110. Maria Del Rosario Mariategui, Et Al., vs.Court Of
Appeals, Jacinto Mariategui, et. Al
G.R. No. L-57062 January 24, 1992
Facts:
The petitioner, Maria del Rosario, initially filed a
petition for registration of the land in 1915. The
Supreme Court noted that the evidence showed that
the northern portion of the land was forestry land,
indicating that it was not included in Maria del
Rosario's possessory information title. The court
directed Maria del Rosario to present an amended plan
showing the specific part of the land she was entitled
to register, but there is no evidence that she complied
with this order.
Issue: WON the court erred in not registering all of the
land claimed by Maria del Rosario in her name.
Ruling:
No, based on the principle that the
determination of whether a particular parcel of land is
more valuable for forestry or agricultural purposes is a
question of fact that must be established during the
trial. The court also emphasized that the classification
of land as agricultural, forestry, or mineral is a casespecific determination, unless the Bureau of Forestry
has already designated the land for forestry or mineral
purposes.
111. Republic of The Philippines, vs. Liberty D. Albios,
G.R. No. 198780, October 16, 2013
Facts:
Albios filed a petition for declaration of nullity, alleging
that their marriage was made in jest and therefore null
and void ab initio. The Regional Trial Court (RTC)
declared the marriage void from the beginning, stating
that the parties married each other for convenience
only. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the RTC's
decision, finding that the essential requisite of consent
was lacking. The Republic of the Philippines,
represented by the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), filed a motion for reconsideration, which was
denied by the RTC.
Issue: WON a marriage contracted for the sole purpose
of obtaining foreign citizenship is void ab initio on the
ground of lack of consent.
Ruling: No, consent was not lacking between Albios and
Fringer. The Court found that their consent was freely
given, conscious, and intelligent, as they understood
the nature and consequences of their marriage. The
1
Court also noted that their intention to enter into a real
and valid marriage was evident, as it was necessary for
Albios to acquire American citizenship.
112. Republic of The Philippines, vs. Merlinda L.
Olaybar,
G.R. No. 189538 February 10, 2014
Facts:
This case involves a petition for cancellation of entries
in a marriage contract filed by respondent Merlinda L.
Olaybar. Olaybar discovered that she was already
married to a Korean national, Ye Son Sune, when she
requested a Certificate of No Marriage (CENOMAR) as
a requirement for her upcoming marriage. Olaybar
denied having contracted the marriage and claimed
that her signature in the marriage certificate was
forged. She filed a petition to cancel the entries in the
wife portion of the marriage contract.
Issue: WON the cancellation of entries in a marriage
contract, which nullifies the marriage, can be done
through a Rule 108 proceeding.
Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled that Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court provides the procedure for cancellation
or correction of entries in the civil registry. The
proceedings may either be summary or adversary. If
the correction is clerical, then the procedure is
summary. If the rectification affects the civil status,
citizenship, or nationality of a party, it is deemed
substantial, and the procedure is adversary.
113. Rosalia Martinez, vs. Angel Tan,
G.R. No. L-4904, February 5, 1909
Facts:
The case involves a dispute over whether the plaintiff
and the defendant were legally married on September
25, 1907, before the justice of the peace in Palompon,
Leyte. The evidence presented includes a document
called "expediente de matrimonio civil" which consists
of a petition signed by the plaintiff and defendant,
stating their agreement to marry and requesting the
justice of the peace to solemnize the marriage. Another
document signed by the parties, the justice of the
peace, and two witnesses, confirms their presence and
ratification of the previous petition.
Issue: WON the plaintiff and defendant were legally
married on September 25, 1907.
Ruling: The court affirms the decision of the lower
court, holding that the plaintiff and defendant were
indeed legally married on the specified date. The court
bases its decision on General Orders, No. 68, section 6,
which states that no particular form for the ceremony
of marriage is required, but the parties must declare in
the presence of the person solemnizing the marriage
that they take each other as husband and wife.
114. Rene Ronulo, vs. People Of the Philippines
G.R. No. 182438 July 2, 2014
Facts:
Joey Umadac and Claire Bingayen were scheduled to
marry each other on March 29, 2003 at the Sta. Rosa
Catholic Parish Church of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte.
However, the supposed officiating priest, Fr. Mario
Ragaza, refused to solemnize the marriage upon
learning that the couple failed to secure a marriage
license. As a recourse, Joey and Claire, along with their
parents, sponsors, and guests, proceeded to the
Aglipayan Church and requested the petitioner, an
Aglipayan priest, to perform a ceremony despite not
having a marriage certificate. The petitioner conducted
the ceremony in the presence of the couple, their
parents, sponsors, and guests.
The petitioner was charged with violation of Article 352
of the RPC for performing an illegal marriage ceremony.
The Municipal Trial Court (MTC) found the petitioner
guilty and imposed a fine of P200. The RTC affirmed the
MTC's decision, and the CA upheld the ruling on appeal.
Issue: WON the petitioner's act of "blessing" the couple
can be considered as an illegal marriage ceremony
under Article 352 of the RPC.
Ruling: The court ruled that the petitioner's act meets
the minimum requirements of a marriage ceremony as
set by law, which include the personal appearance of
the contracting parties before the solemnizing officer
and the declaration of their consent to be husband and
wife in the presence of at least two witnesses of legal
age. The court held that the petitioner's act of
conducting a ceremony in the presence of the couple,
their parents, sponsors, and guests, constitutes a valid
marriage ceremony.
120 Mercedita Mata Arañes, Vs. Judge Salvador M.
Occiano (2002)
Facts:
2
The petitioner and Orobia lived together until her
husband's death. However, their nullity marriage
denied her right to inherit Orobia's properties and
pensions. The respondent judge solemnized the
marriage on 17 February 2000, ensuring all documents
were complete and in his sala at the Municipal Trial
Court.
Petitioner alleges that on 17 February 2000,
respondent judge solemnized her marriage to her late
groom Dominador B. Orobia without the requisite
marriage license and at Nabua, Camarines Sur which is
outside his territorial jurisdiction.
Issue : Whether or not the respondent judge be liable
for solemnizing the marriage outside of his jurisdiction
and without marriage license.
Ruling :
YES. Under the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, or
B.P. 129, the authority of the regional trial court judges
and judges of inferior courts to solemnize marriages is
confined to their territorial jurisdiction as defined by
the Supreme Court. "Judges who are appointed to
specific jurisdictions, may officiate in weddings only
within said areas and not beyond.
121 Juvy N. Cosca, Edmundo B. Peralta, Ramon C.
Sambo, And Apollo A. Villamora, Vs. Hon. Lucio P.
Palaypayon, 1994
FACTS:
Complainants Juvy N. Cosca, et. al. and respondents
Presiding Judge Lucio P. Palaypayon, Jr. were employees
at the same court. Complainants filed an administrative
complaint with the Office of the Court Administrator
against respondents with the following offenses among
others, illegal solemnization of marriage.
Complainants allege that respondent judge solemnized
marriages even without the requisite marriage license.
The respondent judge failed to sign the marriage
contracts, citing a delay in submitting the license, and
the contracts were not filed with the local civil registrar.
Issue : Whether or not respondent judge illegally
solemnized marriages.
Ruling :
Yes. The fact that Judge Palaypayon did not sign the
marriage contracts or certificates of those marriages he
solemnized without a marriage license, will not absolve
him from liability. By solemnizing alone a marriage
without a marriage license he as the solemnizing officer
is the one responsible for the irregularity in not
complying (with) the formal requisites of marriage and
under Article 4(3) of the Family Code of the Philippines,
he shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable.
The Family Code pertinently provides that the formal
requisites of marriage are, inter alia, a valid marriage
license except in the cases provided for therein.
122 Rosario D. Ado-An-Morimoto, Vs. Yoshio
Morimoto and Republic 202
Facts:
On October 5, 2009, Rosario filed a Petition for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage before the Quezon
City Regional Trial Court. . To her surprise, she found
out that a Certificate of Marriage, registered in the City
of San Juan, indicates that she married Yoshio on
December 5, 2007. She maintained that the marriage
attested to by the marriage certificate she discovered
never actually happened and was never backed by a
marriage license.
Both the RTC and Court of Appeals denied Rosario's
petitions.
Issue: Whether or not respondent judge illegally
solemnized marriages.
Ruling :
Yes. The fact that Judge Palaypayon did not sign the
marriage contracts or certificates of those marriages he
solemnized without a marriage license, will not absolve
him from liability. By solemnizing alone a marriage
without a marriage license he as the solemnizing officer
is the one responsible for the irregularity in not
complying (with) the formal requ(i)sites of marriage
and under Article 4(3) of the Family Code of the
Philippines, he shall be civilly, criminally and
administratively liable.
123 Raquel G. Kho, Vs Republic Of The Philippines And
Veronica B. Kho (2016)
Facts:
In the afternoon of May 31, 1972, petitioner Raquel’s
parents instructed the clerk in the office of the
municipal treasurer to arrange and prepare the
necessary papers required for the intended marriage
between petitioner and respondent Veronica to take
place at around midnight of June 1, 1972 so as to
3
exclude the public from witnessing the marriage
ceremony. Petitioner and respondent thereafter
exchanged marital vows in a marriage ceremony which
actually took place at around 3:00 o’clock before dawn
of June 1, 1972.
Issue : Is the Certification issued by the Municipal Civil
Registrar attesting to the fact that it has no record or
copy of the marriage license sufficient to prove the
non-issuance of such license?
YES. Article 80 of the Civil Code also makes it clear that
a marriage performed without the corresponding
marriage license is void. In this case, petitioner was
able to present a Certification issued by the Municipal
Civil Registrar attesting that the Office of the Local Civil
Registrar has no record or copy of any marriage license
ever issued in favor of petitioner and respondent.
124 Republic Of The Philippines, Vs. Court Of Appeals
And Angelina M. Castro(1994)
Angelina M. Castro and Edwin F. Cardenas were
married in a civil ceremony in Pasay City.
Desiring to follow her daughter, Castro wanted to put
in order her marital status before leaving for the States.
Through her lawyer's efforts, they discovered that
there was no marriage license issued to Cardenas prior
to the celebration of their marriage.
As proof, Angelina Castro offered in evidence a
certification from the Civil Register of Pasig, Metro
Manila which states that the said marriage license does
not appear in their records.
RTC declared the marriage between the contracting
parties null and void and directed the Civil Registrar of
Pasig to cancel the subject marriage contract.
Issue : W/N the marriage between Castro and Cardenas
is valid?
Ruling :
NO. The marriage is invalid. The Supreme Court held
that, the documentary and testimonial evidence
presented by private respondent Castro sufficiently
established the absence of the subject marriage
license.nAt the time the marriage was solemnized, the
law governing marital relations was the New Civil
Code..
125. Norberto A. Vitangcol, Vs. People Of The
Philippines
Facts:
On December 4, 1994, Norberto married Alice G.
Eduardo (Alice) at the Manila Cathedral in Intramuros.
She eventually discovered that Norberto was
previously married to a certain Gina M. Gaerlan (Gina)
on July 17, 1987, as evidenced by a marriage contract
registered with the National Statistics Office. Alice
subsequently filed a criminal Complaint for bigamy
against Norberto.
Petitioner’s first marriage was solemnized on July 17,
1987. This was before the Family Code of the
Philippines became effective on August 3,1988. He
presents as evidence a Certification which states that
the Office of Civil Registrar has no record of the
marriage license allegedly issued in his favor and his
first wife, Gina. He argues that the first marriage was
void because there is no proof of existence of its
marriage license. Hence, he is not guilty of bigamy.
Issue: Is Norberto guilty of bigamy because his first
marriage has a certificate that “the marriage license
cannot be found”
Ruling: No. The Supreme Court ruled that “Cannot be
found” does not mean “does not exist.” The document
with greater credence is the signed Marriage Contract
bearing the marriage license number. The latter have
greater weight. Hence, the certification of “cannot be
found” will not excuse him from bigamy.
126. Lovelle S. Cariaga, Vs. The Republic Of The
Philippines
Facts: Lovelle and Henry met while attending college at
the Technical University of the Philippines. They got
married in November 2000 and had three children. In
2013, they decided to live apart due to differences. In
2015, Lovelle sought to have their marriage annulled
after discovering Henry was in a relationship with
another woman. She sought a corresponding
certification from the Civil Registry of Quezon City,
which revealed that their marriage license was issued
to another couple, Mamerto O. Yambao and Amelia B.
Parado.
Issue: Whether the CA erred in affirming the dismissal
of the Nullity Petition on the ground of insufficiency of
evidence.
Ruling: The petition is granted. Lovelle and Henry
married on November 10, 2000, and their marriage is
4
governed by the Family Code. Essential and formal
requisites for marriage include legal capacity, consent,
authority of the solemnizing officer, valid marriage
license, and a marriage ceremony with two witnesses
of legal age. The absence of any of these requisites
renders the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in
Article 35 (2).
127. Alice Reyes Van Dorn Vs. Hon. Manuel vs. Romillo
Facts: Petitioner Alice Reyes Van Dorn is a citizen of the
Philippines while private respondent Richard Upton is a
citizen of the United States. They were married in
Hongkong in 1972 and established their residence in
the Philippines. They had two children born on April 4,
1973 and December 18, 1975, respectively. But the
parties were divorced in Nevada, United States, in 1982
and the petitioner had remarried also in Nevada, this
time to Theodore Van Dorn.
On July 8, 1983, Richard Upton filed a suit against
petitioner, asking that Alice Van Dorn be ordered to
render an accounting of her business in Ermita, Manila
and be declared with right to manage the conjugal
property.
Issue: Whether or not the foreign divorce between the
petitioner and private respondent in Nevada is binding
in the Philippines where petitioner is a Filipino citizen.
Ruling: Richard Upton, an American citizen, is bound by
his divorce as an American citizen. The policy against
absolute divorces only applies to Philippine nationals,
but aliens can obtain divorces abroad if they are valid
in their national law. Upton is no longer the husband of
the petitioner and cannot sue Alice Van Dorn for
control over conjugal assets.
128.Republic Of The Philippines, Vs. Cipriano
Orbecido lII
Facts: Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M.
Villanueva in 1981, who left for the US in 1986. In 2000,
he discovered she had divorced and was remarried to
Innocent Stanley. He filed a petition for remarry, using
Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the
Philippines. The Office of the Solicitor General argued
this provision couldn't apply to mixed marriages, but
both were Filipinos at the time.
Issue: Does paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code
apply in this case?
Ruling: Yes. The Court looked at the legal intent of the
provision and found out that the Civil Code Revision
Committee’s intent in including Article 26 is to avoid
the absurd situation wherein the Filipino spouse is
deemed to remain married to the foreigner when, after
obtaining the divorce, the foreigner is no longer
married to the Filipino.
129.Maria Rebecca Makapugay Bayot, Vs. The
Honorable Court of Appeals
Facts: Vicente and Rebecca were married in 1979 and
had a daughter, Alix. In 1996, Vicente initiated divorce
proceedings in the Dominican Republic, leading to the
dissolution of their marriage and joint custody and
guardianship over Alix. Rebecca filed a petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage in 1996, but later
withdrew it. In 2001, she filed another petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, citing
Vicente's alleged psychological incapacity.
Issue: In G.R. No. 155635, Rebecca raises four (4)
assignments of errors as grounds for the allowance of
her petition, all of which converged on the proposition
that the CA erred in enjoining the implementation of
the RTC's orders which would have entitled her to
support pending final resolution of Civil Case No. 01094.
Ruling: Rebecca, born in Agaña, Guam, USA, is
considered an American citizen at the time of her
divorce from Vicente. She has consistently claimed and
represented her American citizenship, as evidenced by
her marriage certificate, Alix's birth certificate, and the
Affidavit of Acknowledgment. Rebecca has been issued
an ID Certificate No. RC 9778 and a Philippine Passport,
indicating her Filipino citizenship. However, this
recognition was only granted on June 8, 2000, upon the
Secretary of Justice's affirmation.
130
Gerbert R. Corpuz vs Daisylyn Tirol Sto. Tomas
and the Solicitor General
G.R. No. 186571, August 11, 2010
Facts:
In this case, Gerbert R. Corpuz, a former Filipino citizen
who acquired Canadian citizenship, filed for judicial
recognition of a Canadian divorce decree to dissolve his
marriage to Daisylyn T. Sto. Tomas in the Philippines.
Despite the foreign divorce, the National Statistics
Office informed Gerbert that his marriage was still
considered valid under Philippine law. The Regional
Trial Court (RTC) denied Gerbert's petition, stating that
only the Filipino spouse can seek relief under Article 26
of the Family Code to remarry in the Philippines.
5
Gerbert appealed the decision to the Supreme Court,
seeking recognition of the foreign divorce decree.
Issue: Whether or not the second paragraph of Article
26 of the Family Code extends to aliens the right to
petition a court for the recognition of a foreign divorce
decree.
Ruling:
No. The Supreme Court held that the 2nd paragraph of
Art 26 of the Family Code does not extend to aliens. The
legislative intent behind a provision in this context is to
benefit Filipino spouses by clarifying their marital
status and allowing them to remarry. The provision
doesn't grant rights to alien spouses. However, a court
has stated that the unavailability of the provision to
aliens doesn't necessarily prevent them from
petitioning for the recognition of their foreign divorce
decree. To be recognized in the Philippines, the foreign
divorce decree must be proven authentic and in
conformity with Canadian law. In this case, a Canadian
citizen named Gerbert has the burden of proving the
authenticity.
131
Soledad L. Lavadia vs Heirs of Juan Luces Luna
G.R. No. 171914, July 23, 2014
Facts:
Atty. Luna obtained a divorce decree at the Court of
First Instance of Sto. Domingo, Dominican Republic for
his first marriage with Eugenia. On the same day, Atty.
Luna contracted a second marriage with Soledad,
Thereafter, the two returned to the Philippines and
lived together as husband and wife. After the death of
Atty. Luna, his share in the condominium unit including
the law books, office furniture and equipment found
therein were taken over by Gregorio Z. Luna, Atty.
Luna’s son with Eugenia, in which Soledad assailed.
Issues: Whether or not the divorce between Atty. Luna
and Eugenia had validly dissolved the first marriage.
Ruling:
No. Eugenia was the legitimate wife of Atty. Luna until
the latter’s death. The absolute divorce decree
obtained by Atty. Luna in the Dominican Republic did
not terminate his prior marriage with Eugenia because
foreign divorce between Filipino citizens is not
recognized in our jurisdiction.
132
Medina vs Koike
G.R. No. 215723, July 27, 2016
Facts:
The petitioner, Doreen Grace Parilla Medina, a Filipino
citizen, and the respondent, Michiyuki Koike, a
Japanese national, were married in the Philippines in
2005 and had two children together. In 2012, they filed
for divorce in Japan and were subsequently divorced.
Doreen filed a petition to have the divorce recognized
in the Philippines, but the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
denied the petition, stating that Doreen failed to prove
the national law of her husband, particularly the
existence of the law on divorce. Doreen's motion for
reconsideration was also denied.
Issue: Whether or not the RTC erred in denying the
petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce.
Ruling:
The court ruled that the recognition of a foreign divorce
decree in the Philippines, governed by Article 26 of the
Family Code, requires proof of the validity of the
foreign divorce according to the national law of the
foreign spouse. The petitioner failed to provide
sufficient evidence regarding the law on divorce in
Japan, her husband's nationality. Although the court
acknowledged this, it referred the case to the Court of
Appeals to address the factual issues and determine
the validity of the foreign divorce to avoid potential
injustice to the petitioner.
133
Republic of the Philippines vs Marelyn Tanedo
Manalo
G.R. No 221029, April 24, 2018
Facts:
This case involves a petition for cancellation of entry of
marriage filed by respondent Marelyn Tanedo Manalo
(Manalo) in the Civil Registry of San Juan, Metro
Manila. Manalo sought the cancellation of the entry of
her marriage to a Japanese national, Yoshino Minoru,
based on a judgment of divorce rendered by a Japanese
court. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) denied the
petition, ruling that Philippine law does not recognize
divorce for Filipinos. However, the Court of Appeals
(CA) reversed the RTC decision, holding that Article 26
of the Family Code of the Philippines allows for the
recognition of a foreign divorce decree obtained by a
Filipino citizen. The CA held that Manalo should be
considered no longer married to her Japanese
6
husband, who is also no longer married to her, and
therefore, she should be allowed to remarry. The Office
of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a motion for
reconsideration, which was denied. The OSG then filed
a petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme
Court.
Issue: Whether or not a divorce obtained by a Filipino
citizen from a foreign spouse can be recognized and
given legal effects in the Philippines.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of recognizing a
divorce obtained by the respondent in Nevada, stating
that while Philippine law prohibits absolute divorces,
foreign divorces by aliens may be acknowledged in the
Philippines if valid in their home country. The Court
emphasized the purpose of the provision to prevent
absurd situations and concluded that it should be
interpreted to recognize the residual effect of foreign
divorce decrees on Filipinos whose marital ties to alien
spouses hav been severed abroad.
134
Luzviminda Dela Cruz Morisono vs Ryoji
Morisono and Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City
G.R. No. 226013
Facts:
The case involves a petition for recognition of a foreign
divorce decree obtained by the petitioner, Luzviminda
Dela Cruz Morisono, from her former husband, Ryoji
Morisono. Luzviminda and Ryoji were married in
Quezon City in 2009 but eventually divorced in Japan in
2012. Luzviminda filed a petition before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City to have the foreign
divorce decree recognized in the Philippines so that she
could cancel her former husband's surname in her
passport and remarry. The RTC denied her petition.
Issue: Whether or not the RTC correctly denied
Luzviminda’s petition for recognition of the foreign
divorce decree.
Ruling:
The court ruled that the petition is partly meritorious.
It explained that Philippine laws do not provide for
absolute divorce, and therefore, the courts cannot
grant it. However, there are exceptions to this rule. One
exception is when an absolute divorce is obtained
abroad by a couple who are both aliens, which may be
recognized in the Philippines if it is consistent with their
respective national laws.
135 Cynthia Galapon Vs. Republic Of The Philippines,
930 Scra 51, G.R. No. 243722 January 22, 2020
FACTS:
Cynthia, a Filipina, and her spouse, Noh Shik Park, a
Korean national, got married in Manila, Philippines on
February 27, 2012. However, their relationship turned
sour and they obtained a divorce by mutual agreement
in South Korea, which was confirmed by the Cheongju
Local Court on July 16, 2012. Cynthia then filed a
petition for the judicial recognition of the foreign
divorce in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Sto.
Domingo, Nueva Ecija. The RTC granted the recognition
petition, recognizing the divorce decree and stating
that Cynthia is now legally capacitated to remarry
under Philippine laws. The Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) filed a motion for reconsideration,
arguing that the recognition petition should have been
filed in the RTC of Manila and that Cynthia is not
qualified to avail of the benefits provided by Article 26
of the Family Code. The motion was denied by the RTC.
The OSG appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), which
reversed the RTC decision. The CA held that the divorce
decree cannot be recognized in the Philippines since it
was obtained by mutual agreement, contrary to the
requirement of Article 26 (2) of the Family Code.
ISSUE:
Whether the divorce decree obtained by Cynthia and
Park in South Korea should be recognized in the
Philippines.
RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Cynthia and held
that the divorce decree should be recognized in the
Philippines. Cynthia is declared capacitated to remarry
under Philippine law.
136 Gerbert R. Corpuz, Vs.Daisylyn Tirol Sto. Tomas
And The Solicitor General, G.R. No. 186571, August 11,
2010
FACTS:
This case involves a petition for judicial recognition of a
foreign divorce decree filed by Gerbert R. Corpuz, a
former Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian
citizenship through naturalization. Gerbert married
Daisylyn T. Sto. Tomas, a Filipina, in 2005 but later
discovered that his wife was having an affair. Gerbert
filed for divorce in Canada, and the divorce decree was
granted in 2005. Two years later, Gerbert found
another Filipina to love and wanted to marry her in the
7
Philippines. However, the National Statistics Office
(NSO) informed Gerbert that his marriage to Daisylyn
still subsisted under Philippine law and that the foreign
divorce decree must be judicially recognized by a
competent Philippine court. Gerbert filed a petition for
judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or
declaration of marriage as dissolved with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC). The RTC denied Gerbert's petition,
ruling that only the Filipino spouse can avail of the
remedy under Article 26 of the Family Code to be able
to remarry under Philippine law.
ISSUE:
Whether the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code extends to aliens the right to petition a
court for the recognition of a foreign divorce decree.
RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled that the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code does not extend to aliens
the right to petition for the recognition of a foreign
divorce decree.
137 Minoru Fujiki, Vs. Maria Paz Galela Marinay,
Shinichi Maekara, Local Civil Registrar Of Quezon City,
And The Administrator And Civil Registrar General Of
The National Statistics Office, G.R. No. 196049, June
26, 2013
FACTS:
Petitioner Minoru Fujiki, a Japanese national, married
respondent Maria Paz Galela Marinay in the Philippines
in 2004. However, due to objections from Fujiki's
parents, he was unable to bring Marinay to Japan
where he resided, and they eventually lost contact with
each other. In 2008, Marinay married another Japanese
man, Shinichi Maekara, without dissolving her first
marriage. Marinay and Maekara were married in the
Philippines and later went to Japan, where Marinay
allegedly suffered physical abuse. Marinay then
contacted Fujiki, and they were able to reestablish their
relationship. In 2010, Fujiki helped Marinay obtain a
judgment from a family court in Japan declaring her
marriage to Maekara void on the ground of bigamy.
Fujiki then filed a petition in the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) seeking the recognition of the Japanese Family
Court judgment and the declaration of the bigamous
marriage between Marinay and Maekara as void.
ISSUE:
Whether the Regional Trial Court (RTC) has jurisdiction
to recognize the foreign judgment nullifying the
marriage.
RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Fujiki and held that
the RTC has jurisdiction to recognize the foreign
judgment nullifying the marriage.
138 Rhodora Ilumin Racho, A.K.A. "Rhodora Racho
Tanaka V. Seiichi Tanaka, G.R. No. 199515, June 25,
2018
FACTS:
The petitioner, Rhodora Ilumin Racho, filed a petition
for declaration of nullity of marriage against her
husband, Hiroshi Tanaka, before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Dagupan City. The petitioner alleged that
she and Tanaka were married in Japan in 1986 and that
they have been living separately since 2004. She also
claimed that Tanaka obtained a divorce decree in Japan
in 2006. The RTC dismissed the petition, ruling that the
divorce decree obtained by Tanaka is not valid in the
Philippines.
ISSUE:
The main issue in this case is whether or not the divorce
decree obtained by Tanaka in Japan can be recognized
and given effect in the Philippines.
RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the petitioner and
declared that the divorce decree obtained by Tanaka in
Japan is valid and can be recognized in the Philippines.
The Court relied on the principle of comity, which is the
recognition given by one nation to the laws and judicial
decisions of another nation. The Court held that since
the divorce decree was validly obtained in Japan, it
should be recognized and given effect in the
Philippines.
139 Raemark S. Abel, V. Mindy P. Rule, Office of the
Civil Registry General-Philippine Statistics Authority,
and the City Civil Registry Office Of Manila, And All
Other Persons Having Or Claiming Any Interest, G.R.
No. 234457, May 12, 2021
FACTS:
The case involves a petition for recognition of a foreign
divorce decree between Raemark S. Abel, a citizen of
the United States, and Mindy P. Rule, a Filipino citizen.
Abel and Rule got married in California in 2005 and filed
8
for the summary dissolution of their marriage in 2008.
The divorce was granted by the Superior Court of
California in 2009. Abel reacquired his Filipino
citizenship in 2008, while Rule became a citizen of the
United States in 2012. Abel filed a petition for
recognition of the foreign divorce in the Philippines in
2017, but it was dismissed by the Regional Trial Court
for being contrary to public policy.
ISSUE:
Whether a divorce obtained abroad by a foreign
spouse, which capacitates him or her to remarry, can
also capacitate the Filipino spouse to remarry under
Philippine law.
RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Abel and granted
the petition for recognition of the foreign divorce
decree. The Court reversed the decision of the Regional
Trial Court and remanded the case for further
proceedings and reception of evidence.
140 Stephen I. Juego-Sakai, V. Republic Of The
Philippines,
R. No. 224015, July 23, 2018
FACTS
The petitioner, Stephen I. Juego-Sakai, and Toshiharu
Sakai got married in Japan in 2000 and obtained a
divorce decree in Japan two years later. Petitioner filed
a Petition for Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Camarines
Norte, which granted the petition and recognized the
divorce. The Court of Appeals (CA) initially affirmed the
decision of the RTC but later revisited its findings and
set aside its previous decision, stating that the second
requisite under Article 26 of the Family Code is missing.
The CA ruled that since the divorce was consensual and
obtained by agreement of both parties, it cannot be
recognized in the Philippines. The CA also ruled that
petitioner's failure to present authenticated copies of
the Civil Code of Japan was fatal to her cause.
ISSUE
Whether the divorce obtained by the petitioner in
Japan should be recognized in the Philippines under
Article 26 of the Family Code.
RULING
The Supreme Court granted the petition and reversed
the Amended Decision of the Court of Appeals. The
Court ruled that despite petitioner's participation in the
divorce proceedings, she should still be allowed to
benefit from the exception provided under Article 26.
However, the Court also stated that petitioner needs to
comply with certain guidelines before the court can
recognize the divorce decree and its effects. The case
was remanded to the court of origin for further
proceedings and reception of evidence.
141 Marlyn Monton Nullada, Vs. The Hon. Civil
Registrar Of Manila, Akira Ito, Shin Ito And All Persons
Who Have Or Claim Any Interest,
GR. No. 224548
FACTS
This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by the
petitioner, Marelyn Tanedo Manalo, seeking to reverse
and set aside the decision of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 43 of Manila in Special Proceedings Case
No. 14-132832. The petitioner is a Filipino citizen who
married a Japanese national, Hiroshi Manalo, in Japan.
They subsequently obtained a divorce in Japan. The
petitioner then filed a petition for recognition of
foreign divorce and/or declaration of marriage as
dissolved before the RTC. The RTC denied the petition,
ruling that the petitioner failed to prove the divorce
decree and the Japanese law on divorce.
ISSUE
Whether the petitioner has sufficiently proven the
divorce decree and the Japanese law on divorce.
RULING
The Supreme Court granted the petition for review on
certiorari and reversed and set aside the decision of the
RTC. The case was remanded to the RTC for further
proceedings and reception of evidence on the relevant
Japanese law on divorce.
142 In Re: Petition For Judicial Recognition Of Divorce
Between Minuro* Takahashi And Juliet Rendora
Moraña, Juliet Rendora Moraña, Petitioner, Vs.
Republic Of The Philippines,
GR. No. 227605, December 05, 2019
FACTS
The petitioner, Juliet Rendora Mora a, and the
respondent, Republic of the Philippines, are the parties
involved in this case. The events took place in San Juan,
9
Metro Manila, where the petitioner and Minuro
Takahashi got married on June 24, 2002. They later
moved to Japan and had two children together.
However, after ten years of marriage, the couple
became estranged, and the petitioner alleged that her
husband failed to fulfill his marital obligations and
started cohabiting with another woman.
The petitioner then filed an action for recognition of
the divorce report with the Regional Trial Court-Manila.
However, the trial court dismissed the petition for
failure to present the divorce decree itself as evidence.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision,
stating that the petitioner failed to prove the divorce as
a fact and demonstrate its conformity with the foreign
law allowing it.
ISSUE
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in affirming
the dismissal of the petition for recognition of the
foreign divorce decree.
RULING
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the petitioner. The
Court held that a foreign decree of divorce may be
recognized in the Philippines, even if it was the Filipino
spouse who obtained the divorce. The Court
emphasized that the purpose of Article 26 of the Family
Code is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino
spouse remains married to the alien spouse who is no
longer married to the Filipino spouse. The Court also
stated that the divorce report issued by the Office of
the Mayor of Fukuyama City should be considered as
the divorce decree itself.
143 Edna S. Kondo, Represented By Attorney-In-Fact,
Luzviminda S. Pineda, Petitioner, VS. Civil Registrar
General,
GR. No. 223628, March 04, 2020
FACTS
This is a petition for judicial recognition of a foreign
divorce decree filed by Edna S. Kondo, a Filipino citizen,
against the Civil Registrar General. Edna and Katsuhiro
Kondo, a Japanese national, were married in Japan in
1991 and registered their marriage in the Philippines.
However, they obtained a divorce by mutual
agreement in Japan in 2000. Edna filed the petition for
recognition of the divorce decree in 2012, citing Article
26(2) of the Family Code which allows a Filipino spouse
to remarry under Philippine law if the foreign spouse
obtains a valid divorce abroad. The trial court denied
the petition, stating that the divorce should have been
obtained by the foreign spouse, not by mutual
agreement. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
court's decision but disagreed with its ruling on the
inapplicability of Article 26(2) of the Family Code. Edna
filed a petition for review with the Supreme Court,
seeking a reversal of the Court of Appeals' decision and
the remand of the case to the trial court for the
reception of additional evidence. The Supreme Court
granted the petition, stating that the second divorce
report presented by Edna was not newly discovered
evidence and should have been presented during the
trial.
10
Whether or not a divorce obtained abroad by a foreign
spouse, which capacitates him or her to remarry, can
also capacitate the Filipino spouse to remarry under
Philippine law.
RULING
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Abel and granted
the petition for recognition of the foreign divorce
decree. The Court reversed the decision of the Regional
Trial Court and remanded the case for further
proceedings and reception of evidence.
145. Republic Of The Philippines, Vs. Jocelyn Asusano
Kikuchi, As Represented By Her Attorney-In-Fact,
Edwin E. Asusano,
ISSUE
G.R. No. 243646. June 22, 201422
Whether the divorce decree obtained by Edna and
Katsuhiro should be recognized in the Philippines.
Facts:
RULING
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Edna and granted
her petition. The Court reversed and set aside the Court
of Appeals' decision and remanded the case to the trial
court for the presentation of evidence regarding the
pertinent provisions of Japanese law on divorce and
the capacity of Katsuhiro to remarry.
144 Raemark S. Abel, VS. Mindy P. Rule, Office Of The
Civil Registry General-Philippine Statistics Authority,
And The City Civil Registry Office Of Manila, And All
Other Persons Having Or Claiming Any Interest,
This case involves a petition for judicial recognition of
foreign divorce filed by Jocelyn Asusano Kikuchi
(Jocelyn), a Filipino, against her former husband Fumio
U. Kikuchi I(Fumio), a Japanese national. During the
presentation of evidence, Jocelyn submitted various
documents, including the Acceptance Certificate issued
by the Mayor of Sakado City, an Authentication from
the Philippine Embassy in Tokyo, and a photocopy of
the Civil Code of Japan in English text. The Republic did
not object to the presentation of these documents.
The trial court found Jocelyn's petition to be sufficient
and set the case for hearing. The CA affirmed the Trial
Court decision.
G.R. No. 234457, May 12, 2021
FACTS
This is a petition for recognition of a foreign divorce
decree between Raemark S. Abel, a citizen of the
United States, and Mindy P. Rule, a Filipino citizen. Abel
and Rule got married in California in 2005 and filed for
the summary dissolution of their marriage in 2008. The
divorce was granted by the Superior Court of California
in 2009. Abel reacquired his Filipino citizenship in 2008,
while Rule became a citizen of the United States in
2012. Abel filed a petition for recognition of the foreign
divorce in the Philippines in 2017, but it was dismissed
by the Regional Trial Court for being contrary to public
policy. The court held that only the alien spouse is
allowed to obtain a divorce decree under Article 26(2)
of the Family Code.
ISSUE
Issue: WON appellate court err in affirming the trial
court's decision.
Ruling: No, The Petition is meritorious. The Court
reviewed the factual findings of the lower courts
because the Republic raised issues that fell under
recognized exceptions to the general rule that
questions of fact are not reviewable in a Petition for
Review on Certiorari. The Court held that Jocelyn was
able to establish the fact of divorce through the
Acceptance Certificate issued by the Mayor of Sakado
City, which was accompanied by an Authentication
from the Philippine Embassy in Tokyo.
146. Leouel Santos Vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 112019 January 4, 1995
Facts:
This case involves a custody dispute over a minor child
named Leouel Santos Jr. The petitioner, Leouel Santos
Sr., is the legitimate father of the child, while the
private respondents are the child's grandparents,
Leopoldo and Ofelia Bedia. The case was initially filed
in the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 29,
under Special Proceedings No. 4588. The lower court
awarded custody of the child to the grandparents,
prompting the petitioner to appeal the decision to the
Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
lower court's decision, prompting the petitioner to file
a petition for review with the Supreme Court.
Issue: WON custody over the minor child, Leouel
Santos Jr., should be awarded to his legitimate father,
Leouel Santos Sr., or to his grandparents, Leopoldo and
Ofelia Bedia.
Ruling: The Supreme Court granted the petition and
reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals. Custody
over the minor child, Leouel Santos Jr., was awarded to
his legitimate father, Leouel Santos Sr.
The Supreme Court based its decision on several legal
principles and provisions. Firstly, it emphasized that
under the Family Code, the father and mother are the
natural guardians of their children and are entitled to
their custody.
147. Chi Ming Tsoi, Vs. Court of Appeals and Gina LaoTsoi
G.R. No. 119190 January 16, 1997
Facts:
The petitioner and the private respondent were
married on May 22, 1988. However, there was never
any sexual intercourse between them during their
marriage. The petitioner claims that the private
respondent refused to have sexual contact with him
due to physical disorders, while the private respondent
argues that the petitioner is the one who refuses to
have sex with her. The trial court and the Court of
Appeals did not make a finding on who between the
parties refuses to have sex, but they both concluded
that the prolonged refusal of one party to fulfill the
marital obligation is equivalent to psychological
incapacity.
11
Issue: WON the refusal of one party to have sexual
intercourse with the other constitutes psychological
incapacity under the Family Code.
Ruling: The Court held that the prolonged refusal of
one party to fulfill the essential marital obligation of
having sexual intercourse is considered a sign of
psychological incapacity. The Court also emphasized
that the innate modesty of the Filipino woman makes
it hard to believe that she would expose her private life
to public scrutiny and fabricate testimony against her
husband if it were not necessary to put her life in order
and put to rest her marital status. The Court found that
there was absence of empathy between the parties and
that there was a serious personality disorder on the
part of the petitioner, which constitutes psychological
incapacity.
148. Brenda B. Marcos Vs. Wilson G. Marcos
G.R. No. 136490, October 19, 2000
Facts:
The petitioner, Brenda B. Marcos, filed a petition for the
declaration of nullity of her marriage to Wilson G.
Marcos. She alleged that her husband failed to provide
material support to the family and exhibited violent
behavior towards her and their children. The Regional
Trial Court (RTC) granted the petition and declared the
marriage null and void. However, the Court of Appeals
reversed the decision, stating that psychological
incapacity had not been established.
Issue: WON he totality of the evidence presented,
including testimonies from the petitioner, the common
children, petitioner's sister, and a social worker, was
enough to establish that the respondent was
psychologically incapacitated.
Ruling: No, The Court upheld the decision of the Court
of Appeals, stating that while personal medical or
psychological examination of the respondent is not
required, the totality of the evidence presented by the
petitioner does not show permanent or incurable
psychological incapacity. The Court found that the
respondent's behavior could be attributed to the fact
that he lost his job and was not gainfully employed for
a period of more than six years. Furthermore, there
was no evidence to show that his condition was
incurable, especially since he is now gainfully employed
as a taxi driver.
149. Leonilo Antonio Vs. Marie Ivonne F. Reyes,
12
Whether psychological incapacity existed in the case.
G.R. No. 155800, March 10, 2006
Ruling:
Facts:
No. The Supreme Court held that psychological
incapacity, as grounds for nullity under Article 36,
requires a severe and permanent psychological illness
existing before the marriage. The petitioner failed to
demonstrate such incapacity convincingly. Dr. Dayan's
diagnosis lacked specificity, and the alleged disorders
were more attributed to personal conflicts than a
debilitating condition. The Court found Brix's behaviors
rooted in a refusal to fulfill marital obligations rather
than a psychological condition, ruling against the nullity
of the marriage.
The petitioner filed a petition for nullity of marriage
based on Article 36 of the Family Code, alleging that the
respondent was psychologically incapacitated to fulfill
the essential obligations of marriage. The petitioner
presented evidence of the respondent's persistent
lying and deceit, including concealing the fact that she
had a child from a previous relationship, fabricating
stories, misrepresenting herself, and exhibiting
insecurities and jealousies. The petitioner presented
expert witnesses who testified to the respondent's
psychological incapacity. The respondent, on the other
hand, denied the allegations and presented her own
version of events. She also presented an expert witness
who refuted the allegations of psychological incapacity.
Issue: WON the respondent's behavior constitutes
psychological incapacity as defined under Article 36 of
the Family Code.
Ruling: The court ruled in favor of the petitioner and
upheld the declaration of nullity of the marriage. The
court applied the guidelines established in the case of
Republic v. Molina, which include the burden of proof
on the plaintiff, the requirement for the root cause of
the psychological incapacity to be medically or clinically
identified and proven, the incapacity to be existing at
the time of the celebration of the marriage, the
incapacity to be permanent or incurable, the incapacity
to be grave enough to bring about the disability of the
party to assume the essential obligations of marriage,
and the essential marital obligations to be stated in the
petition and proven by evidence.
150 Ma. Armida Perez-Ferraris, Vs. Brix Ferraris, G.R.
No. 162368 July 17, 2006
Facts:
Armida filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of
her marriage to Brix, citing psychological incapacity.
Their relationship soured when Armida doubted Brix's
fidelity, leading to constant fights. Brix, though initially
a responsible and loving husband, withdrew due to
Armida's suspicions, leading to a breakdown in their
marriage. The RTC denied the petition, stating epilepsy
doesn't amount to psychological incapacity, and
insufficient evidence proved infidelity. Armida's
motions for reconsideration were also denied.
Issue:
151 Narciso S. Navarro, Jr., Vs. Cynthia CecilioNavarro, G.R. No. 162049, April 13, 2007
Facts:
On August 21, 1998, the Regional Trial Court declared
the marriage of Narciso S. Navarro and Cynthia CecilioNavarro null and void due to psychological incapacity.
The court directed Narciso to support their children,
disqualified the parties from inheriting from each
other, allowed the revocation of life insurance
beneficiary designations, awarded custody of the
children to Cynthia, and deemed the properties as
advance legitime.
ISSUE:
Whether the parties are psychologically incapacitated
to declare the marriage null and void.
RULING:
The court ruled that the parties did not exhibit the
required psychological incapacity as defined by Article
36 of the Family Code. The petition was denied for lack
of merit. The court found no evidence to support that
either party was psychologically incapacitated at the
time of the marriage. No costs were pronounced.
152 Marieta C. Azcueta Vs. Republic Of The Philippines
And The Court Of Appeals G.R. No. 180668 May 26,
2009
FACTS:
Petitioner Marietta Azcueta and Rodolfo Azcueta were
married on July 24, 1993. After four years of marriage
without bearing children, they separated in 1997.
Petitioner filed a petition for the declaration of the
absolute nullity of marriage, invoking Article 36 of the
Family Code. She claimed that Rodolfo was
psychologically incapacitated due to emotional
immaturity, irresponsibility, failure to adapt to married
life, and instances of physical violence.
ISSUE:
Whether the totality of the evidence presented is
adequate to sustain a finding that Rodolfo is
psychologically incapacitated.
RULING:
Yes. The Court found sufficient compliance with the
guidelines set in the Molina case, justifying the
annulment of the marriage under Article 36. The
burden of proof rests on the petitioner, and in this case,
the root cause of psychological incapacity was
medically identified, alleged in the complaint, proven
by experts, and explained in the decision.
153 Edward Kenneth Ngo Te, Vs. Rowena Ong
Gutierrez Yu-Te, G.R. No. 161793 February 13, 2009
FACTS:
Petitioner Edward Te initially pursued Rowena Te's
friend but eventually courted Rowena after the friend
became unavailable. In January 1996, Rowena
convinced Edward to elope, and they sailed to Cebu
with Edward providing travel funds. After returning to
Manila in April 1996, they got married without a
license. The relationship turned tumultuous, with
Edward being confined and threatened by Rowena and
her uncle. They separated in June 1996. Edward filed
for annulment in January 2000, citing Rowena's
psychological incapacity.
ISSUE:
Whether the marriage is void based on the grounds of
psychological incapacity.
RULING:
Yes.Edward exhibited dependent personality disorder,
unable to make essential decisions without advice and
lacking a cohesive self. Rowena, with antisocial
personality disorder, demonstrated a disregard for
others' rights and impulsive behavior. Both parties
were deemed afflicted with severe and incurable
psychological incapacity, rendering their April 23, 1996
marriage null and void. The evidence presented
established a link between their actions and the
diagnosed disorders, justifying the annulment.
13
154 Ma. Socorro Camacho-Reyes, Vs. Ramon Reyes,
G.R. No. 185286 August 18, 2010
Facts:
Petitioner Maria Socorro Camacho-Reyes and Ramon
Reyes married on December 5, 1976, while Maria was
five months pregnant. They faced financial difficulties,
exacerbated by Ramon's failed business ventures.
Ramon's lack of financial support and fidelity, coupled
with his indifference during Maria's surgical operation,
led to the deterioration of their marriage. Counseling
and a psychological assessment by Dr. Natividad A.
Dayan confirmed Ramon's psychological incapacity.
Despite attempts to salvage the relationship, Maria
filed for the nullity of their marriage under Article 36 of
the Family Code. The RTC granted the petition, but the
Court of Appeals reversed the decision.
Issue:
Whether the marriage is void ab initio due to the
psychological incapacity of both parties.
Held:
The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals'
decision, reinstating the RTC's ruling. The appellate
court erred in stating that Ramon's psychological
incapacity was not incurable. Dr. Dayan's
recommendation for therapy doesn't imply curability,
and her explicit declaration during the testimony
affirmed Ramon's psychological incapacity. The
professional opinion of a psychological expert is crucial
in determining a party's mental capacity at the time of
the wedding, supporting the declaration of nullity
under Article 36 of the Family Code.
155 Benjamin Bugayong, Vs. Leonila Ginez(1956)
Facts:
Petitioner Danilo Aurelio and Respondent Corazon
Aurelio were married on March 1988 and had two sons,
Danilo Miguel and Danilo Gabriel. On May 9, 2002,
respondent Corazon Aurelio filed with RTC of Quezon
City a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage. In
her petition, she states that both she and her husband
were psychologically incapacitated of performing and
complying with their respective essential marital
obligations.
The RTC denied petitioner’s motion and ruled that
respondent’s petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage complied with the requirements of the
Molina Doctrine, and whether or not the allegations
are meritorious would depend upon the proofs
presented by both parties during the trial.
The CA then affirmed the ruling of RTC.
Issue : Whether or not the Court of Appeals violated
the applicable law and jurisprudence when it held that
the allegations contained in the petition for declaration
of the nullity of marriage are sufficient to declare the
nullity of the marriage.
Ruling : No. The Petition is denied. The decision and
resolution of CA are affirmed.
It bears to stress that whether or not petitioner and
respondent are psychologically incapacitated to fulfill
their marital obligations are a matter for RTC to decide
at the first instance. The perusal of the Molina
guidelines would show that the same contemplate a
situation wherein the parties have presented their
evidence, witnesses have testified and that a decision
has been reached by the court after due hearing. It
would certainly be too burdensome to ask this Court to
resolve at first instance whether the allegations
contained in the petition are sufficient to substantiate
a case for psychological incapacity.
156 Valerio E. Kalaw, Vs. Ma. Elena Fernandez, G.R.
No. 166357 ,January 14, 2015
Facts :
This case involves a petition for review of the Court of
Appeals' decision to reverse the trial court's declaration
of nullity of the marriage between Valerio (Tyrone) E.
Kalaw and Ma. Elena (Malyn) Fernandez. The
petitioner, filed a petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code,
alleging that Malyn was psychologically incapacitated
to perform and comply with the essential marital
obligations at the time of their marriage. He claimed
that her psychological incapacity was manifested by her
immaturity, irresponsibility, and adultery.
RTC concluded held that both parties were
psychologically incapacitated to perform their essential
marital obligations. CA reversed the decision of RTC.
Issue
Whether Malyn was psychologically incapacitated to
perform her marital duties.
Ruling
14
The Court ruled that there was insufficient evidence to
prove Malyn's psychological incapacity. It held that the
allegations of immaturity, irresponsibility, and adultery
were not enough to establish psychological incapacity.
The court also noted that the children did not report
feeling neglected or abandoned by their mother.
157 Republic Of The Philippines, Versus. Liberato P.
Mola Cruz, G.R. No. 236629, July 23, 2018
FACTS:
Liberato Mola Cruz and Liezl entered into a
relationship. During their relationship, Liezl left for
Japan to work as an entertainer for 6 months.
Respondent and Liezl got married after the latter
returned home. Liezl confessed that she has a
relationship with a Japanese man that was still
continuing. Respondent forgave Liezl even if the latter
chose to walk away from the marriage.
Liezl again left and Respondent tried to move on.
Although he was in Singapore, Respondent tried to woo
Liezl back but he found out that she already cohabited
with her Japanese lover. This prompted Respondent to
file a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage
under Art. 36 of the Family Code.
RTC: Granted the petition and declared the marriage
void ab initio. The court relied on the psychological
report and testimony of expert witness, Dr. Tudla, a
clinical psychologist.
CA: Affirmed the RTC
ISSUE: Whether or not Liezl’s psychological incapacity
was sufficiently established as to warrant her inability
to comply with her marital obligations and annul the
marriage?
RULING:
YES. The Court found that the evidence presented by
the respondent met these requirements and upheld
the declaration of nullity of the marriage. The Court
explained that psychological incapacity refers to a
mental incapacity that causes a party to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants. The Court
also reiterated the guidelines set in previous cases,
including the burden of proof on the plaintiff, the need
for medical or clinical identification of the root cause,
and the requirement that the incapacity be existing at
the time of the marriage.
158
Republic Vs. Martin Nikolai Z. Javier And
Michelle K. Mercado-Javier (2018)
Facts
This case involves a petition for the declaration of
nullity of marriage filed by Martin Nikolai Z. Javier
against Michelle K. Mercado-Javier under Article 36 of
the Family Code. Martin alleged that both he and
Michelle were psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential obligations of marriage. He
presented the psychological findings of Dr. Elias D.
Adamos to support his claims. Dr. Adamos diagnosed
Michelle with Narcissistic Personality Disorder and
concluded that Martin suffered from the same disorder.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) dismissed the petition for
failure to establish a sufficient basis for the declaration
of nullity. Martin appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA),
which reversed the RTC's ruling and declared the
marriage null and void. The Republic of the Philippines
filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that there
was no basis for the CA's ruling.
Issue
The main issue in this case is whether there is sufficient
evidence to support the claim of psychological
incapacity of both parties to the marriage.
15
In 2013, Jeffrey sought to have their marriage declared
null based on Kris's alleged psychological incapacity. A
clinical psychologist, Dr. Leo Ruben C. Manrique,
conducted interviews with Jeffrey, Kris, and their
relatives.
During the trial, Jeffrey presented three witnesses,
including himself, his mother, and Dr. Manrique.
However, the trial court dismissed the petition, stating
that Jeffrey failed to prove the gravity, juridical
antecedence, and incurability of Kris's psychological
capacity.
Issue
Whether or not the respondent's psychological
incapacity is sufficient to warrant a declaration of
nullity of marriage.
Ruling
Yes, the court found that the Kris’s condition was
attended by gravity, juridical antecedence, and
incurability, which are the requirements for a
declaration of nullity based on psychological incapacity.
The court ruled in favor of the petitioner and declared
the marriage null and void.
160. Rosanna L. Tan-Andal Vs. Mario Victor M. Andal
The Supreme Court found that there was sufficient
evidence to support Martin's claim of psychological
incapacity. However, it disagreed with the CA's findings
that Michelle was psychologically incapacitated, as
there was no independent evidence to establish the
root cause of her alleged incapacity. The Court
modified the CA's decision and declared the marriage
null and void only with respect to Martin's
psychological incapacity.
Facts: Rosanna Tan married Mario Victor Andal in 1995,
but they were already observing him as irritable,
moody, and emotionally imbalanced. They discovered
he was a drug addict and had caused the family
business to close. In December 2000, Rosanna
separated from him and filed a petition in 2003 to
declare their marriage void, claiming Mario was
psychologically incapacitated to perform essential
marital obligations. Dr. Fonso Garcia found Mario
suffering from Narcissistic Antisocial Personality
Disorder.
159
Jeffrey M. Calma, Vs. Mari Kris Santos-Calma,
G.R. No. 242070, August 24, 2020
Issue: Whether or not the marriage between Rosanna
and Mario is void.
Facts
Ruling: The burden of proof in proving psychological
incapacity is still on the plaintiff. The Supreme Court
however clarified that the quantum of proof required
in nullity cases is clear and convincing evidence which
is more than preponderant evidence (ordinary civil
cases) but less than proof beyond reasonable
doubt(criminal cases). This is because marriage is
presumed valid and in this jurisdiction, a presumption
can only be rebutted with clear and convincing
evidence.
Ruling
Jeffrey and Kris met in 2005 while working as Jollibee
crew members. They became sexually intimate and Kris
became pregnant. Despite Jeffrey's admission of being
incapable of raising a family, they got married in August
2005.
When Jeffrey returned to the Philippines, he
discovered that Kris was cohabiting with another man
and was pregnant. Kris refused to talk to Jeffrey or visit
their son.
161. Bebery O. Santos-Macabata, Vs. Flaviano
Macabata, Jr. And Republic Of The Philippines
Facts: In 1996, a couple, who were working as factory
workers in Taiwan, started dating after a traumatic past.
They married in 1997 and had two children. Initially, the
couple enjoyed a peaceful marriage, but faced
disagreements over unemployment, drinking,
gambling, and womanizing. In 2000, the respondent
found work as an entertainer in Japan, but he claimed
to be single. Despite working in Japan and sending
money to the petitioner, he failed to send money and
ceased contact with his family in June 2002.
Issue: The issue before Us is whether or not the CA
erred when it reversed the Decision of the RTC and
issued a Decision finding that petitioner failed to
provide sufficient evidence that respondent is
psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital
obligations.
Ruling: Article 36 of the Family Code allows a marriage
to be void due to psychological incapacity. This
incapacity must be grave, rooted in the party's history,
and incurable, even if it becomes manifest only after
the marriage. The court ruled in Santos v. Court of
Appeals that such incapacity is void even if it becomes
manifest after the marriage.
162. Hannamer C. Pugoy-Solidum, Vs. Republic Of The
Philippines
Facts: Hannamer and Grant were classmates in high
school and became sweethearts. After giving birth,
Hannamer's mother convinced them to marry, but their
relationship deteriorated when Grant was unemployed
and couldn't contribute to their living expenses.
Hannamer's mother moved in with the couple, and
Grant never visited or sent financial support. In 2010,
Hannamer filed a petition for nullity of marriage,
claiming Grant was psychologically incapacitated and
lacked understanding of his duties. In 2011, Grant
appeared at a hearing, but only Hannamer appeared.
The Assistant Provincial Prosecutor couldn't determine
collusion due to Grant's absence, but she actively
participated in the proceedings to prevent fabricated
evidence.
Issue: Whether or not the petition for nullity of
marriage can be granted
Ruling: The petition for nullity of marriage under Article
36 of the Family Code lacks merit. To render a marriage
16
void, psychological incapacity must be grave, rooted in
the party's history, and incurable. Expert testimony is
crucial, but personal examination is not always
necessary. The petitioner bears a greater burden in
proving gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability
163. Maria Vicia Carullo-Padua, Vs. Republic Of The
Philippines And Joselito Padua
Facts: Maria Vicia Carullo-Padua filed a petition for the
declaration of absolute nullity of her marriage against
respondent Joselito Padua, alleging that he was
psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital
obligations. Maria presented herself and psychiatrist
Dr. Villegas as witnesses, who diagnosed Joselito with a
serious personality disorder. The trial court denied the
petition, stating that Maria's evidence failed to
overturn the legal presumption in favor of the validity
of her marriage. The appellate court sustained the trial
court's judgment.
Issue: Whether the totality of evidence presented by
Maria is sufficient to prove that Joselito is
psychologically incapacitated to perform his essential
marital obligations, meriting the dissolution of his
marriage with Maria.
Ruling: The Supreme Court used Tan-Andal guidelines
to determine incapacity, stating that it must be present
at the time of marriage, caused by a durable
personality structure, genuinely serious psychic cause,
and proven by clear evidence. The Court found that the
evidence presented by Maria was insufficient to
support the conclusion that Joselito was
psychologically incapacitated to perform the basic
obligations of marriage
164. Fernando C. Clavecilla, Represented By Atty.
Marvel C. Clavecilla
Facts: Petitioner and Marivic met in 1986 and married
in 1988. In 2006, Petitioner filed a Verified Petition for
the declaration of nullity of his marriage, claiming
Marivic was psychologically incapacitated to fulfill her
marital obligations. He claimed that Marivic was
carefree, nagger, and demanding, preferring the
company of friends over her family. Petitioner also
claimed that Marivic had no interest in finding
employment and did not provide for his basic needs.
Dr. Tayag conducted a psychological examination on
Petitioner, concluding that he was suffering from
Narcissistic Personality Disorder (NPD) and that his
marriage was beyond repair.
Issue: Whether or not the CA's decision to overturn the
RTC's decision was a reversible error, as it failed to
prove psychological incapacity. They argue that the
RTC's findings, supported by factual and clinical
evidence, substantiated their narcissistic tendencies.
Ruling: The RTC granted a petition in 2013 stating that
the petitioner was psychologically incapacitated,
despite unsuccessfully blaming Marivic for their failed
marriage. Dr. Tayag explained that this personality
disorder was deeply rooted in his personality.’
165
Edward N. Rivo vs Dolores S. Rivo
G.R. No. 210780, January 25, 2023
Facts:
In this legal case involving a Petition for Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage under Article 36, the petitioner
claimed the respondent was psychologically incapable
of fulfilling marital obligations due to work priorities,
hygiene neglect, and mistreatment of a child. The
petitioner admitted to extramarital affairs. The
Regional Trial Court granted the petition, but the Court
of Appeals reversed, stating insufficient evidence for
psychological incapacity and emphasizing the
petitioner's infidelity as a ground for legal separation,
not nullity. The case highlights differing interpretations
of Article 36, and further legal action may be pursued.
Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in its ruling.
Ruling:
No. In the Tan-Andal v. Andal case, the Supreme Court
established new criteria for assessing such incapacity,
requiring it to have existed at the time of marriage, be
caused by a durable aspect of one's personality, stem
from a genuinely serious psychic cause, and be proven
with clear and convincing evidence. The Court rejected
the petitioner's heavy reliance on expert opinions,
emphasizing that such opinions are not obligatory. It
stated that durable aspects of personality can be
proven through testimonies of ordinary witnesses. The
Court found that the petitioner's own statements
revealed awareness of marital obligations and positive
actions toward fulfilling them, leading to the conclusion
that the Court of Appeals did not err in reversing the
Regional Trial Court's decision.
17
166
Agnes Padrique Georfo vs Republic of the
Philippines
G.R. No. 246933, March 6, 2023
Facts:
In 2001, Agnes and Joe-Ar were forced to marry after
Agnes's family discovered they had slept together. The
marriage became troubled as Joe-Ar exhibited abusive
behavior, hitting Agnes during arguments. Agnes
moved to Cebu to escape the abuse and work. During
the 8 years of separation, Agnes filed a petition for the
nullity of their marriage, citing Joe-Ar's psychological
incapacity. Clinical psychologist Dr. Andres Gerong
testified that Joe-Ar displayed traits of narcissistic
personality disorder, rendering him incapable of
fulfilling marital duties. Joe-Ar did not present evidence
during the trial. The RTC declared the marriage null and
void, but the Solicitor General filed a Motion for
Reconsideration, challenging the reliance on the
psychological report and arguing for the lack of
independent witnesses.
Issue: Whether or not the psychological assessment
conducted by the doctor basing only on the testimonies
of the petitioner could be use as evidence for the nullity
of the marriage.
Ruling:
Yes. Psychological assessments based on testimonies of
petitioner and her sister may be given credence, unless
there are reasons to believe that the testimonies are
fabricated to favor the petitioner. As long as the totality
of the evidence establishes the private respondent's
psychological incapacity, the dissolution of the
marriage is warranted. Further, psychological
incapacity is a legal concept, not an illness which has to
be medically or clinically identified.
167
Roberto Domingo vs Court of Appeals and
Delia Soledad Avera
G.R. No. 104818
Facts:
This case involves a petition for the declaration of
nullity of marriage and separation of property filed by
Delia Soledad A. Domingo against Roberto Domingo.
Delia alleged that they were married on November 29,
1976, but she later discovered that Roberto had a
previous marriage with Emerlina dela Paz. Delia sought
the nullity of their marriage and the separation of their
properties, which she claimed were acquired using her
personal earnings.
Issue: Whether or not a petition for judicial declaration
of a void marriage is necessary and whether the
petition for nullity of marriage and separation of
property is the proper remedy for Delia to recover her
properties.
Ruling:
Yes. The court ruled that a judicial declaration of
absolute nullity of a prior marriage is necessary not
only for remarriage but also for other purposes such as
the division of properties and the determination of
custody and support of children. The court clarified
that the word "solely" in Article 40 of the Family Code
of the Philippines, which pertains to the absolute
nullity of a previous marriage, is meant to qualify the
phrase "final judgment declaring such previous
marriage void." It does not restrict the grounds for
declaring a previous marriage null and void to only
remarriage. Other evidence, testimonial or
documentary, can be presented to prove the existence
of grounds for nullity.
168
Lucio Morigo Y Cacho vs People of the
Philippines
G.R. No. 145226, February 06, 2004
Facts:
Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates in
Bohol. They lost contacts for a while but after receiving
a card from Barrete and various exchanges of letters,
they became sweethearts. They got married in 1990.
Barrete went back to Canada for work and in 1991 she
filed petition for divorce in Ontario Canada, which was
granted. In 1992, Morigo married Lumbago. He
subsequently filed a complaint for judicial declaration
of nullity on the ground that there was no marriage
ceremony. Morigo was then charged with bigamy and
moved for a suspension of arraignment since the civil
case pending posed a prejudicial question in the
bigamy case. Morigo pleaded not guilty claiming that
his marriage with Barrete was void ab initio. Petitioner
contented he contracted second marriage in good faith.
Issue: Whether or not Morigo must have filed
declaration for the nullity of his marriage with Barette
before his second marriage in order to be free from the
bigamy case.
Ruling:
18
Morigo’s marriage with Barrete is void ab initio
considering that there was no actual marriage
ceremony performed between them by a solemnizing
officer instead they just merely signed a marriage
contract. The petitioner does not need to file
declaration of the nullity of his marriage when he
contracted his second marriage with Lumbago. Hence,
he did not commit bigamy and is acquitted in the case
filed.
169
Luisito G. Pulido vs People of the Philippines
G.R. No. 220149, July 27, 2021
Facts:
Luisito G. Pulido was charged with bigamy for marrying
Rowena U. Baleda while his first marriage to Nora S.
Arcon was still valid. Pulido claimed both marriages
were void—his first due to the lack of a valid marriage
license and his second due to the absence of a marriage
ceremony. The Regional Trial Court convicted Pulido of
bigamy but acquitted Baleda. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the conviction but modified the penalty.
Issue: Whether or not an accused indicted for bigamy
can be exculpated based on the judicial declaration of
nullity of his first or second marriage.
Ruling:
Yes. The Supreme Court held that a subsequent judicial
declaration of nullity of the first and second marriages
can be considered a valid defense in a bigamy case.
They overturned their previous rulings that required a
prior declaration and emphasized the importance of an
official state pronouncement through the courts.
However, they clarified that a subsequent declaration
of nullity of the second marriage is not a valid defense
in bigamy.
170 Republic Of The Philippines, Vs. Gregorio Nolasco,
G.R. No. 94053 March 17, 1993
FACTS:
Nolasco claimed that his wife had been absent for more
than seven years and that he had a well-founded belief
that she was already dead. He presented evidence that
Janet Monica had left their conjugal home in San Jose,
Antique in 1982 and had not been heard from since
then. Nolasco also claimed that Janet Monica declined
to give any information about her personal background
and that all the letters he had sent to her were returned
to him and subsequently lost. He further testified that
he had inquired about her whereabouts from their
friends, but did not identify these friends in his
testimony. Nolasco also failed to explain the delay of
nine months from when he allegedly asked for leave
from his captain to return to San Jose. The trial court
granted Nolasco's petition, declaring Janet Monica
presumptively dead, and the Court of Appeals affirmed
the decision.
ISSUE:
Whether Gregorio Nolasco has established a wellfounded belief that his wife, Janet Monica Parker, is
already dead, as required by law for a judicial
declaration of presumptive death.
RULING:
The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court
of Appeals and nullified the trial court's decision. The
Court held that Nolasco failed to establish a wellfounded belief that Janet Monica was already dead.
The Court found that Nolasco's efforts to locate his wife
were insufficient, as he had confused London for
Liverpool and had not sought the help of local
authorities or the British Embassy. The Court also found
Nolasco's claim that Janet Monica declined to give any
information about her personal background and that
all the letters he had sent to her were returned to him
too convenient and not credible. Nolasco's failure to
explain the delay in his return to San Jose and his failure
to seek the help of the police or other authorities in
London and Liverpool further cast doubt on his claimed
belief that Janet Monica was dead.
171Grace J. Garcia, A.K.A. Grace J. Garcia-Recio, Vs.
Rederick A. Recio, G.R. No. 138322, October 2, 2001
FACTS:
This case involves a complaint for declaration of nullity
of marriage filed by Grace J. Garcia against Rederick A.
Recio on the ground of bigamy. Garcia alleged that
Recio had a prior subsisting marriage to Editha Samson
at the time he married her in 1994. During the trial,
Recio obtained a divorce decree from a family court in
Australia. The trial court ruled that the Australian
divorce had ended the marriage, thus, there was no
more marital union to nullify.
ISSUE:
19
The main issue raised in the case is whether the
Australian divorce decree obtained by Recio establishes
his legal capacity to remarry under his national law, and
whether there is sufficient evidence proving Recio's
legal capacity to marry Garcia.
RULING:
The Supreme Court held that the Australian divorce
decree did not establish Recio's legal capacity to
remarry under his national law. Therefore, there was no
basis for the trial court's ruling that the Australian
divorce restored Recio's capacity to remarry. The Court
also noted that there was no evidence proving Recio's
legal capacity to marry Garcia. The case was remanded
to the lower court for the purpose of receiving
evidence that conclusively shows Recio's legal capacity
to marry Garcia. If no such evidence is presented, the
court may declare the parties' marriage void on the
ground of bigamy.
172 Republic Of The Philippines, Vs. Robert P.
Narceda, G.R. No. 182760, April 10, 2013
FACTS:
The respondent, Robert P. Narceda, married Marina in
1987 when she was only 17 years old. Marina went to
Singapore in 1994 and never returned. Respondent
tried to look for her but was unsuccessful. A town mate
informed him that Marina was living with a
Singaporean husband. In 2002, respondent filed a
petition for the judicial declaration of the presumptive
death and/or absence of Marina.
The RTC granted respondent's petition, declaring the
presumptive death of Marina. The petitioner, through
the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), appealed the
decision to the CA, arguing that respondent failed to
establish a well-founded belief that his absentee
spouse was dead. However, the CA dismissed the
appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether the CA erred in dismissing the appeal filed by
the petitioner and whether the respondent was able to
establish a well-founded belief of his spouse's death.
RULING:
The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed
the decision of the CA, declaring the decision of the RTC
final and executory.
173 Celerina J. Santos, Vs. Ricardo T. Santos,. G.R. No.
187061. October 08, 2014
FACTS:
The Regional Trial Court of Tarlac City had declared
Celerina presumptively dead after her husband,
Ricardo T. Santos, filed a petition for declaration of
absence or presumptive death for the purpose of
remarriage. Ricardo remarried after the declaration.
Celerina argues that the judgment declaring her
presumptively dead was obtained through extrinsic
fraud, as Ricardo made false allegations regarding her
residence and absence. She claims that she never
resided in Tarlac and never left their conjugal dwelling
in Quezon City. Celerina also argues that the court did
not acquire jurisdiction over Ricardo's petition because
it was not published in a newspaper and the Office of
the Solicitor General and the Provincial Prosecutor's
Office were not furnished copies of the petition.
ISSUE:
Whether
the
judgment
declaring
Celerina
presumptively dead was obtained through extrinsic
fraud.
RULING:
The judgment declaring Celerina presumptively dead
had already become final, and the remedy of filing an
affidavit of reappearance under Article 42 of the Family
Code was no longer applicable. The Court emphasized
that the grounds for annulment of judgment are
extrinsic fraud, which refers to fraud that prevents a
party from having a fair opportunity to present their
case or that prevents the court from properly
considering the issues in the case.
174 Republic Of The Philippines, V. Jose B. Sareñogon,
Jr., G.R. No. 199194, February 10, 2016
FACTS:
The respondent, Jose B. Sareogon, Jr., filed a petition
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for the declaration
of presumptive death of his wife, Netchie S. Sareogon.
Jose testified that he and Netchie got married in 1996
but lived together for only a month before they went
abroad for work. Jose did not receive any
communication from Netchie for three months and was
unable to locate her. He filed the petition to contract
another marriage. The RTC granted the petition,
declaring Netchie presumptively dead. The Republic
appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals (CA),
20
arguing that Jose's efforts to locate Netchie were
insufficient and that he did not clearly state his
intention to remarry. The CA dismissed the appeal,
stating that certiorari is not the proper remedy to
correct errors of judgment. The Republic filed a petition
with the Supreme Court, arguing that certiorari is the
proper remedy and that Jose's efforts to locate Netchie
were not enough to establish a "well-founded belief" of
her death.
ISSUE:
Whether Jose's efforts to locate Netchie and his belief
that she is already dead meet the requirements for a
declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of
the Family Code.
RULING:
The court held that Jose's efforts to locate Netchie were
not sufficient to meet the strict standard required by
the Family Code. The court emphasized that a "passive
search" is not enough and that the petitioner must
present evidence of diligent and reasonable search,
such as contacting the absent spouse's relatives,
neighbors, and friends, reporting the disappearance to
the police or mass media, and undertaking a thorough
search for at least two years. Since Jose failed to meet
these requirements, the court concluded that there
was no basis for the trial court's finding that the
petition complied with the requisites of Article 41.
175 Republic v. Tampus
FACTS
This case involves a petition for review on certiorari
filed by the Republic of the Philippines (petitioner)
against Nilda B. Tampus (respondent). The case
revolves around the declaration of presumptive death
of respondent's spouse, Dante L. Del Mundo.
Nilda and Dante were married on November 29, 1975,
but three days later, Dante left Nilda and went to Jolo,
Sulu where he was assigned as a member of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines (AFP). Nilda made efforts to
locate Dante but was unsuccessful. After 33 years
without any communication from him, Nilda filed a
petition to declare Dante as presumptively dead for the
purpose of remarriage. The Regional Trial Court (RTC)
granted Nilda's petition, declaring Dante as
presumptively dead. The Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of
Appeals (CA) to challenge the RTC's decision. The CA
affirmed the RTC's decision, prompting the OSG to file
a petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme
Court.
ISSUE
The issue in this case is whether or not the CA erred in
upholding the RTC's decision declaring Dante as
presumptively dead.
RULING
Before a judicial declaration of presumptive death can
be obtained, it must be shown that the absent spouse
has been missing for four consecutive years and the
present spouse has a well-founded belief that the
absent spouse is already dead. The burden of proof
rests on the present spouse to show that all the
requisites for the declaration of presumptive death
exist.
In this case, Nilda failed to meet the stringent standard
and degree of due diligence required to create a "wellfounded belief" of Dante's death. While Nilda made
inquiries with Dante's parents, relatives, and
neighbors, she did not make any further efforts to
locate him. She could have sought help from the
authorities or the AFP itself, but she did not. Nilda also
did not present any corroborative evidence to support
her claim that she exerted efforts to find Dante.
Therefore, the Supreme Court concluded that Nilda's
claim of a "well-founded belief" that Dante is already
dead was not sufficiently proven.
176 Renato A. Castillo, Vs. Lea P. De Leon Castillo
FACTS
This case involves a Petition for Review on Certiorari
filed by Renato A. Castillo (petitioner) against Lea P. De
Leon Castillo (respondent). The petitioner is seeking to
reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) which
upheld the validity of the marriage between the
parties.
On May 25, 1972, respondent Lea P. De Leon Castillo
married Benjamin Bautista. On January 6, 1979,
respondent married petitioner Renato A. Castillo. On
May 28, 2001, petitioner filed a Petition for Declaration
of Nullity of Marriage, claiming that respondent's
marriage to Bautista was still subsisting at the time of
their marriage. Respondent opposed the petition,
arguing that her marriage to Bautista was null and void
due to the absence of a marriage license.
21
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) granted the petition and
declared the marriage between petitioner and
respondent null and void. However, the CA reversed
the decision of the RTC.
ISSUE
Whether or not the CA was correct in holding that a
judicial decree of nullity was not necessary to establish
the invalidity of a marriage.
RULING
The Court explained that under the Civil Code, a void
marriage is nonexistent from the beginning, while a
voidable marriage is valid until annulled by a
competent court. In this case, respondent's marriage to
Bautista was considered void due to the absence of a
marriage license. Therefore, it was as if the marriage
never existed, and respondent was not prevented from
contracting a second marriage.
177 Republic Of The Philippines, V. Remar A. Quiñonez
FACTS
This case involves a Petition for Review on Certiorari
filed by the Republic of the Philippines against Remar
A. Quionez. The case originated from a Judgment
issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Surigao City,
which declared Lovelyn Uriarte Quionez, Remar's wife,
presumptively dead under Article 41 of the Family
Code. The Court of Appeals (CA) upheld the RTC
Judgment, prompting the Republic to file a Petition for
Certiorari before the CA. The CA denied the petition,
prompting the Republic to file a Petition for Review on
Certiorari before the Supreme Court.
The facts of the case are as follows: Remar and Lovelyn
got married in 1997 and had two children. In 2001,
Lovelyn asked for Remar's permission to go on a threemonth vacation in Manila, but communication
between them ceased after Lovelyn's return. Remar
later found out that Lovelyn was cohabiting with
another man and would not be coming back. Despite
his efforts to locate her, Remar was unable to find
Lovelyn. In 2013, Remar filed a Petition for Declaration
of Presumptive Death before the RTC.
ISSUE
Whether or not the CA erred in upholding the
declaration of Lovelyn's presumptive death.
RULING
In this case, the Supreme Court found that Remar failed
to establish a well-founded belief of Lovelyn's death.
The Court noted that Remar's efforts to locate Lovelyn
were insufficient. Although he traveled to several
places where Lovelyn was reportedly seen and
constantly communicated with her relatives for ten
years, he failed to provide details of the extent of his
search and the information he learned from these
communications.
The Court also considered the allegations in Remar's
petition, which suggested that he is aware of the true
cause of Lovelyn's disappearance. This indicates that
Lovelyn may not want to be found rather than being
deceased.
Based on these reasons, the Court concluded that
Remar's efforts fell short of the requirement for a wellfounded belief of Lovelyn's death. Therefore, the
petition for declaration of presumptive death was
denied.
178. Republic Of The Philippines, Vs. Josephine PoncePilapil
FACTS
Josephine Ponce-Pilapil filed a petition for the
declaration of presumptive death of her husband,
Agapito S. Pilapil, Jr. Josephine and Agapito got married
in 1982 and had two children. In 1994, Agapito left their
conjugal home and never returned. Josephine made
efforts to locate him but was unsuccessful. She filed a
petition for the declaration of presumptive death of
Agapito in 2006 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Mandaue City. The RTC granted the petition, declaring
Agapito as presumptively dead. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the RTC's decision.
ISSUE
Whether or not Agapito can be declared as
presumptively dead.
RULING
The Court explained that a declaration of presumptive
death must be based on a well-founded fact of death.
Mere absence or being missing, no matter how certain
and undisputed, does not automatically lead to a
judicial presumption of death. In this case, Josephine
was only able to establish that Agapito's whereabouts
are indeterminable. There were no circumstances that
definitely suggest Agapito's death. Therefore, the Court
22
cannot consider Josephine's civil status as that of a
widow.
179. Social Security System vs. VDA. De Leon
FACTS
Clemente Bailon and Alice Diaz were married in 1955.
In 1970, Bailon filed a petition to declare Alice
presumptively dead, which was granted by the Court of
First Instance (CFI). In 1983, Bailon married Teresita
Jarque. Bailon was a member of the Social Security
System (SSS) and a retiree pensioner. When Bailon died
in 1998, Teresita filed a claim for funeral benefits and
death benefits, which were granted by the SSS.
However, Cecilia Bailon-Yap, who claimed to be Bailon's
daughter, contested the release of benefits, claiming
that Bailon had three marriages and that all the
documents submitted by Teresita were spurious.
Norma Bailon Chavez, another alleged daughter of
Bailon, supported Cecilia's claim. Hermes P. Diaz,
claiming to be the brother and guardian of "Aliz P.
Diaz," also filed a claim for death benefits. Elisa and
seven of her children also filed claims for death
benefits. The SSS recommended the cancellation of
benefits to Teresita and the refund of the amount paid
to her.
ISSUE
Whether or not Teresita is the legitimate spouse and
primary beneficiary of Clemente Bailon, and whether
she is entitled to the pension benefits.
RULING
The SSC ruled that Teresita is not the legitimate spouse
and primary beneficiary of Bailon. The SSC ordered her
to refund the death benefits and funeral benefits she
received. The SSC also ordered the SSS to pay Alice
Diaz-Bailon the appropriate death benefit. Teresita filed
a petition for review before the Court of Appeals (CA),
which reversed the SSC's decision and ordered the SSS
to pay Teresita all the pension benefits due to her. The
CA held that the SSS cannot declare the second
marriage null and void without a proper judicial
declaration.
180. Dorothy B. Terre, Vs. Atty. Jordan Terre
Facts:
The case involves a complaint filed by Dorothy B. Terre
against Atty. Jordan Terre for "grossly immoral
conduct." The complaint alleges that Atty. Terre
contracted a second marriage with another woman,
Helina Malicdem, while his first marriage with Dorothy
Terre was still subsisting. Atty. Terre initially evaded
service of the complaint and the court's resolution, but
eventually filed an answer claiming that he believed his
marriage with Dorothy Terre was null and void ab initio
because she was already married to someone else. He
argued that he contracted the second marriage in good
faith.
Issue: WON Atty. Terre's actions constitute "grossly
immoral conduct" under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court, which would provide sufficient basis for
his disbarment.
Ruling: The court ruled in favor of Dorothy B. Terre and
ordered the disbarment of Atty. Jordan Terre. The court
found Atty. Terre's defense to be spurious and lacking
in merit. It noted that he had not rebutted Dorothy
Terre's evidence and that his argument was the same
one he used to convince her to marry him. The court
held that Atty. Terre's actions constituted "grossly
immoral conduct" under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court, which provided sufficient basis for his
disbarment.
181. Virginia A. Leonor, Vs. Court Of Appeals, Hon.
Rolindo D. Beldia, Jr., G.R. No. 112597 April 2, 1996
Facts:
The petitioner, Virginia, was married to Mauricio on
March 13, 1960, and they had three children together.
However, Mauricio became unfaithful and lived with
another woman abroad. Virginia filed a civil action for
separation and alimony in Switzerland, while Mauricio
counter-sued for divorce. The Swiss court granted the
divorce but reserved the liquidation of the matrimonial
partnership. Mauricio then raised the issue of the
alleged non-existence of their marriage. Virginia later
discovered that their marriage contract was not
registered with the Civil Registrar of San Carlos City. She
applied for the late registration of their marriage, which
was granted. Mauricio, however, filed a petition for the
cancellation of the late registration, claiming that their
marriage was null and void.
Issue: WON should have appealed the trial court's
decision instead of filing a petition for certiorari and
whether the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review
the decision of the Court of Appeals.
Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Virginia and
held that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to
23
declare the marriage null and void and order the
cancellation of its entry in the civil registry. The Court
emphasized that the only errors that can be cancelled
or corrected under Rule 108 are typographical or
clerical errors, not material or substantial ones like the
validity or nullity of a marriage. The Court also stated
that a summary proceeding under Rule 108 cannot be
used to change the civil status of the parties from
married to single and their children from legitimate to
illegitimate. The trial court's decision was declared null
and void.
182. Emilio R. Tuason Vs. Court of Appeals and Maria
Victoria L. Tuason
G.R. No. 116607 April 10, 1996
Facts:
Maria Victoria Lopez Tuason, filed a petition for
declaration of nullity of her marriage under
psychological incapacity alleging that the petitioner
used prohibited drugs, was a womanizer, and left the
conjugal home to cohabit with other women. The
private respondent further alleged that the petitioner
abused his administration of the conjugal partnership
by alienating assets and incurring large obligations
without her consent.
The petitioner denied the allegations and claimed that
their marriage was normal but they began to have
serious personal differences.
The court then rendered a decision declaring the nullity
of the marriage and awarding custody of the children
to the private respondent
Issue: WON the petitioner was deprived of due process.
Ruling: The court ruled that the petitioner cannot claim
deprivation of due process because he actively
participated in the proceedings below. He filed his
answer to the petition, cross-examined the private
respondent's witnesses, and submitted his opposition
to the motion for dissolution of the conjugal
partnership of gains. The court also ruled that a petition
for relief from judgment is an equitable remedy and is
only allowed in exceptional cases where there is no
other available or adequate remedy.
183. Engrace Niñal Vs. Norma Bayadog, G.R. No.
133778, March 14, 2000
Facts:
Petitioners Niñal were the children of Pepito Niñal
during marriage. Pepito killed their mother and one
year and 8 months later married respondent Bayadog
without marriage license. However, they executed an
affidavit that they have cohabited together for at least
five years and thus were exempted from securing a
marriage license. In Feb 1997, Pepito died and the
petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of
the second marriage due to absence of marriage
license. The petition was grounded on the assumption
that it might affect the successional rights of the Niñals.
Issue: WON Bayadog’s contention valid.
Ruling: No. Bayadog contends that the Niñals have no
cause of action because they are not among those
listed under Article 47 of the Family Code. Article 47
provides causes or grounds of action where a marriage
may be annulled. However, these are grounds for
voidable marriages and not for void marriages. Void
marriages may be questioned even after the death of
either of the parties (this is sometimes called “can be
collaterally attacked”) but voidable marriages may only
be questioned during the lifetime of the parties.
184. Oscar P. Mallion, Vs. Editha Alcantara
G.R. No. 141528 October 31, 2006
Facts:
The petitioner filed a petition for declaration of nullity
of his marriage to the respondent on the ground of
psychological incapacity. The Regional Trial Court (RTC)
denied the petition, and the Court of Appeals dismissed
the appeal for failure to pay the necessary fees. The RTC
granted the respondent's motion to dismiss, citing
forum shopping and multiplicity of suits. The
petitioner's motion for reconsideration was also
denied.
Issue: WON previous final judgment denying a petition
for declaration of nullity on the ground of psychological
incapacity bars a subsequent petition for declaration of
nullity on the ground of lack of marriage license.
Ruling: The court ruled that the two petitions brought
by the petitioner seeking the declaration of nullity of
his marriage are anchored on separate causes of action.
However, the court held that the causes of action are
not different because they both seek the same relief,
which is the declaration of nullity of the marriage. The
court explained that the grounds cited by the petitioner
essentially split the various aspects of the pivotal issue
of the actual status of the marriage.
24
185. Estrellita Juliano-Llave, Vs. Republic Of The
Philippines, Haja Putri Zorayda A. Tamano And Adib
Ahmad A. Tamano, G.R. No. 169766, March 30, 2011
Facts:
Sen. Tamano married Estrellita twice—first under
Islamic laws and tradition on May 27, 1993, and
subsequently under a civil ceremony on June 2, 1993.
Sen. Tamano's civil status was indicated as "divorced"
in their marriage contracts. Sen. Tamano's legitimate
children filed a complaint for the declaration of nullity
of his marriage to Estrellita, alleging bigamy. Estrellita
argued that the RTC lacked jurisdiction due to PD No.
1083, the Muslim Code. The RTC denied her motion to
dismiss, leading to a petition for certiorari with the CA,
which upheld the RTC's jurisdiction. The RTC later
declared the marriage void, affirmed by the CA.
Issues:
Whether Zorayda had standing to file the nullity case.
Held:
Yes, Zorayda had standing to file the nullity case. The
interested party in a void marriage, in which no
marriage took place, can attack the marriage directly or
collaterally without prescription. Zorayda and her son
filed the case within their rights. The petition is denied.
186. Reinel Anthony B. De Castro Vs. Annabelle
Assidao-De Castro, G.R. No. 160172, February 13,
2008
Facts:
Reinel and Annabelle applied for a marriage license but
found it expired when they returned. To proceed, they
executed a fake affidavit stating they had lived together
for five years and got married in March 1995. After the
ceremony, they didn't live together. Annabelle gave
birth in November 1995. In 1998, Annabelle filed a
support complaint against Reinel. He claimed the
marriage was void, coerced, and he never lived with
Annabelle or acknowledged the child.
Issue:
Whether the marriage is valid and whether Reinel is
obligated to support the child.
Held:
The marriage is not valid. Reinel's collateral attack on
its validity is allowed if essential to the case. Evidence
shows they lacked a marriage license and presented a
false affidavit. Their marriage is void ab initio.
Regarding support, the child is Reinel's illegitimate
daughter, entitled to support. The birth certificate and
Reinel's affidavit admitting paternity provide sufficient
evidence. Despite Reinel's claim of coercion, evidence
suggests otherwise.
187. Susan Nicdao Cariño, Vs. Susan Yee Cariño, G.R.
No. 132529. February 2, 2001
Facts:
SPO4 Santiago S. Cariño had two marriages, first with
Susan Nicdao Cariño and later with Susan Yee Cariño.
He had two children with Nicdao but none with Yee.
Santiago fell ill in 1988, and after his death in 1992,
both Nicdao and Yee claimed death benefits. Nicdao
received P146,000, while Yee got P21,000. Yee sued
Nicdao, arguing the first marriage lacked a marriage
license. The trial court ruled in Yee's favor, ordering
Nicdao to pay Yee half of the death benefits.
Issue:
Whether Santiago Cariño's marriage to Susan Nicdao is
void for lack of a marriage license.
Ruling:
No. Under the Civil Code in force during their marriage
in 1969, a valid marriage license is required unless
certain exceptions apply. The absence of a license
makes the marriage void ab initio. Yee and Cariño's
marriage is also void ab initio because there was no
judicial decree of nullity for Cariño's marriage to Nicdao
at the time of the second marriage. Both marriages are
considered bigamous. According to Article 148 of the
Family Code, properties acquired through joint
contributions belong to co-ownership. The decisions of
the trial court and Court of Appeals are affirmed.
188. Amelia Garcia-Quiazon, Jenneth Quiazon And
Maria Jennifer Quiazon, vs. Ma. Lourdes Belen, For
And In Behalf Of Maria Lourdes Elise Quiazon, G.R. No.
189121, July 31, 2013
FACTS:
Elise Quiazon, daughter of Eliseo Quiazon and Ma.
Lourdes Belen, filed a Petition for Letters of
Administration after Eliseo's death, asserting her status
as his natural child. Filiation was evidenced by her Birth
Certificate signed by Eliseo. Elise aimed to invalidate
Eliseo's marriage to Amelia Garcia-Quiazon, alleging it
was bigamous. Respondent Amelia opposed,
25
challenging the venue of the petition. The RTC ruled in
Elise's favor.
ISSUE:
Whether Elise has a cause of action for the declaration
of nullity of Eliseo's marriage to Amelia, and if she is
considered an interested party in the estate.
RULING:
Yes, Elise has a cause of action. In a void marriage, any
interested party can challenge its validity directly or
collaterally without prescription, even beyond the
parties' lifetimes. As a compulsory heir, Elise can
impugn the marriage after her father's death. She is
deemed an interested party with successional rights
and has a vested interest in the estate distribution. The
SC affirmed the RTC decision.
189. Braza Vs. Civil Registrar Of Negros Occidental G.R.
No. 181174, December 4, 2009
Facts:
Ma. Cristina Braza and Pablo Braza Jr. were married in
1978. After Pablo's death in a vehicular accident in
2002, Lucille Titular and her son Patrick introduced
themselves as Pablo's wife and son. Patrick's birth
certificate showed acknowledgment by Pablo and
legitimation through the parents' subsequent marriage
in 1998. Cristina, along with her legitimate children
with Pablo, filed a petition to correct Patrick's birth
certificate, claiming the marriage between Pablo and
Lucille was bigamous.
Issue:
Whether the court, in a petition to correct civil registry
entries, has jurisdiction to rule on the validity of
marriage, legitimacy, and filiation.
Held:
No. In a Rule 108 proceeding for correction of entries,
the court lacks jurisdiction to nullify marriages, rule on
legitimacy, and determine filiation. The petition
essentially sought to declare Pablo and Lucille's
marriage void and challenge Patrick's legitimacy,
matters governed by A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC and the
Family Code, mandating filing in a Family Court. Validity
of marriages, legitimacy, and filiation should be
questioned through direct actions, not collateral
attacks. The petition is denied.
190 Godofredo Buccat, Vs. Luida Mangonon De
Buccat(1941)
Facts:
Godofredo Buccat sought the annulment of his
marriage to Luida Mangonon de Buccat, citing her
assurance of virginity as the basis for consent. They
married on November 26, 1938, in Baguio City. After 89
days, the defendant gave birth, leading to
abandonment by the plaintiff. Despite proper
summons, the defendant didn't appear in court, and
the lower court ruled in her favor. Buccat appealed the
decision.Issue: Whether the marriage should be
annulled based on his claim that the defendant
deceived him by falsely representing herself as a virgin.
Ruling :
No, the plaintiff's claim that he had no suspicion of the
defendant's pregnancy was deemed implausible,
considering that the defendant was in an advanced
stage of pregnancy. The court also dismissed the
plaintiff's argument that it is not uncommon for people
to have developed abdomens, considering that the
plaintiff was a first-year law student. The court
emphasized that marriage is a sacred institution and
requires clear and convincing evidence to be annulled,
which was lacking in this case.
191 CESAR REYES VS. AGRIPINO ZABALLERO | GR No.
L-3561 May 23, 1951
On October 1, 1942, Reyes loaned P6,500 to Zaballero
with 10% upfront interest. Land in Lucena, Quezon, was
mortgaged. 1942 and 1943 installments were paid in
Japanese Military Scrip. In November 1944, Zaballero
promised the third installment in Japanese notes, but
Reyes refused, citing contract options. Despite refusal,
Zaballero paid the entire balance of P5,812 the next
day. Reyes, advised by attorneys, accepted, released
the mortgage, and registered it. After liberation, Reyes
sued for debt recovery, claiming duress. Lower court
and CA ruled in favor of Zaballero, stating Reyes
accepted the money without duress.
Issue : Whether or not the payment made by Zaballero
was voluntarily accepted
Ruling : Yes. The Court held that, although Cesar Reues
accepted the money reluctantly, the same does not
detract from the voluntariness of his act. Mere
reluctance does not detract from the voluntariness of
one's act. There is duress or intimidation when one of
26
the concentrating parties is inspired by a rational and
well- grounded fear of suffering an imminent and
serious injury to his person or property, or to the
person or property of his spouse, descendants or
ascendants.
192 FERNANDO AQUINO vs.CONCHITA DELIZO (1960)
Facts :
The petitioner filed for the annulment of his marriage
with Conchita Delizo, alleging fraud due to her
concealing pregnancy from another man. Despite the
court's dismissal for lack of evidence, the Court of
Appeals acknowledged excusable neglect in presenting
the child's birth certificate. The petitioner, claiming
ignorance of the pregnancy, attempted to provide
additional evidence, including certificates and affidavits
about the respondent's children with his brother, Cesar
Aquino. However, the appellate court affirmed the
dismissal, citing excusable negligence in obtaining and
presenting this evidence earlier.Issue : Whether or not
concealment of pregnancy as alleged by Aquino would
constitute as fraud, and would be a ground for
annulment of marriage
Ruling :
Yes, Under the new Civil Code, concealment by the wife
of the fact that at the time of the marriage, she was
pregnant by a man other than her husband constitutes
fraud and is ground for annulment of marriage. (Art. 85,
par. (4) in relation to Art. 86, par. (3). The decision
complained of is set aside and the case remanded to
the court a quo for new trial. Delizo was alleged to be
only more than four months pregnant at the time of her
marriage to plaintiff. At that stage, it is difficult to say
that her pregnancy was readily apparent, especially
since she was "naturally plump" or fat as alleged by
plaintiff.
193 Joel Jimenez, Vs. Remedios Canizares, (1960)
Fact :
The case involves a complaint filed by Joel Jimenez on
June 7, 1955, in the Court of First Instance of
Zamboanga, seeking the annulment of his marriage to
Remedios Caizares. The marriage was contracted on
August 3, 1950, before a judge of the municipal court
of Zamboanga City. Jimenez claims that Caizares'
genitals or vagina were too small to allow the
penetration of a male organ for copulation.
The court directed the city attorney of Zamboanga to
inquire whether there was collusion between the
parties and, if not, to intervene for the State to ensure
that the evidence for the plaintiff was not fabricated.
The court also ordered Caizares to undergo a physical
examination by a competent lady physician to
determine her physical capacity for copulation.
Issue : Whether the marriage can be annulled based
solely on the testimony of Jimenez, who claims that
Caizares is impotent
Ruling:
The court ruled that the annulment of the marriage
cannot be granted based solely on the testimony of
Jimenez. The court set aside the decree of annulment
and remanded the case to the lower court for further
proceedings. The court held that the impotency of
Caizares was not satisfactorily established because she
did not participate in the proceedings and refused to
undergo a medical examination. While her refusal may
show indifference, it does not give rise to the
presumption of suppression of evidence.
27
The court cited Article 85, No. 4 of the Civil Code, which
provides that a marriage may be annulled if the consent
of either party was obtained through fraud. marital
relationship does not fall within the enumerated
circumstances and is excluded by the law.
195 Florence Teves Macarrubo vs. Atty. Edmundo
Macarrubo, A.C. No. 6148 , Feb 27, 2004
Facts :
A disbarment complaint was filed against Atty.
Edmundo Macarrubo who had a subsisting marriage
with Helen Esparza (with whom he had two children)
before he entered into a second marriage with Florence
Macarrubo (with whom he also had two children),
herein Complainant. It was further averred that Atty.
Macarrubo also entered into a third marriage with one
Josephine Constantino. On the other hand, Atty.
Macarrubo claims that he was able to secure the
annulment of his first two marriages and is in the
process of procuring one for his third.
Issue : 1.) Whether or not Atty. Marrubo’s marriage to
the complainant Florence is bigamous;
194 Aurora A. Anaya, V. Fernando 0. Palaroan, G.R.
No. L-27930. November 26, 1970
Facts:
Aurora A. Anaya filed for the annulment of her
marriage to Fernando O. Palaroan, alleging fraud due
to his non-disclosure of a pre-marital relationship with
a close relative. They were married on December 4,
1953. Despite Fernando's earlier unsuccessful attempt
to annul the marriage, the Court of First Instance of
Manila upheld its validity and granted Aurora's
counterclaim. During negotiations, Fernando disclosed
the pre-marital secret. Aurora argued that this nondisclosure constituted fraud and sought the annulment
of the marriage along with moral damages.
Ruling :
Yes, the complainant and the respondent started living
as husband and wife even when his first marriage was
still subsisting, rendering him liable for concubinage.
The court found the respondent guilty of gross
immorality and ordered his disbarment from the
practice of law.
Such conduct is inconsistent with the good moral
character that is required for the continued right to
practice law as a member of the Philippine Bar.
196. Manuel G. Almelor, Vs. The Hon. Regional Trial
Court Of Las Piiias City, Branch 254, And Leonida T.
Almelor, G.R. No. 179620
Issue:
Facts:
Whether the non-disclosure of a husband's pre-marital
relationship with another woman is a ground for the
annulment of marriage.
Manuel Almelor and Leonida Trinidad, both medical
practitioners, married in 1989. 11 years later, Leonida
sought to annul their marriage, claiming Manuel's
psychological incapacitation. Leonida testified that
Manuel is harsh, unconventional, and affectionate
towards his mother while concealing his
homosexuality. The RTC ruled their marriage void due
to fraud, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the
decision. Manuel's closeness to male companions and
Ruling:
No, the Supreme Court ruled that the non-disclosure of
a husband's pre-marital relationship with another
woman is not a ground for the annulment of marriage.
concealment of homosexuality further fueled their
conflict.
Issue: Whether or not the marriage between the two
can be declared as null and void due to fraud because
of Manuel’s concealment of his homosexuality.
Ruling: The SC ruled that homosexuality is not a ground
to nullify a marriage, but concealment of it. In the case
at bar, it's not proven that Manuel is homosexual, and
the lower court should not use public perception as
evidence. Manuel's peculiarities are not conclusive.
197. Republic Of The Philippines, V. Mel Via T.
Villacorta, G.R. No. 249953, June 23, 2021
Facts:
Melvin and Janufi met in 1996 while studying at
Southwestern University, Cebu City. They ended their
relationship in 2000, and Melvin later learned that
Janufi was pregnant. They reconciled and had a baby
girl named Mejan Dia in 2001. They married in 2004
and had a second child named Javen Mel. During their
marriage, the paternity of Mejan Dia became an issue.
In 2010, Melvin took a DNA test, which revealed a 0.0%
probability that Melvin was the father of Mejan Dia. In
2011, Janufi admitted to lying to Melvin, but he filed a
petition for annulment of marriage before the RTC in
2011. The RTC annulled the marriage in 2017 due to
Janufi's fraudulent concealment of the truth about her
pregnancy by another man. The Republic appealed to
the CA, and the OSG filed a motion for an extension to
file the appellate brief.
Issue: Whether the CA erred in dismissing the OSG's
appeal.
Ruling: The Petition has merit. The CA erred in
dismissing the OSG's appeal pursuant to Rule 50,
Section 1(e) of the Rules. More importantly, the CA
should have resolved the substantial arguments raised
by the OSG, considering that the RTC's November 16,
2017 Decision was inconsistent with the express
wordings of the Family Code.
198. Ong Eng Kiam A.K.A. William Ong, Vs. Lucita G.
Ong, G.R. No. 153206 ,October 23, 2006
Facts: Lucita filed a Complaint for Legal Separation in
1996, alleging that her life with her husband, William,
was marked by physical violence, threats, intimidation,
and abusive conduct. After three years of marriage,
28
they quarreled daily, with William using physical force
to slap, kick, and bang her head. The fights were
primarily related to their children or business. In
December 1995, William slapped Lucita after
protesting William's decision to allow their eldest son
Kingston to go to Bacolod. In a violent quarrel, William
hit Lucita on her head, left cheek, eye, stomach, and
arms. She was taken to her sister's house in Binondo
and treated for her injuries. William denied any
physical harm or insulting language. On January 5,
1998, the RTC declared legal separation, with the
dissolution and liquidation of the conjugal partnership
properties.
Issues: WON Lucita Ong should be granted a decree on
legal separation
Ruling: Lucita filed a case against her husband for
control of conjugal properties, but the court found her
actions were due to physical violence and abusive
behavior. The trial court respected the credibility of
witnesses, finding their testimonies not biased. The
Family Code's abandonment provision does not apply
to Lucita's departure due to abusive conduct. The court
ruled that Lucita should be granted a decree of legal
separation.
199. Carmen Lapuz Sy, Vs. Eufemio S. Eufemio Alias
Eufemio Sy Uy, G.R. No. L-30977 January 31, 1972
Facts: In 1953, Carmen O. Lapuz Sy filed a petition for
legal separation against Eufemio S. Eufemio, alleging
they were married in 1934, had no children, acquired
properties, and discovered Eufemio cohabiting with a
Chinese woman named Go Hiok in 1949. Eufemio
counter-claimed for nullity ab initio of his marriage,
citing his prior marriage with Go Hiok. In 1969, Carmen
died in a vehicular accident, and Eufemio dismissed the
case, arguing that the death abated the action for legal
separation.
Issue: WON Does the death of the plaintiff before final
decree, in an action for legal separation, abate the
action?
Ruling: The Civil Code of the Philippines acknowledges
that a legal separation action is purely personal,
allowing only innocent spouses to claim it. It also allows
reconciliation between spouses to stop proceedings
and rescind a decree. The death of one party causes the
action's death.
200. Enrico L. Pacete, Clarita De La Concepcion,
Emelda C. Pacete, Evelina C. Pacete And Eduardo C.
Pacete, Vs. Hon. Glicerio V. Carriaga
Facts: In 1938, Ernesto Pacete and Concepcion Alanis
were married. Pacete contracted another marriage to
Clarita de la Concepcion, which Alanis discovered in
1979. Alanis filed a complaint for nullity of marriage
and legal separation. The defendants filed motions for
extension, but the court denied them. The Court of
First Instance declared Pacete and Alanis in default and
declared the marriage null and void. The legal
separation was decreed on March 17, 1980.
Issue: WON the Court of First Instance commit grave
abuse of discretion?
Ruling: A petition for certiorari is applicable when a
decision is declared due to grave abuse of discretion.
Article 101 of the Civil Code mandates that no decree
of legal separation should be based on stipulation of
facts or confession of judgment. If the defendant does
not appear, the court must investigate collusion
between the parties and intervene for the State to
ensure the evidence is not fabricated. The State is
interested in the integrity of marriage and noncompliance with these procedures is not excused.
201
Benjamin Bugayong vs Leonila Ginez
G.R. No. L-10033, December 28, 1956
Facts:
Benjamin Bugayong filed for legal separation against his
wife, Leonila Ginez, citing alleged infidelity. They
married in 1949 but faced marital issues. Benjamin
received anonymous reports of Leonila's infidelity,
confronted her in 1952, and lived together briefly. The
court initially dismissed the case due to Benjamin’s
temporary cohabitation with Leonila constituting
condonation, suggesting Benjamin forgave Leonila's
actions. Benjamin appealed to the Court of Appeals,
which referred the case to the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether or not Benjamin’s conduct of
cohabiting with Leonila after he believed she had
committed adultery amounts to condonation, thereby
depriving him of the right to file for legal separation.
Ruling:
Yes. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Leonila,
affirming the dismissal of the case. The court held that
Benjamin's conduct of sleeping with Leonila for two
nights despite his belief in her infidelity constituted
29
condonation. According to Article 100 of the Civil Code,
the legal separation can only be claimed by the
innocent spouse if there has been no condonation or
consent to the adultery.
202
Jose De Ocampo s Serafina Florenciano
G.R. No. L-13553, February 23, 1960
Facts:
This case involves an action for legal separation filed by
Jose de Ocampo against his wife, Serafina Florenciano,
on the ground of adultery. The complaint was filed on
July 5, 1955, and it described their marriage performed
in 1938 and the commission of adultery by Serafina
with Jose Arcalas in March 1951 and with Nelson
Orzame in June 1955. The defendant did not answer
the complaint, and the court defaulted her. Pursuant to
Article 101 of the New Civil Code, the court ordered the
provincial fiscal to investigate whether collusion existed
between the parties. The fiscal examined the
defendant under oath and reported to the court that
there was no collusion. The plaintiff presented his
evidence, which included testimonies from various
witnesses.
Issue: Whether or not the husband’s right to legal
separation on the ground of adultery had prescribed.
Ruling:
Yes, but The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the
petitioner, Jose de Ocampo, and granted the legal
separation. The Court held that the husband's right to
legal separation on the ground of adultery with Jose
Arcalas had prescribed because the action was not filed
within one year from the discovery of the infidelity.
However, the Court found that there was evidence of
adultery with Nelson Orzame, and therefore, the legal
separation could be granted based on this ground.
203
Soccoro Matubis vs Zoilo Praxedes
G.R. No. L-11766, October 25, 1960
Facts:
The case involves a complaint for legal separation and
change of surname filed by Socorro Matubis against her
husband,
Zoilo
Praxedes.
Matubis
alleged
abandonment and concubinage as grounds for the legal
separation. Praxedes denied the allegations and
claimed that it was Matubis who left the conjugal
home. During the trial, Matubis presented oral and
documentary evidence to support her claims. It was
established that Matubis and Praxedes were legally
married on January 10, 1943, but agreed to live
separately from each other on May 30, 1944. They
entered into an agreement on April 3, 1948, which
stated that they relinquished their rights as legal
husband and wife, were free to have other partners
without interference, and were not entitled to support
from each other. In January 1955, Praxedes began
cohabiting with Asuncion Rebulado, and in September
1955, Rebulado gave birth to a child who was recorded
as Praxedes' child.
Issue: Whether or not the complaint for legal
separation was filed within the prescribed period.
Ruling:
The court dismissed the complaint for legal separation.
The court held that the complaint was not filed within
the prescribed period as provided by Article 102 of the
new Civil Code, which states that an action for legal
separation must be filed within one year from the date
the plaintiff became aware of the cause and within five
years from the date the cause occurred. The court
found that Matubis became aware of Praxedes'
concubinage in January 1955 but only filed the
complaint in April 1956, which was beyond the oneyear period.
204
William H. Brown vs Juanita Yambao
G.R. No. L-10699, October 18, 1957
Facts:
On July 14, 1955, William H. Brown filed a suit in the
Court of First Instance of Manila to obtain legal
separation from his wife, Juanita Yambao. Brown
alleged that while he was interned by the Japanese
invaders from 1942 to 1945, his wife engaged in
adulterous relations with another man and had a child
with him. Brown claimed that he only learned of his
wife's misconduct in 1945, upon his release from
internment. The spouses lived separately after that and
executed a document liquidating their conjugal
partnership. Brown's complaint sought confirmation of
the liquidation agreement, custody of their children,
and a declaration that the defendant is disqualified to
succeed him.
Issue: Whether or not Brown’s action for legal
separation has already prescribed.
Ruling:
Yes. The court found that Brown's action for legal
separation was already barred by prescription. Under
30
Article 102 of the Civil Code, an action for legal
separation must be filed within one year from the
plaintiff becoming aware of the cause and within five
years from the date when the cause occurred. Brown
did not file the action until ten years after he learned of
his wife's adultery, thus exceeding the prescribed
period.
205
Elena Contreras vs Cesar J. Macaraig
G.R. No. L-29138, May 29, 1970
Facts:
Elena Contreras filed a complaint for legal separation
against her husband, Cesar Macaraig, in December
1963. The trial court dismissed the complaint, stating
that it was filed more than one year after Elena became
aware of the cause for legal separation. The facts
established by the trial court are as follows: Elena and
Cesar were married in March 1952 and had three
children. In September 1962, Elena's driver informed
her that Cesar was living with another woman named
Lily Ann Alcala. Elena refrained from discussing the
matter with Cesar in order to avoid angering him. In
April 1963, Elena heard rumors that Cesar was seen
with a pregnant woman, but she did not confront him
about it. In December 1963, Elena pleaded with Cesar
to give up Lily Ann and return to their family, but Cesar
refused.
Issue: Whether or not the action for legal separation
had already prescribed.
Ruling:
No. The Supreme Court held that the one-year period
should be counted from December 1963, when Elena
truly became aware of Cesar's infidelity. The court
reasoned that the one-year period should be counted
from the time when the innocent spouse acquires
reliable information about the other spouse's infidelity.
The court rejected the argument that the period should
be counted from the date when the necessary proof of
infidelity is secured. Therefore, Elena's complaint for
legal separation was not time-barred, and the case was
remanded to the lower court for appropriate
proceedings.
206
Lucy Somosa-Ramos, Vs. The Honorable
Cipriano Vamenta, Jr, (1972)
Facts:
The petitioner, Lucy Somosa-Ramos, filed a case for
legal separation against her husband, Clemente G.
Ramos, in the Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental.
She also filed a motion for a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction to return her paraphernal and
exclusive property, which was under the management
of her husband.
The respondent judge, Cipriano Vamenta, Jr., ordered
the suspension of the hearing on the motion for
preliminary injunction based on Article 103 of the Civil
Code, which prohibits the hearing of an action for legal
separation before the lapse of six months from the
filing of the petition.
Issue:
Whether or not Article 103 of the Civil Code precludes
the court from acting on a motion for preliminary
mandatory injunction applied for as an ancillary
remedy to a suit for legal separation.
Ruling:
No, the Supreme Court ruled that Article 103 of the
Civil Code is not an absolute bar to the hearing of a
motion for preliminary injunction prior to the
expiration of the six-month period. The court
recognized that a suit for legal separation involves a
relationship in which the law attaches the quality of
permanence. In this case, the petitioner's motion for
preliminary mandatory injunction should not be
ignored, especially since her husband, whom she
accused of concubinage and an attempt against her life,
continued to manage her paraphernal property.
Article 103 of the Civil Code imposes a six-month period
before an action for legal separation can be tried,
allowing time for the parties to reflect and possibly
reconcile.
207
Arturo Pelayo, Vs. Marcelo Lauron, (1909)
Facts:
Arturo Pelayo, a physician residing in Cebu, filed a
complaint against Marcelo Lauron and Juana Abella.
Pelayo alleged that he was called to the defendants'
house to provide medical assistance to their daughterin-law who was about to give birth. Pelayo performed
an operation to remove the fetus and afterbirth and
visited the patient several times. He claimed that the
31
value of his services was P500, which the defendants
refused to pay without any valid reason.
The defendants denied the allegations and argued that
their daughter-in-law had died due to childbirth
complications. They also claimed that she lived
separately from them and had no relation with them.
They argued that if she was in their house during the
childbirth, it was accidental and due to fortuitous
circumstances.
Issue:
Who is responsible for paying the medical fees of the
physician, the husband of the patient or the father and
mother-in-law of the patient.
Ruling:
The court held that the husband of the patient is the
one responsible for paying the medical fees, not the
father and mother-in-law. The court ruled in favor of
the defendants and absolved them from the complaint.
The court based its decision on the reciprocal
obligation of support between spouses. The court
stated that spouses are mutually bound to support
each other, and this includes providing necessary
medical assistance in case of illness. Therefore, when
one spouse is in need of medical assistance, the other
spouse is obligated to provide it, including paying for
the fees of the medical expert. This obligation is
established by law.
208
Mariano B. Arroyo, Vs. Dolores C. Vasquez De
Arroyo, G.R. No. L-17014, August 11, 1921
Facts
The case involves Mariano B. Arroyo and Dolores C.
Vazquez de Arroyo, who were married in 1910 and
resided in Iloilo City. However, on July 4, 1920, Dolores
left their home with the intention of living separately
from her husband. Mariano attempted to persuade her
to return, but she refused. As a result, Mariano filed a
case to compel Dolores to return to their marital home.
In her defense and cross-complaint, Dolores alleged
that she was forced to leave due to cruel treatment
from Mariano. She requested a decree of separation,
liquidation of their conjugal partnership, and an
allowance for counsel fees and separate maintenance.
The lower court ruled in favor of Dolores, granting her
the right to live apart from Mariano, alimony of P400
Ruling:
32
where a person continues to be unlawfully denied of
one or more of his constitutional freedoms, where
there is denial of due process, where the restraints are
not merely involuntary but are unnecessary, and where
a deprivation of freedom originally valid has later
become arbitrary.
Yes, Mariano can be compelled to provide separate
maintenance for Dolores, even without a cause for
divorce. The duty to maintain the wife is universally
recognized and is imposed by law.
The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas
corpus is to inquire into all manner of involuntary
restraint, and to relieve a person therefrom if such
restraint is illegal.
In summary, the court ruled that Mariano can be
compelled to provide separate maintenance for
Dolores, even without a cause for divorce. However,
Dolores did not have sufficient cause to leave the
marital home, and the court cannot order her to return.
The court emphasized the duty to maintain the wife
and the limitations on its authority to enforce
cohabitation.
210
Eloisa Goitia De La Camara, Vs.Jose Campos
Rueda, G.R. No. 11263 November 2, 1916
per month, and attorney's fees of P1,000. Dissatisfied
with the decision, Mariano appealed the ruling.
Issue: Whether Mariano be compelled to provide
separate maintenance for Dolores?
209
In The Matter Of The Petition For Habeas
Corpus Of Potenciano Ilusorio, Erlinda K. Ilusorio, Vs.
Erlinda K. Ilusorio-Bildner
Facts Respondent - Erlinda Kalaw Ilusorio is the wife of
lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio. Potenciano Ilusorio is about
86 years of age possessed of extensive property valued
at millions of pesos. For many years, lawyer Potenciano
Ilusorio was Chairman of the Board and President of
Baguio Country Club. In 1972, they separated from bed
and board for undisclosed reasons. Potenciano's
children claim his mother overdosed him, leading to a
deterioration in his health. Erlinda filed with the
Regional Trial Court, Antipolo City a petition for
guardianship over the person and property of
Potenciano Ilusorio due to the latter’s advanced age,
frail health, poor eyesight and impaired judgment.
On May 31, 1998, after attending a corporate meeting
in Baguio City, Potenciano Ilusorio did not return to
Antipolo City and instead lived at Cleveland
Condominium, Makati. As a result, Erlinda filed with
the Court of Appeals a Petition for Habeas Corpus to
have the custody of the lawyer
Issue : Whether the wife may file a petition for habeas
corpus to compel the husband to return to her?
Facts:
The case involves Eloisa Goitia, who filed an action
against her husband, Jose Campos Rueda, for separate
maintenance. The couple got married in Manila on
January 7, 1915, and initially lived together for about a
month before the wife returned to her parents' home.
The wife alleges in her complaint that the husband
demanded her to perform indecent acts, which she
refused, leading to continuous mistreatment and
abuse. As a result, she was forced to leave their
conjugal abode and seek refuge with her parents.
Issue: Whether the wife, who was forced to leave the
conjugal abode due to the husband's unbearable
conduct, can maintain an action for separate
maintenance against the husband.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court affirmed the wife's right to pursue
a separate maintenance action against her husband,
rejecting the notion that support should only be
provided in the marital home or with a judicial decree
of divorce or separation. Emphasizing that marriage
involves more than a contract and establishes legal
rights and obligations, the court noted the duty of
mutual support between spouses. The court also
highlighted Article 149 of the Civil Code, stating that
the option to provide support can be restricted,
especially when contrary to public policy or good
morals, as established in prior decisions.
211. People Of The Philippines, Vs. Edgar Jumawan
Ruling :
FACTS
No. The Supreme Court held that a writ of habeas
corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or
detention, or by which the rightful custody of a person
is withheld from the one entitled thereto. It is available
This case involves the accused-appellant, Edgar
Jumawan, who was convicted of two counts of rape by
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cagayan de Oro City.
33
The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC's decision,
leading to an automatic review by the Supreme Court.
The facts of the case are as follows: Edgar Jumawan and
his wife, KKK, were married in 1975 and had four
children together. In February 1999, KKK filed a
complaint alleging that her husband raped her on
December 3, 1998, and physically assaulted her on
December 12, 1998. The Office of the City Prosecutor
found probable cause for rape and recommended the
filing of criminal charges against the accused-appellant.
Two Informations for rape were filed before the RTC,
charging the accused-appellant with raping his wife on
October 9 and 10, 1998.
ISSUE
The main issue in this case is whether the accusedappellant is guilty of rape.
RULING
The Court held that sexual intercourse, even within the
context of marriage, is considered rape if it is not
consensual. The Court cited Section 266-A of the
Revised Penal Code, which states that rape is
committed when the offender has carnal knowledge of
a woman through force or intimidation, even if the
victim is the offender's spouse.
212 V People Of The Philippines
FACTS
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari2 seeking to
reverse and set aside the Decision3 dated September
12, 2019 and the Resolution4 dated February 11, 2021
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 41438.
That sometime in 2004 to present, in Quezon City,
Philippines, the above-named accused, being the
husband of [the] victim, AAA, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commit
psychological violence and economic abuse upon AAA,
by then and there abandoning her and denying her
financial support, thereby causing substantial, mental
or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to
his wife, to the damage and prejudice of the said
offended party.
ISSUE
The issue in this case is whether or not XXX is guilty
beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Section 5(i) of
R.A. No. 9262.
RULING
Petition for Review on Certiorari is hereby GRANTED.
SC held that the obligation of support is mutual
between spouses, not one-sided. It's not solely the
husband's responsibility to support the wife; the wife
has an equal duty to support her husband. The court's
ruling seemed unfair by assuming that the wife was
entirely reliant on her husband for a dignified life,
portraying her as helpless.
213 QUIAO VS. QUIAO
FACTS
Brigido B. Quiao filed a petition to overturn the
Regional Trial Court's (RTC) Order dated January 8,
2007, concerning legal separation and property division
with Rita C. Quiao. Rita filed for legal separation in
2000, and the RTC's 2005 decision declared their legal
separation, ordering property division with the
petitioner's share forfeited to the common children.
After initial payment, the petitioner sought clarification
on "net profits earned," leading to conflicting orders
from the RTC. The RTC initially granted the petitioner's
motion for reconsideration but later reinstated the
original order following a motion from the
respondents.
ISSUE
Is the dissolution and liquidation of the common
properties of the husband and wife governed by Article
125 of the Family Code?
RULING
The Supreme Court ruled that the dissolution and
liquidation of the common properties of the husband
and wife in a legal separation case is governed by
Article 129 of the Family Code.
The Court found that the RTC correctly applied Article
129 of the Family Code in ordering the forfeiture of the
petitioner's share of the net profits earned by the
conjugal partnership in favor of the common children.
The Court noted that the petitioner failed to appeal the
decision of the RTC within the reglementary period,
making the decision final and unalterable. Therefore,
the Court upheld the decision of the RTC and denied
the petitioner's petition for review on certiorari.
214 TODA VS. CA
FACTS
Benigno Toda, Jr. and Rose Marie Tuason-Toda, married
in 1951, faced marital issues leading Rose Marie to file
a petition in 1979 for the termination of their conjugal
partnership due to mismanagement and dissipation of
funds. To avoid further disputes, the parties filed a joint
petition in 1981, seeking judicial approval to dissolve
the conjugal partnership. The petition included a
compromise agreement, signed on March 30, 1981,
outlining the allocation of assets and the dismissal of
related cases. The trial court approved the petition and
compromise agreement on June 9, 1981.ISSUE
Whether or not CA erred in ruling the case of the
spouses benigni and Rose MArie.
RULING
We are in agreement with the holding of the Court of
Appeals that the compromise agreement became
effective only on June 9, 1981, the date when it was
approved by the trial court, and not on March 30,1981
when it was signed by the parties. Under Article 190 of
the Civil Code, 14 “(i)n the absence of an express
declaration in the marriage settlements, the separation
of property between spouses during the marriage shall
not take place save in virtue of a judicial order.” Hence,
the separation of property is not effected by the mere
execution of the contract or agreement of the parties,
but by the decree of the court approving the same. It,
therefore, becomes effective only upon judicial
approval, without which it is void. 15
215 VALDEZ VS. RTC
FACTS
This case involves a petition for review filed by Antonio
A.S. Valdes against the Regional Trial Court (RTC) and
Consuelo M. Gomez-Valdes. Antonio Valdes and
Consuelo Gomez were married on January 5, 1971, and
had five children. Antonio filed a petition for the
declaration of nullity of their marriage on the grounds
of mutual psychological incapacity. The RTC granted the
petition and declared the marriage null and void. The
court also directed the parties to start proceedings for
the liquidation of their common properties in
accordance with Article 147 of the Family Code.
ISSUE
The main issue raised in the case is the correct law that
should govern the disposition of a family dwelling in a
34
situation where a marriage is declared void ab initio
due to psychological incapacity.
RULING
The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the RTC,
stating that in a void marriage, the property relations
of the parties during the period of cohabitation are
governed by the provisions of Article 147 or Article 148
of the Family Code. Article 147 applies when a man and
a woman, who are capacitated to marry each other, live
exclusively as husband and wife without the benefit of
marriage or under a void marriage. Under this property
regime, property acquired by both parties during their
union is presumed to have been obtained through their
joint efforts and will be owned in equal shares. The
court also clarified that the provisions on co-ownership
under the Civil Code should apply to the liquidation and
partition of the common properties.
216
ESTONINA VS. CA
Facts
This case involves a dispute over a parcel of land in
Barrio Santisima Cruz, Sta. Cruz, Laguna. The land was
originally owned by Santiago Garcia, who died on
October 2, 1967. After his death, Trinidad Estonina
obtained a writ of preliminary attachment on the land
in a case against Consuelo Garcia. The attachment was
inscribed on the title of the land. The land was
subsequently sold at a public auction, with Trinidad
Estonina as the highest bidder.
Celso Atayan and Nilda Hicban, along with Santiago
Garcia's heirs, filed a complaint for the annulment of
the sheriff's sale and transfer certificate of title, arguing
the land was not conjugal property.
The trial court dismissed the complaint and held that
Consuelo Garcia owned 55% of the land, while the
remaining 45% belonged to the heirs of Santiago
Garcia.
The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the spouses
Atayan and the heirs of Santiago Garcia, declaring the
sale and transfer of the land to Trinidad Estonina null
and void.
Issue
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in not granting the
petitioners' prayer to uphold Estonina's title to the
property.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that the factual findings of
the Court of Appeals are generally conclusive, but there
are exceptions when there is a conflict between the
factual findings of the appellate court and the trial
court. In this case, the Court of Appeals gave credence
to the testimony of Consuelo Garcia that the land was
inherited by Santiago Garcia from his deceased mother,
while the trial court disregarded this testimony.
In summary, the Supreme Court denied the petition
and affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals,
which declared the land as the exclusive property of
Santiago Garcia and ordered the cancellation of the
title issued to Trinidad Estonina. The Court also upheld
the spouses Atayan's right to file an independent action
to vindicate their claim over the land.
217
G TRACTORS INC. V. CA AND SPOUSES
NICACIO
Facts:
The case involves a dispute between G-Tractors, Inc.
and Luis R. Narciso and Josefina Salak Narciso regarding
the liability of the conjugal partnership for the
judgment debt of Luis R. Narciso. Narciso defaulted on
his rental payments of tractors for his logging
operations, leading G-Tractors, Inc. to file a lawsuit
against him to collect the unpaid rentals.
G-Tractors, Inc. obtained a writ of execution and levied
on the personal properties of the Narciso spouses. They
also levied on a residential land registered under TCT
No. 120923, which was allegedly the conjugal property
of the spouses. G-Tractors, Inc. subsequently
purchased the levied properties at a public auction and
executed a contract of lease with Luis R. Narciso for the
residential land.
Issue: whether the judgment debt of Luis R. Narciso is
a conjugal debt for which the conjugal partnership
property can be held liable.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of G-Tractors, Inc. and
held that the judgment debt of Luis R. Narciso is a
conjugal debt for which the conjugal partnership
property can be held liable.
35
The Court based its decision on Article 161 of the Civil
Code, which states that all debts and obligations
contracted by the husband for the benefit of the
conjugal partnership are chargeable to the conjugal
partnership. The Court also emphasized that the
husband is the administrator of the conjugal
partnership and as long as he believes he is doing right
to his family, he should not be made to suffer and
answer alone.
218
GUIANG VS. CA
Facts:
The case involves a dispute over the ownership of a
residential house and lot in Callejo Subdivision,
Koronadal, South Cotabato. The property was originally
owned by the spouses Corpuz. However, without the
knowledge and consent of his wife, the husband sold
the property to the spouses Guiang. The wife, Gilda
Corpuz, discovered the sale upon her return to
Koronadal and filed a complaint against the spouses
Guiang for the annulment of the sale.
The trial court ruled in favor of Gilda Corpuz, declaring
the sale null and void. The spouses Guiang appealed to
the Court of Appeals, but the decision of the trial court
was affirmed.
Issue:
Whether or not the Deed of Transfer of Rights was
validly executed.
Ruling:
No, the Supreme Court ruled that the Deed of Transfer
of Rights was declared null and void because it was
executed without the consent of the wife, which is
required under Article 124 of the Family Code. The
absence of the wife's consent rendered the contract
void, not voidable. The Court also held that the
amicable settlement executed by the parties cannot
ratify the void contract, as a void contract cannot be
ratified. The Court affirmed the decision of the trial
court, recognizing the nullity of the contract of sale and
the ownership and possession of the remaining portion
of the property by Gilda Corpuz.
219
ALINAS V. ALINAS
Facts:
The case involves a dispute over two lots owned by the
petitioners, Spouses Onesiforo and Rosario Alinas,
36
which were allegedly entrusted to the respondents,
Spouses Victor and Elena Alinas. The petitioners claim
that they entrusted their properties to the respondents
with the agreement that any income from rentals of the
properties should be remitted to the Social Security
System (SSS) and to the Rural Bank of Oroquieta City
(RBO) to pay off their loans with said institutions.
However, the petitioners later discovered that the two
lots were already titled in the name of the respondents.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) ruled that the
respondents are the owners of one of the lots, Lot 896B-9-A, and affirmed the validity of their acquisition
from the RBO. The RTC also declared the petitioners as
the owners of the other lot, Lot 896-B-9-B, but
invalidated the sale of this lot to the respondents by
petitioner Onesiforo without the consent of his wife.
The CA affirmed the RTC's ruling on Lot 896-B-9-A, but
declared the sale of Lot 896-B-9-B by petitioner
Onesiforo to the respondents as null and void in
relation to the share of his wife, Rosario Alinas.
Issue: Whether or not the sale of the conjugal property
by Onesiforo without the consent of his wife is void.
Ruling:
The court ruled that the sale of the conjugal property is
indeed void. According to Article 124 of the Family
Code, any disposition or encumbrance of conjugal
property without the authority or written consent of
the other spouse is void. The court found that the
respondent spouses were aware of the conjugal nature
of the property and the lack of consent from Rosario.
Therefore, they cannot claim to have acted in good
faith. The court also ordered the petitioners to
reimburse the respondent spouses the redemption
price paid for the property.
The court based its decision on Article 124 of the Family
Code, which states that any disposition or
encumbrance of conjugal property without the consent
of the other spouse is void.
220
DOCENA VS. LAPESURA
Facts:
On June 1, 1977, private respondent Casiano Hombria
filed a Complaint for the recovery of a parcel of land
against his lessees, petitioner-spouses Antonio and
Alfreda Docena. The petitioners claimed ownership of
the land based on occupation since time immemorial.
RTC rendered judgement in favour of petitioners. CA
reversed the decision and ordering petitioners to
vacate the land they have leased excluding the portions
reclaimed by petitioners and which form part of the
seashore. The CA dismissed the Petition for Certiorari
and Prohibition on the ground that the petition was
filed beyond the 60-day period provided in the Revised
Rules of Civil Procedure and that the certification of
non-forum shopping attached thereto was signed by
only one of the petitioners.
ISSUE: Whether or not it is sufficient that the
certification of non-forum shopping was signed by only
one of the petitioners.
RULING:
Yes, such certificate signed by Antonio
Docena alone should be deemed to constitute
substantial compliance with the rules. Under the
Family Code, the administration of the conjugal
property belongs to the husband and the wife jointly.
However, unlike an act of alienation or encumbrance
where the consent of both spouses is required, joint
management or administration does not require that
the husband and wife always act together. Each spouse
may validly exercise full power of management alone,
subject to the intervention of the court in proper cases
as provided under Article 124 of the Family Code.