221
MANALO VS. CAMAISA
Issues: Whether the loan obtained to purchase the conjugal dwelling can be
charged against the conjugal partnership.
Facts: Thelma A. Jader-Manalo responded to an advertisement by Spouses
Norma Fernandez C. Camaisa and Edilberto Camaisa for the sale of their tendoor apartment in Makati and Taytay, Rizal. After negotiations and a visual
inspection, petitioner made an offer to purchase the properties, and an
agreement on the prices and installment payments was reached with
Edilberto Camaisa. Formal contracts were prepared, signed, and
downpayments made. However, the spouses later backed out, citing the
need for "spot cash."
Ruling: The Supreme Court granted the petition, modifying the Court of
Appeals decision. Pursuant to Article 121 of the Family Code, the loan is a
liability of the conjugal partnership, benefiting the family by purchasing the
conjugal home. Despite Manuel's lack of consent and refusal to sign
acknowledgment, he is solidarily liable under Article 21 of the Family Code..
The contention that it was a profit share in a construction firm was
dismissed due to lack of proof of stock ownership.
Issue: Whether the husband can validly dispose of conjugal property without
the wife's written consent.
Ruling: No, the disposition of conjugal property by the husband requires the
written consent of the wife, as stated in Article 124 of the Family Code. Since
the properties involved were conjugal, the contracts required the consent of
both spouses to be effective, making the disposition void without the wife's
agreement. The trial court's dismissal of the complaint for specific
performance and damages was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
222
CARLOS VS. ABELARDO
Facts: In October 1989, Manuel Abelardo and his wife Maria Theresa CarlosAbelardo borrowed $25,000 from Honorio Carlos, the father-in-law of
Manuel, for the purchase of a house and lot in Paranaque. Honorio issued a
check as full payment to the seller. Despite Manuel's acknowledgment of the
debt, he later resisted inquiries and made death threats when asked about
repayment. Honorio formally demanded payment in August 1994 and filed a
complaint in October 1994 for the collection of the loan and damages.
223
RELUCIO VS. LOPEZ
Facts: Angelina Mejia Lopez filed a petition against her husband, Alberto J.
Lopez, seeking appointment as the sole administratrix of the conjugal
partnership, forfeiture of properties acquired during Alberto's relationship
with petitioner Imelda Relucio, accounting, and other claims. Petitioner
Relucio filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that she had no cause of action.
The trial court denied the motion, stating that Relucio was a necessary party
due to properties being registered in her name. Relucio's subsequent motion
for reconsideration was also denied.
Issues: 1. Whether a cause of action exists against petitioner Relucio in the
proceedings.
Ruling: The Supreme Court granted the petition, finding that no cause of
action existed against Relucio. The causes of action were directed solely at
Alberto J. Lopez, and none of the elements of a cause of action were present
against Relucio. The Court emphasized that Relucio's involvement was
merely incidental to the allegations against Lopez. Additionally, the Court
stated that Relucio was neither an indispensable nor necessary party, as the
trial court could issue a valid judgment against Lopez without her
involvement.
224
HOMEOWNERS SAVINGS BANK V. DAILO IN RE SEPARATION OF PROP.
OF MULLER SALAS V. AGUILA (ART. 147)
for the mortgage of conjugal properties. The absence of Miguela's consent
renders the entire transaction null and void, including the portion of the
conjugal property pertaining to Marcelino.
225
VENTURA V. ABUDA (ART. 148)
Facts:
FACTS:
Marcelino Dailo, Jr. executed a Deed of Absolute Sale for a house and lot
during his marriage to Miguela C. Dailo. The property was solely titled in
Marcelino's name. Marcelino also executed a Special Power of Attorney
(SPA) in favor of Lilibeth Gesmundo, allowing her to obtain a loan from
Homeowners Savings and Loan Bank using the property as security. Without
Miguela's knowledge and consent, Gesmundo obtained a loan, leading to
the extrajudicial foreclosure of the property. After the foreclosure sale,
petitioner bank consolidated ownership and eventually sold the property.
Socorro Torres and Esteban Abletes' marriage was deemed void due to
Socorro's subsisting marriage with Crispin Roxas. Edilberto Ventura, Jr.,
Socorro's son, contested the sale of properties by Esteban to his daughter,
Evangeline Abuda, alleging forgery and insufficient proof of Esteban's
contribution. The RTC declared the properties not conjugal, applying Articles
144 and 485 of the Civil Code.
Issue:
ISSUE:
Whether the mortgage of the conjugal property made by Marcelino alone is
valid.
Was the CA correct in upholding the decision of the RTC that the properties
are not conjugal?
RULING:
Ruling:
No, the mortgage of the conjugal property made by Marcelino alone is not
valid. Article 124 of the Family Code requires the consent of both spouses
The CA upheld the RTC's decision, emphasizing Esteban's sole ownership
reflected in property titles. It correctly invoked Article 148 of the Family
Code, emphasizing the necessity of joint contributions during cohabitation
for properties to be considered common. The amortization payments made
by Evangeline were deemed donations to Esteban, reinforcing the
conclusion that these properties belonged solely to him.
227
226
Facts
BARRIDO VS. NONATOG.R. NO. 176492(147)
FACTS
In the course of the marriage of respondent Leonardo V. Nonato and
petitioner Marietta N. Barrido,they were able to acquire a property situated
in Eroreco, Bacolod City, consisting of a house and lot. On March 15, 1996,
their marriage was declared void on the ground of psychological incapacity.
Since there was no more reason to maintain their co-ownership over the
property, Nonato asked Barrido for partition, but the latter refused. Thus,
Nonato filed a Complaint for partition before the Municipal Trial Court in
Cities (MTCC) of Bacolod City.
The Bacolod MTCC rendered a Decision, applying Article 129 of the Family
Code. It ruled in that the conjugal property of the spouses be adjudicated to
the defendant Marietta Nonato, the spouse with whom the majority of the
common children choose to remain. Nonato appealed the MTCC Decision.
The Bacolod RTC reversed the ruling of the MTCC. The CA affirmed the RTC
Decision. It held that since the property’s assessed value was only
₱8,080.00, it clearly fell within the MTCC’s jurisdiction. Also, although the
RTC erred in relying on Article 129 of the Family Code, instead of Article 147.
ISSUE/S: WHETHER OR NOT ART 129 FINDS APPLICATION IN THE PRESENT
CASE
Ruling:
No. ART 129 does not apply to the instant case. Although Article 129
provides for the procedure in case of dissolution of the conjugal partnership
regime, Article 147 specifically covers the effects of void marriages on the
spouses’ property relations. In the absence of proof to the contrary,
properties acquired while they lived together shall be presumed to have
been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by
them in equal shares.
MALLILIN VS. CASTILLO(ART. 148
This case involves a dispute between petitioner Eustaquio Mallilin, Jr. and
respondent Ma. Elvira Castillo over the ownership of real and personal
properties. Petitioner filed a suit to be declared as a co-owner of the
properties registered solely in the name of respondent, who is his commonlaw spouse, and for partition. The trial court summarily dismissed the case,
stating that it was a collateral attack on the titles of the properties. The
Court of Appeals initially remanded the case for trial but later affirmed the
trial court's dismissal.
Issue
The main issue in this case is whether summary judgment is proper.
Ruling
The court ruled in the negative, stating that genuine issues exist between
the parties. The court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and
remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings on the merits.
The court held that the trial court erred in summarily dismissing the case
because it presented genuine factual issues. Under the Family Code, coownership can exist between a man and a woman living together as
husband and wife, even if they are not capacitated to marry each other. The
court found that whether petitioner and respondent cohabited and whether
the properties in question are part of the alleged co-ownership are genuine
and material issues that require the presentation of evidence. The court also
stated that based on the premise that petitioner is a co-owner, his partition
suit did not challenge respondent's titles but sought the partition of the
properties in co-ownership and the conveyance of his share.
228
FEHR V. FEHR
FACTS: In 1983, after two years of long-distance courtship, Elna moved in to
Bruno's residence and lived with him. During the time they lived together,
they purchased Suite 204, at LCG Condominium on installment. They got
married in 1985.
In 1998, the trial court declared the marriage between Elna and Bruno void
ab initio under Article 36 of the Family Code and ordered the dissolution of
their conjugal properties. The properties were divided into three: 1/3 for
Elna, 1/3 for Bruno and 1/3 for the children.
The custody of children was awarded to Elna, being the innocent spouse.
Accordingly, Elna is directed to transfer ownership of Suite 204 LCG
Condominium because it was declared to have been the exclusive property
of Bruno Fehr, acquired prior his marriage. Elna filed a motion for
reconsideration of said order. The court held in an order that Art. 147 of the
Family Code should apply, being the marriage void ab initio.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Suite 204 of LGC Condominium is the exclusive
property of Bruno Fehr.
RULING: No. SC held that Suite 204 of LCG Condominium is a common
property of Elna and Bruno and the property regime of the parties should be
divided in accordance with the law on co-ownership. Suite 204 was acquired
during the parties’ cohabitation.
Accordingly, under Article 147 of the Family Code, said property should be
governed by the rules on co-ownership. Article 147 applies in this case
because (1) Elna and Bruno are capacitated to marry each other; (2) live
exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and (3) their marriage is
void under Article 36. All these elements are present in the case at bar.
Accordingly, under Article 147 of the Family Code, said property should be
governed by the rules on coownership.
229
SAGUID V. REY
Seventeen year-old Gina S. Rey, respondent, was married, but separated de
facto from her husband, when she met Jacinto Saguid, petitioner, in
Marinduque sometime in July 1987. The two decided to cohabit as husband
and wife in a house built on a lot owned by Jacinto’s father. Petitioner made
a living as the patron of their fishing vessel while Gina on the other hand,
worked as a fish dealer, but decided to work as an entertainer in Japan.
In 1996, the couple decided to separate and end up their 9-year
cohabitation. Respondent filed a complaint for partition and recovery of
personal property with receivership against the petitioner.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there are actual contributions from the parties?
Ruling:
Yes. It is not disputed that Gina and Jacinto were not capacitated to marry
each other because the former was validly married to another man at the
time of her cohabitation with the latter. Their property regime is governed
by Article 148 of the Family Code which applies to bigamous marriages,
adulterous relationships, relationships in a state of concubinage,
relationships where both man and a woman who are married to other
persons, and multiple alliances of the same married man.
Under this regime, only the properties acquired by both of the parties
through their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry shall
be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective
contributions. Proof of actual contribution is required.
230
SPOUSES CARLOS VS. TOLENTINO, GR NO. 234533
Facts
This case involves a dispute over the ownership of a parcel of land in Quezon
City, Philippines. The property was originally owned by Mercedes Tolentino,
who was married to Juan Cruz Tolentino. Mercedes executed a Deed of
Donation, donating one-half undivided portion of the property to their son,
Kristoff Tolentino. After Mercedes' death, Juan sold the entire property to
Julieta and Fernando Carlos.
The main issue in the case is the validity of the donation and subsequent
sale of the property.
Ruling: Article 122 of the Family Code states that personal debts and fines
imposed on spouses are not charged to the conjugal properties partnership,
except if they benefit the family. However, fines and indemnities can be
enforced against partnership assets if the spouse has no exclusive property
or insufficient property.
Ruling
232. GO V. CA
Issue
The court ruled that the Deed of Donation is null and void with respect to
the undivided half portion owned by Juan, as he did not consent to the
donation of his share. However, the donation is valid with respect to the
other undivided half portion belonging to Mercedes. The court based its
ruling on the principle that a donation requires the consent of the donor and
the donee.
The court further ruled that the Carlos spouses and Juan Cruz Tolentino are
co-owners of the property, with each party having a 50% undivided interest.
The Register of Deeds is ordered to cancel the existing title and issue a new
one reflecting the co-ownership.
231. EFREN PANA V. HEIRS OF JOSE JUANETE
Facts: Petitioner EfrenPana (Efren), his wife Melecia, and others were
accused of murder. Efren was acquitted but Melecia and another person was
found guilty and was sentenced to the penalty of death and to pay each of
the heirs of the victims, jointly and severally for civil indemnity and
damages. Upon motion for execution by the heirs of the deceased, the RTC
ordered the issuance of the writ, resulting in the levy of real properties
registered in the names of Efren and Melecia. Subsequently, a notice of levy
and a notice of sale on execution were issued. Efren and his wife Melecia
filed a motion to quash the writ of execution, claiming that the levied
properties were conjugal assets, not paraphernal assets of Melecia.
Issue: WON the conjugal properties of spouses Efren and Melecia can be
levied and executed upon for the satisfaction of Melecia’s civil liability in the
murder case.
Facts: On July 2, 1991, Eldon Maguan was shot by Elsa Ang Go while driving
in San Juan, Metro Manila. The police found an empty shell and live
ammunition at the scene, which was registered to Ang Go. The police later
found Maguan had dined at Cravings Bake Shop before the shooting. An
eyewitness identified Maguan as the gunman. The police filed a complaint
for frustrated homicide against Maguan, but he refused to execute a waiver
of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code. Maguan died from his gunshot
wounds. The Prosecutor filed an information for murder instead of
frustrated homicide, but no bail was recommended. Counsel for Maguan
filed an omnibus motion for immediate release and proper preliminary
investigation, arguing that the warrantless arrest was unlawful and no
preliminary investigation had been conducted. The Provincial Prosecutor
granted provisional liberty on a cash bond of P100,000.00. Maguan filed an
urgent ex-parte motIon for special raffle to secure his release.
Issue: WON petitioner did not waive his right to a preliminary investigation
Ruling: The fiscal conducts a preliminary investigation to determine if a
prima facie case exists for the accused's prosecution. The information is filed
in the proper court, setting off criminal action. If necessary, a reinvestigation
is conducted, requiring court permission. The fiscal's findings and
recommendations are then submitted to the court for appropriate action.
The court's actions must not impair the accused's rights or the people's right
to due process of law.
233. MARIO SCHUZI V. GUZON, FUENTES V. ROCA AND GIANG V. GIANG
liquidation. In the case of Marta's death in 1987, Protacio, Sr. and her heirs
formed an implied ordinary co-ownership over Marta's share in the assets.
However, he could not claim title to any specific portion of Marta's share
without actual partition. Consequently, the sale by Protacio and Rito without
the consent of other co-owners was not void, as the rights of the selling coowners were transferred, making Servacio a co-owner of Marta's share. The
proper action is to divide the common property as if it continued to be in
the possession of the co-owners.
Facts: Demonstrative of the second par. One of the spouses sold a common
property without the consent of the other spouse because the latter was
unable to participate in the administration, separated de facto for 30 years.
The SC consistent with the 2nd par succinctly ruled that the contract was
void because of lack of consent with the other spouse.
Issue: WON the contract was void
Ruling: Yes, a disposition made without the knowledge of the other spouse
even if joint administration is void because of the absence of the chance for
objection. However, while void the transaction is considered a continuing
offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third party which may be
perfected as a binding contract the moment the court authorizes the
transaction or acceptance by the other spouse.
234. HEIRS OF PROTACIO GO V. ESTER SERVACIO
Facts: Gaviola and Protacio, Jr. sold a parcel of land, which Protacio, Jr.
renounced 23 years later. Protacio Go, Sr. and Rito Go later sold a portion to
Ester Servacio. The petitioners demanded the property's return, but
Servacio refused. The petitioner argued that the property became conjugal
property and the sale without prior liquidation was null and void. Servacio
and Rito argued that the Family Code was inapplicable and the sale was
valid. The RTC declared the property conjugal, not exclusive. The petitioners
appealed to the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether Article 130 of the Family Code was applicable.
Ruling: The Family Code's Article 130 and Article 105 state that disposition of
conjugal property after a conjugal partnership's dissolution must occur after
235. ZULUETA V. PAN AMERICAN WORLD AIRWAYS
Facts: Zulueta, his wife and daughter were passengers aboard defendant’s
plane from Honolulu to Manila. Upon reaching Wake Island the passengers
were advised that they could disembark for a stopover for about 30 minutes.
Plaintiff went to the toilet at the terminal building but finding it full walked
200 yards away. Upon returning he told an employee of the defendant that
they almost made him miss the flight because of a defective announcing
system. He had a discussion with either the plan captain or the terminal
manager. He was told that they would open his bags which he refused and
he warned them of the consequences. Just the same they opened his bags
and found nothing prohibited. They forced him to go out of the plane and
left him at Wake Island. His wife had to send him money and he was able to
leave Wake Island and return to Manila thru Honolulu and Tokyo after two
days. This action was to recover damages from the defendant.
except if they benefit the family. However, fines and indemnities can be
enforced against partnership assets if the spouse has no exclusive property
or insufficient property.
Issue: WON moral damages may be recovered.
Ruling: The plaintiffs were awarded both moral and exemplary damages due
to the rude and rough reception they received from Sitton or Captain
Zentner, the abusive language and reference to them as monkeys by one of
PAN AM's employees, the unfriendly attitude, ugly stares, and unkind
remarks they faced, the refusal to board the plane on the pretext of hiding a
bomb, and the embarrassment and humiliation they suffered due to the
treatment received by their parents at the airport. The plaintiffs were
awarded Pesos 500,000.00 in moral damages, Pesos 200,000.00 in
exemplary damages, Pesos 75,000.00 in attorney's fees, and Pesos 5,502.85
in actual damages.
231. EFREN PANA V. HEIRS OF JOSE JUANETE
Facts: Petitioner EfrenPana (Efren), his wife Melecia, and others were
accused of murder. Efren was acquitted but Melecia and another person was
found guilty and was sentenced to the penalty of death and to pay each of
the heirs of the victims, jointly and severally for civil indemnity and
damages. Upon motion for execution by the heirs of the deceased, the RTC
ordered the issuance of the writ, resulting in the levy of real properties
registered in the names of Efren and Melecia. Subsequently, a notice of levy
and a notice of sale on execution were issued. Efren and his wife Melecia
filed a motion to quash the writ of execution, claiming that the levied
properties were conjugal assets, not paraphernal assets of Melecia.
Issue: WON the conjugal properties of spouses Efren and Melecia can be
levied and executed upon for the satisfaction of Melecia’s civil liability in the
murder case.
Ruling: Article 122 of the Family Code states that personal debts and fines
imposed on spouses are not charged to the conjugal properties partnership,
232. GO V. CA
Facts: On July 2, 1991, Eldon Maguan was shot by Elsa Ang Go while driving
in San Juan, Metro Manila. The police found an empty shell and live
ammunition at the scene, which was registered to Ang Go. The police later
found Maguan had dined at Cravings Bake Shop before the shooting. An
eyewitness identified Maguan as the gunman. The police filed a complaint
for frustrated homicide against Maguan, but he refused to execute a waiver
of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code. Maguan died from his gunshot
wounds. The Prosecutor filed an information for murder instead of
frustrated homicide, but no bail was recommended. Counsel for Maguan
filed an omnibus motion for immediate release and proper preliminary
investigation, arguing that the warrantless arrest was unlawful and no
preliminary investigation had been conducted. The Provincial Prosecutor
granted provisional liberty on a cash bond of P100,000.00. Maguan filed an
urgent ex-parte motIon for special raffle to secure his release.
Issue: WON petitioner did not waive his right to a preliminary investigation
Ruling: The fiscal conducts a preliminary investigation to determine if a
prima facie case exists for the accused's prosecution. The information is filed
in the proper court, setting off criminal action. If necessary, a reinvestigation
is conducted, requiring court permission. The fiscal's findings and
recommendations are then submitted to the court for appropriate action.
The court's actions must not impair the accused's rights or the people's right
to due process of law.
233. MARIO SCHUZI V. GUZON, FUENTES V. ROCA AND GIANG V. GIANG
However, he could not claim title to any specific portion of Marta's share
without actual partition. Consequently, the sale by Protacio and Rito without
the consent of other co-owners was not void, as the rights of the selling coowners were transferred, making Servacio a co-owner of Marta's share. The
proper action is to divide the common property as if it continued to be in
the possession of the co-owners.
Facts: Demonstrative of the second par. One of the spouses sold a common
property without the consent of the other spouse because the latter was
unable to participate in the administration, separated de facto for 30 years.
The SC consistent with the 2nd par succinctly ruled that the contract was
void because of lack of consent with the other spouse.
Issue: WON the contract was void
Ruling: Yes, a disposition made without the knowledge of the other spouse
even if joint administration is void because of the absence of the chance for
objection. However, while void the transaction is considered a continuing
offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third party which may be
perfected as a binding contract the moment the court authorizes the
transaction or acceptance by the other spouse.
234. HEIRS OF PROTACIO GO V. ESTER SERVACIO
Facts: Gaviola and Protacio, Jr. sold a parcel of land, which Protacio, Jr.
renounced 23 years later. Protacio Go, Sr. and Rito Go later sold a portion to
Ester Servacio. The petitioners demanded the property's return, but
Servacio refused. The petitioner argued that the property became conjugal
property and the sale without prior liquidation was null and void. Servacio
and Rito argued that the Family Code was inapplicable and the sale was
valid. The RTC declared the property conjugal, not exclusive. The petitioners
appealed to the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether Article 130 of the Family Code was applicable.
Ruling: The Family Code's Article 130 and Article 105 state that disposition of
conjugal property after a conjugal partnership's dissolution must occur after
liquidation. In the case of Marta's death in 1987, Protacio, Sr. and her heirs
formed an implied ordinary co-ownership over Marta's share in the assets.
235. ZULUETA V. PAN AMERICAN WORLD AIRWAYS
Facts: Zulueta, his wife and daughter were passengers aboard defendant’s
plane from Honolulu to Manila. Upon reaching Wake Island the passengers
were advised that they could disembark for a stopover for about 30 minutes.
Plaintiff went to the toilet at the terminal building but finding it full walked
200 yards away. Upon returning he told an employee of the defendant that
they almost made him miss the flight because of a defective announcing
system. He had a discussion with either the plan captain or the terminal
manager. He was told that they would open his bags which he refused and
he warned them of the consequences. Just the same they opened his bags
and found nothing prohibited. They forced him to go out of the plane and
left him at Wake Island. His wife had to send him money and he was able to
leave Wake Island and return to Manila thru Honolulu and Tokyo after two
days. This action was to recover damages from the defendant.
Ruling:
Issue: WON moral damages may be recovered.
Ruling: The plaintiffs were awarded both moral and exemplary damages due
to the rude and rough reception they received from Sitton or Captain
Zentner, the abusive language and reference to them as monkeys by one of
PAN AM's employees, the unfriendly attitude, ugly stares, and unkind
remarks they faced, the refusal to board the plane on the pretext of hiding a
bomb, and the embarrassment and humiliation they suffered due to the
treatment received by their parents at the airport. The plaintiffs were
awarded Pesos 500,000.00 in moral damages, Pesos 200,000.00 in
exemplary damages, Pesos 75,000.00 in attorney's fees, and Pesos 5,502.85
in actual damages.
Yes. The court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs and held the defendant railroad
company liable for the damages. The court found that the defendant was
negligent in not installing a semaphore at the crossing and in not ensuring
that its flagman and switchman were present at the crossing when a train
arrived. The court also found that the defendant failed to exercise proper
supervision over its employees. Therefore, the defendant was held civilly
liable for the damages suffered by the plaintiffs.
237
236
Lilius vs Manila Railroad Co.
Spouses Wong vs IAC
G.R. No. 70082, August 19, 1991
G.R. No. 39587, March 24, 1934
Facts:
Facts:
This case involves an appeal by both the plaintiffs, Aleko E. Lilius et al., and
the defendant, the Manila Railroad Company, from the judgment rendered
by the Court of First Instance of Manila. The plaintiffs filed a complaint
seeking indemnity for material and moral damages suffered by them due to
the negligence of the defendant's employees. The accident occurred when
the plaintiffs were crossing a railroad line in their car and were hit by a train.
The plaintiffs suffered various injuries, including permanent deformities and
scars. The defendant denied the allegations and claimed that the accident
was due to the negligence of the plaintiffs.
Issue: Whether or not the defendant railroad company is liable for the
damages suffered by the plaintiffs due to its negligence.
Romarico Henson and Katrina Pineda, married in 1964 but living separately,
faced legal trouble when Katrina failed to repay a debt related to jewelry
sold to Anita Chan in 1972. Anita Chan and her husband filed a lawsuit for
the unpaid amount against both Katrina and Romarico. The court ruled in
favor of the Wongs, ordering payment. Properties owned by Romarico were
seized and auctioned to settle the debt. This case involves the aftermath of
the court decision and execution of the judgment in a collection action.
Issue: Whether or not the collection case may be nullified on the ground
that the properties levied upon and sold at public auction are the alleged
exclusive properties of Romarico Henson, who did not participate in his
wife’s business.
by petitioner, claiming that she had no knowledge of the previous marriage
and that it was contracted without the necessary marriage license. The trial
court ruled in favor of respondent, which was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals.
Ruling:
The court ruled in favor of Romarico Henson. It declared the decision in the
collection case null and void as far as it affects Romarico. The writ of
execution, levy on execution, and auction sale of the conjugal property were
also declared null and void. The court permanently enjoined the sheriff and
register of deeds from issuing and registering the corresponding deeds of
sale. The buyers of the properties were directed to reconvey them to
Romarico. The court also held that the properties in question are conjugal
properties and can be levied upon to satisfy Katrina's obligations. However,
since Romarico did not participate in his wife's business transaction and was
not served with the decision, the execution of the decision against him is
invalid.
238
Carino vs Carino
Issue: Whether or not the two marriages contracted by SPO4 Santiago S.
Carino is valid.
Ruling:
the court declared a marriage void due to the absence of a marriage license.
Remarriage requires a prior judicial declaration of nullity. The property
regime, governed by Article 148 of the Civil Code for bigamous marriages,
states that only jointly acquired properties are owned in common, and
individual earnings belong exclusively to each party. The court determined
that monetary benefits earned by the deceased are not claimable by the
surviving party. However, the petitioner is entitled to half of the "death
benefits" as her share in the property regime, while the other half goes to
the deceased's children as legal heirs.
G.R. No. 132529, February 02, 2001
Facts:
239
Bell Cordero vs CA
G.R. NO. 244130, March 11, 2019
This case involves the validity of two marriages contracted by SPO4 Santiago
S. Carino. The first marriage was with petitioner Susan Nicdao Carino, with
whom he had two children. The second marriage was with respondent
Susan Yee Carino, with whom he had no children. After SPO4 Santiago S.
Carino passed away, both petitioner and respondent filed claims for
monetary benefits and financial assistance from various government
agencies. Petitioner collected P146,000 while respondent collected P21,000.
Respondent then filed a case seeking to recover half of the amount collected
404
240
Flores vs Spouses Lindo
G.R. No. 183984, April 13, 2011
Facts:
The case involves a dispute between the petitioners and the respondent,
Edna, over a loan agreement. Edna admitted to obtaining a loan from the
petitioners but claimed that it only amounted to P340,000. The petitioners
filed a complaint for sum of money against Edna before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 42. However, Edna raised the defense that the loan
agreement was void and filed an action for declaratory relief before the RTC,
Branch 93. The RTC, Branch 93 declared the loan agreement void, and the
petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA affirmed the
decision of the RTC, Branch 93, prompting the petitioners to file a petition
for review before the Supreme Court.
This case involves a dispute over the sale of a conjugal property between the
petitioner, Dolores Alejo, and the respondent spouses, Jorge and Jacinta
Leonardo. The property in question is a parcel of land located in Bulacan. In
March 1996, Jorge's father approached Dolores to negotiate the sale of the
property. On March 29, 1996, Jacinta executed a Kasunduan (agreement)
with Dolores for the sale of the property for a purchase price of PhP500,000.
Dolores paid the down payment and subsequent installments as agreed
upon, and was allowed to possess the property and make improvements on
it.
However, in July 1996, Jorge wrote a letter to Dolores denying knowledge
and consent to the Kasunduan. He later sent another letter demanding
payment of the remaining balance and increasing the purchase price.
Dolores refused to sign the agreement and Jorge filed cases against her for
ejectment and annulment of sale. The Leornardos sold property to Cortez
and San Pedro, leading Dolores to file a case for annulment and damages
against them.
Issue: Whether or not the principle against unjust enrichment should prevail
over the procedural rule on multiplicity of suits.
Issue: Whether Dolores is entitled to reimbursement for the amount she
paid for the property, as well as whether she can retain possession of the
property
Ruling:
The Court held that the principle against unjust enrichment should prevail
over the procedural rule on multiplicity of suits. The principle against unjust
enrichment applies when a person unjustly retains a benefit to the loss of
another or when a person retains money or property of another against the
fundamental principles of justice, equity, and good conscience. In this case,
Edna admitted to obtaining a loan from the petitioners but failed to fully pay
it without just cause. The Court found that the loan agreement was declared
void erroneously at the instance of Edna.
241
Facts
ALEJO VS. CORTEZ (827 SCRA 2017)
Ruling
The Supreme Court upheld the ruling of the CA that while the Kasunduan
was void from the beginning, Dolores is, in all fairness, entitled to recover
from the Spouses Leonardo the amount of PhP300,000 with legal Interest
until fully paid.
SC ruled, as correctly held by the CA, Dolores, as possessor in good faith, is
under no obligation to pay for her stay on the property prior to its legal
interruption by a final judgment. She is further entitled under Article 448 to
indemnity for the improvements introduced on the property with a right of
retention until reimbursement is made.
242
PELAYO VS PEREZ 459 SCRA 475 (2005)
Facts
The case involves a dispute over a deed of absolute sale executed by David
Pelayo in favor of Melki Perez for two parcels of agricultural land in Panabo,
Davao. The deed was executed on January 11, 1988, but the wife of Pelayo,
Lorenza, only signed as a witness on the third page of the deed. Perez's
application for registration of the deed was denied due to Lorenza's refusal
to sign on the first and second pages. As a result, Perez filed a complaint for
specific performance against the Pelayos.
The trial court then found that the deed was null and void due to the lack of
marital consent and consideration.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA), the CA reversed the trial court's
decision. The CA declared the deed valid and enforceable, ordering Lorenza
to affix her signature on all pages of the document.
Issue: whether or not the deed of sale is valid, considering the alleged lack
of consent from Lorenza Pelayo.
Ruling
The Supreme Court ruled that the deed of sale is valid and that the
petitioners failed to present any evidence of fraud, mistake, or undue
influence.
It ruled that Lorenza did not take any action to seek the nullification of the
deed of sale for more than three and a half years, despite being aware of the
transaction. This suggests that she knew of and consented to the disposition
of the conjugal property.
Also the court cited Article 1491(2) of the New Civil Code, which prohibits
agents from purchasing property entrusted to them unless the principal
gives consent. Lastly, the court found that there was consideration for the
sale, as the petitioners acknowledged in the deed of sale that they received
a certain amount of money in exchange for the property.
243
PAN PACIFIC INDUSTRIAL SALES CO., INC. V. CA, G.R. NO. 125283, 20
FEB. 2006
Facts:
Severo Cruz III, filed a complaint against the petitioner, Spouses Jose and
Rosario Cruz, claiming ownership of the said property. Severo Cruz III alleged
that he inherited the land from his father, Severo Cruz Jr., who acquired it
during his marriage to Rosario Cruz. He argued that the property should be
considered conjugal and that he is entitled to half of its value.
During the trial, Severo Cruz III presented evidence to support his claim. He
presented a deed of sale showing that his father purchased the land during
his marriage to Rosario Cruz. He also presented witnesses who testified that
the property was used as a family residence and that Severo Cruz Jr. and
Rosario Cruz lived there together.
Spouses Jose and Rosario Cruz denied allegations, claiming property
ownership solely by Jose Cruz, acquired before their marriage, and not part
of their conjugal partnership.
Issue:
The main issue in the case is whether the disputed property should be
considered conjugal and whether Severo Cruz III is entitled to half of its
value.
Ruling:
The court ruled in favor of Severo Cruz III and declared the property as
conjugal. The court held that the property was acquired during the marriage
of Severo Cruz Jr. and Rosario Cruz, and therefore, should be considered part
of the conjugal partnership. As a result, Severo Cruz III is entitled to half of
its value. There was no evidence to show that Rosario Cruz fell under any of
the exceptions mentioned in the law. Therefore, the court concluded that
the property could not be alienated or encumbered without her consent.
The court based its decision on Article 166 of the Civil Code, which states
that unless the wife has been declared a non compos mentis or a
spendthrift, or is under civil interdiction or is confined in a leprosarium, the
husband cannot alienate or encumber any real property of the conjugal
partnership without the wife's consent.
244
IN HEIRS OF PATRICIO GO, SR. AND MARTA BAROLA VS. SERVACIO
[657 SCRA 10 (2011)]
FACTS:
On February 22, 1976, Jesus B. Gaviola sold two parcels of land (17,140
SQM) to Protacio B. Go, Jr. Twenty three years later, Protacio, Jr. executed an
Affidavit of Renunciation and Waiver, whereby he affirmed under oath that it
was his father, Protacio Go, Sr. (Protacio, Sr.), not he, who had purchased the
two parcels of land (the property). Marta Barola Go, wife of Protacio, Sr.,
passed away in 1987. In 1999, Protacio and his son Rito sold a portion of the
property to Ester L. Servacio.
On March 2, 2001, the petitioners demanded the return of the property, but
Servacio refused to heed their demand. They sued Servacio and Rito for the
annulment of the sale of the property. Servacio and Rito countered that
Protacio, Sr. had exclusively owned the property because he had purchased
it with his own money.
RTC affirmed the validity of the sale. However, declared the property was
the conjugal property and not the exclusive property of Protacio, Sr.
ISSUE: Whether or not the sale by Protacio, Sr. to Servacio was void for being
made without prior liquidation?
Upon Marta’s death in 1987, the conjugal partnership was dissolved,
pursuant to Article 175(1) of the Civil Code, and an implied ordinary coownership ensued among Protacio, Sr. and the other heirs of Marta with
respect to her share in the assets of the conjugal partnership pending a
liquidation following its liquidation. Nonetheless, a co-owner could sell his
undivided share.
245
HEIRS OF THE LATE APOLINARIO CABURNAY, VS. HEIRS OF TEODULO
SISON, G.R. NO. 230934, DECEMBER 02, 2020
Facts
This case involves a dispute between the heirs of the late Apolinario
Caburnay (petitioners) and the heirs of Teodulo Sison (respondents) over a
parcel of land. The petitioners alleged that Teodulo Sison sold the property
to Apolinario Caburnay in 1994, with an agreement for installment
payments. However, Teodulo passed away before the full purchase price
could be paid.
The petitioners tried to pay the remaining balance after Apolinario's death,
but the respondents rejected the payment. It was later discovered that the
respondents executed an Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate, which included
the subject property. The petitioners sought to nullify the settlement and
the transfer certificate of title issued in favor of one of the respondents.
Issue: Whether the sale of the property by Teodulo Sison without the
consent of his second wife, Perla Sison, is valid or void.
Ruling:
NO, Protacio, Sr. had the right to freely sell and dispose of his undivided
interest, but not the interest of his co-owners. The sale by Protacio, Sr. and
Rito as co-owners without the consent of the other co-owners was not
necessarily void, for the rights of the selling co-owners were thereby
effectively transferred, making the buyer (Servacio) a co-owner of Marta’s
share.
Ruling
The court ruled in favor of the respondents and affirmed the lower court's
decision declaring the sale null and void. The court held that the property
regime governing Teodulo and Perla is absolute community property, as
their marriage was contracted during the effectivity of the Family Code.
Under the Family Code, the community property consists of all the property
acquired during the marriage by either spouse, which is not excluded by law.
The court cited Article 91 of the Family Code, which provides that the
absolute community of property shall be governed by the rules on the
contract of partnership in all matters not provided for in the Family Code.
petitioners' complaint lack jurisdictional elements for forcible entry which
requires an allegation of prior material possession.
The court also noted that the sale of the property by Teodulo without the
consent of Perla is void, as it violates Article 124 of the Family Code. This
provision states that without the consent of the other spouse, no conjugal
partnership property may be sold or encumbered.
WHETHER OR NOT BASED ON THE ALLEGATIONS) OF THE COMPLAINT, THE
MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT OF ANTIPOLO, RIZAL, CLEARLY HAS ORIGINAL
JURISDICTION OVER THE INSTANT COMPLAINT FILED BEFORE IT.
ISSUE
RULING
VALDEZ,JR. VS CA G..R. No. 132424: May 2, 2006
FACTS
A complaint for unlawful detainer filed by petitioners Bonifacio and Venida
Valdez against private respondents Gabriel and Francisca Fabella before the
Municipal Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal. The complaint alleges that they are
the registered owners] of a piece of residential lot acquired from Carolina
Realty, Inc. by virtue of Sales Contract and copy of the Torrens Certificate of
Title and that defendants occupied] the said lot by building their house in
the said lot thereby depriving the herein plaintiffs rightful possession.
Private respondents claimed ownership over the land on the ground that
they had been in open, continuous, and adverse possession thereof for
more than thirty years. The Municipal Trial Court (MC) rendered a decision
in favor of the petitioners causing the respondents to file an appeal to the
RTC which subsequently affirmed the decision of the RTC. The private
respondents thereafter filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals
which reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC holding that petitioners
failed to make a case for unlawful detainer because they failed to show that
they had given the private respondents the right to occupy the premises or
that they had tolerated private respondents' possession of the same, which
is a • requirement in unlawful detainer cases. It added that the allegations in
The Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC. It held
that petitioners failed to make a case for unlawful detainer because they
failed to show that they had given the private respondents the right to
occupy the premises or that they had tolerated private respondents
possession of the same, which is a requirement in unlawful detainer cases. It
added that the allegations in petitioners' complaint lack jurisdictional
elements for forcible entry which requires an allegation of prior material
possession. The Court of Appeals ratiocinated thus:
The conclusion is inevitable that the Municipal Trial Court before which the
action for ejectment was filed had no jurisdiction over the case.
Consequently, the dismissal thereof is in order.
participation and signature of petitioner's husband. Further, the promissory
note was a unilateral contract of adhesion drafted by Torres against Corazon.
ISSUE
Whether the real property covered by the subject deed of mortgage dated
March 20, 1995 is paraphernal property of petitioner.
RULING
Yes. The real property covered by the subject deed of mortgage is
paraphernal property.
RUIZ VS. CA, 449 PHIL. 419, 431 (2003);
FACTS
Petitioner Corazon G. Ruiz is engaged in the business of buying and selling
jewelry, obtained several loans from private respondent Consuelo Torres on
different occasions, in the following amounts P100,000.00, P200,000.00,
P300,000.00 and P150,000.00 prior to their maturity, the consolidated loan
of P750,000.00 were under one (1) promissory note dated March 22, 1995.
The same was secured by a real estate mortgage on a 240-square meter lot
in Novaliches, Quezon City, and registered in the name of petitioner.
Thereafter, petitioner obtained three (3) more loans from Torres, under
three separate promissory notes. When petitioner failed to pay the said
loans, Torres sought an extra-judicial foreclosure of the aforementioned real
estate mortgage. The same however, was enjoined by a writ of preliminary
injunction. Allegedly, the real estate mortgage was unenforceable for lack of
We also affirm the ruling of the appellate court that the real property
covered by the subject deed of mortgage is paraphernal property. The
property subject of the mortgage is registered in the name of Corazon G.
Ruiz, of legal age, married to Rogelio Ruiz, Filipinos. Thus, title is registered
in the name of Corazon alone because the phrase married to Rogelio Ruiz is
merely descriptive of the civil status of Corazon and should not be construed
to mean that her husband is also a registered owner. Furthermore,
registration of the property in the name of Corazon G. Ruiz, of legal age,
married to Rogelio Ruiz is not proof that such property was acquired during
the marriage, and thus, is presumed to be conjugal. The property could have
been acquired by Corazon while she was still single and registered only after
her marriage to Rogelio Ruiz.
registered in the name of petitioner Antonia R. Dela Peña (Antonia),
"married to Antegono A. Dela Peña" (Antegono)
Antonia obtained a loan using this property as collateral and later sold it to
Gemma Avila. Antonia's son filed a complaint against Gemma, asserting that
the property was conjugal and the sale was void without the husband's
consent. Gemma argued the property was Antonia's exclusive ownership
and that Antonia had misrepresented her husband's status. The trial court
ruled in favor of Antonia, but Gemma was declared in default for not
attending pre-trial. Later, the court voided the sale due to lack of proper
conjugal property disposition. The Court of Appeals, however, overturned
the trial court's decision.
ISSUE
W/N all properties of spouses during the marriage are conjugal properties.
RULING
Dela Peña vs. Avila
FACTS
The suit concerns a 277 square meter parcel of residential land, together
with the improvements thereon, situated in Marikina City and previously
NO. Pursuant to Article 160 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, all property
of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership; unless it
be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife.
LIM VS. EQUITABLE PCI BANK, 713 SCRA 555 (2014)
FACTS
Petitioner Francisco Lim executed an SPA in favor of his brother Franco to
mortgage his share in a property in order to secure a loan. This first loan
extended by BDO in 1989 was fully paid by Franco in 1992. However in 1996,
Franco and their mother obtained another loan over the same property
which they failed to pay. Respondent Bank tried to foreclose the property
due to the non-payment of the loan. Petitioner thus tried to get a TRO and
for the foreclosure and to secure a cancellation of the SPA executed in favor
of his brother. Petitioner alleged that he did not authorize Franco to
mortgage the subject property to respondent and that his signatures in the
Real Estate Mortgage and the Surety Agreement were forged. The RTC
rendered a Decision in favor of petitioner. It ruled that petitioner was able to
prove by preponderance of evidence that he did not participate in the
execution of the mortgage contract giving rise to the presumption that his
signature was forged. The CA reversed the RTC Decision. It ruled that
petitioner’s mere allegation that his signature in the mortgage contract was
forged is not sufficient to overcome the presumption of regularity of the
notarized document.
ISSUE
1. Whether or not Petitioner was able to prove that the SPA was forged.
2. Whether or not Respondent Bank was failed to exercise due diligence
when granting the loan without the signature of Petitioner's wife in the
mortgage contract.
RULING
1. NO. Petitioner was not able to prove that his signature was forged. No
evidence was ever presented to prove the allegation: the alleged forged
signature was never compared with the genuine signatures of petitioner as
no sample signatures were submitted.
CALALANG-PARULAN VS. CALALANG-GARCIA, 725 SCRA 402 (2014)
2. NO. Respondent exercised due diligence. The nature of the property was
never raised as an issue. Hence, the absence of his wife’s signature on the
mortgage contract also has no bearing in this case.
Marriage; Property Relations; Conjugal Property – All property of the
marriage is presumed to be conjugal, unless it is shown that it is owned
exclusively by the husband or the wife; that this presumption is not
overcome by the fact that the property is registered in the name of the
husband or the wife alone; and that the consent of both spouses is required
before a conjugal property may be mortgaged. [T]his presumption under
Article 160 of the Civil Code cannot prevail when the title is in the name of
only one spouse and the rights of innocent third parties are involved.
FACTS
Respondents are the children of Pedro Calang from his first marriage while
petitioners are his children from his second marriage. The petitioners argue
that the disputed property belonged to the conjugal partnership of the
second marriage of Pedro Calalang with Elvira B. Calalang as evidenced by
OCT No. P-2871 which was issued to Pedro Calalang during the subsistence
of his marriage to Elvira B. Calalang. On the other hand, the respondents
claim that the disputed property was transferred by their maternal
grandmother, Francisca Silverio, to their parents, Pedro Calalang and
Encarnacion Silverio, during the latter’s marriage. Thus, the respondents
argue that it belonged to the conjugal partnership of the first marriage of
Pedro Calalang with Encarnacion Silverio.
ISSUE
Whether Pedro Calalang was the exclusive owner of the disputed property
prior to its transfer to his daughter from his second wife, petitioner, Nora B.
Calalang-Parulan?
RULING
YES. t is only upon the death of Pedro Calalang on December 27, 1989 that
his heirs acquired their respective inheritances, entitling them to their pro
indiviso shares to his whole estate. At the time of the sale of the disputed
property, the rights to the succession were not yet bestowed upon the heirs
of Pedro Calalang. And absent clear and convincing evidence that the sale
was fraudulent or not duly supported by valuable consideration (in effect an
in officious donation inter vivas), the respondents have no right to question
the sale of the disputed property on the ground that their father deprived
them of their respective shares. Well to remember, fraud must be
established by clear and convincing evidence. Mere preponderance of
evidence is not even adequate to prove fraud. The Complaint for Annulment
of Sale and Reconveyance of Property must therefore be dismissed.
251. SPS. GO V. YAMANE
G.R. NO. 160762, 03 MAY. 2006
Facts:
This case involves a dispute over a parcel of land in Baguio City, Philippines.
The land was registered in the name of Muriel Pucay Yamane, the wife of
Leonardo Yamane. The property was levied to satisfy a charging lien for
attorney's fees in a separate case. Leonardo Yamane filed a third-party claim
to stop the auction sale, arguing that the property was conjugal and should
not be held liable for the personal obligation of the plaintiffs in the other
case.
The auction sale proceeded and the property was sold to Josephine and
Henry Go. Leonardo Yamane filed a complaint for annulment and
cancellation of the auction sale.
Issue: WON the property in question is conjugal or the exclusive property of
Muriel Pucay Yamane.
Ruling: The Supreme Court held that the property was conjugal, as it was
acquired during the marriage, and rejected the arguments of the petitioners
that it was Muriel's exclusive paraphernal property. The Court emphasized
that the nature of a property is determined by law and not by the unilateral
declaration of one spouse.
252. PINTIANO-ANNO V. ANNO
G.R. NO. 163743, 27 JAN. 2006
Facts:
The case involves a dispute over a 4-hectare public, unregistered, virgin,
agricultural land in Lamut, Becket, La Trinidad, Benguet. Petitioner Dolores
Pintiano-Anno and respondent Albert Anno were married on January 23,
1963, but had no children. Petitioner claims that during their marriage, they
acquired the subject land and both worked on it. However, respondent
Albert executed two transfer documents without petitioner's knowledge,
transferring the land to respondent Patenio Suanding. The land was
subsequently transferred to third parties.
Issue: WON the subject land belongs to the conjugal partnership of gains of
spouses Anno and thus cannot be validly conveyed by one spouse without
the consent of the other.
Ruling: No, the court held that petitioner failed to prove that the subject
land was acquired during the marriage, which is a condition for the
presumption that all property of the marriage is conjugal in nature.
Therefore, the land is deemed the exclusive property of respondent Albert
Anno, and he could validly sell it without the consent of petitioner.
253. JOCSON V. CA
G.R. NO. L-55322, 16 FEB. 1989
Facts:
Moises Jocson filed a complaint against Agustina Jocson-Vasquez, his sister,
seeking the annulment of two deeds of conveyance executed by their father,
Emilio Jocson, in favor of Agustina. The complaint alleged that the deeds
were without consideration and that the properties subject to the deeds
were conjugal properties of Emilio Jocson and his wife, Alejandra Poblete.
254. VILLANUEVA V. CA
G.R. NO. 143286, 14 APR. 2004
Facts:
This case involves a dispute over the ownership of several properties
between Eusebia Napisa Retuya and her husband Nicolas Retuya, as well as
Pacita Villanueva and Procopio Villanueva. Eusebia filed a complaint seeking
the reconveyance of the properties, claiming that they are conjugal
properties with Nicolas. She also sought accounting, damages, and the
delivery of rent and other income from the properties.
Issue: the properties subject to the deeds were conjugal properties.
Issue: WON the properties are conjugal and the presumption of coownership between Nicolas and Pacita applies.
Ruling: The Supreme Court held that Moises Jocson failed to present
sufficient proof that the properties subject to the deeds were conjugal
properties. The fact that the properties were registered in the name of
Emilio Jocson, married to Alejandra Poblete, is not proof that the properties
were acquired during the marriage. The court explained that acquisition of
title and registration are two different acts, and registration does not confer
title but merely confirms one already existing.
Ruling: The court ruled in favor of Eusebia, finding that the properties are
conjugal and that the presumption of conjugal ownership applies. The court
also rejected the argument of prescription and laches.
The court held that under the Family Code, if the properties are acquired
during the marriage, the presumption is that they are conjugal. The burden
of proof is on the party claiming that they are not conjugal. In this case, the
court found that the petitioners failed to meet this burden and failed to
prove that the properties were acquired outside the marriage.
Ruling: The court ruled that the land purchased by Simeona during her
marriage is considered conjugal property. The law presumes all property
acquired during the marriage, regardless of whether the spouses are living
together or not, as conjugal property. Although Simeona purchased the land
exclusively, it was not shown that she used her own money for the purchase.
In the absence of proof, the law presumes that the money came from
conjugal funds.
255. FLORES V. ESCUDERO
G.R. NO. L-5302, 11 MAR. 1953
256
(FERRER V.S FERRER, G.R. NO. 166496, 09 NOV. 2006)
Facts:
The case involves a parcel of land in San Pablo City, Laguna, which was
purchased by Simeona de Mesa in 1912 during her marriage to Regino
Beltran. Simeona purchased the land while living separately from her
husband. After Simeona's death, the land was sold to the defendants,
Arsenio Escudero and Rosario Adap. Romualda Beltran, one of Simeona's
children, married Ponciano Flores and had nine children, who are the
plaintiffs in this case. The plaintiffs attempted to repurchase a portion of the
land corresponding to their mother's inheritance from her father, Regino.
However, the attempt failed, leading the plaintiffs to file a lawsuit to recover
their share of the land.
Issue: WON he land purchased by Simeona during her marriage to Regino is
considered conjugal property or the exclusive property of Simeona.
FACTS: Petitioner acquired a lot before marriage to Alfredo Ferrer. Conjugal
funds were used for improvements. Alfredo sold the property to
respondents. Petitioner sought reimbursement, but the Supreme Court
dismissed Alfredo's case. Petitioner filed a new complaint, denied by RTC but
granted by CA.
ISSUE: Whether the petitioner is entitled to reimbursement for
improvements on the lot. (NO)
RULING: Article 120 of the Family Code places the reimbursement obligation
on the spouse to whom ownership is vested. The purchaser has no
obligation. Since the property was declared exclusive to Alfredo,
respondents are not obligated to reimburse the petitioner.
257
JAVIER VS. OSMEÑ A,
FACTS: Petrona Javier, married to Florentino Collantes, inherited two urban
properties. To gain absolute ownership, she acquired the usufructuary right
from Pascuala Santos, Felix's second wife. Florentino, previously employed
by Petrona's father, had a debt with Tomas Osmena, a major client. After
Florentino's admission of the debt, Tomas's administrator, Lazaro Osmena,
auctioned the properties, winning the bid for P500 each. Petrona contested,
claiming her husband had no rights. Lazaro argued the conjugal partnership
owned the usufructuary right.
ISSUE: Whether the sum owed by Florentino can be paid from the revenues
of properties exclusively owned by Petrona.
RULING: Yes. The revenues are liable for the husband's debt, and no receiver
is needed. Article 1385 and 1386 of the Civil Code establish the liability of
conjugal property for marriage expenses and debts incurred by the husband
in the exercise of his profession. The management rights, as per Article
1384, rest with the wife, and appointing a receiver deprives the spouses of
their respective rights.
258
Ruling: No, as it relates to the ownership of the building. However as to the
other items, including the rents of the paraphernal property, are held liable
to seizure.
"ART. 1404. Any useful expenditures made for the benefit of the separate
property or either one of the spouses by means of advances made by the
partnership, or by the industry of the husband or wife, are partnership
property.
259
COBB-PEREZ VS. LANTIN
FACTS: Mercedes Ruth Cobb-Perez, wife of Damaso Perez, faced a lawsuit
over a judgment debt stemming from Damaso's involvement in a case with
Gregorio Subong. The Sheriff levied 3,573 shares of Damaso's common
stock, contesting it as excessive. Despite ongoing litigation, a scheduled
execution sale was halted by Mercedes through an injunction. She later
moved to lift the execution, claiming the levied shares were conjugal assets.
The court lifted the suspension, leading to subsequent notices of sale.
ABELLADE DIAZ VS. ERLANGER & GALINGER, INC.,
ISSUE: Whether the levied shares are conjugal assets of the spouses Perez.
FACTS: Erlanger & Galinger, Inc., secured a judgement in civil case No. 3722
of the Court of First Instance of Albay against Domingo Diaz, the husband of
the plaintiff therein, and on an execution issued to enforce the abovementioned judgement, the sheriff levied on certain properties.
Plaintiff thereupon brought this action in the Court of Fist Instance of
Camarines Sur alleging that the properties which had been levied upon were
her own paraphernal property.
ISSUE: Whether or not the properties levied upon were liable for the debts
contracted by the husband
RULING: NO. Damaso's consistent assertion of exclusive ownership of the
shares precludes him from claiming them as conjugal assets now. Failure to
raise the conjugal nature earlier and the absence of evidence regarding
when the shares were acquired indicate exclusive ownership.
260
ANSALDO VS. SHERIFF OF MANILA,
FACTS: Rornarlco Agcaoili obtained a loan from Phil Trust Co. guaranteed by
Fidelity and Surety Co., with Angel Ansaldo agreeing to indemnify Fidelity.
After Agcaoili defaulted, Fidelity paid the debt to Phil Trust and sought
recovery from Ansaldo. Obtaining a judgment, Fidelity levied on the joint
savings account of Angel and Margarita in BPI. Margarita and Angel filed a
third-party claim, asserting the funds were part of their conjugal property
and not liable for Angel's personal obligations.
ISSUE: Whether a joint account of a husband and wife is liable for the
payment of the husband's obligation.
Ruling: The contested amount of P636.80 is derived from Margarita's
paraphernal property, making it part of the conjugal partnership. Article
1408 CC states that the conjugal partnership is liable for debts contracted by
the husband during the marriage, subject to qualifications in Article 1386.
The latter specifies that fruits of paraphernal property are not liable for
personal obligations of the husband unless proven beneficial to the family.
The conjugal partnership's assets, including paraphernal fruits, are subject to
payment of debts and expenses, provided the husband's personal
obligations benefited the family.
261
FIDELITY INSURANCE & LUZON INSURANCE CO.,LIBERTY INSURANCE
CORPORA TION VS.BANUELOS, AND LUZON SURETY INC .VS. DEGARCIA
Facts:
Ladislao Chavez, principal, and petitioner Luzon Surety Co. Inc., executed a
surety bond in favor of PNB Victorias Branch to guarantee a crop loan
granted by the latter to Chavez in the sum of P9,000. Vicente Garcia,
together with Ladislao Chavez and Ramon Lacson, as guarantors, signed an
indemnity agreement binding themselves solidarily liable to indemnify
Luzon Surety Co. Inc. against any and all damages, costs and other expenses
which the petitioner may sustain or incur in consequence of having become
guarantor upon said bond, to pay interest and attorney's fees related to the
loan.
On July 30, 1960, a writ of execution was issued against Garcia to satisfy the
claim of the petitioner.
Issue : Whether or not a conjugal partnership could be held liable on an
indemnity agreement executed by the husband to accommodate a third
party in favor of a surety company.
NO, a conjugal partnership under Article 161 of the new Civil Code is liable
only for such "debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the
benefit of the conjugal partnership”. There must be the requisite showing
then of some advantage which clearly accrued to the welfare of the spouses.
The husband in acting as guarantor or surety for another in an indemnity
agreement does not act for the benefit of the conjugal partnership
considering that the benefit is clearly intended for the third party.
262
AYALA INVESTMENT DEVELOPMENT CORP VS CA 2016
Philippine Blooming Mills (PBM) with Alfredo Ching who signed as surety for
the P50M loan contracted on behalf of PBM obtained a P50,300,000.00 loan
from petitioner Ayala Investment and Development Corporation (AIDC).
PBM failed to pay the loan. Thus, on July 30, 1981, AIDC filed a case for sum
of money against PBM and respondent-husband Alfredo Ching with the then
Court of First Instance of Rizal (Pasig).
On June 14,1982, the court rendered judgment ordering PBM and
respondent-husband Alfredo Ching to jointly and severally pay AIDC the
principal amount of P50,300,000.00 with interests. On April 14, 1994, CA
promulgated the assailed decision, affirming the decision of the regional trial
court. CA held that: "The loan procured from respondent-appellant AIDC
was for the advancement and benefit of Philippine Blooming Mills and not
for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of petitioners-appellees.
Issue : Whether a surety agreement or an accommodation contract entered
into by the husband in favor of his employer within the contemplation of the
law?
Ruling :
No, The Court ruled that the property in dispute also involves the family
home. The loan is a corporate loan not a personal one. Signing as a surety is
certainly not an exercise of an industry or profession nor an act of
administration for the benefit of the family.
On the basis of the facts, the rules, the law and equity, the assailed decision
should be upheld without prejudice to the petitioner’s right to enforce the
obligation in its favor against the PBM.
Issue: Whether the sale of the house and lot to the Spouses Terosa was
fraudulent and whether Esmeralda is entitled to damages.
Ruling:
The RTC ruled that the house and lot is part of Nolan and Esmeralda's
conjugal property and that the sale was made at an unreasonably low
amount. The RTC also found that the Spouses Terosa connived with Nolan
and Ilona to defraud Esmeralda and Jimmy and Warlily. The CA agreed with
the RTC's ruling and affirmed its decision.
The court's ratio is that the sale of the house and lot was indeed fraudulent,
and the Spouses Terosa were liable for their involvement in the fraud. The
court also found that Esmeralda is entitled to damages.
264
JADER MANALO VS CAMAISA (2010
Facts :
263
HAPITAN VS. SPS. LAGRADILLA [G.R. NO. 170004, JANUARY 13, 2016,
780 SCRA 288]
Facts
This case involves a petition for review on certiorari filed by Ilona Hapitan
against the spouses Jimmy Lagradilla and Warlily Lagradilla, as well as
Esmeralda Blacer. The case originated from a civil case for sum of money
filed by Jimmy and Warlily against Nolan and Esmeralda Hapitan, Ilona
Hapitan, and the spouses Jessie and Ruth Terosa. The complaint alleged that
the defendants failed to settle their outstanding obligations and fraudulently
sold a house and lot to the Spouses Terosa. The Regional Trial Court (RTC)
ruled in favor of Jimmy and Warlily, declaring the sale null and void and
ordering the defendants to pay the plaintiffs the outstanding amount,
damages, and attorney's fees. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the RTC's
decision.
Thelma Jader-Manalo wished to purchase the 2 10-door apartment
properties (in Makati and Taytay) sold by Norma and Edilberto Camisa that
she saw on a newspaper ad. Petitioner inspected the said properties and
made a definite offer to buy the properties to respondent Edilberto Camaisa
with the knowledge and conformity of his wife, Norma.
The petitioner, real estate broker, and Edilberto signed a handwritten
agreement, confirming his wife's consent to the sale. After receiving two
checks, the spouses backed out of the agreement due to a need for spot
cash.Thelma filed a complaint for damages against the spouses as this
unduly prejudiced her.
The Court of Appeals explained that since private respondent Norma
Camaisa refused to sign the contracts, the sale was never perfected.
Issue : Whether or not the contract to sell is deemed effective despite the
lack of the written consent of the other spouse.
Ruling:
NO. Subject properties are conjugal in nature. For the disposition of this
properties, the law requires that there must be a written consent of both
spouses, otherwise the transaction is rendered void or to be perfected upon
the submission of the required document.
The law, under Article 124 of the Family Code, requires that the disposition
of a conjugal property by the husband as administrator in appropriate cases
requires the written consent of the wife, otherwise, the disposition is void.
265
PNB V. VENANCIO C. REYES (G.R. NO. 212483, OCTOBER 5, 2016
Facts
This case involves a dispute between the Philippine National Bank (PNB) and
Venancio C. Reyes, Jr. (Venancio) regarding the validity of a real estate
mortgage. Venancio and Lilia were married in 1973 and acquired three
parcels of land in Malolos, Bulacan during their marriage. The properties
were mortgaged to PNB to secure a loan, which was later increased.
Venancio claimed that his wife undertook the loan and mortgage without his
consent and that his signature was forged on the loan documents. He
argued that since the properties were conjugal, the mortgage was void. The
Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan annulled the mortgage and ordered
Lilia to reimburse PNB the loan amount. The Court of Appeals affirmed this
decision. PNB appealed, arguing that the mortgage was valid, the conjugal
partnership should be held liable for the loan, and Venancio's claim was
barred by laches.
Issue: Whether the conjugal property real estate mortgage is void for nonconsent of wife
Ruling:
Yes, the Supreme Court held that the real estate mortgage over a conjugal
property is void if the non-contracting spouse did not give consent. The
Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals, declaring the mortgage
void and ordering PNB to return the property to the Reyes spouses.
This is in accordance with Article 124 of the Family Code, which provides
that the administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property
belongs to both spouses jointly. The consent of both spouses is necessary for
any disposition or encumbrance of the conjugal property. In this case,
Venancio claimed that his signature was forged on the loan documents and
that he did not give his consent to the mortgage. The Court found that the
mortgage was indeed void and legally inexistent because it was an
encumbrance attached to a conjugal property without the consent of the
other spouse.
266. SPOUSES AGGABAO V. DIONISIO
Facts:
The couple, Spouses Parulan, have estranged and bought land in Parañaque
City. Real estate broker Atanacio offered the property and met with Ma.
Elena, Parulan's wife. They paid P20,000, and Ma. Elena executed a deed of
absolute sale in their favor. However, Ma. Elena did not provide the owner's
duplicate copy of the title, which was in Dionisio's brother's possession. Atty.
Parulan demanded P800,000 for the property, but the spouses paid the full
amount. Dionisio, through Atty. Parulan, filed an action for the nullity of the
deed and the cancellation of the title.
Issue: Whether or not the sale of conjugal property made by Ma. Elena, by
presenting a special power of attorney to sell (SPA) purportedly executed by
the respondent husband in her favor was validly made to the vendees
Ruling: The court ruled that the sale of conjugal property without husband's
consent was voidable and could not be ratified. The spouses Aggabao
couldn't use the defense of good faith as they didn't inquire into the wife's
authority to sell. The petitioners didn't take immediate action against Ma.
Elena, who was in possession of Atty. Parulan, but instead met with Parulan
to negotiate the possible turnover of the TCT.
267. BAUTISTA V. SILVA
Facts:
Spouses Berlina F. Silva and Pedro M. Silva registered a land parcel in 1980.
Pedro M. Silva, acting as his attorney-in-fact, signed a Deed of Absolute Sale
in favor of defendants Claro Bautista and Nida Bautista. Berlina filed a
complaint for annulment, but the RTC ruled in favor of Silva. The CA affirmed
the RTC decision, leading to this petition.
Issue: WON the petitioners are considered as purchasers in good faith
Ruling: The court ruled that a buyer for value in good faith can only rely on
the seller's certificate of title to establish their status. However, for those
with restricted capacity to sell, such as those under Articles 166 and 173, the
wife can request annulment of contracts or defrauding actions. If the wife
fails to exercise this right, she or her heirs can demand the value of the
property. In disagreements, the husband's decision prevails, and the wife
must inquire into the seller's capacity to sell to establish their status as a
buyer for value in good faith.
268. RAVINA V. VILLA ABRILLE [604 SCRA 120 (2009)
Facts: Mary Ann Pasaol Villa Abrille and Pedro Villa Abrille, husband and
wife, acquired a 555-square meter parcel of land in Davao City in 1982. They
built a house on the lot and Pedro's lot, which they continuously improved.
In 1991, Pedro became neglectful, forcing Mary Ann to sell or mortgage their
movables. Pedro offered to sell the house and two lots to Patrocinia and
Wilfredo Ravina, but Mary Ann objected. On July 5, 1991, Pedro and armed
members of the Civilian Armed Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU) began
transferring their belongings from the house to an apartment. Mary Ann and
her daughter Ingrid were stopped from entering the apartment, and police
authorities refused to intervene, claiming it was a family matter.
Issue: Whether petitioners Patrocin Ravina and wilfredo Ravina are liable for
damages, the same being contrary to law and evidence
Ruling: The claim is erroneous, as the respondent and her children were
removed from their family home by Pedro Villa Abrille, who allegedly
transferred their belongings. Civil law dictates that every person must act
with justice, give due, and observe honesty and good faith. If a right is
exercised in a way that doesn't conform to these norms, the wrongdoer
must be held responsible. The petitioners' actions fall short of these
standards.
269. SPOUSES FULADIO CUENO AND ELORA BONIACIO CUENO V. SPOUSE
EPIFANIO AND VERONICA BAUTISTA ET AL
Facts: The dispute revolves around ownership of a parcel of land owned by
the children of Spouses Epifanio and Veronica Bautista. The property was
previously owned by the two sons of Ramon Bonifacio, Luis and Isidro, who
sold part of their interest to the City of Zamboanga. Petitioner Flora
Bonifacio Cueno, daughter of Luis and Juana, married to petitioner Eulalio
Cueno. In 1961, they bought the pro indiviso share of Isidro in the property.
In a Deed of Absolute Sale dated August 12, 1977, Luis allegedly sold the
property to the respondents. The respondents took possession of the
property and built improvements. In 2005, they donated the property to
their children. The petitioners filed a complaint for recovery of shares,
possession, declaration of nullity of the second sale and donation, and
cancellation of the TCTs issued in their names.
Issue: Whether the CA erred in ordering the dismissal of the petitioners'
complaint.
Ruling: The Petition raises questions of fact regarding whether petitioners
sold their share to Luis and whether Luis sold the property to respondents.
The Court is not a trier of facts and the factual findings of lower courts are
given great weight. The RTC found that petitioners failed to prove the claim,
and the Court will now address the issue of whether the second sale was
void for lack of spousal consent. The petitioners argue that the second sale
executed by Eulalio is void for lack of marital consent, making the recovery
action imprescriptible.
270. SPS. ANASTACIO, SR V. HEIRS OF. COLOMA, G.R. NO. 224572, 27 AUG.
2020
Facts: The case revolves around a dispute over a 19,247 square meter parcel
of land in San Jose, Tarlac. The property, registered by Juan and his wife
Juliana, is now owned by Rudy P. Coloma and Marcela C. Reyes, who claim it
is under their parents' control. After their parents' deaths, they demand the
property's surrender. The petitioners, who claimed ownership through an
alleged Deed of Absolute Sale, were dismissed by the MCTC. The
respondents then filed a complaint for an annulment of the document,
recovery of ownership, and possession, arguing that the Deed is void on two
grounds: forgery and lack of consent from their mother.
Issue: Whether the CA erred in declaring that the subject property is the
conjugal property of the late spouses Juan and Juliana.
Ruling: The Petition is deemed unworthy due to its four issues, which involve
reviewing lower courts' factual findings. The Court will address these issues,
with the third issue being the most significant. Petitioners argue that
respondents must prove property ownership by both Juan and Juliana and
that TCT No. 56899 presents a presumption of Juan's exclusive ownership.
They claim the DAS is valid and Juliana's consent was not required.
271
Spouses Carlos vs Tolentino
Issue: Whether or not the donation and subsequent sale of the property is
valid.
Ruling:
The court nullified a Deed of Donation for half of a property, ruling it invalid
as one co-owner, Juan, did not consent. The remaining half, owned by
Mercedes, was deemed valid. The court established co-ownership, granting
the Carlos spouses and Juan each a 50% interest. The Register of Deeds was
ordered to update the property title. The Carlos spouses' sale rights were
limited to their half, with either party having the right to request property
partition. Kristoff Tolentino was directed to reimburse the Carlos spouses for
half the property's purchase price to ensure fairness and prevent unjust
enrichment.
272
Espinosa vs Omana
A.C. 9081
G.R. No. 234533, June 27, 2018
Facts:
Facts:
This case involves a dispute over the ownership of a parcel of land in Quezon
City, Philippines. The property was originally owned by Mercedes Tolentino,
who was married to Juan Cruz Tolentino. Mercedes executed a Deed of
Donation, donating one-half undivided portion of the property to their son,
Kristoff Tolentino. After Mercedes' death, Juan sold the entire property to
Julieta and Fernando Carlos
Rodolfo A. Espinosa and Maximo A. Glindo filed a complaint for disbarment
against Atty. Julieta A. Omana. The complainants sought Omana's legal
advice on whether they could legally live separately and dissolve their
marriage. Omana prepared a document entitled "Kasunduan Ng
Paghihiwalay" (contract) which outlined the terms of their separation.
However, Marantal eventually took custody of their children and most of the
property they acquired during their marriage. Espinosa and Glindo hired a
lawyer to file a complaint against Oma a before the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD). Oma a denied preparing
the contract and alleged that her part-time office staff forged her signature
and notarized the document without her knowledge or consent.
on the other hand, argued that Luis and Severina were not legally married
and that the properties were owned exclusively by Severina.
Issue: Whether or not Oma violated the Canon of Professional Responsibility
in the notarization of the “Kasunduan Ng Paghihiwalay.”
Issue: Whether or not the marriage between Luis and Severina is valid.
Ruling:
Ruling:
Yes. The Court ruled that Omana violated Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibilty which prohibits lawyers from engaging in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or deceitful conduct. The Court found that
Omana either personally notarized the contract or was negligent in her
notarial duties by allowing her staff to notarize the document without her
knowledge.
273
Diaz-Salgado vs Anson
The court ruled that Luis and Severina's marriage was void from the
beginning due to the absence of a valid marriage license, supported by the
marriage contract and Article 77 of the Civil Code. As Luis failed to provide
evidence of a marriage license, the court held that the burden of proof was
not met. Additionally, the court deemed the partition agreement valid under
Article 147 of the Family Code, which presumes joint ownership of
properties acquired during cohabitation and mandates an equal division of
such assets between the parties in a void marriage.
G.R. No. 204494, July 27, 2016
Facts:
274
Paterno vs Paterno
G.R. No. 213687, January 8, 2020
This case involves a dispute over the ownership of several real properties
between Luis Anson and Jo-Ann Diaz-Salgado and her husband, Dr. Gerard
Salgado. Luis Anson filed a complaint seeking the annulment of three
Unilateral Deeds of Sale and a Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate of
the Deceased Severina De Asis. Luis claimed that the properties were part of
the conjugal partnership between him and Severina, and that she had
disposed of them without his knowledge and consent. Jo-Ann and Gerard,
Facts:
Simon R. Paterno filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari against Dina Marie
Lomongo Paterno after their marriage was nullified in 2005. Despite the
nullity, unresolved issues remained regarding the division of common
properties and the children's presumptive legitimes. In 2006, the
respondent sought to present the petitioner as a hostile witness for
information on post-separation finances. The trial court initially granted the
motion but later sided with the petitioner, stating post-separation earnings
were not joint properties. The respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals
(CA) after the trial court dismissal, leading to a Petition for Review on
Certiorari in the Supreme Court (SC). Simultaneously, in another branch of
the trial court, the respondent sought the appraisal, partition, and delivery
of her share. The trial court granted partial distribution, and the petitioner
appealed to the CA, arguing abuse of discretion. The CA upheld the trial
court's decision, emphasizing different issues from the SC petition.
Dissatisfied, the petitioner filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari before the
SC.
Issue: What is the ownership and partition of properties that shall govern
between the petitioner and the respondent, who were married but their
marriage was declared null and void due to psychological incapacity.
Ruling:
The court ruled that their property relation is one of co-ownership under
Article 147 of the Family Code, which applies to couples who live exclusively
with each other without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage.
The court also considered the previous ruling in a related case (G.R. No.
180226) and concluded that Article 147 only applies to properties acquired
while they were living together. Therefore, the properties acquired after
their separation should not be included in the co-ownership. The court also
addressed the issue of the increase in support granted to the respondent
and ruled that the circumstances had changed, as two of their children had
reached the age of majority and were no longer living with the respondent.
The court found that the increase in support lacked basis and should be
reconsidered.
275
Perez, Jr. vs Perez-Senerpida
G.R. No. 233365, March 24, 2021
Facts:
This case involves a dispute over the ownership of a parcel of land acquired
during a common-law relationship. The petitioner, Nicxon L. Perez, Jr.,
received a donation of the property from his grandfather, Eliodoro Perez,
without the consent of Eliodoro's wife, Adelita Perez. Nicxon's aunt, Avegail
Perez-Senerpida, filed a case for annulment of the donation and title,
claiming that the donation and the renunciation of rights made by Adelita
were prejudicial to her inheritance. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) ruled in
favor of Avegail, annulling the donation and title and ordering the
cancellation of the transfer certificate of title in Nicxon's name. Nicxon
appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), but the CA affirmed the RTC's
decision.
Issue: Whether or not the gratuitous disposition of property acquired during
a common-law relationship or cohabitation requires the consent of both
parties.
Ruling:
The court ruled that under Article 98 of the Family Code, neither spouse
may donate any community property without the consent of the other.
Since Eliodoro was still legally married to Adelita at the time of the donation,
he should have obtained her consent. The court also found that the
renunciation of rights made by Adelita was a prohibited waiver under Article
89 of the Family Code, as no waiver of rights in the absolute community
property is allowed.
276
ADRIANO V. COURT OF APPEALS, 385 PHIL. 474, CITED IN SAGUID
VS. CA, 403 SCRA 678 (2003)]
The co-ownership in Article 144 of the Civil Code requires that the man and
woman living together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage
must not in any way be incapacitated to marry. Considering that the
property was acquired in 1964, or while Lucio's marriage with Gliceria
subsisted, such property is presumed to be conjugal unless it be proved that
it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife.
Facts:
The testator, Lucio Adriano also known as Ambrocio Adriano, married
Gliceria Dorado on October 29, 1933. Out of their lawful marriage, they had
three children, whom are private respondents in this case. Sometime in
1942 or prior thereto. Lucio and Gliceria separated. Also in 1942 or even
earlier, Lucio cohabited with Vicente Villa, with whom he had eight children
whom are petitioners in the instant case, with the exception of Jose Vergel,
who died before the inception of the proceedings. Five months after the
death of Gliceria, Lucio married Vicenta.
Lucio executed a last will and testament disposing of all his properties, and
assigning among others, his second wife Vicenta and all his children by his
first and second marriage as devisees and legatees therein.
Plaintiffs filed petition and claimed that the properties bequeathed in Lucio's
will are undivided "civil partnership and/or conjugal properties of Lucio
Adriano and Vicenta Villa", and thus, the will sought to be probated should
be declared void.
RTC ruled in favor of the private respondents. CA dismissed petitioner’s
appeal for lack of merit.
Issue : WON the property allegedly co-owned by Lucio and Vicenta during
their cohabitation is valid?
Ruling :
NO. Petitioners' insistence that a co-ownership of properties existed
between Lucio and Vicenta during their period of cohabitation before their
marriage in 1968 is without lawful basis considering that Lucio's marriage
with Gliceria was then subsisting.
277
GO-BANGAYAN VS. BANGAYAN, JR., 700 SCRA 702 (2013)].
Facts:
Facts
This case involves a petition for review filed by Sally Go-Bangayan against
Benjamin Bangayan, Jr. Benjamin alleged that he married Azucena Alegre in
1973 and had three children with her. However, he also had a romantic
relationship with Sally Go-Bangayan and they lived together as husband and
wife starting in 1982. Benjamin filed the petition for nullity of his marriage to
Sally, claiming that it was bigamous and lacked the formal requisites for a
valid marriage. He also sought the partition of properties acquired during
their cohabitation and the declaration of their two children as illegitimate.
After Benjamin presented his evidence, Sally filed a demurrer to evidence,
which was denied by the trial court. The trial court and the Court of Appeals
both ruled that the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was null and void
ab initio and non-existent, and property relations should be governed by
Article 148 of the Family Code.
Issue : WON the property relations between Benjamin and Sally should be
governed by Article 148 of the Family Code
Ruling:
Yes, SC ruled that CA correctly ruled that the property relations of Benjamin
and Sally is governed by Article 148 of the Family Code. The trial court and
the Court of Appeals both ruled that the marriage between Benjamin and
Sally was null and void ab initio and non-existent. It was established that
Benjamin was already married to Azucena at the time he entered into a
purported marriage with Sally. There was no valid marriage license issued to
Benjamin and Sally, and the marriage was not recorded with the local civil
registrar and the National Statistics Office. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
trial court's ruling that the marriage was void from the beginning due to the
lack of a marriage license and that it was a fictitious marriage.
Article 148 of the Family Code. Under this regime, …only the properties
acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of
money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in
proportion to their respective contributions, but Proof of actual contribution
is required.
279
278
ATIENZA V. DE CASTRO, G.R. NO. 169698, NOVEMBER 29, 2006
Facts
This case involves a dispute over the ownership of a parcel of land between
petitioner Lupo Atienza and respondent Yolanda de Castro. Lupo and
Yolanda were in an intimate relationship and lived together as common-law
husband and wife.
May 28, 1992, after their Lupo and Yolanda's relationship turned sour, Lupo
filed in the RTC of Makati City a complaint against Yolanda for the judicial
partition between them of a parcel of land with improvements located in
Bel-Air Subdivision, Makati City.
RTC of Makati City ruled in favor of Lupo and declared the property to be
owned in common, share-and-share. CA reversed the decision of RTC and
ruled that the property to be exclusively owned by Yolanda, under the
provisions of Article 148 of FC.
Lupo filed a petition before the SC, arguing that pursuant to Article 144 of
the Civil Code, he is deemed a co-owner and doesn't need evidence
Issue : Whether or not Article 144 and Article 484 of the Civil Code shall
govern the subject property
Ruling :
No, Article 144 and Article 484 of Civil Code does not apply since Lupo
Atienza was validly married to another woman at the time of his
cohabitation with the respondent, therefore Article 148 of FC shall
governed. SC ruled that their property regime, therefore, is governed by
ABING V. CA, G.R. NO. 146294, 31 JULY 2006)
Facts:
Sometime in 1986, John and respondent Juliet Waeyan met and fell in love
with each other. In time, the duo cohabited as husband and wife without the
benefit of marriage. During their cohabitation, they acquired properties,
including a 2-storey residential house and an annex structure that housed a
sari-sari store. In 1995, they decided to partition their properties and
executed a Memorandum of Agreement, which was left unsigned by both
parties. Under the agreement, John was to leave the dwelling and Juliet was
to pay him his share in all their properties. Juliet made a partial payment but
failed to pay the balance. As a result, John filed an ejectment suit against
Juliet.
In 1995, the relationship between the two turned from bad to worse. Hence,
they decided to partition their properties. For the purpose, they executed on
October 7, 1995 a Memorandum of Agreement. Unfortunately, the
document was left unsigned by the parties although signed by the witnesses
thereto.
The MTC ruled in John's favor, ordering Juliet's eviction from the store. The
RTC upheld the MTC's decision. However, Juliet appealed to the CA which
reversed the RTC's decision.
The CA concluded that the property was co-owned by both parties due to
their common-law relationship. The CA also determined that Juliet couldn't
be evicted.
Issue: whether or not the property was co-owned by both parties
Ruling
The Supreme Court held that the property is owned in common by Juliet and
John, as they lived together as husband and wife without the benefit of
marriage. The Court cited Article 147 of the Family Code, which states that
properties acquired by common-law spouses during their cohabitation are
presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts and are owned
in equal shares. Therefore, Juliet cannot be ejected from the property as she
is a co-owner.
Since John and Juliet lived together as husband and wife without the benefit
of marriage, the property in dispute is owned in common by both of them.
Therefore, Juliet cannot be ejected from the property as she is a co-owner.
280
HONTIVEROS VS. RTC BR. 25, ILOILO
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that the trial court erred in dismissing the
complaint based on the lack of verification. The absence of verification does
not affect the court's jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint.
The verification requirement is merely a formal requirement to ensure the
truthfulness of the allegations. The court could have simply ordered the
petitioners to verify the allegations regarding the efforts to settle the case.
The court also held that the case is not covered by Article 151 since it
involves a stranger to the family, Teodora Ayson. Article 151 only applies to
suits exclusively among family members.
The court further clarified that the absence of verification required in Art.
151 did not affect the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter of the
complaint.
Fact:
Petitioner spouses Augusto and Maria Hontiveros filed a complaint for
damages against private respondents Gregorio Hontiveros and Teodora
Ayson. The petitioners alleged that they are the owners of a parcel of land in
Capiz and that they were deprived of income from the land as a result of the
filing of the land registration case.
The petitioners moved for a judgment on the pleadings, arguing that the
private respondents' answer did not tender an issue or admit the material
allegations of the complaint. However, the trial court denied the motion and
dismissed the case on the ground that the complaint was not verified as
required by Art. 151 of the Family Code and that earnest efforts had not
been made to arrive at a compromise. The petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration, but it was denied.
Issue
The main issues raised in the case are: (1) whether the trial court could
dismiss the complaint for failure to comply with Article 151 of the Family
Code, which requires that a suit between family members must show that
earnest efforts towards a compromise have been made; and (2) whether
Article 151 applies to this case.
GUERRERO VS. RTC OF ILOCOS
FACTS
Filed by GAUDENCIO GUERRERO, petitioner as an accion publicana (an
ordinary civil proceeding to recover the right of possession and determine
the better right of possession of realty), against private respondent, PEDRO
G. HERNANDO, this case was dismissed by respondent Judge on the ground
that the parties being brother-in-law the complaint should have alleged that
earnest efforts were first exerted towards a compromise.
Guerrero and Hernando are being married to half-sisters hence are brothersin-law, and on the basis thereof respondent Judge gave petitioner five (5)
days "to file his motion and amended complaint" to allege that the parties
were very close relatives, their respective wives being sisters, and that the
complaint to be maintained should allege that earnest efforts towards a
compromise were exerted but failed.
Guerrero moved to reconsider claiming that since brothers by affinity are
not members of the same family, he was not required to exert efforts
towards a compromise.
ISSUE
whether brothers by affinity are considered members of the same family
requiring earnest efforts towards a compromise before a suit between them
may be instituted and maintained.
RULING
The Constitution protects the sanctity of the family and endeavors to
strengthen it as a basic autonomous social institution. This is also embodied
in Art. 149, and given flesh in Art. 151, of the Family Code, which provides:
Art. 151. No suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless
it should appear from the verified complaint or petition that earnest efforts
toward a compromise have been made, but that the same had failed. If it is
shown that no such efforts were in fact made, the case must be dismissed.
in Gayon v. Gayon, the "brothers and sisters" as members of the same family
does not comprehend "sisters-in-law". In that case, the "sisters-in-law"
(hence, also "brothers-in-law") are not listed under Art. 217 of the New Civil
Code as members of the same family. Since Art. 150 of the Family Code
repeats essentially the same enumeration of "members of the family", we
find no reason to alter existing jurisprudence on the matter. Consequently,
the trial court erred in ruling that petitioner Guerrero, being a brother-in-law
of private respondent Hernando, was required to exert earnest efforts
towards a compromise before filing the present suit.
HIYAS SAVINGS BANK V. MORENO
Hence, the Orders of RTC Ilocos are SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court of
Laoag City, Branch 16, or whichever branch of the court the case may now
be assigned, is directed to continue with Civil Case.
FACTS
Moreno filed a complaint against Hiyas Savings and Loan Bank, among
others, seeking to cancel a mortgage, claiming he didn't sign any loan or
mortgage agreement and that his wife acted in collusion to make it seem like
he did. Hiyas moved to dismiss the case citing Article 151 of the Family
Code, which requires an attempt at compromise before a suit between
family members. Moreno argued that since not all defendants were family
members, this rule didn't apply. The trial court denied the motion, a decision
upheld in a subsequent motion for reconsideration, emphasizing that the
failure to mention attempts at compromise in the complaint wasn't grounds
for dismissal.
ISSUE
W/N lack of earnest efforts toward a compromise is a ground for a motion to
dismiss in suits between husband and wife when other parties who are
strangers to the family are involved in the suit.
RULING
YES. instant petition should be dismissed. petitioner failed to advance a
satisfactory explanation as to its failure to comply with the principle of
judicial hierarchy.
Article 151 of the Family Code provides as follows: No suit between
members of the same family shall prosper unless it should appear from the
verified complaint or petition that earnest efforts toward a compromise
have been made, but that the same have failed. If it is shown that no such
efforts were in fact made, the case must be dismissed.
This rule shall not apply to cases which may not be the subject of
compromise under the Civil Code. Hence, once a stranger becomes a party
to a suit involving members of the same family, the law no longer makes it a
condition precedent that earnest efforts be made towards a compromise
before the action can prosper.
ISSUE
Whether or not the Court of Appeals may dismiss the order of dismissal of
the complaint for failure toallege therein that earnest efforts towards a
compromise have been made.
RULING
FAVIS V. FAVIS G.R. NO. 18592
FACTS
Dr. Mariano Favis, Sr. had two marriages and children from each. After his
first wife, Capitolina Aguilar, passed away, he married Juana Gonzales and
had a child named Mariano G. Favis with her. He acknowledged Mariano as
his legitimate child through an affidavit. Mariano, in turn, is married to
Larcelita D. Favis and has four children.
Dr. Favis, who died without a will in 1995, allegedly executed a Deed of
Donation in favor of his grandchildren with Juana, which was challenged by
his children from his first marriage with Capitolina. They sought to annul the
donation and partition his property. The trial court nullified the Deed of
Donation due to Dr. Favis's health and age. However, the Court of Appeals
dismissed the case, citing the petitioners' failure to comply with Article 151
of the Family Code, which requires attempting a compromise before legal
action.
NO. The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed and set aside and the
judgment of the RTC is affirmed.
The appellate court's dismissal of the complaint contained serious errors.
Their reliance on Rule 16, which pertains to grounds for a motion to dismiss,
is misguided. The court's mistake is evident even within the scope of Rule 16
and Rule 9. Rule 16 concerns grounds for a motion to dismiss, while Rule 9
deals specifically with dismissal of a claim by the court.
On January 1988, Court of Appeals rendered a final and executory judgment
on a case arising from a vehicular accident finding the petitioner liable to
damages. The sheriff levied on a parcel of residential land and a parcel of
agricultural land registered in his name.
A motion to quash was filed by Modequillo alleging therein that the
residential land is a family home and is exempt from execution, forced sale
or attachment under Articles 152 and 153 and that the judgment debts
ought to be enforced against the family home of defendant is not one of
those enumerated under Article 155of the Family Code. As to the
agricultural land although it is declared in the name of defendant it is
alleged to be still part of the public land and the transfer in his favor by the
original possessor and applicant who was a member of a cultural minority
was not approved by the proper government agency.
ISSUE
WON a final judgment of the Court of Appeals in an action for damages may
be satisfied by way of execution of a family home constituted under the
Family Code?
RULING
Under the Family Code, a family home is deemed constituted on a house
and lot from the time it is occupied as a family residence. If the family
actually resides in its premises, it is therefore a family home as
contemplated by law.
MODEQUILLO VS. BREVA
FACTS
In the present case, the residential house and lot of petitioner was not
constituted as a family home whether judicially or extrajudicially under the
Civil Code. it became a family home by operation of law only under Article
153 of the Family Code, upon the effectivity of the same.
However, the contention of petitioner that it should be considered a family
home from the time it was occupied in 1969 cannot be well taken. Under
Article 162 of the FC, it is provided that all existing family residences at the
time of the effectivity of the FC are considered family homes and are
prospectively entitled to benefits; it does not state that the provisions of it
has a retroactive effect.
PATRICIO V. DARIO III , G.R. NO. 170829, 20 NOV. 2006
FACTS
Marcelino V. Dario died intestate. He was survived by his wife, petitioner
Perla G. Patricio and their two sons, Marcelino Marc Dario and private
respondent Marcelino G. Dario III. Among the properties he left was a parcel
of land with a residentil house and a pre-school building built thereon.
Petitioner, Marcelino Marc and private respondent, extrajudicially settled
the estate of the decedent. Thereafter, petitioner and Marcelino Marc
formally advised private respondent of their intention to partition the
subject property and terminate the co-ownership. Private respondent
refused to partition the property claiming that the subject property, which is
the family home duly constituted by spouses Marcelino and Perla Dario,
cannot be partitioned while a minor benificiary is still living therein namely,
his 12-year old son, who is the grandson of the decedent.
ISSUE
Whether or not Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV, the minor son of private
respondent, can be considered as a beneficiary under Article 154 of the
Famlily Code.
RULING
NO. Marcelino Dario IV cannot be considered as a beneficiary.
parents, the Spouses Bell, and the cancellation of the title obtained by the
Eulogios.
Issue: WON the family home can be subject to execution sale under the
Family Code.
Ruling: No, The SC held that the family home is exempt from execution,
forced sale, or attachment, as provided for in Article 153 of the Family Code.
The exemption is limited to P300,000 in urban areas, unless adjusted by law.
The SC emphasized that the exemption is meant to protect the family home
from being seized by creditors, except in special cases.
287. MANACOP VS. CA
G.R. No. 104875. November 13, 1992
Three requisites must concur before a minor beneficiary is entitled to the
benefits of Art. 159:
(1) the relationship enumerated in Art. 154 of the Family Code.
Facts:
(2) they live in the family home.
The case involves a dispute between Florante F. Manacop (petitioner) and
F.F. Cruz Co., Inc. (respondent) regarding the attachment of petitioner's
family home. The respondent filed a complaint against petitioner's
corporation for non-payment of sub-contract costs and requested a writ of
preliminary attachment. The court granted the writ, which resulted in the
attachment of petitioner's family home.
(3) they are dependent for legal support upon the head of the family.
In this case, Marcelino Dario IV is dependent on legal support no from his
grandmother, but from his father.
286. EULOGIO V BELL
Issue: WON the defendant's residence qualifies as a family home and is
therefore exempt from attachment.
762 SCRA 103
Ruling: No, the court held that the defendant's residence does not qualify as
a family home and is not exempt from attachment.
Facts:
The court clarified that the exemption of a family home from attachment
applies only to certain circumstances, such as nonpayment of taxes, debts
incurred prior to the constitution of the family home, debts secured by
mortgages on the premises, and debts due to the construction of the
building. In this case, the debt incurred by the defendant arose before the
This case involves a dispute between the Bell siblings and the Eulogio couple
over the ownership of a residential house and lot. The Bell siblings filed a
complaint seeking the annulment of the contract of sale executed by their
constitution of the family home and is therefore not exempt from
attachment.
288. DE MESA V. ACERO
G.R. NO. 185064. JAN 16, 2012
Ruling: No, the subject property remains subject to execution and the
respondents' title to the property is upheld.
The Court emphasized that the exemption must be set up and proved to the
sheriff before the sale of the property. In this case, the petitioners failed to
set up and prove the exemption of the subject property before the sale at
public auction. They only claimed that the subject property was a family
home after the respondents filed a complaint for unlawful detainer,
approximately four years after the auction sale.
Facts:
The petitioners, Spouses Araceli Oliva-De Mesa and Ernesto S. De Mesa,
purchased a parcel of land in Bulacan, Philippines in 1984 and built a house
on it. In 1988, Araceli obtained a loan from Claudio D. Acero, Jr. and used the
land as collateral. When Araceli failed to repay the loan, Claudio filed a
complaint for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (B.P. 22) against the
petitioners.
A writ of execution was issued, and the land was sold at a public auction to
Claudio.
The petitioners filed a separate complaint to nullify Claudio's title over the
land, claiming it was a family home and exempt from execution.
Issue: WON the subject property is exempt from execution as a family home.
289. GOMEZ-SALCEDO V. STA. INES
G.R. NO. 132537, 14 OCT. 2005
Facts:
The case involves a contract between Dominador Gomez (plaintiff-appellant)
and Remedios Salcedo (defendant-appellee) regarding the lease of a house
and lot. The lease was initially made between Salcedo and Crary for a period
of two years at a monthly rental of P200. Crary then sublet a portion of the
property to Gomez for a term of two years at a monthly rental of P140. In
February 1911, Salcedo agreed to subrogate Gomez in all the rights and
obligations of the original lease, with a reduced rent of P110 per month.
However, Salcedo refused to evidence the subrogation in a public document
and later demanded an increased monthly rental of P300 from Gomez.
Issue: WON the contract between Gomez and Salcedo is enforceable,
considering that it falls within the purview of the statute of frauds.
Ruling: Yes, the court held that a contract falling within the statute of frauds
is not void but voidable at the option of the party sought to be charged. In
the absence of proof to the contrary, the court presumed that the provisions
of the statute of frauds have been observed.
Issue: WON the mortgage contract is valid and enforceable, considering the
petitioner's claim of fraud and lack of consent, as well as the restriction
clause imposed by the National Housing Authority.
Ruling: The court ruled that the mortgage contract is valid and enforceable.
The court found that all the elements of a valid mortgage contract were
present, and there was no evidence of fraud or lack of consent. The court
also held that the restriction clause imposed by the National Housing
Authority does not render the mortgage contract invalid.
291
290. VITUG V. ABUDA
G.R. NO. 201264, 11 JAN. 2016
ANDAL VS. MACARAIG
FACTS: Mariano Andal, a minor represented by his mother Maria Dueñas,
filed a complaint to recover ownership of a land donated to Emiliano Andal
by Eduvigis Macaraig. Emiliano, suffering from tuberculosis, died in January
1943. Mariano was born on June 17, 1943, within 300 days of the marriage
dissolution. The presumption of legitimacy stands, as the husband's illness is
insufficient to overcome it.
ISSUE: Whether Mariano Andal is a legitimate child of the deceased.
Facts:
The case involves a dispute over the validity of a mortgage contract executed
by the petitioner, Florante Vitug, and the respondent, Evangeline Abuda.
Abuda loaned P250,000 to Vitug and his wife, Narcisa Vitug, and as security
for the loan, Vitug mortgaged his property in Tondo Foreshore, Manila. The
property was subject to a conditional Contract to Sell between Vitug and the
National Housing Authority (NHA).
Vitug failed to repay the loan, and Abuda filed a complaint for foreclosure of
the property.
Ruling: Yes. Mariano, born on June 17, 1943, is presumed legitimate because
he was born within 300 days following the dissolution of the marriage. The
husband's serious illness is insufficient to overcome the presumption of
legitimacy. This presumption can only be rebutted by proof that it was
physically impossible for the husband to have had access to his wife during
the first 120 days of the 300 days preceding the child's birth. Mariano is
considered legitimate, making him the owner of the land.
292
BABIERA VS. CATOTAL
FACTS: Presentacion B. Catotal filed a petition to cancel the birth entry of
Teofista Guinto, claiming the latter's birth certificate was simulated. Teofista
argued that Catotal lacked legal capacity to question her legitimacy and that
the action was barred by prescription. The trial court granted Catotal's
petition, which Teofista appealed.
ISSUES:Does Catotal have legal standing to challenge Teofista's legitimacy?
Ruling: Yes, Catotal has standing as her interest in the civil status of Teofista
arises from an action for partition concerning inherited properties. Article
171 of the Family Code is inapplicable, as it pertains to cases where the
father questions the legitimacy of his wife's child, presupposing undisputed
filiation. In this case, Catotal seeks to establish no blood relation to the
parents.
293
BENITEZ-BADUA VS. CA
FACTS:After the deaths of Spouses Vicente Benitez and Isabel Chipongian, a
dispute over the administration of Vicente's estate arose. Private
respondents, Vicente's sister and nephew, sought letters of administration,
while the petitioner, claiming to be the sole heir, opposed it. The trial court
favored the petitioner, but the Court of Appeals reversed the decision.
ISSUE: Whether Articles 164, 166, 170, and 171 of the Family Code apply in
favor of the petitioner.
HELD: NO. The petition was dismissed. Articles 164, 166, 170, and 171,
which address situations where a husband denies a child born to his wife, do
not apply. The heirs assert that the petitioner was not born to Vicente and
Isabel, not contesting her legitimacy as their child.
294
AGUILAR VS. SIASAT G.R. NO. 200169 (172)
FACTS:Petitioner Rodolfo Aguilar claimed to be the only son and sole heir of
Spouses Alfredo Aguilar and Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar. A dispute over
missing property titles arose between petitioner and respondent Edna
Siasat. The RTC ruled in favor of respondent, a decision upheld by the Court
of Appeals (CA).
ISSUE: Whether Alfredo Aguilar’s SSS Form E-1 serves as sufficient proof of
filiation under Article 172 of the Family Code.
RULING: Yes. The Supreme Court granted the petition, overturning the
decisions of the CA and RTC. The Court held that Alfredo Aguilar's SSS Form
E-1 constitutes an "admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or
a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned."
Respondent was ordered to surrender the missing property titles to
petitioner.
295
ARADO V. ALCORAN G.R. NO. 163362
Facts:Raymundo Alcoran was married to Joaquina Arado, and they had a son
named Nicolas Alcoran. During Nicolas' marriage to Florencia, he had an
extramarital affair with Francisca Sarita, resulting in the birth of Anacleto
Alcoran. Nicolas inherited properties from Raymundo, who had passed
away. Subsequently, Nicolas died, leaving the properties to Anacleto, his
illegitimate son. Joaquina, Nicolas' wife, also died with a will.
Issue: Whether Anacleto, as an illegitimate child of Nicolas, has the right to
inherit from Nicolas and the legitimate relatives of Nicolas.
Ruling: No, Anacleto has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate
children and relatives of Nicolas, and vice versa, as stipulated by Article 992
of the Civil Code. Therefore, Anacleto is not entitled to inherit from Nicolas
or from the properties left by Raymundo Alcoran.
302. CABATANIA V. REGODOS
Facts: The Florencia Regodos Controversy revolves around a petition for
recognition and support for her minor son, Camelo Regodos. Florencia
testified that she supported her child after her husband left in 1981. Camelo
brought Florencia to Bacolod City and had sexual intercourse. Florencia
claimed she discovered she was carrying Camelo's child 27 days after their
encounter. Camelo Cabatania claimed the father of the child was Florencia's
husband, and Florencia was already pregnant when they had sex.
301.FERNANDEZ VS. CA
Facts: A private respondent filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against
the petitioner in the MeTC, which was dismissed. Olivares appealed to the
RTC, which reversed the MeTC and ordered Fernandez to pay rental
arrearages, attorney's fees, litigation expenses, and costs. Fernandez filed a
motion for reconsideration, which was denied. He then filed a motion for a
new trial before the RTC of Manila, Branch 46, citing new evidence of his
rental payments. The RTC granted the motion for execution and denied the
motion for reconsideration. Fernandez filed a Petition for Certiorari,
Prohibition, and Mandamus, but the Court of Appeals denied the petition
and affirmed the RTC's stance.
Issue: Can the court compel petitioner Camelo Cabatania to acknowledge
Regodos as his illegitimate son and to give support to him?
Ruling: A certificate of Live Birth purportedly identifying the putative father
is not competent evidence of paternity when there is no showing that the
putative father had a hand in the preparation of said certificate. The local
civil registrar has no authority to record the paternity of an illegitimate child
on the information of a third person.
303. SAYSON vs CA
Issue: Whether or not the mere filing by petitioner of a motion for extension
of time to file a petition for review automatically divested the regional trial
court of its jurisdiction over the case, as to entertain a motion for new trial.
Ruling: Fernandez's motion for new trial was filed late, extending the 15-day
period for filing. He had only one day left to file, as it should be filed within
the 15-day period to appeal. If denied, Fernandez would have only the
remaining reglementary period to appeal.
Facts: Eleno and Rafaela Sayson had five children, including Mauricio,
Rosario, Basilisa, Remedios, and Teodoro. After their deaths, their properties
were left in the possession of Delia, Edmundo, and Doribel, who claim to be
their children. In 1983, they filed a complaint for the partition of their
estate, but the CA modified the decision, disqualifying Delia and Edmundo
from inheriting from their parents' estate.
Issue: Whether Delia, Edmundo and Doribel are entitled to inherit their
father’s share in the estate of his (Teodoro) parents’ estate by right of
representation.
Ruling : YES as to Doribel but NO as to Delia and Edmundo. There is no
question that as the legitimate daughter of Teodoro and thus granddaughter
of Eleno and Rafaela, Doribel has a right to represent here deceased father
in the distribution of the intestate estate of her grandparents. Under Art.
981 (NCC), she is entitled to the share her father would have directly
inherited had he survived, which shall be equal to the shares of her
grandparents’ other children.
304. DE JESUS V. ESTATE OF DIZON, G.R. NO. 142877, 02 OCT. 2001
Facts: The case involves two illegitimate children born in a lawful wedlock,
Jacqueline A. de Jesus and Jinkie Christie A. de Jesus, who claim to be the
illegitimate children of Juan G. Dizon to enforce their shares in his estate
under succession rules. Juan G. Dizon acknowledged Jacqueline and Jinkie as
his own illegitimate children by Carolina Aves de Jesus. After his death, the
petitioners filed a complaint for Partition with Inventory and Accounting of
the Dizon estate. The respondents, the surviving spouse and legitimate
children of the deceased, sought the dismissal of the case, arguing that the
action was made to compel recognition of the children as illegitimate
children and that an action for partition was not an appropriate forum to
determine paternity and filiation.
Issue: Whether petitioners are indeed the acknowledged illegitimate
offsprings of the decedent.
Ruling: Illegitimate children can be filiated through a civil register record of
birth, final judgment, or admission of legitimate filiation in a public
document or private handwritten instrument. If no record is available,
filiation can be proven through open possession of the child's status or other
legal means. Recognition in a record, will, court statement, or authentic
writing is voluntary and does not require further court action.
305. ESTATE OF LOCSIN VS. LOCSIN
Facts: Juan E Locsin, Jr. filed a petition for Letters of Administration to be
appointed Administrator of the Intestate Estate of Juan "Jhonny" Locsin. He
alleged that he is an acknowledged natural child of the late Juan C. Locsin,
owned personal properties, and was the only surviving legal heir. However,
oppositions argued that he is not a child or acknowledged natural child, his
claim is barred by prescription, and there is no filial relationship between
him and the deceased. To support his claim, he submitted a machine copy of
his Certificate of Live Birth No. 477, which he claims is the original and
authentic. Opponents, however, argued that the Certificate of Live Birth No.
477 is spurious and that it was reported by his mother, Amparo Escamilla.
Issue: Whether or not the respondent is entitled to the issuance of letters of
administration.
Ruling: The Roces ruling on illegitimate filiation states that a birth certificate
not signed by the alleged father is not competent evidence of paternity. A
birth certificate is a crucial piece of evidence for recognition and filiation,
but it can be refuted by contrary evidence. In this case, the respondent's
Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 has all the badges of nullity, and the genuine
Exhibit "D" entered in the Local Civil Registry is overturned. The
respondent's photograph with his mother near the coffin of the late Juan C.
Locsin cannot constitute proof of filiation, as it could encourage fraudulent
claims.