G.R. No. L-63318
Nov 25, 1983
Relova, J.
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION (WEEK 1)
Law
- A rule of conduct formulated and made obligatory by legitimate
power of the state.
- Includes statutes enacted by legislature, presidential decrees (PD)
and executive orders (EO) issued by the president in the exercise
of his legislative power, other presidential issuances in the
exercise of his ordinance power, rulings of Supreme Court
construing law, rules and regulations promulgated by
administrative or executive officers pursuant to a delegated
power, and ordinances passed by sanggunians of local
government units (LGU).
Statute
- Act of the legislature as an organized body, expressed in the
form and passed according to the procedure, required to
constitute it as part of the law of the land.
- Passed by Philippine Commission, Philippine Legislature,
Batasang Pambansa, and Philippine Congress
- PD issued by the president during martial law under the 1973
Constitution and EO issued during revolutionary period under
Freedom Constitution has the same category and binding force
as statutes
Types of statutes
➢ Private – applies only to a specific person or subject
➢ Public – affects the public at large or the whole community
Types of Public Statutes
• General law – applies to the whole state and operates
throughout the state alike upon all the people or all of a class.
It embraces a class of subjects or places and does not omit any
subject or place naturally belonging to such class.
• Special law – relates to particular persons or things of a class
or to a particular community, individual or thing.
• Local law – operation is confined to a specific place or locality
(e.g. municipal ordinance.)
G.R. No. L-6355-56
Aug 31, 1953
Montemayor, J.
➢ Permanent – operation is not limited in duration but continues
until repealed.
➢ Temporary – duration is for a limited period of time fixed in the
statute itself or whose life ceases upon the happening of an event
(e.g. emergency).
Other classes of statutes
➢ With respect to its application, statutes may be prospective or
retroactive.
➢ With respect to its form, statutes may be affirmative or negative.
➢ With respect to its operation, statutes may be declaratory,
curative, mandatory, directory, substantive, remedial, or penal.
Manner of referring to statutes
Statutes passed by the legislature are consecutively numbered
and identified by the respective authorities that enacted them. PD and
EO are also serially numbered. A statue may also be referred to by its
title.
• Public Acts – statues passed by the Philippine Commission and
the Philippine Legislature (1901-1935)
• Commonwealth Acts – laws enacted during the
Commonwealth (1936-1946)
• Republic Acts – laws passed by the Congress of the Philippines
(1946-1972 and 1987 under the 1987 Constitution)
• Batas Pambansa – laws promulgated by the Batasang
Pambansa.
A. Background and General Principles
Anyone can interpret the law. Their interpretation, however, is not
necessarily conclusive nor can they bind the courts. The judiciary has
the delicate task of ascertaining the significance of a constitutional or
statutory provision, an executive order, a procedural or a municipal
ordinance. To assure stability in legal relations and avoid confusion, it
has to speak with one voice. Logically and rightly, it does so with
finality through the highest judicial organ, the Supreme Court. What
it says is definite and authoritative, binding on those who occupy the
lower ranks in the judicial hierarchy.
G.R. No. L-63318
Nov 25, 1983
Relova, J.
Principles of Constitutional Interpretation or Construction
• Verba Legis – that is wherever possible, the words used in the
constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except where
technical terms are employed.
• Ratio legis est anima – where there is ambiguity, the words of the
constitution should be interpreted in accordance with the intent of
its framers.
(Note: The proper interpretation of the constitution depends more
on how it was understood by the people adopting it than on the
framers’ understanding. When it is ambiguous to the people, then
the framers’ intention is to be followed.)
• Ut magis valeat quam pereat – the constitution should be
interpreted as a whole, but if the plain meaning of the word is not
found to be clear, resort to other aids available.
G.R. No. L-6355-56
Aug 31, 1953
Montemayor, J.
C. Definition of Statutory Construction
Statutory construction is the act or process of discovering and
expounding the meaning and intention of the authors of the law with
respect to its application to a given case, where that intention is
rendered doubtful, among others, by reason of the fact that the given
case is not explicitly provided in the law.
D. Construction vs. Interpretation
Interpretation and construction have the same purpose and that is
to ascertain and give effect to the legislative intent.
Construction
- Makes use of extrinsic aids or those found outside of the written
language of the law.
- Process of drawing warranted conclusions not always included
in the direct expressions or determining the application of
words to facts in litigation.
B. Nature and Purpose of Construction
Interpretation and construction have the same purpose and that is
to ascertain and give effect to the legislative intent.
Interpretation
- Makes use of intrinsic aids or those found in the statute itself.
- Art of finding the true meaning and sense of any form of words.
Legislative intent – vital part, essence of the law, composed of
purpose and meaning. It is the key to its construction or interpretation.
Its ascertainment depends more on determination of the purpose and
object of the law.
• When the law speaks in clear and categorical language – Apply the
law
• When there is ambiguity in the language of the statue, ascertain
legislative intent by making use of intrinsic aids, or those found in
the law itself – Interpret the law
• When the intent of the legislature cannot be ascertained by merely
making use of intrinsic aids, the court should resort to extrinsic
aids, or those found outside the language of the law – Construct
the law
It is necessary to interpret or construct when any of the following
reasons exists:
1. When the language of the statute is ambiguous, doubtful, or
obscure, when taken in relation to a set of facts;
2. When reasonable minds disagree as to the meaning of the
language used in the statute.
It is not necessary to interpret or construct when the law speaks in
clear and categorical language. The duty of the court, in such a case, is
to APPLY THE LAW, NOT TO INTERPRET IT.
G.R. No. L-63318
Nov 25, 1983
Relova, J.
PHILIPPINE CONSUMERS FOUNDATION, INC. (PCFI), petitioner
vs.
NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION (NTC) and PHILIPPINE
LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANY (PLDT), respondents
FACTS
[Mar 20, 1980] PLDT filed an application with NTC for the approval of a revised
schedule for its Subscriber Investment Plan (SIP).
[Apr 14, 1982] NTC issued an ex-parte order provisionally approving the revised
schedule.
[Aug 31, 1982] Court set it aside ruling that hearing is required by the Commission
before it approved the application of the PLDT. Petitioner claims the rates under the
subscriber investment plan are excessive and unreasonable and, as a consequence, the
low income and middle-class group cannot afford to have telephone connections; and,
that there is no need to increase the rate because the applicant is financially sound.
[Nov 22, 1982] NTC approved PLDT’s new and increased SIP rates claiming that
applicant's reduced proposals for its revised SIP schedule are all within the 50%-of-cost
limit provided in P.D. 217; and are just, reasonable, and in consonance with the public
policies declared in said decree.
[Dec 14, 1982] PCFI filed a motion for reconsideration. PCFI claims SIP schedule is premature and therefore illegal and baseless, because NTC has not yet promulgated the
required rules and regulations implementing Section 2 of PD No. 217 “declared policies
for the telephone industry are immediately implemented and for this purpose pertinent rules
and regulations may be promulgated ...”. Petitioner also mentioned that NTC invoked
powers to limit the numerous oppositors in the instant application by applying the
two-oppositor rule and allow the desired increase purportedly on a provisional basis
even without an iota or proof to substantiate its application.
[Jan 14, 1983] NTC denied said motion for reconsideration. It contends that there is no
provision making the promulgation of rules a mandatory pre-requisite to the approve
SIP schedule and it may or may not promulgate the rules in the immediate
implementation of said decree as the word used there is "may."
ISSUE
WON NTC acted with grave abuse of discretion when it approved the revised
SIP of PLDT in the absence of specific rules and regulations implementing PD No. 217.
RULING
Yes. NTC acted with grave abuse of discretion. In the absence of such rules
and regulations, there is outright confusion among the rights of PLDT, the consumers,
and the government itself. Confusions can never be answered unless such rules and
regulations are set up. It should be emphasized that NTC is stopped from claiming that
there is no need to promulgate such rules and regulations. There is no justification for
the rate increase of the revised schedule of PLDT's SIP. ACCORDINGLY, the
DECISION of the public respondent NTC, dated November 22, 1982, and the ORDER
dated January 14, 1983. are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-6355-56
Aug 31, 1953
Montemayor, J.
PASTOR M. ENDENCIA and FERNANDO JUGO, plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
SATURNINO DAVID, as Collector of Internal Revenue, defendant-appellant
FACTS
• Income tax were collected from the salary of Justice Endencia (P1,744.45) and Justice
Jugo (P2,345.46), following Republic Act No. 590, which states salary of public officers
of the Republic of the Philippines are not exempted from the income tax, declaring
that payment of which not to be diminution of his compensation fixed by the
Constitution or by law. Thus, this joint appeal was raised.
• Under Article 8, Sec 9 of the Constitution of the Philippines, judicial officers are
exempted from the payment of income tax on their salaries, thus the collection of
income tax return from plaintiffs/appellees was in violation of the said law.
• The duty of the courts to maintain the Constitution as the fundamental law of the
state is imperative and unceasing; and, as Chief Justice Marshall said, whenever a
statute is in violation of the fundamental law, the courts must so adjudge and thereby
give effect to the Constitution. The courts will have to interpret and ascertain the
meaning of the law and the pertinent portion of the Constitution in order to decide
whether there is a conflict between the two. If there is, then the law will have to give
way and has to be declared invalid and unconstitutional.
• In Sec. 13, RA No. 590, Congress says that taxing the salary of a judicial officer is not
a decrease of compensation, which is a clear example of interpretation or
ascertainment of the meaning of the phrase "which shall not be diminished during
their continuance in office," found in section 9, Article VIII of the Constitution,
referring to the salaries of judicial officers.
• A legislative definition of a word as used in a statute is not conclusive of its meaning
as used elsewhere; otherwise, the legislature would be usurping a judicial function
in defining a term. The legislature cannot, upon passing a law which violates a
constitutional provision, validate it so as to prevent an attack thereon in the courts,
by declaring that it shall be so construed as not to violate the constitutional inhibition.
• The reason behind the exemption in the Constitution is to preserve the independence
of the Judiciary and was grounded on public policy.
ISSUES
WON RA No. 590, particularly section 13, can justify and legalize the
collection of income tax on the salary of judicial officers
RULING
No, RA No. 590, cannot justify and legalize the collection of income tax on the
salary of judicial officers. The interpretation and application of the Constitution and of
statutes is within the exclusive province and jurisdiction of the Judicial department.
The Legislature cannot interpret the Constitution or any part thereof as it is an invasion
of the well-defined and established province and jurisdiction of the Judiciary. The
decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with no pronouncement as to costs. The
collection of income taxes from the salaries of Justice Jugo and Justice Endencia was a
diminution of their compensation and therefore was in violation of the Constitution of
the Philippines, and so ordered the refund of said taxes.
G.R. No. L-19190
Nov 29, 1922
Malcolm, J.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee
vs.
VENANCIO CONCEPCION, defendant-appellant
FACTS
• Venancio Concepcion, President of the Philippine National Bank (PNB), authorized
an extension of credit by telegrams and letter of confirmation in favor of the firm
"Puno y Concepcion, S. en C." in the amount of P300,000.
• This special authorization was essential in view of the memorandum order (MO)
limiting the discretional power of the local manager at Aparri, Cagayan, to grant
loans and discount negotiable documents to P5,000, which, in certain cases, could
be increased to P10,000.
• Concepcion was charged in the Court of First Instance of Cagayan with a violation
of Sec. 35 of Act No. 2747 which states that “national bank shall not, directly or
indirectly, grant loans to any of the members of the board of directors of the bank
nor to agents of the branch banks” and was found guilty by the Honorable Enrique
V. Filamor, Judge of First Instance. He was sentenced to imprisonment for one year
and six months, to pay a fine of P3,000, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, and the costs, which was according to Sec. 49 of the said Act.
• These two sections were in effect in 1919 when the alleged unlawful acts took place,
but were repealed by Act No. 2938, approved on January 30, 1921.
• The counsel argued that credit was granted to the firm and not a loan. He also
argued that granting a credit was a discount, but was refuted.
• In the interpretation and construction of statutes, the primary rule is to ascertain
and give effect to the intention of the Legislature. In this instance, the purpose of
the Legislature is plainly to erect a wall of safety against temptation for a director
of the bank. The prohibition of an occurrence is shown by the acknowledged fact
that in this instance the defendant was tempted to mingle his personal and family
affairs with his official duties.
ISSUE
WON Concepcion was guilty of violating RA No. 2747, when counsel argued that
appellee granted a credit and discount and not a loan
RULING
The conclusion is that no reversible error was committed in the trial of this
case, and that the defendant has been proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the
crime charged in the information. The penalty imposed by the trial judge falls within
the limits of the punitive provisions of the law. Judgment is affirmed, with the costs of
this instance against the appellant. So ordered.
G.R. No. L-19650
Sept 29, 1966
Castro, J.
CALTEX (PHILIPPINES), INC., petitioner-appellees,
vs.
ENRICO PALOMAR, respondent-appellant
FACTS
• Caltex Philippines, Inc. planned to hold a contest, where participants will estimate
the actual number of liters a hooded gas pump at each station. It is open to all "motor
vehicle owners and/or licensed drivers" and no fee or consideration nor purchase of
Caltex products are required to be made. Entry forms are to be made available upon
request at each Caltex station where a sealed can will be provided for the deposit of
accomplished entry stubs.
• A three-staged winner selection system is envisioned, where communication and
prizes will be sent to contestants/winners via mail. Thus, appellee requested
clearance from appellant for the dissemination of information.
• Appellant denied clearance claiming that appellee will be violating Postal Laws (Sec.
1954(a), 1982 and 1983).
• Caltex filed present petition for declaratory relief against appellant, praying "that
judgment be rendered declaring its 'Caltex Hooded Pump Contest' not to be violative
of the Postal Law, and ordering respondent to allow petitioner the use of the mails to
bring the contest to the attention of the public".
• US Supreme Court defined the term "lottery" as extends to all schemes for the
distribution of prizes by chance, such as policy playing, gift exhibitions, prize
concerts, raffles at fairs, etc., and various forms of gambling. Having the three
essential elements: consideration prize; and chance.
• The element of consideration is not present in the contest as it does not require fee or
purchase thus it is not considered as a lottery. The same can be said when considering
the contest as a “gift enterprise”.
ISSUES
WON the proposed "Caltex Hooded Pump Contest" violates the Postal Law
RULING
Construction, verily, is the art or process of discovering and expounding the
meaning and intention of the authors of the law with respect to its application to a
given case, where that intention is rendered doubtful, amongst others, by reason of the
fact that the given case is not explicitly provided for in the law (Black, Interpretation of
Laws, p. 1). This is precisely the case here. Whether or not the scheme proposed by the
appellee is within the coverage of the prohibitive provisions of the Postal Law.
This conclusion firms up in the light of the mischief sought to be remedied by
the law, resort to the determination thereof being an accepted extrinsic aid in statutory
construction
The appellee may not be denied the use of the mails for purposes thereof. The
petition herein states a sufficient cause of action for declaratory relief, and that the
"Caltex Hooded Pump Contest" as described in the rules submitted by the appellee
does not violate the Postal Law.
G.R. No. L-50999
Mar 23, 1990
Medialdea, J.
G.R. No. 189600
Jun 29, 2010
Carpio Morales, J.
JOSE SONGCO, ROMEO CIPRES, and AMANCIO MANUEL, petitioners,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (FIRST DIVISION), LABOR
ARBITER FLAVIO AGUAS, and F.E. ZUELLIG (M), INC., respondents
MILAGROS E. AMORES, petitioner,
vs.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and EMMANUEL
JOEL J. VILLANUEVA, respondents.
FACTS
• Petition was filed by Songco et al., regarding the amount of separation pay they will
be receiving, which they claimed should be their basic salary, earned sales
commissions and allowances added together, which is mentioned on Art. 97 of the
Labor Code.
• It may be argued that if we correlate Article 97(f) [commission is considered wage]
with Article XIV of the CBA [one month’s salary per year of service], Article 284 of
the Labor Code [separation pay] and Sections 9(b) and 10 [latest salary rate] of the
Implementing Rules, there appears to be an ambiguity.
• The above terms found in those Articles and the particular Rules were intentionally
used to express the intent of the framers of the law that for purposes of separation
pay they mean to be specifically referring to salary only.
• At any rate, settled is the rule that in matters of conflict between the general
provision of law and that of a particular- or specific provision, the latter should
prevail.
• In the computation thereof, what should be taken into account is the average
commissions earned during their last year of employment.
• The workingman's welfare should be the primordial and paramount consideration.
This kind of interpretation gives meaning and substance to the liberal and
compassionate spirit of the law as provided for in Article 4 of the Labor Code which
states that "all doubts in the implementation and interpretation of the provisions of
the Labor Code including its implementing rules and regulations shall be resolved
in favor of labor.
• Article 1702 of the Civil Code which provides that "in case of doubt, all labor
legislation and all labor contracts shall be construed in favor of the safety and
decent living for the laborer.
• Wage is used in its generic sense and obviously refers to the basic wage rate to be
ascertained on a time, task, piece or commission basis or other method of
calculating the same. It does not, however, mean that commission, allowances or
analogous income necessarily forms part of the employee's salary because to do so
would lead to anomalies (sic), if not absurd, construction of the word "salary.
ISSUE
WON earned sales commissions and allowances should be included in the
monthly salary of petitioners for the purpose of computation of their separation pay.
FACTS
• Amores questions the legality of the assumption of office of Emmanuel Joel J.
Villanueva (private respondent) as representative of the party-list organization
Citizens’ Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC) in the House of Representatives.
• Petitioner alleged that private respondent assumed office without a formal
proclamation issued by the COMELEC; he was disqualified to be a nominee of the
youth sector of CIBAC since, at the time of the filing of his certificates of nomination
and acceptance, he was beyond the age limit of 30 (pursuant to Section 9 of Republic
Act (RA) No. 7941, otherwise known as the Party-List System Act); and his change of
affiliation from CIBAC’s youth sector to its overseas Filipino workers and their
families sector was not effected at least six months prior to the May 14, 2007 elections
so as to be qualified to represent the new sector under Section 15 of RA No. 7941.
• Petitioner’s motion for Reconsideration was denied, then she filed the present
petition for Certiorari.
• Sec. 9, Art. 7941. In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twentyfive (25) but not more than thirty (30) years of age on the day of the election.
• A cardinal rule in statutory construction is that when the law is clear and free from
any doubt or ambiguity, there is no room for construction or interpretation. There is
only room for application
• Sec. 15. Change of Affiliation; Effect. Any elected party-list representative who
changes his political party or sectoral affiliation during his term of office shall forfeit
his seat: Provided, That if he changes his political party or sectoral affiliation within
six (6) months before an election, he shall not be eligible for nomination as party-list
representative under his new party or organization.
• The statute is clear and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and
applied without attempted interpretation. This is the plain meaning rule or verba
legis, as expressed in the maxim index animi sermo or speech is the index of intention
RULING
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the
respondent NLRC is MODIFIED by including allowances and commissions in the
separation pay of petitioners. The case is remanded to the Labor Arbiter for the
proper computation of said separation pay.
ISSUES
WON Sections 9 and 15 of RA No. 7941 apply to private respondent
RULING
Yes, Sec. 9 and 15 of RA No. 7941 apply to private respondent. The Court finds
that private respondent was not qualified to be a nominee of either the youth sector or
the overseas Filipino workers and their families sector in the May, 2007 elections.
Private respondent was already more than 30 years of age in May, 2007. Moreover, he
did not change his sectoral affiliation at least six months before May, 2007.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal are SET ASIDE. Emmanuel Joel J. Villanueva is
declared ineligible to hold office as a member of the House of Representatives
representing the party-list organization CIBAC. SO ORDERED.