Note: For the discussion of the “cycle of violence” involved in the claim of Battered Woman Syndrome,
kindly refer to the discussion of R.A. No. 9262 under Special Penal Laws.
(46) A had been married to B for ten (10) years. Since their marriage, B had been jobless and a drunkard,
preferring to stay with his "barkadas" until the wee hours of the morning. A was the breadwinner and
attended to the needs of their three (3) growing children. Many times, when B was drunk, he would
beat A and their three (3) children, and shout invectives against them. In fact, in one of the beating
incidents, A suffered a deep stab wound on her tummy that required a prolonged stay in the hospital.
Due to the beatings and verbal abuses committed against her, she consulted a psychologist several
times, as she was slowly beginning to lose her mind. One night, when B arrived dead drunk, he
suddenly slapped A several times while shouting invectives against her. B then went to sleep and left
A crying. While B was sound asleep, A stabbed B several times causing his instantaneous death.
Medico-Legal Report showed that the husband suffered three (3) stab wounds. Can A validly put up a
defense? Explain. (2014 Bar)
Yes. A can put up the defense of battered woman syndrome. It appears that she is suffering from physical and
psychological or emotional distress resulting from cumulative abuse by her husband. Under Section 26 of R.A.
No. 9262, “victim survivors who are found by the courts to be suffering from battered woman syndrome do not
incur any criminal and civil liability notwithstanding the absence of any of the elements for justifying
circumstances of self-defense under the RPC.” As a rule, once the unlawful aggression ceased, stabbing the
victim further is not self-defense. However, even if the element of unlawful aggression in self-defense is lacking,
A, who is suffering for battered woman syndrome, will not incur criminal and civil liability (R.A. No. 9262, Sec.
26).
(47) When any of the justifying circumstances are present, is the actor always exempted from civil liability?
Not in all cases. Art. 101 provides that in cases falling within subdivision 4 of Article 11 or avoidance of greater
evil of injury, the persons for whose benefit the harm has been prevented shall be civilly liable in proportion to
the benefit which they may have received (2023 BOADO, Compact Reviewer in Criminal Law, supra at 116).
Exempting Circumstances
(48) R went to a store to buy iced tea powder. While he was at the store, C, a minor, 17 years old, poked a
gun at his face and pulled the trigger but the gun did not fire. C then hit R in the head and punched him
several times. P, his friend, hit R in the head with a stone that caused the latter to lose his
consciousness. R was in coma for seven (7) days. The trial court convicted C with frustrated murder.
C appealed arguing that he should be exempted because it should be presumed that he acted without
discernment due to the prosecutor’s failure to prove that he was acting with discernment. Is C
exempted from criminal liability?
Yes. C is exempted from criminal liability. Jurisprudence provides that when a minor between 15 but below 18
years old is charged with a crime, it cannot be presumed that he acted with discernment. It is the duty of the
prosecution to prove as a separate circumstance that C committed the alleged crime with discernment by direct
or circumstantial evidence. Discernment is different from intent. The former cannot be presumed. In this case,
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C must be exempted from criminal liability for failure to prove that he acted with discernment (CICL XXX v.
People, G.R. No. 237334, August 14, 2019).
(49) What are the corresponding liabilities of a minor based on age and discernment?
Under R.A. No. 9344, Sec. 6, as amended by Sec. 3 of R.A. No. 10630, the corresponding liabilities based on
age and discernment are as follows:
1. Minors who are 15 years or under, regardless of discernment are exempted from criminal liability but shall
undergo intervention program;
2. Minors who are above 15 but below 18 years old, without discernment, are exempted from criminal liability
but shall undergo intervention program; and
3. Minors who are above 15 but below 18 years old, with discernment, are subject to criminal liability but shall
undergo diversion program.
(50) While R and X were engaged in a heavy drinking session, R suddenly hacked X on the neck, back and
fingers, causing X’s demise. During trial, R pleaded insanity as defense. R, prior to the incident, was
admitted for his suicidal tendencies. He presented the testimony of Dr. G who diagnosed him as a
schizophrenic three (3) years prior to the incident and three (3) months after the incident. Dr. G testified
that upon examination, R was having auditory hallucinations, depressed mood with appropriate effect
and could not remember what he did at the time of the incident. Nevertheless, the court convicted R of
homicide. On appeal, R argued that he should be exempted from criminal liability on the ground of
insanity. Is R exempted from criminal liability?
No. For the defense of insanity to be successfully invoked as an exempting circumstance, it is necessary that:
(a) the accused was completely deprived of intelligence; and (b) such complete deprivation of intelligence must
be manifest at the time or immediately before the commission of the offense. The testimony of proof of an
accused’s insanity must relate to the time immediately preceding or simultaneous with the commission of the
offense which he is charged. In this case, R failed to prove that he was insane at the time or immediately before
the commission of the offense. The claim that he has absolutely no recollection of the hacking incident amounts
to a mere general denial, which, by itself, does not prove that R had lost his grip on reality at the time of the
incident. Thus, R failed to prove insanity and is not exempted from criminal liability (People v. Bacolot, G.R.
No. 233193, October 10, 2018).
(51) L allegedly hacked S until the latter died. Policemen arrived at the scene and L immediately claimed
responsibility for the death and adding that he had already washed the bolo he used to hack his victim.
Family members of L testified that the latter exhibited odd behavior. He would smile without anyone in
front of him; he would call a chicken late at night; and would keep on saying to himself that S was a
witch. During trial, L claimed not to know or recall the events surrounding the incident, the identity of
the victim, and his confinement and treatment at the mental hospital. The defense claims that L is
insane which should be appreciated as an exempting circumstance in the case. May the exempting
circumstance of insanity be appreciated considering the odd behavior exhibited by the accused?
Explain.
No. Unusual behaviors such as smiling to oneself and calling a chicken late at night are not proof of a complete
absence of intelligence, because not every aberration of the mind or mental deficiency constitutes insanity. For
the defense of insanity to prosper, it must be proven that the accused, was completely deprived of intelligence,
which must relate to the time immediately preceding or simultaneous to the commission of the offense with
which he is charged. Here, L was capable of discernment during the time of the incident considering that he
had the foresight to wash the bolo after killing the victim and the consciousness to decide to confess to the
authorities what he had done upon their arrival. L’s actuations immediately after the incident negate a complete
absence of intelligence or discernment when he killed the victim (People vs. Miraña, G.R. No. 219113, April
25, 2018).
Note: The Supreme Court has held that "the prevalent meaning of the word 'crazy' is not synonymous with
the legal terms 'insane,' 'non compos mentis,' 'unsound mind,' 'idiot,' or 'lunatic.' The popular conception of
the word 'crazy' is being used to describe a person or an act unnatural or out of the ordinary. A man may
behave in a crazy manner, but it does not necessarily and conclusively prove that he is legally so." In order
to be exempt from criminal liability, the accused must be so insane as to be incapable of criminal intent
(People vs. Miraña, G.R. No. 219113, April 25, 2018).
(52) C was terminated from her job as the Vice President for Finance of UMC. The termination from
employment was allegedly caused by a private document falsified by M to make it appear that C was
using office funds for personal use. As a result, M was criminally charged with Falsification of Private
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Documents. In her defense, M maintained that she was merely acting upon Finance Manager L’s
instructions and that M only performed such acts out of fear that she would lose her job if M defied her
superior’s order. M was apprehensive to follow because she suspected something, but nevertheless
acquiesced to such instruction. May the exempting circumstance of acting under an impulse of
uncontrollable fear be appreciated in favor of M?
No, it may not be appreciated because there was an absence of any real and imminent threat, intimidation or
coercion that would have compelled her to do what she did. For the appreciation of such circumstance to
prosper, the duress, force, fear or intimidation must be present, imminent and impending, and of such nature
as to induce a well-grounded apprehension of death or serious bodily harm if the act be done. A threat of future
injury is not enough. Here, there is no showing that M was threatened with loss of employment by her superior
should she fail to do the instruction, thereby negating her claim of having acted under an impulse of
uncontrollable fear (Manansala v. People, G.R. No. 215424, December 9, 2015).
(53) Y and Z were convicted of Robbery with Homicide by the Regional Trial Court. Thereafter, they
appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed their conviction. Z argues before the Supreme Court
that the appellate court erred in not considering the exempting circumstance of uncontrollable fear of
an equal or greater injury. Z posits he was compelled or forced at gunpoint by A to join the robbery,
and if he will resist, something bad will happen to him and his family. Will his contention prosper?
No, it will not prosper. Z is not entitled to avail of the exempting circumstance of uncontrollable fear. To avail
of this exempting circumstance, the evidence must establish: (a) the existence of an uncontrollable fear; (b)
that the fear must be real and imminent; and (c) the fear of an injury is greater than or at least equal to that
committed. A threat of future injury is insufficient. The compulsion must be of such a character as to leave no
opportunity for the accused to escape. The CA noted that the malefactors had a well-hatched plan to commit
the crime of robbery with homicide and that Z was not only well-aware of every detail thereof but likewise
actively participated in its commission. There was no genuine, imminent, and reasonable threat to his life and
his family as he was an active participant in the commission of the crime charged. He acted on his own free
will and was not under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear as he claims. He did not perform any overt act to
dissociate or detach himself from the conspiracy to commit the felony and prevent the commission thereof
(People v. Labuguen y Francisco, G.R. No. 223103, February 24, 2020, Hernando Case).
(54) Riding on a bicycle, V passed by the house of E who was repairing his tricycle. Three meters from the
house, V alighted, walked towards E and brought out a revolver. V poked E with the revolver and then
fired it, hitting the latter who took refuge behind D. V and D struggled for control of the gun and
accidentally fired and hit D in the thigh during the struggle. V again fired his gun two times hitting D
on his nape and back causing the latter to fall down. V was charged with homicide for the death of D.
On his part, V interposed the exempting circumstance of accident. Is V’s defense meritorious?
No, V could not relieve himself of criminal liability by invoking accident as a defense. The exempting
circumstance of accident contemplates a situation where a person is in fact in the act of doing something legal,
exercising due care, diligence and prudence, but in the process produces harm or injury to someone or to
something not in the least in the mind of the actor – an accidental result flowing out of a legal act. Accident
presupposes the lack of intention to commit the wrong done. Here, V’s acts were by no means lawful, being a
criminal assault with his revolver against both E and D. As there was intent to commit the killing, the defense
of accident must fail (Talampas v. People, G.R. No. 180219, November 23, 2011).
(55) AAA was on her way home from work when F approached and told her that B, AAA’s neighbor, wanted
to talk to her to offer her the position of treasurer in their fraternity, Junior-Senior Org. AAA refused
such offer. Thereafter, F and another fraternity member, M held her hands and forced her to go with
them to a nipa hut owned by B. While inside the nipa hut, AAA again refused the offer which led the
members of the fraternity to forcibly bring her to the cornfield nearby. There, B forcibly removed AAA’s
pants and forcibly entered his penis into her vagina. After B consummated his act, another fraternity
member, BBB, a 13-year old minor, raped AAA. B and BBB were charged with rape. B interposed the
defense that he has a mental age of a nine-year old and thus should be exempted from criminal
responsibility.
(a) May BBB be criminally charged with rape?
No, BBB may not be criminally charged because he is a child below the age of criminal responsibility. Sec. 6
of R.A. No. 9344 provides that a child fifteen (15) years of age or under at the time of the commission of the
offense shall be exempt from criminal liability. Pursuant to Sec. 20(a) of said Act, a child is deemed a neglected
child if he/she is above twelve (12) years of age up to fifteen (15) years of age and commits the crime of murder
or rape among others. Sec. 20(a) further provides that a neglected child shall be mandatorily placed in a special
facility within the Bahay Pag-asa called the Intensive Juvenile Intervention and Support Center (IJISC). Thus,
17
instead of being arraigned, BBB, who is deemed a neglected child, will be mandatorily committed to the IJISC
(People v. Balanza, G.R. No. 207943, September 11, 2017).
(b) May B avail of minority as a defense?
No, B may not be exempted from liability on the basis of minority. In determining the age for purposes of
exemption from criminal liability, Section 6 of R.A. No. 9344 as amended by R.A. No. 10630 clearly refers to
the age as determined by the anniversary of one’s birth date, and not the mental age as argued by B. Thus, B
is not a minor contemplated under R.A. No. 9344 as amended by R.A. No. 10630 and is not exempt from
criminal liability (People v. Roxas, G.R. No. 200793, June 4, 2014).
(56) AAA, 15 years old, testified that her classmates J, C and T (aged 15 years old and 11 months, 16 years
old and 17 years old, respectively) convinced her to go with them to the apartment of J’s aunt, where
they handed her a shot of liquor. After five to ten minutes from drinking the liquor, AAA started feeling
dizzy. As she was closing her eyes, AAA felt that she was being carried by J. Then, J proceeded to
lower her shorts while C and T were guarding the door. After successfully lowering AAA's shorts, J
went on top of her and raped her. After performing the deed, J invited C and T to take their turns. When
AAA regained her consciousness, she tried to escape but her ravishers blocked her way. J told AAA
not to report them and threatened to hurt AAA’s brother if she did. Suddenly, AAA’s brother knocked
on the door of the apartment causing J, C and T to run away. J, C and T were later convicted of rape.
On appeal, as a group of 15-17-year-olds, they interposed exemption from criminal liability claiming to
not have acted with discernment in the commission of the crime.
(a) Is their appeal meritorious?
No, as minors who have acted with discernment, J, C and T are not exempt from criminal liability. Under
Section 6 of R.A. No. 9344, the minor appellants herein, all above 15 years of age but under 18, shall only be
exempt from criminal liability if they did not act with discernment. Discernment is the mental capacity of a minor
to understand between right and wrong. Such capacity may be known and should be determined by taking into
consideration all the facts and circumstances afforded by the records in each case. Here, the acts of the
appellants of intoxicating their victim, guarding the door, blocking her escape, threatening her and running
away upon confrontation prove the presence of discernment. Thus, despite being minors above 15 but under
18 years old, they are not exempt from criminal liability for having acted with discernment (People v. Sisracon,
et al., G.R. No. 226494, February 14, 2018).
(b) Should their claim for exemption fail, are appellants entitled to the privileged mitigating circumstance
of minority?
Yes, they are so entitled. Pursuant to Article 68 (2) of the RPC, when the offender is over fifteen (15) and under
eighteen (18) years of age, the penalty next lower than that prescribed by law shall be imposed, but always in
the proper period (RPC, Art. 68, par. 2).
Mitigating Circumstances
(57) R filed a complaint for bigamy against her spouse A and D, whom A allegedly married despite the
subsistence of his first marriage with R. The following day, the trial court issued an order finding
probable cause and for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. In the afternoon of the same day, A learned
of such order and immediately surrendered to the court to file a motion for reduction of bail. During
the trial, A raised voluntary surrender as a mitigating circumstance. R opposed contending that A’s
surrender was involuntary as a warrant of arrest was already issued beforehand.
(a) What are the requisites for voluntary surrender to be appreciated as a mitigating circumstance?
For voluntary surrender to be appreciated, the following requisites should be present: (1) the offender has not
been actually arrested; (2) the offender surrendered himself to a person in authority or to the latter’s agent;
and (3) the surrender was voluntary. The essence of voluntary surrender is spontaneity and the intent of the
accused to give himself up and submit himself to the authorities either because he acknowledges his guilt or
he wishes to save the authorities the trouble and expense that may be incurred for his search and capture
(People v. Maglian, G.R. No. 189834, March 30, 2011).
(b) Is R’s contention correct? Explain.
18
No, R is incorrect because the mere issuance of a warrant of arrest will not automatically make the
surrender involuntary. In a case, the Supreme Court held that notwithstanding the pendency of a warrant
for his arrest, the accused may still be entitled to the mitigating circumstance in case he surrenders,
depending on the actual facts surrounding the very act of himself giving up (People v. Lozano, G.R. Nos.
137370-71, September 29, 2003). Here, the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender shall be
appreciated in favor of A because immediately upon learning that a warrant for his arrest was issued, and
without the same having served on him, he surrendered to the court (De Vera v. De Vera, G.R. No.
172832, April 7, 2009).
M was convicted for the murders of his aunt A and her live-in partner. Prior to A’s death, A alleged that it was
M who hit her on the head and set their house on fire. For his defense, M denied the allegation and argued
that he did not hit his aunt on the head nor did he set on fire. M contended that while he was watching their
house being engulfed by fire, the barangay tanod approached him and handcuffed him, to which he did not
resist. M further argued that the court erred in not considering in his favor the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender to the barangay tanod. Is the argument of M correct?
No. For voluntary surrender to mitigate the offense, the following elements must be present: (a) the
offender has not been actually arrested; (b) the offender surrendered himself to a person in authority;
and (c) the surrender must be voluntary. For a surrender to be voluntary, it must be spontaneous, that is,
there must be an intent to submit oneself to authorities, either because he acknowledges his guilt or
because he wishes to save them the trouble and expenses in capturing him. In this case, M did not
actually surrender. He simply did not offer any resistance when he was arrested. The mere fact that he
did not resist cannot be equated with voluntary surrender (People v. Mercado, G.R. No. 218702, October
17, 2018; People v. Mercado, G.R. No. 218702, October 17, 2018).
(58) P surreptitiously entered the house through the unlocked screen door, positioned himself behind B
and wrapped his left arm around B's neck then stabbed him with a knife in the chest. During trial, P
completely denied the narrative of the prosecution and claimed that the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender should be considered in his favor because when the barangay officials arrived, he
went with them peacefully and surrendered the knife used in stabbing the victim. Is the argument of P
correct?
P is not entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. The requisites for voluntary surrender
that: (a) the offender has not been actually arrested; (b) the offender surrendered himself to a person in
authority or the latter's agent; and (c) the surrender was voluntary, were not met. The facts established herein
parlay that the barangay authorities had to search for Perreira and go to the place where he fled to. Only then
was he arrested (People v. Perreira, G.R. No. 220749, January 20, 2021, Hernando Case).
(59) H was legally married to L. After 2 years, H left L for K. Since then, K and H lived as husband and wife.
One day, H saw K and his secretary, J, passionately kissing each other inside a bar. H got furious so
she took a knife from the counter and stabbed K which caused his death. H was prosecuted for
homicide. H claims that she is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of passion or obfuscation as she
was driven by jealousy when she stabbed K. Is H correct? Explain.
No, H is incorrect because passion or obfuscation is not mitigating when the relations between the parties are
illegitimate. The mitigating circumstance cannot be considered in favor of an accused when the relationship
between him and the deceased is illicit because the causes which mitigate criminal responsibility for the loss
of self-control are such which originate from legitimate feelings, and not those which arises from vicious,
unworthy and immoral passions (People v. Visagar, G.R. No. L-5384, June 12, 1953, citing U.S. v. Hicks, 14
Phil., 217). Since H was still lawfully married to L at the time that she attacked K, her relationship with K cannot
be considered legitimate thereby denying the application of the mitigating circumstance of passion and
obfuscation (People v. Olgado, G.R. No. L-4406, March 31, 1952).
Aggravating Circumstances
(60) B and his nephew, X, were outside the former’s house and were taunting each other. X punched B who
failed to retaliate. R, the brother of X, suddenly emerged and without warning stabbed B three times
with a knife on his left forearm, middle of his chest, and at his stomach. B died while in surgery. R
admitted that he stabbed and killed B to defend himself. The court found R guilty of murder and held
that there was treachery when he suddenly and unexpectedly attacked B. Is treachery present?
19
No. There is treachery when the offender commits any crimes against persons, employing means and methods
or forms which tend to directly and specially ensure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the
defense which the offended party might make. To qualify, the following conditions must be met: a) the assailant
employed means, methods or forms in the execution of the criminal act which give the victim no opportunity to
defend himself or retaliate; and b) said means, methods or forms were deliberately or consciously adopted by
the assailant. In this case, treachery is not present. It does not always follow that if the attack was sudden and
unexpected, it should necessarily be deemed as an attack attended with treachery. The wounds of B show
that the attack was frontal which indicates that the latter was not totally deprived of the opportunity to defend
himself. In the absence of treachery, R is only liable for homicide and not murder (People v. Gonzales, G.R.
No. 218946, September 5, 2018)
(61) What are the circumstances absorbed by treachery?
The circumstances absorbed by treachery are as follows:
1. There is an abuse of superior strength in committing murder but such should be considered as absorbed in
treachery (People v. Layson, G.R. No. L-25177, October 31, 1969; People v. Kalipayan, G.R. No. 229829,
January 22, 2018);’
2. The aggravating circumstance of nighttime is absorbed by treachery if it facilitated the treacherous attack
(People v. Costales, G.R. No. 141154-56, January 15, 2002);
Exception: When nighttime is not absorbed by the aggravating circumstance of treachery — Inasmuch as the
treachery consisted in the fact that the victims’ hands were tied at the time they were beaten, the circumstance
of nighttime is not absorbed in treachery, but can be perceived distinctly therefrom, since the treachery rests
upon an independent factual basis. A special case therefore is present to which the rule that nighttime is
absorbed in treachery does not apply (People vs. Ong, G.R. No. L-34497 January 30, 1975).
3. Craft;
Exception: When craft was employed not with a view to making treachery more effective as nighttime and
abuse of superior strength would result in the killing of the victim (People v. San Pedro, G.R. No. L-44274,
January 22, 1980).
4. Aid of Armed Men;
5. Cuadrilla (band) (People v. Ampo-an, G.R. No. 75366. July 4, 1990); and
6. Employing means to weaken the defense (Reyes, Book One, supra at 470).
(62) Several members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, with high-powered weapons, had abandoned
their places of assignment. Their aim was to destabilize the government. They disarmed the security
of a hotel and planted explosive devices around the building. When arrested, the RTC charged them
with the crime of coup d’etat under the RPC. However, the court martial, pursuant to Article 96 of the
Articles of War, ordered their arrest and detention. On appeal, the accused argued that the violation of
Art. 96 of the Articles of War has been absorbed by the RTC in the crime of coup d’etat. Will the
contention of the accused prosper?
No. The doctrine of absorption of crimes is peculiar to criminal law and applies only to crimes punished by the
same statute. In this case, the RTC erred in absorbing the violation of Art. 96 of the Articles of War in the crime
of coup d’etat, which is governed by a different statute, the RPC (Gonzales v. Abaya, G.R. No. 164007, August
10, 2006).
(63) At a first meeting in hatching a plan to rob the spouses G and H inside their home, accused A, B, E, F
were present. At the second meeting, C and D attended the planning meeting. In both cases, the plan
did not push through. Subsequently, E was informed by A, B, and D, that they would push through
with their plan that night. They hogtied H and grabbed all the valuable items they could carry.
Thereafter, they stabbed G to death, hogtied E, to make it appear that she had no part in the robbery,
and exited the house.
In the testimony of state witness J, it was D who hired him to ferry them to where G was living for the
plan out of the robbery and with instructions to kill her master. He also testified that he was hired by
the same company on the evening of the crime and saw them going towards the victims’ house. Lastly,
he testified that it was D who paid him for the use of his motorcycle two days after the commission of
the crime. May evident premeditation be considered an aggravating circumstance in the present case
for complex crime of Robbery with Homicide?
20
Yes, evident premeditation may be appreciated in the special complex crime of robbery with homicide. While
it was previously ruled that the circumstance of evident premeditation is inherent in robbery, it is not inherent
in the special complex crime of robbery with homicide. However, it may be considered in the special complex
crime of robbery with Homicide if there is premeditation to kill besides stealing. To warrant a finding of evident
premeditation, it must appear not only that the accused decided to commit the crime prior to the moment of its
execution, but also that such decision was the result of "meditation, calculation, reflection, or persistent
attempt."
Here, the persistent attempts made by the accused sufficiently demonstrate how determined they were to
adhere to their agreement despite the sufficient lapse of time. Moreover, that D and his cohorts went to great
lengths to hire J to ferry them back and forth to the scene of the crime shows the sobriety and circumspection
surrounding their decision. Such circumstances show that the crime committed was a product of intent and
coordination among the accused. Hence, the accused-appellant conspired with co-accused in the commission
of the said crime attended by evident premeditation (People v. Olazo, G.R. No. 220761, October 3, 2016).
(64) A and V occupied adjacent apartments, each being a separate dwelling unit of one big house. A
suspected his wife of having an illicit relation with V. One afternoon, A saw V and his wife together on
board a vehicle. At 10 o’clock in the evening of the same day, A went to bed and tried to sleep, but
being so annoyed over the suspected relation between his wife and V, he could not sleep. After thirty
(30) minutes, A resolved to kill V. He rose from bed and took hold of a knife. He entered the apartment
of V through an unlocked window. Inside, he saw V soundly asleep. He thereupon stabbed V, inflicting
several wounds, which caused his death within a few hours. Would you say that the killing was
attended by the qualifying or aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation, treachery,
nighttime, dwelling and unlawful entry?
Evident premeditation cannot be considered against A because he resolved to kill V just after thirty minutes
and there was no sufficient lapse of time between the determination and execution, to allow his conscience to
overcome the resolution of his will. The essence of premeditation is that the execution of the criminal act was
preceded by cool thought and reflection upon the resolution to carry out the criminal intent during a space of
time sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment (People v. Ducabo, G.R. No. 175594, September 28, 2007).
Treachery is present because A stabbed V while the latter was sound asleep. Treachery under paragraph 16
of Article 14 of the RPC is defined as the deliberate employment of means, methods, or forms in the execution
of a crime against persons which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to the offender
arising from the defense which the intended victim might raise (People v. Tubongbanua, G.R. No. 171271,
August 31, 2006).
Nighttime cannot be appreciated because there is no showing that A deliberately sought or availed of nighttime
to insure the success of his act. The intention to commit the crime was conceived shortly before its commission
(People v. Pardo, G.R. No. L-562, November 19, 1947). Moreover, nighttime is absorbed in treachery.
Dwelling may also be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance. It must be a building or structure,
exclusively used for rest and comfort. He who goes to another's house to hurt him or do him wrong is more
guilty than he who offends him elsewhere (People v. Belo, G.R. No. 109148, December 4, 1998). Here, A and
V live in separate apartment units and the attack happened inside the dwelling of V.
Unlawful entry may be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance, inasmuch as A entered the room of V
through the window, which is not the proper place for entrance into the house (RPC, Art. 14. par. 18; People
v. Baruga, G.R. No. L-42744, March 27, 1935).
(65) N was selling halo-halo outside her mother’s (V) store. At that time, V was inside her store cradling N’s
18-month-old daughter, AAA, in a blanket with its ends tied behind her back. Moments later, J, live-in
partner of N, standing 5’10” and with heavy build, entered the store and an argument ensued between
him and V. Apparently, J was asking V why N had not answered his calls. V responded by telling J not
to create trouble. Thereafter, N heard V moaning as if her mouth was being covered. N immediately ran
inside the store where she saw J stab V twice. Is the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior
strength attendant in this case?
Yes, the facts show that J abused his superiority when he stabbed V. The circumstance of abuse of superior
strength is present whenever there is inequality of forces between the victim and the aggressor, assuming a
situation of superiority of strength notoriously advantageous for the aggressor, and the latter takes advantage
of it in the commission of the crime. The appreciation of the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior
strength depends on the age, size, and strength of the parties. In this case, it was sufficiently shown that J was
of heavy build, stood at 5'10", and armed with a knife, while V was then burdened by a child and had no means
21
to defend and repel the attacks of her assailant. Clearly, J abused his superiority afforded him by his sex,
height, and build and a weapon when he attacked V who was then carrying a child (People v. Mat-an, G.R.
No. 215720, February 21, 2018).
(66) M confronted D, and asked, "ano bang pinagsasasabi mo?" D replied "wala," and without warning, M
delivered a fist blow hitting D on the left cheek and causing him to teeter backwards. M then pulled out
his gun and frontally shot D, who fell face-first on the pavement. While D remained in that position, M
shot him several more times leading to his death. M was prosecuted for murder since it was alleged
that treachery attended the killing of D. M contends that there was no treachery because he shot D
during their face-to-face confrontation. Do you agree with M?
I disagree with M. Although the attack was frontal, the sudden and unexpected manner by which it was made
rendered it impossible for D to defend himself. There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes
against persons, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend to directly and
specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might
make. M, who was armed with a gun, confronted D, and without any provocation, punched and shot him. The
heated exchange of words that preceded the incident was insufficient to forewarn D against any impending
attack from his assailant. Thus, the frontal attack made by M does not negate the presence of treachery (People
v. Matibag, G.R. No. 206381, March 25, 2015).
(67) When is the use of a loose firearm considered an aggravating circumstance?
If the use of a loose firearm is inherent in the commission of a crime punishable under the RPC or other special
laws – the use of loose firearm is an aggravating circumstance, subject to the following conditions:
1. If the crime committed with the use of a loose firearm is penalized by the law with a maximum penalty
which is lower than that prescribed for illegal possession of firearm, the penalty for illegal
possession of firearm shall be imposed in lieu of the penalty for the crime charged;
2. If the crime committed with the use of a loose firearm is penalized by the law with a maximum penalty
which is equal to that imposed for illegal possession of firearms, the penalty of prision mayor in its
minimum period shall be imposed in addition to the penalty for the crime punishable under the RPC
or other special laws of which he/she is found guilty.
However, if the violation is in furtherance of, or incident to, or in connection with the crime of rebellion of
insurrection, or attempted coup d’ etat, such violation shall be absorbed as an element of the crime of
rebellion or insurrection, or attempted coup d’ etat (R.A. No. 10591, Sec. 29).
Note: There are two requisites to establish such aggravating circumstance, namely: (a) the existence of the
subject firearm; and (b) the fact that the accused, who owned or possessed the gun, did not have the
corresponding license or permit to carry it outside their residence. The onus probandi of establishing these
elements as alleged in the information lies with the prosecution. In case of failure to do so, the Court cannot
simply appreciate the use of an unlicensed firearm as an aggravating circumstance (Ramos, et. al. v. People,
G.R. No. 218466, January 23, 2017).
Alternative Circumstances
a.
A failed to read the label of his drink and did not notice that it was alcoholic. He became
intoxicated after drinking it. After returning home, he argued with B, his wife, and while
intoxicated, he punched and kicked her in the abdomen, which led these actions to his wife’s
untimely death. Is the alternative circumstance of intoxication aggravating or mitigating in the
case at bar?
The intoxication is mitigating. Intoxication is mitigating if it is not habitual or if such intoxication is not subsequent
to the plan to commit a felony (RPC, Art. 15). In the case at bar, A’s intoxication was inadvertent. As such, A’s
commission of the offense while in the state of intoxication is to be appreciated as a mitigating circumstance
(People v. Mat-an, G.R. No. 215720, February 21, 2018).
Note: For violations of RA 9262, being under the influence of alcohol, any illicit drug, or any other mind-altering
substance shall not be a defense (R.A. No. 9262, Sec. 27).
Absolutory Causes
22
(68) W is the son-in-law of M who owns several pieces of real property. In 2014, W's wife, Anita, died. In
2016, W caused the preparation of a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) giving him the authority to sell a
parcel of land registered in the name of M. The signature of M in the SPA was forged and, through this
forged SPA and without the consent and knowledge of M, W succeeded in selling the parcel for
Php2,000,000. He pocketed the proceeds of the sale. M eventually discovered W's misdeeds and filed
a criminal complaint. W was subsequently charged with estafa through falsification of public
document. May W successfully invoke the absolutory cause of relationship by affinity under Art. 332
of the RPC? (Modified 2013 Bar)
No, W may not be absolved from criminal liability because the absolutory cause under Art. 332 of the RPC
exclusively applies to theft, swindling and malicious mischief. All other crimes, whether simple or complex, are
not affected by the absolutory cause provided by said provision. Here, the crime of estafa was a component
crime in the complex crime of estafa through falsification of public document. To apply the absolutory cause
under Art. 332 to one of the component crimes of a complex crime for the purpose of negating the existence
of that complex crime is to unduly expand the scope of said article (Intestate Estate of Vda. de Carungcong v.
People, G.R. No. 181409, February 11, 2010).
(69) A is the legitimate wife of M. One night, M killed A with the use of a knife. M invoked Article 247 of the
RPC. He claimed that he saw his wife and a man seated beside each other conversing. Furious by what
he had seen, M went out of the room, got a knife, and delivered a stab blow towards the man but the
latter was shielded by A. May M be absolved of the criminal liability based on Article 247?
No, M may not be absolved because Article 247 necessitates the proof that the accused killed his wife and her
paramour in the act of sexual intercourse or immediately thereafter. Here, M disclosed that he saw A and a
man just seated beside each other and were simply talking. Evidently, the absolutory cause embodied in Article
247 is not applicable in the present case (People v. Macal, G. R. No. 211062, January 13, 2016).
(70) Give examples of Absolutory Causes. (DELIMA2FT2)
The examples of absolutory causes are as follows:
1. Spontaneous Desistance in the attempted stage unless the overt act committed already constitutes a crime
other than that intended (RPC, Art. 6(3));
2. Death and slight or less serious physical injuries inflicted under Exceptional circumstances (RPC, Art. 247);
3. Attempted or frustrated Light felonies except those against persons or property (RPC, Art. 7);
4. Instigation by reason of public policy;
5. Marriage of the offender and the offended party in cases of seduction, abduction, acts of lasciviousness and
rape (RPC, Art. 344);
6. Accessories who are exempt from criminal liability by reason or relationship (Art. 20) and in light felonies
(RPC, Art. 16);
7. Adultery and concubinage if the offended party shall have consented or pardoned the offenders (RPC, Art.
344);
8. Forgiveness by the offended party in marital rape (RPC, Art. 344);
9. Certain relatives are exempt from criminal liability for Theft, swindling and malicious mischief under Art. 332
(RPC, Art. 332); and
10.
Trespass to dwelling when the purpose of entering another’s dwelling against the latter’s will is to
prevent some serious harm to himself, the occupants of the dwelling or a third person, or for the purpose of
rendering some service to humanity or justice, or when entering cafes, taverns, inns and other public houses,
while the same are open (Art. 280, par. 3; BOADO, Notes and Cases on the Revised Penal Code, Books 1
and 2 and Special Penal Laws, (2018), p. 97).
(71) Distinguish Instigation from Entrapment.
The distinctions between instigation and entrapment are as follows:
1. As to nature, instigation is the means by which the accused is lured into the commission of the offense
charged in order to prosecute him. On the other hand, entrapment is the employment of such ways and
means for the purpose of trapping or capturing a lawbreaker;
2. As to the source of criminal intent, in instigation, officers of the law or their agents incite, induce, instigate
or lure an accused into committing an offense which he or she would otherwise not commit and has no
intention of committing. While in entrapment, the criminal intent or design to commit the offense charged
originates in the mind of the accused, and law enforcement officials merely facilitate the apprehension of the
criminal by employing ruses and schemes; thus, the accused cannot justify his or her conduct; and
3. As to exemption from criminal liability of the accused, in instigation, where law enforcers act as coprincipals, the accused will have to be acquitted. While entrapment cannot bar prosecution and conviction
(People v. Bartolome, G.R. No. 191726, February 6, 2013).
23
(72) The NBI received a report that A was involved in prostituting women, some of whom were minors.
Special Investigator H decided to proceed with an entrapment operation and prepared entrapment
money. Two NBI agents acted as poseur-customers and proceeded to the hotel where they were met
by A together with the alleged prostitutes. When the poseur-customers handed the entrapment money
to A, the rest of the team proceeded with the rescue operation. A was arrested and was charged with
the crime of violation of R.A. No. 9208 or Trafficking in Person. B, C and D, the minors, testified that A
employed them as prostitutes. On appeal, A interposed the defense of instigation, alleging that he was
forced by the NBI agents to commit the crime. Will the argument of A prosper? What is the difference
between instigation and entrapment?
No. The argument of A will not prosper because there is no instigation in this case but mere entrapment. The
use of entrapment by law enforcement officers as means to arrest wrongdoers is an accepted practice. In this
case, the minors even testified that A has been involved in trafficking of persons prior to the entrapment
operation. The NBI agent did not induce A to procure the prostitutes.
The difference between an instigation and entrapment is that an instigation is the means by which the accused
is lured into the commission of the offense charged in order to prosecute him. On the other hand, entrapment
is the employment of such ways and means for the purpose of trapping or capturing a lawbreaker. Thus, in
instigation, the law officers or their agents incite, induce, instigate or lure an accused into committing an offense
which he or she would otherwise not commit and has no intention of committing. However, in entrapment, the
criminal intent or design to commit the offense charged originates in the mind of the accused, and law enforcers
merely facilitate the apprehension of the criminal by employing ruses and schemes (People v. Amurao, G.R.
No. 229514, July 28, 2020).
PERSONS LIABLE AND DEGREE OF PARTICIPATION
Principals, Accomplices, and Accessories
(73) Distinguish an accomplice from a conspirator as to their knowledge of the criminal design of the
principal, their participation, the penalty to be imposed in relation to the penalty for the principal, and
the requisites/elements to be established by the prosecution in order to hold them criminally
responsible for their respective roles in the commission of the crime. (2012 Bar)
The distinctions between a conspirator and an accomplice are as follows:
1. As to knowledge of the principal’s criminal design – Conspirators and accomplices have one thing in
common – they know and agree with the criminal design. Conspirators, on the other hand, know the criminal
intention because they have collectively decided upon such course of action. Accomplices come to know
about it after the principals have reached the decision, and only then do they agree to cooperate in its
execution. Conspirators decide that a crime should be committed; accomplices merely concur in it.
2. As to their participation – A conspirator authors the commission of the crime; whereas, an accomplice is
a mere instrument who performs acts which are not indispensable, previous or simultaneous, to the
commission of the crime.
3. As to the penalty to be imposed – The penalty to be imposed on a conspirator is of the same degree as
that of the principal; whereas, the penalty to be imposed on an accomplice is one degree lower than that of
the principal.
4. As to the elements to be established by the prosecution – To convict one as a conspirator, the elements
are: (i) that two or more persons come to an agreement; (ii) that the agreement concerns the commission of
felony; and (iii) that these persons decide to commit the felony; whereas, the elements to be proved to convict
one as an accomplice are: (i) that there is a community of design between the principal and the accomplice;
(ii) that the accomplice performs previous or simultaneous acts that are not indispensable to the commission
of the crime; and (iii) that the acts performed by an accomplice are related to those of the principal (People
v. De Vera, G.R. No. 128966, August 18, 1999).
(74) M and A are brothers. Sometime in August 1998, while A was in his office, M, together with two other
men in police uniform, came with two heavy bags. M asked A to keep the two bags in his vault until he
comes back to get them. When A later examined the two bags, he saw bundles of money that, in his
rough count, could not be less than Php5 Million. He kept the money inside the vault and soon he heard
the news that a gang that included M had been engaged in bank robberies. A, unsure of what to do
under the circumstances, kept quiet about the two bags in his vault. Soon after, the police captured,
and secured a confession from, M who admitted that their loot had been deposited with A. What is A's
liability? (2013 Bar)
A is not criminally liable. To be criminally liable as an accessory under Article 19 of the Code, one must have
knowledge of the commission of the crime. He is not liable as an accessory because he has no knowledge of
24
the commission of the crime of robbery. The facts stated would show lack or absence of intent to conceal the
effects of the crime as he was unsure of what to do under the circumstances. Moreover, assuming arguendo
that his act would amount to that of an accessory (i.e. concealing the body of the crime or the effects or
instruments thereof to prevent its discovery under Article 19, par. 2, RPC), he is still exempted from criminal
liability, being the brother of M (RPC, Art. 20).
(75) Coming home from a dance event, J and T, together with two girls, were intercepted by E and S. S
immediately went behind J and embraced him with both hands while he struggled in vain. Facing the
hapless J, E got his knife and thrusted it at the right side of J’s body, just below his navel. E and S fled
and disappeared in the dark. "May tama ako," were the words uttered by J just before he fell to the
ground and died. What is S’s criminal liability?
S is a principal by indispensable cooperation. There can be no question that his act in holding the victim from
behind immediately before the latter was stabbed by E constitutes a positive and an overt act towards the
realization of a common criminal intent, although the intent may be classified as instantaneous. The requisites
for criminal liability Article 17, par. 3 are: (a) participation in the criminal resolution, i.e. there is either anterior
conspiracy or unity of criminal purpose and intention immediately before or simultaneously with the commission
of the crime charged; and (b) cooperation in the commission of the offense by performing another act without
which it would not have been accomplished. The appellant's voluntary and indispensable cooperation was a
concurrence of the criminal act to be executed. Consequently, he is a co-conspirator by indispensable
cooperation, although the common desire or purpose was never bottled up by a previous undertaking (People
v. Guevarra y Papasin, G.R. No. 65017, November 13, 1989).
(76) Ferdie was admitted as a probationary midshipman at the PMMA. In order to reach active status, all
new entrants were required to successfully complete the mandatory "Indoctrination and Orientation
Period," which was set from May 2 to June 1, 2001. Ferdie died on May 3, 2001. Several people were
charged as principals to the crime of hazing. Some school authorities were also charged as
accomplices to the crime in a separate case. Upon acquittal of those charged as principals, the school
authorities contended that there being no more principals with whom they could have cooperated in
the execution of the offense, the case against them must be dismissed. Is the contention meritorious?
No, the contention is untenable. It is a settled rule that the case against those charged as accomplices is not
ipso facto dismissed in the absence of trial of the purported principals; the dismissal of the case against the
latter; or even the latter's acquittal, especially when the occurrence of the crime has in fact been established.
As long as the commission of the offense can be duly established in evidence, the determination of the liability
of the accomplice or accessory can proceed independently of that of the principal (People v. Bayabos, G.R.
Nos. 171222 & 174786, February 18, 2015). Moreover by express provision of law, school authorities including
faculty members who consent to the hazing or who have actual knowledge thereof, but failed to take any action
to prevent the same from occurring shall be punished as accomplices for the acts of hazing committed by the
perpetrators (R.A. No. 11053, Sec. 14, amending R.A. No. 8049, Sec. 4).
Conspiracy and Proposal
Conspiracy
(77) Define conspiracy.
There is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony
and decide to commit it (RPC, Art. 8). The essence of conspiracy is the unity of action and purpose. Conspiracy
requires the same degree of proof required to establish the crime — proof beyond reasonable doubt (People
v. Gimpaya, G.R. No. 227395, January 10, 2018).
(78) Differentiate and illustrate Wheel Conspiracy and Chain Conspiracy. (2016, 2017 Bar)
The wheel conspiracy occurs when there is a single person or group (the hub) dealing individually with two or
more other persons or groups (the spokes). The spoke typically interacts with the hub rather than with another
spoke. In the 2002 case of Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, Former President Estrada was the hub while the spokes
were all the other accused individuals. The rim that enclosed the spokes was the common goal in the overall
conspiracy, i.e., the amassing, accumulation and acquisition of ill-gotten wealth (Macapagal-Arroyo v. People,
G.R. Nos. 220598 & 220953, July 19, 2016).
The chain conspiracy recognized in Estrada v. Sandiganbayan involves individuals linked together in a vertical
chain to achieve a criminal objective. Illustrative of chain conspiracy usually involves the distribution of
narcotics or other contraband, in which there is successive communication and cooperation in much the same
way as with legitimate business operations between manufacturer and wholesaler, then wholesaler and
25
retailer, and then retailer and consumer (Macapagal-Arroyo v. People, G.R. Nos. 220598 & 220953, July 19,
2016).
(79) X is the part time driver and neighbor of A. One day, X overheard that A received a broker's commission
in the sale of a fishpond. X informed Y and Z of such commission and plotted a robbery after inducing
them. The following day, Y and Z robbed the house of A and his wife, B. They demanded jewelry and
cash that A earned from the sale of the fishpond. Further, the robbers carted off the television sets,
Sony Betamax sets, Karaoke, compact disc, assorted pieces of jewelry, VHS player and cash. The said
stolen items were loaded in the couple’s stainless owner type jeep. Y and Z were identified, and
circumstances linked them to X. Upon further investigation, it was found out that X sold the jeep to a
third person and the Betamax stolen from A and B was found in X’s nipa hut. X was charged with
robbery under Article 294, par. 5, and violation of the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972. He contends that
there is no conspiracy between him and Y and Z as there is failure to establish his actual participation
in the commission of the crimes charged. Decide.
X is incorrect. Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission
of a crime and decide to commit it. For an accused to be validly held to conspire with his co-accused in
committing the crimes, his overt acts must tend to execute the offense agreed upon, for the merely passive
conspirator cannot be held to be still part of the conspiracy without such overt acts, unless such passive
conspirator is the mastermind. Conspiracy can also be deduced from the mode and manner in which the
offense is perpetrated or can be inferred from the acts of the several accused evincing their joint or common
purpose and design, concerted action and community of interest. Here, the fact that X directly induced Y and
Z to commit the crimes made him the mastermind. Thus, despite the absence of his active participation in the
commission of the crimes charged, X, being the mastermind, is liable as a co-conspirator (Chua v. People,
G.R. No. 172193, September 13, 2017).
(80) How may conspiracy be proved?
Direct proof is not essential to prove conspiracy for it may be deduced from the acts of the accused before,
during and after the commission of the crime charged, from which it may be indicated that there is a common
purpose to commit the crime. It is not sufficient, however, that the attack be joint and simultaneous for
simultaneousness does not of itself demonstrate the concurrence of will or unity of action and purpose which
are the bases of the responsibility of the assailants. It is necessary that the assailants be animated by one and
the same purpose (People v. Gimpaya, G.R. No. 227395, January 10, 2018).
The existence of conspiracy need not, at all times, be established by direct evidence; nor is it necessary to
prove prior agreement between the accused to commit the crime charged. Thus, the rule is well-settled that
conspiracy may be inferred from the conduct of the accused before, during and after the commission of the
crime, where such conduct reasonably shows community of criminal purpose or design (People v. Padilla,
G.R. No. 247824, February 23, 2022, Hernando Case).
Proposal to Commit a Felony
(81) How is proposal to commit a felony done?
It is committed when the person who has decided to commit a felony proposes its execution to some other
person or persons (RPC, Art. 8, Par. (1)).
(82) What crimes are punishable by mere proposal of its commission?
The mere proposal of treason, rebellion, insurrection and coup d’ etat is punishable (REYES, Book One, supra
at 140).
(83) When is proposal to commit a felony not punishable?
1. The person who proposes is not determined to commit the felony;
2. There is no decided, concrete, and formal proposal but a mere suggestion; and
3. It is not the execution of a felony that is proposed (Id. at 141).
Multiple Offenses (Differences, Rules, Effects)
26
Recidivism
(Art. 14, par. 9)
Reiteracion
(Art. 14, par. 10)
Quasi-Recidivism
(Art. 160)
Habitual Delinquency
(Art. 62, par. 5)
As to Crime Committed
It is sufficient that the
accused, on the date of the
trial, shall have been
previously convicted by final
judgment of another crime
embraced in the same title of
the Revised Penal Code .
The
previous
and
subsequent offenses need
not be be embraced in the
same title of the Code.
Nature of previous crime is
immaterial but the present
crime must be a felony.
The crimes are specified.
These are serious or less
serious physical injuries,
robbery, theft, estafa, or
falsification.
As to Period of Time the Crimes are Committed
No period of time between
the former conviction and
the last conviction is fixed by
law.
Accused committed the
present
crime
AFTER
serving
sentence
for
previous crime.
Accused committed the
present crime BEFORE
beginning to serve OR
WHILE serving sentence for
previous crime.
The offender is found guilty
within ten (10) years from
his last release or last
conviction.
As to Number of Crimes Committed
The second conviction for an
offense embraced in the
same title of the RPC is
sufficient.
At least two (2) crimes are
committed but if penalty for a
previous crime is lighter than
the present crime, then there
must be at least three (3)
crimes.
At least two (2) crimes are
committed.
The accused must be found
guilty the third time or more
of any of the crimes
specified.
As to Effects on Penalties
If not offset by a mitigating
circumstance, serves to
increase the penalty only to
the maximum.
If not offset by a mitigating
circumstance, serves to
increase the penalty only to
the maximum.
Presence of this will require
application of penalty for
present crime in MAXIMUM
period,
regardless
of
mitigating circumstances.
An additional penalty is also
imposed.
Decree Penalizing Obstruction of Apprehension and Prosecution of Criminal
Offenders (PD 1829)
(84) What are the crimes punishable under PD 1829?
Any person who knowingly or willfully obstructs, impedes, frustrates or delays the apprehension of suspects
and the investigation and prosecution of criminal cases by committing any of the following acts (PAC-FDPATM):
1. Preventing witnesses from testifying in any criminal proceeding or from reporting the commission of any
offense or the identity of any offender/s by means of bribery, misrepresentation, deceit, intimidation, force or
threats;
2. Altering, destroying, suppressing or concealing any paper, record, document, or object, with intent to impair
its verity, authenticity, legibility, availability, or admissibility as evidence in any investigation of or official
proceedings in, criminal cases, or to be used in the investigation of, or official proceedings in, criminal cases;
3. Harboring or Concealing, or facilitating the escape of, any person he knows, or has reasonable ground to
believe or suspect, has committed any offense under existing penal laws in order to prevent his arrest
prosecution and conviction;
4. Publicly using a Fictitious name for the purpose of concealing a crime, evading prosecution or the execution
of a judgment, or concealing his true name and other personal circumstances for the same purpose or
purposes;
5. Delaying the prosecution of criminal cases by obstructing the service of process or court orders or disturbing
proceedings in the fiscal's offices, in Tanodbayan, or in the courts;
27
6. Making, Presenting or using any record, document, paper or object with knowledge of its falsity and with
intent to affect the course or outcome of the investigation of, or official proceedings in, criminal cases;
7. Soliciting, Accepting, or agreeing to accept any benefit in consideration of abstaining from, discounting, or
impeding the prosecution of a criminal offender;
8. Threatening directly or indirectly another with the infliction of any wrong upon his person, honor or property
or that of any immediate member or members of his family in order to prevent such person from appearing
in the investigation of, or official proceedings in, criminal cases, or imposing a condition, whether lawful or
unlawful, in order to prevent a person from appearing in the investigation of or in official proceedings in,
criminal cases;
9. Giving of false or fabricated information to Mislead or prevent the law enforcement agencies from
apprehending the offender or from protecting the life or property of the victim; or fabricating information from
the data gathered in confidence by investigating authorities for purposes of background information and not
for publication and publishing or disseminating the same to mislead the investigator or to the court (P.D. No.
1829, Sec. 1).
(85) May the offenses under PD 1829 be qualified?
Yes. If any of the foregoing acts is committed by a public official or employee, he shall in addition to the
penalties provided thereunder, suffer perpetual disqualification from holding public office (P.D. No. 1829, Sec.
2).
C.
PENALTIES
IMPOSABLE PENALTIES
(86)
What are the Constitutional restrictions on the imposition of penalties?
1.
2.
Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment inflicted. Neither
shall the death penalty be imposed, unless, for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the
Congress hereafter provides for it. Any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion
perpetua (CONST. Art. III, Sec. 19, par. 1).
The employment of physical, psychological, or degrading punishment against any prisoner or
detainee or the use of substandard or inadequate penal facilities under subhuman conditions shall
be dealt with by law (CONST. Art. III, Sec. 19, par. 2).
CLASSIFICATION
(87) How are penalties classified as to gravity?
Classification
Penalty
Capital
Death
Afflictive
Reclusion perpetua
Reclusion temporal
Perpetual or temporary absolute disqualification
Perpetual or temporary special disqualification
Prision mayor
Correctional
Prision correccional
Arresto mayor
Suspension
Destierro
Light
Arresto menor
Public Censure
28
DURATION AND EFFECTS
(88) Enumerate the duration of penalties under the RPC.
Reclusion Perpetua – Forty (40) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years
Reclusion Temporal – Twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years
Prison Mayor – Six (6) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years
Temporary Disqualification – Six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years, except when
disqualification is accessory, in which case its duration is that of the principal penalty
5. Prision Correccional – Six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years
6. Suspension – Six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years, except when disqualification is accessory, in
which case its duration is that of the principal penalty
7. Destierro – Six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years
8. Arresto Mayor – One (1) month and one (1) day to six (6) months
9. Arresto Menor – One (1) day to thirty (30) days
10. Bond to Keep the Peace – The period during which the bond shall be effective is discretionary on the court
(RPC, Art. 27).
1.
2.
3.
4.
(89) What are the cases when destierro is imposed?
1.
2.
3.
4.
The following are the cases when destierro is imposed: (SBCR)
Serious physical injuries or death under exceptional circumstances (RPC, Art. 247);
In case of failure to give Bond for good behavior (RPC, Art. 284);
As a penalty for the Concubine in concubinage (RPC, Art. 334); or
In cases where after Reducing the penalty by one or more degrees, destierro is the proper penalty
(REYES, Book One, supra at 625).
(90) Distinguish reclusion perpetua from life imprisonment.
1.
2.
3.
As to Where Imposable – reclusion perpetua is imposable on felonies punished by the RPC whereas life
imprisonment is imposable on crimes punishable by special laws.
As to Duration – reclusion perpetua has a specific duration of twenty (20) years and one (1) day to forty
(40) years whereas life imprisonment has no definite term.
As to Accessory Penalty – reclusion perpetua carries with it accessory penalties whereas life imprisonment
does not carry with it accessory penalties (ESTRADA: Criminal Law: Book One of the RPC: Made Easy for
Students, Examinees & Practitioners (2008), p. 241).
(91) Distinguish a privileged mitigating circumstance from an ordinary mitigating circumstance as to
reduction of penalty and offsetting against aggravating circumstance/s.
The distinctions between ordinary and privileged mitigating circumstances are as follows:
As to Reduction of Penalty – the presence of an ordinary mitigating circumstance, if not offset by an
aggravating circumstance, has the effect of applying the divisible penalty in its minimum period (RPC, Art.
64). Under the rules on graduation of penalty, the presence of privileged mitigating circumstance has the
effect of lowering the penalty by one or two degrees (RPC, Arts. 68 and 69).
2. As to Offsetting – an ordinary mitigating circumstance can be offset against a generic aggravating
circumstance while privileged mitigating cannot be offset by any aggravating circumstance (People v.
Takbobo, G.R. No. 102984 (Resolution), June 30, 1993).
1.
(92) What is the rule when there are two or more penalties to be served by the culprit?
Under Article 70 of the RPC, when the culprit has to serve two or more penalties, they shall serve them
simultaneously if the nature of the penalties will so permit. Otherwise, the order of their severity (under this
article) shall be followed – so that they may be executed successively (RPC, Art. 70).
(93) What are the penalties that may be served simultaneously with imprisonment?
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
The penalties which may be served simultaneously with imprisonment are:
Perpetual or temporary absolute disqualification;
Perpetual or temporary special disqualification;
Public censure;
Suspension from public office; and
Other accessory penalties (Rodriguez v. Director of Prisons, G.R. No. L-35386, September 28, 1972).
(94) A hit his wife B with a maso after seeing the latter kiss another man. He voluntarily went with the
officers to the police station. B was rushed to the hospital but died the next day. The trial court
29
convicted A of parricide, imposing on him the penalty of reclusion perpetua, without appreciating any
of the claimed mitigating circumstance of passion, obfuscation, and voluntary surrender. On appeal,
the Court of Appeals appreciated one mitigating circumstance but held that the penalty imposed was
correct. Was the imposition of the penalty proper?
Yes. The crime of parricide is punishable by two indivisible penalties of reclusion perpetua to death and that
the presence of only one mitigating circumstance with no aggravating circumstance, is sufficient for the
imposition of reclusion perpetua, applying Article 63 of the RPC. Under Article 63, when there are some
mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be applied. As such, the
penalty of reclusion perpetua was properly imposed (People v. Brusola, G.R. No. 210615, July 26, 2017).
(95) A was found guilty of homicide under Article 249 of the RPC, which prescribes the penalty of reclusion
temporal. There were no attendant mitigating nor aggravating circumstances in the commission of
the crime.
(a) Determine the proper penalty.
Applying the rules under the RPC and the Indeterminate Sentence Law, there being no aggravating nor
mitigating circumstance, the maximum term of the indeterminate penalty – which is reclusion temporal – shall
be imposed in its medium period, following Article 64, par. 1 of the RPC. The minimum term of the
indeterminate penalty is anywhere within the range of prision mayor – the penalty next lower from reclusion
temporal, following Article 71 – with or without reference to the period into which it may be subdivided. Thus,
the maximum term of the penalty is reclusion temporal in its medium period (i.e. from fourteen (14) years,
eight (8) months and one (1) day to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months) and the minimum term is
anywhere within the range of prision mayor (i.e. from six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years),
subject to the court’s sound discretion (ISLAW, Sec. 1; RPC, Art. 64, par. 1).
(b) Assuming that A purposely sought to commit the crime at night to better accomplish his plan, but
later on voluntarily surrendered to the police officer and pleaded guilty to the charge during his
arraignment, what is the proper penalty?
In this case, there is thus one mitigating circumstance left after offsetting the aggravating circumstance of
nighttime (RPC, Art. 14, par. 6) with the two ordinary mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender and
plea of guilty (RPC, Art. 13, par. 7). Hence, the maximum term of the indeterminate penalty of reclusion
temporal shall be imposed in its minimum period (i.e. from twelve (12) years and one (1) day to fourteen (14)
years and eight (8) months). The minimum term is the same – prision mayor in any of its period or anywhere
within its range. The attendant circumstances shall be considered only in the imposition of the maximum
term of the indeterminate penalty (ISLAW, Sec. 1; RPC, Art. 64, par. 4).
APPLICATION
Subsidiary Imprisonment
(96) What is subsidiary imprisonment?
Subsidiary imprisonment is a subsidiary personal liability to be suffered by the convict who has no property
with which to meet the fine, at the rate of one day for each amount equivalent to the highest minimum wage
rate prevailing in the Philippines at the time of rendition of judgment of conviction by the trial court. The principal
penalty imposed must not be higher than prision correctional and fine, or fine only (RPC, Art. 39, as amended
by R.A. No. 10159).
(97)
The rules in applying subsidiary imprisonment are the following:
1.
2.
If principal penalty is prision correccional or arresto, and fine:
a. One (1) day is equal to the highest minimum wage in the Philippines;
b. Subsidiary imprisonment shall not exceed one-third (⅓) of the term of the sentence;
c. In no case shall subsidiary imprisonment exceed one (1) year; and
d. No fraction or part of a day shall be counted against the prisoner.
If fine only:
a. One (1) day is equal to the highest minimum wage in the Philippines; and
30
b.
Subsidiary imprisonment shall not exceed six (6) months, if culprit was prosecuted for grave (i.e. fine
exceeds Php1,200,000) or less grave (i.e. fine ranging from Php40,000 to Php1,200,000) felony. If for
a light felony (i.e. fine of less than Php40,000), it shall not exceed fifteen (15) days (RPC, Art. 39, as
amended by R.A. No. 10159).
(98) Spouses M & S were charged with eight (8) counts of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 before the MTC. M was
acquitted but S was sentenced to pay a fine and to indemnify the offended party, B, in the amount of
Php411,000. However, S failed to pay the fine imposed by MTC. As a result, B filed a Motion to Impose
Subsidiary Penalty for S’s failure to pay the fine. The MTC denied B’s motion on the ground that their
decision did not impose subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. Is the accused compelled to
serve subsidiary imprisonment for his failure to pay the fine imposed by the MTC where said court did
not specify, in the judgment of conviction, any subsidiary imprisonment in case of failure to pay?
No, S cannot be compelled to undergo subsidiary imprisonment because the MTC’s judgment of conviction
did not specify a subsidiary imprisonment in case of failure to pay the penalty of fine. Art. 78 of the RPC states
that “no penalty shall be executed except by virtue of a final judgment. A penalty shall not be executed in any
other form than that prescribed by law, nor with any other circumstances or incidents than those expressly
authorized thereby.” Since the said subsidiary imprisonment is not stated in the judgment finding S guilty, the
court could not legally compel him to serve said subsidiary imprisonment. To allow such would be a violation
of the RPC and the constitutional provision on due process (People v. Alapan, G.R. No. 199527, January 10,
2018).
Indeterminate Sentence Law (Act No. 4103, as amended)
(99) Explain how the Indeterminate Sentence Law is applied in crimes punished by the RPC?
It is a sentence with a minimum term and a maximum term which the court is mandated to impose for the
benefit of a guilty person who is not disqualified therefore, provided that the maximum imprisonment exceeds
one (1) year. It applies to both violations of RPC and special laws.
If the offense is punished under the RPC, the maximum term is that which, in view of the attending
circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules of the said code. It is noteworthy that the mitigating
or aggravating is only to be considered in determining the maximum term of the indeterminate sentence. In
contrast, the minimum term should be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the code
(RPC) for the offense. The basis for fixing the minimum term is the prescribed penalty, and not the imposable
penalty (People v. Yco, G.R. No. 6545, July 27, 1954; ISLAW, Sec. 1).
(100) Explain how the Indeterminate Sentence Law is applied in crimes punished by special laws. (2017 Bar)
If the offense is punished by a special law, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate penalty,
the maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the minimum term shall not
be less than the minimum prescribed by the same (ISLAW, Sec. 1).
(101) X was charged with Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale and six (6) counts of Estafa, as she allegedly
recruited and promised several people of employment in East Timor, knowing fully that such
representation be false and was only made to induce the victims to pay her varying amounts of money,
to their damage and prejudice. Y, one of the victims, paid Php 35,000 to X to cover the alleged
necessary fees. The trial court convicted X of the crimes charged. As to the estafa case filed by Y, the
trial court imposed the straight penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor. Was the imposition of the
penalty proper?
Yes, the imposition of the penalty is proper. With the enactment of R.A. No. 10951, Section 85 of which provides
that if the amount involved is less than Php40,000.00, the imposable penalty is only arresto mayor in its medium
and maximum periods (i.e., two (2) months and one (1) day to six (6) months), as is applicable in the case at
bar. The Indeterminate Sentence Law no longer applies because the imposable penalty is less than one (1)
year. Thus, a straight penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor is proper (People v. Racho, G.R. No. 227505,
October 2, 2017).
(102) When is the Indeterminate Sentence Law inapplicable?
Its application shall be mandatory except in the following cases:
31
1.
2.
Those persons convicted of offenses punished with life imprisonment;
Those persons convicted of offenses punished with reclusion perpetua (People v. Rocha, G.R. No.
173797, August 31, 2007; People v. Asturias, G.R. No. 61126, January 31, 1985);
3. Those convicted of treason, conspiracy or proposal to commit treason;
4. Those convicted of misprision of treason, rebellion, sedition or espionage;
5. Those convicted of piracy;
6. Those who are habitual delinquents;
7. Those who shall have escaped from confinement or evaded sentence;
8. Those who having been granted conditional pardon by the Chief Executive shall have violated the
terms thereof;
9. Those whose maximum term of imprisonment does not exceed one (1) year (not to those already
sentenced by final judgment at the time of approval of the Act, except as provided in Sec. 5 thereof);
10. Those already sentenced by final judgment at the time of the approval of this Act; and
11. Those, whose sentence imposes penalties which do not involve imprisonment, like destierro (R.A.
No. 4103, Sec. 2); and
12. When its application is unfavorable to the accused (People v. Nang Kay, G.R. No. L-3565, April 20,
1951).
(103) Macky, a security guard, arrived home late one night after rendering overtime. He was shocked to see
Joy, his wife, and Ken, his best friend, in the act of having sexual intercourse. Macky pulled out his
service gun and shot and killed Ken. The court found that Ken died under exceptional circumstances
and exonerated Macky of murder but sentenced him to destierro, conformably with Article 247 of the
RPC. While serving his sentence, Macky entered the prohibited area and had a pot session with Ivy
(Joy’s sister). Is Macky entitled to an indeterminate sentence in case he is found guilty? Explain your
answer. (2007 Bar)
No, Macky is not entitled to the benefit of the Indeterminate Sentence Law. By virtue of Section 2 of R.A. No.
4103 as amended by Act No. 4225, the Indeterminate Sentence Law is not applicable to those whose maximum
term of imprisonment does not exceed one (1) year. Thus, by implication, the ISLAW is not applicable to those
whose penalties do not involve imprisonment, such as destierro.
Furthermore, it may be said that Macky is still not entitled to the benefit of the law for having evaded his
sentence of destierro when he entered the prohibited area specified in the judgment of conviction. The same
Section 2 of the said law expressly provides that the law shall not apply to those who shall have evaded
sentence (People v. Abilong, G.R. No. L-1960, November 26, 1948).
GRADUATION OF PENALTIES
(104) How are penalties graduated?
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
Scale No. 1
Death;
Reclusion Perpetua;
Reclusion Temporal;
Prision Mayor;
Prision Correccional;
Arresto Mayor;
Scale No. 2
Perpetual Absolute Disqualification;
Temporal Absolute Disqualification;
Suspension from public office, the right to vote and be voted for, the right to follow a profession or
calling;
4. Public Censure; and
5. Fine (RPC, Art. 71).
1.
2.
3.
(105) What are the rules for graduating penalties?
1.
The following rules shall be observed:
When the penalty prescribed for the felony is single and indivisible – the penalty next lower in degree
shall be that immediately following that indivisible penalty in the respective graduated scale prescribed in
Article 71.
32
Example: As Death Penalty was already abolished by R.A. No. 9346, the single indivisible penalty referred to
under this paragraph is Reclusion Perpetua. Thus, the penalty next lower in degree shall be Reclusion
Temporal.
2.
When the penalty prescribed for the crime is composed of two indivisible penalties, or of one or
more divisible penalties to be imposed to their full extent – the penalty next lower in degree shall be
that immediately following the lesser of the penalties prescribed in the respective graduated scale.
Example:
a. If the penalty to be imposed are 2 indivisible penalties – As Death Penalty was already
abolished, the single indivisible penalty being referred to is Reclusion Perpetua. Thus, the penalty
next lower in degree shall be Reclusion Temporal (same as Rule 1).
b. If the penalty to be imposed are one or more divisible penalties to their full extent – For
example, if the penalty is Reclusion Temporal to its full extent, the next penalty lower in degree is
Prision Mayor to its full extent. Another example is if the penalty is Prision Correccional to Prision
Mayor to be imposed to their full extent, the penalty next lower in degree is Arresto Mayor.
3.
When the penalty prescribed for the crime is composed of one or two indivisible penalties and the
maximum period of another divisible penalty – the penalty next lower in degree shall be composed of
the medium and minimum periods of the proper divisible penalty and the maximum periods of the proper
divisible penalty and the maximum period of that immediately following in said respective graduated scale.
Example:
a. If the penalty to be imposed are 2 indivisible penalties and the maximum period of another
divisible penalty – For example, Reclusion Temporal maximum to Death, the penalty next lower
in degree shall be Prision Mayor maximum to Reclusion Temporal medium. However, since Death
Penalty has been abolished, the single indivisible penalty being referred to is Reclusion Perpetua.
Thus, this rule is deemed inoperative.
b. If the penalty to be imposed is 1 indivisible penalty and the maximum period of another
divisible penalty – Since Death Penalty has been abolished, the single indivisible penalty being
referred to is Reclusion Perpetua. For example, if the prescribed penalty is Reclusion Temporal
Maximum to Reclusion Perpetua, the penalty next lower in degree shall be Prision Mayor maximum
to Reclusion Temporal medium. (Same as Rule 3(a))
4.
When the penalty prescribed for the crime is composed of several periods, corresponding to
different divisible penalties – the penalty next lower in degree shall be composed of the period immediately
following the minimum prescribed and of the two next following, which shall be taken from the penalty
prescribed, if possible; otherwise from the penalty immediately following in the above mentioned respective
graduated scale.
Example: For example, if the prescribed penalty is Prision Mayor Medium to Reclusion Temporal minimum,
the penalty next lower in degree is Prision Correccional medium to Prision Mayor minimum (i.e. the penalty
consisting of 3 periods down in the scale).
5.
When the law prescribes a penalty for a crime in some manner not especially provided for in the four
preceding rules – the courts, proceeding by analogy, shall impose corresponding penalties upon those
guilty as principals of the frustrated felony, or of attempt to commit the same, and upon accomplices and
accessories (RPC, Art. 61).
Example:
a. If the penalty prescribed is composed of 2 periods: For example, Prision Correccional minimum
and medium, the penalty next lower in degree is Arresto Mayor medium and maximum (i.e. the
penalty consisting of 2 periods down in the scale)
b. If the penalty prescribed is composed of only 1 period: For example, Prision Correccional
minimum, the penalty next lower in degree is Arresto Mayor maximum (i.e. the penalty which is the
next period down in the scale.
(106) What is the rule in case of a complex penalty?
33
In cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of three distinct penalties, each one shall form a
period; the lightest of them shall be the minimum, the next the medium, and the most severe the maximum
period (RPC, Art. 77).
ACCESSORY PENALTIES
(107) Senator Bernardo was convicted of plunder. About one year after beginning to serve his sentence,
the President of the Philippines granted him absolute pardon. The signed pardon states: "In view
hereof, and in pursuance of the authority vested upon me by the Constitution, I hereby grant absolute
pardon unto Bernardo, who was convicted of plunder in Criminal Case No. XV32 and upon whom the
penalty of reclusion perpetua was imposed." He now comes to you for advice. He wants to know if
he could run for senator in the next election. (2015 Bar)
(a)
What advice will you give Bernardo?
If I were the counsel of Senator Bernardo, I would advise him not to run for another Senatorial race since
the terms of the pardon granted to him by the President did not expressly defer his accessory penalty of
perpetual absolute disqualification nor restore his right to hold public office. Article 36 of the RPC states
that a pardon shall not result in the restoration of the right to hold public office unless such right is
expressly restored by terms of the pardon. Moreover, as according to Article 41 of the RPC, the penalty
of reclusion perpetua shall carry with it perpetual absolute disqualification which the offender shall suffer
even though pardoned as to the principal penalty, unless the same shall have been expressly remitted in
the pardon (Risos-Vidal v. Lim, G.R. No. 206666, January 21, 2015).
(b)
Assuming that what Bernardo committed was heading a rebellion for which the same penalty of
reclusion perpetua was imposed, and what he received was amnesty from the government, will
your answer be the same? Explain.
No. If what was granted to him was an amnesty, then he can run in the Senatorial race. As stated under
Article 89 of the RPC, amnesty totally extinguishes criminal liability including the penalty and all its effects.
Therefore, it does not only extinguish the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua but also its effects, in this
case, the accessory penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification. Amnesty looks backward and abolishes
and puts into oblivion the offense itself, it so overlooks and obliterates the offense with which he is charged,
so that the person released by amnesty stands before the law precisely as he had committed no offense
(Barrioquinto v. Fernandez, G.R. No. L-1278, January 21, 1949).
(108) What are the accessory penalties and under what penalties are they attached?
Penalties in which other accessory penalties are inherent:
Article 40. Death – perpetual absolute disqualification, and civil interdiction during 30 years following date
of sentence;
2. Article 41. Reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal – civil interdiction for life or during the period of
the sentence, as the case may be, and perpetual absolute disqualification;
3. Article. 42. Prision mayor – temporary absolute disqualification, perpetual special disqualification from
the right of suffrage;
4. Article. 43. Prision correccional – suspension from public office, from the right to follow a profession or
calling, and perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage if the duration of the imprisonment
shall exceed 18 months;
5. Article. 44. Arresto – suspension of the right to hold office and the right of suffrage during the term of the
sentence.
1.
There are accessory penalties which are true to other principal penalties. An example is the penalty of civil
interdiction. This is accessory penalty, and, as provided in Article 34, a convict sentenced to civil interdiction
suffers certain disqualification during the term of the sentence. One of the disqualifications is that of making
conveyance of his property inter vivos.
Note: Persons convicted of election offenses under the Omnibus Election Code cannot avail of the benefits of
the Probation Law (Omnibus Election Code, Sec. 261).
34
D. EXECUTION AND SERVICE OF SENTENCE
THREE-FOLD RULE
(109) What are the requisites of the three-fold rule?
The following are the requisites of the three-fold rule:
The maximum duration of the convict’s sentence shall not be more than three (3) times the length of time
corresponding to the most severe of the penalties imposed upon him;
2. But in no case to exceed forty (40) years;
3. This rule shall apply only when the convict is to serve four (4) or more sentences successively (RPC, Art.
70).
1.
Note: The three-fold rule applies only when the convict has to serve continuous imprisonment for several
offenses. If the convict already served sentence for one (1) offense, that imprisonment will not be considered
(Alejandro v. Director of Prisons, G.R. No. L-3215, October 6, 1949).
(110) In 1995, Mayor A and his six (6) cohorts were convicted for seven (7) counts of rape with homicide of
two college students. Each one was sentenced to suffer a total of seven (7) reclusion perpetua. Mayor
A has been in the Bilibid prison for twenty-five (25) years. Due to the recent SC decision which declared
that the GCTA law may be applied retroactively, there is a possibility that Mayor A and his co-principals
may be eligible for an early release, assuming that they meet the qualifications under the GCTA law.
The families of the victims are opposing such possibility, contending that each of the accused must
not be released as they must serve the total of seven (7) reclusion perpetuas each, when in fact they
have only served around twenty-five (25) years. Is the contention correct?
No, the contention of the families is incorrect. The three-fold rule applies in this case. Under Article 70 of the
RPC, the maximum duration of the convict’s sentence shall not be more than three-fold the length of time
corresponding to the most severe of the penalties imposed upon him. No other penalty to which he may be
liable shall be inflicted after the sum of those imposed equals the said maximum period. Further, such
maximum period shall in no case exceed forty (40) years. In the case of People v. Mendoza, it was held that
the accused were guilty of five counts of murders and sentenced to suffer reclusion perpetua for each count.
In this case, it was held that the duration of the aggregate penalties shall not exceed forty (40) years (RPC,
Art. 70; People v. Mendoza, G.R. L-3271, May 5, 1950).
PROBATION LAW (PD 968, AS AMENDED)
(111) Who are disqualified from availing themselves of the benefits of probation law? (6-SP2A2DE2-MT)
The benefits of the Probation Law shall not be extended to those:
Sentenced to serve a maximum term of imprisonment of more than six (6) years;
Convicted of any crime against the national Security;
Who have Previously been convicted by final judgment of an offense punished by imprisonment of more
than six (6) months and one (1) day and/or a fine of more than Php1,000;
4. Who have been once on Probation under the provisions of the Probation Law;
5. Who are Already serving sentence at the time the substantive provisions of the Probation Law became
applicable pursuant to Section 33 thereof (P.D. No. 968, as amended, Sec. 9);
6. Who Appealed;
1.
2.
3.
Note: Does not apply to minor offenders. The court may, after it shall have convicted and sentenced a child
in conflict with the law, and upon application at any time, place the child on probation in lieu of his/her
sentence, taking into account the best interest of the child (R.A. No. 9344, Sec. 42).
7.
8.
9.
Convicted of Drug trafficking or drug pushing (R.A. No. 9165, Sec. 24);
Convicted of Election offenses under the Omnibus Election Code (OMNIBUS ELECTION CODE, Sec. 261);
Placing the offender on probation will not serve the End of justice or the best interest of the society and the
offender himself (P.D. No. 968, Sec. 8);
10. Convicted of Malicious reporting of money laundering transaction (R.A. No. 9160, as amended by R.A. No.
9194 otherwise known as “Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2001)); and
35
11. Who committed the crime of Torture (R.A. No. 9745, otherwise known as Anti-Torture Act of 2009, Sec. 16).
(112) What is the legal effect of his application for probation on the judgment of conviction? Does said
application interrupt the running of the period of appeal?
The judgment becomes final. Once an offender has filed an application for probation, this act is already
considered a waiver of their right to appeal. As a result of the finality of the decision, there is no more period
of appeal (Sec. 4, P.D. No. 968, as amended by R.A. No. 10707).
(113) RG is appealing a decision by the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial
Court finding him guilty of rape against AAA. RG was sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua without eligibility for parole. In the course of his plea to the Supreme Court to modify the
decision, he sent a letter to the court a quo, seeking withdrawal of his appeal and claiming he is eligible
for probation. Is RG’s claim tenable?
No. RG’s claim is untenable. According to Sec. 9(a) of the Probation Law, the benefits of probation shall not
extend to those sentenced to serve a maximum term of imprisonment of more than six (6) years. The sentence
of reclusion perpetua imposed on accused-appellant in this case exceeds six (6) years of imprisonment.
Furthermore, Sec. 4 partly reads that “no application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the
defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment of conviction”. An accused must not have appealed his
conviction before he can avail himself of probation. Thus, even assuming that RG is qualified to apply for
probation, he has already availed himself of the remedy of appeal twice, by appealing the RTC judgment of
conviction before the CA, and then appealing the CA decision affirming his conviction before the SC, which
already proscribes him from applying for probation. Thus, RG’s claims are untenable (People v. Galuga y Wadas, G.R. No. 221428, February 13, 2019, Hernando Case).
(114) J was convicted of the Regional Trial Court of a crime and sentenced to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment for a minimum of eight years. He appealed both his conviction and the penalty imposed
upon him to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court ultimately sustained J’s conviction but reduced
his sentence to a maximum of four years and eight months imprisonment. Could J forthwith file an
application for probation? Explain. (2003 Bar)
Yes, he can. When a judgment of conviction imposing a non-probationable penalty is appealed or reviewed,
and such judgment is modified through the imposition of a probationable penalty, the defendant shall be
allowed to apply for probation based on the modified decision before such decision becomes final. The
application for probation based on the modified decision shall be filed in the trial court where the judgment of
conviction imposing a non-probationable penalty was rendered, or in the trial court where such case has since
been re-raffled (P.D. No. 968, Sec. 4 as amended by R.A. No. 10707). J may apply for probation as he did not
appeal a judgment that would have allowed him to apply for probation (Colinares v. People, G.R. No. 182748,
December 13, 2011).
(115) B was convicted of a crime. Thereafter, he applied for probation and was granted. Discuss the effect
of the termination of his period of probation.
After the period of probation and upon consideration of the report and recommendation of the probation officer,
the court may order the final discharge of the probationer upon finding that he has fulfilled the terms and
conditions of his probation and thereupon the case is deemed terminated. The final discharge of the
probationer shall operate to restore to him all civil rights lost or suspended as a result of his conviction and to
totally extinguish his criminal liability as to the offense for which probation was granted. The probationer and
the probation officer shall each be furnished with a copy of such order (P.D. No. 968, Sec. 16 as amended by
R.A. No. 10707).
(116) S, a newly appointed Municipal Budget Officer, was found guilty of falsification of public documents
under Article 172 in relation to Article 171(4) of the RPC in making false statements in his Personal
Data Sheet. S did not appeal and then applied for probation. His application was granted, and he was
placed under probation for a period of one (1) year. An administrative complaint for the offense of
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude was then filed against S because of his conviction. He
argues that his conviction and eventual discharge from probation presents another administrative
case to be filed against him because to do so would defeat the purpose of the Probation Law which
was to erase the effect of conviction and to restore civil rights that were lost or suspended. Is his
contention correct? Will his eventual relief from probation affect his administrative liabilities?
36
No. Probation does not erase the effects and fact of conviction; rather, it merely suspends the penalty imposed.
The criminal action is separate and distinct from the administrative case. And, if only for that reason, so is
administrative liability separate and distinct from penal liability. The reform and rehabilitation of the probationer
cannot justify his retention in the government service. Probation only affects the criminal liability of the accused,
and not his administrative liabilities, if any (Pagaduan v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 206379,
November 19, 2014).
JUVENILE JUSTICE AND WELFARE ACT (RA 9344, AS AMENDED BY RA
10630)
(117)
What are the rules regarding the criminal liability of a child?
The following rules must be observed:
1. A child fifteen (15) years of age or under at the time of the commission of the offense shall be exempt
from criminal liability. However, the child shall be subjected to an intervention program pursuant to
Section 20 of this Act;
2. A child above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen (18) years of age shall likewise be exempt from
criminal liability and be subjected to an intervention program, unless he/she has acted with discernment,
in which case, such child shall be subjected to the appropriate proceedings in accordance with this Act
(diversion program); and
3. The exemption from criminal liability herein established does not include exemption from civil liability,
which shall be enforced in accordance with existing laws (R.A. No. 9344, as amended, Sec. 6).
(118) A was 2 months below eighteen (18) years of age when he committed the crime. He was charged with
the crime three (3) months later. He was twenty-three (23) when he was finally convicted and sentenced.
Instead of preparing to serve a jail term, he sought a suspension of the sentence on the ground that
he was a juvenile offender. Should he be entitled to a suspension of sentence? If not, what provision
of RA 9344 may he avail of? (2003 Bar)
No. Although A was below eighteen (18) years old when he committed the crime, he was already twenty-three
(23) years old when he was finally convicted and sentenced. The provisions of Sec. 38 and Sec. 40 allow
suspension of sentence only until the offender reaches twenty-one (21) years of age. Thus, A is no longer
eligible for suspension of sentence (R.A. No. 9344, Sec 38). Even if the offender may no longer avail of
suspension of sentence, he may still avail of Sec. 51, which is confinement in agricultural camps or other
training places.
(119) M, a minor, was bullied by B, his classmate. Having had enough, M got the key to the safe where his
father kept his licensed pistol and took the weapon. Knowing that B usually hung out at a nearby
abandoned building after class, he went ahead and hid while waiting for B. He then shot B, who died
on the spot. M then hid the gun in one of the empty containers. At the time of the shooting, M was
fifteen years and one month old. What is M's criminal liability? Explain. (2015 Bar)
Based on the facts presented, M shall be liable of murder which is qualified by treachery or evident
premeditation, and illegal possession of firearms. Since his age falls above fifteen (15) years but below
eighteen (18), and his actions clearly showed discernment, minority under Section 7 of RA No. 9344 does not
grant exemption. The accused’s discernment was displayed through his surprise attack as well as the hiding
of the murder weapon in an empty container. Nonetheless, minority will be considered as a privileged mitigating
circumstance, which will require the graduation of the penalty prescribed by law to one degree lower (RPC,
Art. 68).
AN ACT ADJUSTING THE AMOUNT OR THE VALUE OF PROPERTY AND
DAMAGE ON WHICH A PENALTY IS BASED AND THE FINES IMPOSED
UNDER THE REVISED PENAL CODE (RA 10951)
(120) How are felonies classified?
1. Grave Felonies - Those which the law imposes capital punishment or penalties which in any of their periods
are afflictive;
2. Less Grave Felonies - Those which the law imposes penalties which in their maximum period are
correccional; and
37
3. Light Felonies - Those which the law imposes the penalty of arresto menor or a fine not exceeding
Php40,000 or both (R.A. No. 10951, Sec.1).
(121)
When is a fine considered as an afflictive, correctional, or light penalty?
A fine, whether imposed as a single or as an alternative penalty, shall be considered an:
1. Afflictive Penalty – if it exceeds Php1,200,000;
2. Correctional Penalty – if it does not exceed Php1,200,000 but is not less than Php 40,000;
3. Light Penalty – if it is less than Php40,000 (R.A. No. 10951, Sec.2).
COMMUNITY SERVICE ACT (RA 11362 AND A.M. NO. 20-06-14-SC)
(122)
What is community service?
Community service shall consist of any actual physical activity which inculcates civic consciousness and is
intended towards the improvement of a public work or promotion of a public service (R.A. No. 11362, Sec. 3).
(123)
1.
2.
3.
4.
What are the rules of community service in lieu of imprisonment?
The court in its discretion may impose community service as penalty for minor offenses punishable by arresto
menor and arresto mayor in lieu of imprisonment.
If the defendant violates the terms of the community service, the court shall order his/her re-arrest and the
defendant shall serve the full term of the penalty.
If the defendant has fully complied with the terms of the community service, the court shall order his/her
release unless he/she is detained for some other offenses.
The privilege of rendering community service in lieu of service in jail shall be availed of only once (R.A. No.
11362, Sec. 3).
(124)
How long should the defendant render community service?
The period for the community service to be rendered should not be more than the maximum sentence imposed
by law, but not less than one-third (⅓) thereof. If the accused has undergone preventive imprisonment, the
period shall be deducted from the term of community service (A.M. No. 20-06-14-SC, par. 7).
(125) If the accused applied and was granted probation in a previous case, may he still apply for community
service in a subsequent case?
Yes, an accused who has applied and was granted probation in a previous case is not disqualified to apply for
community service in a subsequent case (A.M. No. 20-06-14-SC, par. 14).
E. EXTINCTION OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY
(126)
What are the causes of total extinguishment of criminal liability?
The following are the causes of total extinction of criminal liability:
By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties and as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is
extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment (thus, if the case is on appeal,
there is no final judgment, the criminal liability is extinguished if death occurred);
2. By service of the sentence;
3. By amnesty, which completely extinguishes the penalty and all its effects;
4. By absolute pardon;
5. By prescription of the crime;
6. By prescription of the penalty;
7. By the marriage of the offended woman, as provided in Article 344 of this Code (RPC, Art. 89).
8. By express repeal of the law (act decriminalized) (BOADO, Compact Reviewer, supra at 201); and
9. Final
discharge
of
probationer
(P.D.
No.
968,
Sec.
16
as
amended).
1.
(127)
1.
2.
3.
How is criminal liability partially extinguished?
Article 94 of the RPC states that criminal liability is partially extinguished by:
Conditional Pardon;
Commutation of sentence;
Good conduct allowance during confinement (RPC, Art. 94, as amended by R.A. No. 10592);
38
4.
5.
6.
Parole under Indeterminate Sentence Law;
Probation under P.D. 968; and
Implied repeal or amendment of penal law lowering the penalty (BOADO, Compact Reviewer, supra at 202).
(128)
What effect does preventive imprisonment imposed on the offender have on a sentence?
GENERAL RULE: Offenders or accused who have undergone preventive imprisonment shall be credited in
the service of their sentence consisting of deprivation of liberty, with the full time during which they have
undergone preventive imprisonment if the detention prisoner agrees voluntarily in writing after being informed
of the effects thereof and with the assistance of counsel to abide by the same disciplinary rules imposed upon
convicted prisoners (RPC, Art.29, par. 1, as amended by R.A. No. 10592).
1.
2.
EXCEPTIONS (R-FS):
When they are Recidivists, or have been convicted previously twice or more times of any crime; and
When upon being summoned for the execution of their sentence they have Failed to Surrender voluntarily
(RPC, Art.29, par. 1, (1-2), as amended by R.A. No. 10592).
(129) May a detainee who fails to abide by the disciplinary rules for convicted prisoners still benefit from RA
10592’s amendment of Art. 29?
Yes. If the detention prisoner does not agree to abide by the same disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted
prisoners, he shall do so in writing with the assistance of a counsel and shall be credited in the service of his
sentence with four-fifths of the time during which he has undergone preventive imprisonment (RPC, Art.29,
par. 2, as amended by RA 10592).
Note: Credit for preventive imprisonment for the penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be deducted from thirty
(30) years (RPC, Art.29, par. 3, as amended by R.A. No. 10592).
(130) What happens when the period of preventive imprisonment equals the possible maximum
imprisonment for the offense charged?
Whenever an accused has undergone preventive imprisonment for a period equal to the possible maximum
imprisonment of the offense charged to which he may be sentenced and his case is not yet terminated, he
shall be released immediately without prejudice to the continuation of the trial thereof or the proceeding on
appeal, if the same is under review (RPC, Art.29, par. 4, as amended by RA 10592)..
Computation of preventive imprisonment for purposes of immediate release under this paragraph shall be the
actual period of detention with good conduct time allowance, provided the following:
1. That if the accused is absent without justifiable cause at any stage of the trial, the court may motu proprio
order the rearrest of the accused; and
2. That recidivists, habitual delinquents, escapees and persons charged with heinous crimes are excluded from
the coverage of this Act (RPC, Art.29, par. 4, as amended by R.A. No. 10592).
Note: In case the maximum penalty to which the accused may be sentenced is destierro, he shall be released
after thirty (30) days of preventive imprisonment (RPC, Art.29, par. 4, as amended by R.A. No. 10592).
(131)
What deductions are offenders who demonstrate good conduct entitled to?
The good conduct of any offender qualified for credit for preventive imprisonment pursuant to Article 29 of this
Code, or of any convicted prisoner in any penal institution, rehabilitation or detention center or any other local
jail shall entitle him to the following deductions from the period of his sentence:
1. During the first two years of imprisonment, he shall be allowed a deduction of twenty days for each month
of good behavior during detention;
2. During the third to the fifth year, inclusive, of his imprisonment, he shall be allowed a reduction of twentythree days for each month of good behavior during detention;
3. During the following years until the tenth year, inclusive, of his imprisonment, he shall be allowed a
deduction of twenty-five days for each month of good behavior during detention;
4. During the eleventh and successive years of his imprisonment, he shall be allowed a deduction of thirty
days for each month of good behavior during detention; and
5. At any time during the period of imprisonment, he shall be allowed another deduction of fifteen days, in
addition to numbers one to four hereof, for each month of study, teaching or mentoring service time rendered.
39
Note: An appeal by the accused shall NOT deprive him of entitlement to the above allowances for good conduct
(RPC, Art. 97, as amended by R.A. No. 10592).
(132)
Are those who escaped from prison entitled to any deduction of sentence?
Yes, but only under special circumstances, namely:
To any prisoner who, having evaded his preventive imprisonment or the service of his sentence under the
circumstances mentioned in Article 158 of this Code, gives himself up to the authorities within 48 hours
following the issuance of a proclamation announcing the passing away of the calamity or catastrophe
referred to in said article - Deduction of one fifth of the period of his sentence shall be granted.
2. In case said prisoner chose to stay in the place of his confinement notwithstanding the existence of a calamity
or catastrophe enumerated in Article 158 of this Code - Deduction of two-fifths of the period of his
sentence shall be granted (RPC, Art. 98, as amended by R.A. No. 10592).
1.
Note: This Article shall apply to any prisoner whether undergoing preventive imprisonment or serving sentence.
(133)
Who grants time allowances?
Whenever lawfully justified, the Director of the Bureau of Corrections, the Chief of the Bureau of Jail
Management and Penology and/or the Warden of a provincial, district, municipal or city jail shall grant
allowances for good conduct. Such allowances once granted shall not be revoked (RPC, Art. 99, as amended
by R.A. No. 10592).
(134) Differentiate prescription of crime and prescription of penalty as to the right forfeited and the penalty
considered in determining the prescriptive period.
As to right forfeited, prescription of crime involves the loss of the right of the State to prosecute while in
prescription of penalty involves the loss of the right of the government to execute the final sentence. In the
former, the penalty prescribed by law is considered in determining the prescriptive period while in the latter, it
is the penalty imposed (RPC, Arts. 91 & 92).
(135) When does the period of prescription of a crime begin to run as provided for under the RPC and when
is it interrupted?
The period of prescription shall commence to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended
party, the authorities, or their agents, and shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information, and
shall commence to run again when such proceedings terminate without the accused being convicted or
acquitted, or are unjustifiably stopped for any reason not imputable to him. The term of prescription shall not
run when the offender is absent from the Philippine Archipelago (RPC, Art. 91). It shall be interrupted by the
filing of the complaint or information and shall commence to run again when such proceedings terminate
without the accused being convicted or acquitted, or are unjustifiably stopped for any reason not imputable to
him.
The running of the prescriptive period of the crime is interrupted when “any kind of investigative proceedings
is instituted against the guilty person which may ultimately lead to his prosecution” (Panaguiton, Jr. v.
Department of Justice, G.R. No. 167571, November 25, 2008).
(136) In January 1990, while 5-year old M was urinating at the back of their house, he heard a strange noise
coming from the kitchen of their neighbor and playmate, A. When he peeped inside, he saw Mimi, A’s
stepmother, strangling A to death. M saw Mimi carry the dead body and place it inside the trunk of her
car and drive away. The dead body of A was never found. For fear of his life, M did not tell anyone,
even his parents and relatives. 20 and 1⁄2 years after the incident, and right after his graduation in
Criminology, M reported the crime to NBI authorities. The crime of homicide prescribes in 20 years.
Can the State still prosecute Mimi for the death of A despite the lapse of 20 and 1⁄2 years? Explain.
(2000 Bar)
Yes. Despite the lapse of 20 and ½ years, M may still be prosecuted for A’s death. Article 91 of the RPC states
that the period of prescription commences to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended
party, the authorities or their agents. However, in the facts presented, such crime was only known by M who
was not an offended party nor an authority or an agent of the latter. The authorities had knowledge over the
same only when M informed them of the commission of the crime. Hence, the period of prescription of 20 years
for homicide commenced to run only from the time M revealed it to the NBI Authorities (RPC, Art. 91).
40
(137) T was convicted of a violation of the Election Code and was sentenced to suffer imprisonment of one
year as minimum, to three years as maximum. The decision of the trial court was affirmed on appeal
and became final and executory. T failed to appear when summoned for execution of judgment,
prompting the judge to issue an order for his arrest. T was able to use the backdoor and left for the
United States. Fifteen years later, T returned to the Philippines and filed a Motion to Quash the warrant
of arrest against him, on the ground that the penalty imposed against him had already prescribed. If
you were the judge, would you grant T's Motion to Quash? Explain. (2015 Bar)
If I were the judge, I will deny the motion to quash. Article 93 of the RPC provides when the prescription of
penalties shall commence to run. Under said provision, it shall commence to run from the date the felon evades
the service of his sentence. Pursuant to Article 157 of the same Code, evasion of service of sentence can be
committed only by those who have been convicted by final judgment by escaping during the term of his
sentence. T never served a single minute of his sentence, and thus, prescription never started to run in his
favor. Clearly, one who has not been committed to prison cannot be said to have escaped therefrom (Del
Castillo v. Torrecampo, G.R. No. 139033, December 18, 2002).
F. CIVIL LIABILITIES IN CRIMINAL CASES
(138)
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
When is civil liability extinguished? (PC3NO)
Civil liability is extinguished:
By Payment or performance;
By Condonation or remission of the debt;
By Confusion or merger of the rights of the creditor and debtor;
By Compensation
By Novation; and
Other causes of extinguishment of obligations, such as annulment, rescission, fulfillment of a resolutory
condition, and prescription (CIVIL CODE, Art. 1231).
(139) If an accused is acquitted, does it necessarily follow that no civil liability arising from the acts
complained of may be awarded in the same judgment? Explain briefly.
No. If an accused is acquitted, it does not necessarily follow that no civil liability arising from the acts
complained of may be awarded in the same judgment except if there is an express waiver of the civil liability
or if there is a reservation to file a separate civil action (People v. Jalandoni, G.R. No. L-57555 August 28,
1984).
The court may acquit an accused on reasonable doubt and still order payment of civil damages already proved
in the same case without need for a separate civil action. The reason is that the accused has been accorded
due process. To require a separate civil action simply because the accused was acquitted would mean
needless clogging of court dockets and unnecessary duplication of litigation with all its attendant loss of time,
effort and money on the part of all concerned (Maximo v. Gerochi, Jr., G.R. Nos. L-47994-97, September 24,
1986).
(140) X was found guilty of statutory rape by the CA. However, before an Entry of Judgment could be issued
in the instant case, the Court received a Letter from the Bureau of Corrections informing the Court of
accused-appellant's death as evidenced by the Certificate of Death. What will be the effect of this on
his criminal and civil liabilities?
Upon accused-appellant's death pending appeal of his conviction, the criminal action is extinguished inasmuch
as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused; the civil action instituted therein for the recovery of
the civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal action. However, it is well
to clarify that accused-appellant's civil liability in connection with his acts against the victim, may be based on
sources other than delicts; in which case, the victim may file a separate civil action against the estate of
accused-appellant, as may be warranted by law and procedural rules (People v. Raga, G.R. No. 211166, June
5, 2017).
II.
BOOK II (Articles 114-365 of the RPC) and RELATED
SPECIAL LAWS
41
CRIMES AGAINST NATIONAL SECURITY AND LAWS OF NATIONS
(ARTS. 114-123)
(141) Where are crimes against the law of nations triable?
Crimes against the law of nations, such as piracy may be punished in any country because they are considered
crimes against the family of nations (hostes humani generis). Those against national security may be punished
only in the country whose national security was offended (BOADO, Notes and Cases on the Revised Penal
Code, 2018).
Treason
(142) The Ratute brothers (Ricalde and Riboli), both Filipino citizens, led a group of armed men in seizing a
southern island in the Philippines and declaring war against the duly constituted government of the
country. The Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), led by its Chief of Staff, General S, responded,
and a full-scale war ensued between the AFP and the armed men led by the brothers. The armed conflict
raged for months.
When the brothers-led armed men were running out of supplies, T, also a Filipino and a good friend
and supporter of the R brothers, was tasked to leave for abroad to solicit arms and funding for the
cash-strapped brothers. He was able to travel to Rwanda, and there he met with U, a citizen and
resident of Rwanda, who agreed to help the brothers by raising funds internationally and to send
them to the Ratute brothers to aid them in their armed struggle against the Philippine government.
Before T and U could complete their fund-raising activities for the brothers, the AFP was able to
reclaim the island and defeat the uprising.
Ricalde and Riboli were charged with conspiracy to commit treason. During the hearing of the two
cases, the government only presented as witness, General Riturban, who testified on the activities
of the Ratute brothers, Ricalde, and Riboli. Can T and U be convicted of conspiracy to commit
treason? (2018 Bar)
No, T and U cannot be convicted of the crime of conspiracy to commit treason. Conspiracy to commit treason
under Art. 115 of the RPC is committed when, in time of war, two or more persons come to an agreement to
levy war against the Government or adhere to the enemies and give them aid or comfort, and decide to commit
it (RPC, Arts. 8 and 114). In this case, there was no war when T and U committed the acts. Treason is a war
crime. It remains dormant until the emergency arises. But as soon as war starts, it is put into effect (Laurel v.
Misa, G.R. No. L-409, January 30, 1947).
Piracy and Qualified Piracy
(143) Distinguish piracy and mutiny.
In piracy punished under the RPC, the offenders are neither members of the complement of the vessel nor
passengers thereof. In mutiny, they are members of the complement of the vessel. The essence of piracy is
robbery and consists of the seizure of the vessel, cargo or personal belongings of passengers. The essence
of mutiny is the disobedience of the complement against the management of the vessel who raise commotion
to protest or go against the lawful command of the captain, employing violence and endangering the safety of
passengers. Any gain derived by the offenders are merely incidental (BOADO, Notes and Cases on the
Revised Penal Code, 2018).
(144) While a ship was negotiating the sea route from Hongkong towards Manila, and while still 300 miles
from Aparri, Cagayan, its engines malfunctioned. The Captain ordered the ship to stop for emergency
repairs, lasting for almost 15 hours. Due to exhaustion, the officers and crew fell asleep. While the ship
was anchored, a motorboat manned by renegades X and Y from Claveria, Cagayan, passed by and took
advantage of the situation. They cut the ship's engines, took away several heavy crates of electrical
equipment and loaded them in their motorboat. Then, t,hey left hurriedly towards Aparri. At daybreak,
the crew found that a robbery took place. They radioed the Aparri Port Authorities, resulting in the
apprehension of the culprits. What was the crime committed? (2006 Bar)
X and Y committed the crime of piracy. The elements of the crime of piracy under Art. 122 of the RPC are: (a)
A vessel is on the high seas or in Philippine waters; (b) The offenders are not members of its complement or
passengers of the vessel; and (c) The offenders either attack or seize the vessel or seize the whole or part of
the cargo of said vessel, its equipment or personal belongings of its complement or passengers. This crime
may be committed in the high seas or in the Philippine waters by offenders who are not members of the vessel’s
complement or its passengers through seizing the whole or part of the cargo of the said vessel, its equipment,
42
or personal belongings of its complement or passengers. The culprits, who were neither members of the
complement nor passengers of the ship, seized part of the vessel's equipment while it was three hundred miles
away from Aparri, Cagayan. Thus, X and Y committed the crime of piracy (RPC, Art. 122).
(145) While cruising off Batanes, an inter-island vessel was forced to seek shelter at the harbor of
Kaoshiung, Taiwan because of a strong typhoon. While anchored in said harbor, X, Y, and Z arrived in
a speedboat, fired a bazooka at the vessel's bow, boarded it, and divested the passengers of their
money and jewelry. A passenger of the vessel, A, took advantage of the confusion to settle an old
grudge with another passenger and killed him. After their apprehension, all four were charged with
qualified piracy before a Philippine court. Was the charge of qualified piracy against the three people
(X, Y, and Z) who boarded the inter-island vessel correct? (2008 Bar)
Yes, the charge of qualified piracy against X, Y, and Z is correct. Under Article 122 of the RPC, the crime of
piracy is committed by offenders who are not members of the complement or passengers of the vessel by
seizing the whole or part of the cargo of the said vessel, its equipment or personal belongings of its complement
or passengers. Article 123 par. 3 of the RPC, the crime of Piracy is qualified if murder, homicide, physical
injuries, or rape accompanied the commission of the crime of piracy. In this case, X, Y, and Z attacked and
boarded the vessel and divested the passengers of their money and jewelry. The crime of murder was also
committed by A against a passenger. As long as murder or homicide is committed due to or on occasion of
piracy, the crime of qualified piracy is committed (RPC, Art. 122-123, Par. (3)).
(146) A vessel registered in Panama was 300 nautical miles from Aparri, Cagayan ,when its engines
malfunctioned. The Captain ordered his men to drop anchor and repair the ship. While the officers and
crew were asleep, armed men boarded the vessel, took away several crates containing valuable items
an,d loaded them in their own motorboat. Before the band left, they planted an explosive which they
detonated from a safe distance. The explosion damaged the ship's hull, killed ten (10) crewmen, and
injured fifteen (15) others. What crime or crimes, if any, were committed? Explain. (2016 Bar)
The crime committed is Qualified Piracy. The circumstances qualifying piracy under Art. 123 of the RPC are:
(1) whenever they have seized a vessel by boarding or firing the same; (2) whenever pirates have abandoned
their victims without means of saving themselves; or (3) whenever the crime is accompanied by murder,
homicide, physical injuries or rape. In this case, the offenders seized the vessel by boarding it and, the piracy
was accompanied by murder and physical injuries of fifteen (15) others caused by the explosion from the
explosive which they planted on the vessel (RPC, Art. 123).
Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery (PD 532)
(147) Define Piracy under P.D. No. 532.
Piracy is any attack upon or seizure of any vessel, or the taking away of the whole or part thereof or its cargo,
equipment, or the personal belongings of its complement or passengers, irrespective of the value thereof, by
means of violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things, committed by any person, including
a passenger or member of the complement of said vessel, in Philippine waters, shall be considered as piracy.
The offenders shall be considered as pirates and punished as hereinafter provided (P.D. No. 532, Sec. 2).
(148) State the punishable acts under P.D. No. 532.
The act of aiding pirates or highway robbers/brigands or abetting piracy or highway robbery/brigandage.
Any person who knowingly and in any manner aids or protects pirates or highway robbers/brigands,
such as giving them information about the movement of police or other peace officers of the
government; or
2. Acquires or receives property taken by such pirates or brigands or in any manner derives any benefit
therefrom; or any person who directly or indirectly abets the commission of piracy or highway
robbery or brigandage, shall be considered as an accomplice of the principal offenders and be
punished in accordance with the Rules prescribed by the Revised Penal Code (P.D. No. 532, Sec. 4).
1.
Note: It shall be presumed that any person who does any of the acts provided in this Section has performed
knowingly unless the contrary is proven.
(149) Define ‘Aiding or Abetting’ of Piracy under P.D. No. 532.
Aiding or abetting piracy refers to the act of any person who in any manner aids or protects pirates, which
includes giving them information about the movement of police or other peace officers of the government or
43
acquiring or receiving property taken by such pirates or in any manner derives any benefit therefrom (P.D. No.
532, Sec. 4).
(150) Enumerate the requisites of aiding or abetting piracy.
The requisites of aiding or abetting of piracy are as follows:
Knowingly aids or protects pirates;
Acquires or receives property taken by such pirates, or in any manner derives any benefit therefrom;
and
3. Directly or indirectly abets the commission of piracy (P. D. No. 532, Sec. 4).
1.
2.
(151) X, along with Y, boarded a jeepney moving along a highway, X announced a holdup, pulled out his gun,
which was hidden in his pants, and pointed his gun at one of the passengers and grabbed the latter’s
necklace. When the passenger tried to stop X from obtaining her necklace, X shot him in the head. Y
then grabbed the wristwatch of another passenger. X and Y alighted from the jeepney and ran towards
the nearby squatter’s area, but were subsequently caught. During the trial, they were found guilty of
the crime of Robbery with Homicide under P.D 532. Is this correct?
No. X and Y committed the crime of Robbery with Homicide under the Revised Penal Code, which is distinct
from the offense covered by P.D. No. 532 which punishes indiscriminate highway robbery. Highway robbery
brigandage is defined in Section 2 (e) of the said decree as “(t)he seizure of any person for ransom, extortion
or other unlawful purposes, or the taking away of the property of another by means of violence against or
intimidation of person or force upon things or other unlawful means, committed by any person on any Philippine
Highway.” Furthermore, jurisprudence has held that a conviction for highway robbery requires proof that
several accused were organized to commit highway robbery indiscriminately. In this case, there is no evidence
of such. There is no proof that appellants previously attempted to commit similar robberies to show the
“indiscriminate” perpetration. Hence, the finding of guilt for the crime of Robbery with Homicide under P.D. 532
is incorrect (People v. Versoza, G.R. No. 118944. August 20, 1998).
Anti-Terrorism Act of 2020
(152) How is terrorism committed pursuant to R.A. No. 11479?
Terrorism is committed by any person who, within or outside the Philippines, regardless of the stage of
execution:
1. Engages in acts intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to any person, or endangers a
person's life;
2. Engages in acts intended to cause extensive damage or destruction to a government or public
facility, public place or private property;
3. Engages in acts intended to cause extensive interference with, damage or destruction to critical
infrastructure;
4. Develops, manufactures, possesses, acquires, transports, supplies or uses weapons, explosives or
of biological, nuclear, radiological or chemical weapons; and
5. Release of dangerous substances, or causing fire, floods or explosions (R.A. No. 11479, Sec. 4).
Note: Terrorism, as defined in this section, shall not include advocacy, protest, dissent, stoppage of work,
industrial or mass action, and other similar exercises of civil and political rights, which are not intended to cause
death or serious physical harm to a person, to endanger a person's life, or to create a serious risk to public
safety (R.A. No. 11479, Sec. 4).
(153) State the punishable acts under Section 6 of R.A. No. 11479.
It shall be unlawful for any person to participate in the planning, training, preparation, and facilitation in the
commission of terrorism, possessing objects connected with the preparation for the commission of terrorism,
or collect or make documents connected with the preparation of terrorism (R.A. 11479, No. Sec. 6).
(154) Enumerate the liabilities that a foreign terrorist may face under R.A.No.11479.
The following acts are unlawful and, the offender shall suffer the penalty of life imprisonment without the benefit
of parole and the benefits of Republic Act No. 10592:
1. For any person to travel or attempt to travel to a state other than his/her state of residence or
nationality, for the purpose of perpetrating, planning, or preparing for, or participating in terrorism,
or providing or receiving terrorist training;
2. For any person to organize or facilitate the Travel of individuals who travel to a state other than their
states of residence or nationality knowing that such travel is for the purpose of perpetrating,
44
3.
planning, training, or preparing for, or participating in Terrorism or providing or receiving terrorist
training; or
For any person residing abroad who comes to the Philippines to participate in perpetrating, planning,
training, or preparing for, or participating in Terrorism or provide support for or facilitate or receive
terrorist training here or abroad (R.A. No. 11479, Sec. 11).
(155) State those who are liable as accessories under Sec. 14, R.A. No. 11479.
Any person who, having knowledge of the commission of any of the crimes defined and penalized under
Section 4 of this Act, without having participated therein, takes part subsequent to its commission in any of the
following manner:
1. By profiting himself/herself or assisting the offender to profit by the effects of the crime;
2. By concealing or destroying the body of the crime, or the effects, or instruments thereof, in order
to prevent its discovery; or
3. By harboring, concealing, or assisting in the escape of the principal or conspirator of the crime.
shall be liable as an accessory (R.A. No. 11479, Sec. 14).
Note: No person, regardless of relationship or affinity, shall be exempt from liability under this section. (R.A.
No. 11479, Sec. 14).
(156) State the application of R.A. No. 4200 (Anti-Wire Tapping Law) vis-a-vis Sec. 16 of R.A. No. 11479.
The provisions of Republic Act No. 4200, otherwise known as the "Anti-Wire Tapping Law" to the contrary
notwithstanding, a law enforcement agent or military personnel may, upon a written order of the Court of
Appeals:
1. Secretly wiretap;
2. Overhear and listen to; and
3. Intercept, screen, read, survey, record or collect, with the use of any mode, form, kind or type of
electronic, mechanical or other equipment or device or technology (R.A. No. 11479, Sec. 16).
(157) State the activities which may be monitored under R.A. No. 11479, Sec. 16.
The activity may cover any private communications, conversation, discussion/s, data, information, messages
in whatever form, kind or nature, spoken or written words (1) between members of a judicially declared and
outlawed terrorist organization, as provided in Sec. 26 of R.A. 11479; (2) between members of a designated
person as defined in Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 10168; or (3) any person charged with or suspected of
committing any of the crimes defined and penalized under the provisions of this Act (R.A. No. 11479, Sec. 16).
Note: Surveillance, interception and recording of communications between lawyers and clients, doctors and
patients, journalists and their sources and confidential business correspondence shall not be authorized.
(158) State the periods governing detention without a judicial warrant under Sec. 29, R.A. No. 11479.
1.
2.
The suspected person shall be delivered to the proper judicial authority within a period of fourteen
(14) calendar days counted from the moment the said suspected person has been apprehended or
arrested, detained, and taken into custody by the law;
The period of detention may be extended to a maximum period of ten (10) calendar days if it is
established that:
a. Further detention of the person/s is necessary to preserve evidence related to terrorism or complete
the investigation;
b. Further detention of the person/s is necessary to prevent the commission of another terrorism; and
c. The investigation is being conducted (R.A. No. 11479, Sec. 29).
(159) X, an individual who was arrested due to his continued organization of mass shootouts and killings in
Manila, was detained for 14 days in Manila City Jail. X was then transferred to Bilibid Prison, where he
was detained for another 4 days for further investigation. X contended that the 4-day extension is not
allowed since it is contrary to the Rules against arbitrary detention. Is X’s contention correct?
No. In the case of Calleja v. Executive Secretary, the Supreme Court ruled in the negative. However, the High
Tribunal declared that Sec. 29 does not allow indefinite detention. The initial detention is only up to a maximum
of 14 days and only when the crime involved falls under either Sections 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 of the
ATA. This can only be extended to a maximum of 10 days and cannot be further extended. The absolute
45
maximum period that a person may be detained under Section 29 is 24 days. Hence, X’s contention as to the
4-day extension is not correct (Calleja v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 252578, et al, December 7, 2021,
Hernando Case).
CRIMES AGAINST THE FUNDAMENTAL LAWS OF THE STATE
(ARTS. 124-133)
Arbitrary Detention
(160) Does detention need to involve physical restraint?
No, detention need not involve any physical restraint. Psychological restraint is sufficient. If the acts and
actuations of the accused can produce such fear in the mind of the victim sufficient to paralyze the latter, to
the extent that the victim is compelled to limit his own actions and movements in accordance with the wishes
of the accused, then the victim is, for all intents and purposes, detained against his will (People v. Fabro, G.R.
No. 208441, July 17, 2017).
(161) X, a policeman of Pateros, acting under the orders of his chief who desired to put a stop to pilfering in
a certain locality, patrolled this district. At about midnight, seeing two persons acting suspiciously in
front of an uninhabited house, X arrested them without warrant, and took them to the municipal
presidencia where they were detained in the jail for six or seven hours before they were released. X
was accused of arbitrary detention. Should he be convicted? Explain.
No, X cannot be convicted of arbitrary detention. Under Article 124 of the RPC, the elements of the crime are:
(1) That the offender is a public officer or employee; (2) That he detains a person; and (3) That the detention
is without legal grounds. In this case, since the two persons acted suspiciously in front of the uninhabited house
at midnight, and entered the same, X was justified to arrest them even without a warrant under the
circumstances of the case, mainly since he was patrolling the place upon orders of his chief. The persons were
arrested in a suspicious place at midnight under suspicious circumstances that they were about to commit a
crime or breach of peace; therefore, the third element is wanting (U.S. v. Santos, G.R. No. 12779, September
10, 1917).
Delay in the Delivery of Detained Persons to the Proper Judicial Authorities
(162) What are the elements of the crime defined under Article 125 of the RPC?
1.
2.
3.
That the offender is a public officer or employee;
That he has detained a person for some legal ground; and
That he failed to deliver such person to the proper judicial authorities within:
a. Twelve (12) hours for offenses or crimes punishable by light penalties or their equivalent;
b. Eighteen (18) hours for offenses or crimes punishable by correctional penalties or their equivalent;
and
c. Thirty-six (36) hours for offenses or crimes punishable by afflictive penalties or their equivalent
(REYES, Book Two, supra at 65).
Note: Period is three (3) days for those charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to
commit terrorism (R.A. No. 9372, Sec. 18).
(163) Does Article 125 apply to all cases of arrest?
No. Article 125 applies only to arrests made without a warrant. If the arrest was made pursuant to a warrant,
the prisoner is already deemed in the court's custody and the officer has only to deliver him without
unnecessary delay to the nearest police station or jail (RULES OF COURT, Rule 113, Sec. 3).
Note: The person arrested pursuant to a warrant can be detained indefinitely until the court decides his case
or he posts bail. The reason is that there is already a complaint or information filed against him making his
delivery to the court unnecessary (REYES, Book Two, supra at 66).
(164) May the conditions under Article 125 be waived?
Before the complaint or information is filed, the person arrested may ask for a preliminary investigation in
accordance with the rule, but he must sign a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code,
in the presence of his counsel (RULES OF COURT, Rule 112, Sec. 6, Par. (2)).
46
Violation of Domicile
(165) In the morning of April 19, 2014, X, lieutenant of the barrio, made his appearance at the gate of the yard
of Y’s house, and stated that he intended to enter the house and search it. The landlady objected to
such a search. In spite of her opposition to such a search, not being provided with and showing no
court order, X insisted upon entering the said dwelling under a threat that he would procure a search
warrant. He entered and proceeded to search the house and inspect some jars and baskets. The
inhabitants were not aware of what was being searched for. What crime/s did X commit?
X is liable for violation of domicile. Under Article 128 of the RPC, the elements are: (1) that the offender is a
public officer or employee; (2) that he is not authorized by judicial order to enter the dwelling and/or to make a
search for papers or other effects; and (3) that the offender shall: (a) enter any dwelling against the will of the
owner thereof; (b) search papers or other effects found therein without the previous consent of such owner; or
(c) refuse to leave the premises, after having surreptitiously entered said dwelling and after having been
required to leave the same.
In this case, (1) X is a lieutenant of the barrio making him a public officer; (2) the facts stated that X was not
authorized by judicial order; and (3) X searched jars and baskets without the previous consent of the owners.
Hence, X is liable for violation of domicile (U.S. v. Macaspac, G.R. No. L-3878, November 16, 1907).
Anti-Torture Act of 2oo9 (RA 9745)
(166) What is torture as defined by R.A. No. 9745? What constitutes "other cruel, inhuman and degrading
treatment or punishment"?
"Torture" refers to an act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted
on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him/her or a third person information or a confession;
punishing him/her for an act he/she or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed; or
intimidating or coercing him/her or a third person; or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when
such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a person in
authority or agent of a person in authority. It does not include pain or Buffering arising only from, inherent in or
incidental to lawful sanctions (R.A. No. 9745, Sec. 3, par. a).
Other cruel, inhumane and degrading treatment or punishment refers to a deliberate and aggravated treatment
or punishment not enumerated under Section 4 of this Act, inflicted by a person in authority or agent of a
person in authority against a person under his/her custody, which attains a level of severity causing suffering,
gross humiliation or debasement to the latter (R.A. No. 9745, Sec. 3, par. b).
(167) Is torture a separate and independent crime or an aggravating circumstance?
Both. Under R.A. No. 9745, torture as a crime shall not absorb or shall not be absorbed by any other crime or
felony committed as a consequence, or as a means in the conduct or commission thereof. In which case,
torture shall be treated as a separate and independent criminal act whose penalties shall be imposable without
prejudice to any other criminal liability provided for by domestic and international laws (R.A. No. 9745, Sec.
15). Under the same law, if crimes against persons, personal liberty and security under the Revised Penal
Code is attended by any of the acts constituting torture and other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or
punishment as defined herein, the penalty to be imposed shall be in its maximum period (R.A. No. 9745, Sec.
22).
(168) X was arrested and imprisoned for his alleged ties with NPA. To elicit information about his
involvement and divulge the names of his superiors in the organization, X was subjected to torture by
Y and Z, both military personnel. Thereafter, X admitted the allegation and named several names as
members of the subversive group. May the information obtained through torture be used against X or
a third person?
No, the information elicited from X through torture cannot be used against him or a third person. R.A. No. 9745
strengthens the right of an arrested person not to be subjected to physical or mental torture while under
detention. This law provides that, the freedom from torture and other cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment
and punishment is an absolute right, even during a public emergency. As in R.A. No. 7438, any confession,
admission, or statement obtained as a result of torture shall be inadmissible in evidence in any proceeding,
except if the same is used as evidence against a person or persons accused of committing torture (Lagman v.
Medialdea, G.R. No. 231658, July 4, 2017).
47
CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC ORDER (ARTS. 134-160)
(169) What are political crimes?
Political crimes are those directly aimed against the political order and common crimes that may be committed
to achieve a political purpose. The decisive factor is the intent or motive. If a crime usually regarded as
common, like homicide, is perpetrated to remove from the allegiance "to the Government the territory of the
Philippines Islands or any part thereof" then said offense becomes stripped of its "common" complexion,
inasmuch as, being part and parcel of the crime of rebellion, the former acquires the political character of the
latter (People v. Hernandez, G.R. Nos. L-6025-26, July 18, 1956).
Rebellion
(170) X, without taking arms or being in open hostility against the Government, incited others to deprive
Congress of its legislative powers by means of speeches or writings. What crime was committed by
X? (2012 Bar)
X committed the crime of Inciting to Rebellion. Under Article 138 of the RPC, this crime may be committed by
an offender who does not take arms or is not in open hostility against the government. The offender must incite
other to the execution of any of the acts of rebellion and the inciting must be done through speeches or
proclamations. Under Article 134 of the RPC, depriving the Congress, wholly or partially, of any of their powers
or prerogatives is considered as an act of rebellion. Here, X through his speeches and writings incited others
to deprive the Congress of its legislative powers hence, he is liable for inciting to rebellion.
(171) The prosecution charged X, Y and Z with rebellion with multiple murder, arson and robbery. The
prosecution alleged that X, Y and Z took arms with the HUKBALAHAP, a rebel group, to commit armed
raids, ambushes and attacks against the police, constabulary and armed detachments, and innocent
civilians. It is further alleged that, as a necessary means to commit rebellion, they also committed the
crime of murder, arson and robbery. Was the charge of the prosecution correct?
No, the charge was not correct. The theory of absorption applies in this case. If a crime usually regarded as
common, like homicide, is perpetrated to remove from the allegiance to the Government the territory of the
Philippine Islands or any part thereof then said offense becomes stripped of its common complexion, in as
much as, being part and parcel of the crime of rebellion, the former acquired the political character of the latter.
The killing, in this case, was committed in furtherance of rebellion. It is absorbed by the crime of rebellion under
the theory of absorption, hence, only a single charge of rebellion is proper (People v. Hernandez, G.R. Nos. L6025-26, July 18, 1956; Lagman v. Medialdea G.R. No. 231658, July 27, 2017).
(172) There was a rebellion staged by several people in the City of Marawi. Among those who participated
in the rebellion were X and Y. X concealed and harbored Y to protect him from being captured by the
police. X was charged with a violation of Presidential Decree 1829 which penalizes obstruction of
apprehending of criminal offenders and was also charged for the crime of Rebellion under the RPC.
May X be separately charged for Rebellion and for violation of P.D No. 1829?
No. According to the Supreme Court in the case of Enrile vs. Amin, all crimes, whether punishable under a
special law or general law, which are mere components or ingredients, or committed in furtherance thereof,
become absorbed in the crime of rebellion and cannot be isolated and charged as separate crimes in
themselves. Theory of absorption in rebellion does not confine itself to common crimes but also to offenses
under special laws which are perpetrated in furtherance of the political offense. In this case, it is clear from the
facts that the act of X in concealing and protecting Y from the police officers was committed in furtherance of
rebellion thus constituting a component thereof. It was motivated by the single intent or resolution to commit
the crime of rebellion (Enrile v. Amin, G.R. No. 93335, September 13, 1990).
Coup d'état
(173) X and his companions were charged before the RTC of Makati of coup d’etat, and in the Military Court,
particularly for acts unbecoming of an officer and a gentleman under the Articles of War. While the
case was in trial, they filed a motion to assume jurisdiction over all the charges filed before the RTC
contending that violations of Articles of War is already absorbed in the crime of coup d’etat. The RTC
48
granted the motion saying that indeed violation of Articles of War is absorbed in the crime of coup
d’etat. Was the RTC correct?
No. Supreme Court held that coup d’etat cannot absorb violation of the Articles of War. The theory of absorption
in rebellion and coup d’etat would lie only in cases which could be heard by the same court. It refers only to
cases or crimes under the jurisdiction of the same court. In this case, the crime of coup d’etat is under the
jurisdiction of civilian court, specifically the Regional Trial Court of Makati, whereas violation of the Articles of
War is under the jurisdiction of the Military Court. Violation of Articles of War cannot be heard, it is not within
the jurisdiction of any civilian court, hence, coup d’etat cannot absorb violation of articles of war. Furthermore,
a violation of the Articles of War is sui generis, it is a crime of its own, nothing compares to it, no one is the
same as violation of the Articles of War, hence, unlike any other law, it cannot be absorbed by coup d'état or
rebellion (Gonzales v. Abaya, G.R. No. 164007, August 10, 2006).
Direct Assault
(174) What is the effect when homicide, murder or serious physical injuries concur with direct assault?
When the assault results in the killing of an agent or of a person in authority for that matter, there arises the
complex crime of Direct Assault with murder or homicide (People v. Vidal, G.R. No. 229678, June 20, 2018).
On the other hand, if direct assault is committed and the person in authority or his agent suffers serious or less
serious physical injuries, the crime shall be a complex crime of direct assault with serious or less serious
physical injuries (REYES, Book Two, supra at 174). The crime of slight physical injuries is absorbed in direct
assault, as the same is the necessary consequence of the force or violence inherent in all kinds of assault
(People v. Acierto, G.R. No. 26595, November 28, 1932).
(175) X, a lady professor, caught Y, one of her students, cheating during an examination. Aside from calling
Y’s attention, she confiscated his examination booklet and sent him out of the room, causing Y extreme
embarrassment. In class the following day, Y approached X and slapped her on the face without any
warning. Y would have inflicted grave injuries on X had Z, another student, not intervened. Y then
turned his ire on Z and punched him repeatedly, causing him injuries.
(a)
What crime did Y commit against X?
Y is liable for Qualified Direct Assault with respect to X. Under Article 148 of the RPC the crime of Direct Assault
may be committed by an offender by attacking a person in authority or his agent while they are engaged in the
actual performance of their official duties. In this case, Y slapped his teacher X, who is a person in authority
as expressly provided in Article 152 of the RPC. X was in the performance of her duties on the day of the
commission of the assault. The crime of Direct Assault is qualified since the laying of hands upon a person in
authority qualifies Direct Assault.
(b)
What crime or crimes did Y commit against Z? (2013 Bar)
Direct Assault was committed by Y to Z. Article 152 of the RPC states that any person who comes to the aid
of persons in authority shall be deemed an agent of a person in authority. Under Article 148 of the RPC, the
crime of direct assault may be committed by an offender by attacking a person in authority or his agent. Here,
Z became an agent of the person in authority when he came to the aid of a person in authority, X. Hence, the
crime of direct assault was committed against him when Y punched him repeatedly (Gelig v. People, G.R. No.
173150, July 28, 2010).
(176) A police officer was manning traffic along Taft Avenue. Despite his presence, traffic was still heavy
and the cars were not moving. X, one of the drivers of a car stuck in the traffic was so mad. He alighted
from his vehicle and went directly to the police officer and boxed the police officer several times. The
police officer fell on the ground. The police officer suffered less serious physical injuries.
(a)
What crime or crimes are committed by X?
The crime committed by X is the complex crime of direct assault with less serious physical injuries. Under
Article 148 of the RPC, the crime of direct assault may be committed by attacking an agent of a person in
authority while he is engaged in the actual performance of his official duties. The crime is complexed with Less
Serious Physical Injuries by virtue of Article 48 of the RPC. In this case, the police officer is considered as an
agent of a person in authority. X punched the police officer while the said police officer was manning traffic
along Taft Avenue. As a result, the police officer suffered less serious physical injuries hence, it is proper to
charge X of the crime of Direct Assault with Less Serious Physical Injuries.
49
(b)
What if in the same problem, a pedestrian saw X punching the police officer. The pedestrian then
tried to stop X. This angered X and as a result he also punched the pedestrian. What crime was
committed against the pedestrian?
The crime committed was Indirect Assault. Under Article 149 of the RPC, the crime of Indirect Assault is
committed when a person who comes to the aid of an agent of a person in authority is a victim of any of the
forms of direct assault under Article 149. In this case, the pedestrian came to the aid of the police officer who
was being boxed by X. Hence, X is liable for the crime of Indirect Assault.
Evasion of Service of Sentence
(177) X was convicted and sentenced to a penalty of destierro. By virtue of such final judgment he was
prohibited from entering the city of Manila. A few days after, X went to the City of Manila. X was charged
with Evasion of Service of Sentence. Was the charge correct?
Yes, X is liable for the crime of Evasion of Service of Sentence. Under Article 157 or the RPC, the crime may
be committed if the offender is convicted by a final judgment and evades the service of his sentence by
escaping during the term of his sentence. The sentence must consist in deprivation of liberty. Furthermore, in
the case of People v. Abilong, the Supreme Court held that since the RPC was originally approved and enacted
in Spanish, the Spanish text governs. It is clear that the word “imprisonment” used in the English text is a wrong
translation of the phrase “sufriendo privacion de libertad” used in the Spanish text. Here, the penalty of destierro
was imposed. Destierro is a deprivation of liberty, though partial, in the sense that X, by his sentence of
destierro was deprived of the liberty to enter the City of Manila. X therefore evaded his sentence by entering
the City during the period of his sentence (People v. Abilong, G.R. No. L-1960, November 26, 1948).
(178) D, a drug syndicate member, was a detention prisoner in the provincial jail of X Province. B, another
syndicate member, regularly visited D. E, the guard in charge who had been receiving gifts from B
every time the latter visited D, became friendly with E and relaxed in the inspection of B’s belongings
during B’s jail visits. In one of B’s visits, he was able to smuggle a pistol which Dancio used to disarm
the guards and destroy the padlock of the jail's main gate, enabling D to escape. (2015 Bar)
(a) Did D commit the crime of evasion of service of sentence?
No, D did not commit the crime of evasion of service of sentence. To be convicted under Article 157 of the
RPC, the accused shall evade service of his sentence by escaping during the term of his imprisonment by
reason of final judgment. In this case, D was only a detention prisoner. By escaping while undergoing
preventive imprisonment, D is not evading the service of his sentence.
(b)
What other crimes, if any, did D commit?
D committed the crime of direct assault. Under Article 148 of the RPC, the crime of direct assault may be
committed by attacking an agent of a person in authority while he is engaged in the actual performance of his
official duties. Disarming the guards with the use of pistol while they are engaged in the performance of their
duties constitutes direct assault.
(c)
What crime, if any, did B commit?
B committed the crime of delivery of prisoner from jail qualified by bribery. Under Article 156 of the RPC, helping
a person confined in jail to escape constitutes a crime. Helping means furnishing the prisoner with the material
means or tools which greatly facilitate his escape. In this case, B provided D with a pistol which helped D to
escape. Thus, B is liable for the crime of delivery of prisoner from jail.
(d)
What crime, if any, did E commit?
E committed the crime of infidelity in the custody of a prisoner or evasion through negligence under Article 224.
As the guard in charge, E was negligent in relaxing the inspection of B’s belongings during jail visits allowing
B to smuggle a pistol to D, which D used to escape. By accepting gifts from B, who was part of the syndicate
to which D belonged, E is also guilty of indirect bribery under Article 211 of the RPC.
Comprehensive Firearms and Ammunition Regulation Act (RA 10591)
50
(179) Enumerate the qualifications for the Issuance of and Obtaining a License to Own and Possess
Firearms.
1.
2.
3.
The applicant must be a:
Filipino citizen;
At least twenty-one (21) years old; and
Has gainful Work, Occupation or Business or has filed an Income Tax Return (ITR) for the preceding
year as proof of income, profession, business or occupation.
In addition, the applicant shall submit the following certification issued by appropriate authorities attesting the
following:
1. The applicant has not been convicted of any crime involving Moral turpitude;
2. The applicant has passed the Psychiatric test administered by a PNP-accredited psychologist or
psychiatrist;
3. The applicant has passed the Drug test conducted by an accredited and authorized drug testing
laboratory or clinic;
4. The applicant has passed a Gun Safety seminar which is administered by the PNP or a registered
and authorized gun club;
5. The applicant has filed in writing the application to possess a Registered Firearm which shall state
the personal circumstances of the applicant;
6. The applicant must present a Police Clearance from the city or municipality police office; and
7. The applicant has not been convicted or is currently an accused in a pending criminal case before
any court of law for a crime that is punishable with a penalty of more than two (2) years.
8. For purposes of this Act, an acquittal or permanent dismissal of a criminal case before the courts of
law shall qualify the accused thereof to qualify and acquire a license (R.A. No. 10591, Sec. 4).
(180) X and Y were drinking and partying at Roxas Club, and suddenly, five successive gunshots were fired
through the window. X and Y sustained shots on their head, and they were immediately brought to the
hospital, but were pronounced dead on arrival. The person who fired the gunshots was Z. He was later
charged and found guilty of Murder with the aggravating circumstance of loose firearms. The counsel
of X and Y contend that Z should also be punished for Illegal Possession of Firearms pursuant to R.A.
No. 10591. Is X and Y’s counsel contention correct?
No. The contention of X and Y’s counsel is not correct. In the case of People v. Gaborne, the Supreme Court
clarified the issue, to wit:
In view of the amendments introduced by R.A. No. 8294 and R.A. No. 10591, to Presidential Decree No. 1866,
separate prosecutions for homicide and illegal possession are no longer in order. Instead, illegal possession
of firearm is merely to be taken as an aggravating circumstance in the crime of murder. It is clear from the
foregoing that when murder results from the use of an unlicensed firearm, the crime is not qualified illegal
possession but, murder. In such a case, the use of the unlicensed firearm is not considered as a separate
crime but rather a mere aggravating circumstance. Where murder was committed, the penalty for illegal
possession of firearms is no longer imposable since it becomes merely a special aggravating circumstance.
Hence, the contention of X and Y’s counsel is wrong (People v. Gaborne, G.R. No. 210710, July 27, 2016).
CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC INTEREST (ARTS. 161-187)
Falsification by Public Officer, Employee, or Notary, or Ecclesiastical Minister
(181) The Sangguniang Barangay (SB) of Municipality M requested International Builders Corporation (IBC)
to change the course of their river, and they authorized Mayor R to negotiate with IBC. The Municipality
M then entered into a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with IBC, allowing IBC to receive surplus sand
and gravel after constructing the dike. Later, a criminal complaint under Art. 171 of the Revised Penal
Code (RPC) was filed before the Ombudsman against all the accused including Vice Mayor P for
making it appear that the Minutes of the Regular Session of the SB for Reso. Nos. 30-A and 30-B were
deliberated and approved when no such resolutions were passed and/or enacted. Another criminal
complaint was filed for violation of Sec. 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 for giving unwarranted benefits and
advantages and displaying manifest impartiality, in favor of IBC by entering a contract grossly
disadvantageous to the government.
Vice Mayor P denied the falsification charge, claiming the offered minutes were certified, and argued
against the corrupt practices charge, stating that Reso. No. 30-B did not benefit anyone. A
prosecution witness testified that Exhibit "8" (the minutes) was falsified with added phrases and
paragraphs to make it appear that the Resolutions were enacted.
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(a)
Is Vice Mayor P guilty of falsification of public documents under Art. 171 of the RPC?
Yes, Vice Mayor P is guilty of falsification of public documents under Art. 171 of the RPC. Falsification of a
Public Document is committed when the public document is simulated "in a manner so as to give it the
appearance of a true and genuine instrument, thus, leading others to errors as to its authenticity.
In this case, all the elements of falsification of public documents are present. As the Vice Mayor, P took
advantage of his position to falsify the Minutes of the SB to make it appear that the SB deliberated on the
issuance of the subject. This was substantiated by the testimony of some SB members that they did not
deliberate on the issuance of the resolutions and that the Minutes contained insertions not deliberated upon.
Further, the refusal of some SB members to sign the falsified minutes sufficiently proved that the minutes did
not reflect the true and actual proceedings of the session. Additionally, there is no need to present the alleged
true copy of the Minutes to be held liable under Art. 171. It is undisputed, and in fact admitted by Vice Mayor
P himself, that he took part in executing Exhibit "8" and even signed it (People v. Mondejar, G.R. Nos. 24593132, April 25, 2022, Hernando Case).
(b)
Is Vice Mayor P guilty of committing corrupt practices of public officials under Sec. 3(e) of RA
3019?
Yes, Vice Mayor P is guilty of committing corrupt practices of public officials under Sec. 3(e) of RA 3019. In
Ampil v. Office of the Ombudsman, the Court specified the following elements of the offense falling under Sec.
3(e) of RA 3019: (a) The offender is a public officer; (b) The act was done in the discharge of the public officer's
official, administrative or judicial functions; (c) The act was done through manifest partiality, evident bad faith,
or gross inexcusable negligence; and (d) The public officer caused any undue injury to any party, including the
Government, or gave any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference.
The records show that Vice Mayor P deliberately acted with manifest partiality and bad faith when he, as the
presiding officer of the SB, falsified Exhibit “8". As a result, Mayor R was given authority to enter into a MOA
with IBC which was grossly disadvantageous to the government since it give IBC unwarranted benefits,
advantages, or preferences by getting the surplus supply of sand and gravel extracted from the river despite
not having the necessary permit in violation of Sec. 138 of the Local Government Code (LGC) which provides
that the permit to extract sand, gravel, and other quarry resources shall be issued exclusively by the provincial
governor, by virtue of an ordinance of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan (People v. Mondejar, G.R. Nos. 24593132, April 25, 2022, Hernando Case).
(182) R, J, N, D, S, and C were charged with conspiring to make it appear that J, N, D, S, and C were legitimate
job order employees in R's office. B, a former Administrative Aide of R, testified that R instructed her
to submit their names to the Human Resources Department for contract issuance, falsely representing
them as job order employees. B also prepared false Daily Time Records (DTRs), Accomplishment
Reports (AR), and other documents related to their employment. The DTRs indicated they worked from
8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., when they actually did not. R was complicit in falsifying public documents by
signing and certifying false entries in the DTRs.
R argued that J, N, D, S, and C were legitimate job order employees of the provincial government
assigned to her satellite office. Job order employees were not required to submit DTRs as they were
not considered government employees according to Civil Service Commission Resolution No. 020790 and their contracts. The DTRs were intended merely for processing the salaries of the job order
employees. Admittedly, the DTRs of J, N, D, S, and C, did not necessarily reflect their true time of
arrival and departure because they were practically living in the satellite office as they stayed there
24 hours a day, seven days a week. Is malicious intent essential to establish the guilt of the accusedappellants for Falsification of Public Documents and for violating Sec. 3(3) of R.A. No. 3019?
Yes, malicious intent must be attendant in both crimes to establish the guilt of the accused-appellants.
Falsification of Public Documents has the following elements: (1) the offender is a public officer, employee, or
notary public; (2) the offender takes advantage of his or her official position; and (3) the offender falsifies a
document by committing any of the acts enumerated in Article 171 of the RPC. To warrant a conviction for
Falsification of Public Documents by making untruthful statements in a narration of facts under Article 171,
paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code, the prosecution must establish beyond reasonable doubt the following
elements: (1) the offender makes in a public document untruthful statements in a narration of facts; (2) he or
she has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated by him or her; and (3) the facts narrated
are absolutely false. In Falsification of Public Documents, the offender is considered to have taken advantage
of his or her official position in making the falsification when (1) he or she has the duty to make or prepare or,
otherwise, to intervene in the preparation of a document; or (2) he or she has the official custody of the
document which he falsifies. Further, criminal intent is required in order for criminal liability to be incurred under
Art. 171 of the RPC.
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Here, the accused-appellants cannot be held criminally culpable for the falsification of public documents by
making untruthful statements in a narration of facts in the absence of a clear showing that they acted with
malicious intent when they affixed their signatures on the contested documents. With regard to the charge of
violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019, R did not act in evident bad faith when she signed the contracts of services.
DTRs and ARs did not act in evident bad faith when they received their salaries. It was sufficiently proven that
they were actually engaged by the provincial government under job contracts. (People v. Roflo, G.R. Nos.
249564 & 249568-76; March 21, 2022, Hernando Case)
(183) Mayor Y is the incumbent mayor of municipality X. Pursuant to his authority to appoint as the chief
executive, he appointed his legitimate son, M, as meat inspector in the office of the municipal treasurer.
He signed the appointment document — Civil Service Form No. 40 — twice, first as the appointing
authority and second, as the personnel officer, certifying that all the required supporting papers have
been complied with, reviewed and found to be in order to be submitted to the Civil Service Commission.
Among the supporting papers required for the appointment is the Certification declaring M is not
related to him and to any person exercising immediate supervision over him within the third degree of
either consanguinity or affinity. The appointee, however, neither assumed the position to which he was
appointed nor collected the salary corresponding to it.
(a)
What is the criminal liability of Mayor Y, if any?
He is liable for committing falsification of public document under Art. 171, par. 4 of the RPC. This fourth kind
of falsification has the following requisites that must concur: (a) that the offender makes in a document
untruthful statements in a narration of facts; (b) that he has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts
narrated by him; and (c) that the facts narrated by the offender are absolutely false. Mayor Y was a public
officer being then the incumbent mayor of the Municipality X, when he issued the appointment. In connection
with such appointment, Mayor Y taking advantage of his official position, issued the certification — a public
document — stating therein that he is not related to the appointee within the third degree of consanguinity or
affinity; but he had the legal obligation to disclose his true relationship with the appointee. The facts narrated
by him in the said certification are absolutely false because the bare fact and naked truth is that the appointee
is his legitimate son (Layno v. People, G.R. No. 93842, September 7, 1992).
(b)
Mayor Y raises the defense of lack of criminal intent to commit the crime by his withdrawal of
the appointment, followed by his order to the municipal treasurer not to honor the
appointment of his son and not to allow him to report for work; being in good faith, he should
not be liable for any crime. Is he correct? Discuss.
No, Mayor Y's claim of good faith is unavailing. Although Art. 171 allows the defense of good faith in the crime
of falsification of public documents by making untruthful statements in a narration of facts. He brazenly certified
that he was not related to him within the 3rd degree of consanguinity. The perversion was designed to conceal
his father-son relationship from the Civil Service Commission and thereby deceived it, as it was in fact
deceived, in approving the appointment he extended to him. The criminal intent is not only obvious, but is also
presumed, from the untruthful narration of fact. The crime of falsification having already been committed, no
acts showing subsequent repentance and abandonment of purpose, even if true, can relieve the accused of
his penal liability (Layno v. People, G.R. No. 93842, September 7, 1992).
(184) When is the commencement period of prescription for instituting criminal actions for falsification of
public document?
If the offense is falsification of a public document punishable under Art 172 of the RPC, the period for
prescription commences on the date of registration of the forged or falsified document (Lim v. People, G.R.
No. 226590, April 23, 2018).
(185) In the implementation of the “Medical Indigency Program”, various purchase orders (POs) and
requests for medical supplies were approved by AAA, Governor of the Province of Camarines Norte.
After a post-audit of the COA, it was revealed that the purchase orders for medicines from a supplier
was altered to make it appear that they were prepared after a public bidding was held when in fact they
were prepared by BBB, then OIC of the General Services Office, and approved by AAA prior thereto.
AAA argued that he may have acted negligently when he affixed his signature on the subject purchase
orders, which document were forwarded to him with all the necessary signatures of his subordinates,
and that he had no criminal intent. He stressed that he relied on his subordinates and provincial
officers in good faith. May AAA be convicted of the crime of falsification of public document?
Yes. Wrongful intent on the part of the accused to injure a third person is not an essential element of the crime
of falsification of public document. The elements of falsification by a public officer or employee or notary public
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are that: (1) the offender is a public officer or employee or notary public; (2) the offender takes advantage of
his official position; and (3) he or she falsifies a document by committing any of the acts mentioned in Art. 171
of the RPC. The act of "altering true dates" requires that: (1) the date mentioned in the document is essential;
and (2) the alteration of the date in a document must affect either the veracity of the document or the effects
thereof. The principal thing punished is the violation of the public faith and the destruction of truth as therein
solemnly proclaimed. Hence, changing the date in the subject PO was not a mere correction but an act of
falsification to make it appear that a bidding was conducted prior to ordering the medicines (Typoco, Jr. v.
People, G.R. No. 221857, August 16, 2017).
Falsification by Private Individual and Use of Falsified Documents
(186) D applied for a salary loan from XYZ Cooperative by misrepresenting himself as an employee of the
City’s Engineer’s Office by using the name “T” to the loan clerk of said cooperative. Likewise, he
presented his employee’s I.D. from the City Engineer’s Office bearing the name of T. He also gave
supporting documents: the certification from the City Human Resource, Certificate of Employment,
service record and promissory note. All such documents reflected the name of “T” as the loan
applicant and debtor. Through his misrepresentation, the loan clerk gave him the cash advances.
However, the real T was informed that his name was used to applied for a salary loan. If you were the
lawyer of the real T, what crime will you file against D? Explain.
I will file a complaint for estafa through falsification of commercial documents against D. The elements of the
crime of falsification of commercial documents under Article 172(1) are: (1) the offender is a private individual;
(2) the offender committed any of the acts of falsification enumerated in Article 171 of the RPC; and (3) the act
of falsification is committed in a commercial document. In the given facts, D is a private individual; he caused
it to appear that T had participated in the act of applying for a loan, in fact, he did not do so, the falsification
was committed in a loan application and a promissory note which are all commercial documents considering
that these instruments are used by merchants or businessmen to promote or facilitate trade or credit
transactions. Moreover, D used the falsified documents in applying for a salary loan which resulted in the
eventual release and withdrawal of the cash advances which he converted to his personal use and benefit
resulting in damage to T. It must be emphasized anew that when the offender commits on a public, official, or
commercial document any of the acts of falsification enumerated in Article 171 of the RPC as a necessary
means to commit another crime like estafa, the two crimes form a complex crime (Desmoparan v. People, G.R.
No. 233598, March 27, 2019 citing De Castro v. People, G.R. No. 171672, February 2, 2015).
CRIMES RELATIVE TO OPIUM AND OTHER PROHIBITED DRUGS
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 [RA 9165, as amended by RA 10640;
Section 21 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) only]
(187) What twin conditions to justify a procedural lapse under Section 21 of R.A 9165?
In a case, the Supreme Court mentioned that for justifiable reasons, non-compliance with the procedure under
Section 21 of R.A 9165 may be justified provided that the prosecution is able to sufficiently explain the reasons
behind the procedural lapses, and that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized evidence had
nonetheless been preserved (People v. Crispo, G.R. No. 230065, March 14, 2018).
Additionally, in a case, it was emphasized by the Supreme Court that the justifiable ground for non-compliance
must be proven as a fact and cannot be presumed by the Court (People v. De Guzman, G.R. G.R. No. 186498,
March 26, 2010).
(188) What is the Chain of Custody rule in Drug Cases?
The rule on chain of custody establishes the identity of the object of the sale or the item possessed by the
accused without authority. The purpose of this rule is to preserve the integrity and evidentiary value of the
seized dangerous drugs to fully remove doubts as to its identity. It must be shown that the items presented
and identified in court during trial are the same items sold and seized from the accused during the buy-bust
operation (People v. Batino, G.R. No. 254035, November 15, 2021, Hernando Case).
(189) Who are the persons that must be present during physical inventory and photographing of the seized
items?
The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure
and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s
54
from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative
from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to
sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof (IRR of R.A. No. 9165, Section 21(a)).
(190) What is the purpose of the law in requiring the presence of a media representative or a DOJ
representative during the physical inventory and photographing of the seized items in Drug Cases?
The purpose of the law in requiring the presence of certain witnesses, at the time of the seizure and inventory
of the seized items, is to "insulate the seizure from any taint of illegitimacy or irregularity." (People v. Maganon,
G.R. No. 234040, June 26, 2019)
(191) Discuss the mandatory policy enumerated by the SC in relation to the Chain of Custody Rule.
The mandatory policy in relation to the Chain of Custody Rule are as follows:
In the sworn statements/affidavits, the apprehending/seizing officers must state their compliance
with the requirements of Section 21 (1) of R.A. No. 9165, as amended by R.A. No. 10640, and its IRR.
2. In case of non-observance of the provision, the apprehending/seizing officers must state the
justification or explanation therefor as well as the steps they have taken in order to preserve the
integrity and evidentiary value of the seized/ confiscated items.
3. If there is no justification or explanation expressly declared in the sworn statements or affidavits,
the investigating fiscal must not immediately file the case before the court. Instead, he or she must
refer the case for further preliminary investigation in order to determine the (non) existence of
probable cause.
4. If the investigating fiscal filed the case despite such absence, the court may exercise its discretion
to either refuse to issue a commitment order (or warrant of arrest) or dismiss the case outright for
lack of probable cause in accordance with Section 5, Rule 112, Rules of Court (People v. Lim, G.R.
No. 231989, September 4, 2018).
1.
(192) Is the provision against plea-bargaining application in R.A. No. 9165, as amended, constitutional int
the said act?
No. The SC deemed it proper to declare as invalid the prohibition against plea bargaining on drug cases until
and unless it is made part of the rules of procedure through an administrative circular duly issued for the
purpose considering that plea bargaining is a rule of procedure. The authority to promulgate such rule
exclusively pertains to the Supreme Court pursuant to its rule-making power under Section 5, Article VIII of the
1987 Constitution (Estipona v. Lobrigo, G.R. No. 226679, August 15, 2017).
(193) What is the role of prosecutors in applying the saving clause found under Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165?
In the People v. Ga-a, it was ruled by the Court that in the course of proving such compliance before the trial
courts, prosecutors must have the initiative to not only acknowledge, but also justify, any perceived deviations
from the procedural requirements of Section 21 (People v. Ga-a, G.R. No. 222559, June 6, 2018).
Note: If, from such full examination of the records, there appears to be unjustified failure to comply with Section
21, it becomes the appellate court's bounden duty to acquit the accused, and perforce, overturn a conviction
(People v. Ga-a, G.R. No. 222559, June 6, 2018).
(194) Acting on an anonymous report, the police authorities served a search warrant to B’s apartment. The
police officers discovered that the house is being used for shabu sessions. The officers were able to
apprehend B, together with 3 other individuals, including his girlfriend A who was caught in a room
with scattered sachets of shabu. In her defense, A claims that she is a mere tenant and has been
sharing with his common-law husband the place raided by the authorities wherein illegal drugs were
confiscated. She denies knowledge of the rooms being used to store the said drugs. Can A be
convicted of possession under Section 11 of R.A. No. 9165?
Yes, A may be convicted of violation of Sec. 11 of R.A. No. 9165. The essential elements of the crime of illegal
possession of regulated drugs are the following: (1) the actual possession of an item or object which is identified
to be a prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely or consciously
possessed (intent to possess) the said drug. Under the law, possession includes not only actual possession,
but also constructive possession. There is constructive possession when the drug is under the dominion and
control of the accused or when he has the right to exercise dominion and control over the place where it is
found. Exclusive possession or control is not necessary. The finding of illicit drugs and paraphernalia in a
house or building owned or occupied by a particular person raises the presumption of knowledge and
55
possession thereof which, standing alone, is sufficient to convict (People v. Santos, G.R. No. 223142, January
17, 2018).
(195) A is charged with illegal sale of marijuana. PO1 X testified that it was the evidence custodian who
marked the items, and that he bought four teabags of suspected marijuana from A. PO1 Z, however,
claimed that it was him who marked the items sold by A, and that there were only two teabags of
suspected marijuana. A now raises the inconsistencies to dismiss the charge against him. The
prosecution, however, stressed that PO1 X testified that he bought 4 teabags of suspected marijuana
from A which was listed, together with the marked money and their serial numbers, in the Receipt of
the Property Seized. Rule on the inconsistency of testimonies of PO1 X and PO1 Z.
The mere inconsistencies on the testimony of PO1 X and PO1 Z are insufficient to dismiss the charge against
A. In every prosecution for the illegal sale of marijuana, the following elements must be proved: (1) the identities
of the buyer and the seller, the object, and consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment
therefor. What is material to the prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof that the transaction
or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of evidence of corpus delicti. As long as the
testimony of PO1 X who acted as the poseur-buyer is consistent with the evidence on record, the
inconsistencies do not warrant dismissal of the charges. Thus, A’s defense of denial which is unsupported and
unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence becomes negative and self-serving, deserving no weight
(People v. Mendoza, G.R. No. 220759, July 24, 2017).
(196) X was apprehended through a buy-bust operation, and thereafter charged with a violation of R.A. No.
9165, for the sale of prohibited shabu. He protests that the buy-bust did not adhere to the requirements
because the photographing, marking, and inventorying were done at the POEA station instead of the
site of the arrest; and that the barangay officials in attendance were not from the barangay where the
arrest was made. Answering X’s contention, the police officers averred during trial that the team had
to immediately leave the place of arrest to avoid a commotion or reprisal inasmuch as the accused, a
notorious person, could have cohorts around. That officials were not from the barangay where the
arrest was made to avoid leaking the buy-bust operation to X’s cohorts. Is the accused entitled to an
acquittal on the ground that his guilt was not proved beyond reasonable due to substantial lapses in
the chain of custody?
No. The non-compliance with the requirements provided under R.A. No. 9165 under justifiable grounds, as
long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending
officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items. The law does not
expressly require that the marking, photographing and inventorying be always made at the site of the buy-bust
operation, and that the elected officials be always from the place where the buy-bust arrest occurred (People
v. Lamama, G.R. No. 188313, August 27, 2017). In the given case, the non-observance of the proper place
where photographing, marking, and inventorying should take place was justified given the circumstance that
the apprehending officers wanted that the buy-bust operation be unknown to X’s cohorts.
(197) Police officers received a tip that there are various drug users in one of the bars in Makati. Acting on
such tip, a search warrant was served to the owner of the restau-bar. Among those apprehended was
X who was caught holding a sachet of shabu intended for consumption that night. The police officers
filed an information, charging X with two crimes – using and possessing illegal drugs. Did X commit
two separate crimes?
No, X should have been charged with only one crime. Possession is part of illegal use because the latter
necessarily requires the former and the law is compassionate with users. He is presumed to be a user than a
possessor. Only one information will be filed. But if the quantity is such as to show that it is not only for use,
prosecution will be for illegal possession (R.A. No. 9165, Sec. 11 in relation to Sec. 15). In the case at hand,
the quantity of the shabu, a sachet, indicates that X’s intention was to consume the illegal drug recovered from
him. Hence, only one information should have been filed.
(198) During a buy-bust operation, B came, carrying a black traveling bag with him. B approached Police
officer A and demanded for the payment of the marijuana but the latter insisted that she should see
the narcotics first. B acceded to the request and opened the black traveling bag. Police officer A and
the CI inspected the bag and saw three (3) bundles of marijuana stalks and leaves inside. Wasting no
time, Police officer A made the pre-arranged signal, by executing a "missed call" to Police officer P,
and the rest of the team rushed to their location. Police officer P arrested B after apprising the latter of
his constitutional rights and the nature of the crime he had just violated. Police officer P then got hold
of the black traveling bag with three (3) bundles of marijuana inside. The team then brought B to their
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station with Police officer P in possession of the traveling bag and the illegal narcotics in going thereto.
Was Buniag Guilty of the offense Attempted illegal sale of dangerous drugs?
Yes. B should have been convicted of the offense of attempted illegal sale of dangerous drugs. Under the rule
on variance, while B cannot be convicted of the offense of illegal sale of dangerous drugs because the sale
was never consummated, he may be convicted for the attempt to sell as it is necessarily included in the illegal
sale of dangerous drugs. In the present case, B attempted to sell shabu and commenced by overt acts the
commission of the intended crime however, the sale was aborted when Police officer A, upon confirming that
B had with him the marijuana, made a "miss-call" to Police officer P, the pre-arranged signal, and the rest of
the team rushed to the area and placed B under arrest. Thus, B may only be held liable for attempted illegal
sale of dangerous drugs (People v. Bunia y Mercadera, G.R. No. 217661, June 26, 2019).
(199) N was apprehended through a buy-bust operation. Upon a tip to desk officer regarding drug-related
activities, Sta. Barbara Police Station was instructed to conduct a buy-bust operation. The police told
the bystanders that he wanted to buy shabu. N, one of the bystanders, obliged, going in and coming
out of his house carrying 2 plastic sachets, after which, N was arrested. On the other hand, N’s version
was that a group of 7-8 men, later identified as police officers, barged into a house, dragged, and
frisked them, but produced nothing. Was N properly convicted of violation of illegal sale and illegal
possession of dangerous drugs?
No on both charges. To convict a person charged with the crime of illegal sale of dangerous drugs under
Section 5, Article II of RA 9165, the prosecution is required to prove the following elements: (1) the identity of
the buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment
therefor. On the other hand, illegal possession of dangerous drugs under Section 11, Article II of RA 9165 has
the following elements: (1) the accused is in possession of an item or object, which is identified to be a
prohibited or regulated drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and
consciously possessed the drug. As clearly seen in the photographs submitted into evidence by the
prosecution, no photographs were taken during the alleged buy-bust operation and inventory conducted by the
police. Only photographs of the accused-appellant under detention and the supposed marked money and
marked plastic sachets on a table obviously taken inside an office were offered into evidence (People v. Narvas
y Balosoc, G.R. No. 241254; July 8, 2019).
CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC MORALS (ARTS. 200-202)
Grave Scandal
(200) P, a bold actress living on the top floor of a plush condominium in Makati City, sunbathes naked at its
penthouse every Sunday morning. She was unaware that the business executives holding office at the
adjoining tall buildings reported to office every Sunday morning and, using powerful binoculars, kept
gazing at her while she sunbathed. Eventually, her sunbathing became the talk of the town.
(a)
What crime, if any, did P commit?
P did not commit any crime. The felony closest to making P criminally liable is Grave Scandal, but then her act
is not to be considered as highly scandalous and offensive against decency and good customs. In order to be
convicted of grave scandal, the following elements must concur: (1) that the offender performs an act or acts;
(2) that said act is highly scandalous as offending against decency or good customs; (3) that highly scandalous
conduct is not expressly falling within any article of the Code; and (4) that the act or acts complained of be
committed in a public place or within public knowledge or view. P did not know that in a nearby building,
business executives reported to office every Sunday. She cannot be held liable for grave scandal as such is
not committed in a public place or within public knowledge or view (U.S. v. Samaniego, G.R. No. 5115,
November 29, 1909).
(b)
What crime, if any, did the business executives commit? Explain. (1996 Bar)
The business executives cannot be charged with any crime. They cannot be charged with acts of
lasciviousness as Art. 336 requires an act of lewdness committed against another person. They cannot also
be held liable for Libel under Art. 353 as it requires that the source of the derogatory remark be known, and it
be committed in a public and malicious manner. In this case, P becoming the talk of the town cannot be directly
imputed to the business executives.
57
Anti-Gambling Act (PD 1602, as amended by RA 9287)
(201) Define “Illegal Numbers Game as defined under R.A. No. 9287.
Any form of illegal gambling activity which uses numbers or combinations thereof as factors in giving out
jackpots (P.D. No. 1602, as amended by R.A. No. 9287, Sec. 2(a)).
(202) Enumerate the punishable Acts under R.A. No. 9287.
Any person who participates in any illegal numbers game shall suffer the following penalties:
Imprisonment from thirty (30) days to ninety (90) days, if such person acts as a bettor;
Imprisonment from six (6) years and one (1) day to eight (8) years, if such person acts as a personnel
or staff of an illegal numbers game operation. The same penalty shall likewise be imposed to any
person who allows his vehicle, house, building or land to be used in the operation of the illegal
numbers games;
3. Imprisonment from eight (8) years and one (1) day to ten (10) years, if such person acts as a collector
or agent;
4. Imprisonment from ten (10) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years, if such person acts as a
coordinator, controller or supervisor
5. Imprisonment from twelve (12) years and one (1) day to ten (10) fourteen (14) years, if such person
acts as a maintainer, manager or operator; and
6. Imprisonment from fourteen (14) years and one (1) day to sixteen (16) years, if such person acts as
a financier or capitalist;
7. Imprisonment from sixteen (16) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years, if such person acts as
protector or coddler jackpots (P.D. No. 1602, as amended by R.A. No. 9287, Sec. 3).
1.
2.
CRIMES COMMITTED BY PUBLIC OFFICERS (ARTS. 203-245)
Malfeasance and Misfeasance in Office
(203) Define malfeasance, misfeasance, and nonfeasance. (2016 Bar)
1.
2.
3.
Malfeasance is the doing of an act which a person ought not to do at all.
Misfeasance is the improper doing of an act which a person may or might lawfully do.
Nonfeasance is the omission of an act which a person ought to do (Black’s Dictionary, 6th Edition,
West Publishing 1990).
Direct Bribery
(204) Distinguish direct bribery from indirect bribery.
In direct bribery, there is an agreement between the public officer and the giver of the gift or present, while in
indirect bribery, usually no such agreement exists. In direct bribery, the offender agrees to perform or performs
an act or refrains from doing something because of the gift or promise; while in indirect bribery, the officer
doesn't need to do any particular act or even promise to do an act, as it is enough that he accepts gifts offered
to him by reason of his office (Pozar v. CA, G.R. No. L-62439, October 23, 1984).
(205) X, a Japanese national, was accused of being a member of the Yakuza. Y, a Bureau of Immigration and
Deportation (BID) agent, took custody of the passport of X, supposedly as a guarantee for X’s
appearance in the BID office. However, Y demanded Php1,000,000.00 pesos to release the passport
and X paid a down payment of Php25,000.00. What crime is committed?
Y is liable for the second kind of direct bribery under Art. 210 of the RPC, the elements of which are: (1) the
offender was a public officer; (2) who received the gifts or presents personally or through another; (3) in
consideration of an act that did not constitute a crime, and (4) that act related to the exercise of official duties.
The prosecution proved all the elements. First, there is no question that the offense was committed by a public
officer, Y being a BID Agent extorted money from the Aoyagi spouses to return the passport. Second, Y
received the money as payoff. Third, the money was given in consideration of the return of the passport, an
act that did not constitute a crime. Fourth, both the confiscation and the return of the passport were made in
the exercise of official duties (Acejas III v. People, G.R. No. 156643, June 27, 2006).
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Indirect Bribery
(206) What are the elements of indirect bribery?
1.
2.
3.
The elements of indirect bribery are:
That the offender is a public officer;
He accepts gifts; and
The said gifts are offered to him by reason of his office (REYES, Book Two, supra at 466).
(207) Are there stages of execution in the crime of indirect bribery?
No. There is no attempted or frustrated indirect bribery because it is committed by accepting gifts offered to
the public officer by reason of his office. He does not commit the crime if he does not accept the gifts. The
crime is consummated if he accepts the gift (REYES, Book Two at 467).
Qualified Bribery
(208) What is the crime of qualified bribery? May a judge be charged and prosecuted for such felony? How
about a public prosecutor? A police officer? Explain. (2010 Bar)
Qualified bribery is a crime committed by a public officer who is entrusted with law enforcement and who, in
consideration of any offer, promise, gift of offer, refrains from arresting or prosecuting an offender who has
committed a crime punishable by reclusion perpetua and/ or death (RPC, Art. 211-A).
No, a judge may not be charged with this felony because their official duty as a public officer is not law
enforcement, but the determination of cases already filed in court.
On the other hand, a public prosecutor may be prosecuted for this crime in respect of the bribery committed,
aside from dereliction of duty committed in violation of Art. 208 of the Revised Penal Code, should he refrain
from prosecuting an offender who has committed a crime punishable by reclusion perpetua and/or death in
consideration of any offer, promise, gift or present.
Meanwhile, a police officer who refrains from arresting such offender for the same consideration above stated,
may be prosecuted for this felony since he is a public officer entrusted with law enforcement.
Corruption of Public Officials
(209) One Sunday afternoon, Mr. X, President of ABC Corp., bumped into the Labor Arbiter assigned to the
illegal case filed by certain employees against his company. During their encounter, Mr. X promised
the Labor Arbiter a luxury car in exchange for a favorable ruling. The Labor Arbiter immediately
rejected the offer and walked away. What crime did Mr. X commit under the RPC? (2019 Bar)
Mr. X committed the crime of Attempted Corruption of a Public Officer. Art. 212 of the RPC states that any
person who shall have made the offers or promises or given the gifts or present to a public officer is guilty of
corruption of a public officer. In this case, Mr. X, by making an offer, has already commenced the performance
of material acts of execution in corrupting the Labor Arbiter. He could not perform all the material acts of
execution only because the Labor Arbiter refused to accept the offer. Thus, Mr. X is liable of the crime of
Attempted Corruption of a Public officer (Pozar v. CA, G.R. No. L-62439, October 23, 1984).
Malversation
(210) T is the principal of Vigan National High School. He ordered L, the school’s collection and disbursing
officer, to prepare checks representing the teachers’ salaries and allowances after which he endorsed
it to T as the latter will be the one to encash it. However, T never returned to the school and delivered
the money to L. Who is an accountable public officer under Article 217 of the RPC and may T be held
liable for malversation?
An accountable public officer, within the purview of Article 217 of the RPC, custody or control of public funds
or property because of the duties of his office. The nature of the duties of the public officer or employee, the
fact that as part of his duties he received public money for which he is bound to account and failed to account
for it, is the factor which determines whether or not the accused public officer or employee commits
malversation. Hence, a public high school principal, such as T, may be held guilty of malversation if he or she
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is entrusted with public funds and misappropriates the same (Torres v. People, G.R. No 175074, August 31,
2011).
(211) What is/are the effect/s of restitution of the amount in the crime of malversation?
Full restitution of the amount malversed will not in any way exonerate an accused, as payment is not one of
the elements of extinction of criminal liability. Under the law, the refund of the sum misappropriated, even if
made before the commencement of the criminal prosecution, does not exempt the guilty person from liability
for the crime. At most, then, payment of the amount malversed will only serve as a mitigating circumstance
akin to voluntary surrender, as provided for in paragraph 7 of Article 13 in relation to paragraph 10 of the same
article of the RPC (Manuel, et.al. v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 158413, February 8, 2012).
(212) AAA was the Municipal Mayor of Pozorrubio when a group of auditors investigated the accounts of C
and discovered a shortage of Php2,872,808.00 on the joint accounts of C and V. The auditors
discovered that the seventeen (17) cash advances made by AAA were illegal. AAA was likewise not
authorized to receive cash advances. BBB confirmed that the signatures appearing on sixteen (16) of
the seventeen (17) illegal disbursement vouchers belonged to AAA. X, Officer in Charge in the
Municipal Treasurer's Office, testified that the receipts presented by AAA, did not reflect the payments
claimed by AAA. The receipts were issued to different persons, in different amounts and for different
purposes. What crime is committed by AAA? Explain.
AAA committed Malversation of Public Funds. The elements of malversation are: (1) the offender is a public
officer; (2) he had custody or control of funds or property by reason of the duties of his office; (3) those funds
or property were public funds or property for which he was accountable; and (4) he appropriated, took,
misappropriated or consented or, through abandonment or negligence, permitted another person to take them.
AAA was a public officer, being the mayor during the period relevant to the time of the crime charged. During
his term, he incurred unliquidated cash advances amounting to Php2,872,808.00 that constituted funds
belonging to the Municipality of Pozorrubio and earmarked for use by the said municipality. Finally, anent the
last element for the crime of malversation of public funds, AAA failed to return the amount of Php2,572,808.00,
upon demand. His failure or inability to return the shortage upon demand created prima facie evidence that the
funds were put to his personal use, which AAA failed to overturn (Venezuela v. People, G.R. No. 205693,
February 14, 2018).
Illegal Use of Public Funds
(213) Is criminal intent an element of technical malversation? Explain.
No. The law punishes the act of diverting public property earmarked by law or ordinance for a particular public
purpose to another public purpose. The offense is mala prohibita. The commission of an act as defined by law,
and not the character of effect thereof, determines whether or not the provision has been violated. Hence,
malice or intent is completely irrelevant (Ysidoro v. People, G.R No. 192330, November 14, 2012).
Technical Malversation
(214) The Department of Agriculture gave Governor A the amount of Php 10 million to buy seedlings to be
distributed to the farmers. Supposedly intending to modernize the farming industry in his province,
Governor A bought farm equipment through direct purchase from XY Enterprise, owned by his
kumpare B, the alleged exclusive distributor of the said equipment. Upon inquiry, the Ombudsman
discovered that B has a pending patent application for the said farm equipment. Moreover, the
equipment purchased turned out to be overpriced. What crime or crimes, if any, were committed by
Governor A? Explain. (2016 Bar)
Governor A committed the crimes of (1) Technical Malversation if the amount given by the Department of
Agriculture was specifically appropriated by law for the purpose of buying seedlings to be distributed by the
farmers; and (2) Violation of Sections 3 (e)and (g) of R.A. No. 3019. Governor A committed the crime of illegal
use of public funds or property punishable under Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code, also known as
Technical Malversation. The crime has three elements: (1) that the offender is an accountable public officer;
(2) that he applies public funds or property under his administration to some public use; and (3) that the public
use for which such funds or property has been applied is different from the purpose for which they were
originally appropriated by law or ordinance (Ysidro v People, G.R. No. 192330, November 14, 2012).
The amount of Php10M granted by the Department of Agriculture to Governor A, an accountable public officer,
is specifically appropriated to buy seedlings to be distributed to the farmers. Instead, Governor A applied the
amount to acquire modern farm equipment through direct purchase from XY Enterprise owned by his kumpare.
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The law punishes the act of diverting public funds earmarked by law or ordinance for a specific public purpose
to another public purpose, hence, the liability for technical malversation. In the absence of such a law
appropriating the fund allegedly technically malversed, the use thereof for another public purpose will not make
the accused liable for technical malversation (Abdulla v. People, G.R. No. 150129, April 6, 2005).
Governor A can also be held liable for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, which has the following
elements: (1) the accused is a public officer discharging administrative, judicial, or official functions; (2) he
must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross excusable negligence; and (3) his action
caused undue injury to any party, including the government, or gave any private party unwarranted benefits,
advantage or preference in the discharge of his functions.
The facts show that the first element is present. The second element is likewise present because “through
manifest partiality” in favoring his kumpare, Governor A did not hold public bidding and directly purchased the
farm equipment from the latter. With respect to the third element, Governor A’s actions caused undue injury to
the government as well as the farmers deprived of the seedlings. His acts likewise gave his kumpare, a private
party, the unwarranted benefit, advantage, or preference, to the exclusion of other interested suppliers.
The act committed by the Governor also violates Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019 for entering a contract on behalf
of the government which is manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to it.
(215) A typhoon destroyed the houses of many of the inhabitants of X Municipality. Thereafter, X Municipality
operated a shelter assistance program whereby construction materials were provided to the calamity
victims, and the beneficiaries provided the labor. The construction was partially done when the
beneficiaries stopped helping with the construction because they needed to earn income to provide
food for their families. When informed of the situation, Mayor Maawain approved the withdrawal of ten
boxes of food from X Municipality's feeding program, which were given to the families of the
beneficiaries of the shelter assistance program. The appropriations for the funds pertaining to the
shelter assistance program and those for the feeding program were separate items on X Municipality's
annual budget.
(a)
What crime did Mayor Maawain commit? Explain.
Mayor Maawain committed the crime of Illegal use of public funds or property punishable under Article 220 of
the RPC. This offense is also known as Technical Malversation. The crime has three (3) elements: (1) that the
offender is an accountable public officer; (2) that he applies public funds or property under his administration
to some public use; and (3) that the public use for which such funds or property were applied is different from
the purpose for which they were originally appropriated by law or ordinance. The funds for the feeding program
are not specifically appropriated for the beneficiaries of the shelter assistance program in X Municipality’s
annual budget. Mayor Maawain ought to use the boxes of food earmarked particularly for the feeding program,
catering only to the malnourished among his constituents who needed the resources for proper nourishment.
(b)
May Mayor Maawain invoke the defense of good faith and that he had no evil intent when he
approved the transfer of the boxes of food from the feeding program to the shelter assistance
program? Explain. (2015 Bar)
No. Mayor Maawain cannot invoke good faith when he approved the transfer of the boxes of food from the
feeding program to the Shelter Assistance program. “Criminal intent is not an element of technical
malversation. The law punishes the act of diverting public property earmarked by law or ordinance for a
particular purpose to another public purpose. The offense is mala prohibita, meaning that the prohibited act is
not inherently immoral but becomes criminal because positive law forbids its commission based on
considerations of public policy, order and convenience. It is the commission of an act as defined by the law,
and not the character or effect thereof that determines whether or not the provision has been violated. Hence,
malice or criminal intent is completely irrelevant” (Ysidoro v. People, G.R. No. 192330, November 14, 2012).
Conniving with or Consenting to Evasion
(216) J, an assistant provincial warden, received a note allegedly written by Governor A. The note stated that
the governor is asking J to send five inmates to construct a fence at his house then leased by the
province and used as an official guest house. Notwithstanding the fact the J was unsure as to the
genuineness of the note, he complied with the request. Consequently, Prison Guard E picked five men
to work on the fence and he was designated to supervise and monitor the prisoners while working.
However, P, one of the prisoners, was able to run away and escape. Believing that the escape of P was
made possible by the note of Gov. A to J, an information for the crime of conniving with or consenting
to evasion was filed against Gov. A. Will the charge prosper? Explain.
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No. To be guilty under Art. 223 of the RPC, it is necessary that the public officer had consented to, or connived
in, the escape of the prisoner under his custody or charge. Connivance in the escape of a prisoner on the part
of the person in charge is an essential condition in the commission of the crime of faithlessness in the custody
of the prisoner. If the public officer charged with the duty of guarding him does not conspire with the fugitive,
has not violated the law and is not guilty of the crime. No connivance in the escape of P from the custody of
the accused E can be deduced from the note of Gov. A to J, it appearing that the note does not mention the
names of the prisoners to be brought to the guest house; and that it was E himself who picked the men to
compose the work party in the Municipality of Canaman, Province of Camarin (Alberto v. De la Cruz, G.R. No.
L-31839, June 30, 1980).
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (RA 3019, as amended)
(217) What are the prohibitions for certain individuals under R.A. No. 3019?
1.
Prohibition on private individuals
It shall be unlawful for any person having family or close personal relation with any public official to capitalize
or exploit or take advantage of such family or close personal relation by directly or indirectly requesting or
receiving any present, gift or material or pecuniary advantage from any other person having some business,
transaction, application, request or contract with the government, in which such public official has to intervene.
Family relation shall include the spouse or relatives by consanguinity or affinity in the third civil degree. The
word "close personal relation" shall include close personal friendship, social and fraternal connections, and
professional employment all giving rise to intimacy which assures free access to such public officer.
It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly to induce or cause any public official to commit any of the offenses
defined in Section 3 hereof (R.A. No. 3019, Sec 4).
2.
Prohibition on certain relatives
It shall be unlawful for the spouse or for any relative, by consanguinity or affinity, within the third civil degree of
the President of the Philippines, the Vice-President of the Philippines, the President of the Senate, or the
Speaker of the House of Representatives, to intervene, directly or indirectly, in any business, transaction,
contract or application with the Government.
This section shall not apply to any person who, prior to the assumption of office of any of the above officials to
whom he is related, has been already dealing with the Government along the same line of business, nor to
any transaction, contract or application already existing or pending at the time of such assumption of public
office, nor to any application filed by him the approval of which is not discretionary on the part of the official or
officials concerned but depends upon compliance with requisites provided by law, or rules or regulations issued
pursuant to law, nor to any act lawfully performed in an official capacity or in the exercise of a profession. (R.A.
No. 3019, Sec. 5).
3.
Prohibition on Members of Congress
It shall be unlawful hereafter for any Member of the Congress during the term for which he has been elected,
to acquire or receive any personal pecuniary interest in any specific business enterprise which will be directly
and particularly favored or benefited by any law or resolution authored by him previously approved or adopted
by the Congress during the same term.
The provision of this section shall apply to any other public officer who recommended the initiation in Congress
of the enactment or adoption of any law or resolution and acquires or receives any such interest during his
incumbency.
It is also unlawful for such a member of Congress or other public officer, who, having such interest prior to the
approval of such law or resolution authored or recommended by him, continues for thirty days after such
approval to retain such interest (R.A. No. 3019, Sec. 6).
(218) What is the rule on the filing Statement of Assets and Liabilities (SALN) under R.A. No. 3019?
Every public officer, within thirty days after the approval of this Act or after assuming office, and within the
month of January of every other year thereafter, as well as upon the expiration of his term of office, or upon
his resignation or separation from office, shall prepare and file with the office of the corresponding Department
Head, or in the case of a Head of Department or chief of an independent office, with the Office of the President,
or in the case of members of the Congress and the officials and employees thereof, with the Office of the
Secretary of the corresponding House, a true detailed and sworn statement of assets and liabilities, including:
62
(1) a statement of the amounts and sources of his income and (2) the amounts of his personal and family
expenses and the amount of income taxes paid for the next preceding calendar year.
For public officers assuming office less than two months before the end of the calendar year, may file their
statements in the following months of January (R.A. No. 3019, Sec. 7).
(219) What is the difference between gross excusable negligence and evident bad faith under Section 3 (e)
of R.A. No. 3019?
Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 may be committed either by dolo, when the accused acted with evident bad faith
or manifest partiality, or by culpa, when the accused committed gross inexcusable negligence. The two
modalities of violating Section 3 (e) are distinct in their nature of commission: "evident bad faith" entails the
willfulness to do something wrong, whereas "gross inexcusable negligence" entails failure to exercise the
required diligence that either results in a wrong or in the failure to prevent the occurrence of a wrongdoing.
Thus, "gross inexcusable negligence" and "evident bad faith" are separate and distinct modalities, and a charge
of one in an Information may not be considered extendible to a conviction for the other. Petitioner here,
therefore, may not be convicted based on gross inexcusable negligence, since the said modality was not
included in the charge leveled against him on both counts (Buencamino v. People, G.R. Nos. 216745-46.
November 10, 2021).
(220) Can there be a charge for a violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 in the absence of bad faith?
Yes, as evident bad faith is merely one of the three modalities by which a violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No.
3019 may be committed. The two other modalities are manifest partiality and gross inexcusable negligence.
Hence, a prosecution under the said section may be had even in the absence of evident bad faith.
Jurisprudence instructs that a violation of Section 3(e) may be committed in three modes - by "manifest
partiality," "evident bad faith," or "gross inexcusable negligence." Each modality is distinct from the others and
must be alleged in the Information [and duly proved by the prosecution] as basis for conviction (Macairan v.
People, G.R. No. 215104, March 18, 2021).
Note: To constitute evident bad faith or manifest partiality, it must be proven that the accused acted with
malicious motive or fraudulent intent. It is not enough that the accused violated a law, committed mistakes or
was negligent in his duties. There must be a clear showing that the accused was spurred by a corrupt motive
or a deliberate intent to do wrong or cause damage. Mere bad faith or partiality per se is not enough for one to
be held liable under the law since the act of bad faith or partiality must in the first place be evident or manifest
(Macairan v. People, G.R. No. 215104, March 18, 2021).
(221) X, the DOTC Secretary was charged with violation of Sec. 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019 or Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act. Later on, Y, a private individual was also impleaded based on conspiracy. Y contended
that it was an error to charge him, because he was not a public officer – a necessary element of the
crime. May a private individual be held liable under this Act?
Yes, Y may still be held liable for violation of RA 3019. One of the elements of Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019
is "that the accused is a public officer" which does not necessarily preclude its application to private persons
charged with conspiring with public officers in the commission of the offense thereunder. Section 9(a) of RA
3019 bolsters the conclusion that the anti-graft law’s application extends to both public officers and private
persons which provides that any public officer or private person committing any of the unlawful acts or
omissions enumerated in Sections 3, 4, 5 and 6 of this Act shall be punished (Go v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No.
172602, April 13, 2007).
(222) Charina, Clerk of Court of an RTC Branch, promised the plaintiff in a case pending before the court
that she would convince the Presiding Judge to decide the case in plaintiff’s favor. In consideration
therefor, the plaintiff gave Charina Php20,000.00. Charina was charged with violation of Section 3 (b)
of Republic Act No. 3019, prohibiting any public officer from directly or indirectly requesting or
receiving any gift, present, percentage, or benefit in connection with any contract or transaction x x x
wherein the public officer, in his official capacity, has to intervene under the law. Charina was acquitted
from the charge under R.A. No. 3019. The Ombudsman filed another information against Charina for
Indirect Bribery under the RPC. Charina claims she can no longer be charged under the RPC after
being acquitted for the same act under RA 3019. Is Charina correct? Explain. (Modified 2009 Bar)
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No. It is undisputed that the two charges stemmed from the same incident. However, it is well-settled that the
same act may give rise to two or more separate and distinct charges. Further, because there is a variance
between the elements of the two offenses charged, Charina cannot safely assume that her innocence in one
case will extend to the other case even if both cases hinge on the same set of evidence. The acquittal of
petitioner in the anti-graft case is not a bar to her conviction for indirect bribery under the RPC given the
differences between the elements of the two offenses (Lumauig v. People, G.R. No. 166680, July 7, 2014).
(223) S, a sole proprietor of various businesses, filed for a renewal of Business Permit for her ships handling
operations in the Port of Sta. Ana. M, then Mayor, refused to sign S’s Business Permit, despite
compliance with all the other requirements. All other businesses of S have been previously issued with
Business Permits by the LGU. Initially, S was able to carry out its operations despite the lack of the
said Permit by securing temporary permits. However, S’s operations were shut down when the Bureau
of Customs issued a Cease and Desist Order after receiving M's unnumbered Memorandum alleging
that S was involved in smuggling and drug trading. Despite all her pleas, no Business Permit was
issued for S, causing losses for her business. Does M’s refusal to issue a business permit to S violate
Section 3(e), RA 3019, as amended?
Yes. The elements of violation of Section 3(e), R.A. No. 3019, as amended, are present in this case. M is a
public officer who acted with manifest partiality and evident bad faith causing undue injury on the part of S. If
M truly believed that S was indeed engaged in illegal smuggling and drug trading, then he would not have
issued Business Permits to the latter's other businesses. Under these questionable circumstances, M's refusal
to issue a Business Permit to S was committed with manifest partiality against the latter, and in favor of the
other ships handling operators in the Port of Sta. Ana. As regards the issue of bad faith, while it is within the
municipal mayor's prerogative to suspend, revoke, or refuse to issue Business Permits, it must nevertheless
be emphasized that the power to refuse issuance is premised on non-compliance with the prerequisites for
said issuance. It is clear that S had complied with all the prerequisites for the issuance of a Business Permit.
As to the third and last element, M's acts of refusing to issue a Business Permit, coupled with his issuance of
the unnumbered Memorandum which effectively barred S from engaging in its ship handling operations without
such Business Permit, caused some sort of undue injury on the part of S (Fuentes v. People, G.R. No. 186421,
April 17, 2017).
(224) A complaint for estafa was filed against Chinkee by her neighbor after she failed to pay a loan on time.
The complaint was assigned to Jeremy for investigation. One day, Jeremy called Chinkee and asked
for Php 75,000.00 in exchange for the dismissal of the complaint against her. Appalled, Chinkee
reported the matter to NBI. After a successful entrapment operation, Jeremy was charged with a
violation of Section 3(b) of R.A. No. 3019 for demanding Php 75,000.00 as consideration for a favorable
resolution in a case wherein he had to intervene in his official capacity as the Investigating Fiscal. Is
the charge against Jeremy correct?
No, the charge against Jeremy is incorrect. For the charge to prosper, the following elements must be present:
(1) the offender is a public officer (2) who requested or received a gift, a present, a share, a percentage, or a
benefit (30 on behalf of the offender or any other person (4) in connection with a contract or transaction with
the government (5) in which the public officer, in an official capacity under the law, has the right to intervene.
Here, the fourth element is absent since the preliminary investigation conducted by Jeremy was
neither a contract nor a transaction because it did not involve some consideration as in credit
transactions. Jurisprudence has consistently held that Section 3(b) of R.A. No. 3019 is limited only
to contracts or transactions involving monetary consideration where the public officer has the
authority to intervene under the law (Soriano, Jr. V. Sandiganbayan, 216 Phil. 177 (1984)).
(225) Proserfina, an assistant public high school principal, acted to facilitate the release of salary
differentials and election duty per diem of classroom teachers with the agreement that they would
reimburse her for her expenses. Did Proserfina commit a crime? Explain. (2010 Bar)
Yes, Proserfina commited violation of Sec. 3(b) of R.A. No. 3019 which considers as a corrupt practice, the act
of “(b) Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift, present, share percentage, or benefit, for himself
or for any other person, in connection with any contact or transaction between the Government and any other
party, wherein the public officer in his official capacity has to intervene under the law.” Being the assistant
public high school principal, it is her duty to intervene in the release of salary differentials and per diem of
classroom teachers under her. Her act of doing so, made with a request for a share or benefit therefor
constitutes graft or corrupt practices under Sec. 3(b) of R.A. No. 3019. Considering the acts prohibited or
punished under this law are mala prohibita, and thus punishable thereunder, whether done with criminal intent
or not.
[Alternative Answer]: No. In the case of Jaravata v. Sandiganbayan (G.R. No. 56170, January 31, 1984), which
has identical set of facts as the present case, the Supreme Court ruled that there is no law which invests an
assistant principal with the power to intervene in the payment of the salary differentials of classroom teachers
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or anyone for that matter. Accordingly, the assistant principal cannot be said to have violated Sec. 3(b) of R.A.
No. 3019 although she exerted efforts to facilitate the payment of the salary differentials.
(226) In an effort to increase literacy among elementary students in his municipality, Mayor De Vera entered
into memorandum of agreement with Literate Kids Project, a non-stock, non-profit association which
sets up libraries in barangays and organize after-school reading programs for children. The MOA was
signed on October 2021 and had a term of two (2) years. Letlet, Mayor De Vera's wife, who has a track
record of advocating for underprivileged children, was employed as a consultant by Literate Kids
Project on September 2022. In an open forum hosted by the municipality, Ronnie, a concerned citizen,
criticized Letlet's employment for being violative of R.A. No. 3019. Mayor De Vera responded that what
the law prohibits is the employment by a public officer or his family in an «enterprise" that is primarily
organized for profit. Since Literate Kids Project is a non-stock, non-profit organization, Letlet's
employment in it was valid. Is Mayor De Vera correct?
No, Mayor De Vera's contention is incorrect. Letlet's employment with Literate Kids Project is violative of
Section 3(d) of R.A. No. 3019 as all the elements needed to be guilty under this provision are present, to wit:
(a) her husband, Mayor De Vera is a public officer, (b) despite being a member of his family, she accepted
employment in a private enterprise, Literate Kids Project; and, Project; and, (c) such private enterprise has a
pending official business, the MOA, with her husband, Mayor De Vera. The fact that Literate Kids Project is a
non-stock, non-profit group is immaterial since the law does not distinguish if the enterprise is for profit or not,
stock or non-stock. It is an elementary rule in statutory construction that: where the law does not distinguish,
the courts should not distinguish. Ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguere debemus. (Villanueva v. Peopie,
G.R. No. 237864, July 8, 2020).
(227) A is charged with the crime defined in Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act in an
Information that reads:
“*That from 01 to 30 January 1995, in the City of Pasig and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the accused, being then employed in the Office of the District Engineer, Department of Public
Works and Highways and in the discharge of his official administrative functions, did then and there
willfully and unlawfully work for and facilitate the approval of B's claim for the payment of the price
of his land which the government had expropriated, and after the claim was approved, the accused
gave B only Php1,000.00 of the approved claim of Php5,000 and willfully and unlawfully appropriated
for himself the balance of Php4,000, thus causing undue injury to B and the Government. A has filed
a motion to quash the information, contending that it does not charge an offense. Is he correct?
(1997 Bar)
Yes, the contention of A is correct. The Information failed to allege that the undue injury to B and the
government was caused by the accused’s manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable
negligence, which are necessary elements of the offense charged, i.e. violation of Sec. 3€ of the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act. The accused is employed in the Office of the District Engineer of the DPWH which
has nothing to do with the determination and fixing of the price of the land expropriated, and for which
expropriated land the Government is legally obligated to pay. There is no allegation in the Information that the
land was overpriced or that the payment of the amount was disadvantageous to the Government. It appears
that the charge was solely based on the accused having followed up the payment for B’s land which the
Government has already appropriated, and that the accused eventually withheld for himself from the price of
the said land, the amount of Php 4,000 for his services. No violation of Sec. 3€ of the Anti-Graft Act appears.
At most, the accused should be merely charged administratively.
(228) Benjoe Peralta was the Mayor of San Jose Occidental Mindoro. During his term, he issued an Extraction
Permits to quarry operators for the extraction of sand and gravel within his municipality. The Local
Government Code, however, unmistakably and distinctly vests the power to grant Extraction Permits
for the extraction of sand and gravel within the province (and consequently, the municipality) with the
Provincial Governor.
As a result of his actions, Benjoe was charged with a Violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 under
an Information which reads:
"That on or about 24 August 2010, in San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, Benjoe Peralta, a public officer, being then the
Municipal Mayor of San Jose, taking advantage of his official position and committing the crime in
relation to his office, did then and there willfully, criminally and with evident bad faith, give
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference to private party, by unlawfully issuing an Extraction
Permit to (Gem CHB Maker), contrary to the provisions of Section 138 of Republic Act No. 7160,
which vests on the Provincial Governor the exclusive power to regulate and levy taxes on extraction
65
activities conducted within the Province, thereby allowing said private party to benefit from and take
advantage of the privilege to extract quarry resources without legal authority and official support."
During trial, Benjoe claimed that he believed in good faith that he was allowed to issue the said
extraction permits. The Sandiganbayan ruled that while his acts were not clearly proven to be tinged
with evident bad faith, he still violated Section 3(e) because his actions fall under the rubric of gross
inexcusable negligence. Did the Sandiganbayan correctly convict Benjoe? Explain.
No. The Sandiganbayan may not convict Benjoe for a Violation of Section 3 (e) under the mode of gross
inexcusable negligence because the Information against Benjoe clearly accuse him of violating Section 3 (e)
of RA 3019 through the modality of evident bad faith only.
Jurisprudence provide that the crime may be committed through three (3) modalities: "manifest partiality,"
"evident bad faith," or "gross inexcusable negligence." Each modality of violating Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 is
actually distinct from the others. Hence, while all three modalities may be alleged simultaneously in a single
information for violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019, an allegation of only one modality without mention of the
others necessarily means the exclusion of those not mentioned. Verily, an accusation for a Violation of Section
3 (e) of RA 3019 committed through evident bad faith only, cannot be considered as synonymous to, or includes
an accusation of violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 committed through gross inexcusable negligence
(Villarosa v. People, G.R. Nos. 233155-63, June 23, 2020).
(229) Robeme, Roda, and four other local government officials of the municipality of Bucay purchased 612
pieces of walis tingtig for the sweepers of Bucay at Php 25.00 or Php 15.00 per piece.
The transaction was audited by a team from COA and the team reported that the walis tinging were
overpriced since the prevailing price per piece of walis tinging was only Php11.00. In ascertaining
the prevailing price of Php11.00, the audit team relied primarily on the (1) invoices from stores where
the audit team purchased walis tinging and the (2) price listing of the DBM procurement service.
Notably, the audit team attempted to purchase walis tingting from the actual suppliers of Bucay but
when the audit team went to the listed addresses of the suppliers, they were occupied by other
business establishments. Consequently, the audit team was only able to purchase walis tinging from
a supplier in the nearby municipality of Sallapadan.
The Sandiganbayan rendered judgment finding Robemel and Roda guilty of violating Sec. 3 (g) of
R.A. No. 3019. Is the Sandiganbayan correct?
For a charge under Section 3 (g) to prosper, the following elements must be present: (1) that the accused is a
public officer; (2) that he entered into a contract or transaction on behalf of the government; and (3) that such
contract or transaction is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government. While the first two (2)
elements are undoubtedly present, the prosecution was not able to substantiate its allegation that there was
overpricing of the walis tinging, which would establish he third element. Notably, it was not able to establish
the actual price of the walis tinging sold by the suppliers of Bucay and which were actually used by the
sweepers of Bucay.
On the contrary, it was only able to show the present market price of walis tinging of a different specification,
purchased from a non-supplier of
Bucay, and the price of walis tinging purchases in Sallapadan. In the absence of proof of the price of a walis
tinging that was identical to the waling tinging purchased by Robemel and Roda, the Sandiganbayan could not
have made a determination that the transaction was so manifest and gross as to make Robemel and Roda
liable under Section 3 (g) of R.A. No. 3019 (Caunan v. People, 614 Phil. 179 (2009)).
Note: Mayor Ocampo's reliance on Caunan v. People is misplaced. Unlike walis tinging, the manufacture,
production, sale, distribution, and importation of fertilizer is regulated by law, particularly by the Fertilizer and
Pesticides Authority. As part of its mandate, the FPA maintains a list of registered fertilizers sold and distributed
in the market, and likewise monitors its price. Thus, the data required to determine prevailing prices of fertilizers
in the market are readily available. There is no such similar m regulation or data with respect to walis tinging,
hence the inapplicability of Caunan to Mayor Ocampo's case. In his case, the price index of the FPA may be
relied on as a reasonable representation of the actual prices of fertilizers at the time the purchases were made
and may be used to determine if the transaction he entered into was grossly and manifestly disadvantageous
to the government (Lee v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 234664-67, January 12, 2021).
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Anti-Plunder Act (RA 7080, as amended by RA 7659)
(230) In an information filed by the Ombudsman, it alleged that former President X and PCSO Budget and
Accounts Manager Y and some public officers conspired to commit plunder. X filed her demurrer to
evidence averring that the prosecution did not establish a case for plunder for failing to allege in the
information who the main plunderer or mastermind was. Must there be a determination of a main
plunderer or mastermind to be convicted for plunder?
Yes, the main plunderer or mastermind must be specifically alleged in the information. The law requires in the
criminal charge for plunder against several individuals that there must be a main plunderer and her coconspirators, who may be members of her family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates,
subordinates or other persons. Such identification is essential not for the sufficiency of the information as to
the allegation of conspiracy, but rather as an element of the crime of plunder. The identification is not only
necessary because the law requires such identification, but also because it is essential in safeguarding the
rights of all the accused to be properly informed of the charges they were being made answerable for. In fine,
the Prosecution’s failure to properly allege the main plunderer should be fatal to the cause of the State against
President X, for violating her right to be informed of the charge against her (Macapagal-Arroyo v. People,
Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 220598, July 19, 2016).
(231) What is ill-gotten wealth?
“Ill-gotten wealth” means any asset, property, business enterprise or material possession of any person within
the purview of Section 2 hereof, acquired by him directly or indirectly through dummies, nominees, agents,
subordinates and/or business associates by any combination or series of the following means or similar
schemes:
1. Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public funds or raids on the
public treasury;
2. By receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share, percentage, kickbacks or any other
form of pecuniary benefit from any person and/or entity in connection with any government
contract or project or by reason of the office or position of the public officer concerned;
3. By the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of asset belonging to the National
Government or any of its subdivision, agencies or instrumentalities or government-owned or
controlled corporations and their subsidiaries;
4. By obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stock, equity or any other
form of interest or participation including promises of future employment in any business
enterprise undertaking;
5. By establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other combinations and/or
implementation of decrees and orders intended to benefit particular persons or special interests;
or
6. By taking undue advantage of official position, authority, relationship, connection or influence to
unjustly enrich himself or themselves at the expense and to the damage and prejudice of the
Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines (R.A. No. 7080, Sec. 1(d)).
(232) How is the crime of plunder committed?
The crime of plunder is committed when the following elements are: (a) the offender is a public officer who acts
by himself or in connivance with members of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business
associates, subordinates or other persons; (b) he amassed, accumulated or acquired ill-gotten wealth through
a combination or series of the overt or criminal acts described in Section 1(d) of RA 7080 as amended by RA
7659; and (c) the aggregate amount or total value of the ill-gotten wealth amassed, accumulated or acquired
is at least Php 50,000,000.00 (Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 148560, November 19, 2001).
(233) Is plunder considered malum in se or malum prohibitum?
In the case of Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, it was held that plunder is considered malum in se.The legislative
declaration in R.A. No. 7659 that plunder is a heinous offense implies that it is a malum in se. For when the
acts punished are inherently immoral or inherently wrong, they are malum in se and it does not matter that
such acts are punished in a special law, especially since in the case of plunder the predicate crimes are mainly
malum in se (Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 148560, November 19, 2001).
67
Prohibition of Child Marriage Law (RA 11596)
(234) Who is a child under R.A. No. 11596?
“Child” refers to any human being under eighteen (18) years of age, or any person eighteen (18) years of age
or over but who is unable to fully take care and protect oneself from abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation or
discrimination because of a physical or mental disability or condition (R.A. No. 11596, Sec. 3(a)).
(235) Define child marriage under Sec. 3, R.A. No. 11596
Child marriage refers to any marriage entered into where one or both parties are children as defined in the
paragraph above, and solemnized in civil or church proceedings, or in any recognized traditional, cultural or
customary manner. It shall include an informal union or cohabitation outside of wedlock between an adult and
a child, or between children (R.A. No. 11596, Sec. 3(b)).
(236) What acts are punishable under R.A. No. 11596?
1.
Facilitation of Child Marriage
Note: If the perpetrator is a public officer, he or she shall be dismissed from the service and may be perpetually
disqualified from holding office, at the discretion of the courts (R.A. No. 11596, Sec 4 (a));
2.
3.
Solemnization of Child Marriage (R.A. No. 11596, Sec. 4(b)); and
Cohabitation of an Adult with a Child Outside Wedlock (R.A. No. 11596, Sec 4).
CRIMES AGAINST PERSONS (ARTS. 246-266)
Parricide
(237) A heated argument ensued between H and W over the former’s womanizing. H then punched W, who
was six and a half months pregnant, on the head. The impact of the blow made W lose her balance.
She fell hard on the floor, hitting her head. The fall caused her death and the premature delivery of her
child. Both were brought to the hospital, but W was pronounced dead on arrival, while the child went
on to live for thirty-six more hours before eventually losing breath.
(a)
What crime(s) did H commit?
With respect to the killing of the wife, parricide under Article 246 of the RPC is committed because of the
qualifying circumstance of relationship. With respect to the killing of the child, H is liable for infanticide under
Article 255 of the RPC because his child was born alive and was already viable or capable of independent
existence and the child’s age is less than three (3) days for the latter died after thirty-six hours from expulsion.
He shall incur criminal liability for parricide and infanticide although these crimes committed are different from
his criminal intention of maltreating his wife (RPC, Art. 4). This is a complex crime because the single act of
punching the victim constitutes two grave felonies (RPC, Art. 48).
(b)
If W was only six months pregnant when the incident occurred and the fetus inside her womb also
died when she died, will your answer be different? Explain.
No. The crime committed would be the complex crime of parricide with unintentional abortion. Killing the unborn
child as a result of the violence employed against the mother without intent to abort is unintentional abortion.
Since the child died inside the mother's womb, unintentional abortion is committed regardless of viability of the
victim. Since the same violence that killed the mother also caused unintentional abortion, the crime committed
is a complex crime (People v. Pacayna, Jr., G.R. No. 179035, April 16, 2008).
(c)
If X, a stranger, cooperated in the killing of W, what will be his liability?
A stranger who cooperates and takes part in the commission of the crime of parricide, is not guilty of parricide,
but only homicide or murder as the case may be. The key element in parricide is the offender's relationship
with the victim (People v. Dalag, G.R. No. 129895, April 30, 2003).
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(238) What are the cases of parricide when the penalty shall not be reclusion perpetua to death?
Parricide through negligence (RPC, Art. 365), Parricide by mistake (RPC, Art. 49) and Parricide under
exceptional circumstances (RPC, Art. 427).
(239) Distinguish parricide from infanticide.
As to Basis
Parricide
Infanticide
(Art. 246)
(Art. 255)
Relationship of the offender and the victim
The age of the child. He/she must be less
than three (3) days old. Otherwise, the
crime is parricide.
May be committed not only against a child
three (3) days old or over but also against
other relatives.
Only against a child less than three (3)
days old
Committed only
enumerated
Committed by any person
of the Crime
As to the
Victim
As to the
Offender
As to Application of
the Rule on
Conspiracy
As to the Mitigating
Circumstance of
Concealment of
Dishonor
by
the
relatives
Does not apply as the basis is the
relationship of the offender and the victim.
Separate Information must be filed for the
murder or homicide committed by the nonrelative conspirator.
Applicable. Only one Information is filed
against all offenders.
Concealment of dishonor of the mother is
not mitigating.
Concealment of dishonor of the mother
(and maternal
grandparents) is
mitigating.
Death or Physical Injuries Inflicted under Exceptional Circumstances
(240) X and A’s wife, J, had an illicit relationship. A arrived at his residence at the V & G Subdivision in
Tacloban City at around 6:00 o'clock in the afternoon. Upon reaching home, the accused found his
wife, J, and X in the act of sexual intercourse. When the wife and X noticed A, the wife pushed her
paramour, who got his revolver. A who was then peeping above the built-in cabinet in their room,
jumped and ran away.
A went to look for a firearm at Tacloban City. He went to the house of a PC soldier arriving there at
around 6:30 p.m. He got the soldier's firearm and went back to his house. He was not able to find his
wife and X there. He proceeded to the "mahjong session" as it was the "hangout" of X. A found X
playing mahjong. He fired at X three times with his rifle. X was hit. Y and Z, who were occupying a
room adjacent to the room where X was playing mahjong, were also hit by the shots fired by A. X
died instantaneously. Y and Z were brought to the hospital due to the less serious physical injuries
sustained.
The Solicitor General recommends that Article 247 of the RPC defining death inflicted under
exceptional circumstances, complexed with double frustrated murder should be applied. Is the OSG
correct? Decide.
The OSG is not correct in designating the crimes as double frustrated murder. For Article 247 of the RPC to
properly apply, the following elements must be present: (a) that a legally married person surprises his spouse
in the act of committing sexual intercourse with another person; and (b) that he kills any of them or both of
them in the act or immediately thereafter.
These elements are present in this case. Though quite a length of time, about one hour, had passed between
the time the accused-appellant discovered his wife having sexual intercourse with the victim and the time the
latter was actually shot, the shooting must be understood to be the continuation of the pursuit of the victim by
the accused-appellant.
69
As to the finding of double frustrated murder, the accused-appellant was not committing murder when he
discharged his rifle upon the deceased. Inflicting death under exceptional circumstances is not murder. The
court cannot therefore hold the appellant liable for frustrated murder for the injuries suffered by Y and Z.
Nonetheless, there is negligence on his part. Accordingly, he should be held liable under Article 365 for less
serious physical injuries through simple imprudence or negligence (People v. Abarca, G.R. No. 74433,
September 14, 1987).
(241) What are the requisites for an accused to be entitled to the benefit granted by Article 247?
The requisites for an accused to be entitled to the benefit granted by Article 247 are:
A legally married person surprises his spouse in the act of committing sexual intercourse with
another person;
2. He kills any or both of them in the act or immediately thereafter; and
3. He has not promoted or facilitated the prostitution of his wife nor consented to the infidelity of the
other spouse (People v. Oyanib, G.R. No. 130634-35, March 12, 2001).
1.
Note: These rules shall be applicable, under the same circumstance, to parents with respect to their daughters,
under eighteen years of age, and their seducer, while the daughters are living with their parents (RPC, Art.
247, par. 2).
(242) What is the nature of the phrase “immediately thereafter” under Article 247?
The phrase does not import that the offended spouse should commit the killing instantly thereafter. It only
requires that the death caused must be the proximate result of the outrage overwhelming the accused after
chancing upon his spouse in the basest act of infidelity (People v. Abarca, G.R. No. 74433, September 14,
1987).
Murder
(243) A and his friends were talking when B suddenly sneaked behind A, grabbed his neck with his left arm,
and drove a knife at his side. A pushed away B, causing both of them to fall. A got on his feet and ran
away but B caught up with him and stabbed him twice in the chest. A was brought to the hospital where
he was pronounced dead on arrival. B narrates that he followed A to the store intending to hurt him
because of the threats he made to him. He tried to grab the knife from A and stabbed the right side of
A's body when he got hold of it. What crime/s is B liable for?
B is liable for murder attended by treachery. To warrant a conviction for the crime of murder, the following
essential elements must be present: (1) that a person was killed; (2) that the accused killed him or her; (3) that
the killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in Art. 248 of the RPC; and (d) that
the killing is not parricide or infanticide.
Here, A was killed by B. Also, B surreptitiously sneaked behind A and gave him a headlock that restrained his
movement, thus denying him the chance to defend himself; which establishes the presence of treachery.
Considering that the elements of treachery attended the killing of A, B committed the crime of murder (People
v. Advincula, G.R. No. 218108, April 11, 2018).
(244) At around 1:00 a.m., B and C were about to leave the Christmas party held at Tip-Topp Disco in SingSong Garden Restaurant. As they were on their way downstairs, M pushed C. A heated argument
ensued. It appeared that M was looking for the girl who left him on the dance floor and had mistaken
C to be that girl. D pacified B and M. When they were already on their path on the sidewalk of the SingSing Garden, M suddenly came from behind and shot the B who fell on the shoulders of C. At around
3:00 p.m. of the same day, B died. Is the aggravating circumstance of treachery present in the case to
qualify the crime of homicide to murder?
No, treachery is not present in this case. To qualify the crime to murder, the following elements of treachery in
a given case must be proven: (1) the employment of means of execution by the offender which gives the
person attacked no opportunity to defend or retaliate; and (2) said means of execution was deliberately or
consciously adopted. Treachery is never presumed. It is required that the manner of attack must be shown to
have been attended by treachery as conclusively as the crime itself. Likewise, it has been consistently held by
the Court that chance encounters, impulse killing, or crimes committed at the spur of the moment or that were
preceded by heated altercations are generally not attended by treachery for lack of opportunity of the accused
to deliberately employ a treacherous mode of attack.
70
Here, M and B had a heated altercation at the restaurant before the accused killed the victim. Although D had
pacified their fight, it does not necessarily mean that at the time the shooting incident happened, they already
had cool and level heads since only a short amount of time had lapsed between the heated altercation and the
shooting. The means of execution used by M cannot be said to be deliberately or consciously adopted since it
was more of a result of a sudden impulse due to his previous heated altercation with the victim than a planned
and deliberate action. Thus, the accused should only be convicted of the crime of homicide, not murder (People
v. Menil y Bongkit, G.R. No. 233205, June 26, 2019).
(245) Accused was having a drinking spree with several other friends at the house of X’s father. When the
drinking spree ended at around 2:00 pm, X was asked by his father to return a chair that they borrowed
from Y who lives at around 200 meters away. From that time, X never returned. Subsequently, X’s
cousin and his friend encountered accused at a corn plantation. Accused was said to be carrying X on
his back and heading towards a nearby body of water. X’s lifeless body was recovered the following
morning. The autopsy revealed that X died of asphyxia by submersion or drowning. Accused denied
commission of the crime. He further contended that the motive or intent to commit the crime charged
was not established in this case. What is motive and when does motive become material in criminal
prosecutions, as in this case?
Motive pertains to the reason which prompts the accused to engage in a particular criminal activity. It is not an
essential element of a crime and need not be proven by the State in criminal prosecutions. Hence, proof of
motive alone will not establish guilt in the same way that the absence thereof cannot establish innocence. The
question of motive only becomes material when there is doubt as to the identity of the malefactor committing
the offense charged. In this case, the totality of circumstantial evidence on record sufficiently dispels any doubt
that the accused was responsible for X's death. The circumstances — namely the fact X met with Y to return
the chair, that Y was seen carrying X on his back going to a nearby body of water, that X’s body was later
found lifeless in the same area, and that he died drowning — established an unbroken chain leading to one
fair and reasonable conclusion and pointing to the accused as the guilty person (People v. Pentecostes, G.R.
No. 226158, November 8, 2017).
(246) A, a 76-year old woman, was brought to the hospital in a coma with slight cerebral hemorrhage. An
endotracheal tube was inserted in her mouth to facilitate her breathing. B, a hospital janitor, removed
the tube. A doctor saw him and told him to get out of the room. But when the doctor was gone, B came
back and removed the tube. The victim started to convulse and bleed in the mouth. Only the timely
arrival of the nurse prevented the patient’s death. The patient was then transferred to another hospital
where she died the next day of cardio-respiratory arrest. Is B criminally liable? If so, what crime was
committed? (1991 Bar)
Yes, B is criminally liable for murder qualified by treachery. In People v. Umaging, the Supreme Court ruled
that removal of the endotracheal tube is attempted murder, qualified by treachery, because the patient did not
die.
Here, the overt act of B appears to be the proximate cause of the death of A. A died of cardio-respiratory arrest
which evidently was brought about by the convulsion and bleeding in the mouth of the victim due to the removal
by B of the endotracheal tube twice. The two acts of B can be considered as the result of one criminal design.
Moreover, B performed these acts against A who was completely defenseless. Therefore, B is liable for murder.
(247) One day, while Y’s wife was quietly minding her own business, X suddenly barged into their house
looking for Y. X ran into Y’s room. Y’s wife shouted at Y to close his room. However, X immediately
stabbed Y with a bladed weapon while uttering the words “Papatayin kita”, in which he eventually
succeeded. Z, Y’s friend, was able to pull him out of the room. Not contented, X went back and stabbed
Y again. X was charged and convicted of the crime of murder. X insisted on appeal that treachery
cannot be appreciated since Y’s wife was able to warn her husband that he was approaching their
room with a bladed weapon. Is X liable for murder?
Yes, he is liable for murder. The fact that Y’s wife was able to shout at the former to close his room does not
rule out the presence of treachery. It has been held that while a victim may have been warned of possible
danger to his person, there is treachery nonetheless when the attack was executed in such a manner as to
make it impossible for the victim to retaliate. The present case typifies this doctrine for the victim had no
opportunity to defend himself precisely because it was simply unexpected to be the subject of an attack right
inside his own abode and he was unarmed, with no opportunity to put up a defense (People v. Soriano, G.R.
No. 216063, June 5, 2017).
(248) Around 2:15 AM, W was awakened from her sleep when a hard object hit her head. When she turned
on the lights, a man –who was later identified as X– leaped on their bed and repeatedly stabbed her
71
husband, H. H was able to kick the man out of the room and close the door, but immediately collapsed
thereafter. W shouted for help, and their neighbors actively helped her in bringing H to the hospital.
Unfortunately, H died while undergoing treatment. Is qualifying circumstance of treachery present to
qualify the attack on H to murder?
Yes, treachery qualified the attack on H to murder. In order for the qualifying circumstance of treachery to be
appreciated, the following requisites must be shown: (1) the employment of means, method, or manner of
execution that would ensure the safety of the malefactor from the defensive or retaliatory acts of the victim,
and (2) the means, method, or manner of execution was deliberately or consciously adopted by the offender.
The essence of treachery is a deliberate and sudden attack, affording the hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting
victim no chance to resist or to escape.
X’s sudden attack on H while asleep in his own home amply demonstrates treachery in the commission of the
crime. H had no inkling of the impending attack that night; or any peril to his person as he felt secured in his
home. H was not able to put up an effective defense. Although he kicked and pushed the appellant out of their
room, this did not negate the presence of treachery. Treachery must still be appreciated even if the victim was
able to retaliate as a result of his reflexes, so long as he did not have the opportunity to repel the initial assault.
Further, the SC found that X consciously and deliberately adopted the particular means, methods or form of
attack in order to ensure the execution of the crime. He stabbed H several times so that he would not be a risk
to himself. He lodged a bladed weapon on the victim's chest and back. Indeed, the attack on H was treacherous
thereby qualifying the killing to murder (People v. Moreno y Tazon, G.R. No. 191759, March 2, 2020, Hernando
Case).
(249) Security guards A, B, and C had just finished eating and B was washing the dishes when X knocked
on the gate. A opened the gate and then X asked how they were and if he could already report for duty.
A informed X to report to the operations manager and he subsequently let him in. X then told A that B
has been saying things about him. B overheard their conversation and asked X what he was saying. X
started cursing at B and told him that he had lost his job because of him. A heated exchange ensued
between the two. X finally lost his patience and shot him on the neck. When B dropped to the ground,
X approached him, almost kneeled on top of him, and proceeded to shoot him on the head. X attempted
to escape but A was able to chase after him and he was brought to the police precinct thereafter. B
instantly died from the shooting and the autopsy conducted confirmed that he died due to the gunshot
wounds on the head and neck. Is the aggravating circumstance of treachery present in the case to
qualify the crime of homicide to murder?
No, there is no treachery when the attack of X was preceded by a heated altercation with B. Article 14, par. 16
of the RPC states that there is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person,
employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its
execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. Further, to
appreciate treachery as a qualifying circumstance, two conditions must be met: (1) the assailant employed
means, methods or forms in the execution of the criminal act which give the person attacked no opportunity to
defend himself/herself or to retaliate; and (2) said means, methods or forms of execution were deliberately or
consciously adopted by the assailant. Jurisprudence provides that "chance encounters, impulse killing or
crimes committed at the spur of the moment or that were preceded by heated altercations are generally not
attended by treachery for lack of opportunity of the accused to deliberately employ a treacherous mode of
attack." Stated otherwise, there can be no treachery when the attack is preceded by a heated exchange of
words between the accused and the victim, or when the victim is aware of the hostility of the assailant towards
the former.
Based on the attendant facts, X’s acts were more of a result of a sudden impulse or a spur of the moment
decision due to his previous heated altercation with the victim, rather than a planned and deliberate action.
There is no showing that X employed a particular mode of attack in order to facilitate the killing without any risk
to himself. It appears that X shot B because he got fed up and was carried away by the anger arising from his
confrontation with the deceased (People v. Alegre Y Nazaral G.R. No. 254381, February 14, 2022, Hernando
Case).
(250) What are the rules for the application of the circumstances which qualify the killing to murder?
1.
The rules for the application are:
Only one qualifying circumstance described in Article 248 is necessary to qualify the offense as
murder (People v. Dueño, G.R. No. L-31102, May 5, 1979);
Note: Where there is more than one qualifying circumstance present, only one will qualify the killing. The rest
shall be considered as generic aggravating circumstance;
72
2.
When the other circumstances are absorbed or included in one qualifying circumstance, they cannot
be considered as generic aggravating circumstances (People v. Sespeñe, G.R. No. L-9346, October
30, 1957); and
Any of the qualifying circumstances enumerated in Article 248 must be alleged in the information
(U.S. v. Campo, G.R. No. 7321, November 5, 1912; RULES OF COURT, Rule 110, Sec. 8).
3.
(251) X was watching television with his wife, their daughter, and their neighbor when Y surreptitiously
entered the house through the unlocked screen door, positioned himself behind X and wrapped his
left arm around the latter’s neck and stabbed him with a knife in the chest. Y aimed towards X’s wife
who quickly parried the attack with a chair. Alerted by the commotion, Z entered X’s house and was
likewise stabbed by Y who thereafter fled the scene. X was brought to the hospital where he was
pronounced dead on arrival. The barangay authorities of Brgy. Balingasa eventually arrested Perreira
at the house of his aunt. Is treachery present in this case to qualify the crime to murder?
Yes, treachery is present in this case. In order for treachery to be properly appreciated under Article 14, par.
16 of the RPC, two elements must be present: (1) at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to
defend himself; and (2) the accused consciously and deliberately adopted the particular means, methods, or
forms of attack employed by him.
The elements of treachery were present in this case: at the time of the attack, X was not in a position to defend
himself from the suddenness and swiftness thereof. He had no inkling that an attack was forthcoming and had
no opportunity to mount a defense. While X was seated on the floor watching TV with his back towards the
screen door, Y surreptitiously entered the X’s house and immediately wrapped his left arm around Bagan's
neck, and with the knife in his right hand repeatedly stabbed him in the chest. The facts show that treachery
was employed by Y. Hence, treachery was correctly appreciated as a circumstance to qualify the crime to
murder (People v. Perreira, G.R. No. 220749; January 20, 2021, Hernando Case).
Homicide
(252) In a free-for-all brawl that ensued after some customers inside a nightclub became unruly, guns were
fired by groups A and B, which finally put the customers back to their senses. Unfortunately, one
customer died. Subsequent investigation revealed that A’s gunshot had inflicted on the victim a slight
wound that did not cause the deceased’s death nor materially contribute to it. It was B’s gunshot that
inflicted a fatal wound on the deceased. A contended that his liability should, if at all, be limited to
slight physical injury. Would you agree? Why? (2003 Bar)
No, I disagree with A’s contention that his liability should be limited to slight physical injury under Article 263 of
the RPC. The gunshot wound inflicted by petitioner Araneta, Jr. was a slight wound that did not cause the
victim's death nor materially contribute to it so that he may be liable for homicide. 18 His liability should
therefore be limited to the slight injury he caused. However, the fact that petitioner Araneta Jr. inflicted a
gunshot wound on the victim shows the intent to kill. The use of a gun fired at another certainly leads to no
other conclusion than that there is intent to kill. He is therefore liable for the crime of attempted homicide and
not merely for slight physical injury (Araneta, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-43527, July 3, 1990).
(253) Prosecution witness, A, testified that while inside their family home she heard a man outside their
house shouting "Get out" to which her father responded and stepped out of their house. After hearing
three gunshots, she went outside and saw X running away with a gun in his hand. A’s father was later
found dead. The autopsy and death certificate revealed that his death was due to a gunshot wound in
his left eyebrow caused by a bullet fired from a caliber .25 firearm. What crime/s is X liable for?
X shall be liable for homicide. Under Article 249 of the RPC, the elements of the crime of homicide are: (1) a
person was killed; (2) the accused killed that person without justifying circumstance; (3) the accused had the
intention to kill, which is presumed; and (4) the killing was not attended by any of the qualifying circumstances
of murder, or that of parricide or infanticide.
Here, a man was killed. There is no showing that any of the qualifying circumstances was present. According
to the Certificate of Death of the victim, it was shown that the underlying cause of his death was a gunshot
wound. X was seen holding firearms immediately after the victim was shot and his fatal injury was caused by
a bullet fired from one of the firearms of petitioner. Petitioner's criminal intent is conclusively presumed due to
the death of the victim. In the absence of any of the qualifying circumstances of murder, the crime committed
by petitioner was homicide (Barbosa v. People, G.R. No. 207193, July 24, 2017).
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(254) The victim, A, is a friend of X, the accused. One afternoon, X was in the house of A waiting for the latter.
Shortly after A arrived home, X and A left the house. Later that evening, A and X rented a room in an
apartelle. When A started to fall asleep, X tied A, and struck him with a piece of wood on his head,
causing his death. Will a conviction for kidnapping with murder prosper in this case?
No, the crime committed was murder. In the given facts, the intent of X to deprive A of his liberty was not
proven thereby negating the commission of kidnapping. The essence of the crime of kidnapping is the actual
deprivation of the victim’s liberty coupled with the intent of the offender to that effect. Both act and intent must
be proven. The fact alone of waiting for the victim to fall asleep and then and there tying him is not determinant
of the intent to actually detain the victim or deprive him of his liberty. Therefore, X cannot be held liable for
kidnapping.
However, X is liable for murder qualified by treachery. Murder is committed by any person who, not falling
within the provisions of Article 246, shall kill another with treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with
the aid of armed men, or employing means to weaken the defense or of means or persons to insure or afford
impunity. There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means,
methods or forms which tend directly and specially to ensure its execution, without risk to himself arising from
the defense which the offended party might make. Treachery is not presumed but must be proved as
conclusively as the crime itself (People v. Bugarin, G.R. No. 224900, March 15, 2017). In this case, X tied the
hands of A who was already starting to fall asleep. Since A’s hands were tied coupled with the fact that he was
already starting to fall asleep, he naturally was rendered absolutely defenseless which is the essence of
treachery (People v. Ong, G.R. No. L-37908, October 23, 1981).
(255) At around 5:00 p.m., a drinking spree took place at G’s house for his birthday celebration. Just as when
A, one of the victims, was about to leave, G suddenly took his gun and shot A. Upon witnessing what
happened to his cousin, R, drew his bolo and hit G at his chin. In turn, G and J hacked and stabbed R.
The RTC and the CA ruled that the killing of A was treacherous qualifying the crime to murder, while
the killing of R only amounted to homicide in the absence of treachery. The case against J was
dismissed because of his death. Is the ruling correct? Explain.
No, G is liable only for homicide. The RPC provides that there are two requirements in order that treachery
may be appreciated: (1) the victim was in no position to defend himself or herself when attacked; and (2) the
assailant consciously and deliberately adopted the methods, means, or form of one's attack against the victim.
In this case, while G suddenly attacked A, there was no showing that he deliberately and consciously adopted
such mode of attack to facilitate the killing without any risk to himself arising from any defense that A might
have adopted. G suddenly shot A in the presence of the latter's wife and the other guests at the party. If G
deliberately intended that no risk would come to him, he could have chosen another time and place to attack
A. As it is, the location and time of the attack did not discount the possibility of retaliation coming from the other
guests. In addition, the shooting and stabbing incident transpired at around 5:00 p.m. or during such time that
G could still be easily seen and recognized as the perpetrator of the crime. From all indications, it thus appeared
that G did not consciously intend to employ a particular mode of attack to kill A. The attack was a spur-of-themoment decision caused by sheer annoyance when A and his wife left while the party was still ongoing. As
such, in the absence of the qualifying circumstance of treachery, the crime committed was only homicide
(People v. Abina, G.R. No. 220146, April 18, 2018).
(256) When is the element of intent to kill essential?
Evidence to show intent to kill is important only in attempted or frustrated homicide. This is because, if death
resulted, intent to kill is conclusively presumed. It is generally shown by the kind of weapon used, the parts of
the victim’s body at which it was aimed, the wounds inflicted, nature and number, and the utterances of the
accused before, during and immediately after the commission of the crime. The element of intent to kill is
incompatible with imprudence or negligence.
(257) How can intent to kill be proved?
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
Evidence to prove intent to kill may include, inter alia, of:
The means used by the malefactors;
The nature, location, and number of wounds sustained by the victim;
The conduct of the malefactors before, at the time of, or immediately after the killing of the victim;
The circumstances under which the crime was committed;
The motive of the accused (People v. Lanuza y Bagaoisan, G.R. No. 188562, August 17, 2011); and
Words uttered at the time of inflicting the injuries on the victim may also be considered (De Guzman
v. People, G.R. No. 178512, November 26, 2014).
74
Infanticide
(258) A woman gave birth to a child born dead. Because of the night's darkness, she left her child's lifeless
body in a hole one meter deep, instead of digging a grave to put her child to rest. Is the woman liable
for infanticide?
No, she is not. The elements of infanticide are: (1) That a child was killed; (2) That the deceased child was less
than three days (72 hours) of age; and (3) That the accused killed the said child. Here, the child was born dead
and lifeless. No crime of infanticide is committed where the child was born dead, or although born alive, it could
not sustain an independent life when killed. Therefore, the woman is not liable for infanticide (U.S. v. Vedra,
G.R. No. 4779, November 20, 1908).
(259) What is the effect if the crime is committed to conceal dishonor?
Concealment of dishonor is not an exculpatory circumstance in the crime of infanticide. It is merely a privileged
mitigating circumstance as it lowers the penalty to: Prision Mayor - if committed by the mother; and Reclusion
temporal – if committed by the maternal grandparents (REYES, Book Two, supra at 641).
(260) What is required of a delinquent mother who claims mitigation of liability under Article 255?
A delinquent mother must have good reputation and good morals so that concealing dishonor may mitigate
her liability (REYES, Book Two, supra at 642).
Serious Physical Injuries
(261) X, accused, allegedly attacked and assaulted A. A sustained physical injuries in the different parts of
his body which required medical attendance for a period of 25 days, and caused him to be
incapacitated to perform his customary labor for the same period of time. A, as alleged in the
complaint, also lost the power to hear on his right ear. What crime(s) did X commit? Explain.
X is guilty of serious physical injuries under Article 263, paragraph 3 of the RPC. Under the RPC, it should be
considered serious physical injuries when the injured person becomes ill or incapacitated for labor for more
than 30 days (but must not be more than 90 days), as a result of the physical injuries inflicted. Here, A required
medical attendance for only 25 days. However, he lost the power of his right ear. Article 263, paragraph 3
applies when the person injured shall have lost "the use of any other part of his body." Since A in this case
was deprived of the use of his right ear, a part of his body, such offense properly falls under such
aforementioned provision. Therefore, X is liable for serious physical injuries (People v. Hernandez, G.R. No.
L-4213, November 28, 1953).
Less Serious Physical Injuries
(262) A was roused from her sleep upon hearing some noise from a neighbor's house and then darted
through her main door. B, mother of A, followed the latter, but as they were about to step out of the
house they were met by X who was already in a belligerent mood. X suddenly stabbed A. Thereupon,
X turned his wrath on B and stabbed her on the ear with a kitchen knife. A was able to evade further
harm by seeking refuge inside her house. The medical certificate issued by a physician to B, stated
that the estimated healing period would be one (1) month. What crime was committed by X with respect
to B?
X committed the crime of less serious physical injuries. Taking into account the medical certificate issued to B,
the estimated healing period for her wounds was one (1) month. Article 265 of the RPC, in relation to par. (4),
Art. 263 thereof, provides that where the incapacity of the victim or his required medical attendance is from ten
(10) to thirty (30) days the offense would be less serious physical injuries, and if for more than thirty (30) days,
it would be serious physical injuries.
Article 13 of the Civil Code explicitly provides that when the law speaks of months it shall be understood that
they are of thirty (30) days. In the present case, the one (1) month healing period provided in B’s medical
certificate should thus be interpreted as referring to thirty (30) days of incapacity. The liability therefore of the
accused for the wounding of B should fall under Art. 265 of The RPC for less serious physical injuries, and not
under par. (4), Art. 263, of the aforesaid law (People v. Gutierrez, G.R. Nos. 144907-09, September 17, 2002).
75
Slight Physical Injuries
(263) Distinguish serious, less serious, and slight physical injuries.
Gravity
Serious
(Art. 263)
Less Serious
(Art. 265)
Slight
(Art. 266)
Injury
Days
Incapacity from habitual work
Permanent
Illness/incapacity from habitual work
Over 90 days (91 or over)
Illness/incapacity from labor
31 to 90 days
Incapacity
from
labor
attendance required
labor/medical
Incapacity from labor/medical attendance
required
10 to 30 days
1 to 9 days
Rape: When and How Committed
(264) At around 3:30am, AAA was sleeping beside her two-year-old nephew, BBB, on the floor of her sister’s
room, when P, AAA’s brother-in-law, hugged and kissed her nape and neck. AAA cried, but P covered
her and BBB with a blanket. P went on top of AAA and held her hands. AAA resisted, but P parted her
legs using his own legs then tried to insert his penis into her vagina. P stopped when AAA’s cry got
louder. AAA kicked P’s upper thigh as he was about to stand up. He threatened to kill AAA if she
disclosed the incident. P left the room. AAA covered herself with a blanket and cried.
AAA’s brother, CCC, at 6am, went to her room and asked why she was lying on the floor and crying.
AAA hurled invectives at CCC. AAA went to her older sister's house, DDD, and narrated what
happened. AAA and her 2 siblings reported the incident to the Women and Children’s Desk of the
Mandaluyong police station.
The RTC convicted him of rape. The CA affirmed this, explaining that slight penetration of the labia is
sufficient and this occurred when Pareja’s penis touched AAA’s vagina as he tried to insert it. Are the
RTC and CA correct?
No, the RTC and CA are not correct. P is liable for attempted rape only. Under Article 266-A of the RPC, one
of the elements of rape is that the offender has carnal knowledge of a woman. Carnal knowledge is defined as
the act of a man having sexual intercourse or sexual bodily connections with a woman. In People v. Pareja,
the Supreme Court held that there must be proof that the penis touched the labia or slid into the female organ
and not merely stroked the external surface thereof.
The facts did not show that there was penile penetration. All acts of execution were not performed by reason
of a cause not his spontaneous desistance, i.e., the victim’s loud cries and resistance. Therefore, P is only
liable for attempted rape (People v. Pareja, G.R. No. 188979, September 5, 2012).
Note: Under Section 1, R.A. No. 11648, the age of consent under Art. 266-A 1(d) has been raised from twelve
(12) to under sixteen (16) years of age. As a general rule, rape is committed by a person who shall have carnal
knowledge of another person, when the offended party is under sixteen (16) years of age. An exception to this
rule is that there shall be no criminal liability on the part of a person having carnal knowledge of another person
under sixteen (16 years of age when the age difference between the parties is not more than three (3) years,
and the sexual act in question is proven to be consensual. However, if the victim is under thirteen (13) years
of age, this exception will not apply.
(265) What constitutes force, threat or intimidation in rape cases?
Force employed against a victim of rape need not be of such character as could not be resisted. It is enough
that the force used is sufficient to consummate the culprit’s purpose of copulating with the victim (People v.
Savellano, G.R. No. L-31227, May 31, 1974).
The test remains to be whether the threat or intimidation produces a reasonable fear in the victim's mind that
if she resists or does not yield to the desires of her attacker, the threat would be carried out. It is thus not
necessary for the victim to have resisted unto death or to have sustained physical injuries in the hands of the
accused. So long as the intercourse takes place against the victim's will and she submits because of genuine
76
apprehension of harm to her and her family, rape is committed (People v. Martinez, G.R. No. 248016,
December 2, 2020).
Intimidation must be viewed in the light of the victim's perception and judgment at the time of the rape and not
by any hard and fast rule. It is enough that it produces fear — fear that if the victim does not yield to the bestial
demands of the accused, something would happen to her at the moment or thereafter (People v. Martinez,
G.R. No. 248016, December 2, 2020).
(266) AAA was watching those having videoke in a birthday party near her house, when B told her to go to
CCC's house. Upon her arrival, B and P were already there and the men undressed AAA. B showed her
his penis, inserted it into her vagina, and moved in a pumping motion. P also inserted his penis into
her vagina. CCC saw AAA raising her shorts with a male companion. CCC informed AAA's parents of
what he saw, and when confronted, AAA replied that she was with B. They reported the incident.
The doctor who examined AAA found that there was clear evidence of penetration which happened
within 72 hours from examination. She also referred AAA for psychiatric evaluation as she suspected
her of having Down Syndrome. BBB testified that her daughter, AAA, was mentally retarded since birth
as manifested by the latter's hardheadedness, uttering of senseless words, and unresponsiveness to
questions. CCC, testified that he has been a neighbor of AAA for ten (10) years and has known AAA to
be mentally retarded for she was always smiling and laughing for no reason and that AAA went to a
special education school.
B questions the conclusion that AAA was mentally retarded and as a result of her mental retardation,
he was guilty of rape. Is B guilty of the crime of rape?
No, B is not guilty of the crime of rape for the failure of the prosecution to prove all the elements of the crime
charged beyond reasonable doubt. For the charge of rape under Art. 266-A to prosper, the prosecution has
the burden to conclusively prove the two elements of the crime: (a) that the offender had carnal knowledge of
a woman, and () he accomplished such act through force or intimidation, or when she was deprived of reason
or otherwise unconscious, or when she was under 12 years of age or was demented.
Here, the records of the present case are likewise bereft of evidence conclusively establishing AAA's mental
retardation. If at all, the only evidence offered to prove the said fact were: (1) BBB's testimony that AAA has
had mental retardation since birth and the doctor’s testimony that AAA "probably" has Down Syndrome. BBB
and CCC's testimonies are mere conclusions that do not establish the fact of AAA's mental retardation.
Likewise, the doctor’s testimony cannot be the basis for such, as the said findings were inconclusive. The
prosecution failed to establish her mental retardation beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, the second element of
the crime charged — that the victim be "deprived of reason" — was not established beyond reasonable doubt.
Hence, B is acquitted of the crime charged (People v. Padilla, G.R. No. 234947, June 19, 2019).
(267) AAA, a 14-year old, asked permission from her mother to visit R, as they were going to cook gelatin
for their school Christmas party. Before leaving, AAA bumped into N on her way down, who persuaded
her to go inside his apartment on the pretext that he would show her something. Once inside, N
grabbed her, hugged her, and made her lie down and remove all her clothing. Frightened, because
AAA knows he has a bladed weapon inside his room, she allowed him to mount her and insert his
penis into her vagina. N removed his penis from AAA’s vagina and AAA felt his semen coming out. He
ordered AAA to clean and to not squeal about what happened. AAA followed his orders.
In another incident, AAA asked permission from her mother to go to a computer shop. On her way out,
she met N who demanded her to board his motorcycle and brought her to Meycauayan, Bulacan.
Arriving there, they went inside a hotel. AAA was again raped by N. Before leaving the hotel premises,
N showed AAA his gun and she became afraid.
RTC and CA convicted Nievera for the crime of rape. Is the conviction proper?
Yes, Nievera is guilty for the crime of rape. The gravamen of the crime of rape under Art. 266-A(1) is sexual
intercourse with a woman against her will or without her consent. Jurisprudence is settled that in rape, the
force and intimidation must be viewed in the light of the victim's perception and judgment at the time of the
commission of the crime and not by any hard and fast rule.
Here, AAA was a 14-year-old was tricked into being alone in a room by someone she thought she could trust.
She was alone in a locked room with a fully grown man, overcome by the strength of his embrace, with the
knowledge that the same man had in his possession — or at least owned — a bladed weapon. AAA was in an
environment where there was sufficient intimidation that would cow her to submit to the sexual act without
offering tenacious resistance (People v. Nievera, G.R. No. 242830, August 28, 2019).
77
(268) AAA went inside the bathroom beside the room of V, the brother of AAA’s stepfather, when V peeped
inside. When AAA came out of the room, V told her to buy cigarettes and upon receiving the cigarette,
V pulled AAA inside his bedroom and told AAA to remove her clothes but she refused, so it was V,
who was already naked, who did so. AAA tried resisting but V covered her mouth with one hand while
the other held her hands. V made her lie down on his bed, touched AAA’s private part for about twenty
(20) minutes, and mounted on top of her, inserting his sexual organ into her private part. When done,
V told AAA to dress up and walked out of the room. In another incident, AAA was alone in the house
when V again sexually abused her by inserting his sexual organ into her private part. One of the V’s
hands covered AAA’s mouth while his other hand removed his shorts, and he remained on top of AAA
for fifteen (15) minutes after the intercourse. He warned AAA that he would hurt her siblings if she did
not let him do what he wanted. Is V is guilty of two (2) counts of rape?
Yes, V is guilty of two (2) counts of rape. In rape, the force and intimidation must be viewed in the light of the
victim's perception and judgment at the time of the commission of the crime and not by any hard and fast rule.
The fact that the accused-appellant did not use any weapon is immaterial, especially since the victim in this
case was just 12 or 13 years old at the time of the incidents. Moreover, this case involves a rape of a close
kin. In rapes committed by a close kin, it is not necessary that actual force or intimidation be employed; moral
influence or ascendancy takes the place of violence or intimidation. The fact that the accused-appellant was
only a "brother of her stepfather" does not diminish the fact that he exercised moral influence over the minor,
much more so in this case where they actually live together in the same house (People v. Villaros y Caranto,
G.R. No. 228779, October 8, 2018).
(269) NNN noticed blood in the undergarments of CCC, the two (2)-year-old daughter of MMM and FFF, while
she was doing the laundry. NNN asked CCC if she was "touched" by G. She suspected G to have
something to do with the blood stains found on the undergarments because of his close familiarity
with the child — him being a distant relative of FFF and hired by the latter to feed his flock of fighting
cocks on several occasions, and him residing in the house of the spouses. CCC answered in the
affirmative and demonstrated a push-and-pull movement of her index finger. NNN told spouses FFFMMM and showed them the undergarments with blood stains. CCC was then brought to the municipal
hospital for a physical examination. Thereafter, the spouses FFF-MMM brought her to the Women and
Children Protection Desk of the PNP, where a police blotter of the incident was made. What crime(s)
did G commit? Explain.
G is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Acts of Lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC, in relation to
Section 5 (b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610.
The elements of Rape by Sexual Assault are as follows: (1) that the offender commits an act of sexual assault;
(2), that the act of sexual assault is committed by any of the following means: (a) by inserting his penis into
another person's mouth or anal orifice; or (b) by inserting any instrument or object into the genital or anal orifice
of another person; (3) that the act of sexual assault is accomplished under any of the following circumstances:
(a) by using force and intimidation; (b) when the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or (c)
by means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; or (4), when the woman is under 12 years of
age or demented.
In this case, G inserted his finger in the genital area of CCC, who was then under twelve (12) years of age.
On a different matter, the nomenclature of the offense committed is modified following the recent ruling in
People v. Macapagal. Therein, the original conviction for Rape through Sexual Assault under paragraph 2,
Article 266-A of the RPC was modified to Acts of Lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC, in relation to
Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610.
If the victim of lascivious conduct is under twelve (12) years of age, the nomenclature of the crime should be
“Acts of Lasciviousness under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Section 5(b), Article III of
R.A. No. 7610”.
Hence, G is guilty of Acts of Lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC, in relation to Section 5 (b), Article
III of RA 7610 (Granton v. People, G.R. No. 226045, October 10, 2018).
(270) AAA, four (4) months pregnant, was walking near the railroad track where she worked as a street
sweeper. D approached her, blocked her path, and hugged her. AAA started shouting and begged D to
let her go because she was pregnant and on her way to work. Despite her pleas, D warned her not to
shout, otherwise, he would kill her. D dragged AAA towards the railroad tracks, pinned her down on a
vacant, rocky area along the track, removed her uniform and sucked on her nipples. He removed his tshirt and laid on top of AAA, who kept on hitting him on the face while begging for him to stop. D,
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however, continued to insert his private part into AAA's vagina and had carnal knowledge of her. AAA
kept resisting but D repeated his threats to kill her. AAA gave up her attempts to free herself.
Meanwhile, AAA noticed D's wallet protruding from his waist and she threw it towards a grassy area
along the railroad track. After about 15 minutes, D stood up, wiped both their genitals with his shirt,
and then ran away. Is the failure to use her dustpan, broom, and heavy boots to wrestle against her
aggressor an evidence against the guilt of the accused?
No, the law does not impose upon a rape victim the burden of proving resistance. The Court has explained
that resistance is not an element of rape and lack thereof does not lead to an acquittal of the accused.
Here, even where the aggressor is unarmed, the victim is not required to struggle nor will such failure defeat
her rape case. The Court has long recognized the lack of uniformity in the behavior of rape victims during or
after a rape incident (People v. Dechoso, G.R. No. 248530, March 3, 2021).
(271) AAA is a member and a full-time worker of Jesus the Anointed One Church. F was the driver of the
church's Bishop. F was tasked to retrieve soap bars and asked AAA where the storage was. As AAA
explained that an inventory is required before the items can be disposed of, F suddenly grabbed her
breasts. Out of shock, AAA shouted. F immediately grabbed the front of AAA's pants directly over her
private part. She was shouting in pain as F dragged her further inside the bodega. F then used his body
to block and keep the door shut behind him as he fondled her breasts and tried to unzip her pants. F
inserted his fingers in and out of her vagina. All the while, AAA resisted and tried to protect herself by
crossing her arms in front of her in an "X" position thereby incurring bruises in the process. F pressed
her onto the wall causing her to bump her head, leaving her disoriented and dazed. She also felt
weakened by the pain she felt all over her body. The last thing she saw was the accused pulling out
his penis and she heard him saying "tumuwad ka." When she regained composure, AAA realized she
was already seated on the floor. She saw that her pants and underwear were pulled down to her knees
but the F was nowhere to be found. The RTC found F guilty of the crime of rape by carnal knowledge
to which F appealed to the CA but the same affirmed the said decision. What crime(s) did F commit?
F is guilty of sexual assault under Article 266-A (2) of the RPC, not rape by carnal knowledge under Article
266-A (1)(b). AAA testified that F was moving his finger in and out of her private part through the opening of
her pants' zipper, he took out his penis and massaged the same. AAA lost consciousness and when she woke
up, she was seated on the floor with her underwear and pants pulled to her knees. Based on the foregoing,
the crime committed by F is sexual assault. Although it is possible that Fruelda had carnal knowledge of AAA
while the latter was unconscious, he cannot be convicted of the crime of rape by carnal knowledge based on
a mere possibility (People v. Fruelda y Anulao, G.R. No. 242690, September 3, 2020).
(272) AAA, a boarder in a boarding house, slept alone in the room she shared with the daughter of the
building’s owner. She was awakened and found three men inside the room, who she recognized as M,
R and T. R approached her and covered her mouth with his palm. T poked the right side of her body
with a short bolo. Being pinned in this position, M undressed AAA and began kissing her. M then
inserted his penis into her vagina. Afterward, T took his turn. T kicked AAA in the stomach several
times and inserted his penis into her vagina. Thereafter, AAA became unconscious. AAA was
awakened when she felt T bit her arm. It was then that R took his turn in raping her. T and R were
charged under three separate Informations for three counts of rape. During the arraignment, only T
appeared and pleaded not guilty while the two other accused remained at large. The RTC and the CA
found T guilty of one count of rape. Is the conviction proper? Explain.
No, accused-appellant is guilty of three counts of rape. Proof of conspiracy need not even rest on direct
evidence, as the same may be inferred from the collective conduct of the parties before, during or after the
commission of the crime indicating a common understanding among them with respect to the commission of
the offense.
Here, the evidence presented by the prosecution fully support the charge that M, R and T conspired to rape
AAA. The act of R in approaching and covering AAA's mouth, the act of T in poking a bolo at her side, the act
of M in having sexual intercourse with AAA and then later on followed by R and accused-appellant, all point to
their unified and conscious design to sexually violate AAA. Accordingly, T should be held liable not only for the
act of rape he perpetrated against AAA, but also for the rape committed by his co-accused (People v.
Villanueva, G.R. No. 211082, December 13, 2017).
(273) From the time AAA was in Grade 1, B would often ask her for favors, like buying food or kerosene for
him. It was also then that he would usually abuse her. While they were celebrating the New Year, B,
who was under the influence of liquor, called AAA in his room. While they were inside, he locked the
door, grabbed her hand and laid her down. He undressed her, fondled her breast, and licked her vagina.
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He then undressed his lower garment and inserted his penis inside her vagina. After the act, he gave
her Php50.00 to not tell anyone. The second incident happened on another date when he called her
and he was able to suck her breast, lick her vagina and insert his penis into her vagina. Finally, another
incident happened when B called AAA inside the comfort room while his live-in partner was in their
room and put down her undergarments to her knees, licked her vagina and touched his penis to her
vagina. The RTC, as affirmed by the CA, found B guilty of three counts of rape, particularly: 1) Statutory
rape, 2) rape through intimidation, and 3) rape through force. Is the conviction of Martinez for rape
through force proper? Explain.
No, the lower courts erred in convicting B of rape through force as the prosecution failed to prove the element
of force. While AAA convincingly testified as regards the fact of carnal knowledge on the second incident, her
testimony was bereft of any categorical statement that B used force in accomplishing the lustful deed. In rape
cases alleged to have been committed by force, it is imperative for the prosecution to establish that the element
of voluntariness on the part of the victim be absolutely lacking. The prosecution must prove that the accused
employed force or intimidation upon his victim to achieve his end (People v. Martinez, G.R. No. 248016,
December 2, 2020).
(274) In the early stage of their marriage, X treated KKK well and she, of course, responded with equal degree
of enthusiasm. However, in 1997, he started to be brutal in bed. He would immediately remove her
panties and, sans any foreplay, insert her penis in her vagina. His abridged method of lovemaking was
physically painful for her so she would resist his sexual ambush, but he would threaten her into
submission. One night, in the spouse’s bedroom, KKK rested separately in a cot near the bed. Her
reclusive behavior prompted X to ask angrily: “Why are you lying on the cot?”, and to instantaneously
order: “You transfer here to our bed.”
KKK insisted on staying on the cot. X got angry, rose from the bed, lifted the cot, and threw it against
the wall causing KKK to fall on the floor. Terrified, KKK stood up from where she fell, took her pillow
and transferred to the bed.
The accused then lay beside KKK and not before long, expressed his desire to copulate with her by
tapping his fingers on her lap. When KKK tried to resist by holding on to her panties, X pulled them
down so forcefully they tore on the sides. KKK stayed defiant by refusing to bend her legs. What
crime(s) did the accused commit? Explain.
The accused is liable for rape. In People v. Jumawan, the Supreme Court held that husbands do not have
property rights over their wives’ bodies. Sexual intercourse, albeit within the realm of marriage, if not
consensual, is rape. In relation to the equal protection of the law clause, the Court ruled that to treat marital
rape cases differently from non-marital rape cases in terms of the elements that constitute the crime and in the
rules for their proof, infringes on the equal protection clause. Further, the Court found no rational basis for
distinguishing between marital rape and non-marital rape. In this case, X had carnal knowledge with KKK by
forcing himself onto her despite her efforts to resist and defy his sexual advances, making the sexual congress
non-consensual equal to rape. Their relation by marriage is not a defense. Thus, X is liable for rape.
(275) AAA, a 13-year-old girl, was sleeping in a bedroom when X’s kiss on her face woker her up. AAA tried
to push X away, but X held her hand and pointed a fan knife at her neck, and warned her not to shout
or move. X removed AAA’s jogging pants and panty, undressed himself, and inserted his penis into
her vagina. X threatened AAA not to tell anybody and left. AAA’s family learned about the incident.
AAA submitted herself to a medical examination by Dr. P. AAA further disclosed that this was the
second time she had sexual intercourse with X. On the other hand, X interposed the defenses of alibi
and denial. According to X, he never left their house. He attended to his wife who had just given birth,
prepared food, and tended to their store.
On appeal, X argued that AAA never tried to push him away or escape. He also asserted that no rape
can be concluded even from the medical findings of Dr. P as her medical certificate did not state that
AAA suffered any physical injury resulting from his alleged use of force. X theorizes that the sexual
intercourse between him and AAA was unenforced and consensual, thus, rape is inconceivable as her
medical certificate did not state that AAA did not suffer any physical injury resulting from his alleged
use of force. Is lack of action to push or run away from the X detrimental to the case of the prosecution?
No, AAA’s inaction to push or run away from the accused-appellant is not detrimental to the prosecution's case.
There is no standard behavior expected by law from a rape victim. By whatever manner she reacts, the same
is immaterial because it is not an element of rape. Neither should a rape victim’s reflex be interpreted on its
lonesome. Absent any other adequate proof that the victim consented to the sexual act, a victim shall not be
condemned solely based on her reactions against the same.
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In this case, AAA’s passive conduct will not negate the rape committed by X. Her statements that she had
been threatened into silence by X were unwavering. AAA readily yielded to the police assistance and medical
examination when her family found out about the incident. Jurisprudence provides that “no woman, least of all
a child, would concoct a story of defloration, allow examination of her private parts and subject herself to a
public trial or ridicule if she has not, in truth, been a victim of rape and impelled to seek justice for the wrong
done to her being.” Moreover, while a medical certificate attesting to the victim's physical trauma from the rape
has corroborative purposes, it is wholly unnecessary for conviction, if not a mere superfluity (People V.
Cabales, G.R. No. 213831; September 25, 2019, Hernando Case).
(276) AAA was at home with her father, XXX, while BBB, her mother, was out. XXX instructed AAA to go into
the bedroom and ordered her to remove her shorts. When AAA complied, XXX inserted his penis into
her vagina which caused her pain and she pleaded for XXX to stop. XXX stopped but threatened her
not to tell her mother. AAA did not report anything as she feared that her father might do something to
her mother, who he was constantly being verbally and physically abused. Afraid that her mother would
leave her when XXX banished BBB during a quarrel, AAA disclosed to her what her father had done
and revealed that it was not the first time it happened since her father has been sexually assaulting
her since she was five years old. BBB and AAA reported the matter to the authorities which eventually
led to XXX’s arrest. Afterwards, AAA gave her statement to the police and underwent a medical
examination. Medico-legal officer, Police Chief Inspector (PCI), found that there was a recent and
previous blunt force to the labia minora and the hymen. On cross-examination, PCI averred that it was
more probable that a finger was inserted due to the difference in force between a hand and a penis and
added that during the genital examination, the hymen was intact and had no laceration which could be
caused by an erect penis, but clarified that it is still possible that the injury could have been caused by
a penis which did not actually penetrate the vagina but only reached the opening. Is actual force, threat,
or intimidation necessary to establish rape if the father commits the crime against his daughter?
No, actual force, threat, or intimidation is not necessary to establish rape if the father commits the crime against
his daughter. There need not be actual force, threat or intimidation because when a father commits the odious
crime of rape against his own daughter, who was also a minor at the time of the commission of the offenses,
his moral ascendancy or influence over the latter substitutes for violence and intimidation (People v. XXX G.R.
No. 218277, November 9, 2020, Hernando Case).
(277) Is there a crime of frustrated rape?
There is no crime of frustrated rape. Clearly, in the crime of rape, from the moment the offender has carnal
knowledge of his victim he actually attains his purpose and, from that moment also all the essential elements
of the offense have been accomplished. Nothing more is left to be done by the offender, because he has
performed the last act necessary to produce the crime. Thus, the felony is consummated. Necessarily, rape is
attempted if there is no penetration of the female organ because not all acts of execution was performed. The
offender merely commenced the commission of a felony directly by overt acts. Taking into account the nature,
elements, and manner of execution of the crime of rape and jurisprudence on the matter, it is hardly
conceivable how the frustrated stage in rape can ever be committed (People v. Orita, G.R. No. 88724, April 3,
1990).
(278) Is exact date of the commission of the crime of rape an essential element?
No. An information is valid as long as it distinctly states the elements of the offense and the acts or omission
constitutive thereof. The exact date of the commission of a crime is not an essential element of the crime
charged. In a prosecution for rape, the material fact or circumstance to be considered is the occurrence of the
rape, not the time of its commission. The precise time of the crime has no substantial bearing on its
commission. Therefore, it is not essential that it be alleged in the information with ultimate precision (People v.
ZZZ, G.R. No. 232329, April 28, 2021, Hernando Case).
(279) What is the operative act that distinguishes rape through sexual intercourse from rape through sexual
assault?
Carnal knowledge is the operative act that distinguishes the first mode from the second mode (People v. XXX,
G.R. No. 233867, February 28, 2022, Hernando Case).
Qualified Rape
(280) AAA lives with EEE, her aunt and guardian, who raised her as a daughter. GGG requested FFF, EEE’s
friend, to get from X’s boarding house an electric fan and a transformer. After giving the requested
items, X ordered FFF to leave AAA behind.
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When FFF brought the items back to GGG, she requested FFF to fetch AAA. FFF called out to AAA to
go home. AAA came out fixing her short pants. AAA told FFF that X pulled her inside the room, removed
her shoes and panty, told her to lie down on the floor, and inserted his penis into her vagina without
her consent. The genital exam of AAA revealed old hymenal lacerations only. Her psychiatric
evaluation revealed that she was suffering from mild retardation with the mental age of a 9-12 year-old
child. Her IQ was 53, below the average of 71 and was within the defective level of a normal intelligence
scale.
X testified that he knew AAA and that he even used to reside with her and her relatives. He was treated
as family and he regarded AAA as his niece. He also admitted that AAA was known to be mentally
retarded in their community. What crime(s) is X liable for? Explain.
X is liable for qualified rape. For the charge of rape under Art.266-A to prosper, it must be proved that: (a) the
offender had carnal knowledge of a woman; (b) through force or intimidation, when she was deprived of reason
or otherwise unconscious, or when she was under 12 years old or was demented. In People v. Suansing, the
Supreme Court held sex with one who is intellectually weak to the extent that she is incapable of giving consent
to the carnal act is rape without needing proof that there was force or intimidation. Only the fact of sex and the
victim’s mental retardation need be proved.
Here, the fact of sex and victim’s mental condition were proved. Also, the facts show that X was aware of the
mental retardation of AAA. Therefore, X is liable for qualified rape (People v. Suansing, G.R. No. 189822,
September 2, 2013).
(281) In 2003, AAA was living with her mother, BBB, and the latter’s live-in partner, X. Later, AAA transferred
to and lived in the house of CCC, her aunt. However, in 2011, another incident occurred when AAA
returned to BBB’s and X’s residence. Such incidents were eventually reported by AAA’s relatives to
the DSWD and to the police upon learning about the sexual abuse committed by the appellant. As such,
two separate Informations were filed against X for Qualified Rape. It was alleged therein that X had
carnal knowledge with AAA without her consent, and took advantage of his moral ascendancy over
her, him being AAA’s step parent, among others. Is the qualifying circumstance of relationship
attendant to qualify the offense of rape?
No, the qualifying circumstance of relationship was not attendant as to qualify the charge of rape against X. In
People v. Begino, the Supreme Court listed the elements of qualified rape which are: (1) sexual congress; (2)
with a woman; (3) done by force and without consent; (4) the victim is under 18 years of age at the time of the
rape; and (5) the offender is either a parent (whether legitimate, illegitimate or adopted), ascendant, stepparent,
guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the
parent] of the victim. The minority of the victim and his or her relationship with the offender should both be
alleged in the Information and proven beyond reasonable doubt during trial to qualify the rape charge as these
circumstances have the effect of altering the nature of the rape and its corresponding penalty.
In this case, AAA's minority was properly alleged and indisputably proven during trial. Moreover, it was proven
by evidence that X forced AAA into engaging in sexual congress by using threats and intimidation and without
her consent, in addition to his moral ascendancy over her. Corollary, it was alleged in the Information that X
was AAA's "stepfather." A "stepfather" is the "husband of one's mother by virtue of a marriage subsequent to
that of which the person spoken of is the offspring. However, during trial, the prosecution failed to establish
this stepparent-stepdaughter relationship between X and AAA. No proof of marriage was presented to establish
De Guzman's legal relationship with BBB. On the contrary, records show that X was actually the common-law
spouse of BBB as he was not legally married to her. Since X's relationship with AAA as alleged in the
Information was not proven beyond reasonable doubt, X cannot be convicted of Qualified Rape, only Simple
Statutory Rape and Simple Rape (People v. De Guzman G.R. No. 224212; November 27, 2019, Hernando
Case)
Note: Pursuant to R.A. No. 11648, Art. 266-A (1)(d), known as Statutory Rape, and Section 5 (b) of R.A. No.
7610, referring to crimes of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child, have been amended to state
that the age of the victim in such is now “under sixteen (16) years of age.”
(282) What are the effects of pardon or subsequent valid marriage between the offender and the offended
party?
Art. 266-C, RPC provides that the subsequent valid marriage between the offender and the offended party
shall extinguish the criminal action or the penalty imposed. In case it is the legal husband who is the offender,
the subsequent forgiveness by the wife as the offended party shall extinguish the criminal action or the penalty:
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Provided, That the crime shall not be extinguished or the penalty shall not be abated if the marriage be void
ab initio (R.A. No. 8353, Sec. 2).
Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003 (RA 9208, as amended by RA 11862)
(283) What constitutes trafficking in person?
Trafficking in Persons refers to the recruitment, obtaining, hiring, providing, offering, transportation, transfer,
maintaining, harboring, or receipt of persons with or without the victim's consent or knowledge, within or across
national borders by means of threat, or use of force, or other forms of coercion, abduction, fraud, deception,
abuse of power or of position, taking advantage of the vulnerability of the person, or, the giving or receiving of
payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose
of exploitation which includes at a minimum, the exploitation or the prostitution of others, or the engagement
of others for the production or distribution, or both, of materials that depict child sexual abuse or exploitation,
or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery, servitude, or the removal or sale of
organs.
The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring, adoption or receipt of a child for the purpose of exploitation
or when the adoption is induced by any form of consideration for exploitative purposes, shall also be considered
as 'trafficking in persons' even if it does not involve any of the means set forth in the preceding paragraph (R.A.
No. 9208, Sec. 3, par. (a), as amended by R.A. No. 11862).
(284) What are the acts of Trafficking in Persons?
It shall be unlawful for any person, natural or juridical, to commit by means of a threat, or use of force, or other
forms of coercion, or through abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or of position, or through taking
advantage of the vulnerability of the person, or by giving or receiving of payment or benefit to obtain the consent
of a person having control over another person, any of the following acts:
1. To recruit, obtain, hire, provide, offer, transport, transfer, maintain, harbor, or receive a person by
any means, including those done under the pretext of domestic or overseas employment or training
or apprenticeship, for the purpose of prostitution, pornography, sexual abuse or exploitation,
production, creation, or distribution of Child Sexual Abuse and Exploitation Material or Child Sexual
Abuse Material (CSAEM or CSAM), forced labor, slavery, involuntary servitude, or debt bondage;
2. To introduce or match for money, profit, or material, economic or other consideration, any person
or, as provided for under Republic Act No. 10906 or the Anti-Mail Order Spouse Act, any Filipino to
a foreign national, for marriage for the purpose of acquiring, buying, offering, selling or trading
him/her to engage in prostitution, pornography, sexual exploitation, forced labor, slavery,
involuntary servitude or debt bondage;
3. To offer or contract marriage, real or simulated, for the purpose of acquiring, buying, offering, selling,
or trading them to engage in prostitution, pornography, sexual exploitation, forced labor or slavery,
involuntary servitude or debt bondage;
4. To undertake or organize tours and travel plans consisting of tourism packages or activities for the
purpose of utilizing and offering persons for prostitution, pornography or sexual exploitation;
5. To maintain or hire a person to engage in prostitution or pornography;
6. To adopt persons by any form of consideration for exploitative purposes or to facilitate the same for
purposes of prostitution, pornography, sexual exploitation, forced labor, slavery, involuntary
servitude or debt bondage;
7. To adopt or facilitate the adoption of persons with or without consideration for the purpose of
prostitution, pornography, sexual exploitation, forced labor, slavery, involuntary servitude or debt
bondage, or to facilitate illegal child adoptions or child-laundering, or for other exploitative
purposes;
8. To recruit, hire, adopt, transport, transfer, obtain, harbor, maintain, provide, offer, receive, or abduct
a person, for the purpose of removal or sale of organs of said person;
9. To recruit, transport, obtain, transfer, harbor, maintain, offer, hire, provide, receive, or adopt a child
to engage in armed activities or participate in activities in the context of an armed conflict in the
Philippines or abroad;
10. To recruit, transport, transfer, harbor, obtain, maintain, offer, hire, provide, or receive a person by
means defined in Section 3 of this Act for purposes of forced labor, slavery, debt bondage and
involuntary servitude, including a scheme, plan, or pattern intended to cause the person either:
a. To believe that if the person did not perform such labor or services, he or she or another person would
suffer serious harm or physical restraint; or
b. To abuse or threaten the use of law or the legal processes;
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11. To recruit, transport, harbor, obtain, transfer, maintain, hire, offer, provide, adopt, or receive a child
for purposes of exploitation or trading them, including the act of buying or selling a child, or both
for any consideration or for barter for purposes of exploitation. Trafficking for purposes of
exploitation of children shall include:
a. All forms of slavery or practices similar to slavery, involuntary servitude, debt bondage, and forced
labor, including recruitment of children for use in armed conflict;
b. The use, procuring or offering of a child for prostitution, for the production of CSAEM or CSAM, or for
pornographic performances;
c. The use, procuring or offering of a child for the production and trafficking of drugs; and
d. The use, procuring or offering of a child for illegal activities or work which, by its nature or the
circumstances in which it is carried out, is likely to harm their health, safety or morals;
12. To organize, provide financial support, or direct other persons to commit the offenses defined as
acts of trafficking under this Act; and
13. To recruit, transport, obtain, transfer, harbor, maintain, offer, hire, provide, receive, or adopt a child
for deployment abroad as migrant workers.
Note: Provided, That when the victim is a child, the means to commit these unlawful acts as enumerated in the
first paragraph of this section shall not be necessary: Provided, further, That in the case of overseas domestic
work, a 'child' means a person below twenty-four (24) years old (R.A. No. 9208, Sec. 4 as amended by R.A.
No. 11862).
(285) What are acts that Promote Trafficking in Persons?
The following are considered acts that Promote Trafficking in Persons:
To knowingly lease or sublease, use, or allow to be used any house, building, tourism enterprise, or any
similar establishment; or any vehicle or carrier by land, sea, and air; or any of their computer system or
computer hardware, other computer-related devices, or any of their digital platform and application, for the
purpose of promoting trafficking in persons;
2. To produce, print and issue, or distribute unissued, tampered, or fake passports, birth certificates, affidavits
of delayed registration of births, foundling certificates, travel clearances, counseling certificates, registration
stickers, overseas employment certificates or other certificates of any government agency which issues
these certificates, decals, and such other markers as proof of compliance with government regulatory and
pre-departure requirements for the purpose of promoting trafficking in persons;
3. To advertise, publish, print, broadcast or distribute, or cause the advertisement, publication, printing,
broadcasting, or distribution by any means including the use of information technology and the internet, of
any brochure, flier, or any propaganda, materials that promote trafficking in persons;
4. To assist in the conduct of misrepresentation or fraud for purposes of facilitating the acquisition of clearances
and necessary exit documents from government agencies that are mandated to provide pre-departure
registration and services for departing persons for the purpose of promoting trafficking in persons;
5. To facilitate, assist, or help in the exit and entry of persons from/to the country at international and local
airports, territorial boundaries and seaports, knowing they are not in possession of required travel
documents, or are in possession of tampered, fake, or fraudulently acquired travel documents, for the
purpose of promoting trafficking in persons;
6. To Confiscate, conceal, or destroy the passport, travel documents, or personal documents or belongings of
trafficked persons in furtherance of trafficking or to prevent them from leaving the country or seeking redress
from the government or appropriate agencies;
7. To knowingly Benefit from, financial or otherwise, or make use of, the labor or services of a person held to
a condition of involuntary servitude, forced labor, or slavery,
8. To tamper with, destroy, or cause the Destruction of evidence, or to influence or attempt to influence
witnesses, in an investigation or prosecution;
9. To Destroy, conceal, remove, confiscate or possess, or attempt to destroy, conceal, remove, confiscate or
possess, any actual or purported passport or other travel, immigration or working permit or document, or any
other actual or purported government
10. To utilize his or her office to impede the investigation, prosecution or execution of lawful orders;
11. For internet intermediaries to knowingly or by gross negligence allow their internet infrastructure to be used
for the purpose of promoting trafficking in persons;
12. For internet cafes, kiosks, and hotspots, including establishments offering Wi-Fi access services to the
public, to knowingly or by gross negligence allow their facilities to be used for the purpose of promoting
trafficking in persons;
13. For financial intermediaries, including banks and credit card companies and money transfer or remittance
centers, to knowingly or by gross negligence allow their services, online platform and applications, among
others, to be used for the purpose of promoting trafficking in persons;
1.
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14. To knowingly or by gross negligence facilitate, assist, or help in the entry into the country of persons who
are convicted sex offenders whether at international and local airports, territorial boundaries, and seaports
for the purpose of promoting trafficking in persons; or
15. To arrange, facilitate, expedite, or cause the introduction or encounter of persons who are suspected or
convicted sex offenders in any jurisdiction, to a child. The actual introduction or encounter need not occur to
be liable under this provision. It is enough that there is a deliberate attempt to cause the introduction or
encounter (R.A. No. 9208, Sec. 5, as amended by R.A. No. 11862).
(286) What is considered Qualified Trafficking?
The following are considered as Qualified Trafficking:
When the trafficked person is a child: Provided, That acts of online sexual abuse and exploitation of children
shall be without prejudice to appropriate investigation and prosecution under other related laws;
2. When the adoption of a child is effected through the Inter-Country Adoption Act of 1995 and said adoption
is for the purpose of prostitution, pornography, sexual exploitation, forced labor, slavery, involuntary
servitude or debt bondage;
3. When the crime is committed by a syndicate, or in large scale;
4. When the offender is a spouse, an ascendant, parent, sibling, guardian or a person who exercises authority
over the trafficked person or when the offense is committed by a public officer or employee;
5. When the trafficked person is recruited to engage in prostitution with any member of the military or law
enforcement agencies;
6. When the offender is a member of the military or law enforcement agencies;
7. When by reason or on occasion of the act of trafficking in persons, the offended party dies, becomes insane,
suffers mutilation or is afflicted with Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) or the Acquired Immune
Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS);
8. When the offender, commits one or more acts of trafficking under Section 4 over a period of at least sixty
(60) days, whether those days are continuous or not;
9. When the offender, or through another, directs or manages the actions of a victim in carrying out the
exploitative purpose of trafficking;
10. When the crime is committed during a crisis, disaster, public health concern, pandemic, a humanitarian
conflict, or emergency situation, or when the trafficked person is a survivor of a disaster or a human-induced
conflict;
11. When the trafficked person belongs to an indigenous community or religious minority and is considered a
member of the same;
12. When the trafficked person is a person with disability (PWD);
13. When the crime has resulted in pregnancy;
14. When the trafficked person suffered mental or emotional disorder as a result of being victim of trafficking; or
15. When the act is committed by or through the use of ICT or any computer system (R.A. No. 9208, Sec. 6, as
amended by R.A. No. 11862).
1.
(287) Due to financial difficulties and to help her parents, as well as to buy some gadgets for herself, AAA,
then 17 years old, requested X for a raket. The following day, AAA was booked to a British National. X
delivered AAA to a condominium in Makati City. Thereat, AAA had sexual intercourse with the said
man and thereafter, she was paid the amount of Php 5,000.00. When prosecuted for qualified
trafficking, X maintained that it was AAA who asked for a raket. Further, she averred that she is not
aware that AAA is still a minor. Is the defense tenable?
No, contrary to the X’s submission, the fact that AAA had asked her for a raket does not negate her criminal
liability. Trafficking in persons may be committed with or without the victim's consent or knowledge. The victim's
consent is rendered meaningless due to the coercive, abusive, or deceptive means employed by perpetrators
of human trafficking. Even without the use of coercive, abusive, or deceptive means, a minor's consent is not
given out of his or her own free will.
Under Section 6(a) of R.A. No. 9208, Trafficking in Persons automatically becomes qualified upon proof that
the trafficked person is a minor or a person below 18 years of age. Evidently, knowledge of the accusedappellants with regard to AAA's minority is inconsequential with respect to qualifying the crime of Trafficking in
Persons. Thus, consent of the minor is not a defense under R.A. No. 9208 (People v. Bandojo, G.R. No.
234161, October 17, 2018).
(288) AAA, BBB, and CCC are the minor children of spouses XXX and YYY. AAA claimed that when she was
just 13 years old, her mother XXX brought her to a hotel in Makati to meet with a certain John who
proceeded to have sexual intercourse with her. AAA further alleged XXX ordered her to engage in
cybersex for three (3) to four (4) times a week in pornographic websites where AAA was shown in her
underwear and made to do sexual activities in front of the computer. For their part, BBB and CCC
85
corroborated AAA's statements, both averring that XXX ordered them to dance naked in front of the
computer with internet connectivity while facilitating the webcam sessions and chatting with a certain
"Sam," their usual client. BBB and CCC alleged that during those sessions, their father YYY would be
outside the room or fixing the computer. The children all claimed that they were made to do sexual
activities to earn money for their household expenses which were collected by YYY in remittance
centers. XXX and YYY were charged with qualified trafficking in persons under RA 9208. Is the charge
proper?
Yes, XXX and YYY are liable for Qualified Trafficking in Persons under Section 4 in relation to Section 6 of
R.A. No. 9208. Section 4 provides that it shall be unlawful for any person to recruit, transport, transfer, harbor,
provide, or receive a person by any means, including those done under the pretext of domestic or overseas
employment or training or apprenticeship, for the purpose of prostitution, pornography, sexual exploitation,
forced labor, slavery, involuntary servitude or debt bondage and to maintain or hire a person to engage in
prostitution or pornography. Furthermore, Section 6 also provides that trafficking is qualified when the trafficked
person is a child or the offender is an ascendant, parent, sibling, guardian or a person who exercises authority
over the trafficked person or when the offense is committed by a public officer or employee (R.A. No. 9208,
Secs. 4 (a) to (e) in relation to Sec. 6 (a) to (d), as amended by R.A. No. 10364; People v. XXX and YYY, G.R.
No. 235652, July 9, 2018).
Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004 (RA 9262)
(289) Define “Violence Against Women” under R.A. No. 9262
“Violence against women and their children" refers to any act or a series of acts committed by any person
against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual
or dating relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or against her child whether legitimate or
illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which result in or is likely to result in physical, sexual,
psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse including threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion,
harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty (R.A. No. 9262, Sec. 3(a)).
(290) Instances of physical, sexual, psychological, and economic abuse as provided under R.A. No. 9262.
Physical
Violence
(Sec. 3(A))
Acts
that
include
bodily
or
physical
harm
Sexual Violence
(Sec. 3 (B))
Psychological Violence
(Sec. 3(C))
Economic Abuse
(Sec. 3 (D))
Refers to an act which is
sexual in nature, committed
against a woman or her child.
It includes, but not limited to:
a. Rape, sexual harassment,
acts of lasciviousness,
treating a woman or her
child as a sex object,
making demeaning and
sexually
suggestive
remarks,
physically
attacking the sexual parts
of the victim's body,
forcing her/him to watch
obscene publications and
indecent shows or forcing
the woman or her child to
do indecent acts and/or
make films thereof, forcing
the wife and mistress/lover
to live in the conjugal
home or sleep together in
the same room with the
abuser
b. Acts causing or attempting
to cause the victim to
engage in any sexual
activity by force, threat of
force, physical or other
Refers
to
acts
or
omissions causing or
likely to cause mental or
emotional suffering of the
victim, such as but not
limited to:
a. Intimidation,
harassment,
stalking, damage to
property,
public
ridicule
or
humiliation, repeated
verbal abuse and
marital infidelity;
b. Causing or allowing
the victim to witness
the physical, sexual
or
psychological
abuse of a member
of the family to which
the victim belongs, or
c. To
witness
pornography in any
form or
d. To witness abusive
injury to pets or
e. To
unlawful
or
unwanted
Refers to acts that make or
attempt to make a woman
financially dependent which
includes, but not limited to
the following:
a. Withdrawal of financial
support or preventing
the
victim
from
engaging
in
any
legitimate profession,
occupation, business
or activity, except in
cases wherein the
other spouse/partner
objects
on
valid,
serious and moral
grounds as defined in
Article 73 of the Family
Code;
b. Deprivation or threat of
deprivation of financial
resources and the right
to
the
use
and
enjoyment
of
the
conjugal, community or
property owned in
common;
c. Destroying household
property;
86
Physical
Violence
(Sec. 3(A))
Sexual Violence
(Sec. 3 (B))
c.
harm or threat of physical
or other harm or coercion;
Prostituting the woman or
her child.
Psychological Violence
(Sec. 3(C))
deprivation of the
right
to
custody
and/or visitation of
common children
Economic Abuse
(Sec. 3 (D))
d. Controlling the victim's
own
money
or
properties or solely
controlling the conjugal
money or properties.
[R.A. No. 9262 Sec. 3 (A), (B) (C), (D].
(291) A was charged with violation of Section 5(a) of RA 9262 after B, his former girlfriend accused him of
pulling her hair, punching her back, shoulder and left eye, thereby demeaning and degrading her
intrinsic worth and dignity as a human being. In his defense, A averred that at the time of the alleged
incident, he was no longer in a dating relationship with B; hence, R.A 9262 was inapplicable.
(a)
Will the defense prosper?
No, the defense was not valid. Dating relationship contemplates a situation wherein the parties are romantically
involved over time and on a continuing basis during the course of the relationship (R.A. No. 9262, Sec. 3, par.
e). For R.A. No. 9262 to be applicable, it is not indispensable that the act of violence be a consequence of
such relationship. It is immaterial whether the relationship had ceased for as long as there is sufficient evidence
showing the past or present existence of such relationship between the offender and the victim when the
physical harm was committed (Dabalos v. RTC Angeles City, G.R. No. 193960, January 07, 2013). In the given
case, even if A and B were no longer romantically involved when the incident happened, the fact that B was
his former girlfriend and that he inflicted physical suffering which demeans and degrades the latter’s intrinsic
worth and dignity, is constitutive of the crime.
(b)
Is it required that the complainant bore a child with the accused to be able to charge him with
violation of R.A. No. 9262?
No, as long as the woman had sexual relations with the accused, which may or may not result in bearing a
common child (R.A. No. 9262, Sec. 3, par. f). Thus, B was not excluded from the coverage of the law even if
she did not bear any child from A.
(292) What are the remedies available to victims of acts of "violence against women and their children?
There are three distinct remedies available: first, a criminal complaint; second, a civil action for damages; and
finally, a civil action for the issuance of a protection order. A criminal complaint may be resorted to when the
act of violence against women and their children is committed through any, some, or all of the nine (9) means
which Sec. 5 of the Anti-VAWC Law specifies as constitutive of “the crime of violence against women and their
children. A civil action for damages may be resorted to pursuant to Sec. 36 of the Anti-VAWC Law. A protection
order is issued "for the purpose of preventing further acts of violence against a woman or her child and granting
other necessary relief;" thereby "safeguarding the victim from further harm, minimizing any disruption in the
victim's daily life, and facilitating the opportunity and ability of the victim to independently regain control over
her life (Pavlow v. Mendenilla, G.R. No. 181489, April 19, 2017).
(293) X married Y in 2006. Thereafter, Y started to work in Singapore as a chef, where he acquired permanent
resident status in 2008. X claimed that Y stopped supporting their children, compelling her to take
additional job to augment her income. X also alleged of Y’s virtual abandonment, mistreatment, and
physical and sexual violence. To make matters worse, Y has been allegedly living with a Singaporean
woman. The alleged marital infidelity caused X mental and emotional anguish, prompting her to file a
case against Y for violation of Sec. 5 (i) of R.A. No. 9262 before the Family Court of Pasig. The Family
Court dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction, because the alleged illicit relationship occurred
outside the country. Is the ruling of the court correct?
No, the ruling of the Family Court is incorrect. Contrary to the court's interpretation, R.A. No. 9262 criminalizes
not the marital infidelity per se but the psychological violence causing mental or emotional suffering on the
wife. Otherwise stated, it is the violence inflicted under the said circumstances that the law seeks to outlaw.
Marital infidelity as cited in the law is only one of the various acts by which psychological violence may be
committed. Thus, the mental or emotional suffering of the victim is an essential and distinct element in the
commission of the offense. Sec. 7 of RA 9262 provides that the case may be filed where the crime or any of
its elements was committed at the option of the complainant. While psychological violence as the means
employed by the perpetrator is certainly an indispensable element of the offense, equally essential also is the
87
element of mental or emotional anguish which is personal to the complainant (AAA v. BBB, G.R. No. 212448,
January 11, 2018).
(294) Define Battered Woman Syndrome and its phases.
Battered Woman Syndrome refers to a scientifically defined pattern of psychological and behavioral symptoms
found in women living in battering relationships as a result of cumulative abuse (R.A. No. 9262, Sec. 3(c)).
The battered woman syndrome is characterized by the so-called cycle of violence, which has three phases:
First, the tension-building phase, wherein minor battering occurs that could be verbal or slight physical abuse
or another form of hostile behavior. Second, the acute battering incident, which is said to be characterized by
brutality, destructiveness and sometimes, death. During this phase, the woman has no control; only the batterer
may put an end to the violence. Finally, the tranquil, loving, or at least nonviolent phase, wherein the couple
experience profound relief. The batterer may show a tender and nurturing behavior towards his partner. He
knows he has been viciously cruel and tries to make up for it, begging for her forgiveness and promising never
to beat her again. On the other hand, the battered woman also tries to convince herself that the battery will
never happen again; that her partner will change for the better; and that this “good, gentle and caring man” is
the real person whom she loves (People v. Genosa, G.R. No. 135981, January 15, 2004).
(295) When can Battered Woman Syndrome be invoked as a defense?
The defense of Battered Woman Syndrome can be invoked if the woman in a marital relationship with the
batterer is subjected to cumulative abuse or battery involving the infliction of physical harm resulting in physical
and psychological or emotional distress. Cumulative means resulting from successive addition. In sum, there
must be “at least two battering episodes” between the accused and her intimate partner and such final episode
produced in the battered person’s mind an actual fear of imminent harm from her batterer and an honest belief
that she needed to use force in order to save her life (People v. Genosa, G.R. No. 135981, January 15, 2004).
Under Section 26 of R.A. No. 9262, victim-survivors who are found by the courts to be suffering from battered
woman syndrome do not incur any criminal and civil liability notwithstanding the absence of any of the elements
for justifying circumstances of self-defense under the Revised Penal Code. In the determination of the state of
mind of the woman who was suffering from battered woman syndrome at the time of the commission of the
crime, the courts shall be assisted by expert psychiatrists/ psychologists.
(296) During her marriage with Y, X suffered maltreatment for over five years. In one instance, she was
rushed to the hospital after passing out when Y beat his badly. She was confined for almost a week,
because of the severity of the physical injuries she sustained. She did not talk to anyone. refused to
eat her meals and did not take her medicine. Hence, her husband requested one of the psychiatrists in
the hospital to conduct an examination on her. Later, the doctor found that X has exhibited symptoms
or manifestations of Battered Woman Syndrome. Y felt sorry for what he did to his wife and asked for
a last chance. One night, when Y arrived at the hospital to visit X, without any provocation on his part,
X suddenly attacked and wounded him which caused his instant death. When prosecuted, X invoked
self-defense, testifying that she was afraid that Y would hurt her again. However, the prosecution
rebutted X’s claim contending that unlawful aggression, an essential element of self-defense is absent
in the case. May the claim for self-defense lie even if there was no unlawful aggression on the part of
the deceased husband?
No, the claim for self-defense will not lie as the primordial element for its proper invocation, unlawful
aggression, is absent. The proper invocable defense is the battered woman syndrome which must be
established through the expert testimony of psychologists/psychiatrists. Victim-survivors who are found by the
courts to be suffering from battered woman syndrome do not incur any criminal and civil liability notwithstanding
the absence of any of the elements for justifying circumstances of self-defense under the RPC (R.A. No. 9262,
Sec. 26).
88
Anti-Child Pornography Act of 2009 (RA 9775)
(297) Define the terms “Child,” “Child Pornography,” and “Explicit Sexual Activity” under R.A. No. 9775 or
the Anti-Child Pornography Act.
1.
"Child" refers to a person below eighteen (18) years of age or over, but is unable to fully take care of
himself/herself from abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation or discrimination because of a physical or mental
disability or condition.
A “child” also refers to: (1) a person regardless of age who is presented, depicted or portrayed as a
child as defined herein; and (2) computer-generated, digitally or manually crafted images or graphics
of a person who is represented or who is made to appear to be a child as defined herein (R.A. No.
9775, Sec. 3 (a)).
2. "Child pornography" refers to any representation, whether visual, audio, or written combination
thereof, by electronic, mechanical, digital, optical, magnetic or any other means, of child engaged or
involved in real or simulated explicit sexual activities (R.A. No. 9775, Sec. 3(b)).
3. "Explicit Sexual Activity" includes actual or simulated
a. As to form:
i. Sexual intercourse or lascivious act including, but not limited to, contact involving genital to genital,
oral to genital, anal to genital, or oral to anal, whether between persons of the same or opposite
sex;
b. Bestiality;
c. Masturbation;
d. Sadistic or masochistic abuse;
e. Lascivious exhibition of the genitals, buttocks, breasts, pubic area and/or anus; or
f. Use of any object or instrument for lascivious acts (R.A. No. 9775, Section 3(C))
(298) X received a friend request from A, a minor, on his Facebook Messenger. X and A then started talking
and at some point, X asked A to send him pictures of her private parts. A submitted to the request of
X. B, A’s mother, filed a complaint against X. They presented screenshots of the chat thread between
A and X. The photos and the chat thread were obtained since X gave A his password. Should X be held
liable under R.A. No. 9775?
Yes. It is decisively clear that the crime of child pornography as defined and penalized under R.A. No. 9775
should be classified as a crime mala in se. As parens patriae, the State cannot tolerate this act of grooming
minors for sexual abuse. We should not be complicit in reinforcing this belief upon the minors that sex with
children is acceptable and thereby fuel a pedophile's fantasies prior to committing sexual abuse, which clearly
happened in the instant case (Cadajas y Cabias v. People, G.R. No. 247348, November 16, 2021).
(299) X induced A and B, both minor, to perform sexual acts in front of web camera. As their “reward” X
gives them chocolates and new toys. Once recorded, X sends these pornographic videos online to her
foreign patrons in exchange of dollars. What offense/s is/are committed by the offender, and what
penalty should be imposed?
The offender is guilty of Section 4 (a) R.A. No. 9775 or the Anti-Child Pornography Act, for inducing the two
children to perform in the creation of production of any form of child pornography. Moreover, the offender
committed this through a computer system, in violation of R.A. No. 10175 or the Cybercrime Prevention Act.
Under the latter law, the unlawful or prohibited acts defined and punished under R.A. No. 9775 is punishable
by one degree higher than that it provides (R.A. No. 10175, Section 4 (c) (2)).
(300) A was caught in possession of five (5) DVDs containing music videos of him and two (2) children
showing explicit sexual activities including bestiality, masturbation, sadistic or masochistic abuse,
lascivious exhibition of the genitals, buttocks, breasts, pubic area and/or anus. When charged for
violations of Sec. 4(c) and 4(d) of R.A. No. 9775, A alleges that he may not be charged under Sec. 4(c)
for he had no intention to sell, distribute, publish or broadcast the said music videos. Comment on A’s
contention.
A’s contention is untenable. Possession of three or more articles of child pornography of the same form shall
be prima facie evidence of the intent to sell, distribute, publish or broadcast (R.A. No. 9775, Sec. 4(d)). Hence,
A’s mere possession of five (5) DVDs creates a disputable presumption of his intent to sell the same. A may,
however present sufficient evidence to overcome this presumption.
89
(301) Define conspiracy to commit child pornography and syndicated child pornography.
Conspiracy to commit any form of child pornography shall be committed when two (2) or more persons come
to an agreement concerning the commission of any of the said prohibited acts and decide to commit it (R.A.
No. 9775, Sec. 4(k)). Child pornography is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a group of three
(3) or more persons conspiring or confederating with one another (R.A. No. 9775, Sec. 5).
Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation, and Discrimination
Act (RA 7610, as amended)
Note: R.A. No. 11648 has amended the age of the child victim in Sections 5(b), and 7 of R.A. 7610, which respectively
pertain to Child Prostitution and other Sexual Abuse, and Child Trafficking, respectively, the age of the victim referred
to in the provisions is now under sixteen (16) years old. As for the Section 9 of R.A. 7610, which pertains to children
exposed to “Obscene Publications and Indecent Shows,” the age of the victim referred to is now under eighteen (18)
years old. Lastly, as to Section 10(b) of the same, which refers to other acts of Neglect, Abuse, Cruelty, or Exploitation
and Other Conditions Prejudicial to the Child's Development, the age of the victim is now a minor sixteen (16) years
old or under or who is ten (10) years of more junior of the accused.
(302) The minor victim (AAA) was only fourteen (14) years old when petitioner, O, a teacher and CAT
Commandant of AAA’s school, allegedly molested her by kissing her on the lips and sucking her
breast. In the guise of an initiation to become an officer, petitioner made her come to his house to
which the former took advantage of AAA. What crime is committed by O?
O should be convicted of lascivious conduct under Sec. 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610. The requisites for sexual abuse
under Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610 are as follows: (1) the accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or
lascivious conduct; (2) the said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other
sexual abuse; and (3) that the child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age. Considering that the
victim was only 14 years of age at the time of the commission of the crime, O is guilty under said law (Orsos
v. People, G.R. No. 214673, November 20, 2017).
(303) AAA, an 11-year-old minor, was sexually harassed by Mr. E. The first incident was when she was
playing in the street when Mr. E summoned her to his house. When AAA refused, Mr. E threatened her
that he would kidnap one of her siblings. AAA went along with Mr. E and upon reaching the latter’s
house, Mr. E proceeded to have carnal knowledge with her. During the second incident, Mr. E did not
undress her but instead, Mr. E made her lie on the bed and kissed her. Can Mr. E be held criminally
liable under Sec. 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610?
Yes, Mr. E may be held liable under Sec. 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610. In the case of People v. Bernabe, the Supreme
Court ruled that the elements of a violation of Sec. 5(b) are:
1. The accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct;
2. The said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse;
and
3. The child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age.
A child is deemed subjected to other sexual abuse when the child engages in lascivious conduct under the
coercion or influence of any adult. Intimidation need not necessarily be irresistible. It is sufficient that some
compulsion equivalent to intimidation annuls or subdues the free exercise of the will of the offended party. The
law does not require physical violence on the person of the victim; moral coercion or ascendancy is sufficient.
In this case, all the elements were established. Hence, Mr. E may be held liable under Sec. 5(b) of R.A. No.
7610 (People v. Bernabe, G.R. No. 214882, October 16, 2019, Hernando Case).
(304) When is there an attempt to commit child prostitution under R.A. No. 7610?
There is an attempt to commit child prostitution under Section 5, paragraph (a) hereof when any person who,
not being a relative of a child, is found alone with the said child inside the room or cubicle of a house, an inn,
hotel, motel, pension house, apartelle or other similar establishments, vessel, vehicle or any other hidden or
secluded area under circumstances which would lead a reasonable person to believe that the child is about to
be exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse.
There is also an attempt to commit child prostitution, under paragraph (b) of Section 5 hereof when any person
is receiving services from a child in a sauna parlor or bath, massage clinic, health club and other similar
90
establishments. A penalty lower by two (2) degrees than that prescribed for the consummated felony under
Section 5 hereof shall be imposed upon the principals of the attempt to commit the crime of child prostitution
under this Act, or, in the proper case, under the Revised Penal Code (R.A. No. 7610, Sec. 6).
(305) How is Child Trafficking committed under R.A. No. 7610, as amended by R.A. No. 11648?
Any person who shall engage in trading and dealing with children including, but not limited to, the act of buying
and selling of a child for money, or for any consideration, or barter, shall suffer the penalty of reclusion temporal
to reclusion perpetua. The penalty shall be imposed in its maximum period when the victim is under sixteen
(16) years of age. (R.A. No. 7610, Sec. 7, as amended by R.A. No. 11648).
(306) What are the instances when there is an attempt to commit child trafficking under R.A. No. 7610?
There is an attempt to commit child trafficking:
When a child travels alone to a foreign country without valid reason therefor and without clearance issued
by the Department of Social Welfare and Development or written permit or justification from the child's
parents or legal guardian;
2. When a person, agency, establishment or child-caring institution recruits women or couples to bear children
for the purpose of child trafficking;
3. When a doctor, hospital or clinic official or employee, nurse, midwife, local civil registrar or any other person
simulates birth for the purpose of child trafficking; or
4. When a person engages in the act of finding children among low-income families, hospitals, clinics,
nurseries, day-care centers, or other child-during institutions who can be offered for the purpose of child
trafficking (R.A. No. 7610, Sec. 8).
1.
Note: A penalty lower by two (2) degrees than that prescribed for the consummated felony under Section 7
hereof shall be imposed upon the principals of the attempt to commit child trafficking under this Act.
(307) X, a 14-year old was hired by Y, as a dancer for an event in Club 123, X was ordered to wear only a
lingerie and she was compelled to dance live in an erotic manner, whereby X must gradually undress
herself completely. May Y be charged under R.A. No. 7610? Explain.
Yes, Mr. Y may be charged under Sec. 9 of R.A. No. 7610, as amended by R.A. No. 11648. The said provision
punishes any person, who shall hire, employ, use, persuade, induce or coerce a child to perform in, obscene
exhibitions and indecent shows, whether live or in video, or model in obscene publications or pornographic
materials or to sell or distribute the said materials. In this scenario, Mr. Y hired X, who is a 14 year old minor,
to dance live in an erotic manner. Hence, Mr. Y can be held liable for violation of Sec. 9 of R.A. No. 7610, as
amended. (R.A. No. 7610, Sec.9, as amended by R.A. No. 11648).
(308) Differentiate a prosecution for Acts of Lasciviousness under Art. 366 of the RPC from R.A 7610, as
amended.
Under Article 336 of the RPC, the accused performs the acts of lasciviousness on a child who is neither
exploited in prostitution nor subjected to "other sexual abuse." In contrast, under Section 5 of R.A. No. 7610,
the accused performs the acts of lasciviousness on a child who is either exploited in prostitution or subjected
to "other sexual abuse.” Section 5 of R.A. No. 7610 deals with a situation where the acts of lasciviousness are
committed on a child already either exploited in prostitution or subjected to "other sexual abuse." Clearly, the
acts of lasciviousness committed on the child are separate and distinct from the other circumstances that the
child is either exploited in prostitution or subjected to "other sexual abuse."
The very definition of "child abuse" under Sec. 3(b) of R.A. No. 7610 does not require that the victim suffer a
separate and distinct act of sexual abuse aside from the act complained of. For it refers to the maltreatment,
whether habitual or not, of the child. Thus, a violation of Sec. 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 occurs even though the
accused committed sexual abuse against the child victim only once, even without a prior sexual affront
(Quimvel v. People, G.R. No. 214497, April 18 2017).
(309) AAA, a minor of about 16 years of age at the time, was sexually harassed three times by XXX. The first
incident was when the appellant went on top of AAA, forcibly had carnal knowledge, and mashed her
breast. The second incident happened when AAA was playing with her siblings. He directed AAA inside
a house and forced her to have carnal knowledge. The last instance was when AAA was alone and XXX
forced her to have carnal knowledge with him but this time, AAA already informed her parents about
the incident. XXX alleged that the carnal knowledge in those three instances were consensual because
they were sweethearts. May X be held criminally liable under Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610?
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Yes, XXX may be held liable under Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610. The present case has similar factual
circumstances with that of People V. Bobonga, likewise the Court ruled that the essential elements of Section
5(b) are:
1. The accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct;
2. The said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse;
and
3. The child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age.
In the case at bar, all the elements were established. As such, XXX may be held liable under Section 5(b) of
R.A. No. 7610 (People v. Bobonga, G.R. No. 214771, August 9, 2017).
(310) A complaint was filed against XXX for refusing to provide financial for his child, CCC. This has caused
mental anguish to his wife, AAA. Such refusal was proven through several witnesses and the number
of complaints filed against XXX in barangay conciliation proceedings. XXX was also seen at a
restaurant with another woman, Can XXX be held liable under R.A. No. 7610?
Yes, XXX may be held liable under R.A 7610, specifically, Section 5(i) of R.A. No. 7610. In the case of XXX v.
People, the Court discussed the elements of Section 5(i) under R.A. No. 7610:
1. The offended party is a woman and/or her child or children;
2. The woman is either the wife or former wife of the offender, or is & woman with whom the offender
has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or is a woman with whom such offender has a common
child. As for the woman's child or children, they may be legitimate or illegitimate, or living within or
without the family abode;
3. The offender causes on the woman and/or child mental or emotional anguish; and
4. The anguish is caused through denial of financial support.
In the given case, the filiation and marriage of AAA and CCC to XXX was established. The mental anguish
which AAA is experiencing was brought about their worsening financial situation and XXX’s refusal to provide,
and such refusal was proven through several witnesses and their testimonies, as well as the number of
complaints filed before the barangay as against XXX (XXX v. People, G.R. No. 241390, October 7, 2021).
(311) B, the directress and owner of Challenger Montessori School (Challenger), was charged with the crime
of Child Abuse in relation to under Section 10 (a) of R.A. No. 7610 in relation to Section 3 (b) (2). The
situation arose when the private complainants, both 16 years old, who were fourth year high school
students at Challenger sent a text message to a certain C, one of their classmates. The message said:
"Hi cha ate Gale to kumusta na?" Apparently, the person named Gale mentioned in said message was
B’s daughter. C’s mother arrived and got angry at the private complainants and their classmates who
sent the message for allegedly quarreling with her daughter. B called the private complainants and
their six other classmates to the faculty room. There, in front of the teachers and other students, B
shouted at them and inquired as to who sent the text message which contained her daughter's name.
The private complainants and their classmates admitted that they all planned to send the text message
to C and that the sim card which was used to send the same was owned by M. B then threatened to
sue M and said harsh words in a derogatory tone. These actions by N resulted in M having sleepless
nights, fear, and symptoms of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder. Is B liable for child abuse under Section
10 (a) in relation to Section 3 (b) (2) of R.A. No. 7610?
No. B may not be held liable for child abuse under Section 10 (a) in relation to Section (b) (2) of R.A. No. 7610.
Jurisprudence has consistently held that a specific intent to debase, degrade or demean the intrinsic worth of
a child as a human being is required for conviction under Section 10 (a) of R.A. No. 7610 in relation to Section
3 (b) (2). "Debasement" is defined as the act of reducing the value, quality, or purity of something;
"degradation," on the other hand, is a lessening of a person's or thing's character or quality while "demean"
means to lower in status, condition, reputation, or character. In the present case, B acts were only done in the
heat of anger, made after she had just learned that the private complainants had deceivingly used her
daughter's name to send a text message to another student. She had also then just learned that the mother of
the student who received the misleading text message had confronted the private complainants for quarreling
with the former's daughter. The specific intent required for conviction under Section 10 (a) in relation to Section
3 (b) (2) of R.A. 7610 was not proven by the prosecution. Thus, it can be readily said that B had no intent to
debase, degrade, or demean the private complainants and may not be convicted for the crime of child abuse
(Brinas v. People, G.R. no. 254005, June 23, 2021).
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(312) Marley, a 16-year old barrio lass, was invited by Charlie, a 60-year old man, to keep him company in
Lights On Lights Off, a beerhouse in the red light district of Malate. May Charlie be charged for a
violation of R.A. No. 7610? Explain.
Yes, Charlie may be charged for violation of Sec. 10 (b) of R.A. No. 7610. The said provision punishes other
acts of neglect, abuse, cruelty or exploitation and other conditions prejudicial to the child's development
committed by any person who shall keep or have in his company a minor, sixteen (16) years or under or who
in ten (10) years or more his junior in any public or private place, hotel, motel, beer joint, discotheque, cabaret,
pension house, sauna or massage parlor, beach and/or other tourist resort or similar places. It further provides
that this provision shall not apply to any person who is related within the fourth degree of consanguinity or
affinity or any bond recognized by law, local custom and tradition or acts in the performance of a social, moral
or legal duty. Here, Marley is a minor and ten years younger than Charlie. They are strangers to each other
and Charlie is not in the performance of any moral duty when they hang out together in a public beerhouse.
Thus, Charlie committed other acts of neglect and exploitation punished under Sec. 10 (b) of R.A. No. 7610
(R.A. No. 7610, Sec. 10(b), as amended by R.A. No. 11648).
CRIMES AGAINST PERSONAL LIBERTY AND SECURITY (ARTS. 267-292)
Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention
(313) In 1999, T went with C, then 2 years of age, and her elder sister Z to a McDonald’s outlet in the KP
Tower in Binondo, Manila. Barely had C gone from his mother’s sight when she realized that he had
disappeared. T and her sister looked for him to no avail. They reported the incident. In 2001, T received
a call from a woman who claimed to have custody of C. The caller asked for Php30,000 in exchange for
the boy. T sought the help of the police and PO3 J was designated to act as T’s niece.
In the designated pay-off place, X and Y came. T told them that they were waiting for a certain Bato. X
said she knew Bato. X told T that she would ask a cousin of Bato if Bato was already in Kapatagan.
She turned to Y, supposedly Bato’s cousin. Y informed T and J that she had C and asked them to come
with her. T refused. Y reluctantly agreed to leave X and fetched C.Y returned and told them that C was
in a nearby ice plant. T insisted on the agreement that the boy be handed over at the carinderia. Y
relented, left, and returned with C. C no longer recognized T. X and Y demanded the ransom money.
She said that J had it. J boarded a jeepney outside. J there handed the money to X. J gave the signal
and the PAOCTF team arrested X and Y.
RTC convicted them of kidnapping for ransom, but only imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua as
it held that the Php30,000 was to measly to be a ransom and considered it as the amount spent for the
care of Christopher during the two years he was with the sisters. But the CA considered the Php30,000
as a qualifying circumstance, thus imposing death with the penalty of RP to death. Decide.
X and Y are liable for kidnapping for ransom. Under the RPC, If the victim is a minor, the duration of his
detention is immaterial. Likewise, if the victim is kidnapped and illegally detained to extort ransom, the duration
of his detention becomes inconsequential. The crime is qualified and becomes punishable by death even if
none of the circumstances mentioned in paragraphs 1 to 4 of Article 267 of the RPC is present. Here, C is two
years of age. X and Y took C for the purpose of extorting Php30,000.
Ransom means money, price, or consideration paid or demanded for the redemption of a captured person that
will release him from captivity. No specific form of ransom is required to consummate the felony of kidnapping
for ransom as long as the ransom is intended as a bargaining chip in exchange for the victim’s freedom. The
amount of and purpose for the ransom is immaterial. Here, the accused asked for P30,000 in exchange for the
boy. Therefore, X and Y are liable for kidnapping for ransom (People v. Mamantak, G.R. No. 174659, July 28,
2008).
(314) While walking alone on her way home from a party, M was seized at gun point by F and taken on board
a tricycle to a house some distance away. F was with J, R, and L, who drove the tricycle. At the house,
F, J, and R succeeded in having sexual intercourse with M against her will and under the threat of F's
gun. L was not around when the sexual assaults occurred as he left after bringing his colleagues and
M to their destination, but he returned every day to bring food and the news about M's disappearance
in town. For five days, F, J and R kept M in the house and took turns in sexually assaulting her. On the
6th day, M managed to escape; she proceeded immediately to the nearest police station and narrated
her ordeal. What crime/s did F, J, R, and L commit and what was their degree of participation?
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F, J, R and L are all liable for the special complex crime of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention with Rape.
It was sufficiently proved that the 4 accused kidnapped M and held her in detention for 5 days and carnally
abused her. Since it is a special complex crime, no matter how many times the victim had been raped, the
resultant crime is only one kidnapping and serious illegal detention with rape. The composite acts are regarded
as a single indivisible offense with only one penalty. It is illegal detention and not forcible abduction since it
was evident that the intent was to detain the victim. As to the degree of their participation, F, J, R and L are all
liable as principals. There was implied conspiracy as they acted toward a single criminal design or purpose.
Although L was not around when the sexual assaults took place, there is complicity on his part as he was the
one who drove the tricycle at the time the victim was seized and he returned everyday to bring food and news
to his conspirators (People v. Mirandilla, Jr., G.R. No. 186417, July 27, 2011).
(315) Can kidnapping and murder or homicide in the course of detention of the person kidnapped, be
complexed under Article 48 or be treated as separate crimes? Explain.
No. The rule now is where the person kidnapped is killed in the course of the detention, regardless of whether
the killing was purposely sought or was merely an afterthought, the kidnapping and murder or homicide can
no longer be complexed under Article 48, nor be treated as separate crimes. It shall be punished as a special
complex crime under the last paragraph of Article 267, as amended by R.A. No. 7659 (People v. Ramos, G.R.
No. 118570, October 12, 1998).
(316) X and her friend, Y, were walking along Agham Road, Diliman, Quezon City. Suddenly, a man who was
later identified as PO3 Z, grabbed X by her right forearm and forcibly took her inside a gray van where
three (3) other men were waiting. Both X and Y shouted for help, but no one came to their rescue. Y
managed to escape and immediately reported the incident to X's mother, A. Meanwhile, PO3 Z and his
companions drove the van around Quezon City. One (1) of X's abductors, a certain Major C, asked for
her relatives' contact numbers. X gave the number of her brother, E.
A received a phone call from one (1) of the kidnappers, who demanded Php200,000.00 in exchange for
X's liberty. A informed him that their family could not afford to pay the ransom due to their financial
condition. Suddenly, the caller hung up. E thereafter arrived and negotiated for a reduced ransom when
one (1) of the kidnappers called again. The kidnappers acceded and lowered their demand to
Php100,000.00. What crime(s) did the Z and his companions commit? Explain.
Z and his companions are liable for kidnapping for ransom. Under the RPC, a conviction for the crime requires
the concurrence of the following elements: (1) the offender is a private individual; (2) that individual kidnaps or
detains another or in any other manner deprives the latter of liberty; (3) the act of detention or kidnapping is
illegal; and (4) in the commission of the offense, any of the following circumstances is present: (a) the
kidnapping or detention lasts for more than three days; (b) it is committed by one who simulates public
authority; (c) any serious physical injury is inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained, or any threat to kill
that person is made; (d) the person kidnapped or detained is a minor, a female or a public officer.
In this case, (1) a public official may be prosecuted under Article 267 of the RPC if it is shown that he committed
acts unrelated to the functions of his office; (2) the accused kidnapped X as stated in the facts; (3) the accused
deprived the victim of her liberty to extort money, and therefore illegal; (4) the victim X is a woman. Hence, the
accused are liable for kidnapping for ransom (People v. Borja, G.R. No. 199710, August 2, 2017).
(317) What does the law contemplate as “deprivation of liberty” for purposes of kidnapping?
The term “actual deprivation of liberty” consists not only of placing a person in an enclosure but also of detaining
a person or depriving him in any manner of his liberty (People v. Ramos, G.R. No. 118570, October 12, 1998).
(318) During trial, the prosecution presented H’s wife W, who positively identified X and Y as among the four
armed men who took H at gunpoint and forcibly stole their car, which they used as a getaway vehicle.
She claimed the accused repeatedly asked for a ransom, which she only paid in part, in cash and
jewelry, by delivery per the perpetrators’ instructions. Still, H was not released and his body was later
discovered in Angono, Rizal a month after payment. In addition, the prosecution presented accusedturned-state witness Z, who testified that he and the accused are members of the Waray-Waray Kidnap
for Ransom Group. He guarded H with the other accused after he was brought to the safe house tied
in chains. Z testified that H was later shot four times in the head after distribution of ransom money
paid by W among the accused group. Were X and Y guilty of the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom with
Homicide?
Yes, X and Y were guilty of the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom with Homicide as the elements of the crime
are proven. The elements of kidnapping for ransom under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as
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amended, are as follows: (1) intent on the part of the accused to deprive the victim of his/her liberty; (2) actual
deprivation of the victim of his/her liberty; and (3) motive of the accused, which is extorting ransom for the
release of the victim. In the special complex crime of Kidnapping for Ransom with Homicide, the person
kidnapped is killed in the course of the detention, regardless of whether the killing was purposely sought or
was merely an afterthought.
In the instant case, the prosecution was able to prove the foregoing elements of Kidnapping for Ransom with
Homicide. Firstly, appellants' intent to deprive H of his liberty was evident from the moment his freedom of
movement was forcibly curtailed, wherein appellants poked a gun at him and his wife W while they were both
about to board their car. Secondly, the prosecution was able to prove the actual deprivation of his liberty
through Z’s testimony proving that as H’s guard, he saw to it that he was tied and bound at all times. Thirdly,
the prosecution was able to prove that ransom money was demanded for the release of H following records of
several communications between W and the accused and the testimony relating to the delivery of the ransom.
Finally, H was killed in the course of the detention when his body was found dead in Angono, Rizal a month
after delivery and receipt of ransom money (People v. Cornista y Reotutar, G.R. No. 218915, February 19,
2020, Hernando Case).
Slight Illegal Detention
(319) X arrived home in a tricycle while Y was waiting, drunk at the gate of the house. Y intercepted X at the
garage area and held a knife to her back, dragged her to his room, locked the door and blocked it using
his bed. Y raped X. Shortly after, a person arrived who introduced himself as Chief of Police, called on
Y to release X but refused and made demands to first produce certain persons. Upon their arrival, he
asked Z, his girlfriend to admit that she had been raped. Z admitted but Y refused to release X. Y again
raped X, holding a knife to her neck. In order to prevent persons from entering the room where they
were confined, Y installed electric wires on the door. The police forcibly entered his room and arrested
Y. Y argued that he detained X only to extract an admission from his girlfriend of the fact of her being
raped and to bring the alleged perpetrators out in the open. Absent proof that he abducted X with lewd
designs, he could not be convicted of forcible abduction under Art. 342 of the RPC. Further, he insisted
that there was no proof that he raped X. The judge found Y liable only for rape, as the crime of rape
absorbed the act of illegal detention. Is judgment correct?
No, the judgment is not correct. Slight illegal detention has four elements: (1) that the offender is a private
individual; (2) that he kidnaps or detains another, or in any manner deprives him of his liberty; (3) the act of
kidnapping or detention is illegal; (4) that the crime is committed without the attendance of any circumstances
enumerated in Art. 267.
The elements of slight illegal detention are all present here. After raping X, Y continued to detain her and to
deprive her of her liberty. The detention was illegal and not attended by circumstances that would render it
serious illegal detention. Thus, although the crime of rape may have absorbed the initial abduction of X, the
continued detention of AAA after the rape cannot be deemed absorbed in it. Likewise, since the detention
continued after the rape had been completed, it cannot be deemed a necessary means for the crime of rape.
Hence, the court is not correct in holding Y guilty of rape absorbing illegal detention (People v. Concepcion,
G.R. No. 214886, April 4, 2018).
(320) What is the liability of the person who furnished the place for the perpetration of the crime?
The liability of the person who furnished the place for the perpetration of the crime is that of a co-principal
(RPC, Art. 268, par. 2).
Trespass to Dwelling
(321) What is dwelling?
Dwelling is any building or structure exclusively devoted for rest and comfort. The determining factor of whether
a building is a dwelling is the use to which it is put (REYES, Book Two, supra at 768).
(322) At about 11:00 in the evening, D forced his way inside the house of M. J, M’s son, saw D and accosted
him. D pulled a knife and stabbed J on his abdomen. M heard the commotion and went out of his room.
D, who was about to escape, assaulted M. J suffered injuries which, were it not for the timely medical
attendance, would have caused his death. M sustained injuries that incapacitated him for 25 days.
What crime/s did D commit?
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D committed qualified trespass to dwelling, frustrated homicide for the stabbing of J, and less serious physical
injuries for the assault on M. The crime of qualified trespass to dwelling should not be complexed with frustrated
homicide because when the trespass is committed as a means to commit a more serious crime, trespass to
dwelling is absorbed by the greater crime and the former constitutes an aggravating circumstance of dwelling.
The stabbing of J and the assault on M were merely an afterthought, hence D is liable for the separate crimes
of trespass to dwelling, frustrated homicide, and less serious physical injuries (People v. Medina, G.R. No. L38417, December 16, 1933).
(323) When is Article 280 inapplicable?
Article 280 is inapplicable in the following instances:
If the entrance to another’s dwelling is made for the purpose of preventing some serious harm to himself,
the occupants of the dwelling or a third person;
2. If the purpose is to render some service to humanity or justice; or
3. If the place where entrance is made is a café, tavern, inn and other public houses, while the same are
open (RPC, Art. 280, par. 3).
1.
Grave Coercion
(324) AAA was brought to the police headquarters, where he was tortured and maltreated by agents of the
law in order to compel him to confess a crime imputed to him. However, the agents failed to draw from
AAA a confession they intended to obtain. The agents later released AAA. What crime was committed
by the agents of the law?
1.
2.
They are guilty of the crime of grave coercion. The agents
tortured and maltreated AAA to obtain a confession from
him, without AAA being arrested or confined in jail. AAA was
merely “brought” to the police headquarters and is thus not a
detention prisoner. Had he been validly arrested, the crime
committed would be maltreatment of prisoners (U.S. v. Cusi,
G.R. No. L-3699, March 18, 1908).
Under Republic Act 9745 or Anti-Torture Act of 2009, any
confession, admission or statement obtained as a result of
torture shall be inadmissible in evidence in any proceedings,
except if the same is used as evidence against a person or
persons accused of committing torture.
(325) Distinguish threats and coercion.
THREATS
COERCION
As to Character of Threatened Harm
The threatened harm or wrong is future and conditional.
The threatened harm or wrong is immediate and direct.
As to Use of Intermediary
It may be done through an intermediary or in writing.
It cannot be done by means of an intermediary or in writing.
As to Manner of Commission
Generally, it is committed by means of intimidation which is Generally, it is committed by violence, although it may also
future and conditional.
be by intimidation if it is serious enough, direct, immediate,
and personal.
As to Who May be Intimidated
Intimidation is directed against the victim or his family.
Intimidation is directed personally.
(326) Distinguish grave coercion (Article 286) from unjust vexation (Article 287, par. 2).
If the second element of grave coercion, which is the use of violence upon the offended party in preventing or
compelling him to do something against his will is lacking, the crime committed by the accused falls under
unjust vexation (REYES, Book Two, supra at 806).
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Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012 (RA 10175)
(327) What is a computer system?
Computer system refers to any device or group of interconnected or related devices, one or more of which,
pursuant to a program, performs automated processing of data. It covers any type of device with data
processing capabilities including, but not limited to, computers and mobile phones. The device consisting of
hardware and software may include input, output and storage components which may stand alone or be
connected in a network or other similar devices. It also includes computer data storage devices or media (R.A.
No. 10175, Sec. 3, Par. (g)).
(328) Mr. Prejudice, the secretary of Ms. Pride, accessed the latter’s personal laptop without authority.
Because Ms. Pride did not approve his request for a vacation leave, Mr. Prejudice intentionally deleted
all the computer files and introduced a virus to the computer system. What crime did Mr. Prejudice
commit?
Mr. Prejudice committed data interference, violating Sec. 4(a)(3) of the Cybercrime Prevention Act. Data
interference is the intentional or reckless alteration, damaging, deletion or deterioration of computer data,
electronic documents, or electronic data message, without right, including the introduction or transmission of
viruses. Under the said Act, “without right” refers to either (i) conduct undertaken without or in excess of
authority; or (ii) conduct not covered by established legal defenses, excuses, court orders, justifications, or
relevant principles under the law (R.A. No. 10175, Sec. 3(h)). Here, even if Mr. Prejudice is the secretary of
Ms. Pride, he had no authority to interfere with the personal laptop of his superior. The act of introducing a
virus and deleting all the files constitutes data interference (R.A. No. 10175, Sec. 4(a)(3)).
Note: A prosecution under this Act shall be without prejudice to any liability for violation of any provision of the
RPC, as amended, or special laws (R.A. No. 10175, Sec. 7). However, an offender cannot be charged (1) with
both online libel under Sec. 4(c)(4) of RA 10175 and Art. 353 of the RPC or (2) with both child pornography
committed online under Sec. 4(c)(2) of RA 10175 and RA 9775 or the Anti-Child Pornography Act of 2009 as
these constitute violations of the proscription against double jeopardy (Disini v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No.
203335, February 11, 2014).
(329) What are the punishable Acts under the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012?
Cybercrime Offenses can be found under Section 4 of R.A. No. 10175, categorized as (a) offenses against the
confidentiality, integrity, and availability of computer data and systems, (b) computer-related offenses, (c)
content-related offenses and (d) libel. Offenses under this Act are not limited to those which are expressly
stated, since the Act also contemplates other crimes and offenses defined and penalized by the RPC, as
amended, and special laws, if committed by, through and with the use of information and communications
technologies shall be covered by the relevant provisions of this Act. The penalty to be imposed shall be one
(1) degree higher than that provided for by the RPC, and special laws, as the case may be.
Note: As for Liability under Other Laws, a prosecution under this Act shall be without prejudice to any liability
for violation of any provision of the RPC, as amended, or special laws (R.A. No. 10175, Sec. 7).
(330) What is access and interception within the context of R.A. No. 10175?
Access refers to the instruction, communication with, storing data in, retrieving data from, or otherwise making
use of any resources of a computer system or communication network (R.A. No. 10175, Sec. 3, Par (a)).
Interception refers to listening to, recording, monitoring or surveillance of the content of communications,
including procuring of the content of data, either directly, through access and use of a computer system or
indirectly, through the use of electronic eavesdropping or tapping devices, at the same time that the
communication is occurring (R.A. No. 10175, Sec. 3, par. (m)).
(331) When can a person be held liable for Libel under the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012?
A person may be held liable under Sec. 4(c)(4) of R.A. No. 10175, a cybercrime offense which includes the
unlawful or prohibited acts of libel as defined in Art. 355 of the Revised Penal Code committed through a
computer system or any other similar means which may be devised in the future (R.A. No. 10175, Sec. 4).
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(332) What are the other offenses punishable under the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012?
The following acts shall also constitute an offense:
Aiding or Abetting in the Commission of Cybercrime. – Any person who willfully abets or aids in the
commission of any of the offenses enumerated in this Act shall be held liable.
2. Attempt in the Commission of Cybercrime. — Any person who willfully attempts to commit any of the
offenses enumerated in this Act shall be held liable (R.A. No. 10175, Sec. 5).
1.
CRIMES AGAINST PROPERTY (ARTICLES 293-332)
Robbery in General
(333) What is robbery?
Robbery is the taking of personal property belonging to another, with intent to gain, by means of violence
against, or intimidation of any person, or using force upon anything (REYES, Book Two, supra at 823).
(334) Who are guilty of robbery?
Any person who, with intent to gain, shall take any personal property belonging to another, by means of
violence against or intimidation of any person, or using force upon anything, shall be guilty of robbery (RPC,
Art. 293).
Robbery with Violence Against or Intimidation of Persons
(335) When is robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons qualified?
If any of the offenses defined in subdivisions 3, 4, and 5 of Article 294 is committed:
In an uninhabited place;
By a band;
By attacking a moving train, streetcar, motor vehicle, or airship;
By entering the passengers’ compartments in a train, or in any manner taking the passengers by
surprise; or
5. On a street, road, highway, or alley, and the intimidation is made with the use of firearms (REYES,
Book Two, supra at 865-866).
1.
2.
3.
4.
(336) X, a police officer, was assigned to investigate a vehicular collision between a jeepney and a taxi. X
confiscated the license of TD, the driver of the taxi, and demanded from the latter the amount of
Php5,000 in exchange for his license. The thought of not having his driver's license back and the
possibility that he might not be able earn a living for his family prompted him to give the amount
demanded. Feeling aggrieved, TD instituted an action against X allegedly for the crime of simple
robbery. During the trial, it is established by the prosecution that whenever a license was confiscated
due to a traffic violation, the same must be claimed from the office of the MMDA or City Hall, and not
from the officer who confiscated his license as the case may be. What crime did X commit?
X is liable for committing simple robbery against the taxi driver. Simple robbery is committed by means of
violence against or intimidation of persons, but the extent of the violation or intimidation does not fall under
paragraphs 1 to 4 of Article 294 of the RPC. The following elements must be established: (1) that there is
personal property belonging to another; (2) that there is unlawful taking of that property; (3) that the taking is
with the intent to gain; and (4) that there is violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things.
The petitioner unlawfully took TD’s money with the intent to gain and through intimidation. X is not authorized
to keep an offender's license and receive any payment for its return. Likewise, intense fear produced in the
TD’s mind restricted or hindered him to exercise his will as X succeeded in forcing him to choose between
parting with his money or having his driver's license completely confiscated or cancelled (Flores v. People,
G.R. No. 222861, April 23, 2018).
(337) C and K flagged down and boarded a jeepney going to G-Mall. E and R also boarded the vehicle. K saw
E giving a signal to R and heard him say "tirahi na nang babaye bai." R snatched the necklace of C,
and both disembarked the jeepney. What crime(s) did R commit?
The crime committed by R is only theft, not robbery. The distinguishing element between the crimes of robbery
and theft is the use of violence or intimidation as a means of taking the property belonging to another; the
element is present in the crime of robbery and absent in the crime of theft.
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Here, the snatching of the necklace was without violence against or intimidation of persons or with force upon
things. The fact that the necklace was "grabbed" did not automatically mean that force attended the taking. In
the strikingly similar case of Ablaza v. People, the Court clarified that "for the requisite of violence to obtain in
cases of simple robbery, the victim must have sustained less serious physical injuries or slight physical injuries
in the occasion of the robbery." Here, there was no such degree of injuries (Del Rosario v. People, G.R. No
235739, July 22, 2019).
(338) X and Y were playing a game of poker with their friend, A. After 3 deals, X and Y went home with their
total winnings of Php12,000. On their way home, they were suddenly ambushed by accused A by
indiscriminately firing against them. Y was shot, which led to his death, but X was able to evade the
shooting by jumping into a canal. A then took the money and fled the crime scene. Is A liable for the
separate crime of attempted murder/homicide with respect to X?
No, as A committed the special complex crime of robbery with homicide. The crime of attempted murder with
respect to X is not a separate crime but is absorbed in the special complex crime of robbery with homicide.
Attempted homicide or attempted murder committed during or on the occasion of the robbery, as in this case,
is absorbed in the crime of Robbery with Homicide which is a special complex crime that remains fundamentally
the same regardless of the number of homicides or injuries committed in connection with the robbery (People
v. Cabbab Jr., G.R. No. 173479, July 12, 2007).
(339) X, Y and Z went to a gasoline station and pretended to be customers. While the gasoline boy was filling
up their tank, X, Y and Z declared a hold up. X, Y, and Z then proceeded to the station’s convenience
store and took the employees' personal belongings who can only submit to their demands as guns
were poked at them. They shot the station's security guard which caused his death, and also took the
gasoline station’s profits.
(a)
When prosecuted for the special complex crime of robbery with homicide, X, Y, and Z contend
that they shot the security guard accidentally. Will their defense prosper?
No, their defense of having shot C by accident is untenable. There is no such felony of robbery with homicide
through reckless imprudence or simple negligence. It is immaterial that the death would supervene by mere
accident; or that the victim of homicide is other than the victim of robbery, or that two or more persons are
killed, or that aside from the homicide, rape, intentional mutilation, or usurpation of authority, is committed by
reason or on the occasion of the crime. All of them are still liable for the special complex crime of Robbery with
Homicide. When homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion of robbery, all those who took part as
principals in the robbery would also be held liable as principals of the single and indivisible felony of robbery
with homicide, although they did not actually take part in the killing, unless one of them clearly endeavored to
prevent the same in which case he is liable only for Robbery. Thus, even if the security guard's killing was
accidental, X, Y and Z are still liable for robbery with homicide (People v. De Leon, G.R. No. 179943, June 26,
2009).
(b)
Assuming it was Z (not the security guard) who was accidentally killed by X and Y during the
robbery, will the charge of robbery with homicide still prosper?
Yes, immaterial is the fact that the victim of homicide is one of the robbers. The felony would still be robbery
with homicide. Once a homicide is committed by or on the occasion of the robbery, the felony committed is
robbery with homicide. All the felonies committed by reason of or on the occasion of the robbery are integrated
into one and indivisible felony of robbery with homicide. X and Y are still liable for the special complex crime
of Robbery with Homicide (People v. De Leon, G.R. No. 179943, June 26, 2009).
(340) While outside her house, Lalaine saw Aurora and 3 other men. Aurora introduced herself as an
employee of the POEA and upon such pretension, Lalaine offered Aurora to talk to her inside her
house. At this juncture, one of the men suddenly declared a hold-up, poked a gun at Lalaine’s neck,
slapped her, and tied her hands. The men then proceeded to rob the house taking with them valuables
and a vault containing dollar currencies, and thereafter left the crime scene. What crime/s is/are
committed?
The crime committed is the complex crime of robbery in an inhabited house under Art. 299 of the RPC and
robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons under Art. 294 of the RPC. The elements of robbery
with force upon things under Subdivision A applicable in the case are: (1) the offender entered an inhabited
place; (2) the entrance was effected by using any fictitious name or pretending the exercise of public authority;
(3) once inside the building, the offender took personal property belonging to another with intent to gain. One
the other hand, robbery with violence against and intimidation of persons under Art. 294 has the elements
applicable in the case which are: (1) any of the physical injuries defined in pars. 3 and 4 of Art. 263 was inflicted
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in the course of robbery; (2) any of them was inflicted upon any person not responsible for the commission of
the robbery.
After entering the residential house of Lalaine, the accused took away valuables, including the vault containing
US dollar currencies, and in the process committed acts of violence against and intimidation of persons during
the robbery by slapping, threatening and tying the victim. Furthermore, Aurora pretended to be from the POEA
(paragraph a(4) of Art. 299) and also took the vault (paragraph b(2) of Art. 299). Hence, they are liable for the
complex crime of robbery in an inhabited house by armed men under Article 299 of the RPC and robbery with
violence against and intimidation of persons under Article 294 of the RPC (Fransdilla v. People, G.R. No.
197562, April 20, 2015).
(341) Onyok and Pedro became friends when they met on the streets collecting plastic bottles and scrap
materials. As homeless people, they just put their makeshift beds along the streets or sleep inside
their carts to spend the night. One day, Onyok earned Php300 after selling the plastic bottles he
collected all day and he put this money inside his car. During the night, while Pedro was on his way
back, he saw Crispin stab Onyok while the latter was still sleeping. When Pedro came to rescue Onyok,
the latter was already dead and upon checking, the Php300 Onyok had made that day was nowhere to
be found. An information for robbery with homicide was filed against Crispin. Will the case prosper?
Discuss.
No, the case of robbery with homicide filed against Crispin will not prosper. In order to sustain a conviction for
the crime of robbery with homicide, the robbery itself must be proven as conclusively as any other essential
element of the crime. In order for the crime of robbery with homicide to exist, it must be established that a
robbery has actually taken place and that, as a consequence or on the occasion of robbery, a homicide be
committed. For robbery to apply, there must be taking of personal property belonging to another, with intent to
gain, by means of violence against or intimidation of any person or by using force upon things. In robbery with
homicide, the intent to rob must precede the taking of human life but the killing may occur before, during or
after the robbery. The mere fact that 300 pesos earned by the victim was missing cannot serve as basis for
concluding that robbery was the intent of Crispin in killing Onyok (People v. Domasig, G.R. No. 217028, June
13, 2018).
(342) In the middle of the night, spouses Wifey and Hubby were alone in their house when they heard
someone was outside their door. Feeling alarmed, Hubby got up to double-check the lock of their
doors. Suddenly, four armed and masked men, A, B, C, and D barged into their kitchen and pointed a
gun at Hubby demanding to surrender jewelries and cash. Hubby refused to give the money, so he was
dragged to the bedroom. Upon seeing Wifey, one of the armed men, A, said, “Akin na ‘to pre” and
brought Wifey outside the room where A forced her to have carnal knowledge with him. Thereafter, the
armed men fled the crime scene taking with them 3 gold necklaces and cash amounting to Php23,000.
What is the criminal liability of each of the accused?
All are liable for the special complex crime of robbery with rape. The elements of robbery with rape are: (1) the
taking of personal property is committed with violence or intimidation against persons; (2) the property taken
belongs to another; (3) the taking is done with animus lucrandi; and (4) the robbery is accompanied by rape.
The original intent of the accused was to take, with intent to gain, personal property belonging to another and
rape is committed on the occasion thereof or as an accompanying crime, and not the other way around. It is
established that all the accused barged into the victims’ house and threatened to kill them if they do not give
into their demands showing their original intent to rob the spouses (People v. Bragat, G.R. No. 222180,
November 22, 2017). Furthermore, whenever a rape is committed as a consequence, or on the occasion of a
robbery, all those who took part therein are liable as principals of the crime of robbery with rape, although not
all of them took part in the rape. Once conspiracy is established, they would be both equally culpable for the
rape committed by one of them on the occasion of the robbery, unless any of them proves that he endeavored
to prevent the other from committing the rape. Therefore, although only A raped Wifey, all of them are liable
for the special complex crime of robbery with rape (People v. Belmonte et. al., G.R. No. 220889, July 5, 2017).
(343) Spouses X were owners of a market stall at a public market. Around 6 o'clock in the evening, Spouses
X and their son, H, closed their stall and proceeded home by riding together on their motorcycle. H
was the driver, his mother sat at the middle, while H’s sat behind the mother. They were approaching
the entrance to their barangay around 6:30 p.m. when they noticed two persons, whom they later
identified as accused, near a motorcycle. When they passed, accused rode the motorcycle and tailed
them. Accused eventually caught up with them, whereupon, accused D forced them to stop and
immediately declared a holdup. H’s mother embraced H, while D grabbed her belt bag which contained
P70,000.00 cash. Thereafter, D uttered, "barilin mo na." G, another accused, then fired at the victims
hitting, first, the left hand of H’s mother. The bullet went through mother’s left hand and pierced H's
chest causing the latter to fall down together with the motorcycle. H’s father, on the other hand, was
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able to get off the motorcycle and tried to escape but G also fired at him thereby hitting his right knee.
Accused, thereafter, fled through their motorcycle. Several people then came to the aid of the victims
and brought them to the hospital where H later expired by reason of his gunshot wound. Spouses X
were treated for their wounds. Accused were apprehended by police authorities later at night where
they were subsequently identified by H’s mother at the police station as the ones who grabbed her belt
bag and shot them. What crime(s) did the accused commit? Explain.
The accused are liable for robbery with homicide. Under the RPC, to sustain a conviction for robbery with
homicide, the prosecution must prove the following elements: (1) the taking of personal property is committed
with violence or intimidation against persons; (2) the property belongs to another; (3) the taking is animo
lucrandi or with intent to gain; and (4) on the occasion or by reason of the robbery, the crime of homicide, as
used in the generic sense, was committed. The intent to rob must precede the taking of human life, but the
killing may occur before, during or after the robbery. Under the given facts, (1) they forced H and Spouses X
to stop their motorcycle; (2) D declared the holdup and grabbed the belt bag in the possession of H’s mother;
and (3) thereafter, G fired at the victims in order to preserve their possession of the stolen item and to facilitate
their escape. Aside from H being killed, the Spouses X also sustained injuries by reason of the gunshots fired
by Garcia. However, component crimes in a special complex crime have no attempted or frustrated stages
because the intention of the offender/s is to commit the principal crime which is to rob but in the process of
committing the said crime, another crime is committed. All the felonies committed by reason of or on the
occasion of the robbery are integrated into one and indivisible felony of robbery with homicide (People v.
Dillatan Sr., G.R. No. 212191, September 5, 2018).
(344) J, P, and their children were having dinner when they heard noises outside their house. P looked out
the window to ascertain the noise outside when E shot him on his head. Someone shouted and warned
that they would massacre J and her children if they did not go down. Because of fear, they went
downstairs. X took P’s air gun and FM radio while R took the bolo after hacking the body of P.
Subsequently, E shouted “Attack!” thereby giving the others the signal to ransack other valuables of
the spouses. Both the RTC and CA convicted X, R, and E guilty of robbery and murder instead of
robbery with homicide. Was the conviction correct?
Yes, the conviction was correct. A conviction for robbery with homicide requires that robbery is the main
purpose and objective of the malefactors and the killing is merely incidental to the robbery. If, originally, the
malefactors did not comprehend robbery, but robbery follows the homicide either as an afterthought or merely
as an incident of the homicide, then the malefactor is guilty of two separate crimes, homicide or murder and
robbery.
In this case, the original intention of the malefactors was to kill P. E immediately shot P on his head when the
latter looked out from his window. This shows that the malefactors did not intend to commit robbery.
Nonetheless, robbery was committed incidentally when they took P’s belonging without the consent and at
gunpoint against J and her children. Thus, X, R, and E are guilty of murder under Article 248 and robbery under
Article 294(5) of the RPC (People v. Natindim, G.R. No. 201867, November 4, 2020, Hernando Case).
(345) When is robbery deemed committed by a band?
Article 296 of RPC provides that when more than three armed malefactors take part in the commission of
robbery, it shall be deemed to have been committed by a band. At least four armed persons must take part in
the commission of robbery (REYES, Book Two, supra at 869).
Theft
(346) Who are liable for theft?
The following are liable for theft:
Those who, with intent to gain, but without violence against or intimidation of persons nor force
upon things, take personal property of another without the latter’s consent.
2. Those who found lost property but failed to deliver the same to the local authorities or to its owner.
3. Those who maliciously damage the property of another, remove or make use of the fruits or object
of the damage caused.
4. Those who enter an inclosed estate or a field where trespass is forbidden or which belongs to
another without the consent of its owner, hunt or fish or gather fruits, cereals, or other forest or farm
product upon the same (REYES, Book Two, supra at 912-913).
1.
(347) Hilario was a pawnshop employee who was given the authority to manage the same. He also had a set
of keys and access to the vault. One night, Tekla, a bystander, saw Hilario outside the pawnshop and
talking to Bobby and Tedy. Then, Hilario unlocked the gate of the shop and together with Bobby they
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entered the shop. Tedy served as the lookout. After several minutes, they came out carrying the
contents of the vault and Hilario put a tape plaster in his mouth trying to declare that he was robbed
inside the shop. What is the criminal liability of Hilario, Tedy and Bobby?
Hilario committed qualified theft while Tedy and Bobby committed simple theft. The elements of theft under
Art. 308 of the RPC are: (1) there was a taking of personal property; (2) the property belongs to another; (3)
the taking was without the consent of the owner; (4) the taking was done with intent to gain; and (5) the taking
was accomplished without violence or intimidation against the person or force upon things. The crime of theft
here became qualified because it was committed with grave abuse of confidence. Grave abuse of confidence
must be the result of the relation by reason of dependence, guardianship, or vigilance, between the accusedappellant and the offended party that might create a high degree of confidence between them which the
accused-appellant abused. Hilario could not have committed the crime had he not been holding the position of
the trusted employee which gave him not only sole access to the pawnshop's vault but also control of the
premises (People v. Sabado, G.R. No. 218910, July 5, 2017). Then, Tedy and Bobby are only liable for the
crime of simple theft as the qualifying circumstance of grave abuse of confidence does not apply to an offender
who was not in confidential relations with the complainant (People v. Valdellon, G.R. No. 21487, September
27, 1924).
(348) Jema was a loan bookkeeper of CCS Bank, thus, she is authorized to collect and accept loan payments
from the bank’s clients and issue provisional receipts. Likewise, she is also authorized to accomplish
a cash transfer slip at the end of each banking day detailing the amounts of money that she has
received, and remit such payments to her supervisor. However, CCS Bank discovered the nonremittance of some loan payments received from its clients. Based on the audit, Jema issued 853
provisional receipts amounting to Php500,000.00 but were unreported and the corresponding
payments were unremitted. Dissatisfied with her explanation about the unremitted payments, an
Information for estafa through misappropriation was filed against her. Will the case prosper? Discuss.
No, the case will not prosper. One of the elements of Estafa through misappropriation is that the offender's
receipt of money, goods, or other personal property in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or under
any other obligation involving the duty to deliver, or to return, the same. Under this, the offender acquires both
material or physical possession and juridical possession of the thing received. Juridical possession gives the
transferee a right over the thing which the transferee may set up even against the owner. Hence, conversion
of personal property in the case of an employee having mere material possession of the said property
constitutes theft, whereas in the case of an agent to whom both material and juridical possession have been
transferred, misappropriation of the same property constitutes estafa. Jema was merely a collector of loan
payments from CCS Bank's clients, and just being a mere custodian of the missing funds, she had only
acquired material and not juridical possession of such funds and consequently, cannot be convicted of the
crime of Estafa as charged (Benabaye v. People, G.R. No. 203466, February 25, 2015).
(349) D, R, and M were having coffee at D’s house when A entered and grabbed the bag of R which contained
P4,000.00 cash and other personal items. R immediately stood up and attempted to retrieve his bag
but A was already gone with the bag. In his defense, A argued that while conducting an anti-illegal
gambling campaign against Q, he saw Q divide the alleged tips for distribution by D. Q left his bag and
ran inside D’s house. A tried to pursue Q but D did not allow him to enter the house despite identifying
himself as a police officer. A was charged with the crime of theft. Will the case prosper?
Yes, the case will prosper. The essential elements of theft are: (1) taking of personal property; (2) the property
taken belongs to another; (3) the taking was done without the owner’s consent; (4) there was intent to gain; (5)
the taking was done without violence against or intimidation of the person or force upon things. A took the bag
belonging to R without the latter’s consent and with intent to gain. The taking was done without the use of
violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things, thereby removing the act from the coverage
of the crime of robbery (Albotra v. People, G.R. No. 221602, November 16, 2020, Hernando Case).
(350) D dropped by the People’s Mart with his house helper, A. He was carrying money bundled together in
a rubber band. W gave A money to buy fish and arranged his remaining money while waiting inside his
car. Upon alighting from the car, the bundle of money fell on the road. The following morning, P noticed
a bundle of money lying on the ground near W’s car. X also noticed the bundle of money and picked it
up. W realized that the money was missing. He learned that X picked it up. Upon investigation, X
averred that the money was shared with his co-accused P. X and P were convicted of the crime of theft.
According to P, he should not be convicted for theft since there was no unlawful taking of the money
on his part because the finder of the lost money was his co-accused and not himself. Is the contention
of P correct?
No, the contention of P is incorrect. P can be convicted for the crime of theft even if he is just a finder in law.
Under Article 308, par. 2 (1) of the RPC, theft is also committed by one’s failure to deliver lost property to its
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owner or local authorities. In this kind of theft, it is essential to prove: (a) the finding of lost property; and (b)
the failure of the finder to deliver the same to the local authorities or its owner.
In this case, instead of returning the money, P convinced X not to return the money and divide it among
themselves. P placed himself in the situation as if he was the actual finder. Though not the actual finder, there
is no dispute that P knew for a fact that X did not own the subject money. P had the opportunity and the
obligation to return the lost property to its rightful owner or to the local authorities, but he unjustifiably refused
to do so. The RPC does not require that the thief knows the owner of the lost property (Pante v. People, G.R.
No. 218969, January 18, 2021, Hernando Case).
(351) Distinguish robbery from theft.
Theft
(Art. 308)
Robbery
(Art. 293-294)
As to Presence of Violence
The offender does not use violence or
intimidation or does not enter a house or
building through any of the means specified
in Art. 299 or Art. 302 in taking personal
property of another with intent to gain.
There is violence or intimidation or force
upon things.
As to Consent of the Owner
It suffices that consent on the part of the
owner is lacking.
It is necessary that the taking is against
the will of the owner.
Estafa/Swindling
(352) What are the elements of estafa in general?
1.
2.
The accused defrauded another (a) by abuse of confidence, or (b) by means of deceit; and
The damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation is caused to the offended party or third
person (REYES, Book Two, supra at 970).
(353) How is estafa committed?
1.
2.
3.
Estafa is committed:
With unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence;
By means of false pretenses or fraudulent acts; or
Through fraudulent means (REYES, Book Two, supra at 970).
(354) B was engaged in the business of buying and selling of appliances, furniture, and other products. Z
would buy from B's business once a month. Because she had become a regular customer, she and B
had an agreement that her store would be used to establish A's Polangui and that she would be its
branch manager.
B visited A’s Polangui one time and he did not find any cash there. The preliminary audit revealed a
shortage. He confronted Z about this, and she allegedly promised to pay the shortages back within
15 days. The RTC found Z guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of estafa, as defined and
penalized under par. 1(b), Article 315 of the RPC. This was affirmed by the CA. Is Z guilty of estafa?
Explain.
No, the first and second elements of estafa were not established. The elements of estafa through conversion
or misappropriation, punished under Article 315 (1) (b) of the RPC are: (1) that personal property is received
in trust, on commission, for administration or under any other circumstance involving the duty to make delivery
of or to return the same, even though the obligation is guaranteed by a bond; (2) that there is conversion or
diversion of such property by the person who has so received it or a denial on his part that he received it; (3)
that such conversion, diversion or denial is to the injury of another; and (4) that there be demand for the return
of the property.
There is no evidence pointing to the existence of agency between Z and B. While Z was the branch manager,
there was no written agreement as to what Z’s responsibilities were. Moreover, Z directly reported to B about
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the operation of the business. Thus, B had control over the operations and Z was not an agent of B or A’s
Polangui nor was there proof that Z received the items delivered to A's Polangui on consignment basis, or that
any title passed to her by virtue of the said delivery. As to the second element, the words "convert" and
"misappropriate" connote an act of using or disposing of another's property as if it were one's own, or of
devoting it to a purpose or use different from that agreed upon. To misappropriate to one's own use includes,
not only conversion to one's personal advantage, but also every attempt to dispose of the property of another
without right. The Court finds that the prosecution failed to establish the existence of misappropriation beyond
reasonable doubt (Layson Vda. de Manjares v. People, G.R. No. 207249, May 14, 2021).
(355) Chris, Paula, Arthur, Sissy, Theo, Chelca and Matt established the HRem Network Corporation, an
association operating on funds solicited from the public. They made representations of having the
business, property and power to solicit and accept investments and deposits from the general public
and the capacity to pay guaranteed monthly interest on investment from 5% to 6% and commissions.
Upon hearing these, Mariel, Hannah, Margaret, Carla and their other 7 friends decided to invest, thus
giving several amounts of cash to the corporation as payment. After several months, no money was
given to the investors despite repeated demands. Then, they found out that HRem Network used their
money to their own personal benefits. What is the crime committed? Discuss.
Chris, Paula, Arthur, Sissy, Theo, Chelca and Matt committed the crime of syndicated estafa. The elements of
Syndicated Estafa are: (1) Estafa or other forms of swindling, as defined in Arts. 315 and 316 of the RPC, is
committed; (2) the Estafa or swindling is committed by a syndicate of five (5) or more persons; and (3) the
defraudation results in the misappropriation of money contributed by stockholders, or members of rural banks,
cooperatives, "samahangnayon(s)," or farmers' associations, or funds solicited by corporations/associations
from the general public. They used deceit and falsely pretended to have the authority to solicit investments
from the general public when, in truth, they did not have such authority. Investors were induced to invest
because of the representations and promise of lucrative income. Their false pretenses and representations
made prior to or simultaneous with the commission of fraud and reliance thereon by aggrieved parties
constitute the element of defraudation in the crime of syndicated estafa (People v. Baladjay, G.R. No. 220458,
July 26, 2017).
(356) MMM and DDD left their savings account passbooks with Cassie, a bank teller at XYZ Bank, when they
went to the bank to transact on their accounts. MMM withdrew the sum of Php500.00 and left her
passbook with Cassie upon the latter’s instruction. MMM had to return two more times to XYZ Bank
before the bank manager Cynthia sensed that something wrong was going on. Cynthia reviewed
MMM’s account and found 3 withdrawal slips containing signatures radically different from the
specimen signatures of MMM, covering a total of Php65,000.00. Since Cassie’s co-bank teller saw
Cassie’s initials on the slips attesting to having verified the signature of MMM, Cassie presumed that
the withdrawal was genuine. She posted and released the money to Cassie. However, MMM insisted
that the signatures on the slips were not hers, forcing Cassie to admit that the passbook was still with
her and kept it in her house. What crime did Cassie commit? Explain.
Cassie is liable for the crime of estafa through falsification of a commercial document. As a bank teller, she
took advantage of the bank depositors who had trusted her enough to leave their passbooks by filling out
withdrawal slips she signed, and misrepresenting to her fellow bank employees that the signatures had been
verified in due course. Her misrepresentation to her co-employees enabled her to receive the amounts stated
in the withdrawal slips. She thereby committed two crimes, namely: estafa, by defrauding XYZ Bank, her
employer, in the various sums withdrawn from the bank account of MMM; and falsification of a commercial
document, by forging the signature of MMM in the withdrawal slips to make it appear that the depositor
concerned had signed the respective slips in order to enable her to withdraw the amounts. Such offenses were
complex crimes, because the estafa would not have been consummated without the falsification of the
withdrawal slips (De Castro v. People, G.R. No. 171672, February 02, 2015).
(357) May the crime of estafa be complexed with falsification of a private document?
No, there is no complex crime of estafa through falsification of a private document considering that the damage
essential to both is the same. As a result, having such offenses compounded or complexed in accordance with
Article 48 of the RPC is inherently disallowed.
Note: The Court held in Batulanon v. People that “as there is no complex crime of estafa through falsification
of private document, it is important to ascertain whether the offender is to be charged with falsification of a
private document or with estafa. If a private document is falsified as a means to commit estafa, the proper
crime to be charged is falsification. If the estafa can be committed without falsifying a document, the proper
crime to be charged is estafa (Co v. People, G.R. No. 233015, October 16, 2019).
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(358) Alicia went to Peter persuading the latter to buy her 10 checks at a rediscounted rate of 10% of the
total aggregate amount. She, likewise, assured Peter that the checks were hers and duly funded.
However, unknown to Peter, Alicia actually knew that she had no sufficient funds to cover the amount
of the checks. After Peter agreed to buy the checks, Alicia affixed her signature on the face of the
checks. When the checks become due, Peter tried to deposit the checks to his bank account but the
drawee bank refused payment because the account was already closed thus the bank returned the
said checks to Peter. He immediately demanded from Alicia the equivalent amount of said checks
giving her 5 days to comply. However, Alicia still failed to pay Peter. An Information for estafa was filed
against Alicia. Will the case prosper? Explain.
Yes, Alicia is liable for the crime of estafa by postdating a check, or issuing a check in payment of an obligation.
Such estafa consists of the following elements: (1) the offender has postdated or issued a check in payment
of an obligation contracted at the time of the postdating or issuance; (2) at the time of postdating or issuance
of said check, the offender has no funds in the bank or the funds deposited are not sufficient to cover the
amount of the check; and (3) the payee has been defrauded. It is necessary that the check should have been
issued as an inducement for the surrender by the party deceived of his money or property and not in payment
of a preexisting obligation. It is established that Alicia induced Peter to buy her checks after she misrepresented
that she had enough funds in her account. Moreover, when informed by Peter of the dishonor of the checks,
Alicia still failed to pay within the period given to her (Batac v. People, G.R. No. 191622, June 6, 2018).
(359) AAA introduced herself as the head of a company, MMG, to private complainant to solicit
investments. The Articles of partnership showed AAA as its general partner. The other 4 accused
were shown to be limited partners. After investing, the complainants received several post-dated
checks supposedly covering their investments with interest. However, when they tried to deposit
the checks, their banks informed them that these were dishonored because MMG’s accounts were
already closed. AAA insists that he may not be found guilty of violating PD 1689 in relation to
estafa under Art. 315 (2)(a) of the RPC as the element of fraud or deceit is absent. Is AAA correct?
No, AAA’s contention is untenable. One of the elements of estafa by means of deceit is that there must be a
false pretense or fraudulent representation as to his business. In the case at hand, such element of fraud or
deceit is apparent because the incorporators/directors of MMG comprising more than five (5) people, including
herein accused, made false pretenses and representations to private complainant regarding a supposed
lucrative investment opportunity with MMG in order to solicit money from them. Furthermore, the said false
pretenses and representations were made prior to or simultaneous with the commission of fraud; relying on
the same, private complainants invested their hard-earned money into MMG; and the incorporators/directors
of MMG ended up running away with the private complainants' investments, obviously to the latter's prejudice
(People v. Mateo et al. G.R. No. 210612, October 9, 2017).
(360) AAA was alleged to have recruited and promised employment or job placement to and collected fees
from 16 contract workers, without first obtaining any license/authority from the POEA or by the DOLE
to recruit workers for overseas employment. AAA denied the charges against her and argued that she
was an auditor of PET Plans, Inc. from March 23, 2000 to August 31, 2005, making it highly unlikely for
her to have engaged in the business of recruitment and promised employment abroad. What crime/s
did AAA commit? Explain.
AAA is liable for the crime of Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale and Estafa. Illegal recruitment is malum
prohibitum, while estafa is mala in se. In the first, the criminal intent of the accused is not necessary for
conviction. In the second, such intent is imperative. Estafa by means of deceit is committed when these
elements concur: (1) the accused used fictitious name or false pretense that he possesses power, influence,
qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions, or other similar deceits; (2) he used
such deceitful means prior to or simultaneous with the commission of the fraud; (3) the offended party relied
on such deceitful means to part with his money or property; and (4) the offended party suffered damage(People
v. Racho G.R. No. 227505, October 2, 2017).
(361) Jake is a businessman and wants to buy dollar checks for the purpose of buying machines for his
business. Later, he met Amy who represented herself as one who possessed fully funded dollar
checks. Then, upon agreement to buy the checks, Amy issued Check No. 9999 drawn by and against
Brooklyn Bank in New York. As payment, Jake gave a cashier’s check in favor of Amy. Amy was able
to encash the cashier’s check, however, when Jake deposited the dollar check he was notified that the
dollar check was spurious.
(a)
What is the crime committed by Amy?
She is liable for estafa through falsification of commercial documents. The essential elements of estafa Art.
315, par. 2(a) of the RPC are: (1) there must be a false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means; (2) such
false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means must be made or executed prior to or simultaneously with
105
the commission of the fraud; (3) the offended party must have relied on the false pretense, fraudulent act, or
fraudulent means, that is, he was induced to part with his money or property because of the false pretense,
fraudulent act, or fraudulent means; (d) as a result thereof, the offended party suffered damage. In this case,
Amy’s act of falsifying the dollar check and misrepresenting to Jake that it was genuine and sufficiently funded
in exchange for the cashier's checks constituted fraud. Furthermore, Amy’s act of enchasing the check and
appropriating the proceeds thereof caused damage and prejudice to Jake thereby sealing her liability (Serrano
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 123896, June 25, 2003).
(b)
Assuming Amy argued that Jake accepted her promise to novate the transaction into ordinary
creditor-debtor relationship, thus, extinguishing her criminal liability. Is her defense proper?
Explain.
No. Criminal liability for estafa is not affected by compromise or novation of contract, for it is a public offense
which must be prosecuted and punished by the Government on its own motion though complete reparation
should have been made of the damage suffered by the offended party. Criminal offense is committed against
the People and the offended party may not waive or extinguish the criminal liability that the law imposes for
the commission of the offense (Serrano v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 123896, June 25, 2003, citing People v.
Nery, G.R. No. L-19567, February 5, 1964).
Arson
(362) What is arson?
Arson is the malicious destruction of property by fire.
(363) What constitutes destructive arson?
It is the malicious burning of structures, both public and private, hotels, buildings, edifices, trains, vessels,
aircraft, factories, and other military, government or commercial establishments by any person or group of
persons (REYES, Book Two, supra at 1096).
(364) XX and YY had a heated argument involving a parcel of land. YY said hurtful words against XX causing
the latter to throw punches against YY. Before falling on the floor, he hit his head at the sink causing
his instant death. Realizing what he had done, XX grabbed some stored gasoline in YY’s kitchen and
set the house on fire. Then, two Informations were filed against XX for the separate crimes of homicide
and arson. XX contends that he may be convicted only of the crime of homicide and not both homicide
and arson. Is XX correct?
No. Article 320 of the RPC, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, contemplates the malicious burning of structures,
both public and private, hotels, buildings, edifices, trains, vessels, aircraft, factories and other military,
government or commercial establishments by any person or group of persons. To determine whether the crime
committed is arson only, or murder, or arson and homicide or murder, as the case may be, the main objective
of the accused is to be examined. If the objective is, likewise, to kill a particular person, and in fact the offender
has already done so, but fire is resorted to as a means to cover up the killing, then there are two separate and
distinct crimes committed — homicide/murder and arson. XX burned the house of the victim to hide or conceal
the commission of the crime. It was established that he first beat the victim causing his death before setting
the latter's house on fire. Therefore, two separate crimes were committed by XX, homicide and arson (People
v. Cacho y Songco, G.R. No. 218425, September 27, 2017).
(365) Spouses Erlinda and Brando lived in an apartment complex with their two children. One night, Erlinda
and Brando had an altercation that caused the wife and children to leave the house. Thereafter, Brando
brought an LPG gas tank outside their apartment unit and allowed gas to leak which Bubuy, their
neighbor, saw. Bubuy immediately went to Brando, who was holding a match. Bubuy stopped Brando,
turned off the regulator of the tank, and brought the tank with him for safekeeping. Sometime past
midnight, the apartment complex caught fire, resulting in the complete burn down of the complex and
three persons died as a result. Brando was convicted of the complex crime of arson with multiple
homicide. Is Brando’s conviction correct?
No, there is no complex crime of arson with (multiple) homicide. In the classification of crimes committed by
fire, attention must be given to the intention of the author. When fire is used with intent to kill a person who
may be in shelter, and that objective is secured, the crime is murder. Murder or homicide in a juridical sense
would exist if the killing was the objective of the malefactor and the burning of the building was resorted only
to accomplish his purpose. The rule is otherwise when arson is itself the end and death is a mere consequence.
The crime in such a case would be arson only, absorbing the homicide.
106
In this case, Brando’s intent was merely to destroy his family's apartment through the use of fire. The resulting
deaths that occurred, therefore, should be absorbed by the crime of arson and only increase the imposable
penalty to reclusion perpetua to death, pursuant to Section 5 of P.D. No. 1613 (People v. Cedenio, G.R. No.
93485, June 27, 1994). This was the similar ruling of the Supreme Court in People v. Malngan (G.R. No.
170470, September 26, 2006).
Note: However, in the case of People v. Soria (G.R. No. 248372, August 27, 2020), which involved similar facts
as in People v. Malngan, the Supreme Court characterized the crime as arson with homicide likewise citing
Section 5 of P.D. No. 1613, emphasizing that the death of the victim was caused by appellant in deliberately
burning the inhabited house of Parcon and adverting to the earlier case of People v. Gil (G.R. No. 172468,
October 15, 2008).
(366) Is there a crime of frustrated arson?
Yes, the Supreme Court, in a case, recognized that the crime of arson has a frustrated stage. There, the High
Tribunal ruled that the crime is classified only as frustrated arson, inasmuch as the defendant performed all
the acts conceived for the burning of said house, but nevertheless, owing to causes independent of his will,
the criminal act which he intended was not produced. The offense committed cannot be classified as
consummated arson for the reason that no part of the building had yet commenced to burn, although, as the
piece of sack and the rag, soaked in kerosene oil, had been placed near partition of the entresol, the partition
might have started to burn, had the fire not been put out on time (U.S. v. Valdes, G.R. No. L-14128, December
10, 1918).
Note: However, some authors in the subject of Criminal Law argue that there is no frustrated stage in the crime
of arson. In a case, the Supreme Court ruled that the corpus delicti rule in cases of arson is generally satisfied
by proof of the bare occurrence of the fire and its having been intentionally caused. Even if the fire has not
completely gutted the whole house, the crime is still consummated arson. It is enough that a portion thereof is
shown to have been destroyed (People v. Gutierrez, G.R. No. 100699, July 5, 1996). There is thus no frustrated
arson. If no burning resulted but the offender commenced the commission of the felony directly by overt acts
that would have resulted in arson but was not able to produce the felony due to causes other than his
spontaneous desistance, attempted arson is committed (BOADO, Compact Reviewer in Criminal Law, 2019).
Exemption from Criminal Liability in Crimes Against Property
(367) Who are exempt from criminal liability in the commission of the crime of theft, swindling, or malicious
mischief?
Only civil liability, not criminal liability, shall result in the commission of the crimes of theft, swindling or malicious
mischief committed or caused mutually by the following persons:
1. Spouses, ascendants and descendants, or relatives by affinity in the same line;
2. The widowed spouse with respect to the property which belonged to the deceased spouse before
the same shall have passed into the possession of another; and
3. Brothers and sisters and brothers-in-law and sisters-in-law, if living together.
Note: The exemption established by this article shall not be applicable to strangers' participation in the
commission of the crime (RPC, Art. 332); also, this exception applies not where any of the enumerated crimes
is complexed with another crime (Intestate Estate of Gonzales Vda. De Carungcong, v. People, G.R. No.
181498, February 11, 2010).
Anti-Fencing Law (PD 1612)
(368) Define “fencing” and “fence” under P.D. No. 1612 or the Anti-Fencing Law
"Fencing" is the act of any person who, with intent to gain for himself or for another, shall buy, receive, possess,
keep, acquire, conceal, sell or dispose of, or shall buy and sell, or in any other manner deal in any article, item,
object or anything of value which he knows, or should be known to him, to have been derived from the proceeds
of the crime of robbery or theft (P.D. No. 1612, Section 2 (a)). Meanwhile, a “fence" includes any person, firm,
association corporation or partnership or other organization who/which commits the act of fencing (P.D. No.
1612, Section 2(b)).
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(369) Enumerate the elements of fencing
The elements of the crime of fencing are the following:
A crime of robbery or theft has been committed;
The accused, who is not a principal or an accomplice in the commission of the crime of robbery or
theft, buys, receives, possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells or disposes, or buys and sells, or
in any manner deals in any article, item, object or anything of value, which has been derived from
the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft;
3. The accused knew or should have known that the said article, item, object or anything of value has
been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; and
4. There is, on the part of one accused, intent to gain for oneself or for another (Cahulogan v. People
of the Philippines, G.R. No.225695, March 21, 2018).
Note: Fencing is a malum prohibitum, and P.D. No. 1612 creates a prima facie presumption of Fencing from
the evidence of possession by the accused of any good, article, item, object or anything of value, which has
been the subject of robbery or theft; and prescribes a higher penalty based on the value of the property another
(Cahulogan v. People, G.R. No.225695, March 21, 2018).
1.
2.
(370) What is the difference between a fence and an accessory to theft or robbery? Do they also have
similarities?
The differences are as follows: As to the degree of participation and penalty, a fence is punished as a principal
under Section 2(b), P.D. No. 1612 with a higher penalty in contrast to accessories to theft and robbery under
the RPC, who are punished as such and with a penalty two degrees lower than that of the principal. Meanwhile,
as to legal presumptions innate in such crimes, mere possession of property acquired by robbery or theft shall
constitute prima facie evidence that the person selling is a fence; in contrast, there is no such presumption for
accessories to theft or robbery.
(371) Farrowing crates and assorted lengths of G.I. pipes were found and displayed on the shelves in the
premises of A, a storeowner. C, an employee of B, positively identified that they were the missing pipes
of B. A claims that a person aboard a jeep unloaded the pipes in front of his establishment and left
them there. A further argues that he did not have any intent to gain, hence, he cannot be punished for
fencing. Can A be made liable under P.D. No. 1612?
Yes, A may be held liable for violation of P.D. No. 1612 or the Anti-Fencing Law. First, intent to gain need not
be proved in crimes punishable by a special law such as P.D. No. 1612. Secondly, the law does not require
proof of purchase of the stolen articles by petitioner, as mere possession thereof is enough to give rise to a
presumption of fencing. It was incumbent upon A to overthrow this presumption by sufficient and convincing
evidence. When a storeowner displays articles, it is assumed that he intends to sell them (Dunlao v. CA, G.R.
No. 111343, August 22, 1996).
(372) A sold to F cases of soft drinks, without authority and consent from his employer, C, abusing the trust
and confidence reposed upon him as a truck helper. F bought the subject items from A for a discounted
price. Their transaction did not have any accompanying delivery and official receipts, and A did not
demand that such items be replaced with empty bottles, contrary to common practice among dealers
of soft drinks.
(a)
May F be convicted for a violation of the Anti-Fencing Law?
Yes, F may be held liable for violation of P.D. No. 1612. The essential elements of the crime of fencing are as
follows: (1) a crime of robbery or theft has been committed; (2) the accused, who is not a principal or an
accomplice in the commission of the crime of robbery or theft, buys, receives, possesses, keeps, acquires,
conceals, sells or disposes, or buys and sells, or in any manner deals in any article, item, object or anything of
value, which has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; (3) the accused knew or
should have known that the said article, item, object or anything of value has been derived from the proceeds
of the crime of robbery or theft; and (4) there is, on the part of one accused, intent to gain for oneself or for
another. Here, F should have been forewarned that the subject items came from an illegal source, as his
transaction with A did not have any accompanying delivery and official receipts, and that the latter did not
demand that such items be replaced with empty bottles, contrary to common practice among dealers of soft
drinks; F’s intent to gain was made evident when he bought the subject items for just a price lower than their
value (Cahulogan v. People, G.R. No. 225695, March 21, 2018).
108
(b)
May F raise the defense of good faith?
No, he may not raise the defense of good faith. Notably, fencing is a malum prohibitum, and P.D. No. 1612
creates a prima facie presumption of fencing from evidence of possession by the accused of any good, article,
item, object or anything of value, which has been the subject of robbery or theft (Cahulogan v. People, G.R.
No. 225695, March 21, 2018). Since fencing is a malum prohibitum, good faith may not be used as a defense.
What needs to be overcome is the presumption of fencing (Dunlao v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 111343,
August 22, 1996).
CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY (ARTS. 333-334, 336-346)
Note: For Articles 337 and 338 of the RPC on Qualified and Simple Seduction, Sections 2 & 3 of R.A. No. 11648
changed the age of sexual consent from over twelve (12) but under eighteen (18) years of age, to sixteen (16) and over
but under eighteen (18) years of age. R.A. No. 11648 also amended Section 5(b) of RA 7610 on lascivious conduct
from twelve (12), to sixteen (16) years of age.
Acts of Lasciviousness
(373) What is lascivious conduct?
Lascivious conduct means the intentional touching, either directly or through clothing, of the genitalia, anus,
groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttocks, or the introduction of any object into the genitalia, anus or mouth, of any
person, whether of the same or opposite sex, with an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or
gratify the sexual desire of any person, bestiality, masturbation, lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic
area of a person (R.A. No. 7610, Sec. 2).
(374) AAA, only five (5) years old at the time of the rape incidents, testified that she was repeatedly molested
by Ladra who always carried a bolo during the molestations. AAA – who was already twelve (12) years
old at the time – again encountered Ladra in their house’s kitchen where the latter allegedly suddenly
squeezed her vagina. Ladra denied the charges and claimed that AAA's family were merely angry at
him when he left their house, leaving no one to attend to their errands. He further argues that he could
not have committed the rape in the presence of AAA's younger brother, who slept beside her. What
crime(s) did Ladra commit? Explain.
Ladra is liable for acts of lasciviousness under Art. 336 of the RPC, in relation to Sec. 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610.
An accused can be held criminally liable for lascivious conduct under Sec. 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610, provided the
requisites of the crime of Acts of Lasciviousness as penalized under Art. 336 of the RPC are met and, in
addition: (a) the accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct; (b) the said act is
performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse; and (c) that the child,
whether male or female, is below 18 years of age (People v. Ladra, G.R. No. 221443, July 17, 2017).
In the case at bar, AAA was 12 years old at the time of the commission of the lascivious act. Accused-appellant,
an adult who exercised influence on the victim, committed a lewd and lascivious act by "squeezing" AAA’s
vagina. Thus, accused-appellant Ladra is guilty of Acts of Lasciviousness under Art. 336 of the RPC, as
amended, in relation to Sec. 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 (Id).
Note: The elements of Acts of Lasciviousness under Art. 336 as ruled by the court in the case of People v.
Ladra require clarification. The ruling in the case as to the elements of the crime was made in reference to
Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610. The elements of Acts of Lasciviousness based solely on Art. 336 are as follows:
1. The offender commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness;
2. The act of lasciviousness is committed against a person of either sex; and
3. It is done under any of the following circumstances:
a. By Force or intimidation
b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious
c. By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; or
d. When the offended party is under 12 years of age or is demented (Reyes, Book Two, p. 1142-1143).
(375) Three separate charges of qualified rape were filed against X for three separate occurrences. First, one
evening, while X, drunk, was sleeping in one bed with her daughter AAA, 14 years old, he undressed
109
her, touched her vagina, held her breast, and afterwards he inserted his penis in her vagina. Due to
threats, AAA merely cried—she did not shout, resist, or ask her father to stop. Second, the same series
of acts were done by X to AAA early dawn the next day. And third, later in the evening, X once more
held AAA's breasts and vagina and placed himself on top of her. X denied having any carnal knowledge
of AAA. However, in view of the failure of the prosecution to prove the fact of penile penetration with
regard to the alleged rape, the appellate court downgraded the offense to acts of lasciviousness.
(a)
Is accused guilty of qualified rape? If so, what is its effect on X’s eligibility for parole?
Yes, X is guilty of two (2) counts of qualified rape under Art. 266-A in relation to Art. 266-B (1) of the RPC. As
to the penalty for qualified rape under paragraph 1, Article 266-A of the RPC, Article 266-B (1) of the RPC
which provides that the death penalty shall be imposed if the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and
the offender is the parent. Applying R.A. No. 9346, the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua but it should
be specified that it is without eligibility for parole. This is pursuant to A.M. No. 15-08-02-SC which states that
"when circumstances are present warranting the imposition of the death penalty, but this penalty is not imposed
because of R.A. No. 9346, the qualification 'without eligibility for parole' shall be used to qualify reclusion
perpetua in order to emphasize that the accused should have been sentenced to suffer the death penalty had
it not been for R.A. No. 9346.
(b)
Is the CA correct in convicting the accused with acts of lasciviousness considering that there was
no penetration?
No, the proper nomenclature for the third charge is sexual abuse under R.A. No. 7610 or the Special Protection
of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act, not of acts of lasciviousness. The following
guidelines must be followed in determining the proper nomenclature of the crime committed:
1. The age of the victim is taken into consideration in designating the offense, and in determining the
imposable penalty.
2. If the victim is under twelve (12) years of age, the nomenclature of the crime should be "Acts of
Lasciviousness under Art. 336 of the RPC in relation to Sec. 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610.
3. If the victim is exactly twelve (12) years of age, or more than twelve (12) but below eighteen (18) years
of age, or is eighteen (18) years or older but is unable to fully take care of herself/himself or protect
herself/himself from abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation or discrimination because of a physical or
mental disability or condition, the crime should be designated as "Lascivious Conduct or Sexual
Abuse under Sec. 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610.”
Considering that the victim in this case was 14 years old at the time of the commission of the crime, accordingly,
X should be convicted of sexual abuse under Sec. 5 (b), Art. III of R.A. No. 7610, and not just acts of
lasciviousness under Art. 336 of the RPC, in relation to the same provision of R.A. No. 7610 (People v. Ursua,
G.R. No. 218575, October 4, 2017).
Prosecution of the Crimes of Adultery, Concubinage, Seduction, Abduction, and Acts of Lasciviousness
(376) Define adultery, concubinage, seduction, abduction, and acts of lasciviousness.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Adultery is committed by any married woman who shall have sexual intercourse with a man not her
husband and by the man who has carnal knowledge of her, knowing her to be married, even if the
marriage be subsequently declared void (RPC, Art. 333).
Concubinage is committed by any husband who shall keep a mistress in the conjugal dwelling, or shall
have sexual intercourse, under scandalous circumstances, with a woman who is not his wife, or shall
cohabit with her in any other place (RPC, Art. 334).
Seduction is the offense that occurs when a man entices a woman of previously chaste character to have
unlawful intercourse with him by means of persuasion, solicitation, promises, or bribes, or other means not
involving force (Black’s Law Dictionary, 9th ed).
Abduction is the taking away of a woman from her house or the place where she may be for the purpose
of carrying her to another place with intent to marry or corrupt her (People v. Crisostomo, G.R. No. L19034, February 17, 1923).
Acts of lasciviousness is committed by an offender who commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness
against a person of either sex, and is done under any of the following circumstances: (a) by using force or
intimidation; (b) when the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; (c) by means of
fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; or when the offended party is under 12 years of age or
is demented.
(377) X and Y were charged with the crime of adultery by A, the husband of X and the offended party in this
case. The trial court rendered its decision convicting the two of the crime charged with its
110
corresponding penalty. After the case had been submitted, a motion to dismiss was filed on behalf of
the appellant predicated on an affidavit executed by A, in which he pardoned his guilty spouse X for
her infidelity. Will the alleged act of pardon extinguish the crime charged against X and Y?
No. Pardon by the offended party is not one (1) of the recognized grounds in extinguishing criminal liability
under Article 89 of the RPC. Such pardon only bars the institution of the criminal action if extended within the
period prescribed by law. The second paragraph of Article 344 of the RPC reads: "The offended party cannot
institute criminal prosecution without including both the guilty parties, if they are both alive, nor, in any case, if
he shall have consented or pardoned the offenders." This provision means that the pardon afforded the
offenders must come before the institution of the criminal prosecution, and means, further, that the offended
part must pardon both the offenders. The pardon given by the offended party again constitutes a bar to the
prosecution for adultery. Once more, however, it must be emphasized that this pardon must come before the
institution of the criminal prosecution and must be for both offenders to be effective — circumstances which
do not concur in this case (People v. Infante, G.R. No. 36270, August 31, 1932).
(378) Distinguish seduction and abduction.
Seduction
(Arts. 337 and 338)
Abduction
(Arts. 342 and 343)
As to Nature of the Crime
Crime against chastity
As to Types
Simple Seduction, Qualified Seduction
Forcible
Abduction
Abduction,
Consented
As to Elements
Simple Seduction
1. That the offended party is a
minor, sixteen (16) and over but
under eighteen (18) years of
age;
2. That the offender had sexual
intercourse with her; and
3. That it is committed by means of
deceit.
Forcible Abduction
1. That the person abducted is a
woman regardless of her age,
civil status, or reputation;
2. That the abduction is against her
will; and
3. The abduction is with lewd
designs.
Consented Abduction
Qualified Seduction
1. That the offended party is a
minor, sixteen (16) and over but
under eighteen (18) years of
age;
2. That the offender has sexual
intercourse with her; and
3. That it is committed by any
person in public authority, priest,
home-servant,
domestic,
guardian, teacher, or any person
who, in any capacity, shall be
entrusted with the education or
custody of the minor seduced.
1. That the offended party must be
a virgin;
2. That she must be over twelve
(12) and under eighteen (18)
years of age;
3. That the taking away of the
offended party must be with her
consent, after solicitation or
cajolery from the offender; and
4. That the taking away of the
offended party must be with
lewd designs.
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(379) Distinguish adultery and concubinage.
Adultery
(Art. 333)
Concubinage
(Art. 334)
As to Nature of the Crime
Crime against chastity.
As to Persons Liable
Married woman
Married man
As to Manner of Commission
Having sexual intercourse with a
man not her husband and the man
knows her to be married
1. Keeping a mistress in the conjugal
dwelling;
2. Having sexual intercourse under
scandalous circumstances with a
woman who is not his wife; or
3. Cohabiting with her in any other place
and the woman knows him to be
married.
(380) UUU, who was drunk, told AAA (her 14 year old daughter) to turn off the light and close the door. As
they were sleeping in one bed, he undressed her, touched her vagina, and held her breast. He then
removed his short pants and brief, moved on top of her, pulled his penis, and inserted it into her vagina.
He told her not to make any noise. Consequently, she merely cried and did not shout, resist, or ask her
father to stop. After the acts were done, they went to sleep. Early dawn the next day, UUU repeated the
dastardly acts on AAA. Later in the evening, UUU once more held AAA's breasts and vagina and placed
himself on top of her.
(a)
Is UUU guilty of two counts of qualified rape?
Yes, the trial court found AAA’s testimony credible. She positively identified her father as the one who raped
her.
As to the penalty for qualified rape under paragraph 1, Article 266-A of the RPC, Article 266-B (1) of the RPC
provides that the death penalty shall be imposed if the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the
offender is the parent. Applying RA 9346, the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua but it should be specified
that it is without eligibility for parole. This is pursuant to A.M. No. 15-08-02-SC which states that "when
circumstances are present warranting the imposition of the death penalty, but this penalty is not imposed
because of RA 9346, the qualification 'without eligibility for parole' shall be used to qualify reclusion perpetua
in order to emphasize that the accused should have been sentenced to suffer the death penalty had it not been
for R.A. No. 9346."
(b)
Is UUU guilty of the crime of acts of lasciviousness?
No, the proper nomenclature for the third charge is sexual abuse under R.A. No. 7610 or the Special Protection
of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act, not of acts of lasciviousness. The following
guidelines must be followed in determining the proper nomenclature of the crime committed:
1. The age of the victim is taken into consideration in designating the offense, and in determining the
imposable penalty.
2. If the victim is under twelve (12) years of age, the nomenclature of the crime should be Acts of
Lasciviousness under Art. 336 of the RPC in relation to Sec. 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610.
3. If the victim is exactly twelve (12) years of age, or more than twelve (12) but below eighteen (18) years
of age, or is eighteen (18) years or older but is unable to fully take care of herself/himself or protect
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herself/himself from abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation or discrimination because of a physical or
mental disability or condition, the crime should be designated as Lascivious Conduct or Sexual
Abuse under Sec. 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610.
4.
Considering that the victim in this case was 14 years old at the time of the commission of the crime,
accordingly, X should be convicted of sexual abuse under Sec. 5 (b), Art. III of R.A. No. 7610, and not
just acts of lasciviousness under Art. 336 of the RPC, in relation to the same provision of R.A. No.
7610 (People v. Ursua, G.R. No. 218575, October 4, 2017).
(381) How is acts of lasciviousness distinguished from attempted rape?
The intent of the offender to lie with the female defines the distinction between attempted rape and acts of
lasciviousness. The felony of attempted rape requires such intent; the felony of acts of lasciviousness does
not (Cruz v. People, G.R. No. 166441, October 8, 2014).
Anti-Photo and Video Voyeurism Act of 2009 (RA 9995)
(382) Define “Photo or Video Voyeurism under R.A No. 9995 or the Anti-Photo and Video Voyeurism Act of
2009
"Photo or video voyeurism" means the act of taking photo or video coverage of a person or group of persons
performing sexual act or any similar activity or of capturing an image of the private area of a person or persons
without the latter's consent, under circumstances in which such person/s has/have a reasonable expectation
of privacy, or the act of selling, copying, reproducing, broadcasting, sharing, showing or exhibiting the photo
or video coverage or recordings of such sexual act or similar activity through VCD/DVD, internet, cellular
phones and similar means or device without the written consent of the person/s involved, notwithstanding that
consent to record or take photo or video coverage of same was given by such person's (R.A No. 9995, Sec.
3(d)).
(383) Define “broadcast” and “capture” under RA 9995, or the Anti-Photo and Video Voyeurism Act of 2009.
"Broadcast" means to make public, by any means, a visual image with the intent that it be viewed by a person
or persons (RA 9995, Sec. 3a). "Capture" with respect to an image, means to videotape, photograph, film,
record by any means, or broadcast (R.A. No. 9995, Sec. 3b).
(384) What are the punishable acts under R.A. No. 9995?
The punishable acts under RA 9995 are the following:
To take photo or video coverage of a person or group of persons performing sexual act or any similar
activity or to capture an image of the private area of a person/s such as the naked or undergarment
clad genitals, public area, buttocks or female breast without the consent of the person/s involved
and under circumstances in which the person/s has/have a reasonable expectation of privacy;
2. To copy or reproduce, or to cause to be copied or reproduced, such photo or video or recording of
sexual act or any similar activity with or without consideration;
3. To sell or distribute, or cause to be sold or distributed, such photo or video or recording of sexual
act, whether it be the original copy or reproduction thereof; or
4. To publish or broadcast, or cause to be published or broadcast, whether in print or broadcast media,
or show or exhibit the photo or video coverage or recordings of such sexual act or any similar activity
through VCD/DVD, internet, cellular phones and other similar means or device.
1.
Note: The prohibition under paragraphs (b), (c) and (d) shall apply notwithstanding that consent to record or
take photo or video coverage of the same was given by such person/s. Any person who violates this provision
shall be liable for photo or video voyeurism as defined herein (R.A. No. 3019, Sec 4).
(385) Are there any exemptions to Section 4 with regard to the aforementioned punishable acts?
Yes. The exemption can be found under Section 6 of R.A 9995 which provides for authorized usage of the
recording upon written order of the court. The said section provides that: Nothing contained in this Act,
however, shall render it unlawful or punishable for any peace officer, who is authorized by a written order of
the court, to use the record or any copy thereof as evidence in any civil, criminal investigation or trial of the
crime of photo or video voyeurism.
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Such written order shall only be issued or granted upon written application and the examination under oath or
affirmation of the applicant and the witnesses he/she may produce, and upon showing that there are
reasonable grounds to believe that photo or video voyeurism has been committed or is about to be committed,
and that the evidence to be obtained is essential to the conviction of any person for, or to the solution or
prevention of such crime.
(386) Are photos and videos obtained in violation of R.A. No. 9995 also inadmissible in evidence?
Yes. Any record, photo or video, or copy thereof, obtained or secured by any person in violation of the
preceding sections shall not be admissible in evidence in any judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative or
administrative hearing or investigation (R.A. No. 9995, Sec. 7).
(387) Lolo, lessor, set up hidden cameras inside of the apartment being leased to Dalaga. When Dalaga
discovered one of the hidden cameras in the bathroom, she reported Lolo to the police. During a valid
raid of his house, Lolo was caught watching a VHS entitled “bathroom Dalaga 143”. The video showed
Dalaga undressing and taking a bath.
(a)
Did Lolo commit photo or video voyeurism?
Yes, Lolo committed the crime of photo or video voyeurism. “Photo or video voyeurism” includes the act of
capturing an image of the private area of a person or persons without the latter's consent, under circumstances
in which such person/s has/have a reasonable expectation of privacy. In the given case, the act of Lolo
installing a hidden camera inside the bathroom to take videos of Dalaga while undressing and taking a bath
constitutes a crime (R.A. No. 9995, Sec. 3(d)).
(b)
May Lolo invoke that since he was the owner of the apartment and Dalaga was a mere lessee, the
latter cannot expect reasonable privacy?
No, such contention of Lolo is not a ground to exempt him from liability. The law does not contemplate
committing the crime in the victim’s house or abode. It also contemplates circumstances in which such person/s
has/have a reasonable expectation of privacy or a belief that he/she could disrobe in privacy, without being
concerned that an image or a private area of the person was being captured; or circumstances in which a
reasonable person would believe that a private area of the person would not be visible to the public, regardless
of whether that person is in a public or private place (R.A. No. 9995, Sec. 3 (f)). In the given case, Dalaga has
a reasonable expectation of privacy in her apartment, even if she is a mere lessee.
(388) XY and XX have been dating for three months. On their third monthly anniversary, XY secretly recorded
their sexual activities. A month later, XX broke up with XY. XY was so heartbroken that he publicly
posted the video online out of anger. XY was charged with violations of Secs. 4(a) and 4(d) of R.A. No.
9995.
(a)
Will the case prosper?
Yes. XY’s act of taking a video coverage of their sexual act without the consent of XX is a prohibited act under
Sec. 4(a). Posting the video online constituted broadcasting or making the video public, which is prohibited
under Sec. 4(d) (R.A. No. 9995, Secs. 4(a) and (d)).
(b)
Assuming XY asked XX if he could record them making love with each other for their third
monthsary and XX agreed, may XY claim that he may not be held liable because XX gave her
consent to record the video?
XY may still be held liable for violation of Sec. 4 (d), but not Sec. 4 (a) of R.A. No. 9995. For a violation of Sec.
4(a), the consent of XX may be raised as a defense because what the law prohibits is photo or video voyeurism
of a person or group of persons performing sexual act or any similar activity without their consent. For a
violation of Sec. 4(d), the consent of XX may not be raised as a defense. The last paragraph of Sec. 4 provides
that “The prohibition under paragraphs (b), (c) and (d) shall apply notwithstanding that consent to record or
take photo or video coverage of the same was given by such person/s” (R.A. No. 9995, Sec. 4). Thus, even if
XY cannot be prosecuted for taking a video of his sexual act with XX, his subsequent act of publicly posting
the video is punishable under the said law.
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CRIMES AGAINST THE CIVIL STATUS OF PERSONS (ARTS. 347-352)
Bigamy
Note: Pulido v. People established a new doctrine on bigamy, wherein the accused was exonerated of criminal liability
for bigamy when during the pendency of the bigamy case, a judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage was
entered. Previous decisions held that a person who contracts a second marriage without a prior court declaration of
nullity of his first marriage was liable for bigamy even if the first marriage was subsequently declared void by a court.
The Court ruled that the requirement of a prior judicial declaration of nullity under Article 40 of the Family Code, which
is for purposes only of remarriage, should not be extended to criminal cases.
(389) X married Y in 1983. X later entered into marriage with Z in 1995, unbeknownst to Y. Upon confrontation,
X admitted to his affair with Z. Thus Y charged X and Z with Bigamy in the RTC. Z claimed that she only
knew of X’s prior marriage with Y in 2007. X argues that his marriage to Y was void ab initio for lack of
marriage license. The RTC convicted X of Bigamy and acquitted Z. It stated that the Civil Registrar
attested that there was no record of a marriage license and application of X and Y on account of a
probable termite infestation of the documents, not that no marriage license was issued. X appealed his
conviction to the CA, which sustained petitioner’s conviction, finding that all the elements of bigamy
were present since X entered into a 2nd marriage with Z while his prior marriage with Y was subsisting,
and without first having obtained a judicial declaration of the nullity of the prior marriage with Y.
(a)
Is a judicial declaration of nullity of marriage necessary to establish the invalidity of a void ab
initio marriage in a bigamy prosecution?
No, a judicial declaration of absolute nullity is not necessary to prove a void ab initio prior and subsequent
marriage in a bigamy case. A void ab initio marriage is a valid defense in a prosecution for bigamy even without
a judicial declaration of absolute nullity. Consequently, a judicial declaration of absolute nullity of either the first
and second marriages obtained by the accused is considered a valid defense in bigamy.
(b)
Is the absence of a marriage license fatal to a bigamy charge?
Yes, the lack of marriage license is fatal to a bigamy charge as it renders the marriage void ab initio. For one
to be held guilty of bigamy, the prosecution must prove the following: (a) that the offender has been legally
married; (b) that the first marriage has not been legally dissolved, or in case his or her spouse is absent, the
absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code; (c) that he or she contracts a
second or subsequent marriage; and (d) that the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites
for validity. It is vital in a prosecution for bigamy that the alleged second marriage, having all the essential
requirements, would be valid were it not for the subsistence of the first marriage.
Based on the evidence presented, the Registrar did not categorically declare that a marriage license was
issued to X and Y nor that it was issued but was destroyed probably due to termite infestation. It bears stressing
that the Registrar found no entry of its date or issuance and license number in its record book which will likely
explain why the original document of the marriage license could not be found in its custody. With the absence
of a valid marriage license, a reasonable doubt arises as to the existence of a prior valid marriage, i.e. X’s first
marriage with Y which is one of the elements of bigamy. Lacking an essential element of the crime of bigamy,
i.e., a prior valid marriage, and the subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of X and Y’s marriage by the RTC,
the prosecution failed to prove that the crime of bigamy was committed. Therefore, the acquittal of X from the
bigamy charge is warranted (Pulido v. People, G.R. No. 220149; July 27, 2021, Hernando Case).
(390) Assuming a first marriage existed at the time a second marriage was contracted and there is a
subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity, would you render a judgment of conviction or acquittal? Explain your answer. (2012 Bar)
If I were the judge, I would acquit the accused. In the context of criminal prosecutions concerning bigamy, the
accused can effectively assert the defense of a nullity judgment. Accordingly, a judicial declaration of nullity of
the first and/or subsequent marriages, regardless of the timing of their issuance, stands as a legitimate defense
in the criminal bigamy case. When the second or subsequent marriage is declared null and void due to reasons
other than being bigamous, the element of bigamy is absent, as no valid second or subsequent marriage exists
in technical terms. In the case of Pulido vs. People, the accused was exonerated from the charge of bigamy
because both his first and second marriages were judicially declared null and void due to the absence of
marriage licenses.
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(391) AAA is married to BBB. While in Japan, BBB contracted a marriage with CCC. Thereafter, BBB and
CCC returned to the Philippines where they lived as husband and wife. Can BBB be prosecuted for the
crime of bigamy?
No, because the subsequent bigamous marriage was contracted abroad. The violation is not one of those
where the RPC, under Article 2 thereof, may be applied extraterritorially. The general rule on territoriality of
criminal law governs this case.
Performance of Illegal Marriage Ceremony
(392) X and Y entered into marriage, asserting that the union was solemnized by W. However, it emerged
that X and Y are first-degree cousins. Notably, the solemnizing officer, W, a clergy member of a
religious faction, was aware of the consanguinity between X and Y. Are X and Y liable and what crimes
have been committed by X, Y, and W?
Yes, X and Y are susceptible to charges of illegal marriage in accordance with Article 350 of the RPC. Despite
being conscious of their inability to satisfy the prerequisites for a valid marriage, they chose to proceed with
the marriage.
W, the religious leader from the particular denomination, may be held liable under Article 352 of the RPC. This
provision criminalizes the act/s of any priest or minister from a religious denomination or sect who authorizes
an unlawful marriage ceremony or performs such an illicit ceremony. In this case, W conducted an illegal
marriage ceremony, thereby rendering him subject to charges under Article 352.
CRIMES AGAINST HONOR (ARTS. 353-364)
Libel
(393) How is the crime of libel committed?
The elements of the crime of libel are as follows: (a) there must be an imputation of a crime, or a vice or defect,
real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status or circumstance; (b) the imputation must be made
publicly; (c) it must be malicious; (d) the imputation must be directed at a natural personal or a juridical person,
or one who is dead; and (e) the imputation must tend to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of the
person defamed (REYES, Book Two, p.1239).
(394) B wrote two articles for the Manila Bulletin. The first article dealt with a letter complaint of the Waray
employees of the DTI which accused D of dereliction of duties. B’s second article contained statements
of the alleged lousy performance of the respondent. Finding these articles as offensive, D filed a
complaint for libel against petitioners. B contended that his work is an exposé, a product of
investigative work. Likewise, he claimed that he knew of D when he received several letter-complaints
against the respondent. He presumed that the copies of the complaints were those already filed before
the CSC and Ombudsman and found them to be of public interest which caused him to write about it
in his articles. Does the writing of the said articles against a public figure constitute the crime of libel?
No, the two articles written by B are qualifiedly privileged and hence, cannot constitute the crime of libel.
Qualifiedly privileged communications are those which contain defamatory imputations but which are not
actionable unless found to have been made without good intention or justifiable motive, and to which "private
communications" and "fair and true report without any comments or remarks" belong.
Here, the statements on the "lousy performance" and "mismanagement" of D are matters of public interest as
these relate to his moral conduct, his capacity to lead the employees, and to manage and supervise the affairs
of the office. These statements are fair and true reports without any comments or remarks and undoubtedly
are qualifiedly privileged communication and thus, would require actual malice to be actionable. In this case,
there was no proof of actual malice on the part of B (Manila Bulletin Publishing Corp. v. Domingo, G.R. No.
170341, July 5, 2017).
(395) A is the incumbent City Mayor of Cadiz City and is popularly known by the nickname "Bading." X, the
accused, calls A "Bading." A, while exercising his official duties, saw billboards with the printed phrase
"CADIZ FOREVER" with a blank space before the word "NEVER" directly under said phrase. Some
days later, A received a phone call relating that the blank space preceding the word "NEVER" was filled
up with the added words "BADING AND SAGAY." The next day, he saw the billboards with the phrase
"CADIZ FOREVER, BADING AND SAGAY NEVER" printed in full. Reacting and feeling that he was being
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maligned and dishonored with the printed phrase and of being a "tuta" of Sagay, A caused the filing of
a complaint for libel against X. X admitted having placed all the billboards because he is aware of all
the things happening around Cadiz City. He mentioned "BADING" because he was not in conformity
with the many things the mayor had done in Cadiz City. He insisted that he has no intention whatsoever
of referring to "Bading" as the "Tuta" of Sagay. Does the controversial phrase "CADIZ FOREVER,
BADING AND SAGAY NEVER" impute derogatory remarks on A’s character, reputation and integrity
and thus, sufficient to convict X of the crime of libel?
No, it does not. An allegation is considered defamatory if it ascribes to a person the commission of a crime,
the possession of a vice or defect, real or imaginary or any act, omission, condition, status or circumstance
which tends to dishonor or discredit or put him in contempt or which tends to blacken the memory of one who
is dead. Here, the phrase "CADIZ FOREVER, BADING AND SAGAY NEVER" does not tend to induce
suspicion on private respondent's character, integrity and reputation as mayor of Cadiz City.
There are no derogatory imputations of a crime, vice or defect or any act, omission, condition, status or
circumstance tending, directly or indirectly, to cause his dishonor. Neither does the phrase in its entirety,
employ any unpleasant language or somewhat harsh and uncalled for that would reflect on the private
respondent's integrity. Obviously, the controversial word "NEVER" used by the petitioner was plain and simple.
In its ordinary sense, the word did not cast aspersion upon the private respondent's integrity and reputation
much less convey the idea that he was guilty of any offense. Hence, X is not liable for libel (Lopez y Aberasturi
v. People, G.R. No. 172203, February 14, 2011).
(396) In her weekly gossip column in a tabloid, G wrote an unflattering article about P, a famous singer, and
his bitter separation from his wife. The article portrayed P as an abusive husband and caused him to
lose lucrative endorsement contracts. P charged G with libel. In her defense, G countered that she did
not commit libel because P has attained the status of a public figure so even his personal life has
become a legitimate subject of public interest and comment. Is G correct?
No, G is not correct. Although wider latitude is given to defamatory utterances against public figures in relation
to matters of public interest involving them, such defamatory utterances do not automatically fall within the
ambit of constitutionally protected speech. If the utterances are false, malicious or unrelated to a public figure’s
work, the same may give rise to criminal liability (Fermin v. People, G.R. No. 157643, March 28, 2008). Any
attack upon the private character of the public figure on matters which are not related to their works may
constitute libel under Article 355 (Sazon v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 120715, March 29, 1996). Here, G was
attacking the personal life of P as a husband and not his public life as a famous singer.
(397) How is malice in law distinguished from malice in fact?
Malice in law is a presumption of law. It dispenses with the proof of malice when words that raise the
presumption are shown to have been uttered. It is also known as constructive malice, legal malice, or implied
malice. On the other hand, malice is a positive desire and intention to annoy and injure. It may denote that the
defendant was actuated by ill will or personal spite. It is also called express malice, actual malice, real malice,
true malice, or particular malice (Yuchengco v. The Manila Chronicle Publishing Corporation, G.R. No.
1843155, November 25, 2009).
In this jurisdiction, malice in law is provided in Article 354 of the RPC which also enumerates the exception
thereto: (a) a private communication made by any person to another in the performance of any legal, moral or
social duty; and (b) a fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of any judicial,
legislative or other official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of any statement, report or
speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act performed by public officers in the exercise of their
functions. There is, thus, a presumption of malice in every defamatory imputation, where there is no showing
of a good intention or justifiable motive for making such imputation. The exceptions provided in Article 354 are
also known as qualifiedly privileged communications (Id.).
(398) What is the Doctrine of Fair Comment?
The doctrine of fair comment means that while in general every discreditable imputation publicly made is
deemed false, because every man is presumed innocent until his guilt is judicially proved, and every false
imputation is deemed malicious, nevertheless, when the discreditable imputation is directed against a public
person in his public capacity, it is not necessarily actionable. In order that such discreditable imputation to a
public official may be actionable, it must either be a false allegation of fact or a comment based on a false
supposition. If the comment is an expression of opinion, based on established facts, then it is immaterial that
the opinion happens to be mistaken, as long as it might reasonably be inferred from the facts (Tulfo v. People,
G.R. No. 161032, September 16, 2008).
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Slander
(399) L and M are candidates in the local elections. In his speeches, L attacked his opponent M alleging that
he is the son of N, a robber and a thief who amassed his wealth through shady deals. May M file a case
against L for grave oral defamation? State your reasons.
M cannot file a case for grave oral defamation. If at all, he may file a case for light slander. The gravity of oral
defamation depends not only (a) upon the expressions used, but also (b) on the personal relations of the
accused and the offended party, and (c) the circumstances surrounding the case. It is a doctrine of ancient
respectability that defamatory words will fall under one or the other, depending not only upon their sense,
grammatical significance, and accepted ordinary meaning judging them separately, but also upon the special
circumstances of the case, antecedents or relationship between the offended party and the offender, which
might tend to prove the intention of the offender at the time. Therefore, M cannot file a case for grave oral
defamation (Pader v. People, G.R. No. 139157, February 8, 2000).
CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE (ARTICLE 365)
Imprudence and Negligence
(400) What are the acts punishable under Article 365 of the RPC?
The punishable acts under Article 365 of the RPC are as follows: (1) committing through reckless imprudence
any act which, had it been intentional, would constitute a grave or less grave felony; (2) committing through
simple imprudence or negligence an act which would otherwise constitute a grave or less serious felony; (3)
causing damage to the property of another through reckless imprudence or simple imprudence or negligence;
and (4) causing through simple imprudence or negligence some wrong which, if done maliciously would have
constituted a light felony (RPC, Art. 365).
(401) How is imprudence distinguished from negligence?
As to the effect, both are not crimes and merely determine a lower degree of criminal liability - they are means
of committing the crime. As to nature, imprudence pertains to deficiency of action and failure in precaution,
while negligence pertains to deficiency in perception and failure in advertence. As to exemption from liability,
in imprudence, one must take the necessary precaution once they foreseen while in negligence; paying proper
attention and using due diligence in foreseeing them would exempt one from liability (REYES, Book Two,
(2021) p. 1320).
(402) O caught a cold and was running a fever. His doctor prescribed paracetamol. O went to a drug store
with the prescription, and the pharmacist sold him three (3) tablets. Upon arriving home, he took a
tablet. One hour later, he had a seizure and died. The autopsy showed that the tablet he had taken was
not paracetamol but a pill to which he was allergic. The pharmacist was charged with murder. Is the
charge proper? If not, what should it be? (2013 Bar)
The charge was improper. The pharmacist should be charged with criminal negligence, or reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide. Under Article 365 of the RPC, this crime may be committed by committing through
reckless imprudence any act which, had it been intentional, would constitute a grave or less grave felony or
light felony. For there to be reckless imprudence the offender must do an act which is voluntary but must be
without malice. Such an act must result in material damage. There must also be an inexcusable lack of
precaution on the part of the offender taking into account his occupation, degree of intelligence and other
personal circumstances. Here, the pharmacist is expected to exercise due care and have the necessary skills
and knowledge in dispensing various drugs to purchasers. While it is true that the pharmacist had no intent to
kill O, the pharmacist inexcusably lacked precaution in failing to dispense the proper medicine to the O which
caused his death hence, the pharmacist should be held for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide.
(403) X, a septuagenarian, was walking with his ten-year old grandson, Y, along Paseo de Roxas and decided
to cross at the intersection of Makati Avenue but both were hit by a speeding van and were sent
sprawling on the pavement a meter apart. The driver, Z, stopped his car after hitting the two victims
but then reversed his gears and ran over Mang J's prostrate body anew and third time by advancing
his car forward. The grandson suffered broken legs only and survived but Mang J suffered multiple
fractures and broken ribs, causing his instant death. The driver was arrested and charged with Murder
for the death of Mang J and reckless imprudence resulting in serious physical injuries. Is the charge
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of reckless imprudence resulting in serious physical injuries with respect to the grandson correct?
(2001 Bar)
Yes, the charge is correct. Under Article 365 of the RPC, quasi-offenses may be committed by committing
through reckless imprudence any act which had been intentional, would constitute grave or less grave felony
or light felony. For there to be reckless imprudence the offender must do an act which is voluntary but must be
without malice. Such an act must result in material damage. There must also be an inexcusable lack of
precaution on the part of the offender considering his occupation, degree of intelligence and other personal
circumstances (Caminos, Jr. v. People, G.R. No. 147437, May 8, 2009). Here, the serious physical injuries
sustained by Mang J's 10-year old grandson, as a result of having been hit by the speeding vehicle of said
driver, was the result of reckless imprudence which is punishable as a quasi-offense.
(404) X brought his son Y to a local faith healer known as "Mother Himala." He was diagnosed by the faith
healer as being possessed by an evil spirit. X thereupon authorized the conduct of a "treatment"
calculated to drive the spirit from the boy’s body. Unfortunately, the procedure conducted resulted in
the Y’s death. What crime or crimes did the faith healer commit? (2007 Bar)
The crime committed was Reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. Article 365 of the RPC provides that
any person, who by reckless imprudence shall commit any act which had it been intentional, would constitute
grave or less grave felony or light felony shall suffer the penalty prescribed thereunder. For there to be reckless
imprudence the offender must do an act which is voluntary but must be without malice. Such an act must result
in material damage. There must also be an inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the offender taking
into account his occupation, degree of intelligence and other personal circumstances (Jarcia, Jr. v. People,
G.R. No. 187926, February 15, 2012). Here, it is clear from the facts that the faith healer had no intention of
killing Y. The faith healer merely conducted a treatment in a reckless or negligent manner which resulted in
Y’s death hence; the faith healer should be charged with the quasi-offense of reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide.
(405) Is negligence or reckless imprudence a crime in itself or merely a mode of committing an offense?
Negligence or reckless imprudence is not merely a means to commit a felony, but is a quasi-offense punished
under Article 365 of the RPC. The same article provides a scheme of penalties for the death, injuries or
damages resulting from such recklessness. What is principally punished in quasi-offenses is not the act itself
but the mental attitude or condition behind the act, the dangerous recklessness or the lack of care or foresight
(Ivler v. M-San Pedro, G.R. No. 172716, November 17, 2010).
(406) Ryan was involved in a vehicular collision causing him to be charged with two separate offenses
namely: 1) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical for injuries sustained by Lisa; and 2)
Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property for the death of Jennie’s
husband, Paul and damage to the spouses’ vehicle. Then, Ryan pleaded guilty to the first charge and
was meted out the penalty of public censure. May Ryan be held guilty for the second charge? Explain.
No, Reckless Imprudence is a single crime; its consequences on persons and property are material only to
determine the penalty. The two charges against Ryan, arising from the same facts, were prosecuted under the
same provision of the RPC, as amended, namely, Art. 365. Reckless imprudence under the said article is a
single quasi-offense by itself and not merely a means to commit other crimes such that conviction or acquittal
of such quasi-offense bars subsequent prosecution for the same quasi-offense, regardless of its various
resulting acts. The gravity of the consequence is only taken into account to determine the penalty; it does not
qualify the substance of the offense. And, as the careless act is single, whether the injurious result should
affect one person or several persons, the offense (criminal negligence) remains the same. It cannot be split
into different crimes and prosecutions. Otherwise, that would violate the constitutional proscription on double
jeopardy (Ivler v. M-San Pedro, G.R. No. 172716, November 17, 2010).
(407) May violations of Article 365 of the RPC absorb violations of special laws?
No, because what makes Article 356 of the RPC (a mala in se) a felony is criminal intent (dolo), or negligence
(culpa); what makes violation of special laws (a mala prohibita) a crime are the special laws enacting them.
The different laws involved cannot absorb one another as the elements of each crime are different from one
another (Loney v. People, G.R. No. 152644, February 10, 2006).