TRANSPORTATION AND COMMON CARRIERS
TRANSPORTATION IN GENERAL
Transportation as a component of Public Utilities and Public Service
13 (b) CA No. 146 or the Public Service Law (of 1936) , as last amended by RA
No.2677
SEC. 13. Except as otherwise provided herein, the Commission shall have general
supervision and regulation of, jurisdiction and control over, all public services, and also
over their property, property rights, equipment, facilities; and franchises so far as may
be necessary for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of this Act, and in the
exercise of its authority it shall have the necessary powers and aid of the public
force: Provided, however, That the Commission shall have no control or jurisdiction over
ice plants, cold storage plants, or any public services operated by the Government of
the United States in the Philippines exclusively for Its own use and not to serve private
persons for pay or compensation, nor over municipal warehouses nor animal-drawn
vehicles: Provided, further. That the Commission shall not exercise any control or
supervision over air craft in the Philippines, except with regard to the fixing of maximum
passenger and freight rates, nor over the Manila Railroad Company until the same shall
be controlled by the Government of the Philippines, nor over radio companies or
concerns except as regards the fixing of rates: Provided, further, That the control and
jurisdiction of the Commission over ships shall be limited to the fixing of freight and
passenger
rates.
SEC. 14. The terms "public service" or "public utility" used in this Act include every
individual, copartnership, association, corporation, or joint-stock company, whether
domestic or foreign, their lessees, trustees, or receivers appointed by any court
whatsoever, or any municipality, province, or other department of the Government of the
Philippines, that now or hereafter may own, operate, manage, or control in the
Philippines, for hire or compensation, any common carrier, railroad, street railway,
traction railway, subway, freight and/or passenger motor vehicles, with or without fixed
route, freight or any other car service, express service, steamboat or steamship line,
ferries, small water craft, such as lighters, pontines, lorchas, and others, engaged in the
transportation of passengers or cargo, shipyard, marine railway, marine repair shop,
public warehouse, wharf, or dock not under the jurisdiction of the Insular Collector of
Customs, ice, refrigeration, canal, irrigation, pipe line, gas, electric light, heat, power,
water, oil, sewer, telephone, wire or wireless, telegraph system, plant or equipment, and
broadcasting stations, when owned, operated, managed, or controlled for public use or
service within the Philippines, whether the owner or operator be an individual,
copartnership, association, corporation or joint-stock company, either domestic or
foreign, or a trustee or receiver appointed by any court whatsoever, or any municipality,
province, or other department of the Government of the Philippines, or any other
entities.
SEC. 15. No public service as herein defined shall operate in the Philippines without
having first secured from the Commission a certificate, which shall be known as
Certificate of Public Convenience or as Certificate of Public Convenience and
Necessity, as the case may he, to the effect that the operation of said service and the
authorization to do business will promote the public interests in a proper and suitable
manner.
"Sec. 13(b). RA No.2677
(a) The Commission shall have jurisdiction, supervision and control over all public
services and their franchises, equipment, and other properties, and in the exercise of its
authority, it shall have the necessary powers and the aid of public force: Provided, That
public services owned or operated by government entities or government-owned or
controlled corporations shall be regulated by the Commission in the same way as
privately-owned public services, but certificates of public convenience or certificates of
public convenience and necessity shall not be required of such entities or corporations:
And provided, further, That it shall have no authority to require steamboats, motorships
and steamship lines, whether privately-owned, or owned or operated any government
controlled corporation or instrumentality to obtain certificate of public convenience or to
prescribe their definite routes or lines of service.
"(b) The term 'public service' includes every person that now or hereafter may own,
operate, manage, or control in the Philippines, for hire or compensation, with general or
limited clientele, whether permanent, occasional or accidental, and done for general
business purposes, any common carrier, railroad, street railway, traction railway, subway motor vehicle, either for freight or passenger, or both with or without fixed route and
whatever may be its classification, freight or carrier service of any class, express
service, steamboat, or steamship line, pontines, ferries, and water craft, engaged in the
transportation of passengers or freight or both, shipyard, marine railway, marine repair
shop, wharf or dock, ice plant, ice-refrigeration plant, canal, irrigation system, gas
electric light, heat and power, water supply and power, petroleum, sewerage system,
wire or wireless communications system, wire or wireless broadcasting stations and
other similar public services: Provided, however, That a person engaged in agriculture,
not otherwise a public service, who owns a motor vehicle and uses it personally and/or
enters into a special contract whereby said motor vehicle is offered for hire or
compensation to a third party or third engaged in agriculture, not itself or themselves a
public service, for operation by the latter for a limited time and for a specific purpose
directly connected with the cultivation of his or their farm, the transportation, processing,
and marketing of agricultural products of such third party or third parties shall not be
considered as operating a public service for the purposes of this Act.
"(c) The word 'person' includes every individual, co partnership, joint-stock company or
corporation, whether domestic or foreign, their lessees, trustees or receivers, as well as
any municipality, province, city, government-owned or controlled corporation, or agency
of the Government of the Philippines, and whatever other persons or entities that may
own or possess or operate public services."
National Power Corp v CA, 345 Phil 9 (1997)
Facts:
On June 17, 1961, the Cagayan Electric and Power Light Company (CEPALCO) was
enfranchised by Republic Act No. 3247 "to construct, maintain and operate an electric
light, heat and power system for the purpose of generating and/or distributing electric
light, heat and/or power for sale within the City of Cagayan de Oro and its suburbs" for
fifty (50) years.
Presidential Decree No. 243, issued on July 12, 1973, created a "body corporate and
politic" to be known as the Philippine Veterans Investment Development Corporation
(PHIVIDEC) vested with authority to engage in "commercial, industrial, mining,
agricultural and other enterprises" among other powers and "to allow the full and
continued employment of the productive capabilities of an investment of the veterans
and retirees of the Armed Forces of the Philippines." On August 13, 1974, Presidential
Decree No. 538 was promulgated to create the PHIVIDEC Industrial Authority (PIA), a
subsidiary of PHIVIDEC, to carry out the government policy "to encourage, promote and
sustain the economic and social growth of the country and that the establishment of
professionalized management of well-planned industrial areas shall further this
objective. Under Sec. 3 of P.D. No. 538, the first area for development shall be located
in the municipalities of Tagoloan and Villanueva. This area forms part of the PHIVIDEC
Industrial Estate Misamis Oriental (PIE-MO).
On July 6, 1979, PIA granted CEPALCO a temporary authority to retail electric power to
the industries operating within the PIE-MO.
At the end of the fifth year, or at the end of the 10th year, should this Agreement be thus
renewed, PIA has the option to take over the operation of the electric service and
acquire by purchase CEPALCO's assets within PIE-MO. This option shall be
communicated to CEPALCO in writing at least 24 months before the date of acquistion
of assets and takeover of operation by PIA. Should PIA exercise its option to purchase
the assets of CEPALCO in PIE-MO, PIA shall respect the right of ownership of and
maintenance by CEPALCO of those assets inside PIE-MO not covered by such
purchase.
According to PIA,[5] CEPALCO proved no match to the power demands of the
industries in PIE-MO that most of these companies operating therein closed shop.[6]
Impelled by a "desire to provide cheap power costs to power-intensive... industries
operating within the Estate," PIA applied with the National Power Corporation (NPC) for
direct power connection which the latter in due course approved.
Notwithstanding NPC's claim that it was authorized by its Charter to sell electric power
"in bulk" to industrial enterprises, the lower court rendered a decision on May 2, 1984,
restraining the NPC from supplying power... directly to FPI upon the ground that such
direct sale, supply and delivery of electric power by the NPC to FPI was violative of the
rights of CEPALCO under its legislative franchise. Hence, the lower court ordered the
NPC to "permanently desist" from effecting direct supply of... power to the FPI and "from
entering into and/or implementing any agreement or arrangement for such direct power
connection, unless coursed through the power line" of CEPALCO.
Notwithstanding said decision, in September 1990, FPI filed a new application for the
direct supply of electric power from NPC. The Hearing Committee of the NPC had
started hearing the application but CEPALCO filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City a petition for... contempt against NPC officials led by Ernesto Aboitiz. On
August 10, 1992, the trial court found the respondents in direct contempt of court and
accordingly imposed upon them a fine of 500.00 each.
In the Decision of July 5, 1993, the Court upheld the contempt ruling... onsequently, in
its Report and Recommendation dated September 27,... 1991, the committee gave
weight to the evidence presented by FPI that CEPALCO charged higher rates than what
the NPC would if allowed to supply power directly to FPI. Although the committee
considered as unfounded FPI's claim of CEPALCO's unreliability as a power...
supplier,... For its part, on November 3, 1989, CEPALCO filed with the Energy
Regulatory Board (ERB) a petition praying that the ERB "order the discontinuance of all
existing direct supply of power by the NPC within petitioner's franchise area" (ERB Case
No. 89-430). On July 17, 1992, the
ERB ruled that CEPALCO "is relatively efficient and reliable as manifested by its very
low system losses (far from the 14% standard) and very high power factors" and
therefore CEPALCO is technically capable "to distribute power to its consumers within
its franchise area particularly the industrial customers.
On June 23, 1993, noting the cases filed by CEPALCO all seeking exclusivity in the
distribution of electric power to areas covered by its franchise, the court[21] ruled that
"the right of petitioner to supply electric power in the aforesaid area to the... exclusion of
other entities had been settled once and for all by the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City wherein petitioner obtained a favorable judgment." Hence, the petition was
dismissed on the ground of res judicata.
On September 10, 1993, the Fifteenth Division of the Court of Appeals issued a
resolution[24] denying the prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order on
the strength of Sec. 1 of P.D. No. 1818. It ruled that since the NPC is a public utility,... it
"enjoys the protective mantle" of said decree prohibiting courts from issuing restraining
orders or preliminary injunctions in cases involving infrastructure and natural resource
development projects of, and operated by, the government.
Issues:
Whether or not "the NPC itself has the power to determine the propriety of direct power
connection from its lines to any entity located within the franchise area of another public
utility."
Ruling:
Principles:
The statutory authority given to the NPC as regards direct supply of power to BOIregistered... enterprises "should always be subordinate to the 'total-electrification-of-theentire-country-on-an-area-coverage basis policy' enunciated in P. D. No. 40.
'It is only after a hearing (or an opportunity for such a hearing) where it is established
that the affected private franchise holder is incapable or unwilling to match the reliability
and rates of NPC that a direct connection with NPC may be... granted.' Here, petitionerappellee's reliability as a power supplier and ability to match the NPC rates were never
put in issue.
'As consistently ruled by the Court pursuant to P.D. No. 380 as amended by P.D. No.
395, NPC is statutorily empowered to directly service all the requirements of a BOI
registered enterprise provided that, first, any affected private franchise holder is
afforded an opportunity to... be heard on the application therefore and second, from
such a hearing, it is established that said private franchise holder is incapable or
unwilling to match the reliability and rates of NPC for directly serving the latter (National
Power Corporation v. Jacinto, 134 SCRA 435
Determination of which franchise holder has jurisdiction over a certain area when both
of them have a right thereto a direct connection to the NPC may be granted, a proper
administrative body must conduct a hearing "to determine which entity, the franchise
holder or the NPC, has the right to supply electric power to the entity applying for direct
connection,"
PUBLIC UTILITIES
Constitutional provisions on public utilities
11, Art. XII, 1987 Constitution
Section 11. No franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for the operation
of a public utility shall be granted except to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations
or associations organized under the laws of the Philippines, at least sixty per centum of
whose capital is owned by such citizens; nor shall such franchise, certificate, or
authorization be exclusive in character or for a longer period than fifty years. Neither
shall any such franchise or right be granted except under the condition that it shall be
subject to amendment, alteration, or repeal by the Congress when the common good so
requires. The State shall encourage equity participation in public utilities by the general
public. The participation of foreign investors in the governing body of any public utility
enterprise shall be limited to their proportionate share in its capital, and all the executive
and managing officers of such corporation or association must be citizens of the
Philippines.
Albano v. Reyes, G.R. No. 83551. July 11, 1989
Facts:
The Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) board directed the PPA management to prepare
for the public bidding of the development, management and operation of the Manila
International Container Terminal (MICT) at the Port of Manila. A Bidding Committee was
formed by the DOTC for the public bidding. After evaluation of several bids, the Bidding
Committee recommended the award of the contract to respondent International
Container Terminal Services, Inc. (ICTSI). Accordingly, Rainerio Reyes, then DOTC
secretary, declared the ICTSI consortium as the winning bidder.
On May 18, 1988, the President of the Philippines approved the same with directives
that PPA shall still have the responsibility for planning, detailed engineering,
construction, expansion, rehabilitation and capital dredging of the port, as well as the
determination of how the revenues of the port system shall be allocated for future
works; and the contractor shall not collect taxes and duties except that in the case of
wharfage or tonnage dues.
Petitioner Albano, as taxpayer and Congressman, assailed the legality of the award and
claimed that since the MICT is a public utility, it needs a legislative franchise before it
can legally operate as a public utility.
ISSUE: Whether a franchise is needed for the operation of the MICT?
Held: No. While the PPA has been tasked under E.O. No. 30 with the management and
operation of the MICT and to undertake the provision of cargo handling and port related
services thereat, the law provides that such shall be “in accordance with P.D. 857 and
other applicable laws and regulations”. P.D. 857 expressly empowers the PPA to
provide services within Port Districts “whether on its own, by contract, or otherwise”.
Even if the MICT is considered a public utility, its operation would not necessarily need
a franchise from the legislature because the law has granted certain administrative
agencies the power to grant licenses for or to authorize the operation of public utilities.
Reading E.O. 30 and P.D. 857 together, it is clear that the lawmaker has empowered
the PPA to undertake by itself the operation and management of the MICP or to
authorize its operation and management by another by contract or other means, at its
option.
Doctrine: The law granted certain administrative agencies the power to grant licenses
for the operation of public utilities. Theory that MICT is a “wharf” or a “dock”, as
contemplated under the Public Service Act, would not necessarily call for a franchise
from the Legislative Branch.
17, Art. XII, 1987 Constitution
Section 17. In times of national emergency, when the public interest so requires, the
State may, during the emergency and under reasonable terms prescribed by it,
temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately-owned public utility or
business affected with public interest.
Agan, Jr. v. Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc., G.R. No. 155001. May
5, 2003
Facts: Some time in 1993, six business leaders, explored the possibility of investing in
the new NAIA airport terminal, so they formed Asians Emerging Dragon Corp.
They submitted proposals to the government for the development of NAIA Intl.
Passenger Terminal III (NAIA IPT III). The NEDA approved the NAIA IPT III project.
Bidders were invited, and among the proposal Peoples Air Cargo (Paircargo) was
chosen. AEDC protested alleging that preference was given to Paircargo, but still the
project was awarded to Paircargo. Because of that, it incorporated into, Phil. Intl. Airport
Terminals Co. (PIATCO). The DOTC and PIATCO entered into a concession agreement
in 1997 to franchise and operate the said terminal for 21years. In Nov. 1998 it was
amended in the matters of pertaining to the definition of the obligations given to the
concessionaire, development of facilities and proceeds, fees and charges, and the
termination of contract. Since MIAA is charged with the maintenance and operations of
NAIA terminals I and II, it has a contract with several service providers. The workers
filed the petition for prohibition claiming that they would lose their job, and the service
providers joined them, filed a motion for intervention. Likewise several employees of the
MIAA filed a petition assailing the legality of arrangements. A group of congressmen
filed similar petitions. Pres. Arroyo declared in her speech that she will not honor
PIATCO contracts which the Exec. Branch's legal office concluded null and void.
Issue: Whether or Not the 1997 concession agreement is void, together with its
amendments
for
being
contrary
to
the constitution.
Held: The 1997 concession agreement is void for being contrary to public policy. The
amendments have the effect of changing it into and entirely different agreement from
the contract bidded upon. The amendments present new terms and conditions which
provide financial benefit to PIATCO which may have the altered the technical and
financial parameters of other bidders had they know that such terms were available.
The 1997 concession agreement, the amendments and supplements thereto are set
aside
for
being
null
and
void.
The petitioners have local standi. They are prejudiced by the concession agreement as
their livelihood is to be taken away from them.
What constitutes a public utility?
A public utility is an entity that provides goods or services to the general public. Public
utilities may include common carriers as well as corporations that provide electric, gas,
water, heat, and television cable systems.
18 and 19, Art. XII, 1987 Constitution
Section 18. The State may, in the interest of national welfare or defense, establish and
operate vital industries and, upon payment of just compensation, transfer to public
ownership utilities and other private enterprises to be operated by the Government.
Section 19. The State shall regulate or prohibit monopolies when the public interest so
requires. No combinations in restraint of trade or unfair competition shall be allowed.
The Iloilo Ice and Cold Storage Company v. Public Utility Board, G.R. No. L-19857.
March 2, 1923; 44 Phil. 551
Facts:
Petitioner maintains and operates a plant for the manufacture and sale of ice in the City
of Iloilo. The business of petitioner has been carried on with selected customers only.
Sec of Public Utility Commission upon investigation reported that petitioner should be
considered a public utility. Petitioner alleges that it is and has always been operating as
a private enterprise.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner is a public utility.
Ruling: NO.
The criterion by which to judge of the character of the use is whether the public may
enjoy it by right or only by permission. The essential feature of a public use is that it is
not confined to privileged individuals, but is open to the indefinite public. The use is
public if all persons have the right to the use under the same circumstances. If the
company did in truth sell ice to all persons seeking its service, it would be a public utility.
But if on the other hand, it was organized solely for particular persons under strictly
private contracts, and never was devoted by its owners to public use, it could not be
held to be a public utility without violating the due process of law clause of the
Constitution. And the apparent and continued purpose of the Iloilo Ice and Storage
Company has been, and is, to remain a private enterprise and to avoid submitting to the
Public Utility law.
“Public use” means the same as “use by the public.” The essential feature of the
public use is that it is not confined to privileged individuals, but is open to the indefinite
public. It is this indefinite or unrestricted quality that gives it its public character. In
determining whether a use is public, we must look not only to the character of the
business to be done, but also to the proposed mode of doing it. If the use is merely
optional with the owners, or the public benefit is merely incidental, it is not a public use,
authorizing the exercise of the jurisdiction of the public utility commission. There must
be, in general, a right which the law compels the owner to give to the general public. It is
not enough that the general prosperity of the public is promoted. Public use is not
synonymous with public interest. The true criterion by which to judge of the character of
the use is whether the public may enjoy it by right or only by permission.
Distinction between “operation” and “ownership” of a public utility
Tatad v. Garcia, Jr., G.R. No. 114222. April 6, 1995
Facts:
In 1989, the government planned to build a railway transit line along EDSA. No bidding
was made but certain corporations were invited to prequalify. The only corporation to
qualify was the EDSA LRT Consortium which was obviously formed for this particular
undertaking. An agreement was then made between the government, through the
Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC), and EDSA LRT
Consortium. The agreement was based on the Build-Operate-Transfer scheme provided
for by law (RA 6957, amended by RA 7718). Under the agreement, EDSA LRT
Consortium shall build the facilities, i.e., railways, and shall supply the train cabs. Every
phase that is completed shall be turned over to the DOTC and the latter shall pay rent
for the same for 25 years. By the end of 25 years, it was projected that the government
shall have fully paid EDSA LRT Consortium. Thereafter, EDSA LRT Consortium shall
sell the facilities to the government for $1.00.
However, Senators Francisco Tatad, John Osmeña, and Rodolfo Biazon opposed the
implementation of said agreement as they averred that EDSA LRT Consortium is a
foreign corporation as it was organized under Hongkong laws; that as such, it cannot
own a public utility such as the EDSA railway transit because this falls under the
nationalized areas of activities. The petition was filed against Jesus Garcia, Jr. in his
capacity as DOTC Secretary.
Issue:
Can respondent EDSA LRT Corporation, Ltd., a foreign corporation own EDSA LRT III;
a public utility?
Ruling:
What private respondent owns are the rail tracks, rolling stocks like the coaches, rail
stations, terminals and the power plant, not a public utility. While a franchise is needed
to operate these facilities to serve the public, they do not by themselves constitute a
public utility. What constitutes a public utility is not their ownership but their use to serve
the public.
In law, there is a clear distinction between the "operation" of a public utility and the
ownership of the facilities and equipment used to serve the public. The right to operate
a public utility may exist independently and separately from the ownership of the
facilities thereof. One can own said facilities without operating them as a public utility, or
conversely, one may operate a public utility without owning the facilities used to serve
the public. The devotion of property to serve the public may be done by the owner or by
the person in control thereof who may not necessarily be the owner thereof.
Power to grant licenses or franchise to operate public utilities.
Pangasinan Transportation, Inc. v. The Public Service Commission, G.R. No.
47065. June 26, 1940; 70 Phil 221
Facts:
The petitioner has been engaged for the past twenty years in the business of
transporting passengers in the Provinces of Pangasinan and Tarlac and, to a certain
extent, in the Provinces of Nueva Ecija and Zambales, by means of motor vehicles
commonly known... as TPU buses, in accordance with the terms and conditions of the
certificates of public convenience issued in its favor by the former Public Utility
Commission in cases Nos. 24948, 3U973, 36831, 32014 and 53090.
On August 26, 1939, the petitioner filed with the Public Service
Commission an application for authorization to operate ten additional new Brockway
trucks (case No. 56641), on the ground that they were needed to comply with the terms
and conditions of its existing certificates and as a result of the application of the Eight
Hour Labor Law.
In... the decision of September 26, 1939, granting the petitioner's application for
increase of equipment, the Public Service Commission ordered
Not being agreeable to the two new conditions thus incorporated in its existing
certificates, the petitioner filed on October 9, 1939 a motion for reconsideration which
was denied by the Public Service Commission on November 14, 1939.
November 20, 1939, the present... petition for a writ of certiorari was instituted in this
court praying that an order be issued directing the secretary of the Public Service
Commission to certify forthwith to this court the records of all proceedings in case No.
56641; that this court, after hearing, render a... decision declaring section 1 of
Commonwealth Act No. 454 unconstitutional and void; that, if this court should be of the
opinion that section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 454 is constitutional, a decision be
rendered declaring that the provisions thereof are not applicable to valid... and
subsisting certificates issued prior to June 8, 1939.
it is contended:
1. That the legislative powers granted to the Public Service Commission by section
1 of Commonwealth Act No. 454, without limitation, guide or rule except the
unfettered discretion and judgment of the Commission, constitute a complete and
total abdication by the
Legislature of its functions in the premises, and. for that reason, the Act, in so far as
those powers are concerned, is unconstitutional and void.
2. That even if it be assumed that section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 454, is a
valid delegation of legislative powers, the Public Service Commission has
exceeded its authority because: (a) The Act applies only to future certificates and
not to valid and subsisting certificates... issued prior to June 8, 1939, when said
Act took effect, and (a) the Act, as applied by the Commission, violates
constitutional guarantees.
Section 15 of Commonwealth Act No. 146, as amended by section 1 of Commonwealth
Act No. 454,... reads as follows:... no public service shall operate in the Philippines
without possessing a valid and subsisting certificate from the Public Service
Commission, known as 'certificate of public convenience/ or 'certificate... of convenience
and public necessity,' as the case may be, to the effect that the operation of said service
and the authorization to do business will promote the public interests in a proper and
suitable manner.
"The Commission may prescribe as a condition for the issuance of the certificate
provided in the preceding paragraph that the service can be acquired by the
Commonwealth of the Philippines or by any instrumentality thereof upon payment of the
cost price of its useful equipment,... less reasonable depreciation; and likewise, that the
certificate shall be valid only for a definite period of time; and that the violation of any of
these conditions shall produce the immediate cancellation of the certificate without the
necessity of any express action on the... part of the Commission.
Under the first paragraph of the aforequoted section 15 of Act No. 146, as amended, no
public service can operate without a certificate of public convenience or certificate of
convenience and public necessity to the effect that the operation of said service and the
authorization... to do business will promote "public interests in a proper and suitable
manner.'
Under the second paragraph, one of the conditions which the Public Service
Commission may prescribe for the issuance of the certificate provided for in the first
paragraph is that "the service can... be acquired by the Conmmonwealth of the
Philippines or by any instrumentality thereof upon payment of the cost price of its useful
equipment, less reasonable depreciation," a condition which is virtually a restatement of
the principle already embodied in the Constitution,... section 6 of Article XII, which
provides that "the State may, in the interest of national welfare and defense, establish
and operate industries and means of transportation and communication, and, upon
payment of just compensation, transfer to public ownership utilities and other... private
enterprises to be operated by the Government."
Another condition which... is assailed by the petitioner,... "shall be valid only for a
definite period of time."
Issues:
section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 454 unconstitutional and void
Ruling:
Section 8 of Article XIII of the Constitution provides, among other things, that no
franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for the operation of a public
utility shall be "for a longer period than fifty years," and when it was ordained, in section
15 of
Commonwealth Act No. 146, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 454, that the
Public Service Commission may prescribe as a condition for the issuance of a certificate
that it "shall be valid only for a definite period of time" and, in section 16 (a) that "no
such certificates shall... be issued for a period of more than fifty years," the National
Assembly meant to give effect to the aforesaid constitutional mandate.
it has thereby also declared its will that the period to be fixed by the Public Service
Commission shall not be longer than fifty... years.
All that has been delegated to the Commission, therefore, is the administrative function,
involving the use of discretion, to carry out the will of the National Assembly having in
view, in addition, the promotion of "public interests in a proper and suitable manner."
The... fact that the National Assembly may itself exercise the function and authority thus
conferred upon the Public Service Commission does not make the provision in question
constitutionally objectionable.
One thing, however, is apparent in the development of the principle of... separation of
powers and that is that the maxim of delegatus non potest delegari or delegata potestas
non potest delegari, attributed to Bracton (De Legibus et Consuetedinious Angliae,
edited by G. E. Woodbine, Yale University Press, 1922, vol. 2, p. 167) but which is
also... recognized in principle in the Roman Law (D. 17.18.3), has been made to adapt
itself to the complexities of modern governments, giving rise to the adoption, within
certain limits, of the principle of "subordinate legislation," not only in the United States
and England but in... practically all modern governments.
Accordingly, with the growing complexity of modern life, the multiplication of the
subjects of governmental regulation, and the increased difficulty of... administering the
laws, there is a constantly growing tendency toward the delegation of greater powers by
the legislature, and toward the approval of the practice by the courts.
The petitioner is mistaken in the suggestion that, simply because its existing certificates
had been granted before June 8, 1939, the date when Commonwealth Act No. 454,...
amendatory of section 15 of Commonwealth Act No. 146, was approved, it must be
deemed to have the right of holding them in perpetuity. Section 74 of the Philippine Bill
provided that "no franchise, privilege, or concession shall be granted to any corporation
except under the... conditions that it shall be subject to amendment, alteration, or repeal
by the Congress of the United States."
Lastly, the Constitution of the Philippines provides, in section 8 of Article XIII, that "no
franchise or right shall be granted to any individual, firm, or... corporation, except under
the condition that it shall be subject to amendment, alteration, or repeal by the National
Assembly when the public interest so requires."
Nor is there any merit in petitioner's contention, that, because of the establishment of
petitioner's operations prior to May 1, 1917, they are not subject to the regulations of the
Commission. Statutes for the regulation of public utilities are a proper exercise by the
state... of its police power. As soon as the power is exercised, all phases of operation of
established utilities, become at once subject to the police power thus called into
operation.
The statute is applicable not only to those public utilities coming into existence after its
passage, but likewise to those already established and in operation.
When, therefore, one devotes his property to a use in which the public has... an interest,
he, in effect, grants to the public an interest in that use, and must submit to be
controlled by the public for the common good, to the extent of the interest he has thus
created.
This right of the state to regulate public utilities is founded upon the police power, and
statutes for the control and regulation of utilities are a legitimate exercise thereof, for the
protection of the public as well as of the utilities... themselves.
Such statutes are, therefore, not unconstitutional, either as impairing the obligation of
contracts, taking property without due process, or denying the equal protection of the
laws, especially inasmuch as the question whether or not private property shall be
devoted... to a public use and the consequent burdens assumed is ordinarily for the
owner to decide; and if he voluntarily places his property in public service he cannot
complain that it becomes subject to the regulatory powers of the state.
Whilst the challenged provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 454 are valid and
constitutional, we are, however, of the opinion that the decision of the Public Service
Commission should be reversed and the case remanded thereto for further proceedings
for the reason now to be stated.
The Public Service Commission has power, upon proper notice and hearing, "to amend,
modify or revoke at any time any certificate issued under the provisions of this Act,
whenever the facts and circumstances on the strength of which said certificate was
issued have been... misrepresented or materially changed.
There are cardinal primary rights which must be respected even in proceedings of this
character.
The first of these rights is the right to a hearing, which includes the right of the party
interested or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof.
While the duty to deliberate ioes not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply i
necessity... which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support
its decision.
This principle emanates from the more fundamental principle that the... genius of
constitutional government is contrary to the vesting of unlimited power anywhere. Law is
both a grant and a limitation upon power.
The decision appealed from is hereby reversed and the :ase remanded to the Public
Service Commission for further proceedings in accordance with law and this decision,
withjut any pronouncement regarding costs. So ordered.
Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity distinguished from Certificate of
Public Convenience
Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics Board, G.R. No. 119528. March 26,
1997
Facts:
This Special Civil Action for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court seeks to prohibit respondent Civil Aeronautics Board from exercising jurisdiction
over private respondent's Application for the issuance of a Certificate of
Public Convenience and Necessity, and to annul and set aside a temporary operating
permit issued by the Civil Aeronautics Board in favor of Grand International Airways
(GrandAir, for brevity) allowing the same to engage in scheduled domestic air
transportation services,... particularly the Manila-Cebu, Manila-Davao, and converse
routes.
The main reason submitted by petitioner Philippine Airlines, Inc. (PAL) to support its
petition is the fact that GrandAir does not possess a legislative franchise authorizing it to
engage in air transportation service within the Philippines or elsewhere. Such franchise
is,... allegedly, a requisite for the issuance of a Certificate of Public Convenience or
Necessity by the respondent Board, as mandated under Section 11, Article XII of the
Constitution.
Respondent Gra
Respondent GrandAir, on the other hand, posits that a legislative franchise is no longer
a requirement for the issuance of a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity or
a Temporary Operating Permit, following the Court's pronouncements in the case of
Albano vs.
Reyes,[1] as restated by the Court of Appeals in Avia Filipinas International vs. Civil
Aeronautics Board[2] and Silangan Airways, Inc. vs. Grand International Airways, Inc.,
and the Hon. Civil Aeronautics Board.[
On November 24, 1994, private respondent GrandAir applied for a Certificate of Public
Convenience and Necessity with the Board, which application was docketed as CAB
Case No. EP-12711.[4]Accordingly, the Chief Hearing Officer of the CAB issued a
Notice of
Hearing setting the application for initial hearing on December 16, 1994, and directing
GrandAir to serve a copy of the application and corresponding notice to all scheduled
Philippine Domestic operators. On December 14, 1994, GrandAir filed its Compliance,
and requested for the... issuance of a Temporary Operating Permit. Petitioner, itself the
holder of a legislative franchise to operate air transport services, filed an Opposition to
the application for a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity on December 16,
1995 on the following grounds:
"A. The CAB has no jurisdiction to hear the petitioner's application until the latter has
first obtained a franchise to operate from Congress.
B. The petitioner's application is deficient in form and substance
On December 20, 1994, the Chief Hearing Officer of CAB issued an Order denying
petitioner's Opposition. Pertinent portions of the Order read:
"PAL alleges that the CAB has no jurisdiction to hear the petitioner's application until the
latter has first obtained a franchise to operate from Congress.
The Civil Aeronautics Board has jurisdiction to hear and resolve the application. In Avia
Filipina vs. CAB, CA G.R. No. 23365, it has been ruled that under Section 10 (c) (I) of
R.A. 776, the Board possesses this specific power and duty.
In view thereof, the opposition of PAL on this ground is hereby denied.
On December 23, 1994, the Board promulgated Resolution No. 119(92) approving the
issuance of a Temporary Operating Permit in favor of Grand Air[7] for a period of three
months, i.e., from December 22, 1994 to March 22, 1994. Petitioner moved for the...
reconsideration of the issuance of the Temporary Operating Permit on January 11,
1995, but the same was denied in CAB Resolution No. 02 (95) on February 2, 1995.[8]
In the said Resolution, the Board justified its assumption of jurisdiction over GrandAir's...
application.
"WHEREAS, the CAB is specifically authorized under Section 10-C (1) of Republic Act
No. 776 as follows:
Petitioners argue that the respondent Board acted beyond its powers and jurisdiction in
taking cognizance of GrandAir's application for the issuance of a Certificate of Public
Convenience and Necessity, and in issuing a temporary operating permit in the
meantime, since GrandAir... has not been granted and does not possess a legislative
franchise to engage in scheduled domestic air transportation. A legislative franchise is
necessary before anyone may engage in air transport services, and a franchise may
only be granted by Congress. This is the meaning... given by the petitioner upon a
reading of Section 11, Article XII,[9]and Section 1, Article VI,[10] of the Constitution.
Respondent GrandAir, on the other hand, relies on its interpretation of the provisions of
Republic Act 776, which follows the pronouncements of the Court of Appeals in the
cases of Avia Filipinas vs. Civil Aeronautics Board, and Silangan Airways, Inc. vs.
Grand International
Airways (supra).
Issues:
whether or not Congress, in enacting Republic Act 776, has delegated the authority to
authorize the operation of domestic air transport services to the respondent Board, such
that Congressional mandate for the approval of such authority is no longer... necessa
Ruling:
It is g
Congress has granted certain administrative agencies the power to grant licenses for, or
to authorize the operation of certain public utilities. With the growing complexity of
modern life, the multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulation, and the
increased... difficulty of administering the laws, there is a constantly growing tendency
towards the delegation of greater powers by the legislature, and towards the approval of
the practice by the courts.[14] It is generally recognized that a franchise may be
derived... indirectly from the state through a duly designated agency, and to this extent,
the power to grant franchises has frequently been delegated, even to agencies other
than those of a legislative nature.[15]In pursuance of this, it has been held that
privileges... conferred by grant by local authorities as agents for the state constitute as
much a legislative franchise as though the grant had been made by an act of the
Legislature.[16]
The trend of modern legislation is to vest the Public Service Commissioner with the
power to regulate and control the operation of public services under reasonable rules
and regulations, and as a general rule, courts will not interfere with the exercise of that
discretion when... it is just and reasonable and founded upon a legal right.
This submission relies on the premise that the authority to issue a certificate of public
convenience and necessity is a regulatory measure separate and distinct from the
authority to grant a franchise for the operation of the public utility subject of this
particular case,... which is exclusively lodged by petitioner in Congress.
We do not agree with the petitioner.
Congress, by giving the respondent Board the power to issue permits for the operation
of domestic transport services, has delegated to the said body the authority to
determine the capability and competence of a prospective domestic air transport
operator to engage in such... venture. This is not an instance of transforming the
respondent Board into a mini-legislative body, with unbridled authority to choose who
should be given authority to operate domestic air transport services.
"To be valid, the delegation itself must be circumscribed by legislative restrictions, not a
"roving commission" that will give the delegate unlimited legislative authority. It must not
be a delegation "running riot" and "not canalized with banks that keep it from...
overflowing." Otherwise, the delegation is in legal effect an abdication of legislative
authority, a total surrender by the legislature of its prerogatives in favor of the delegate."
Principles:
Given the foregoing postulates, we find that the Civil Aeronautics Board has the
authority to issue a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity, or Temporary
Operating Permit to a domestic air transport operator, who, though not possessing a
legislative franchise, meets... all the other requirements prescribed by the law. Such
requirements were enumerated in Section 21 of R.A. 776.
here is nothing in the law nor in the Constitution, which indicates that a legislative
franchise is an indispensable requirement for an entity to operate as a domestic air
transport operator. Although Section 11 of Article XII recognizes Congress' control over
any franchise,... certificate or authority to operate a public utility, it does not mean
Congress has exclusive authority to issue the same. Franchises issued by Congress
are not required before each and every public utility may operate.[19] In many
instances, Congress has... seen it fit to delegate this function to government agencies,
specialized particularly in their respective areas of public service.
A reading of Section 10 of the same reveals the clear intent of Congress to delegate the
authority to regulate the issuance of a license to operate domestic air transport services:
SECTION 10. Powers and Duties of the Board. (A) Except as otherwise provided
herein, the Board shall have the power to regulate the economic aspect of air
transportation, and shall have general supervision and regulation of, the jurisdiction and
control over air... carriers, general sales agents, cargo sales agents, and air freight
forwarders as well as their property rights, equipment, facilities a... nd franchise, insofar
as may be necessary for the purpose of carrying out the provision of this Act.
In support of the Board's authority as stated above, it is given the following specific
powers and duties:
(C) The Board shall have the following specific powers and duties:
(1) In accordance with the provisions of Chapter IV of this Act, to issue, deny, amend,
revise, alter, modify, cancel, suspend or revoke in whole or in part upon petition or
complaint or upon its own initiative any Temporary Operating Permit or Certificate of
Public Convenience... and Necessity: Provided however, That in the case of foreign air
carriers, the permit shall be issued with the approval of the President of the Republic of
the Philippines.
Petitioner argues that since R.A. 776 gives the Board the authority to issue "Certificates
of Public Convenience and Necessity", this, according to petitioner, means that a
legislative franchise is an absolute requirement. It cites a number of authorities
supporting the view... that a Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity is issued
to a public service for which a franchise is required by law, as distinguished from a
"Certificate of Public Convenience" which is an authorization issued for the operation of
public services for which no... franchise, either municipal or legislative, is required by
law.
he use of the word "necessity", in conjunction with "public convenience" in a certificate
of authorization to a public service entity to operate, does not in any way modify the
nature of such certification, or the requirements for the issuance of the same. It is the
law which... determines the requisites for the issuance of such certification, and not the
title indicating the certificate.
COMMON CARRIERS AND CONTRACT OF CARRIAGE
Contract of transportation or Contract of carriage defined
A contract whereby a person, natural or juridical, obligates to transport persons, goods,
or both, from one place to another, by land, air, or water, for a price or compensation.
Contract of carriage imbued with public interest
CIVIL LAW; COMMON CARRIER; OBLIGATION TO OBSERVE EXTRAORDINARY
DILIGENCE OVER ITS PASSENGERS; EXTENT. — The contract of air carriage is a
peculiar one. Being imbued with public interest, the law requires common carriers to
carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the
utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with due regard for all the circumstances.
1755, Civil Code
ART. 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human
care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons,
with a due regard for all the circumstances.
Air France v. Carrascoso, G.R. No. No. L-21438. Sept. 28, 1966; 18 SCRA 155
FACTS:
Plaintiff, a civil engineer, was a member of a group of 48 Filipino pilgrims that left Manila
for Lourdes on March 30, 1958.
On March 28, 1958, the defendant, Air France, through its authorized agent, Philippine
Air Lines, Inc., issued to plaintiff a "first class" round trip airplane ticket from Manila to
Rome. From Manila to Bangkok, plaintiff travelled in "first class", but at Bangkok, the
Manager of the defendant airline forced plaintiff to vacate the "first class" seat that he
was occupying because, in the words of the witness Ernesto G. Cuento, there was a
"white man", who, the Manager alleged, had a "better right" to the seat. When asked to
vacate his "first class" seat, the plaintiff, as was to be expected, refused, and told
defendant's Manager that his seat would be taken over his dead body. After some
commotion, plaintiff reluctantly gave his "first class" seat in the plane.
DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:
1. CFI – Manila: sentenced petitioner to pay respondent Rafael Carrascoso P25,000.00
by way of moral damages; P10,000.00 as exemplary damages; P393.20 representing
the difference in fare between first class and tourist class for the portion of the trip
Bangkok- Rome, these various amounts with interest at the legal rate, from the date of
the filing of the complaint until paid; plus P3,000.00 for attorneys' fees; and the costs of
suit.
2. CA: slightly reduced the amount of refund on Carrascoso's plane ticket from P393.20
to P383.10, and voted to affirm the appealed decision "in all other respects", with costs
against
petitioner.
Air France contends that respondent knew that he did not have confirmed reservations
for first class on any specific flight, although he had tourist class protection; that,
accordingly, the issuance of a first class ticket was no guarantee that he would have a
first class ride, but that such would depend upon the availability of first class seats.
ISSUE:
Is
Carrascoso
entitled
to
damages?
RULING:
Yes. The manager not only prevented Carrascoso from enjoying his right to a first class
seat; worse, he imposed his arbitrary will; he forcibly ejected him from his seat, made
him suffer the humiliation of having to go to the tourist class compartment - just to give
way to another passenger whose right thereto has not been established. Certainly, this
is bad faith. Unless, of course, bad faith has assumed a meaning different from what is
understood in law. For, "bad faith" contemplates a "state of mind affirmatively
operating with furtive design or with some motive of self-interest or will or for
ulterior
purpose."
For the willful malevolent act of petitioner's manager, petitioner, his employer,
must
answer.
Article
21
of
the
Civil
Code
says:
ART. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner
that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the
latter
for
the
damage.
The contract of air carriage, therefore, generates a relation attended with a public duty.
Neglect or malfeasance of the carrier's employees, naturally, could give ground for an
action
for
damages.
Passengers do not contract merely for transportation. They have a right to be treated by
the carrier's employees with kindness, respect, courtesy and due consideration.
Although the relation of passenger and carrier is "contractual both in origin and
nature" nevertheless "the act that breaks the contract may be also a tort". The
stress of Carrascoso's action as we have said, is placed upon his wrongful
expulsion. This is a violation of public duty by the petitioner air carrier — a case
of quasi-delict. Damages are proper.
Singson v. CA, G.R. No. 119995. Nov. 18, 1997
FACTS:
Petitioner CARLOS SINGSON and his cousin Crescentino Tiongson bought from
respondent Cathay Pacific Airways two (2) open-dated, identically routed, round trip
plane tickets (Manila to LA and vice versa). Each ticket consisted of six (6) flight
coupons, each would be detached at the start of each leg of the trip.
Singson failed to obtain a booking in LA for their to Manila; apparently, the coupon
corresponding to the 5th leg of the trip was missing and instead the 3rd was still
attached. It was not until few days later that the defendant finally was able to arrange for
his
return
to
Manila.
Singson commenced an action for damages based on breach of contract of carriage
against
CATHAY
before
the
Regional
Trial
Court.
CATHAY alleged that there was no contract of carriage yet existing such that
CATHAY’s refusal to immediately book him could not be construed as breach of
contract
of
carriage.
The trial court rendered a decision in favor of petitioner herein holding that CATHAY
was guilty of gross negligence amounting to malice and bad faith for which it was
adjudged to pay petitioner P20,000.00 for actual damages with interest at the legal rate
of twelve percent (12%) per annum from 26 August 1988 when the complaint was filed
until fully paid, P500,000.00 for moral damages, P400,000.00 for exemplary damages,
P100,000.00 for attorney’s fees, and, to pay the costs.
On appeal by CATHAY, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s finding that there
was gross negligence amounting to bad faith or fraud and, accordingly, modified its
judgment by deleting the awards for moral and exemplary damages, and the attorney’s
fees
as
well.
ISSUES:
1.) whether a breach of contract was committed by CATHAY when it failed to confirm
the
booking
of
petitioner.
2.) whether the carrier was liable not only for actual damages but also for moral and
exemplary
damages,
and
attorney’s
fees.
HELD:
1.) Yes. x x x the round trip ticket issued by the carrier to the passenger was in itself a
complete written contract by and between the carrier and the passenger. It had all the
elements of a complete written contract, to wit: (a) the consent of the contracting parties
manifested by the fact that the passenger agreed to be transported by the carrier to and
from Los Angeles via San Francisco and Hong Kong back to the Philippines, and the
carrier’s acceptance to bring him to his destination and then back home; (b) cause or
consideration, which was the fare paid by the passenger as stated in his ticket; and, (c)
object, which was the transportation of the passenger from the place of departure to the
place of destination and back, which are also stated in his ticket. In fact, the contract of
carriage in the instant case was already partially executed as the carrier complied with
its obligation to transport the passenger to his destination, i.e., Los Angeles. , x x x the
loss of the coupon was attributable to the negligence of CATHAY’s agents and was the
proximate cause of the non-confirmation of petitioner's return flight.
2.) Yes. x x x Although the rule is that moral damages predicated upon a breach of
contract of carriage may only be recoverable in instances where the mishap results in
the death of a passenger, or where the carrier is guilty of fraud or bad faith, there are
situations where the negligence of the carrier is so gross and reckless as to virtually
amount to bad faith, in which case, the passenger likewise becomes entitled to recover
moral
damages.
x x x these circumstances reflect the carrier’s utter lack of care and sensitivity to the
needs of its passengers, clearly constitutive of gross negligence, recklessness and
wanton disregard of the rights of the latter, acts evidently indistinguishable or no
different from fraud, malice and bad faith. As the rule now stands, where in breaching
the contract of carriage the defendant airline is shown to have acted fraudulently, with
malice or in bad faith, the award of moral and exemplary damages, in addition to actual
damages,
is
proper.
However, the P500,000.00 moral damages and P400,000.00 exemplary damages
awarded by the trial court have to be reduced. The well-entrenched principle is that the
grant of moral damages depends upon the discretion of the court based on the
circumstances of each case. This discretion is limited by the principle that the "amount
awarded should not be palpably and scandalously excessive" as to indicate that it was
the result of prejudice or corruption on the part of the trial court. Damages are not
intended to enrich the complainant at the expense of the defendant. They are awarded
only to alleviate the moral suffering that the injured party had undergone by reason of
the defendant's culpable action. There is no hard-and-fast rule in the determination of
what would be a fair amount of moral damages since each case must be governed by
its
own
peculiar
facts.
In the instant case, the injury suffered by petitioner is not so serious or extensive as to
warrant an award amounting to P900,000.00. The assessment of P200,000.00 as moral
damages and P50,000.00 as exemplary damages in his favor is, in our view,
reasonable
and
realistic.
On the issue of actual damages, we agree with the Court of Appeals that the amount of
P20,000.00 granted by the trial court to petitioner should not be disturbed.
As regards attorney's fees, they may be awarded when the defendant's act or omission
has compelled the plaintiff to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect
his interest. It was therefore erroneous for the Court of Appeals to delete the award
made by the trial court; consequently, petitioner should be awarded attorney's fees and
the amount of P25,000.00, instead of P100,000.00 earlier awarded, may be considered
rational, fair and reasonable.
Parties to contracts of carriage of goods and of passengers
carriage of goods- 1. Common carrier 2. Shipper 3. Consignee
carriage of passengers - 1. Common carrier 2. Passenger
Carrier defined- a person or thing that carries, holds, or conveys something. a person
or company that undertakes the professional conveyance of goods or people.
Classifications of carriers
1. Common or Private Persons, corporations, firms or associations engaged in the business of carrying or
transporting passengers or goods or both, by land, water, or air, for compensation,
offering their services to the public (Art. 1732, Civil Code).
any distinction between one whose principal
business activity is the carrying of persons or goods or both and one who does such
carrying only as an ancillary activity (sideline). It also avoids a distinction between a
person or enterprise offering transportation service on a regular or scheduled basis and
one offering such service on an occasional, episodic or unscheduled basis. Neither
does the law distinguish between a carrier offering its services to the general public that
is the general community or population and one who offers services or solicits business
only from a narrow segment of the general population. A person or entity is a common
carrier even if he did not secure a Certificate of Public Convenience (De Guzman vs.
CA, 168 SCRA 612).
transporting, as long as it is by land, water
or air. It does not provide that the transportation should be by motor vehicle.
(First Philippine Industrial Corporation vs. CA)
no fixed and publicly known route, maintains
no terminals, and issues no tickets (Asia Lighterage Shipping, Inc. vs. CA).
1. Undertakes to carry for all people indifferently and thus is liable for refusal without
sufficient reason (Lastimoso vs. Doliente, October 20, 1961);
2. Cannot lawfully decline to accept a particular class of goods for carriage to the
prejudice of the traffic in these goods;
3. No monopoly is favored (Batangas Trans. vs. Orlanes, 52 PHIL 455);
4. Provides public convenience.
2. Goods or Passengers
3. For a fee (for hire) or Gratuitous
4. Land, Water/maritime, or Air
5. Domestic/inter-island/coastwise or
International/foreign