REPUBLIC VS. SANDIGANBAYAN
GR NO. 152154, JULY 15, 2003
FACTS:
President Corazon Aquino upon her assumption to office after the ouster of the Marcoses was
EO No. 1, issued on February 28, 1986. It created the Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG) and charged it with the task of assisting the President in the "recovery of all
ill-gotten wealth accumulated by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family,
relatives, subordinates and close associates, whether located in the Philippines or abroad, including
the takeover or sequestration of all business enterprises and entities owned or controlled by them
during his administration, directly or through nominees, by taking undue advantage of their public
office and/or using their powers, authority, influence, connections or relationship."
In all the alleged ill-gotten wealth cases filed by the PCGG, this Court has seen fit to set aside
technicalities and formalities that merely serve to delay or impede judicious resolution. This Court
prefers such cases resolved on the merits at the Sandiganbayan. Almost two decades have passed
since the government initiated its search for and reversion of such ill-gotten wealth. The definitive
resolution of such cases on the merits is thus long overdue. If there is proof of illegal acquisition,
accumulation, misappropriation, fraud or illicit conduct, let it be brought out now. Let the
ownership of these funds and other assets be finally determined and resolved with dispatch, free
from all the delaying technicalities and annoying procedural sidetracks.
ISSUE:
Whether or not President Marcos committed prohibited and inhibited acts as a president during his
term of office
RATIO DECIDENDI:
Yes. The sum of $304,372.43 should be held as the only known lawful income of respondents
since they did not file any Statement of Assets and Liabilities (SAL), as required by law, from
which their net worth could be determined.
Article VII, Sec. 4(2) The President and the Vice-President shall not, during their tenure, hold
any other office except when otherwise provided in this Constitution, nor may they practice any
profession, participate directly or indirectly in the management of any business, or be financially
interested directly or indirectly in any contract with, or in any franchise or special privilege
granted by the Government or any other subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof,
including any government owned or controlled corporation.
Article VII, Sec. 11 No Member of the National Assembly shall appear as counsel before any
court inferior to a court with appellate jurisdiction. Neither shall he, directly or indirectly, be
interested financially in any contract with, or in any franchise or special privilege granted by the
Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof including any government
owned or controlled corporation during his term of office. He shall not intervene in any matter
before any office of the government for his pecuniary benefit.
ESTRADA VS ARROYO
G.R. NO. 146738, MARCH 02, 2001
FACTS:
In the May 11, 1998 elections, petitioner Joseph Estrada was elected President while respondent
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was elected Vice-President. From the beginning of his term, however,
petitioner was plagued by problems that slowly eroded his popularity. On October 4, 2000, Ilocos
Sur Governor Chavit Singson, a longtime friend of the petitioner, accused the petitioner,
his family and friends of receiving millions of pesos from jueteng lords. The expose’ immediately
ignited reactions of rage. On November 13, 2000, House Speaker Villar transmitted the Articles
of Impeachment signed by 115 representatives or more than 1/3 of all the members of the House of
Representatives to the Senate. On November 20, 2000, the Senate formally opened the
impeachment trial of the petitioner. On January 16, 2001, by a vote of 11-10, the senator-judges
ruled against the opening of the second envelope which allegedly contained evidence showing that
petitioner held P3.3 billion in a secret bank account under the name “Jose Velarde.” The ruling
was met by a spontaneous outburst of anger that hit the streets of the metropolis. Thereafter,
the Armed Forces and the PNP withdrew their support to the Estrada government. Some
Cabinet secretaries, undersecretaries, assistant secretaries and bureau chiefs resigned from their
posts.
On January 20, 2001, at about 12 noon, Chief Justice Davide administered the oath to respondent
Arroyo as President of the Philippines. It also appeared that on the same day, Estrada signed a
letter stating that he was transmitting a declaration that he was unable to exercise the powers and
duties of his office and that by operation of law and the Constitution, the Vice-President shall be
the
Acting
President
ISSUES:
Whether
or
not
the
petitioner
resigned
as
President
RATIO DECIDENDI:
The resignation of the petitioner was implied. During the second round of negotiation, the
resignation of the petitioner was again treated as a given fact. It was confirmed by his leaving
Malacañang. In the press release containing his final statement, (1) he acknowledged the oathtaking of the respondent as President of the Republic, but with the reservation about its legality;
(2) he emphasized he was leaving the Palace, the seat of the presidency, for the sake of peace and
in order to begin the healing process of the nation. He did not say he was leaving the Palace due
to any kind of inability and that he was going to reassume the presidency as soon as the disability
disappears; (3) he expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them; (4) he
assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge that may come ahead in the same service
of the country; and (5) he called on his supporters to join him in the promotion of a constructive
national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity.
CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION V EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
194 SCRA 317
FACTS:
The petitioner is assailing the Executive Order No. 284 issued by the President allowing cabinet
members, undersecretary or asst. secretaries and other appointive officials of the executive
department to hold two positions in the government and government corporations and to receive
additional compensation. They find it unconstitutional against the provision provided by Section
13, Article VII prohibiting the President, Cabinet members and their deputies to hold any other
office or employment. Section 7, par. (2), Article IX-B further states that “Unless otherwise
allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any
other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality
thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporation or their subsidiaries." In the
opinion of the DOJ as affirmed by the Solicitor General, the said Executive Order is valid and
constitutional as Section 7 of Article IX-B stated “unless otherwise allowed by law” which is
construed to be an exemption from that stipulated on Article VII, section 13, such as in the case
of the Vice President who is constitutionally allowed to become a cabinet member and the
Secretary of Justice as ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council.
ISSUE: Whether EO 284 is unconstitutional
RATIO DECIDENDI:
It is clear that the 1987 Constitution (Art. 7, Section 13) seeks to prohibit the President, VicePresident, members of the Cabinet, their deputies or assistants from holding during their tenure
multiple offices or employment in the government, except in those cases specified in the
Constitution itself and as above clarified with respect to posts held without additional
compensation in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law and as required by the primary
functions of their office, the citation of Cabinet members (then called Ministers) as examples
during the debate and deliberation on the general rule laid down for all appointive officials
should be considered as mere personal opinions which cannot override the constitution's
manifest intent and the people's understanding
CRUZ V COMMISSION ON AUDIT
GR NO. 138489, NOVEMBER 29, 2001
FACTS:
The NHA Resident Auditor issued a Notice of Disallowance on October 23, 1997 disallowing the
payment to the petitioners, who are the members of the Board of Directors of the National Housing
Authority (NHA), of their representation allowances and per diems for the period from August 19,
1991
to
August
31,
1996
in
the
total
amount
of
P276,000.00.
Such disallowance was pursuant to COA Memorandum No
970 3 8 i s s u e d b y t h e C O A , directing all unit heads1auditors1team leaders of the nati
onal government agencies and government/owned and controlled corporations which have
effected
payment
of
any
form
of a d d i t i o n a l c o m p e n s a t i o n o r r e m u n e r a t i o n t o c a b i n e t s e c r e t a r i e s , t h e i r d e
p u t i e s a n d assistants, or their representatives, in violation of the rule on multiple
positions, to (a)immediately cause the disallowance of such additional compensation or
remuneration given to and received by the concerned officials, and (b) effect the refund
of the same from the time of the finality of the Supreme Court En Banc Decision in the
consolidated cases of Civil Liberties Union vs. Executive Secretary and Anti-Graft League of the
Philippines
Inc. et
al.
vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform et al.,promulgated on February 22,
1 9 9 1 . T h e C O A . Memorandum further stated that the said Supreme Court Decision, which
became final and executory on August 19, 1991, declared Executive Order No 284
unconstitutional insofar as it allows Cabinet members, their deputies and assistants to hold other
offices, in addition to their primary offices, and to receive compensation therefor. The petitioners
appealed from the Notice of Disallowance to the COA, claiming that the Supreme Court
decision applies only to the members of the Cabinet, their deputies or assistants and does not cover
other appointive officials with equivalent rank or those lower than the position of Assistant
Secretary. They added that NHA Directors are not Secretaries, Undersecretaries or Assistant
Secretaries and that they occupy positions lower than the position of Assistant Secretary.
ISSUE: Whether the petitioners are entitled to their representation allowances and per diems as
members of the NHA Board of Directors.
RATIO DECIDENDI:
The prohibition against holding dual or multiple offices or employment under Section 13, Article
VII of the Constitution must not, however, be construed as applying to posts occupied by the
Executive officials specified therein without additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity as
provided by law and as required by the primary functions of said officials' office. The reason is
that these posts do not comprise any other office within the contemplation of the constitutional
prohibition but are properly an imposition of additional duties and functions on said official.
NATIONAL AMNESTY COMMISSION VS. COMMISSION ON AUDIT
G.R. NO. 156982 8 SEPTEMBER 2004
FACTS:
Petitioner National Amnesty Commission (NAC) is a government agency created on March 25,
1994 by then President Ramos through Proclamation No. 247. The NAC is tasked to receive,
process and review amnesty applications, and composed of seven members (1 Chairperson, 3
regular members appointed by the President, and the Secretaries of Justice, DND, and DILG as
ex officio members)
After attending initial meetings, the three ex officio members turned over their said
responsibilities to their representatives who were paid honoraria beginning December 12, 1994.
Almost three years later, NAC resident auditor Eulalia disallowed on audit the payment of
honoraria to these representatives amounting to P255,750 pursuant to a COA memorandum.
On April 28, 1999, the NAC passed an Admin Order which was approved by then President
Estrada, Section I, Rule II of which provides:
1. The NAC shall be composed of 7 members, a Chairperson appointed by the
President, 3 Commissioners who shall be appointed by the President, and 3 exofficio members).
2. The ex officio members may designate their representatives to the Commission.
Said Representatives shall be entitled to per diems, allowances, bonuses and other
benefits as may be authorized by law.
Petitioner invoked the AO in assailing before the COA the rulings of the resident auditor
disallowing the payment of honoraria to the ex officio members’ representatives, to no avail.
On March 14, 2003, the NAC filed the present petitioner contending that COA committed grave
abuse of discretion in applying the COA memorandum to the representatives and disallowing
payment of honoraria to them on the ground that they lack authority.
ISSUE:
 W/N the Secretaries of National Defense, Interior and Local Government, and Justice are
entitled to hold office in an ex officio capacity
RATIO DECIDENDI:
 Yes, the Secretaries of National Defense, Interior and Local Government, and Justice are
entitled to hold office in an ex officio capacity. In the earlier Civil Liberties Union case,
the SC ruled that Cabinet Secretaries, their deputies and assistants may not hold any other
office or employment. It also declared EO 284 unconstitutional insofar as it allows
Cabinet members, their deputies and assistants to hold other office in addition to their
primary office and to receive compensation thereof. The same became final and
executory on August 19, 1991. The same prohibition is reiterated in Sections 54 and 56
of the Administrative Code of 1987.
 However, the prohibition on multiple offices does not cover offices in ex officio capacity,
provided that there is no additional compensation. The term “ex officio” means “from
office, by virtue of office.” It refers to an “authority derived from official character
merely, not expressly conferred upon the individual character, but rather annexed to the
official position.”
MARCOS V. MANGLAPUS
G.R. NO. 88211, 15 SEPTEMBER 1989
FACTS:
This petition for mandamus and prohibition asks the Court to order respondents to issue travel
documents to Mr. Marcos and the immediate members of his family and to enjoin the
implementation of the President’s decision to bar their return to the Philippines.
In February 1986, former president Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed from the presidency through
people power revolution and forced into exile.
In lieu, Corazon C. Aquino was declared
President of the Philippines under a revolutionary government
Marcos, in his deathbed, expressed his wish to return to the Philippines to die after three years of
being exiled; however, President Aquino stood firm in her decision to bar the return of Mr. Marcos
and his family considering serious consequences to the nation and the economy is just beginning
to rise.
The Marcoses founded their assertion that their right to return to the Philippines is guaranteed
under the provisions of the Bill of Rights. They contended further that the President has no power
to impair the liberty of abode of the Marcoses because only a court may do so “within the limits
prescribed by law”. They advanced the view that right to travel may be impaired if there be a
legislation to that effect. Furthermore, they have asserted that under international law, the right of
Marcos and his family to return to the Philippines is guaranteed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not President Cory Aquino in the exercise of her powers granted by Constitution may
prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.
RATIO DECIDEDI:
Yes, President Cory Aquino has discretion in determining the return of former President Marcos
and his family under the present circumstances which poses a serious threat to national interest
and welfare.
The power involved is the President’s residual power to protect the general welfare of the people.
It is founded on the duty of the President, as steward of the people. It is a power borne by the
President’s duty to preserve and defend the Constitution. It also may be viewed as a power implicit
in the President’s duty to take care that the laws are faithfully executed
The power of the President to keep the peace is not limited merely to exercising the commanderin-chief powers in times of emergency or to leading the State against external and internal threats
to its existence. The President is not only clothed with extraordinary powers in times of emergency
but is also tasked with attending to the day-to-day problems of maintaining peace and order and
ensuring domestic tranquility in times when no foreign foe appears on the horizon.
DENR VS. DENR REGION 12 EMPLOYEES
G.R. NO. 149724, AUGUST 19, 2003
FACTS:
On November 15, 1999, Regional Executive Director of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources for Region XII, Israel C. Gaddi, issued a Memorandum. The Memorandum was
issued pursuant to DENR Administrative Order No. 99-14, issued by then DENR Secretary
Antonio H. Cerilles. The DENR hereby adopts a policy to establish at least one Community
Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) or Administrative Unit per Congressional
District except in the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) and the National Capital
Region (NCR). The Regional Executive Directors (REDs) are hereby authorized to
realign/relocate existing CENROs and implement this policy in accordance with the attached
distribution list per region which forms part of this Order.
Respondents filed a petition for nullity of orders with prayer for preliminary injunction with the
Regional Trial Court, which was GRANTED. Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration was
denied. Further, a petition for certiorari filed with the Court of Appeals was dismissed outright
because of procedural flaws.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not DAO-99-14 and the Memorandum implementing the same were valid
2. Whether or not the DENR Secretary has the authority to reorganize the DENR
RATIO DECIDENDI:
Petition for review is GRANTED. Previous resolutions of the Court of Appeals and Regional
Trial Court are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The permanent injunction enjoining the petitioner
from enforcing the Memorandum Order of the DENR XII Regional Executive Director, is
LIFTED.In said ruling, the court investigated the elementary doctrine of qualified political agency.
Applying the doctrine of qualified political agency, the power of the President to reorganize the
National Government may validly be delegated to his cabinet members exercising control over a
executive department.
This doctrine is corollary to the control power of the President as provided for under Article VII,
Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution, which reads:
Sec. 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and
offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.
BLAQUERA vs ALCALA
295 SCRA 411
FACTS:
Petitioners are officials and employees of several government departments and agencies who were
paid incentive benefits for the year 1992, pursuant to Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known
as the Administrative Code of 1987. On January 19, 1993, then President Fidel V. Ramos issued
Administrative Order No. 29 authorizing the grant of productivity incentive benefits for the year
1992 in the maximum amount of P1,000.00 and reiterating the prohibition under Section 7 of
Administrative Order No. 268, enjoining the grant of productivity incentive benefits without prior
approval of the President. Section 4 of AO 29 directed “all departments, offices and agencies
which authorized payment of CY 1992 Productivity Incentive Bonus in excess of the amount
authorized under Section 1 hereof are hereby directed to immediately cause the return/refund of
the excess within a period of six months to commence fifteen (15) days after the issuance of this
Order.” In compliance therewith, the heads of the departments or agencies of the government
concerned, who are the herein respondents, caused the deduction from petitioners’ salaries or
allowances of the amounts needed to cover the alleged overpayments. To prevent the respondents
from making further deductions from their salaries or allowances, the petitioners have come before
this Court to seek relief.
The petitioner, Association of Dedicated Employees of the Philippine Tourism Authority who
were granted productivity incentive bonus for calendar year 1992 pursuant to Republic Act No.
6971, otherwise known as the Productivity Incentives Act of 1990. Subject bonus was, however,
disallowed by the Corporate Auditor on the ground that it was “prohibited under Administrative
Order No. 29 dated January 19, 1993.” The disallowance of the bonus in question was finally
brought on appeal to the Commission on Audit which denied the appeal in its Decision of March
6, 1995 on the grounds that provisions of RA 6971 insofar as the coverage is concerned, refer to
business enterprises including government owned and/or controlled corporations performing
proprietary functions.
ISSUE: Whether or not the PTA is within the scope of RA 6971
RATIO DECIDENDI:
Government-owned and controlled corporations may perform governmental or proprietary
functions or both, depending on the purpose for which they have been created. If the purpose is
to obtain special corporate benefits or earn pecuniary profit, the function is proprietary. If it is in
the interest of health, safety and for the advancement of public good and welfare, affecting the
public in general, the function is governmental. Powers classified as “proprietary” are those
intended for private advantage and benefit.
The aforecited powers and functions of PTA are predominantly governmental, principally geared
towards the development and promotion of tourism in the scenic Philippine archipelago. But it is
irrefutable that PTA also performs proprietary functions, as envisaged by its charter. To ascertain
whether PTA is within the ambit of RA 6971, there is need to find out the legislative intent, and to
refer to other provisions of RA 6971 and other pertinent laws, that may aid the Court in ruling on
the right of officials and employees of PTA to receive bonuses under RA 6971.
HUTCHISON PORTS PHILIPPINES LIMITEDV.SUBIC BAY METROPOLITAN
AUTHORITY
G.R. NO. 131367AUGUST 31, 2000
FACTS:
In 1996, Hutchison Ports Philippines Limited (HPPL) won a public bidding made by the Subic
Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA). The project was to develop and operate a modern marine
container terminal within the Subic Bay Freeport Zone. The SBMA Board of Directors already
declared HPPL as the winner but later, the Office of the President reversed the decision of the
Board and ordered a rebidding in the rebidding, however. HPPL was no longer among the
qualified bidders. Eventually HPPL filed a petition for injunction to enjoin SBMA from
conducting the rebidding.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Hutchison has the right to file an injunction case against SBMA.
RATIO DECIDENDI:
As a chartered institution, the SBMA is always under the direct control of
the Office of the President, particularly when contracts and/or projects undertaken by the SBMA
entail substantial amounts of money. The declaration made by the SBMA Board declaring HPPL
as the winning bidder was neither final nor unassailable. Under LOl No. 620, all projects
undertaken by the SBMA are subject to the approval of the Office of the President, Hence, the
Board of SBMA is under the control and supervision of the president of the Philippines,
Therefore, the declaration made by the Board did not vest any right in favor of HPPL Further,
HPPL cannot sue in the Philippines. It is a foreign corporation registered under the laws of the
British Virgin Islands; it did not register here in the Philippines.
NEA vs. COA
377 SCRA 233 (2002)
FACTS:
The President issued an executive order entitled "Implementing the Fourth and Final Year Salary
Increases Authorized by Joint Senate and House of Representatives. Resolution No. 01, Series of
1994." It directed the payment of the fourth and final salary increases in two tranches. However,
the NEA did not implement the salary increases in accordance with the schedule of payment and
instead implemented in one lump sum the two tranches, in other words. NEA accelerated the
implementation of the salary increase by paying the second trance along with the first tranche
Hence, the Commission's resident auditor in NEA issued a notice of suspension and,
consequently, a notice of suspension and, consequently, a notice of disallowance. The petitioner
asked for a reconsidered, but it was, however, denied. Hence, the petition at bar.
ISSUE:
Did the COA commit a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
disallowing the increased salaries?
RATIO DECIDENDI:
The presidential power of control over the executive branch of government extends to all
executive employees from Cabinet Secretary to the lowliest clerk.
NEA's accelerated release of salary is not in accordance with the law because it is still requiring
the approval of the President.
PIMENTEL VS AGUIRRE
G.R. 132988, JULY 19, 2000
FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition seeking to annul Section 1 of Administrative
Order No. 372, issued by the President, insofar as it requires local government units to reduce
their expenditures by 25% of their authorized regular appropriations for non-personal services
and to enjoin respondents from implementing Section 4 of the Order, which withholds a portion
of the internal revenue allotments.
ISSUE:
Whether Sections 1 and 4 of AO 372 are valid exercises of President’s power of general
supervision over LGUs.
RATIO DECIDENDI:
The President only exercises supervision over local governments and territorial and political
subdivisions. The members of the Cabinet and other executive officials are merely altering egos.
As such, they are subject to the power of control of the President. at whose will and behest, they
can be removed from office; or their actions and decisions changed, suspended or reversed. in
contrast, the heads of political subdivisions are elected by the people. Their sovereign powers
emanate from the electorate, to whom they are directly accountable. By constitutional fiat, they
are subject to the President's supervision only, not control, so long as their acts are exercises
within the sphere of their legitimate powers. Local government units also enjoy fiscal autonomy
as well.
Section 1 of the AO does not violate local fiscal autonomy. Local fiscal autonomy does not rule
out any manner of national government intervention by way of supervision, in order to ensure
that local programs, fiscal and otherwise, are consistent and national goals. AO 372 Is merely
directory and has been Issued by the President consistent with his powers of supervision over
local governments. A directory order cannot be characterized as an exercise of the power of
control.
BERMUDEZ V. TORRES
G.R. NO. 131429, AUGUST 4, 1999
FACTS:
Petitioner Oscar Bermudez, the First Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Tarlac and Officer-inCharge of the Office of Provincial Prosecutor, was a recommendee of then Sec. of Justice
Guingona for the position of Provincial Prosecutor. Private respondent Atty. Conrado Quiaoit
had the support of then Representative Yap of the Second District of Tarlac. Quiaoit was
appointed by Pres. Ramos to the office. Quiaoit took his oath and assumed office. Bermudez
refused to vacate the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor. Nonetheless, Quiaoit, performed the
duties and functions of the Office of Provincial Prosecutor. Petitioner Bermudez challenged the
appointment of Quiaoit primarily on the ground that the appointment lacks the recommendation
of the Sec. Of Justice prescribed under the Revised Administrative Code of 1987. Section 9,
Chap. II, Title III, Book IV of the Revised Administrative Code provides that “all provincial and
city prosecutors and their assistants shall be appointed by the Pres. upon the recommendation of
the Secretary.”
ISSUE
Whether or not the absence of a recommendation of the Secretary of Justice to the President can
be held fatal to the appointment of Quiaoit
RATIO DECIDENDI:
The power to appoint is, in essence, discretionary. The appointing authority has the right of
choice which he may exercise freely according to his judgment, deciding for himself who is best
qualified among those who have the necessary qualifications and eligibilities.
The President is the head of government whose authority includes the power of control over all
“executive departments, bureaus and offices.” Control means the authority of an empowered
officer to alter or modify, or even nullify or set aside, what a subordinate officer has done in the
performance of his duties, as well as to substitute the judgment of the latter, as and when the
former deems it to be appropriate. The Pres. has the power to assume directly the functions of an
executive department, bureau and office.
The phrase “upon recommendation of the Secretary” found in Sec. 9, Chap. II, Title III, Book IV
of the Revised Administrative Code should be interpreted to be a mere advice, exhortation or
indorsement, which is essentially persuasive in character and not binding or obligatory upon the
party to whom it is made. The recommendation is here nothing really more than advisory in
nature.
SARMIENTO VS MISON,
156 SCRA 549, 1987
FACTS:
This is the 1st major case under the 1987 Constitution. In 1987, Salvador Mison was appointed
as the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs by then president Corazon Aquino. Ulpiano
Sarmiento III and Juanito Arcilla, being members of the bar, taxpayers, and professors of
constitutional law questioned the appointment of Mison because it appears that Mison’s
appointment was not submitted to the Commission on Appointments (COA) for approval.
Sarmiento insists that under the new Constitution, heads of bureaus require the confirmation of
the COA.
Meanwhile, Sarmiento also sought to enjoin Guillermo Carague, the then Secretary of the
Department of Budget, from disbursing the salary payments of Mison due to the
unconstitutionality of Mison’s appointment.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the appointment of “heads of bureaus” needed confirmation by the Commission
on
Appointment.
RATIO DECIDENDI:
No. In the 1987 Constitution, the framers removed “heads of bureaus” as one of those officers
needing confirmation by the Commission on Appointment. Under the 1987 Constitution, there
are four (4) groups of officers whom the President shall appoint. These four (4) groups are: First,
the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers
of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose
appointments are vested in him in this Constitution; Second, all other officers of the Government
whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by law; Third, those whom the President
may be authorized by law to appoint; Fourth, officers lower in rank whose appointments the
Congress may by law vest in the President alone. The first group above are the only public
officers appointed by the president which require confirmation by the COA. The second, third,
and fourth group do not require confirmation by the COA. The position of Mison as the head of
the Bureau of Customs does not belong to the first group hence, he does not need to be
confirmed by the COA.
BAUTISTA VS. SALONGA
172 SCRA 160, 1989
FACTS:
President Aquino designated Mary Bautista as Acting Chairman of the CHR. Later on, the
President extended to Bautista a permanent appointment as Chairman of the Commission. She
took her oath of office by virtue of her appointment as Chairman of the CHR.
Bautista received letters from the COA Secretary requesting her to submit certain information and
documents and to be present at a meeting of the COA Committee on Justice and Judicial and Bar
Council and Human Rights, in connection with her confirmation as Chairman of CHR. However,
she refused to submit herself to the COA arguing that the latter has no jurisdiction to review her
appointment as CHR Chairman.
The COA's secretary sent a letter to the executive secretary informing the latter that COA
disapproved Bautista's "ad interim appointment" as Chairman of the CHR, in view of her refusal
to submit to the jurisdiction of the COA. It is the COA's submission that the President decides to
the extent another appointment to Bautista, this time, submitting such appointment/nomination to
the COA for confirmation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not confirmation of the appointments of the Chairman of the Commission on Human
Rights requires the consent of the COA.
RATIO DECIDENDI:
No, since the office is not one of those mentioned in the first sentence of Article VII, Section 16,
nor is it specified elsewhere that such appointments needs consent of the Commission, it follows
that the appointment by the President of the Chairman of the CHR is to be made without the review
or participation of the Commission on Appointments.
To be more precise, the appointment of the Chairman and Members of the Commission on Human
Rights is not specifically provided for in the Constitution itself, unlike the Chairmen and Members
of the Civil Service Commission, the Commission on Elections and the Commission on Audit,
whose appointments are expressly vested by the Constitution in the President with the consent of
the Commission on Appointment.
The President appoints the Chairman and Members of the Commission on Human Rights pursuant
to the second sentence in Section 16, Art. VII, that is, without the confirmation of the Commission
on Appointments because they are among the officers of government "whom he (the President)
may be authorized by law to appoint." And Section 2(c), Executive Order No. 163, 5 May 1987,
authorizes the President to appoint the Chairman and Members of the Commission on Human
Rights. It provides:
"(c) The Chairman and the Members of the Commission on Human Rights shall be appointed by
the President for a term of seven years without re-appointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall
be only for the unexpired term of the predecessor."
CALDERON V. CARALE
G.R. NO. 91636 APRIL 23, 1992
FACTS:
In 1989, RA 6715 was passed. This law amended PD 442 or the Labor Code. RA 6715 provides
that the Chairman, the Division Presiding Commissioners and other Commissioners [of the NLRC]
shall all be appointed by the President, subject to confirmation by the CoA.
Pursuant to the law, Cory assigned Carale et al as the Chairman and the Commissioners
respectively of the NLRC, the appointment was not submitted to the CoA for its confirmation.
Calderon questioned the appointment saying that w/o the confirmation by the CoA, such an
appointment is in violation of RA 6715. Calderon asserted that RA 6715 is not an encroachment
on the appointing power of the executive contained in Sec16, Art. 7, of the Constitution, as
Congress may, by law, require confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of other officers
appointed by the President additional to those mentioned in the first sentence of Sec 16 of Article
7 of the Constitution. The Solicitor General, on the other hand, contends that RA 6715 which
amended the Labor Code transgresses Section 16, Article VII by expanding the confirmation
powers of the Commission on Appointments without constitutional basis. Mison and Bautista laid
the issue to rest.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Congress may, by law, require confirmation by the CoA of appointments extended
by the President to government officers additional to those expressly mentioned in the first
sentence of Sec. 16, Art. 7 of the Constitution whose appointments require confirmation by the
CoA.
RATIO DECIDENDI:
No. Art. 215 of the Labor Code as amended by RA 6715 insofar as it requires the confirmation of
the Commission on Appointments of appointments of the Chairman and Members of the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) is hereby declared unconstitutional. The second sentence of
Sec. 16, Art. VII refers to all other officers of the government whose appointments are not
otherwise provided for by law and those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint.
Undeniably, the Chairman and Members of the NLRC are not among the officers mentioned in the
first sentence of Section 16, Article VII whose appointments requires confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments. To the extent that RA 6715 requires confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments of the appointments of respondents Chairman and Members of the
National Labor Relations Commission, it is unconstitutional because:
1) it amends by legislation, the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the Constitution by adding
thereto appointments requiring confirmation by the Commission on Appointments; and
2) it amends by legislation the second sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the Constitution, by imposing
the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments on appointments which are otherwise
entrusted only with the President