STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
“A course that explores the use and force of statutes and the
principles and methods of their construction and interpretation.
The course also includes discussion on the language of the law, the
interpretation and affectivity of laws as provided under the Civil
Code.” LEB Memorandum Order No. 24, Series of 2021
COURSE OUTLINE
I. INTRODUCTION
A. The Three Branches of the Government
The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system
of government.
B. Definition and Significance of Statutory Construction
Construction, verily, is the art or process of discovering and
expounding the meaning and intention of the authors of the
law with respect to its application to a given case, where that
intention is rendered doubtful, amongst others, by reason of
the fact that the given case is not explicitly provided for in
the law (Black, Interpretation of Laws, p. 1).
Caltex v. Palomar, G.R. No. L-19650, September 29, 1966
Facts: Caltex conceived a promotional scheme called “Caltex
Hooded Pump Contest”, wherein participants should guess
the actual number of liters a hooded gas pump at a Caltex
station. For the privilege to participate, no fee or
Each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of
matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own
sphere. But it does not follow from the fact that the three powers
are to be kept separate and distinct that the Constitution intended
them to be absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other.
consideration is required to be paid, no purchase of Caltex
The Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of checks
and balances to secure coordination in the workings of the various
departments of the government.
cleared in advance for mailing.
products required to be made.
Foreseeing the extensive use of mails in the contest, Caltex
made representations with the postal authorities to be
Postmaster General Palomar declined to grant clearance for
the contest as it violates anti-lottery provisions of the Postal
Angara v. Electoral Commission, G.R. No. L-45081, July 15,
1936
Law.
Caltex sought reconsideration; however, respondent stood
Jose A. Angara petitioned to the Supreme Court an issuance
of a writ of prohibition to restrain and prohibit the Electoral
Commission one of the respondents, from taking further
cognizance of the protest filed by Pedro Ynsua, another
respondent, against the election of said petitioner as member
of the National Assembly for the first assembly district of the
Province of Tayabas.
his ground and declined the use of mails for purposes of the
1. Has the Supreme Court jurisdiction over the Electoral
Commission and the subject matter?
Issue: Whether the scheme proposed by Caltex is within the
1. Yes. This court has jurisdiction over the Electoral
Commission and the subject matter of the present
controversy for the purpose of determining the character,
scope and extent of the constitutional grant to the Electoral
Commission as "the sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of the members of the
National Assembly."
proposed contest.
Caltex invoked judicial intervention, and the trial court ruled
in their favor.
Respondent appealed.
coverage of the prohibitive provisions of the postal law.
Held: No. It was emphasized by the SC that The term
"lottery" extends to all schemes for the distribution of prizes
by chance, such as policy playing, gift exhibitions, prize
concerts, raffles at fairs, etc., and various forms of gambling.
The three essential elements of a lottery are: First,
consideration; second, prize; and third, chance.
Nowhere in the said rules is any requirement that any fee be
The Constitution assigned to the judiciary department to
determine the nature, scope and extent of powers, and to
determine conflicting claims of authority under the
Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual
controversy the rights which that instrument secures and
guarantees to them. Judicial Supremacy: judicial review
paid, any merchandise be bought, any service be rendered,
In our case, the nature of the present controversy shows the
not a lottery that may be administratively and adversely
necessity of a final constitutional arbiter to determine the
dealt with under the Postal Law.
conflict of authority between two agencies created by the
Constitution.
or any value whatsoever be given for the privilege to
participate.
Thus enlightened, we join the trial court in declaring that the
"Caltex Hooded Pump Contest" proposed by the appellee is
City of Baguio v. Marcos, G.R. No. 26100, February 28, 1969
The office of statutory interpretation, let us not for a moment
forget, is to determine legislative intent. In the words of a well-
known authority, "[t]he true object of all interpretation is to
ascertain the meaning and will of the law-making body, to the end
that it may be enforced." In varying language, "the, purpose of all
rules or maxims" in interpretation "is to discover the true
intention of the law." They "are only valuable when they subserve
this purpose." In fact, "the spirit or intention of a statute prevails
over the letter thereof." A statute "should be construed according
to its spirit and reason, disregarding as far as necessary, the letter
of the law." By this, we do not "correct the act of the Legislature,
but rather ... carry out and give due course to" its true intent.
land "by virtue of judicial decisions rendered within the
forty years next preceding the approval of this Act."
Therefore, by that statute, the July 25, 1961 petition of
respondent Belong Lutes to reopen Civil Reservation Case
No. 1, GLRO Record No. 211 of the cadastral court of Baguio,
the decision on which was rendered on November 13, 1922,
comes within the 40-year period.
It should be certain by now that when engaged in the task of
construing an obscure expression in the law or where exact or
literal rendering of the words would not carry out the legislative
intent, the title thereof may be resorted to in the ascertainment of
congressional will. Reason therefor is that the title of the law may
properly be regarded as an index of or clue or guide to legislative
intention.
2. A. Legislative Power in General, Where Lodged
Facts: On July 25, 1961, the Director of Lands in the Court of
First Instance of Baguio instituted the reopening of the
cadastral proceedings under Republic Act 931. It is not
disputed that the land here involved was amongst those
declared public lands by final decision rendered in that case
on November 13, 1922. Respondent Belong Lutes petitioned
the cadastral court to reopen said Civil Reservation Case No.
1 as to the parcel of land he claims and prayed that the land
be registered in his name.
II. STATUTES AND THEIR ENACTMENT
Section 1 of Article VI of the Constitution
ARTICLE VI
THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
Section 1. The legislative power shall be vested in the
Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate
and a House of Representatives, except to the extent
reserved to the people by the provision on initiative and
referendum.
David v. Arroyo, G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006
Facts: On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the 20th
Anniversary of the Edsa People Power I, President Arroyo
issued PP 1017 declaring a state of national emergency, thus:
On December 18, 1961, private petitioners Francisco G.
Joaquin, Sr., Francisco G. Joaquin, Jr., and Teresita J.
Buchholz registered opposition to the reopening. The
petitioners questioned the cadastral court's jurisdiction over
the petition to reopen.
Issue: Whether or not the reopening petition was filed
outside the 40 year period preceding the approval of
Republic Act 931.
NOW, THEREFORE, I, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President
of the Republic of the Philippines and Commander-in-Chief
of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, by virtue of the
powers vested upon me by Section 18, Article 7 of the
Philippine Constitution which states that: "The President. . .
whenever it becomes necessary, . . . may call out (the) armed
forces to prevent or suppress. . .rebellion. . .," and in my
capacity as their Commander-in-Chief, do hereby command
Held: Yes. The cadastral proceedings sought to be reopened
were instituted on April 12, 1912. Final decision was
rendered on November 13, 1922. Lutes filed the petition to
reopen on July 25, 1961. It will be noted that the title of R.A.
931 authorizes "the filing in the proper court, under certain
conditions, of certain claims of title to parcels of land that
have been declared public land, by virtue of judicial
decisions rendered within the forty years next preceding the
approval of this Act." The body of the statute, however, in its
Section 1, speaks of parcels of land that "have been, or are
about to be declared land of the public domain, by virtue of
judicial proceedings instituted within the forty years next
preceding the approval of this Act." There thus appears to be
a seeming inconsistency between title and body.
It has been observed that "in modern practice the title is
adopted by the Legislature, more thoroughly read than the
act itself.” R.A. 931 is a piece of remedial legislation and it
should receive blessings of liberal construction. The court
says that lingual imperfections in the drafting of a statute
should never be permitted to hamstring judicial search for
legislative intent, which can otherwise be discovered.
Republic Act 931, claims of title that may be filed thereunder
embrace those parcels of land that have been declared public
the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and
order throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all
forms of lawless violence as well as any act of insurrection or
rebellion and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all
decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me
personally or upon my direction; and as provided in Section
17, Article 12 of the Constitution do hereby declare a State of
National Emergency.
She cited the following facts as bases:
WHEREAS, over these past months, elements in the political
opposition have conspired with authoritarians of the
extreme Left represented by the NDF-CPP-NPA and the
extreme Right, represented by military adventurists – the
historical enemies of the democratic Philippine State – who
are now in a tactical alliance and engaged in a concerted and
systematic conspiracy, over a broad front, to bring down the
duly constituted Government elected in May 2004;
WHEREAS, these conspirators have repeatedly tried to bring
down the President;
WHEREAS, the claims of these elements have been
WHEREAS, these activities give totalitarian forces; of both
recklessly magnified by certain segments of the national
the extreme Left and extreme Right the opening to intensify
media;
their avowed aims to bring down the democratic Philippine
State;
WHEREAS, this series of actions is hurting the Philippine
State – by obstructing governance including hindering the
WHEREAS, Article 2, Section 4 of our Constitution makes
growth of the economy and sabotaging the people’s
the defense and preservation of the democratic institutions
confidence in government and their faith in the future of this
and the State the primary duty of Government;
country;
WHEREAS,
the
activities
above-described,
their
WHEREAS, these actions are adversely affecting the
consequences, ramifications and collateral effects constitute a
economy;
clear and present danger to the safety and the integrity of the
Philippine State and of the Filipino people;
WHEREAS, these activities give totalitarian forces of both
the extreme Left and extreme Right the opening to intensify
WHEREAS, Proclamation 1017 date February 24, 2006 has
their avowed aims to bring down the democratic Philippine
been issued declaring a State of National Emergency;
State;
NOW, THEREFORE, I GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO,
WHEREAS, Article 2, Section 4 of the our Constitution
by virtue of the powers vested in me under the Constitution
makes the defense and preservation of the democratic
as President of the Republic of the Philippines, and
institutions and the State the primary duty of Government;
Commander-in-Chief of the Republic of the Philippines, and
pursuant to Proclamation No. 1017 dated February 24, 2006,
WHEREAS,
the
activities
above-described,
their
do hereby call upon the Armed Forces of the Philippines
consequences, ramifications and collateral effects constitute a
(AFP) and the Philippine National Police (PNP), to prevent
clear and present danger to the safety and the integrity of the
and suppress acts of terrorism and lawless violence in the
Philippine State and of the Filipino people;
country;
On the same day, the President issued G. O. No. 5
I hereby direct the Chief of Staff of the AFP and the Chief of
implementing PP 1017, thus:
the PNP, as well as the officers and men of the AFP and
WHEREAS, over these past months, elements in the political
opposition have conspired with authoritarians of the
extreme Left, represented by the NDF-CPP-NPA and the
PNP,
to
immediately
carry
out
the
necessary
and
appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent
acts of terrorism and lawless violence.
extreme Right, represented by military adventurists - the
Undeterred by the announcements that rallies and public
historical enemies of the democratic Philippine State – and
assemblies would not be allowed, groups of protesters
who are now in a tactical alliance and engaged in a concerted
(members of Kilusang Mayo Uno [KMU] and National
and systematic conspiracy, over a broad front, to bring down
Federation of Labor Unions-Kilusang Mayo Uno [NAFLU-
the duly-constituted Government elected in May 2004;
KMU]), marched from various parts of Metro Manila with
WHEREAS, these conspirators have repeatedly tried to bring
down our republican government;
the intention of converging at the EDSA shrine. Those who
were already near the EDSA site were violently dispersed by
huge clusters of anti-riot police. The well-trained policemen
WHEREAS, the claims of these elements have been
used truncheons, big fiber glass shields, water cannons, and
recklessly magnified by certain segments of the national
tear gas to stop and break up the marching groups, and
media;
scatter the massed participants. The same police action was
used against the protesters marching forward to Cubao,
WHEREAS, these series of actions is hurting the Philippine
Quezon City and to the corner of Santolan Street and EDSA.
State by obstructing governance, including hindering the
That same evening, hundreds of riot policemen broke up an
growth of the economy and sabotaging the people’s
EDSA celebration rally held along Ayala Avenue and Paseo
confidence in the government and their faith in the future of
de Roxas Street in Makati City.
this country;
According to petitioner Kilusang Mayo Uno, the police cited
WHEREAS, these actions are adversely affecting the
PP 1017 as the ground for the dispersal of their assemblies.
economy;
During the dispersal of the rallyists along EDSA, police
arrested (without warrant) petitioner Randolf S. David, a
professor at the University of the Philippines and newspaper
Sec. 4. Proclamations. — Acts of the President fixing a date
columnist. Also arrested was his companion, Ronald Llamas,
or declaring a status or condition of public moment or
president of party-list Akbayan.
interest, upon the existence of which the operation of a
specific law or regulation is made to depend, shall be
These seven (7) consolidated petitions for certiorari and
promulgated in proclamations which shall have the force of
prohibition allege that in issuing Presidential Proclamation
an executive order.
No. 1017 (PP 1017) and General Order No. 5 (G.O. No. 5),
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo committed grave abuse
Sec. 5. Memorandum Orders. — Acts of the President on
of discretion.
matters of administrative detail or of subordinate or
temporary interest which only concern a particular officer or
In their presentation of the factual bases of PP 1017 and G.O.
office
No. 5, respondents stated that the proximate cause behind
memorandum orders.
of
the
Government
shall
be
embodied
in
the executive issuances was the conspiracy among some
military officers, leftist insurgents of the New People’s Army
Sec. 6. Memorandum Circulars. — Acts of the President on
(NPA), and some members of the political opposition in a
matters relating to internal administration, which the
plot to unseat or assassinate President Arroyo. They
President desires to bring to the attention of all or some of
considered the aim to oust or assassinate the President and
the departments, agencies, bureaus or offices of the
take-over the reigns of government as a clear and present
Government, for information or compliance, shall be
danger.
embodied in memorandum circulars.
Petitioners, especially Representatives Francis Joseph G.
Sec. 7. General or Special Orders. — Acts and commands of
Escudero, Satur Ocampo, Rafael Mariano, Teodoro Casiño,
the President in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief of the
Liza Maza, and Josel Virador argue that PP 1017 is
Armed Forces of the Philippines shall be issued as general or
unconstitutional as it arrogated upon President Arroyo the
special orders.
power to enact laws and decrees in violation of Section 1,
Article VI of the Constitution, which vests the power to enact
And lastly, Section 1, Article VI states that "[t]he legislative
laws in Congress. They assail the clause "to enforce
power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines
obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and
which
regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my
Representatives.
direction."
shall consist of a
Senate
and a
House
of
In this case, President Arroyo’s ordinance power is limited to
Issue: Whether PP 1017 is unconstitutional as it arrogated
the foregoing issuances. She cannot issue decrees similar to
upon President Arroyo the power to enact laws and decrees?
those issued by Former President Marcos under PP 1081.
Presidential Decrees are laws which are of the same category
Held: Yes, PP 1017 is unconstitutional as it arrogated upon
and binding force as statutes because they were issued by
President Arroyo the power to enact laws and decrees.
the President in the exercise of his legislative power during
the period of Martial Law under the 1973 Constitution.
Section 17, Article VII which reads:
Legislative power is peculiarly within the province of the
SEC. 17. The President shall have control of all the executive
departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the
laws be faithfully executed.
Furthermore, the President is granted an Ordinance Power
under Chapter 2, Book III of Executive Order No. 292
(Administrative Code of 1987). She may issue any of the
Legislature. Neither Martial Law nor a state of rebellion nor
a state of emergency can justify President Arroyo’s exercise
of legislative power by issuing decrees.
Hence, PP 1017 is unconstitutional as it arrogated upon
President Arroyo the power to enact laws and decrees.
Sanidad v. COMELEC, G.R. No. L-44640, October 12, 1976
following:
Sec. 2. Executive Orders. — Acts of the President providing
for
rules
of
a
general
or
permanent
character
in
implementation or execution of constitutional or statutory
powers shall be promulgated in executive orders.
Sec. 3. Administrative Orders. — Acts of the President which
relate to particular aspect of governmental operations in
pursuance of his duties as administrative head shall be
promulgated in administrative orders.
In normal times the separation of powers forms a distinct
obstruction to arbitrary governmental action. By this same token,
in abnormal times it may form an insurmountable barrier to a
decisive emergency action in behalf of the state and its independent
existence. There are moments in the life of any government when
all powers must work together in unanimity of purpose and action,
even if this means the temporary union of executive, legislative,
and judicial power in the hands of one man.
The power of the state in crisis must not only be concentrated and
expanded; it must also be freed from the normal system of
constitutional and legal limitations.
John Locke, on the other hand, claims for the executive in its own
right a broad discretion capable even of setting aside the ordinary
laws in the meeting of special exigencies for which the legislative
power had not provided. 22 The rationale behind such broad
emergency powers of the Executive is the release of the government
from "the paralysis of constitutional restrains" so that the crisis
may be ended and normal times restored.
Facts:
In 1976, Pres. Marcos submitted to the people in a
referendum-plebiscite two questions: “(1) Do you want
martial law to be continued?; “(2) Whether or not you want
martial law to be continued, do you approve the following
amendments to the Constitution? xxx” Petitioners now seek
to declare void the presidential decrees which submitted the
aforementioned issues to the people in a plebiscitereferendum. They aver that the incumbent President has no
constitutional grant of constituent power to propose
amendments to the Constitution; consequently, the
referendum-plebiscite has no legal basis. They now seek to
enjoin COMELEC from holding such plebiscite.
Issues:
(1) Is the nature of the question on the constitutionality of the
assailed presidential decrees political or justiciable?
(2) Does the President possess the power to propose
amendments to the Constitution as well as set up the
required machinery and prescribe the procedure for the
ratification of his proposals by the people?
power. For the President to decline to undertake the
amending process, in the absence of the Int. Assembly,
would leave a governmental machinery at a stalemate,
thereby impeding the objective of a crisis govt “to end the
crises and restore normal times”.
(3) Yes. Three weeks (period from the issuance of
presidential decrees to referendum-plebiscite) is not too
short for free debates and discussions. The questions are not
new. They are issues of the day. All that the 1973
Constitution provides is that the plebiscite “xxx shall be held
not later than 3 months after approval of such amendment
xxx”.*** Citing Jameson: “An alteration of the Constitution
proposed today has relation to the sentiment and felt needs
today, and that, if not ratified early while the sentiment may
fairly be supposed to exist, it ought to be regarded as
waived, and not again to be voted upon, unless a second
time proposed.”
* There are two periods contemplated in the Constitutional
life of a nation: (1) the period of normalcy, and (2) the period
of transition (abnormal times). xxx In times of transition,
amendments maybe proposed by a majority vote of all the
members of the Int. National Assembly upon special call by
the Int. Prime Minister (Art XVII, Sec 15, 1973 Const.)
(Sanidad v. COMELEC, 73 SCA 333)
** 1973 Const., Art XVII, Sec 3: “(1) The incumbent President
xxx shall initially convene the int. National Assembly and
shall preside over its sessions until the int. Speaker shall
have been elected. He shall continue to exercise his powers
and prerogatives under the 1935 Const. and the powers
vested in the President and the Prime Minister under this
Constitution until the calls upon the interim National
(3) Is the submission to the people of the proposed
amendments sufficient and proper?
Held:
(1) The question is justiciable. The constitutional amending
in this case is in the form of a delegated and hence a limited
power so that the SC is vested with that authority to
determine whether that power has been discharged within
its limits. Political questions are neatly associated with the
wisdom, not the legality of a particular act. [In the case at
bar,] what is in the heels of the Court is not the wisdom but
the Constitutional authority of the President to perform such
acts or to assume the power of a constituent assembly. If the
Constitution provides how it may be amended, the Judiciary
as the interpreter of that Constitution, can declare whether
the procedure followed or the authority assumed was valid
or not.
(2) Yes. In abnormal times,* the separation of powers may
form an insurmountable barrier to a decisive emergency
action xxx. The power of the State in crisis xxx must be freed
from the normal system of constitutional and legal
limitations so that the crisis may be ended and normal times
restored. The presidential exercise of legislative powers in
times of martial law is now a conceded valid act.** There is,
thus, no reason why the President cannot discharge validly
the function of the Int. Assembly to propose amendments to
the Constitution, which is but adjunct to its gross legislative
Assembly to elect the interim President and the interim
Prime Minister, who shall then exercise their respective
powers vested by this Constitution. “(2) All proclamations,
orders, decrees, instructions, and acts promulgated xxx by
the incumbent President shall be part of the law of the land,
and shall remain valid, binding, and effective even after
lifting of martial law or the ratification of this Constitution
xxx”
*** Art XVI, Sec 2. The 1987 Const. now requires the
plebiscite to “be held not earlier than 60 days nor later than
90 days xxx” – Art XVII, Sec 4.
2.B. Bicameralism
Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council, G.R. No. 202242, April
16, 2013
(In the constitution there is a high regard for the separate
powers of the two houses, however, in this case, framers
simply gave recognition to the Legislature, not because it
was in the interest of a certain constituency, but in reverence
to it as a major branch of government (Judicial Bar Council
Members).)
A perusal of the records of the Constitutional Commission
against the other six (6) members who are undeniably
reveals that the composition of the JBC reflects the
presidential appointees.
Commission’s desire "to have in the Council a representation
for the major elements of the community." xxx The ex- officio
Issues:
members of the Council consist of representatives from the
1. Are the conditions sine qua non for the exercise of the
three main branches of government while the regular
power of judicial review have been met in this case?
members are composed of various stakeholders in the
judiciary. The unmistakable tenor of Article VIII, Section 8(1)
was to treat each ex-officio member as representing one coequal branch of government. xxx Thus, the JBC was
2. Is the JBC’s practice of having members from the Senate
and the House of Representatives making 8 instead of 7
sitting members unconstitutional?
designed to have seven voting members with the three ex-
3. What is the effect of the Court's finding that the current
officio members having equal say in the choice of judicial
composition of the JBC is unconstitutional?
nominees.
Held:
Congress, in relation to the executive and judicial branches
1. Yes. The Courts’ power of judicial review is subject to
of government, is constitutionally treated as another co-
several limitations, namely: (a) there must be an actual case
equal branch in the matter of its representative in the JBC.
or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (b)
(1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the
supervision of the Supreme Court composed of the Chief
Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a
representative of the Congress as ex officio Members, a
representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a
retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative
of the private sector. (Sec. 8, Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution)
Facts:
the person challenging the act must have “standing” to
challenge; he must have a personal and substantial interest
in the case, such that he has sustained or will sustain, direct
injury as a result of its enforcement; (c) the question of
constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible
opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be
the very lis mota of the case. Generally, a party will be
allowed to litigate only when these conditions sine qua non
are present, especially when the constitutionality of an act by
a co-equal branch of government is put in issue.
In 1994, the seven-member composition of the Judicial and
Bar Council was substantially altered. Instead of having only
The Court disagrees with the respondents’ contention that
7 members, an eighth member was added as two
petitioner lost his standing to sue because he is not an official
representatives from Congress began sitting in the JBC – one
nominee for the post of Chief Justice. While it is true that a
from the House of Representatives and one from the Senate,
“personal stake” on the case is imperative to have locus
with each having one-half (1/2) of a vote. In 2001, the JBC En
standi, this is not to say that only official nominees for the
Banc, allowed the representatives from the Senate and the
post of Chief Justice can come to the Court and question the
House of Representatives one full vote each. Senator
JBC composition for being unconstitutional. The JBC
Escudero and Congressman Tupas, Jr. simultaneously sit in
likewise screens and nominates other members of the
the JBC as representatives of the legislature. Francisco
Judiciary. Albeit heavily publicized in this regard, the JBC’s
Chavez filed a petition questioning this practice.
duty is not at all limited to the nominations for the highest
magistrate in the land. A vast number of aspirants to judicial
The respondents claimed that when the JBC was established,
posts all over the country may be affected by the Court’s
the framers originally envisioned a unicameral legislative
ruling. More importantly, the legality of the very process of
body, thereby allocating “a representative of the National
nominations to the positions in the Judiciary is the nucleus of
Assembly” to the JBC. The phrase, however, was not
the controversy. The claim that the composition of the JBC is
modified to aptly jive with the change to bicameralism
illegal and unconstitutional is an object of concern, not just
which was adopted by the Constitutional Commission on
for a nominee to a judicial post, but for all citizens who have
July 21, 1986. The respondents also contend that if the
the right to seek judicial intervention for rectification of legal
Commissioners were made aware of the consequence of
blunders.
having a bicameral legislature instead of a unicameral one,
they would have made the corresponding adjustment in the
2. From a simple reading of the above-quoted provision, it
representation of Congress in the JBC; that if only one house
can readily be discerned that the provision is clear and
of Congress gets to be a member of JBC would deprive the
unambiguous. The first paragraph calls for the creation of a
other house of representation, defeating the principle of
JBC and places the same under the supervision of the Court.
balance. They further argue that the presence of two (2)
Then it goes to its composition where the regular members
members from Congress will most likely provide balance as
are enumerated: a representative of the Integrated Bar, a
professor of law, a retired member of the Court and a
representative from the private sector. On the second part
of the Constitution should be read as including both the
lies the crux of the present controversy. It enumerates the ex
Senate and the House of Representatives. They theorize that
officio or special members of the JBC composed of the Chief
it was so worded because at the time the said provision was
Justice, who shall be its Chairman, the Secretary of Justice
being drafted, the Framers initially intended a unicameral
and “a representative of Congress.”
form
of
Congress.
Then,
when
the
Constitutional
Commission eventually adopted a bicameral form of
The use of the singular letter “a” preceding “representative
Congress, the Framers, through oversight, failed to amend
of Congress” is unequivocal and leaves no room for any
Article VIII, Section 8 of the Constitution.
other construction. It is indicative of what the members of
the Constitutional Commission had in mind, that is,
It is evident that the definition of “Congress” as a bicameral
Congress may designate only one (1) representative to the
body refers to its primary function in government – to
JBC. Had it been the intention that more than one (1)
legislate. In the passage of laws, the Constitution is explicit
representative from the legislature would sit in the JBC, the
in the distinction of the role of each house in the process. The
Framers could have, in no uncertain terms, so provided.
same holds true in Congress’ non-legislative powers. An
inter-play between the two houses is necessary in the
One of the primary and basic rules in statutory construction
realization of these powers causing a vivid dichotomy that
is that where the words of a statute are clear, plain, and free
the Court cannot simply discount. This, however, cannot be
from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and
said in the case of JBC representation because no liaison
applied without attempted interpretation. It is a well-settled
between the two houses exists in the workings of the JBC.
principle of constitutional construction that the language
Hence, the term “Congress” must be taken to mean the
employed in the Constitution must be given their ordinary
entire legislative department.
meaning except where technical terms are employed. As
much as possible, the words of the Constitution should be
3. As a general rule, an unconstitutional act is not a law; it
understood in the sense they have in common use. What it
confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no
says according to the text of the provision to be construed
protection; it creates no office; it is inoperative as if it has not
compels acceptance and negates the power of the courts to
been passed at all. This rule, however, is not absolute. Under
alter it, based on the postulate that the framers and the
the doctrine of operative facts, actions previous to the
people mean what they say. Verba legis non est recedendum
declaration of unconstitutionality are legally recognized.
– from the words of a statute there should be no departure.
They are not nullified. This is essential in the interest of fair
play.
Applying the foregoing principle to this case, it becomes
apparent that the word “Congress” used in Article VIII,
The doctrine of operative fact, as an exception to the general
Section 8(1) of the Constitution is used in its generic sense.
rule, only applies as a matter of equity and fair play. It
No particular allusion whatsoever is made on whether the
nullifies the effects of an unconstitutional law by recognizing
Senate or the House of Representatives is being referred to,
that the existence of a statute prior to a determination of
but that, in either case, only a singular representative may be
unconstitutionality is an operative fact and may have
allowed to sit in the JBC.
consequences which cannot always be ignored. The past
cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The
It is worthy to note that the seven-member composition of
doctrine
the JBC serves a practical purpose, that is, to provide a
unconstitutionality will impose an undue burden on those
solution should there be a stalemate in voting. This
who have relied on the invalid law. Thus, it was applied to a
underlying reason leads the Court to conclude that a single
criminal case when a declaration of unconstitutionality
vote may not be divided into half (1/2), between two
would put the accused in double jeopardy or would put in
representatives of Congress, or among any of the sitting
limbo the acts done by a municipality in reliance upon a law
members of the JBC for that matter. This unsanctioned
creating it.
is
applicable
when
a
declaration
of
practice can possibly cause disorder and eventually muddle
the JBC’s voting process, especially in the event a tie is
Under the circumstances, the Court finds the exception
reached. The aforesaid purpose would then be rendered
applicable in this case and holds that notwithstanding its
illusory, defeating the precise mechanism which the
finding of unconstitutionality in the current composition of
Constitution itself created While it would be unreasonable to
the JBC, all its prior official actions are nonetheless valid.
expect that the Framers provide for every possible scenario,
it is sensible to presume that they knew that an odd
composition is the best means to break a voting deadlock.
The respondents insist that owing to the bicameral nature of
Congress, the word “Congress” in Section 8(1), Article VIII
Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, 235 SCRA 630
Held:
a.
Without H. No. 11197, the Senate could not have
Republic Act No. 7716 seeks to widen the tax base of the
enacted S.No. 1630. Because the Senate bill was a mere
existing VAT system and enhance its administration by
amendment of the House bill, H. No. 11197.
amending the National Internal Revenue Code.
It is not the law, but the revenue bill, which is required by
These are various suits for certiorari and prohibition,
the Constitution to originate exclusively in the House of
challenging the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7716 on
Representatives. It is
various grounds summarized in the resolution of July 6, 1994
because a bill originating in the House may undergo such
of this Court, as follows:
extensive changes in the Senate that the result may be a
important
to
emphasize
this,
rewriting of the whole.
I. Procedural Issues:
A. Does Republic Act No. 7716 violate Art. VI, § 24 of the
Constitution?
B. Does it violate Art. VI, § 26(2) of the Constitution?
C. What is the extent of the power of the Bicameral
Conference Committee?
Art. 6. Section 24 of our Constitution reads:
All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing
increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and
private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of
Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with
II. Substantive Issues:
amendments.
A. Does the law violate the following provisions in the Bill of
b.
Rights (Art. III)?
which, at the time he makes the certification, is under
It is enough that the President certified the bill
consideration.
1. §1
Since
on March 22, 1994 the Senate was
considering S. No. 1630, it was that bill which had to be
2. § 4
certified. For that matter on June 1, 1993 the President had
3. § 5
earlier certified H. No. 9210 for immediate enactment
4. § 10
because it was the one which at that time was being
B. Does the law violate the following other provisions of the
considered by the House. This bill was later substituted,
Constitution?
together with other bills, by H. No. 11197.
1. Art. VI, § 28(1)
Art. 6 Sec 26 (2) of the present Constitution, thus:
2. Art. VI, § 28(3)
(2) No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless
it has passed three readings on separate days, and
Facts:
Petitioner Tolentino filed a certiorari
to reconsider
printed copies
the dismissal of the decision of the 10 suits filed against the
distributed
declaration of R.A. 7716 or known as the Expanded Value
passage,
Added Tax Law (E-Vat) unconstitutionality. H.
thereof
in
its
to
its Members
except
when
final
form
have
three
days
before
been
its
the President certifies to the
No. 1197
necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public
was filed in the House of Representatives and passed three
calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no
readings. It was sent to the Senate and was approved as S.
amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the vote thereon
No. 1630 on May 24, 1994, voting on the bill on second and
shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and
third readings on the same day.
nays entered in the Journal
Issues:
Apparently, the members of the Senate (including some of
a.
Is the E-Vat Law unconstitutional because it did not
the petitioners in these cases) believed that there was an
urgent need for consideration of S. No. 1630, because they
originate exclusively in the House of Representatives?
responded to the call of the President by voting on the bill on
b.
Is the E-Vat Law unconstitutional because it did not
second and third readings on the same day. While the
pass the required 3 required readings on 3 separate days and
judicial
the final form to be distributed to its members
acceptance of the President's certification, the respect due
3
days
before the passage of law?
c.
Did the Conference Committee usurped
coequal
the
legislative power of Congress and violated the Constitution?
department
departments
is not
of
the
bound
by the Senate's
government
in
matters
committed to them by the Constitution and the absence
of a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion caution
a stay of the judicial hand.
At
any
rate,
we
are
satisfied
that
S.
No.
1630
received thorough consideration in the Senate where it was
discussed for six days. Only its distribution in
advance
Art.6,
Sec. 26(2) must, therefore, be construed as referring
in its final printed form was actually dispensed with by
only to bills introduced for the first time in either house of
holding the voting on second and third readings on the
Congress, not to the conference committee report.
same day (March
24, 1994). Otherwise, sufficient time
between the submission of the bill on February 8,
1994 on second reading and its approval on March 24, 1994
elapsed before it was finally voted on by the Senate on third
reading.
c.
C. Legislative Process
Article VI, Sections 24, 26 and 27, 1987 Constitution
SECTION 24. All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills
The allegation that the Conference Committee
usurped
the legislative power of Congress is, in our view,
without warrant in fact and in law.
authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local
application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in
the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or
concur with amendments.
The Court recently held that it is within the power
of a conference committee to include in its report an
entirely new provision that is not found either in the House
bill or in the Senate bill. If the committee can propose
amendment consisting of one or two provisions,
there
SECTION 26. (1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall
embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the
title thereof.
is
(2) No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless
no reason why it cannot propose several provisions,
it has passed three readings on separate days, and printed
collectively considered as an amendment in the nature of a
copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to its
substitute, so long as such amendment is germane to the
Members three days before its passage, except when the
subject of the bills before the committee.
President certifies to the necessity of its immediate
This observation applies to the other contention that the
Rules of the two chambers were likewise disregarded in the
preparation of the
because
the
Conference
Report
did
Committee
Report
not contain a detailed and
enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon the
last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed,
and the vote thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter,
and the yeas and nays entered in the Journal.
sufficiently explicit statement of changes in, or amendments
SECTION 27. (1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall,
to, the subject measure. The Report used brackets and capital
before it becomes a law, be presented to the President. If he
letters to indicate the changes. This is a standard practice in
approves the same, he shall sign it; otherwise, he shall veto it
bill-drafting. We cannot say that in using these marks and
and return the same with his objections to the House where
symbols the Committee violated the Rules of the Senate and
it originated, which shall enter the objections at large in its
the House.
Journal and proceed to reconsider it. If, after such
Moreover, this Court is not the proper forum for
the enforcement of these internal Rules. To the contrary,
as
we have already
ruled,
parliamentary
rules
are
merely procedural and with their observance the courts
have no concern. Our concern is with the procedural
requirements of
the
Constitution
for
the
enactment
of laws. As far as these requirements are concerned, we are
satisfied that they have been faithfully observed in these
cases.
Nor
House shall agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent, together
with the objections, to the other House by which it shall
likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two-thirds of
all the Members of that House, it shall become a law. In all
such cases, the votes of each House shall be determined by
yeas or nays, and the names of the Members voting for or
against shall be entered in its Journal. The President shall
communicate his veto of any bill to the House where it
originated within thirty days after the date of receipt thereof;
is
there
any
reason
for
requiring
that
the
Committee’s Report in these cases must have undergone
three readings in each of the two houses. If that be the case,
there would be no end to negotiation since each house
may
reconsideration, two-thirds of all the Members of such
seek
modifications
of
the compromise bill. The
nature of the bill, therefore, requires that it be acted upon by
each house on a “take it or leave it,” basis, with the only
alternative that if it is not approved by both houses,
another conference committee must be appointed. But then
again the result would still be a compromise measure
that may not be wholly satisfying to both houses.
otherwise, it shall become a law as if he had signed it.
(2) The President shall have the power to veto any particular
item or items in an appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill, but
the veto shall not affect the item or items to which he does
not object.
ABAKADA v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 168056
Facts:
September 1, 2005
1. On May 24, 2005, the President signed into law Republic
Act 9337 or the VAT Reform Act.
Whether R.A. No. 9337 violates the following provisions of
the Constitution:
2. There was a TRO issued by the Court before the law could
take effect on July 1 2005 which enjoined government from
a. Article VI, Section 24, and
implanting the law in response to a slew of petitions for
certiorari and prohibition questioning the constitutionality of
b. Article VI, Section 26(2)
the new law.
A. The Bicameral Conference Committee
3.
ABAKADA
GURO
Party
List
challenged
the
Under the "enrolled bill doctrine," the signing of a bill by the
constitutionality of RA No. 9337 particularly Sections 4, 5
Speaker of the House and the Senate President and the
and 6 amending Sections 106, 107 and 108, respectively, of
certification of the Secretaries of both Houses of Congress
the National Internal Revenue Code ( NIRC).
that it was passed are conclusive of its due enactment. A
review of cases reveals the Court’s consistent adherence to
the rule. The Court finds no reason to deviate from the
salutary rule in this case where the irregularities alleged by
the petitioners mostly involved the internal rules of
Congress, e.g., creation of the 2nd or 3rd Bicameral
Conference Committee by the House. This Court is not the
proper forum for the enforcement of these internal rules of
Congress, whether House or Senate. Parliamentary rules are
merely procedural and with their observance the courts have
4.
These
questioned
provisions
contain
a
uniform
proviso authorizing the President, uponrecommendation
of the Secretary of Finance, to raise the VAT rate to 12%,
effective January 1, 2006,after any of the following conditions
have been satisfied, to wit: That the President, upon the
recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, shall, effective
January 1,2006, raise the rate of value-added tax to twelve
percent (12%), after any of the following conditions has been
satisfied:
no concern. Whatever doubts there may be as to the formal
4.a
validity of Rep. Act No. 9006 must be resolved in its favor.
Domestic Product (GDP) of the previous year exceeds two
The Court reiterates its ruling in Arroyo vs. De Venecia, viz.:
and four-fifth percent (2 4/5%); or
But the cases, both here and abroad, in varying forms of
4.b National government deficit as a percentage of GDP of
expression, all deny to the courts the power to inquire into
the previous year exceeds one and one-half percent (1 ½%).
Value-added tax collection as a percentage of Gross
allegations that, in enacting a law, a House of Congress
failed to comply with its own rules, in the absence of
5. Petitioners argue that the law is unconstitutional, as it
showing that there was a violation of a constitutional
constitutes abandonment by Congress of its exclusive
provision or the rights of private individuals. In Osmeña v.
authority to fix the rate of taxes under Article VI,
Pendatun, it was held: "At any rate, courts have declared
Section 28(2) of the 1987 Philippine Constitution.
that ‘the rules adopted by deliberative bodies are subject to
revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the
6.
body
that
exchange of goods and services which cannot be included
"Parliamentary rules are merely procedural, and with their
within the purview of tariffs under the exemption delegation
observance, the courts have no concern. They may be waived
since this refers to customs duties, tolls
or disregarded by the legislative body." Consequently, "mere
upon
failure to conform to parliamentary usage will not invalidate
imposed on imported/exported goods.
adopting
them.’
And
it
has
been
said
the action (taken by a deliberative body) when the requisite
number of members have agreed to a particular measure."
Moreover, as far back as 1994 or more than ten years ago, in
the case of Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance, the Court
already made the pronouncement that "[i]f a change is
desired in the practice [of the Bicameral Conference
Committee] it must be sought in Congress since this question
is not covered by any constitutional provision but is only an
internal rule of each house." To date, Congress has not seen
it fit to make such changes adverted to by the Court. It
seems, therefore, that Congress finds the practices of the
They argue that VAT is a tax levied on the sale or
merchandise
to
the
or tribute payable
government
and
usually
7. They also said that the President has powers to cause,
influence or create the conditions provided bylaw to bring
about the conditions precedent.
8. Moreover, they allege that no guiding standards are
made by law as to how the Secretary of Finance will
make the recommendation. They claim, nonetheless, that
any recommendation of the Secretary of Finance can easily
be brushed aside by the President since the former is a mere
alter ego of the latter, such that, ultimately, it is the President
who decides whether to impose the increased tax rate or not.
bicameral conference committee to be very useful for
9. Aside from questioning the so-called stand-by authority
purposes of prompt and efficient legislative action.
of the President to increase the VAT rate to12%, on the
ground that it amounts to an undue delegation of legislative
3. The equal protection clause under the Constitution means
power, petitioners also contend that the increase in the VAT
that “no person or class of persons shall be deprived of the
rate to 12% contingent on any of the two conditions being
same protection of laws which is enjoyed by other persons or
satisfied violates the due process clause embodied in Article
other classes in the same place and in like circumstances.”
III, Section 1 of the Constitution, as it imposes an unfair and
The Supreme Court held no decision on this matter. The
additional tax burden on the people, in that:
power of the State to make reasonable and natural
classifications for the purposes of taxation has long been
(1) the 12% increase is ambiguous because it does not state if
established. Whether it relates to the subject of taxation, the
the rate would be returned to the original 10% if the
kind of property, the rates to be levied, or the amounts to
conditions are no longer satisfied;
be
(2) the rate is unfair and unreasonable, as the people are
unsure of the applicable VAT rate from year to year; and
raised, the methods of assessment, valuation and
collection, the State’s power is entitled to presumption of
validity. As a rule, the judiciary will not interfere with
such
(3) the increase in the VAT rate, which is supposed to be an
incentive to the President to raise the VAT collection to at
least 2 4/5 of the GDP of the previous year, should only be
based on fiscal adequacy.
power
absent
a
clear
showing
of
unreasonableness, discrimination, or arbitrariness.
De Guzman v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 129118, July 19, 2000
At bar is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with urgent
10. Petitioners’ further claim that the inclusion of a stand-by
authority granted to the President by the Bicameral
Conference Committee is a violation of the "no-amendment
rule" upon last reading of a bill aid down in Article VI,
Section 26(2) of the Constitution
prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
and temporary restraining order, assailing the validity of
Section 44 of Republic Act No. 8189 (RA 8189) otherwise
known as "The Voter’s Registration Act of 1996". RA 8189
was enacted on June 10, 1996 and approved by President
Fidel V. Ramos on June 11, 1996. Section 44 thereof provides:
Issues:
1. Whether or not R.A. No. 9337 has violated the provisions
in Article VI, Section 24, and Article VI, Section 26 (2) of the
Constitution.
"SEC. 44. Reassignment of Election Officers. - No Election
Officer shall hold office in a particular city or municipality
for more than four (4) years. Any election officer who, either
at the time of the approval of this Act or subsequent thereto,
2. Whether or not there was an undue delegation of
has served for at least four (4) years in a particular city or
legislative power in violation of Article VI Sec28 Par 1 and 2
municipality shall automatically be reassigned by the
of the Constitution.
Commission
to a
new
station
outside
the
original
congressional district.
3. Whether or not there was a violation of the due process
and equal protection under Article III Sec. 1 of the
Facts:
Constitution.
Comelec reassigned petitioners to other stations pursuant to
Section 44 of the Voter’s registration act. The act prohibits
Held:
election officers from holding office in a particular city or
1. R.A. No. 9337 has
The
municipality for more than 4 years. Petitioners claim that the
revenue bill exclusively originated in the House of
act violated the equal protection clause because not all
Representatives,
election officials were covered by the prohibition.
the
not violated the provisions.
Senate
was
acting
within
its
constitutional power to introduce amendments to the House
bill when it included provisions in Senate Bill No. 1950
Petitioners
amending corporate income taxes, percentage, excise and
unconstitutional as it violates the equal protection clause
contend
that
RA
8189
Section
44
is
franchise taxes. Verily, Article VI, Section 24 of the
enshrined in the constitution; that it violates constitutional
Constitution does not contain any prohibition or limitation
guarantee on security of civil servants; that it undermines
on the extent of the amendments that may be introduced by
the constitutional independence of comelec and comelec’s
the Senate to the House revenue bill.
constitutional authority; that it contravenes the basic
constitutional precept; that it is void for its failure to be read
2. There is no undue delegation of legislative power but
on 3 separate readings
only of the discretion as to the execution of a law. This is
constitutionally permissible. Congress does not abdicate its
Issue: Whether Section 44 of RA 8189 is valid and
functions or unduly delegate power when it describes what
constitutional.
job must be done, who must do it, and what is the scope of
his authority; in our complex economy that is frequently the
only way in which the legislative process can go forward.
Held: No. The singling out of election officers in order to
"ensure the impartiality of election officials by preventing
them from developing familiarity with the people of their
place of assignment" does not violate the equal protection
Constitution, and the absence of a clear showing of grave
clause of the Constitution.
abuse of discretion suffice to stay the judicial hand.11
The objectives of Section 26(1), Article VI of the 1987
WHEREFORE,
Constitution, that "[e]very bill passed by the Congress shall
constitutionality and validity of Section 44 of RA 8189
embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the
UPHELD.
the
petition
is
DISMISSED;
and
the
title thereof", are:
D. Evidence of Enactment of Laws
1. To prevent hodge-podge or log-rolling legislation;
Enrolled Bill Theory
2. To prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislature by
means of provisions in bills of which the titles gave no
THE ENROLLED BILL THEORY
information, and which might therefore be overlooked and
This theory is amply discussed in the memoranda of the
carelessly and unintentionally adopted; and
parties attached hereto as Appendices A, B, and C. Although
we consider it unnecessary to enlarge the discussion, we
3. To fairly apprise the people, through such publication of
deem it convenient to make a little analysis of what is stated
legislative proceedings as is usually made, of the subjects of
in the majority opinion. Respondents contend, with the full
legislation that are being considered, in order that they may
approval of the majority, that a duly authenticated bill or
have opportunity of being heard thereon by petition or
resolution imports absolute verity and is binding on the
otherwise if they shall so desire.
courts.
Section 26(1) of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution is
The present case is a conclusive evidence of the absurdity of
sufficiently complied with where, as in this case, the title is
the theory. How can we accept the absolute verity of the
comprehensive enough to embrace the general objective it
presiding officers' certification that the resolution in question
seeks to achieve, and if all the parts of the statute are related
has been adopted by three-fourths of all the members of the
and germane to the subject matter embodied in the title or so
Senate and of the House of Representatives, when as a
long as the same are not inconsistent with or foreign to the
matter of undisputable fact the certification is false? How can
general subject and title.8 Section 44 of RA 8189 is not
we accept a theory which elevates a false-hood to the
isolated considering that it is related and germane to the
category of truth?
subject matter stated in the title of the law. The title of RA
8189 is "The Voter’s Registration Act of 1996" with a subject
The majority alleges that the rule is the one prevailing in
matter enunciated in the explanatory note as "AN ACT
England. Because the English have committed the nonsense
PROVIDING FOR A GENERAL REGISTRATION OF
of accepting the theory, is that reason for Filipinos to follow
VOTERS, ADOPTING A SYSTEM OF CONTINUING
suit? Why, in the administration of justice, should our
REGISTRATION,
PROCEDURES
tribunals not think independently? Our temple of justice is
THEREOF AND AUTHORIZING THE APPROPRIATION
not presided by simians trained in the art of imitation but by
OF FUNDS THEREFOR." Section 44 which provides for the
human beings, and human beings must act according to
reassignment of election officers, is relevant to the subject
reason, never just to imitate what is wrong, although such
matter of registration as it seeks to ensure the integrity of the
mistakes may happen to be consecrated as a judicial
registration process by providing a guideline for the
precedent. It would be inconceivable for our courts to
COMELEC to follow in the reassignment of election officers.
commit such a blunder.
PRESCRIBING
TH
It is not an alien provision but one which is related to the
conduct and procedure of continuing registration of voters.
In this regard, it bears stressing that the Constitution does
not require Congress to employ in the title of an enactment,
language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or
catalogue, all the contents and the minute details therein.9
Repeating what Wigmore has said (4 Wigmore on Evidence,
685, footnote), the majority states that in the United States
the jurisdictions are divided almost equally pro and con on
the theory, although in petitioners' memorandum Appendix
A there appears more up-to-date evidence to the effect that
there is a great majority for the rejection. But to our mind,
In determining the constitutionality of a statute dubbed as
mere numbers as to pro and con seem to us immaterial in the
defectively titled, the presumption is in favor of its validity.
decision as to whether the theory is or is not correct.
Numbers do not make reason nor justice.
As regards the issue raised by petitioners - whether Section
44 of RA 8189 was enacted in accordance with Section 26 (2),
The majority contends that the theory conforms to the
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, petitioners have not
express policy of our law-making body, invoking to said
convincingly shown grave abuse of discretion on the part of
effect the now obsolete section 313 of the old Code of Civil
Congress. Respect due to co-equal departments of the
Procedure, as amended by Act No. 2210.
government
in
matters
entrusted
to
them
by
the
Even if we should follow the anachronistic practice of
and 8 representatives did not take part in the passage of the
deciding issues upon the authority of laws which have been
questioned resolution, nor was their membership reckoned
repealed or abolished, still the evidence pointed out by the
within the computation of the necessary ¾ vote which is
majority does not support their contention. Section 313
required in proposing an amendment to the Constitution. If
alluded to enumerates the evidence that may prove the
the petitioners had been counted, the affirmative votes in
procedures of the defunct Philippine Commission or of any
favor of the proposed amendment would have been short of
legislative body that may be provided for in the Philippines,
the necessary ¾ vote in either House of Congress.
with the proviso that the existence of a copy of acts of said
commission or the Philippine Legislature, signed by the
Respondents argue that the Court has jurisdiction, relying on
presiding officers and secretaries of said bodies, is a
the
conclusive proof "of the provisions of such acts and of the
bill/resolution.
due enactment thereof."
conclusiveness
Petitioners
on
contend
that
the
courts
of
respondents
the
are
enrolled
confusing
This proviso has been repealed by its non-inclusion in the
jurisdiction (substantive law) with conclusiveness of an
Rules of Court. Sections 5 and 41 of Rule 123 show
enactment or resolution (evidence and practice).
conclusively that this Supreme Court, in making the rules
effective since July 1, 1940, rejected the proviso as
unreasonable and unjust. Section 5 provides that we may
take judicial notice of the official acts of Congress and section
Issue:
Whether the Court can take cognizance of the issue.
Whether the resolution was duly enacted by Congress.
41 provides what evidence can be used to prove said official
Held:
acts, but nowhere in the rules can a provision be found that
No. Political questions are not within the province of the
would make conclusive a certification by the presiding
judiciary, except to the extent that power to deal with such
officers and secretaries of both House of Congress even if we
questions has been conferred upon the courts by express
know by conclusive evidence that the certification is false.
constitutional or statutory provisions. The difficulty lies in
The allegation that the theory in question conforms to the
express policy of our lawmaking body, upon the very
evidence used in support thereof, after a little analysis, has to
banish as a mid-summer night's dream.
determining what matters fall within the meaning of
political question. However, in Coleman v. Miller, the
efficacy of ratification by state legislature of a proposed
amendment to the Federal Constitution is a political question
and hence not justiciable. If a ratification of an amendment is
Mabanag v. Lopez Vito, L-1223, March 5, 1947, 78 Phil. 1
a political question, a proposal which leads to ratification has
(1947)
to be a political question. There is no logic in attaching
political character to one and withholding that character
Facts:
from the other. Proposal to amend the Constitution is a
This is a petitioner for prohibition to prevent the
highly political function performed by Congress. If a
congressional resolution proposing an amendment to the
political question conslusively binds the judges out of
Constitution of the Philippines to be appended as an
respect to the political departments, a duly certified law or
ordinance
resolution also binds the judges under the “enrolled bill”
thereto.
Petitioners
are
8
senators,
17
representatives, and the presidents of the Democratic
rule born of that respect
Alliance, the Popular Front and the Philippine Youth Party.
Petitioners allege that the resolution is contrary to the
Yes. Section 313 of the Code of Civil procedure, as amended
Constitution.
by Act No. 220, provides two methods of proving legislative
proceedings:
The 3 petitioner senators and 8 representatives have been
proclaimed by a majority vote of the Comelec as having been
By the journals, or by published statutes or resolutions, or
elected senators and representatives in the elections held on
copies certified by the clerk or secretary or printed by their
April 23, 1946. The 3 senators were suspended by the Senate
order; and
shortly after the opening of the first session of Congress due
to
alleged
irregularities
in
their
election.
The
8
representatives since their election had not been allowed to
sit in the lower House, except to take part in the election of
the Speaker, although they had not been formally
In case of acts of the Legislature, a copy signed by the
presiding officers and secretaries thereof, which shall be
conclusive proof of the provisions of such Acts and of the
due enactment thereof.
suspended. A resolution for their suspension had been
In US v. Pons, the Court looked into the journals because
introduced in the House of Representatives, but that
those were the documents offered in evidence. It does not
resolution had not been acted upon definitely by the House
appear that a duly authenticated copy of the Act was in
when the petition was filed. Consequently, the 3 senators
existence or was placed before the Court; and it had not been
shown that if that had been done, this Court would not have
same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker and the Senate
held the copy conclusive proof of the due enactment of the
President and certified by the secretaries of both Houses of
law.
Congress. The enrolled bill was signed into law by President
Ramos on November 22, 1996.
Even if both journals and an authenticate copy of the Act had
been presented, the disposal of the issue by the Court on the
Issue: Whether Congress committed a grave abuse of
basis of the journals does not imply rejection of the
discretion in enacting RA 8240.
enrollment theory, for the due enactment of a law may be
proved in either of the 2 ways specified in Section 313 of The
Held:
Code of Civil Procedure. No discrepancy appears to have
No. The Court finds no ground for holding that Congress
been noted between the 2 documents and the court did not
committed a grave abuse of discretion in enacting RA 8240.
say or so much as give to understand that if discrepancy
It is clear that what is alleged to have been violated are
existed it would give greater weight to the journals,
merely internal rules of procedure of the House rather than
disregarding the explicit provision that duly certified copies
constitutional requirements for the enactment of a law.
“shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of such Acts and
of the due enactment thereof.”
In Osmena v. Pendatun, the Court ruled that rules adopted
by
deliberative
bodies
are
subject
to
revocation,
Arroyo v. De Venecia, G.R. No. 127255, August 14, 1997, 277
modification, or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting
SCRA 268
them. Parliamentary rules are merely procedural, and with
Facts:
their observance, the courts have no concern.
Petitioners are members of the House of Reps, challenging
the validity of RA 8420 amending certain provisions of the
NIRC by imposing so-called “sin taxes” on the manufacture
and sale of beer and cigarettes. Petition is against Speaker of
In US v. Ballin, Joseph, & Co., the rule stated was the
Constitution (US) empowers each house to determine its
rules of proceedings.
the House Jose De Venecia, Deputy Speaker Raul Daza,
In City Loan & Savings Co. v. Moore, the SC of Ohio rules
Majority Floor Leader Rodolfo Albano, Executive Secretary,
that the provision for consideration is no part of the
Secretary of Finance, and Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
Constitution and is therefore entirely within the control of
charging violation of the riles of the House which are
the General Assembly. Having made the rule, it should be
“constitutionally mandated”, so their violation is tantamount
regarded, but a failure to regard it is not subject-matter of
to a constitutional violation.
judicial inquiry.
The law originated in the House of Reps as HB 7198, was
According to Chief Justice Fernando, mere failure to conform
approved on 3rd reading on September 12, 1996, and
to the rules of proceedings of Congress does not have the
transmitted to the Senate on September 16, 1996 which
effect of nullifying the act taken if the requisite number of
approved it with certain amendments on third reading on
members have agreed to a particular measure.
November 17, 1996. A bicameral conference committee was
formed to reconcile disagreeing provisions of both Houses.
In the instant case, the matter complained of concerns a
The bicam committee submitted its report to the House at
matter of internal procedure of the House which the Court
8AM on November 21, 1996. Rep. Exequiel Javier, chairman
should not be concerned about. The claim was not that there
of the committee on ways and means proceeded to deliver
was no quorum, but only that petitioner was prevented from
his sponsorship speech and was interpellated. When Rep.
questioning the presence of a quorum.
Rogelio Sarmiento was interpellating, he was interrupted
when petitioner moved to adjourn for lack of quorum. The
motion was objected and a roll call was done. Deputy
Speaker Raul Daza decalred the presence of a quorum.
Petitoner appealed but was defeated when put to a vote. The
interpellation proceeded.
Also, under the enrolled bill doctrine, the signing of HB 7198
by the presiding officers and certification by the secretaries
of both Houses that it was passed on November 21, 1996 is
conclusive of its due enactment. When there is no evidence
to the contrary, the Court will respect the certification of the
presiding officers of both Houses that a bill has been duly
Petitioner registered to interpellate and was 4th in order.
passed. To disregard the enrolled bill doctrine would be to
Petitioner announced that he was going to raise a question
disregard the respect due the other departments of the
on the quorum, never did. The transcript on the session on
government.
November 21, 1996 as published by Congress in the
newspaper issues shows that when petitioner was asking the
Speaker a question, the Speaker outright approved the bill
acting on the motion by Rep. Albano. When petitioner tried
to clarify, session was suspended by the Speaker. On the
Petitioners have not advanced any argument that warrants
departure from the doctrine. The due enactment of the law is
likewise confirmed by the Journal of the House of November
21, 1996 which shows that the conference committee report
on HB 7198 which became RA 8240 was approved on that
signature on House Bill No. 9266 (which had been returned
day. The keeping of the Journal is required by Section 16
to the Senate the previous July 3), adding that "it would be
Article VI of the Constitution. The Journal is regarded as
untenable and against public policy to convert into law what
conclusive with respect to matters that are required by the
was not actually approved by the two Houses of Congress."
Constitution to be recorded therein. With respect to other
matters, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the
Upon the foregoing facts the Mayor of Manila, Antonio
Journals have also been accorded conclusive effect.
Villegas, issued circulars to the department heads and chiefs
of offices of the city government as well as to the owners,
Journal Entry Rule
operators and/or managers of business establishments in
Manila to disregard the provisions of Republic Act 4065.
Astorga v. Villegas, G.R. No. 23475, April 30, 1974, 56
SCRA 714
Vice-Mayor, Herminio A. Astorga, filed a petition with this
Court on September 7, 1964 for "Mandamus, Injunction
The journal of the proceedings of each House of Congress is
and/or
no ordinary record. The Constitution requires it. While it is
Prohibitory Injunction" to compel respondents Mayor of
true that the journal is not authenticated and is subject to the
Manila, the Executive Secretary, the Commissioner of Civil
risks of misprinting and other errors, the point is irrelevant
Service, the Manila Chief of Police, the Manila City Treasurer
in this case. This Court is merely asked to inquire whether
and the members of the municipal board to comply with the
the text of House Bill No. 9266 signed by the Chief Executive
provisions of Republic Act 4065.
Prohibition
with
Preliminary
Mandatory
and
was the same text passed by both Houses of Congress.
Under the specific facts and circumstances of this case, this
(Lengthy arguments, supported by copious citations of
Court can do this and resort to the Senate journal for the
authorities, principally decisions of United States Federal
purpose. The journal discloses that substantial and lengthy
and State Courts, have been submitted on the question of
amendments were introduced on the floor and approved by
whether the "enrolled bill" doctrine or the "journal entry"
the Senate but were not incorporated in the printed text sent
rule should be adhered to in this jurisdiction.)
to the President and signed by him. This Court is not asked
to incorporate such amendments into the alleged law, which
Issue:
admittedly is a risky undertaking, 13 but to declare that the
Whether House Bill No. 9266 is considered enacted and
bill was not duly enacted and therefore did not become law.
valid.
This We do, as indeed both the President of the Senate and
the Chief Executive did, when they withdrew their
signatures therein. In the face of the manifest error
committed and subsequently rectified by the President of the
Senate and by the Chief Executive, for this Court to
perpetuate that error by disregarding such rectification and
Held:
Since both the Senate President and the Chief Executive
withdrew their signatures therein, the court declared that the
bill was not duly enacted and therefore did not become a
law.
holding that the erroneous bill has become law would be to
The Constitution requires that each House shall keep a
sacrifice truth to fiction and bring about mischievous
journal. An importance of having a journal is that in the
consequences not intended by the law-making body.
absence of attestation or evidence of the bill’s due enactment,
Facts:
There were mistakes committed in transmitting of the House
Bill No. 9266. Senator Arturo Tolentino released a press
statement after the bill was passed into law, stating that it
was a wrong version of the bill actually passed by the Senate
because it did not embody the amendments introduced by
him and approved on the Senate floor.
The Senate President then invalidated his signature on the
bill, and meant that the bill on which his signature appeared
had never been approved by the Senate and therefore the
fact that he and the Senate Secretary had signed it did not
make the bill a valid enactment.
President of the Philippines sent a message to the presiding
officers of both Houses of Congress informing them that in
view of the circumstances he was officially withdrawing his
the court may resort to the journals of the Congress to verify
such.
“Where
the
journal
discloses
that
substantial
amendment were introduced and approved and were not
incorporated in the printed text sent to the President for
signature, the court can declare that the bill has not been
duly
enacted
and
did
not
become
a
law.”
E. When Statute Becomes Effective
which shall be imposed by law or regulation to be observed
and followed by any person.
Articles 2, 3 and 4, New Civil Code
(4) "Rule making" means an agency process for the
Article 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following
formulation, amendment, or repeal of a rule.
the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette,
unless it is otherwise provided. This Code shall take effect
(5) "Contested case" means any proceeding, including
one year after such publication. (1a)
licensing, in which the legal rights, duties or privileges
asserted by specific parties as required by the Constitution or
Article 3. Ignorance of the law excuses no one from
by law are to be determined after hearing.
compliance therewith. (2)
(6) "Person" includes an individual, partnership, corporation,
Article 4. Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the
association, public or private organization of any character
contrary is provided. (3)
other than an agency.
Administrative Code, Book VII, Sections 2 – 9
(7) "Party" includes a person or agency named or admitted as
BOOK VII
a party, or properly seeking and entitled as of right to be
admitted as a party, in any agency proceeding; but nothing
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE
herein shall be construed to prevent an agency from
CHAPTER 1
admitting any person or agency as a party for limited
GENERAL PROVISIONS
purposes.
Section 1. Scope. - This Book shall be applicable to all
agencies as defined in the next succeeding section, except the
Congress, the Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions,
military establishments in all matters relating exclusively to
Armed Forces personnel, the Board of Pardons and Parole,
and state universities and colleges.
commission, authority or officer of the National Government
authorized by law or executive order to make rules, issue
licenses, grant rights or privileges, and adjudicate cases;
research institutions with respect to licensing functions;
with
respect
affirmative, negative, or injunctive in form, of an agency in
any matter, including licensing, rate fixing and granting of
rights and privileges.
formulation of a final order.
(1) "Agency" includes any department, bureau, office,
corporations
disposition, not of an interlocutory character, whether
(9) "Adjudication" means an agency process for the
Section 2. Definitions. - As used in this Book:
government
(8) "Decision" means the whole or any part of the final
to
functions
(10) "License" includes the whole or any part of any agency
permit,
certificate,
passport,
clearance,
approval,
registration, charter, membership, statutory exemption or
other form of permission, or regulation of the exercise of a
right or privilege.
regulating private right, privileges, occupation or business;
(11) "Licensing" includes agency process involving the grant,
and officials in the exercise of disciplinary power as
renewal,
provided by law.
withdrawal,
denial,
revocation,
limitation,
suspension,
amendment,
annulment,
modification
or
conditioning of a license.
(2) "Rule"
means any agency
statement of general
applicability that implements or interprets a law, fixes and
describes the procedures in, or practice requirements of, an
agency, including its regulations. The term includes
memoranda
or
statements
concerning
the
internal
administration or management of an agency not affecting the
rights of, or procedure available to, the public.
(12) "Sanction" includes the whole or part of a prohibition,
limitation or other condition affecting the liberty of any
person; the withholding of relief; the imposition of penalty
or fine; the destruction, taking, seizure or withholding of
property; the assessment of damages, reimbursement,
restitution,
compensation,
cost,
charges
or
fees;
the
revocation or suspension of license; or the taking of other
compulsory or restrictive action.
(13) "Relief" includes the whole or part of any grant of
(3) "Rate" means any charge to the public for a service open
money, assistance, license, authority, privilege, exemption,
to all and upon the same terms, including individual or joint
exception, or remedy; recognition of any claim, right,
rates, tolls, classifications, or schedules thereof, as well as
immunity, privilege, exemption or exception; or taking of
commutation, mileage, kilometerage and other special rates
any action upon the application or petition of any person.
(14) "Agency proceeding" means any agency process with
(2) Every rule establishing an offense or defining an act
respect to rule-making, adjudication and licensing.
which, pursuant to law, is punishable as a crime or subject to
a penalty shall in all cases be published in full text.
"Agency action" includes the whole or part of every agency
rule, order, license, sanction, relief or its equivalent or denial
Section 7. Distribution of Bulletin and Codified Rules. - The
thereof.
University of the Philippines Law Center shall furnish one
(1) free copy each of every issue of the bulletin and of the
CHAPTER 2
codified rules or supplements to the Office of the President,
RULES AND REGULATIONS
Congress, all appellate courts and the National Library. The
Section 3. Filing. -
bulletin and the codified rules shall be made available free of
(1) Every agency shall file with the University of the
Philippines Law Center three (3) certified copies of every
rule adopted by it. Rules in force on the date of effectivity of
charge to such public officers or agencies as the Congress
may select, and to other persons at a price sufficient to cover
publication and mailing or distribution costs.
this Code which are not filed within three (3) months from
Section 8. Judicial Notice. - The court shall take judicial
that date shall not thereafter be the basis of any sanction
notice of the certified copy of each rule duly filed or as
against any party or persons.
published in the bulletin or the codified rules.
(2) The records officer of the agency, or his equivalent
Section 9. Public Participation. -
functionary, shall carry out the requirements of this section
under pain of disciplinary action.
(1) If not otherwise required by law, an agency shall, as far as
practicable, publish or circulate notices of proposed rules
(3) A permanent register of all rules shall be kept by the
and afford interested parties the opportunity to submit their
issuing agency and shall be open to public inspection.
views prior to the adoption of any rule.
Section 4. Effectivity. - In addition to other rule-making
(2) In the fixing of rates, no rule or final order shall be valid
requirements provided by law not inconsistent with this
unless the proposed rates shall have been published in a
Book, each rule shall become effective fifteen (15) days from
newspaper of general circulation at least two (2) weeks
the date of filing as above provided unless a different date is
before the first hearing thereon.
fixed by law, or specified in the rule in cases of imminent
danger to public health, safety and welfare, the existence of
(3) In case of opposition, the rules on contested cases shall be
which must be expressed in a statement accompanying the
observed.
rule. The agency shall take appropriate measures to make
emergency rules known to persons who may be affected by
them.
Tañada v. Tuvera, G.R. No. L-63915 April 24, 1985
Facts:
Section 5. Publication and Recording. - The University of the
The petitioners sought a writ of mandamus from the Court
Philippines Law Center shall:
in order to compel the respondent public officials to publish
in the Official Gazette various presidential decrees, letters of
(1) Publish a quarter bulletin setting forth the text of rules
instructions,
general
orders,
proclamations,
executive
filed with it during the preceding quarter; and
implementations, and administrative orders. They did so
because of the right of the people to be informed on matters
(2) Keep an up-to-date codification of all rules thus
of public concern, a right recognized in Section 6, Article IV
published and remaining in effect, together with a complete
of the 1973 Constitution. In addition, petitioners stress that
index and appropriate tables.
Article 2 of the Civil Code requires the publication of laws as
Section 6. Omission of Some Rules. (1) The University of the Philippines Law Center may omit
from the bulletin or the codification any rule if its
publication would be unduly cumbersome, expensive or
otherwise inexpedient, but copies of that rule shall be made
a requirement for their effectivity.
Issue:
Can laws of general application take effect even without
being published as long as it provides the date of effectivity?
available on application to the agency which adopted it, and
Ruling:
the bulletin shall contain a notice stating the general subject
No. “Article 2 does not preclude the requirement of
matter of the omitted rule and new copies thereof may be
publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself
obtained.
provides for the date of its effectivity.” This is because if
laws are allowed to take effect without publication, the
public would not be informed of the existence of the law that
essentially governs them. Without such publication, Article 3
Held:
of the Civil Code, which provides that “ignorance of the law
excuses no one from compliance therewith” would have no
No, RMO 15-91 and RMC 43-91 are not valid. While it is true
basis. Thus, the Court ruled that all unpublished laws which
that pawnshops are engaged in the business of lending
are of general application have no binding force and effect.
money, they are not considered lending investors. R.A. No.
7716 repealed Section 116 of NIRC of 1977, as amended,
NOTES
which was the basis of RMO No. 15-91 and RMC No. 43- 91.
Another Issue
• There is another issue in this case, which is the legal
R.A. No. 7716 was published in the Official Gazette on 1
standing of the petitioners. It has been ruled by the Court
August 1994; in the Journal and Malaya newspapers, on 12
that since the matter involves a public right and therefore a
May 1994; and in the Manila Bulletin, on 5 June 1994. Thus,
concern for the public, the petitioners have the standing in
R.A. No. 7716 was deemed effective on May 27, 1994.
this case.
Consequently, RMO No. 15-91 and RMC No. 43-91 are
automatically repealed.
Legislative Powers of the President
• The Court recognized in this case the importance of
Moreover, RMC No. 43-91 and RMO No. 15-9 were not
publication of laws since the president now has the power to
published. CIR may not disregard legal requirements.
make laws. They point out that while the public can be
aware of the laws made by the legislative department
through the broadcasting of debates and deliberations in the
Batasang Pambansa, they do not have the same privilege
with legislation made by the president.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Michel J. Lhuillier
Pawnshop, Inc., G.R. No. 150947, 15 July 2003
Petitioner, Commission of Internal Revenue (CIR), assailed
that pawnshop were included in the term lending investors
for the purpose of imposing the 5% percentage tax under the
Section 116 of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC)
of 1977, as amended by Executive Order No. 273 whereas,
the Michel Lhuillier Pawnshop (Lhuillier Pawnshop), Inc
contends otherwise.
Petitioner, Commission of Internal Revenue (CIR), assailed
that pawnshop were included in the term lending investors
for the purpose of imposing the 5% percentage tax under the
Section 116 of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC) of
1977, as amended by Executive Order No. 273 whereas, the
Michel Lhuillier Pawnshop (Lhuillier Pawnshop), Inc
contends otherwise.
March
11,
1991,
and void. Consequently, Lhuillier is not liable to pay the
5% lending investor's tax. WHEREFORE, the petition is
hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Publication is indispensable for statutes to take effect as
settled in Tañada v. Tuvera.
COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS and the DISTRICT
COLLECTOR OF THE PORT OF SUBIC, Petitioners, vs.
HYPERMIX FEEDS CORPORATION, Respondent.
G.R. No. 179579
February 1, 2012
Facts:
On 7 November 2003, petitioner Commissioner of Customs
issued CMO 27-2003, which provides for the classifications
of wheat and the corresponding tariff for each.
Facts:
On
RMO No. 15-91 and RMC No. 43-91 are hereby declared null
On 19 December 2003, respondent filed a Petition for
Declaratory Relief with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Las
Piñas City. Respondent contended the following:
(1) That CMO 27-2003 was issued without following
the mandate of the Revised Administrative Code;
(2) That the regulation summarily adjudged it to be a
feed grade supplier without the benefit of prior
CIR
issued
RMO
No.
15-91
imposing a 5% lending investor's tax on pawnshops. This
RMO was clarified by RMC No. 43-91 on May 27, 1991.
assessment and examination, forcing them to pay
133% more than was proper.
Furthermore, respondent claimed that:
(3) The equal protection clause of the Constitution was
Bureau of Internal Revenue issued an assessment notice on
violated when the regulation treated non-flour
September 11, 1997, demanding that Lhuillier Pawnshop
millers differently from flour millers for no reason
must pay the percentage tax. Lhuillier Pawnshop filed an
at all.
administrative protest, contending that pawnshops are
different from lending investors.
Lastly, respondent asserted that:
(4) The regulation was confiscatory in nature.
Issue: Are Memorandum Orders, RMO 15-91 and RMC 43-
Petitioners thereafter filed a Motion to Dismiss. They
91, valid?
alleged that:
(1) The RTC did not have jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the case, because respondent was asking
for a judicial determination of the classification of
reasonable, it must be shown that (1) it rests on
wheat;
substantial distinctions; (2) it is germane to the purpose
(2) An action for declaratory relief was improper;
of the law; (3) it is not limited to existing conditions
(3) CMO 27-2003 was an internal administrative rule
only; and (4) it applies equally to all members of the
and not legislative in nature; and
same class.
(4) The claims of respondent were speculative and
Unfortunately, CMO 27-2003 does not meet these
premature, because the Bureau of Customs (BOC)
requirements. We do not see how the quality of wheat is
had yet to examine respondent’s products. They
affected by who imports it, where it is discharged, or
likewise opposed the application for a writ of
which country it came from.
preliminary injunction on the ground that they had
not inflicted any injury through the issuance of the
3.
Petitioner Commissioner of Customs also went
regulation; and that the action would be contrary to
beyond his powers when the regulation limited the
the rule that administrative issuances are assumed
customs officer’s duties mandated by Section 1403 of
valid until declared otherwise.
the Tariff and Customs Law, as amended. The
provision mandates that the customs officer must first
The RTC ruled in favor of respondent, prompting
assess and determine the classification of the imported
petitioners to appeal to the CA. However, the CA dismissed
article before tariff may be imposed. Unfortunately,
the appeal.
CMO 23-2007 has already classified the article even
before the customs officer had the chance to examine it.
Issue:
Whether
the
executive
construction,
that
is
-
the
administrative rule CMO 27-2003 issued by the petitioner
Commissioner of Customs, be given weight.
In
effect,
petitioner
Commissioner
of
Customs
diminished the powers granted by the Tariff and
Customs Code with regard to wheat importation when
it no longer required the customs officer’s prior
Ruling:
examination and assessment of the proper classification
No. The Court held that CMO 27-2003 is erroneous and must
of the wheat.
not be given weight.
In this case, the administrative rule (CMO 27-2003) issued by
the petitioner Commissioner of Customs is merely an
Thus, being erroneous, CMO 27-2003 must be struck down.
Fallo/ Dispositive Portion:
interpretative rule which is designed to provide guidelines
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition is
to the Tariff and Customs Law which the Bureau of Customs
DENIED. SO ORDERED.
is in charge of enforcing.
The Court expressed the administrative rule to be erroneous
under the following circumstances:
1.
As the CMO 27-2003 issued by the Commissioner of
Customs affects substantive rights of respondent
considering the imposition of tariff rates to the latter, it
therefore follows that petitioners should have applied
the pertinent provisions of Book VII, Chapter 2 of the
Revised Administrative Code, providing for the on
public participation, prior notice, and publication or
registration with the University of the Philippines Law
Center.
2.
Going now to the content of CMO 27-3003, we likewise
hold that it is unconstitutional for being violative of
the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
The equal protection clause means that no person or
class of persons shall be deprived of the same protection
of laws enjoyed by other persons or other classes in the
same place in like circumstances. Thus, the guarantee of
the equal protection of laws is not violated if there is a
reasonable classification. For a classification to be