306
CONCEPCION V. ALMONTE
Facts
This case involves the dispute between Gerardo B.
Concepcion (petitioner) and Ma. Theresa Almonte
(respondent) regarding the legitimacy of their child,
Jose Gerardo. Gerardo and Ma. Theresa were married
on December 29, 1989, and their son, Jose Gerardo,
was born on December 8, 1990. However, Gerardo
later discovered that Ma. Theresa had previously been
married to Mario Gopiao, making their marriage
bigamous.
Gerardo filed a petition to have their marriage
annulled, which was granted by the trial court. The
court declared Jose Gerardo to be an illegitimate child
and awarded custody to Ma. Theresa with visitation
rights granted to Gerardo.
Issue: Whether Jose Gerardo should be considered
legitimate or illegitimate.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Ma. Theresa,
affirming the lower court's decision. In this case, there
was no evidence presented to disprove personal
access between Ma. Theresa and Mario. The court
concluded that the presumption of legitimacy in favor
of Jose Gerardo stands.
The court cited Article 167 of the Family Code, which
states that a child shall be considered legitimate even
if the mother declares against its legitimacy. The court
emphasized that the law, not the parents, determines
the legitimacy of a child.
The court explained that the presumption of
legitimacy is based on the principles of natural justice
and the protection of the child from the stigma of
illegitimacy. The court further stated that the
presumption of legitimacy can only be rebutted by
evidence of physical impossibility of coitus between
the husband and wife during the period of conception.
307
Spouses Tijing v. Court of Appeals G.R.
125901
Facts
This case involves a petition for habeas corpus filed by
Edgardo A. Tijing and Bienvenida R. Tijing. They sought
the return of their son, Edgardo Tijing Jr., who they
claimed was taken by Angelita Diamante.
The petitioners presented evidence to support their
claim, including testimony from a midwife who
assisted in the delivery of Edgardo Jr., and a witness
who stated that Angelita's common-law husband was
sterile and that John Thomas Lopez, the child in
question, was adopted. The trial court ruled in favor of
the petitioners, ordering Angelita to release the child
to them.
Issue: whether the evidence presented by the
petitioners is sufficient to establish that John Thomas
Lopez is the same person as Edgardo Tijing Jr.
Ruling
The Supreme Court, upon review, found that the
evidence presented by the petitioners was indeed
sufficient to establish that John Thomas Lopez is the
same person as Edgardo Tijing Jr. The court
emphasized the importance of determining the child's
identity in a habeas corpus case and found that the
evidence, including the physical resemblance between
the child and the petitioners, supported the
petitioners' claim.
The court also noted the availability of DNA testing as
a more modern and scientific method of establishing
parentage. Ultimately, the court granted the petition
and reinstated the decision of the trial court, ordering
the return of the child to the petitioners.
308
AGUSTIN V. PROLLAMANTE
Facts
Fe Angela and her son Martin Prollamante filed a
complaint for support and support pendente lite
against Arnel L. Agustin in the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Quezon City. They alleged that Arnel
impregnated Fe in 1999 and refused to provide
support for Martin despite his financial capacity. Arnel
denied being Martin's father and claimed that his
relationship with Fe had ended before Martin's
conception. He also alleged that Fe had other secret
lovers and that the signature on Martin's birth
certificate was forged.
Arnel filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, arguing
that Martin, as an unrecognized child, had no right to
support and should establish his filiation in a separate
suit. He also opposed the DNA paternity testing, citing
his right to privacy and right against self-incrimination.
The trial court denied the motion to dismiss and
1
ordered the parties to undergo DNA testing. CA
upheld the trial court’s decision.
Issue: whether the CA gravely erred in upholding the
trial court's decision and order, which denied the
petitioner's motion to dismiss the complaint for
support and directed the parties to undergo DNA
paternity testing.
Ruling:
The court also held that the integration of an action
for recognition with an action for support was valid
and in accordance with jurisprudence. The court
further held that DNA paternity testing can be ordered
without violating the petitioner's constitutional rights,
as the right against self-incrimination does not apply
to object evidence, such as DNA samples, and the
right to privacy does not bar incursions into individual
privacy for scientific and technological advancements
that enhance public service and the common good.
The court ruled that the complaint for support
showed a cause of action against the petitioner, as it
alleged that he impregnated Fe and refused to provide
support for Martin despite his financial capacity.
309
IN RE CHANGE OF NAME OF JULIAN LIN
BRIONES V. MIGUEL
Facts
This case involves a petition for change of name
and/or correction/cancellation of entry in the Civil
Registry of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang, a minor,
represented by his mother Anna Lisa Wang. The
petition was filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Cebu City, Branch 57. Julian sought to drop his middle
name and have his registered name changed from
Julian Lin Carulasan Wang to Julian Lin Wang.
grounds for a valid change of name, including when
the name is ridiculous, dishonorable, or difficult to
write or pronounce, or when the change will avoid
confusion. However, the court found that convenience
alone is not a sufficient reason to change the
petitioner's name. The court also emphasized the
importance of considering the best interests of the
minor petitioner, and believed that granting the name
change at this point may prejudice the petitioner's
rights under the law. Therefore, the court denied the
petition for change of name.
310
REPUBLIC V. CAPOTE
Facts:
Capote sought to change Giovanni's name to Giovanni
Nadores. The petition was filed in Special Proceeding
No. R-481 in the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 23
of San Juan, Southern Leyte. Capote, as Giovanni's
guardian ad litem, stated in the petition that Giovanni
is an illegitimate child and that his father has failed to
fulfill his responsibilities towards him. Capote argued
that changing Giovanni's name to his mother's
surname would be in his best interest and would
facilitate his mother's intended petition to have him
join her in the United States. The trial court granted
the petition, and the decision was affirmed by the
Court of Appeals (CA).
The Republic of the Philippines, through the OSG,
argued that all persons who may be adversely affected
by the change of name should have been made
respondents to make the proceeding adversarial.
Issue: Whether the proceedings for the change of
name were sufficiently adversarial, considering the
non-joinder of alleged indispensable parties.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the trial
court, denying the petition for change of name.
In this case, the court found that Giovanni's petition
for a change of name complied with all procedural
requirements and that the evidence presented during
the hearing established that he is entitled to change
his name. The court noted that Giovanni was never
recognized by his father, and changing his name would
erase the impression of recognition.
The court held that a change of name is a privilege
and not a right. To justify a request for a change of
name, the petitioner must show proper or reasonable
cause and that he will be prejudiced by the use of his
true and official name. The court listed several
The court ruled that a person cannot change their
name without judicial authority because a person's
name affects their identity, interests, and interactions.
The appropriate remedy for a change of name is
covered by Rule 103 of the Rules of Court. The court
Issue: Whether dropping the middle name of a minor
child is contrary to Article 174 of the Family Code.
Ruling
2
also emphasized the importance of an adversarial
proceeding in addressing substantial or contentious
issues resulting from a change of name.
311
DE SANTOS VS. ANGELES
Facts
On February 7, 1941, Dr. Antonio de Santos married
Sofia Bona, which union was blessed with a daughter,
herein petitioner Maria Rosario de Santos. After some
time, their relationship became strained to the
breaking point. Thereafter, Antonio fell in love with a
fellow doctor, Conchita Talag, private respondent
herein. Antonio sought a formal dissolution of his first
marriage by obtaining a divorce decree from a Nevada
court in 1949.
The petitioner, Maria Rosario de Santos, filed a
petition for legitimation of her children with the
respondent, Conchita Talag de Santos. The lower
court, presided by Judge Adoracion G. Angeles, denied
the petition, prompting the petitioner to file an
appeal. The children of the petitioner were born out
of a void marriage.
Issue: whether or not the children of the petitioner,
who were born out of a void marriage, can be
legitimated.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the respondent
and upheld the lower court's decision. The Court held
that natural children by legal fiction, such as the
children of the petitioner, cannot be legitimated.
The Court explained that legitimation is a privilege
granted by law only to natural children who were
conceived by parents who could have legally married
at the time of conception. In this case, the parents of
the children were legally barred from marrying each
other at the time of conception, as the father was still
married to another woman. Therefore, the children
cannot be legitimated.
Unrecognized illegitimate children have no rights
under the law.
312
Facts
ABELLA VS. CABAÑ ERO,GR NO. 206647
This case involves a petition for support filed by
Richelle P. Abella on behalf of her minor daughter,
Marl Jhorylle Abella, against Policarpio Caba ero.
Richelle alleged that she was sexually abused by Caba
ero, resulting in the birth of her child. She sought a
monthly allowance for the child. Caba ero denied the
allegations and claimed that he could not be the
father of the child.
The Regional Trial Court dismissed Richelle's complaint
for failure to implead her minor child as a plaintiff. The
Court of Appeals ruled that separate filiation
proceedings should have been instituted to establish
the child's paternity before Richelle's action for
support could prosper.
Issue: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling
that separate filiation proceedings should have been
instituted before Richelle's action for support could
prosper.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court
of Appeals. It held that while filiation must be
established for a child to claim support, it was
unnecessary for Richelle's action for support to be
dismissed. Instead, the Court of Appeals should have
remanded the case to the Regional Trial Court to allow
Richelle and her daughter to present evidence to
establish their cause of action, including the claim of
paternal relations against Caba ero.
The Court cited Article 194 and 195 of the Family
Code, which provide for the extent of support among
family members and the persons obliged to support
each other. It also emphasized that an illegitimate
child is entitled to support but must first establish
filiation with the putative parent. The Court
recognized that an action for compulsory recognition
may be filed ahead of an action for support, but it also
stated that an action for support may be directly filed.
313
BARCELOTE VS. REPUBLIC, GR NO. 222095
Facts
The petitioner, Jonna Karla Baguio Barcelote
(Barcelote), filed a petition for the cancellation of
certificates of live birth against the Republic of the
Philippines, Ricky O. Tinitigan, and the Local Civil
Registrar of Davao City. Barcelote alleges that Tinitigan
registered the birth certificates of their two children
without her knowledge and participation, and that the
3
birth certificates contain erroneous entries. Barcelote
explains that she bore a child out of wedlock with
Tinitigan in 2008 and another child in 2011. She did
not register the births of their children at the time due
to various reasons, alter, she discovered that there
were already birth certificates with the same names of
the children registered by Tinitigan in Davao City.
Barcelote filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) for the cancellation of the subject birth
certificates. The RTC ruled in favor of Barcelote,
ordering the cancellation of the birth certificates.
However, the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the RTC's
decision. The CA found that Barcelote failed to prove
the falsity of the entries in the birth certificates and to
provide evidence of the true personal circumstances
of her children.
Issue: whether or not the birth certificates of
illegitimate children should be signed by both parents
or only by the mother.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the petitioners
and reinstated the decision of the RTC. The Court held
that under Section 5 of Act No. 3753, the birth
certificate of an illegitimate child should be signed and
sworn to jointly by the parents or only by the mother
if the father refuses to acknowledge the child. The
Court emphasized that the provision is mandatory and
applies specifically to illegitimate children. The use of
the word "shall" in the provision indicates its
mandatory character.
The Court further explained that the mother's
signature is required because she has parental
authority and custody over the illegitimate child. The
right of custody springs from the exercise of parental
authority. Therefore, the mother must sign and agree
to the information entered in the birth certificate.
314
LUCAS V. LUCAS
Facts
This case involves a petition for review on certiorari
filed by Jesse U. Lucas (petitioner) against Jesus S.
Lucas (respondent). The petitioner filed a petition to
establish illegitimate filiation before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), alleging that he is the illegitimate child of
the respondent. The petitioner provided various
documents to support his claim. The respondent
claimed that he was not served with a copy of the
petition and filed a special appearance and comment,
arguing that the petition was adversarial in nature and
he should have been served with summons. The RTC
initially dismissed the case but later reconsidered its
decision and set the case for hearing.
Issue: whether a prima facie showing is necessary
before a court can issue a DNA testing order.
Ruling
The SC held that in an action in rem, jurisdiction over
the person of the defendant is not a prerequisite as
long as the court has jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the petition. The lack of summons may be
excused if the adverse party had the opportunity to
file their opposition.
The SC also held that the petition was adversarial in
nature despite the lack of a defendant's name, failure
to implead the respondent, and non-service of
summons. The notice requirement for an adversarial
proceeding was satisfied through publication and
notice to the Solicitor General. The SC further ruled
that the petition to establish filiation was sufficient in
substance, and the veracity of the assertions can be
determined during the trial.
315
TISON V. COURT OF APPEALS
Facts
This case involves an action for reconveyance filed by
Corazon Dezoller Tison and Rene R. Dezoller against
Teodora Domingo before the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City. The petitioners claim that they are
entitled to inherit one-half of a property owned by
their deceased aunt, Teodora Dezoller Guerrero, by
right of representation. The property was originally
owned by Teodora and her husband, Martin Guerrero.
After Teodora's death, Martin executed an Affidavit of
Extrajudicial Settlement, adjudicating the property to
himself. He later sold the property to Teodora
Domingo.
Issue: whether the petitioners are entitled to inherit
one-half of the property owned by their deceased
aunt, Teodora Dezoller Guerrero, by right of
representation.
Ruling
4
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the petitioners
and reversed the decision of the lower courts. The
Court held that the petitioners are entitled to inherit
one-half of the property owned by their deceased
aunt, Teodora Dezoller Guerrero, by right of
representation.
The Court emphasized the presumption of legitimacy,
stating that there is no presumption more firmly
established and founded on sounder morality than the
presumption that children born in wedlock are
legitimate. The issue of legitimacy cannot be attacked
collaterally, and the burden of proof rests on the party
disputing the legitimacy.
LIYAO V. LIYAO
FACTS
William Liyao Jr. (Billy), the illegitimate son of the
deceased, as represented by her mother (Corazon),
filed a petition ordering Juanita Tanhoti-Liyao, Pearl L.
Tan, Tita L. Tan and Linda Liyao to recognize and
acknowledge the former as a compulsory heir of the
deceased and to be entitled to all successional rights.
William Liyao Jr. was in continuous possession and
enjoyment of the status as the child of the deceased
having been recognized and acknowledged as such
child by the decedent during his lifetime. There were
two sides of the story. Corazon maintained that she is
legally married but living separately from Ramon Yulo
for more than 10 years and that Corazon cohabited
with the late William Liyao from 1965 until the death
of William. On the other hand, the daughters of the
deceased stated that her mom and the deceased were
legally married and that her parents were not
separated legally or in fact.
ISSUE
Whether or not the petitioner can impugn his own
legitimacy to be able to claim from the estate of the
deceased.
RULING
No. Impugning the legitimacy of the child is a strictly
personal right of the husband, or in exceptional cases,
his heirs for the reason that he was the one directly
confronted with the scandal and ridicule which the
infidelity of his wife produced and he should be the
one to decide whether to conceal that infidelity or
expose it in view of the moral and economic interest
involved
Babiera vs. Presentacion
FACTS
Presentacion questioned the authenticity of the entry
of birth of Teofista Babiera. She then filed a petition
for the cancellation of the entry of birth of petitioner.
She asserted that she is the only surviving child of the
late spouses Eugenio Babiera and Hermogena
Carinosa, who died on May 1996 and July 1990
respectively.
It appears that on September 1996, a baby girl was
delivered by a “hilot” in the household of spouses
Eugenio and Hermogena Babiera and without the
knowledge of the said spouses. Flora Guinto, mother
of the child and a housemaid of spouses caused the
registration and recording of the facts of birth of her
child by simulating that the baby girl was the child of
the spouses Eugenio, then 65 years old and
Hermogena then 54 years old and made Hermogena
appear to be the mother by forging her signature.
ISSUE
Whether or not Presentacion has legal capacity to file
the special proceedings pursuant to Art. 171?
RULING
Article 171 is not applicable in this case. Article 171 of
the Family Code shows that it applies to instances
which the father impugns the legitimacy of his wife’s
child. The provision, however, presupposes that the
child was the undisputed child of the mother. Present
case alleges and shows that Hermogena did not give
birth to Teofista. The present action does not impugn
Teofista’s filiations to Eugenio and Hermogeno, be
there is no blood relation to impugn in the first place.
The reason why Presentacion took interest on
Teofista’s status is to protect the former’s successional
rights.Article 170 of the FC does not apply. The
provision provides a prescriptive period for action to
impugn the legitimacy of the child. The present action
involves the cancellation of Teofista’s Birth Certificate,
it does not impugn her legitimacy. The action to nullify
the birth certificate does not prescribe because it was
allegedly declared void ab initio.
BENITEZ V. COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS
5
Spouses Vicente Benitez and Isabel Chipongian had
various properties. They both died intestate. The
special proceedings for administration of the
properties were filed with the trial court. Vicente's
sister Victoria B. Lirio filed for issuance of letters of
administration in favor of the nephew. Marissa
opposed the petition, saying that she is the sole heir
of deceased Vicente and that she is capable of
administering his estate. She submitted the pieces of
documentary evidence and testified that the spouses
treated her as their own daughter. The relatives of
Vicente tried to prove through testimonial evidence,
that the spouses failed to beget a child during their
marriage. Victoria categorically declared that Marissa
was not the biological child of the spouses who were
unable to physically procreate.
Trial court relied on Arts. 166 and 170 of the Family
Code and ruled in favor of Marissa. On appeal, the CA
reversed the lower court decision and declared
Marissa Benitez-Badua is not the biological child of
the late spouses.
ISSUE
Villar's house at Villa Teresa in Angeles City sometime
in 1986 and introduced him to Villar's legal wife.
After this, the children of Daisie were freely brought
by Villar to his house as they were eventually accepted
by his legal family.
In the summer of 1991, Villar asked Daisie to allow
Christopher J., then six years of age, to go with his
family to Boracay. Daisie agreed, but after the trip,
Villar refused to give back the child. Villar said he had
enrolled Christopher J. at the Holy Family Academy for
the next school year.
On July 30, 1991, Daisie filed a petition for habeas
corpus on behalf of Christopher J. RTC ruled in favor of
Petitioner and gave Christopher J.’s custody to her. CA
reversed RTC ruling and stated that it is for the best
interest of Christopher J that he should temporarily
remain under the custody of respondent-appellant
until the issue on custody and support shall have been
determined in a proper case.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE
Whether or not Marissa Benitez-Badua is the
legitimate child and the sole heir of the late spouses.
WoN petitioner should have custody of Christoper J.
RULING
RULING
NO.
Yes. Rule 102, 1 of the Rules of Court provides that
"the writ of habeas corpus shall extend to all cases of
illegal confinement or detention by which any person
is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful
custody of any person is withheld from the person
entitled thereto." It is indeed true, as the Court of
Appeals observed, that the determination of the right
to the custody of minor children is relevant in cases
where the parents, who are married to each other, are
for some reason separated from each other. It does
not follow, however, that it cannot arise in any other
situation.
The SC find no merit to the petition.
Articles 164, 166, 170 and 171 of the Family Code
cannot be applied in the case at bar. The above
provisions do not contemplate a situation where a
child is alleged not to be the biological child of a
certain couple.
DAVID V. CA AND TUNOG V. CA
FACTS
Petitioner Daisie T. David, secretary of private
respondent had a relationship Ramon R. Villar, a
married businessman in Angeles City with four
children. Christopher J., was born on March 9, 1985 to
them. Christopher J. was followed by two more
children, both girls, namely Christine, born on June 9,
1986, and Cathy Mae on April 24, 1988.
The relationship became known to private
respondent's wife when Daisie took Christopher J, to
TUNOG V. CA
FACTS
Dinah B. Tonog gave birth to Gardin Faith Tonog, her
illegitimate daughter with Edgar V. Daguimol. The two
cohabited for a time and lived with Edgar's parents
and sister. A year after, Dinah left for the USA where
she found a work as a registered nurse. Gardin was
left in the care of her father and paternal
grandparents.
6
Edgar later filed a petition for guardianship over
Gardin. The court granted the petition and appointed
Edgar as the legal guardian.
The parties agreed to move for the dismissal of the
case, which was granted by the trial court and
dismissed with prejudice.
Dinah filed a petition for relief from judgment. The
trial court set aside its original judgment and allowed
Dinah to file her opposition to Edgar's petition.
Meanwhile, the court issued a resolution granting
Dinah's motion for custody over Gardin. Dinah moved
for the immediate execution of the resolution.
However, another complaint for maintenance and
support was subsequently filed against the petitioner,
this time in the name of the minor, represented by her
legal guardian. The petitioner moved to dismiss the
complaint on the ground of res judicata, arguing that
the previous dismissal with prejudice barred the
subsequent case. The trial court denied the motion,
ruling that res judicata does not apply in an action for
support because renunciation or waiver of future
support is prohibited by law.
Edgar filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of
Appeals. The CA let Gardin remain in the custody of
Edgar until otherwise adjudged.
Dinah appealed to the Supreme Court, contending
that she is entitled to the custody of Gardin, as a
matter of law. First, as the mother of Gardin Faith, the
law confers parental authority upon her as the mother
of the illegitimate minor. Second, Gardin cannot be
separated from her since she had not, as of then,
attained the age of seven.
Issue: Whether the manifestation sent by the legal
guardian amounts to renunciation of the right to claim
support from the petitioner.
Ruling:
ISSUE
Who is entitled to the temporary custody of the child
pending the guardianship proceeding?
RULING
In custody disputes, it is axiomatic that the paramount
criterion is the welfare and well-being of the child.
In the case at bar, we are being asked to rule on the
temporary custody of the minor, Gardin Faith, since it
appears that the proceedings for guardianship before
the trial court have not been terminated, and no
pronouncement has been made as to who should
have final custody of the minor.
For the present and until finally adjudged, temporary
custody of the subject minor should remain with her
father, the private respondent herein pending final
judgment of the trial court.
321
The petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari with
the Court of Appeals, which dismissed the petition.
The petitioner then brought the case to the Supreme
Court.
The Supreme Court held that the dismissal with
prejudice of the first case does not bar the subsequent
case for support. The right to receive support cannot
be renounced or transmitted to a third person. Future
support also cannot be the subject of a compromise.
The manifestation sent by the legal guardian
amounted to renunciation, severing the right of the
minor to claim support from the petitioner. The
agreement between the parties for the dismissal of
the complaint and counterclaim was in the nature of a
compromise, which is prohibited in cases of support.
The right to receive support cannot be renounced or
transmitted to a third person. Future support also
cannot be the subject of a compromise. The
manifestation sent by the legal guardian amounted to
renunciation, severing the right of the minor to claim
support from the petitioner.
DE ASIS V. CA, G.R. 127578, 15 FEB. 1999
Facts:
322
The case involves an action for maintenance and
support brought by the legal guardian of a minor
against the alleged father, Manuel de Asis. The
petitioner was accused of refusing to provide support
for the minor despite repeated demands.
Facts
HILARIO V MIRANDA (887 SCRA 217)
This case involves a petition for review on certiorari
filed by Ingrid V. Hilario (Ingrid) against Thelma V.
Miranda and Irenea Belloc. The case revolves around
the issue of who is the rightful heir of Antonio Belloc
7
and Dolores Retiza, who both died intestate and left
properties in Sibonga, Cebu.
Ingrid filed two petitions for the issuance of letters of
administration, one for Antonio's properties and
another for Dolores' properties.
The RTC declared that Magdalena is an illegitimate
daughter of Antonio and that Dolores died without
issue. The court ruled that the properties of Antonio
and Dolores should form part of their intestate estate
and be inherited by their intestate heirs.
Based on this decision, Ingrid filed the petitions for
letters of administration. The RTC eventually granted
her request and issued letters of administration to her.
However, Thelma, who is Magdalena's other daughter,
opposed Ingrid's claim. She argued that Magdalena
cannot inherit from Dolores because Dolores was a
legitimate child, and Magdalena is an illegitimate child
of Antonio.
Irenea, on the other hand, claimed to be the niece of
Antonio and the first cousin of Dolores. She argued
that she is entitled to inherit from the decedents as
the closest surviving relative.
Issue: The main issue in this case is whether
Magdalena is an intestate heir of Antonio and Dolores.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court granted the petition and ruled
that Magdalena is an intestate heir of Antonio and
Dolores. The Court held that there is no evidence to
support the Court of Appeals' finding that Magdalena
is a spurious child and that she must prove recognition
by Antonio to inherit from his estate. The Court
emphasized that the law itself establishes the status of
a child from the moment of birth, and proof of filiation
is only necessary when the legitimacy of the child is
being questioned. Since Magdalena was an
illegitimate child of Antonio, she had no need to file
an action to establish her filiation.
323
UY V JOSE NGO CHUA, 600 SCRA 806
Facts
The case involves a petition for the issuance of a
decree of illegitimate filiation filed by Joanie Surposa
Uy against Jose Ngo Chua. Uy alleged that Chua had
an illicit relationship with Irene Surposa and that they
had two children, including Uy. She claimed that Chua
financially supported her and her brother, provided
them with employment, and introduced them as his
illegitimate children. Chua denied the allegations and
filed a demurrer to evidence, arguing that the case
was barred by res judicata due to a previous
compromise agreement between the parties in a
similar case. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) granted
the demurrer to evidence and dismissed the case. Uy
appealed to the Supreme Court.
Issue: whether the compromise agreement entered
into between Uy and Chua in a previous case
constitutes res judicata and bars the filing of the
present case.
Ruling:
The Court ruled that the compromise agreement did
not constitute res judicata and did not bar the filing of
the present case.
The Court emphasized that a compromise agreement
must comply with the requisites in the Civil Code,
including consent of the parties, a certain object, and
a valid cause. It also noted that a compromise
agreement cannot be contrary to law or public policy.
In this case, the compromise agreement between Uy
and Chua intended to settle the question of Uy's
status and filiation, which is prohibited under Article
2035 of the Civil Code. The agreement also waived
Uy's rights to future support and future legitime as an
illegitimate child. Therefore, the Court held that the
compromise agreement did not constitute res
judicata.
324
LIYAO, JR. V. TANHOTI-LIYAO, G.R. 138961, 07
MAR. 2002
Facts
This case involves an action for compulsory
recognition as the illegitimate son of the late William
Liyao. The petitioner, William Liyao Jr., represented by
his mother Corazon Garcia, filed the case against
Juanita Tanhoti-Liyao, Pearl Margaret L. Tan, Tita Rose
L. Tan, and Linda Christina Liyao. The petitioner alleges
that Corazon is legally married to Ramon Yulo but
cohabited with William Liyao, resulting in the
conception and birth of the petitioner.
Issue
8
The main issue in this case is whether the petitioner
can impugn his own legitimacy in order to claim from
the estate of his supposed father, William Liyao.
Issue: whether the Court of Appeals erred in ordering
the petitioner to recognize and provide support to his
minor son, Gliffze O. Buling.
Ruling
Ruling:
The court ruled in the negative, stating that the fact
that Corazon had been living separately from her
husband at the time the petitioner was conceived and
born is of no significance. The grounds for impugning
the legitimacy of a child mentioned in Article 255 of
the Civil Code may only be invoked by the husband or,
in exceptional cases, his heirs. Impugning the
legitimacy of a child is a strictly personal right of the
husband, as he is the one directly affected by the
infidelity of his wife. The child himself cannot choose
his own filiation. If the husband does not impugn the
legitimacy of the child, then the status of the child is
fixed, and the child cannot choose to be the child of
his mother's alleged paramour.
The Supreme Court held that the Court of Appeals did
not err in ordering the petitioner to recognize and
provide support to his minor son. The Court of
Appeals correctly appreciated the respondent's
testimony and concluded that she made an honest
mistake in her understanding of the questions asked.
The petitioner is ordered to recognize his minor son,
Gliffze O. Buling, and provide support.
The court held that a child born within a valid
marriage is presumed legitimate, even if the mother
declares against its legitimacy or is sentenced as an
adulteress. Therefore, the petition to compel
recognition by the respondents of the petitioner as
the illegitimate son of William Liyao was denied.
325
CHARLES GOTARDO V. DIVINA BULING, G.R.
NO. 165166, 15 AUG. 2012
Facts
This case involves a petition for review on certiorari
filed by petitioner Charles Gotardo to challenge the
decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA G.R. CV No. 76326. The CA decision ordered the
petitioner to recognize and provide legal support to
his minor son, Gliffze O. Buling. The case started when
respondent Divina Buling filed a complaint with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Maasin, Southern Leyte,
for compulsory recognition and support pendente lite,
claiming that the petitioner is the father of her child
Gliffze.
The RTC dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of
evidence proving Gliffze's filiation. The CA set aside
the RTC decision and ordered the petitioner to
recognize his minor son Gliffze and provide support.
The petitioner's denial of paternity is insufficient to
overcome the evidence presented by the respondent.
The Court of Appeals' decision is in accordance with
the best interests of the child, as it ensures that the
child receives the support and recognition he is
entitled to.
326
SSS V. AGUAS, G.R. NO. 165546, 27 FEB. 2006
FACTS:Pablo Aguas, a member and pensioner of the
SSS, passed away, and his surviving spouse, Rosanna
H. Aguas, filed a claim for death benefits, stating that
they had a minor child named Jeylnn. However,
Pablo's sister, Leticia Aguas-Macapinlac, contested
Rosanna's claim, alleging that she abandoned the
family years ago and had a relationship with another
man. The SSC ruled against Rosanna, questioning her
eligibility as the primary beneficiary. The Court of
Appeals later reversed the SSC decision.
ISSUE: Whether Rosanna, Jeylnn, and Janet are
entitled to the SSS death benefits accruing from
Pablo's death.
RULING: The petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED.
Legitimacy, as established by Article 164 of the Family
Code, supports Jeylnn's claim, backed by her birth
certificate with Pablo's signature and authentication
from the Civil Registry. The records confirm that Jeylnn
was born during Rosanna and Pablo's marriage,
justifying her entitlement to the SSS death benefits
accruing from Pablo's demise.
9
327
MACADANGDANG VS. COURT OF APPEALS,
Facts:
Respondent Elizabeth Mejias engaged in sexual
relations with Antonio Macadangdang in March 1967
while still married to Crispin Anahaw. Mejias claimed
that her child, Rolando, was born in October 1967. In
1972, she filed a complaint for recognition and
support against petitioner Macadangdang. The Court
of First Instance (CFI) Davao dismissed the action, but
the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the decision and
granted Mejias' claim.
Issue: Whether the child Rolando is legitimate, given
the circumstances of his birth and the legal
presumption of legitimacy under Article 256 of the
Civil Code.
Ruling: The child Rolando is presumed legitimate, as
Article 256 of the Civil Code upholds the presumption
of legitimacy, even if the mother declared against it.
This provision serves as a guarantee for the child's
status regardless of the parents' conflicts.
328
REPUBLIC V MAGPAYO, 641 SCRA 533)
FACTS: Julian Edward Emerson Coseteng Magpayo
filed a petition to change his name to Julian Edward
Emerson Marquez Lim Coseteng. He claimed that
although his parents were never married, his birth
certificate erroneously indicated a marriage. To
support his petition, he submitted a certification from
the NSO, academic records, and his child's birth
certificate. The RTC granted the petition, ordering
changes to his birth certificate. The Republic appealed,
arguing that such changes affecting civil status require
an adversary proceeding.
ISSUE/S: Whether Rule 103 is the proper remedy for a
change in name involving a change in civil status.
Ruling:NO. Rule 103 applies to valid grounds for
changing names, which do not include altering civil
status. Changes in civil status require strict compliance
with Rule 108 when substantial and controversial
alterations are involved, such as legitimacy or
citizenship.
329
CONCEPCION V. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO.
123450, AUGUST 31, 2005
FACTS: Gerardo B. Concepcion filed a petition to annul
his marriage to Ma. Theresa Almonte, claiming she
was married to Mario Gopiao. The trial court declared
their marriage void, deemed their child Jose Gerardo
illegitimate, and awarded custody to Ma. Theresa. The
Court of Appeals ruled that Jose Gerardo was the
legitimate child of Ma. Theresa and Mario due to the
void marriage with Gerardo. Gerardo moved for
reconsideration.
ISSUE: Whether Jose Gerardo is the legitimate child of
Ma. Theresa and Gopiao or the illegitimate child of
Ma. Theresa and Gerardo.
Ruling Jose Gerardo is the legitimate child of Ma.
Theresa and Mario Gopiao. The law presumes
legitimacy for children conceived or born during the
parents' marriage. The child's legitimacy cannot be
compromised, and public policy protects the child's
rights. Since Gerardo's marriage to Ma. Theresa was
void, he lacks the right to impugn the legitimacy of the
child. Jose Gerardo has the right to use the surnames
of both parents. Gerardo's petition is denied, affirming
the Court of Appeals' resolution in favor of
respondents.
330
TISON VS. COURT OF APPEALS,
Facts:Corazon Tison and Rene Dezoller, niece and
nephew of the deceased Tedora Dezoller Guerrero,
sought reconveyance of a property inherited from
their aunt. Upon Tedora's death, her surviving spouse,
Martin Guerrero, executed an Affidavit of Extrajudicial
Settlement, claiming sole heirship and selling the
property to Teodora Domingo. Petitioners filed for
reconveyance, claiming inheritance through right of
representation from their deceased father,
Hermogenes Dezoller. However, Domingo questioned
Hermogenes' legitimacy.
Issue: Can a third person, not the father nor an heir,
attack the legitimacy of Hermogenes?
Ruling: No, a third person like Domingo is not the
proper party to impugn the legitimacy of petitioners.
The law firmly establishes the presumption that
children born in wedlock are legitimate. Only the
husband can contest the legitimacy of a child born to
his wife. The issue of legitimacy cannot be attacked
collaterally, and outside of exceptional cases, even
10
heirs cannot impugn legitimacy as it would insult the
memory of the deceased.
331
AMLAYON ENDE AND QUEZON ENDE VS.
ROMAN CATHOLIC PRELATE G.R. NO. 191867,
DECEMBER 6, 2021
Facts:
The heirs of the spouses Ende filed a complaint for
quieting of title and recovery of possession of the
land, alleging that the respondents took possession of
portions of the land through deceitful means. They
also claimed that the respondents' ownership over the
portions of the land was not properly registered and
that the conveyances were fictitious. The heirs filed an
amended complaint, rectifying the defects in the
verification and certification. The respondents filed
their answer with a compulsory counterclaim,
claiming ownership over their respective portions of
the land and invoking acquisitive prescription.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) dismissed the complaint
filed by the heirs but granted the claim of the
intervenors, Amlayon and Quezon Ende, who proved
that they are the legitimate children and heirs of the
spouses Ende. The CA held that both parties failed to
establish that they are the real parties-in-interest to
institute an action for quieting of title or recovery of
possession.
Issue : Whether the prior determination of heirship in
a separate special proceeding is a prerequisite for
filing an ordinary civil action.
Ruling: The court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs and
held that a prior determination of heirship in a special
proceeding is not necessary before filing an ordinary
civil action to enforce ownership rights acquired
through succession.
In this case, the court found that the plaintiffs, Amado,
Daniel, Felipe, and Pilar, and the intervenors, Amlayon
and Quezon, are the legal and rightful heirs of the
spouses Ende. The court relied on the continuous
possession of the status of legitimate children as
evidence of their filiation. The court also noted that
the plaintiffs' records of birth were not recorded in the
civil register, but this did not negate their status as
legitimate heirs.
332
ROCES VS. LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF
MANILA (102 PHIL. 1050 [1958])
Joaquin P. Roces filed, with the Court of First Instance
of Manila, a petition alleging that he is married to
Pacita Carvajal; that on November 4, 1955, he came to
know of the existence of a birth certificate registered
with the Local Civil Registrar of Manila, mentioning
him as the father of one Ricardo V. Roces, an
illegitimate child; that said birth certificate shows, on
its face, that it had been executed with neither the
knowledge nor the consent of the petitioner; and that
said information with regard to the alleged party of
Ricardo Joaquin V. Roces is false.
Petitioner prays order be issued directing the Local
Civil Registrar to strike out from the said documents
all information having reference to the herein
petitioner as the father of the child. Local Civil
Registrar of Manila filed an answer stating that he had
no knowledge or information sufficient to form a
belief as to the truth of the averments.
Issue: whether the statements in said birth certificate
identifying the alleged father of said child are valid
Ruling :
No. SC ruled that such statements in the said birth
certificate are void and should be corrected. Pursuant
to section 5 of Act No. 3753 and Article 280 of the Civil
Code, both legal provisions explicitly prohibit, not only
the naming of the father of a child born outside
wedlock when the birth certificate, or the recognition,
is not filed or made by him, but, also, the statement of
"any information" or "circumstance" by which he
"could be identified. I
t is clear that statements therein relative to the
identity of the father of said child were, and are, an
open violation of the law. Insofar as the identity of the
father of Ricardo Joaquin V. Roces, is null and void,
and should be canceled or corrected.
333
BERCILES VS. GOVERNMENT SERVICE
INSURANCE SYSTEM (128 SCRA 53 [1984])
Facts:
Judge Pascual G. Berciles died on cardiac arrest on
August 21, 1979, age 66. He had GSIS pension for
serving in the government for 36 yrs, of which 26 yrs
were in judiciary. He was also entitled to other
benefits from his employer as well as return of the
premium paid to GSIS. Such benefits are now being
claimed by 2 families.
11
On February 4, 1981, Atty Cecilia Berciles, daughter in
law of deceased, together with Iluminada, submitted
to the Court Investigator additional documents to
support their claim and the following
recommendation (1) that the death benefit of the
deceased be awarded to Iluminada, to whom the
deceased had been living with up to the time of his
death, (2) That the claim of Flor be denied.
Issue: Whether or not Flor and her children are
entitled to the GSIS retirement benefit of the late
Judge Pascual Berciles?
Ruling:
No, the Supreme Court ruled that Flor and her
children are not entitled to the GSIS retirement
benefit of the late judge. The court ruled that GSIS
committed grave abuse of discretion for considering
Pascual Voltaire Berciles as acknowledged nature
child, and Maria, Mercy and Rhoda as illegitimate
children without substantial evidence through
competent and admissible proof of acknowledgement
of filiation by the late judge.
Iluminada and her children are the lawful heirs
entitled to the distribution of benefits and will be
distributed in accordance with the law on intestate
and succession. Article 966 of the New Civil Code
states that: “If a widow or widower and legitimate
children of descendants are left, the surviving spouse
has in succession the same share as that of each of
the children.”
334
CASTRO VS. COURT OF APPEALS (1989)
Facts:
Petitioners Juan Castro and Feliciana Castro are the
brother and sister of the late Eustaquio Castro while
respondent Benita Castro Naval is the only child of
Eustaquio. Respondent Cipriano Naval is the husband
of Benita Castro. Juan and Feliciana filed an action of
properties against Benita alleging that they are the
forced heirs of Pedro Castro who died in 1923.
Marcelina Bautista also filed an action for partition of
properties against Benita alleging that she is also
compulsory heirs of Eustaquio who died in 1961 and
that she is entitled to the partition of the properties of
said deceased.
During the pre-trial the parties agreed that the main
issue to be resolved in this case is as to whether or not
defendant Benita Castro Naval is the acknowledged
natural child of Eustaquio Castro.
The trial court ruled that respondent Benita Castro
Naval is the acknowledged and recognized child of
Eustaquio Castro. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
trial court's decision.
Issue : Whether or not respondent Benita Castro Naval
is the acknowledged and recognized illegitimate child
of Eustaquio Castro.
Ruling :
Yes. Benita is an acknowledged and recognized child of
Eustaquio Castro. First, Benita Castro Naval is
unquestionably the daughter of the late Eustaquio
Castro who was qualified to legally marry when she
was conceived and born.
Second, the rule on separating the legitimate from the
illegitimate family is of no special relevance here
because Benita and her mother Pricola Maregmen
were the only immediate family of Eustaquio. There
are no legitimate children born of a legitimate wife
contesting the inheritance of Benita. And lastly, it was
Eustaquio himself who had the birth of Benita
reported and registered.
335
2004
ECETA V. ECETA, G.R. NO. 157037, 20 MAY
Facts:
The case involves a dispute over a property located in
Stanford, Cubao, Quezon City. Petitioner Rosalina P.
Vda. De Eceta was married to Isaac Eceta and they
acquired several properties, including the disputed
property. Isaac died in 1967, leaving behind Rosalina
and their son Vicente as his compulsory heirs. In 1977,
Vicente died, leaving Rosalina and his illegitimate
daughter Maria Theresa as his compulsory heirs. In
1991, Maria Theresa filed a case for "Partition and
Accounting with Damages" against Rosalina, claiming
that she is entitled to a portion of the disputed
property.
Issue:
Whether Rosalina's admission that Maria Theresa is
her granddaughter is enough to prove Maria Theresa's
filiation with Vicente.
Whether the action for recognition has already
prescribed.
Ruling:
12
The Court ruled in favor of Maria Theresa. The Court
noted that the case filed by Maria Theresa is one for
partition and accounting with damages, and not for
compulsory recognition. Both parties have already
admitted that Maria Theresa is Rosalina's
granddaughter. Maria Theresa successfully established
her filiation with Vicente by presenting a duly
authenticated birth certificate, which was signed by
Vicente himself, acknowledging Maria Theresa as his
daughter.
The Court held that the acknowledgment of paternity
by Vicente through the birth certificate is sufficient to
establish Maria Theresa's filiation. Therefore, the
Court denied the petition for review on certiorari and
affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals, which
affirmed with modification the decision of the trial
court.
336. ANGELES V. ANGELES- MAGLAYA, G.R. NO.
153798, 02 SEPT. 2005
Facts:
Petitioner Belen Angeles is the wife of the deceased
while the respondent Aleli Maglaya is the child of the
deceased Francisco Angeles in his first wife. Francisco
died intestate and the respondent seeks
administration of the estate of the deceased but
opposed by the surviving wife (2nd wife) alleging that
the respondent is an illegitimate child of the
deceased. Petitioner also averred that respondent
could not be the daughter of Francisco for, although
she was recorded as Francisco’s legitimate daughter,
the corresponding birth certificate was not signed by
him. Respondent alleged, inter alia, that per
certification of the appropriate offices, records of
marriages of the Civil Registrar where the alleged
1938 Francisco-Genoveva wedding took place were
destroyed.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent is illegitimate
precluding her to become the administrator of the
deceased Francisco Angeles’s Estate?
Ruling:
No, the respondent is not illegitimate. Article 164 of
the Family Code cannot be more emphatic on the
matter: “Children conceived or born during the
marriage of the parents are legitimate.” The issue of
legitimacy cannot be attacked collaterally.
337. Perla vs Baring
Facts: A complaint for abandonment and support was
filed by herein respondent Mirasol Baring together
with her son, Randy Perla allegedly the son of Antonio
Perla. It is Randy’s birth certificate that was presented
as evidence to support the claim which was later
denied by petitioner that such information has
discrepancies and not signed by him. Such was neither
signed by Antonio.
Issue: Whether or not illegitimate filiation was
established.
Ruling: No. The rules for establishing filiation are
found in Articles 172 and 175 of the Family Code
which provide as follows:
Article 172. The filiation of legitimate children is
established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register
or a final judgment; or
(2)
An admission of legitimate filiation in a
public document or a private handwritten instrument
and signed by the parent concerned.
338. NEPOMUCENO VS LOPEZ (2010)
Facts: Arhbencel Ann Lopez filed a complaint for
recognition and support against petitioner Ben-Hur
Nepomuceno, alleging she was born out of an
extramarital affair. She presented a handwritten note
from Nepomuceno, stating he would provide financial
support to Ahrbencel Ann Lopez. Nepomuceno denied
being the father and claimed threats from the
National People's Army. The trial court dismissed the
complaint, stating Arhbencel's Certificate of Birth was
not prima face evidence, the note did not
acknowledge Arhbencel as his child, and no overt act
of acknowledgment was performed.
Issue: Whether or not the handwritten note is
sufficient to establish Arhbencel's filiation as an
illegitimate child
Ruling: No. Arhbencel's entitlement to support from
petitioner is dependent on the determination of her
filiation. The handwritten note does not contain any
statement whatsoever about Arhbencel's filiation to
petitioner. It is, therefore, not within the ambit of
Article 172(2) vis-à-vis Article 175 of the Family Code
which provides that the filiation of illegitimate
13
children may be established by a private handwritten
instrument signed by the parent concerned admitting
such filiation.
339. TABUADA V TABUADA (880 SCRA 67)
Facts: The petitioners filed a civil case against
respondents, including spouses Bernan and Eleanor
Certeza, Eleanor Tabuada, Julieta Trabuco, and Laureta
Redondo. The RTC ruled the Mortgage of Real Rights
null and void, stating that Eleanor Tabuada
misrepresented herself as the deceased Loreta
Tabuada and mortgaged the property without the
plaintiffs' knowledge. Moral damages were deemed
proper under Article 309 of the Civil Code.
Issue: Whether or not the real estate mortgage is null
and void
Ruling: The Court ruled that a mortgage must fulfill a
principal obligation, be the absolute owner of the
property, and have free disposal. Eleanor Tabuada
fraudulently represented herself as the late Loreta
Tabuada, the titleholder, to the Spouses Certezas,
despite the late Loreta Tabuada's death in 1990. The
RTC declared the mortgage nullity, stating Eleanor
Tabuada was not legally authorized to mortgage the
property.
340. JISON V. CA, G.R. NO. 124853, 1998
Facts: Private respondent, Monina Jison, instituted a
complaint against petitioner, Francisco Jison, for
recognition as illegitimate child of the latter. The case
was filed 20 years after her mother’s death and when
she was already 39 years of age.
Petitioner was married to Lilia Lopez Jison since 1940
and sometime in 1945, he impregnated Esperanza
Amolar, Monina’s mother. Monina alleged that since
childhood, she had enjoyed the continuous, implied
recognition as the illegitimate child of petitioner by his
acts and that of his family. It was likewise alleged that
petitioner supported her and spent for her education
such that she became a CPA and eventually a Central
Bank Examiner. Monina was able to present a total of
11 witnesses.
Issue: WON Monina should be declared as illegitimate
child of Francisco Jison.
Ruling: Under Article 175 of the Family Code,
illegitimate filiation may be established in the same
way and on the same evidence as that of legitimate
children. Article 172 therefore provides the various
forms of evidence by which legitimate filiation is
established.
“To prove open and continuous possession of the
status of an illegitimate child, there must be evidence
of the manifestation of the permanent intention of
the supposed father to consider the child as his, by
continuous and clear manifestations of parental
affection and care, which cannot be attributed to pure
charity. Such acts must be of such a nature that they
reveal not only the conviction of paternity, but also
the apparent desire to have and treat the child as such
in all relations in society and in life, not accidentally,
but continuously”.
341
PERLA VS BARING (2012)
Facts
This case involves a petition for review on certiorari
filed by Antonio Perla against Mirasol Baring and
Randy Perla. Antonio and Mirasol lived together as
common-law spouses for two years, during which time
Randy was born. However, Antonio later abandoned
them and failed to provide any support for his son.
Mirasol and Randy filed a complaint for support
against Antonio, alleging that he is Randy's father and
should be ordered to provide support. Antonio denied
being Randy's father and claimed that he never had a
common-law relationship with Mirasol.
Issue: whether or not Antonio should be ordered to
provide monthly support to Randy based on his
alleged paternity.
Ruling
The Supreme Court ruled that there was no basis for
the order for Antonio to support Randy.
The court based its decision on the lack of evidence
establishing Randy's paternity to Antonio. Mirasol
testified that she and Antonio were sweethearts but
did not live together as husband and wife. She also
presented Randy's birth certificate and baptismal
certificate, which listed Antonio as the father.
However, Antonio denied being Randy's father and
claimed that he never had a common-law relationship
with Mirasol.
342
UYGUANGCO V. COURT OF APPEALS
Facts
14
The case involves a dispute over the filiation of
Graciano Bacjao Uyguangco, who claims to be the
illegitimate child of Apolinario Uyguangco. Apolinario
Uyguangco died in 1975, leaving behind his wife,
Dorotea, and four legitimate children. Graciano filed a
complaint for partition against all the petitioners,
alleging that he was born to Apolinario and Anastacia
Bacjao in 1952 and that he was excluded from the
family and inheritance of the petitioners.
Issue: Whether or not Graciano should be allowed to
prove his filiation as an illegitimate child of Apolinario,
Ruling
The Supreme Court held that it is clear that the private
respondent Graciano can no longer be allowed at this
time to introduce evidence of his open and continuous
possession of the status of an illegitimate child or
prove his alleged filiation through any of the means
allowed by the Rules of Court or special laws. The
simple reason is that Apolinario Uyguangco is already
dead and can no longer be heard on the claim of his
alleged son's illegitimate filiation.
The Court explained that under the Family Code,
illegitimate children can establish their filiation in the
same way and on the same evidence as legitimate
children. This includes the open and continuous
possession of the status of a legitimate child or any
other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special
laws. However, the Court noted that Graciano's action
is now barred because his alleged father is already
deceased. The Court emphasized that the putative
parent should be given the opportunity to affirm or
deny the child's filiation, which cannot be done if the
alleged parent is already dead.
343
MIGUEL D. GOCOLAY, PETITIONER, VS.
MICHAEL BENJO GOCOLAY, RESPONDENT.[ G.R. NO.
220606,
Facts
This case involves a petition for paternity filed by
Michael Benjo Gocolay (Michael) against Miguel
Gocolay (Miguel). Michael seeks to be recognized as
Miguel's biological and nonmarital son. Michael
presented his birth certificate, which named Miguel as
his father and stated that Miguel and his mother,
Priscilla Castor, were married. Miguel denied having a
child with Priscilla and claimed that the statements in
Michael's birth certificate were falsified.
During the trial, Michael filed a motion for DNA
testing, which Miguel opposed. The Regional Trial
Court granted the motion, and Miguel appealed the
decision until it reached the Supreme Court, which
affirmed the grant in 2012.
The Regional Trial Court granted Miguel's motion, but
the Court of Appeals reversed the decision.
Issue: whether Priscilla's conviction for making false
entries in Michael's birth certificate renders the birth
certificate inadmissible as evidence to establish a
prima facie case for paternity.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the Court
of Appeals, ruling that Priscilla's conviction for making
false entries in Michael's birth certificate does not
render the birth certificate inadmissible as evidence to
establish a prima facie case for paternity.
344
GRANDE V. ANTONIO (G.R. NO. 206248;
FEBRUARY 18, 2014)
Facts
This case involves a dispute between petitioner Grace
Grande and respondent Patricio Antonio over the
custody and surname of their two illegitimate
children. Grande and Antonio lived together as
husband and wife, even though Antonio was already
married to someone else. They had two sons together,
but Antonio did not recognize them as his own in the
Record of Births. Grande eventually left for the United
States with the children, prompting Antonio to file a
petition for recognition and custody.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) ruled in favor of
Antonio, granting him recognition and joint parental
authority with Grande. CA modified the RTC's
decision. The CA awarded sole custody to Grande and
ordered the change of the children's surnames to
Antonio. Grande filed a petition for review with the
Supreme Court, arguing that the father cannot compel
the use of his surname without the mother's consent.
Issue: whether or not the use of the father's surname
by illegitimate children is mandatory or discretionary.
Ruling
15
The Supreme Court (SC) ruled that the use of the
father's surname by illegitimate children is
discretionary and not mandatory. The SC held that the
clear and unequivocal use of the word "may" in Article
176 of the Family Code, which allows illegitimate
children to use the surname of their father, gives them
the choice on the surnames by which they will be
known. The SC also declared the provisions of the
Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of Republic
Act (RA) 9255, which made the use of the father's
surname mandatory, as null and void.
The SC also cited its constitutional prerogative and
authority to strike down and declare as void rules of
procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies
that are contrary to statutes and/or the Constitution.
345
REPUBLIC V. VICENCIO, G.R. NO. 88202
Facts
Cynthia Vicencio sought to change her surname from
"Vicencio" to "Yu." Cynthia Vicencio was born to Fe
Leabres and Pablo Vicencio on January 19, 1971. After
a marital dispute, Pablo Vicencio left their conjugal
home and never returned or provided support to his
family. Ernesto Yu, who later became Fe Leabres'
second husband, took on the role of Cynthia's father
and supported her. Fe Leabres filed a petition for
dissolution of their conjugal partnership, and later
filed a petition to drop Pablo Vicencio's surname from
her name.
In 1984, Fe Leabres filed a petition to declare Pablo
Vicencio as an absentee. Fe Leabres and Ernesto Yu
were married in 1986. Cynthia Vicencio claimed that
she has always been known as the daughter of
Ernesto Yu and that using the surname "Vicencio" has
caused confusion and embarrassment. She had used
the surname "Yu" in public functions and beauty
contests.
Issue: whether the appellate court erred in affirming
the trial court's decision to allow the change of
Cynthia Vicencio's surname.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that there was no proper and
reasonable cause to warrant the change of surname.
The general rule is that legitimate children should
bear the surname of their father. While there are
exceptions to this rule, such as when the name is
ridiculous, dishonorable, or extremely difficult to
pronounce, the Court found that none of these
exceptions applied in this case.
The Court emphasized that the best interest of the
child should be considered in determining whether a
change of surname is warranted, but in this case,
there was no evidence presented to show that using
the surname "Vicencio" caused any harm or detriment
to Cynthia Vicencio. Therefore, the Court ruled that
the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in
granting the petition for change of surname.
346
DELA CRUZ V. GRACIA (2009)
Facts:
The petitioners, Jenie San Juan dela Cruz and her
minor child Christian dela Cruz "Aquino", sought to
register the child's birth using the surname of his
deceased father, Dominique Aquino. Jenie and
Dominique lived together as husband and wife
without being legally married. After Dominique's
death, Jenie gave birth to their child and applied for
registration of the child's birth using Dominique's
surname.
Respondent, Ronald Paul S. Gracia, the City Civil
Registrar of Antipolo City, denied the application,
stating that the child cannot use the surname of his
father because he was born out of wedlock and the
father has no capacity to acknowledge his paternity.
The trial court dismissed the complaint, stating that
the Autobiography written by Dominique, which was
submitt
ed as evidence, was unsigned and did not contain an
express recognition of paternity.
Issue: whether the unsigned handwritten statement of
the deceased father can be considered as a
recognition of paternity
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the petitioners
and held that while Article 176 of the Family Code
does not explicitly require the private handwritten
instrument to be signed by the father, it must be read
in conjunction with related provisions of the Family
Code which require the father's signature for
recognition of paternity. However, in this case, special
circumstances exist that satisfy the requirement of the
law. These circumstances include the fact that
Dominique died before the child's birth, the
16
Autobiography corresponds to the testimonial
evidence presented by Jenie, and the testimony of
Dominique's father and brother corroborate Jenie's
declarations. These circumstances indicate
Dominique's paternity of the child and give life to his
statements in the Autobiography.
]The court also noted that the policy of the Family
Code is to liberalize the rule on the investigation of
paternity and filiation of children, especially
illegitimate children. It further stated that the state, as
parens patriae, affords special protection to children
from abuse, exploitation, and other conditions
prejudicial to their development.
The court based its ruling on the provisions of the law
on adoption, which require the written consent of the
adopter's spouse and children who are 10 years old or
older. In this case, Rosario's consent was not obtained,
and Joanne was not given notice of the adoption
proceedings. The court emphasized that these
requirements are essential to protect the rights of the
spouse and legitimate children, as their consent and
participation in the adoption process are crucial.
348 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CA and
ZENAIDAC. BOBILES G.R. No. 92326,
FACTS:
347
CA………………..’STRO VS. GREGORIO, G.R. NO.
188801
Facts
This case involves a petition for annulment of
adoption filed by Larry Rentegrado and his wife
Lilibeth against Jose Rentegrado, Larry's brother, and
his wife Rosario. The petitioners alleged that Jose
fraudulently obtained the adoption of their daughter,
Joanne, without their knowledge and consent. Jose
filed a petition for adoption in the Regional Trial Court
of Batac, Ilocos Norte, claiming that he and Rosario
were childless. He submitted a fraudulent affidavit of
consent in Rosario's name, as well as fraudulent birth
certificates for their supposed children, Jed and
Regina. The trial court granted the petition for
adoption without personally serving notice to Rosario
and Joanne, Larry and Lilibeth's legitimate child.
Issue
The main issue raised in the case is whether the
adoption was validly obtained.
Ruling
The court ruled that the adoption was not valid due to
the lack of consent from Rosario and Joanne. The
court emphasized that the law requires the written
consent of the adopter's spouse and children who are
10 years old or older. Since Rosario's consent was not
obtained and Joanne was not given notice of the
proceedings, the adoption was deemed invalid.
Zenaida C. Bobiles filed a petition on February 2, 1988,
to adopt Jason Condat, then(six) 6 years old who had
been living with her family since he was four (4)
months old, before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Legazpi City. On February 15, 1988, the RTC, finding
the petition to be sufficient in form and substance,
issued an order setting the petition for hearing on
March 28, 1988, where copies of the said order were
duly served and published, but nobody appeared to
oppose the petition. The jurisdictional requirements
have been proved to be compliant at the hearing,
therefore taken and admitted in the proceedings. The
RTC rendered judgment on March 20, 1988, granting
that Jason Condat be the child of the spouses
Dioscoro and Zenaida Bobiles, and the surname of the
child be changed to “Bobiles”.
On August 3, 1988, Executive Order No. 209 (Family
Code) took effect while the case was pending on
appeal in the Court of Appeals. Under the said code,
joint adoption by husband and wife is mandatory. The
Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Regional
Trial Court, and the petitioner seeks the reversal of the
said decision.
ISSUE:
WON Family Code can be applied retroactively to the
petition filed by Zenaida C. Bobiles alone to adopt
Jason Condat?
RULING:
NO. Since the Family Code took effect after the
favorable decision of the Regional Trial Court and
while it was pending in the Court of Appeals, the
petition cannot be dismissed by reason of failure to
comply with a law which was not yet in force and
effect at the time. Article 246 of the Family Code
17
provides for retroactive effect of appropriate relevant
provisions thereof, subject to the qualification that
such retrospective application will not prejudice or
impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with
the Civil Code or other laws.
349: HERBERT CANG, petitioner, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS
Facts:
Petitioner Herbert Cang and Anna Marie Clavano were
married and begot three children, namely: Keith, born
on July 3, 1973; Charmaine, born on January 23, 1977,
and Joseph Anthony, born on January 3, 1981.
Anna Marie filed a petition for legal separation before
the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Cebu,
upon learning of her husband’s extramarital affairs
Wilma Soco, a family friend of the Clavanos, which the
trial court approved. Petitioner sought a divorce from
Anna Marie before the Second Judicial District Court
of the State of Nevada which issued the divorce
decree that also granted sole custody of the three
minor children to Anna Marie, reserving rights of
visitation at all reasonable times and places to
petitioner.
Petitioner contest the adoption, alleging that,
although were financially capable of supporting the
children while his finances were too meager
compared to theirs, he could not in conscience, allow
anybody to strip him of his parental authority over his
beloved children.
The petition was granted by the lower court which the
Court of Appeals affirmed stating Article 188 of the
Family Code which requires the written consent of the
natural parents of the child to be adopted. It has been
held however that the consent of the parent who has
abandoned the child is not necessary
Issue/s: Whether or not petitioner has abandoned his
children and the latter be legally adopted without his
written consent.
Ruling:
No, petitioner has not abandoned his children and the
latter cannot be legally adopted without his written
consent.
The act of abandonment imports any conduct of the
parent which evinces a settled purpose to forego all
parental duties and relinquish all parental claims to
the child. It means neglect or refusal to perform the
natural and legal obligations of care and support
which parents owe their children.
In this case, however, petitioner did not manifest any
conduct that would forego his parental duties and
relinquish all parental claims over his children as to,
constitute abandonment. Physical abandonment
alone, without financial and moral desertion, is not
tantamount to abandonment. While petitioner was
physically absent, he was not remiss in his natural and
legal obligations of love, care and support for his
children.
350
CERVANTES VS. FAJARDO
Facts:
The petitioners, Nelson and Zenaida Cervantes, filed a
petition for a writ of Habeas Corpus over the custody
and care of the minor Angelie Anne Cervantes. The
respondents in the case are Gina Carreon Fajardo and
Conrado Fajardo, who are common-law husband and
wife. The minor child was born on February 14, 1987,
and the respondents offered the child for adoption to
the petitioners, who are the sister and brother-in-law
of Gina Carreon. An Affidavit of Consent to the
adoption was executed by Gina Carreon on April 29,
1987.
The petitioners filed a petition for adoption before the
Regional Trial Court of Rizal, which granted the
petition on August 20, 1987. However, in September
1987, Gina Carreon took the child from the
petitioners' residence without their consent and
refused to return her unless she was paid a sum of
money.
Issue: Custody and care of the minor child, Angelie
Anne Cervantes.
Ruling:
18
The court granted the petition and ordered the
custody and care of the minor to be granted to the
petitioners CERVANTES. The respondents were
ordered to deliver the child to the petitioners
immediately upon notice of the resolution.
The court also considered the fact that Gina Carreon
had previously given birth to another child by a
married man and that the minor would be growing up
with a sister whose "father" is not her true father,
which could affect her moral outlook and values. On
the other hand, the petitioners, who are legally
married, were found to be morally, physically,
financially, and socially capable of supporting the
minor and providing her with a better future.
Additionally, the court noted that the minor had been
legally adopted by the petitioners with the consent of
the respondents, and a decree of adoption dissolves
the authority of the natural parents over the adopted
child.
exercise of supervision and control. Since the Rapisura
spouses did not have physical custody over Adelberto
at the time of the incident, they cannot be held liable
for his actions.
LAHOM VS. SIBULO
FACTS
This case involves a petition for rescission of adoption
filed by petitioner Isabelita S. Lahom against
respondent Jose Melvin Sibulo. Petitioner and her late
husband legally adopted respondent, but due to
strained and uncomfortable relationship between
them, petitioner filed a petition to rescind the
adoption decree. Respondent moved for the dismissal
of the petition, arguing that petitioner had no cause of
action under the provisions of R.A. No. 8552
(Domestic Adoption Act). The trial court dismissed the
petition, and petitioner appealed to the Supreme
Court.
TAMARGO VS. CA
ISSUE
FACTS
whether the action for rescission of the adoption
decree can still be pursued after the effectivity of R.A.
No. 8552.
•The case involves a civil complaint for damages filed
by the petitioners, Macario Tamargo, Celso Tamargo,
and Aurelia Tamargo, against the respondents, Victor
Bundoc and Clara Bundoc. The complaint was filed
after their minor child, Adelberto Bundoc, shot and
killed Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle. The
petitioners argued that the respondents, as the
natural parents of Adelberto, were liable for the
damages caused by their minor child.
ISSUE
The main issues in this case are whether the
petitioners can still file the instant petition despite
losing their right to appeal, and whether the effects of
adoption can be given retroactive effect to make the
adopting parents the indispensable parties in a
damage case filed against their adopted child.
RULING
The court ruled that the natural parents, the Bundoc
spouses, are the indispensable parties to the suit for
damages. The court rejected the argument of the
adopting parents, the Rapisura spouses, that they
should be held liable for the tortious act committed by
Adelberto. The court emphasized that parental liability
is based on the relationship between the parents and
the minor child living with them, and the parents'
RULING
The Court held that the action for rescission of the
adoption decree could no longer be pursued because
it was initiated by petitioner after R.A. No. 8552 had
already abrogated and repealed the right of an
adopter to rescind a decree of adoption. The Court
explained that the concept of "vested right" is
protected against arbitrary state action and includes
not only legal or equitable title but also exemptions
from new obligations. In this case, the right to rescind
the adoption decree was no longer available to the
petitioner because it had been repealed by R.A. No.
8552.
The Court also emphasized that a person has no
vested right in statutory privileges and a right of action
given by statute may be taken away before it has been
exercised. While R.A. No. 8552 has withdrawn the
right to rescind the adoption decree, it is still the duty
of the Court to apply the law. However, the Court
mentioned that an adopter can still cause the
forfeiture of certain benefits to an undeserving child.
19
IN RE PETITION FOR ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE
ASTORGA
FACTS
Honorato B. Catindig, herein petitioner, filed a petition
to adopt his minor illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy
Astorga Garcia.
Stephanie was born on June 26, 1994; that her
mother is Gemma Astorga Garcia; that Stephanie has
been using her mother's middle name and surname;
and that he is now a widower and qualified to be her
adopting parent. He prayed that Stephanie's middle
name Astorga be changed to "Garcia," her... mother's
surname, and that her surname "Garcia" be changed
to "Catindig," his surname.
On April 20, 2001, petitioner filed a motion for
clarification and/or reconsideratioN praying that
Stephanie should be allowed to use the surname of
her natural mother (GARCIA) as her middle name.
On May 28, 2001 the trial court denied petitioner's
motion for reconsideration holding that there is no
law or jurisprudence allowing an adopted child to use
the surname of his biological mother as his middle
name.
child. The court interpreted this provision to mean
that the adopted child should be entitled to use the
surname of the adopters, including the adoptive
mother's surname as a middle name.
LANDINGIN VS. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
FACTS
A petition for adoption filed by Diwata Ramos
Landingin, a citizen of the United States of America
(USA) and a resident of Guam, USA. Landingin filed
the petition for the adoption of three minors who are
the natural children of her deceased brother and his
wife. The minors were left under the care of their
paternal grandmother after their mother went to Italy
and remarried. Landingin, who financially supports
the minors, desires to adopt them. The minors have
given their written consent to the adoption, and
Landingin's children have also given their consent.
Landingin is a 57-year-old widow with her own home
in Guam and works as a restaurant server. The
Department of Social Welfare and Development
(DSWD) conducted a case study and recommended
the adoption. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) granted
the petition for adoption, but the Court of Appeals
reversed the decision.
ISSUE
May an illegitimate child, upon adoption by her
natural father, use the surname of her natural mother
as her middle name?
Whether the written consent of the biological mother
is necessary for the adoption, whether the affidavit of
consent of Landingin's children is valid, and whether
Landingin is financially capable of supporting the
adoptees.
RULING
RULING
The court explained that while there is no specific law
regulating the use of a middle name, the law is silent
as to what middle name an adoptee may use.
However, the court cited Article 176 of the Family
Code, which provides that illegitimate children may
use the surname of their father if their filiation has
been expressly recognized by the father. The court
noted that there is no provision in the law that
prohibits an illegitimate child from using her mother's
surname as her middle name.
The Court denied the petition, stating that the written
consent of the biological parents is indispensable for
the validity of a decree of adoption. Since Landingin
failed to submit the written consent of the biological
mother, the adoption cannot proceed. The Court also
noted that if the consent of the biological parents
cannot be obtained, the written consent of the legal
guardian of the minors will suffice. However,
Landingin failed to provide the written consent of the
legal guardian. The Court rejected Landingin's
argument that the biological mother had effectively
abandoned the children, as there was no evidence to
support this claim. Therefore, the Court upheld the
decision of the Court of Appeals, which reversed the
RTC's decision.
ISSUE
The court also referred to Article 189 of the Family
Code, which states that for civil purposes, the adopted
child shall be deemed to be a legitimate child of the
adopters and shall acquire the reciprocal rights and
obligations arising from the relationship of parent and
20
IN RE: PETITION FOR ADOPTION OF MICHELLE AND
MICHAEL LIM
FACTS
A petition for adoption filed by Monina P. Lim seeking
to adopt Michelle P. Lim and Michael Jude P. Lim.
Monina P. Lim and her late husband, Primo Lim, were
childless and had registered the children as their own
after they were entrusted to them by Lucia Ayuban.
Monina P. Lim remarried Angel Olario and decided to
adopt the children. She filed separate petitions for
adoption for Michelle and Michael. The Department
of Social Welfare and Development certified that the
children were abandoned and their biological parents
were unknown.
ISSUE
Whether joint adoption by the husband and wife is
mandatory, and if it can be relaxed in this case where
the children are already emancipated.
RULING
The Supreme Court denied the petition, stating that
joint adoption is mandatory according to the law. The
court affirmed the trial court's decision to dismiss the
petitions for adoption.
The court explained that joint adoption is mandatory
under the law, as stated in Article 185 of the Family
Code. This provision requires the husband and wife to
jointly adopt, except in cases where one spouse seeks
to adopt the legitimate child of the other. In this case,
Monina P. Lim sought to adopt Michelle and Michael,
who were not the legitimate children of her late
husband. Therefore, joint adoption was required.
356
BARTOLOME VS SSS (G.R. NO. 192531
NOVEMBER 12, 2014)
Facts
The facts of the case are as follows: John Colcol, an
electrician employed by Scanmar Maritime Services,
Inc., died in an accident on board the vessel Maersk
Danville on June 2, 2008. At the time of his death,
John was childless and unmarried. Bernardina P.
Bartolome, John's biological mother, filed a claim for
death benefits under Presidential Decree No. 626 (PD
626) with the SSS. However, the claim was denied by
the SSS La Union office, stating that John had been
legally adopted by Cornelio Colcol. The denial was
appealed to the ECC, which affirmed the ruling of the
SSS La Union branch.
Bernardina P. Bartolome filed a petition against the
Social Security System (SSS) and Scanmar Maritime
Services, Inc
Issue:whether the biological parents of a legally
adopted employee are considered secondary
beneficiaries and entitled to receive benefits under
the Employees' Compensation Program (ECP).
Ruling
The court ruled in favor of the petitioner, stating that
the ECC's factual findings were not consistent with the
evidence on record. The ECC had overlooked a crucial
piece of evidence, which was Cornelio's death
certificate, proving that John's adoptive father had
already passed away. The court also held that the
ECC's interpretation of the Labor Code, as amended,
was in contravention of the clear language of the law.
The court emphasized that the phrase "dependent
parents" should include all parents, whether
legitimate or illegitimate, biological or by adoption,
who are in need of support or assistance.
357
LIM-LUA V. LUA G.R. NO. 175279-80
Facts
The case originated from an action for the declaration
of nullity of marriage filed by Susan against Danilo. In
her prayer for support pendente lite, Susan sought a
monthly support of P500,000.00, citing Danilo's
substantial earnings from various companies and
businesses.
The trial court granted the support pendente lite in
the amount of P250,000.00 per month, retroactive to
the filing of the complaint. Danilo filed a motion for
reconsideration, arguing that Susan is not entitled to
spousal support as she does not maintain a separate
dwelling from their children and he has been
supporting the family.
The trial court denied the motion. CA nullified the trial
court's orders and reduced the monthly support to
P115,000.00. The CA allowed the deduction of certain
expenses incurred by Danilo.
Issue: Whether certain expenses incurred by Danilo
may be deducted from the total support in arrears
owed to Susan and their children.
21
Ruling
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that the deductions made by
Danilo should not be credited against the accrued
support pendente lite. The court emphasized that
support should be in proportion to the resources of
the giver and the needs of the recipient. It includes
everything indispensable for sustenance, dwelling,
clothing, medical attendance, education, and
transportation. The court also noted that support
pendente lite is a provisional relief and does not
require a full examination of the merits. Therefore, the
Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of
Appeals and disallowed the deductions made by
Danilo.
358
DEL SOCORRO VS. VAN WILSEMG.R. NO.
193707
The petitioner, Norma A. Del Socorro, and the
respondent, Ernst Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem, were
married in Holland in 1990 and had a son named
Roderigo Norjo Van Wilsem. Their marriage ended in
divorce in 1995, and petitioner and her son returned
to the Philippines.
Petitioner claimed that respondent promised to
provide monthly support for their son but failed to do
so. Petitioner filed a complaint against respondent for
unjust refusal to support his minor child, and the
Provincial Prosecutor recommended the filing of an
information for the crime charged. T
Respondent filed a motion to dismiss the case,
arguing lack of jurisdiction and prescription of the
crime charged. The RTC granted the motion and
dismissed the case, ruling that the facts charged in the
information do not constitute an offense with respect
to the accused, who is an alien. Petitioner filed a
motion for reconsideration, arguing that respondent is
still obligated to support their child under the Family
Code and is liable under the Anti-Violence Against
Women and Their Children Act. The RTC denied the
motion, reiterating its previous ruling.
Issue: whether a foreign national has an obligation to
support his minor child under Philippine law, and
whether a foreign national can be held criminally
liable for failure to support his minor child.
Yes, the Supreme Court ruled that the respondent can
be held liable for unjustly refusing to provide support
for their child, despite the divorce decree. The Court
also held that the provisions of Republic Act No. 9262
can be applied in this case, as the act of denying
support to a child is considered an act of violence
against women and children. The Court rejected the
respondent's argument that the criminal liability has
prescribed and remanded the case to the RTC for
further proceedings.
The Court also rejected the respondent's argument
that the criminal liability has been extinguished due to
the prescription of the crime. The act of denying
support to a child is considered a continuing offense,
which started in 1995 but is still ongoing at present.
Therefore, the crime charged in the case has not
prescribed.
359
1909
PELAYO V. LAURON, G.R. NO. L-4089, 12 JAN.
Facts:
Arturo Pelayo, a physician residing in Cebu, filed a
complaint against Marcelo Lauron and Juana Abella.
Pelayo alleged that he was called to the defendants'
house to provide medical assistance to their daughterin-law who was about to give birth. Pelayo performed
an operation to remove the fetus and afterbirth and
visited the patient several times. He claimed that the
value of his services was P500, which the defendants
refused to pay without any valid reason.
The defendants denied the allegations and argued
that their daughter-in-law had died due to childbirth
complications. They also claimed that she lived
separately from them and had no relation with them.
They argued that if she was in their house during the
childbirth, it was accidental and due to fortuitous
circumstances.
Issue: who is responsible for paying the medical fees
of the physician, the husband of the patient or the
father and mother-in-law of the patient.
Ruling:
The court held that the husband of the patient is the
one responsible for paying the medical fees, not the
father and mother-in-law. The court ruled in favor of
22
the defendants and absolved them from the
complaint.
The court based its decision on the reciprocal
obligation of support between spouses. The court
stated that spouses are mutually bound to support
each other, and this includes providing necessary
medical assistance in case of illness. Therefore, when
one spouse is in need of medical assistance, the other
spouse is obligated to provide it, including paying for
the fees of the medical expert. This obligation is
established by law.
The court further explained that the father and
mother-in-law are not liable to provide support for the
wife because the obligation to support the wife falls
solely on the husband.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's
decision, holding that the petitioners, Prudencio and
Filomena Lim, are indeed liable to provide legal
support to the respondents, Cheryl and her minor
children Lester Edward, Candice Grace, and Mariano
III.
The court based its decision on the provisions of the
Civil Code regarding the obligation of parents and
their legitimate children to mutually support one
another. In this case, the petitioners, as the parents of
Edward Lim, have a legal obligation to provide support
to their son's wife and children. The SC held that the
petitioners should be jointly liable with Edward for the
monthly support of the respondents.
361
360
SPOUSES LIM V. CHERYL LIM, G.R. NO.
163209, 30 OCT. 2009
Facts:
In 1990, Cheryl left the Forbes Park residence with the
children after a violent confrontation with Edward,
whom she caught in a compromising situation with
the in-house midwife. Cheryl and her children sued
the petitioners, Edward, and others for support in the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City. The trial court
ordered Edward to provide monthly support of P6,000
pendente lite.
The trial court later rendered a judgment ordering
Edward and the petitioners to jointly provide P40,000
monthly support to the respondents, with Edward
shouldering P6,000 and the petitioners the balance of
P34,000.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's
decision, stating that the law on support is clear that
parents and their legitimate children are obliged to
mutually support one another.
Issue: whether the petitioners, Prudencio and
Filomena Lim, are liable to provide legal support to
the respondents, Cheryl and her minor children Lester
Edward, Candice Grace, and Mariano III.
LACSON V. LACSON, G.R. NO. 150644 (2006)
Facts:Petitioner Edward Lacson left the conjugal
home, leaving his wife Lea and their children to seek
shelter elsewhere due to financial reasons. Over 18
years, they moved from one dwelling place to another.
Edward reneged on his promise of support, although
occasionally providing meager amounts for school
expenses. Lea filed a complaint for support in 1995,
and the trial court granted support in arrears from
1976 to 1994. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
Issue: Did the appellate court err in affirming the grant
of support in arrears?
Ruling: The Court upheld the decision, finding Edward
liable for support arrears. Lea, representing her
daughters, rightfully sought support due to Edward's
neglect. The ruling corrects the injustice caused by
Edward's failure to fulfill his parental duties.
362
GOTARDO V. BULING, G.R. NO. 165166 (2012)
Facts: Charles Gotardo and Divina Buling engaged in a
relationship, leading to Divina's pregnancy in August
1994. Plans for marriage fell through, and Divina filed
a complaint for damages, later settled. Gliffze was
born in March 1995, and Charles, denying paternity,
faced a complaint for compulsory recognition and
support pendente lite. The RTC dismissed the case,
citing inconsistencies in Divina's testimony. The CA
reversed the decision, finding Divina's evidence
sufficient.
Ruling
23
Issue: Whether the CA committed reversible error in
rejecting the RTC's appreciation of Divina's testimony,
and if the evidence is insufficient to prove paternity.
Ruling: The Supreme Court affirmed the CA decision,
stating that the burden of proof in paternity cases lies
with the person alleging. Divina's testimony,
corroborated by witnesses, established a prima facie
case. Charles did not dispute their sexual relations but
claimed it occurred later, failing to present evidence to
counter the paternity claim.
363
DE CASTRO V. ASSIDAO-DE CASTRO, G.R. NO.
170172 (2008)
Facts: Annabelle and Reinel applied for a marriage
license but found it expired when they returned. To
expedite marriage, they executed a false Affidavit
claiming five years of cohabitation. After marriage,
they did not live together. Annabelle later gave birth
to Tricia. Reinel, denying marriage validity, refused
support. Annabelle sought support, and the trial court
declared the marriage void but ruled Reinel as Tricia's
father.
Issues: Is Tricia legitimate daughter?
Ruling: Yes, Tricia is legitimate as she was born during
the marriage, and no evidence contradicts her
legitimacy. The Certificate of Live Birth of the child lists
Reinel as the father. The Family Code presumes
children born within a valid marriage to be legitimate.
364
SUSAN LIM-LUA VS. DANILO Y. LUA G.R. NOS.
175279-80, 05 JUNE 2013 [VILLARAMA, JR., J.]
FACTS: Susan Lim-Lua filed for the nullity of her
marriage with Danilo Lua and sought support
pendente lite for herself and their two children. The
trial court granted monthly support, but the Court of
Appeals (CA) reduced the amount, considering
expenses already incurred by Danilo for the family's
benefit. The CA also deducted a considerable amount
from the total support in arrears.
ISSUE: Whether expenses already incurred by Danilo
may be deducted from the total support in arrears.
DECISION: The petition is partly granted. The court
acknowledges the provisional nature of support
pendente lite and upholds the CA's reduction of the
monthly support. However, it disagrees with the
deductions made by Danilo from the total support in
arrears, emphasizing the continuing responsibility of
Danilo, given his substantial financial capacity. The
court directs the Family Court to oversee the
deduction of provisional support from Danilo's salary.
365
MABUGAY-OTAMIAS, ET AL. VS. REPUBLIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES G.R. NO. 189516, 08 JUNE 2016
FACTS:
Edna Mabugay-Otamias and Colonel Francisco B.
Otamias, after their marriage and separation, reached
an agreement through a Deed of Assignment where
Colonel Otamias waived 50% of his retirement
benefits in favor of Edna and their children. The
Armed Forces of the Philippines Pension and Gratuity
Management Center later refused to honor the
agreement without a court order.
ISSUE:
Was the Deed of Assignment effective in waiving
Colonel Otamias' rights to 50% of his retirement
benefits for monthly support?
RULING:
Yes. The waiver made through the Deed of
Assignment is valid, as it does not violate law or public
policy. The purpose of the waiver is to ensure financial
support for the family, which aligns with their rights
under the Family Code. The court granted the petition,
reversing the decision of the Court of Appeals and
reinstating the Regional Trial Court decision.
366
PGMC V. AAA, G.R. NO. 201292
Facts
This case involves a petition for review on certiorari
filed by the Pension and Gratuity Management Center
(PGMC), GHQ, AFP, against AAA, the respondent. The
case originated from an action for support filed by
AAA against her husband, BBB, a retired military
person, before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Isabela, Basilan. The trial court issued a judgment
ordering the issuance of a Permanent Protection
Order and directing PGMC to withhold 50% of BBB's
monthly pension for direct remittance to AAA.
PGMC filed a manifestation questioning the directive,
arguing that it was not impleaded as a party
defendant and that it is prohibited by law from
releasing pensions to individuals other than the
retirees themselves. The trial court denied PGMC's
24
manifestation, prompting PGMC to file a petition for
certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA). However,
the CA dismissed the petition for being tardy and for
failure to comply with procedural requirements.
Issue: W/N adultery can be used as a defense in an
action for support
Ruling:
Issue: whether PGMC can be ordered to withhold a
portion of BBB's pension for direct remittance to AAA.
Ruling:
Yes, the Supreme Court ruled that PGMC can be
ordered to withhold a portion of BBB's pension for
direct remittance to AAA.
The Court reasoned that the Anti-Violence against
Women and Their Children Act of 2004 (RA 9262)
authorizes courts to order the withholding of a
percentage of the income or salary of the defendant
by the employer, which shall be remitted directly to
the plaintiff, notwithstanding other laws to the
contrary. The Court also rejected PGMC's argument
that the directive violates laws governing the
retirement and separation of military personnel,
stating that RA 9262 applies to all employers, whether
private or government.
367
REYES V. INES-LUCIANO, G.R. NO. L-4821
Facts
Celia Ilustre-Reyes filed in the Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court of Quezon City a complaint against her
husband Manuel J.C. Reyes for legal separation on the
ground that he had attempted to kill her:
On May 10, 1976, he punched her, held her head, and
bumped it several times against the cement floor. And
on May 26, 1976, he doused her with grape juice,
kicked her several times. But she was saved this time
by her driver.
Celia asked for support pendente lite for her and her
three children The respondent Judge issued an order
dated March 15, 1977 granting plaintiff's prayer for
alimony pendente lite commencing from June 1976.A
petition for certiorari was raised in the Court of
Appeals dated July 25, 1977 asking that the order
granting support pendente lite to private respondent.
Celia Ilustre-Reyes, be annulled. This was dismissed by
CA.
No. The alleged adultery must be established by
competent evidence. Adultery is a good defense if
properly proved. Manuel did not present any evidence
to prove his allegation. He still has the opportunity to
adduce evidence on this alleged adultery when the
action for legal separation is heard on the merits
before the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of
QC.
368
LERMA V. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. L33352
Facts:
Teodoro E. Lerma (petitioner) and Concepcion Diaz
(respondent) are married. On August 22, 1969, the
petitioner filed a complaint for adultery against the
respondent and another person. In response, the
respondent filed a complaint for legal separation
and/or separation of properties, custody of their
children, and support. The respondent's complaint for
legal separation is based on concubinage and an
attempt against her life. The lower court granted the
respondent's application for support pendente lite,
which the petitioner opposed. The petitioner then
filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the
Court of Appeals to annul the orders granting support
pendente lite. The Court of Appeals initially set aside
the orders and granted the petitioner an opportunity
to present evidence. However, upon motion for
reconsideration, the Court of Appeals dismissed the
petition.
Issue:
Whether the provisions of Article 292 of the Civil Code
make it mandatory to grant support pendente lite to
the respondent during the pendency of legal
separation proceedings.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court set aside the resolution of the
Court of Appeals and the orders of the lower court
granting support pendente lite to the respondent. The
enforcement of the orders was also enjoined. The
25
Court held that adultery is a good defense against the
respondent's claim for support pendente lite. While
Article 292 of the Civil Code states that spouses and
children shall be supported from the conjugal
partnership property during legal separation
proceedings, the Court emphasized that the right to
separate support or maintenance presupposes the
existence of a justifiable cause for the spouse claiming
such right to live separately. In this case, the
respondent, who had been convicted of adultery, was
not an innocent spouse and therefore not entitled to
support pendente lite.
As to the first assignment of error, we find that by the
provisions of Art. 303 of the new Civil Code, the
obligation to support shall cease "when the recipient
has committed some act which gives rise to
disinheritance;" that under Art. 921 (k) of the same
Code, a spouse may be disinherited when she has
given cause for legal separation," and under Art. 97,
one of the causes for legal separation is "adultery on
the part of the wife and concubinage on the part of
the husband", as defined in the Penal Code.
370
369 HIPOLITA ALMACEN VS. TEODORO N. BALTAZAR
(G. R. No. L- 10028, May 23, 1958)
FACTS:
Hipolita and defendant Teodoro were legally married
on March 24, 1923. In 1937, plaintiff committed
adultery with one named Jose Navarro, a cousin of
defendant Teodoro. Prior to the infidelity of the wife,
the defendant himself has not been loyal to her, he
having been once confined at the hospital suffering
from venereal disease (STD). Baltazar separated from
Almcaen after the latter's infidelity and while
estranged from her, he lived maritally with another
woman by the name of Lourdes Alvarez.
After their separation there has been a reconciliation
between them or at least a condonation by defendant
of the acts committed by the wife as shown by the
fact that he has been sending her money for her
support. The husband and wife were in pari delicto
and, therefore, the defendant is bound to support the
plaintiff because he has likewise been unfaithful to
her.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the lower court erred in not taking
plaintiff's adulterous act of infidelity as defense
against her claim for support and in not exempting
defendant from the obligation to give such support.
RULING:
Yes, we agree with the lower court's ruling that the
defendant is still bound to support his wife.
TAYAG V. CA, G.R. NO. 95229, 09 JUNE 1992
Facts
The case involves a complaint filed by Emilie Dayrit
Cuyugan, the mother and legal guardian of minor
Chad Cuyugan, against Corito Ocampo Tayag, the
administratrix of the estate of the late Atty. Ricardo
Ocampo. The complaint, titled "Claim for Inheritance,"
alleges that Chad Cuyugan is the illegitimate child of
Atty. Ocampo and is entitled to a share in his estate.
The complaint also states that Atty. Ocampo had
acknowledged Chad as his son and expressed his
desire for Chad to inherit his properties.
Issue: Whether the action to claim inheritance and the
action to compel recognition can be joined in one
complaint.
Ruling:
The court rules that the action to claim inheritance
and the action to compel recognition can be joined in
one complaint. The court held that there is no
absolute necessity for the action to compel
acknowledgment to be completed before seeking
additional relief as an heir.
The court also ruled the applicable law regarding
actions for recognition of illegitimate children, under
Article 175 of the Family Code, if the action is based
on the child's birth record, a final judgment, or an
admission by the parent in a public or private
document, the action may be brought during the
child's lifetime. However, if the action is based on the
child's open and continuous possession of the status
of an illegitimate child or other evidence allowed by
the Rules of Court and special laws, the action must
be brought during the alleged parent's lifetime.
26
376 NERISSA Z. PEREZ vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 118870
Facts
Nerissa Z. Perez and Ray C. Perez got married in 1986
and had been struggling with fertility issues, with
Nerissa experiencing multiple miscarriages. Finally, in
1992, Nerissa gave birth to Ray Perez II in New York.
After the birth, Nerissa returned to the United States
to work, while Ray stayed in the Philippines to take
care of his sick mother.
However, their relationship deteriorated, and Nerissa
filed a petition for habeas corpus to gain custody of
their son, Ray Perez II. The trial court granted custody
to Nerissa based on Article 213 of the Family Code,
which states that no child under seven years old shall
be separated from the mother unless there are
compelling reasons to do so.
CA reversed the trial court's decision and awarded
custody to Ray. The court argued that it would be in
the best interest and welfare of the child to be with
his father.
Issue: The main issue in this case is the determination
of who should be awarded custody of the minor child.
Ruling
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the petitioner and
reinstated the trial court's decision awarding custody
to Nerissa. The Supreme Court, in its decision,
emphasized that the welfare and best interest of the
child should always be the primary consideration in
custody cases. It cited Article 213 of the Family Code
and Rule 99, Section 6 of the Revised Rules of Court,
which both state that a child under seven years old
should not be separated from the mother unless there
are compelling reasons to do so. The court explained
that the use of the word "shall" in these provisions
connotes a mandatory character.
The court also highlighted the rationale behind
awarding custody to the mother of children under
seven years old, which is the basic need of a child for
his mother's loving care. In this case, the Supreme
Court found that there was no compelling reason to
separate the child from his mother.
377
Facts:
VANCIL VS. BELMES(G.R. 132223)
The case involves a petition for guardianship filed by
Bonifacia Vancil, a naturalized American citizen and
resident of Colorado, USA, over her deceased son's
minor children, Valerie and Vincent. The Regional Trial
Court (RTC) granted the petition and appointed Vancil
as the guardian. However, the children's mother,
Helen Belmes, filed an opposition to the proceedings,
arguing that she should be the natural guardian of her
children.
The RTC rejected Belmes' motion to remove and/or
disqualify Vancil as the guardian.
Issue: Whether the respondent is unsuitable to be the
guardian of Vincent and if the petitioner can qualify as
a substitute guardian.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court affirms the decision of the lower
court, stating that the petitioner has not provided
convincing evidence to prove the respondent's
unsuitability as a guardian. The court also notes that
even if the respondent is unfit, the petitioner cannot
qualify as a substitute guardian due to her residency
in another country.
The court explains that in order for the petitioner to
assert her right to be Vincent's guardian, she must
prove the respondent's unsuitability. However, the
petitioner fails to provide convincing evidence to
support her claim. The court also highlights the
petitioner's admission that she would have difficulty
fulfilling the duties of a guardian due to her residency
in another country. Therefore, the court affirms the
decision of the lower court and rules that Valerie will
no longer be under the guardianship of the
respondent.
378 ST. MARY’S ACADEMY VS. CARPITANOS
Facts:
The case involves an accident occurred when the
steering wheel guide of a jeep owned by respondent
Villanueva detached, causing the vehicle to crash that
resulted in the death of Sherwin Carpitanos. Sherwin
Carpitanos was a student of St. Mary's Academy in
Dipolog City, and he was riding in the jeep at the time
of the accident. The parents of Sherwin Carpitanos
filed a complaint for damages against St. Mary's
27
Academy, Dipolog City, as well as the registered owner
of the vehicle, respondent Villanueva, and the driver,
respondent Daniel.
The trial court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs and held
St. Mary's Academy, Dipolog City, primarily liable for
damages. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision
of the trial court.
Issue: whether St. Mary's Academy, Dipolog City,
should be held primarily liable for damages for the
death of Sherwin Carpitanos.
Ruling:
The Court held that St. Mary's Academy, Dipolog City,
should not be held primarily liable for damages.
Instead, the registered owner of the vehicle,
respondent Villanueva, should be held responsible for
damages for the death of Sherwin Carpitanos.
The Court based its decision on Article 218 and 219 of
the Family Code of the Philippines, which provide that
schools and their administrators have special parental
authority and responsibility over minor children under
their supervision. However, the liability of the school
and its administrators is subsidiary to the liability of
the parents or guardians of the minor. In this case, the
Court found that there was no evidence to show that
St. Mary's Academy, Dipolog City, was negligent in the
supervision of Sherwin Carpitanos. Therefore, the
school should not be held primarily liable for
damages.
379
MASBATE V. RELUCIO, G.R. NO. 235498, 30
JULY 2018)
Facts:
This case involves a custody dispute over a minor child
named Queenie Angel M. Relucio. Queenie was born
on May 3, 2012 to Renalyn A. Masbate and Ricky
James Relucio, who were not married. After their
relationship ended in April 2015, Renalyn went to
Manila, leaving Queenie in the care of her parents.
Ricky James alleged that Renalyn's parents took
Queenie from him and refused to give her back,
presenting a Special Power of Attorney granting them
custody. Ricky James filed a petition for habeas corpus
and child custody, seeking the return of Queenie.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) ruled in favor of
Renalyn. The CA affirmed Renalyn's custody pending
the outcome of the case but granted Ricky James
visitation rights of two days per week.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, while
Ricky James filed a motion for clarification regarding
visitation rights. The CA denied both motions.
Issue: whether Ricky James should be granted
custody of Queenie, considering that he is the father
of an illegitimate child and there is no provision of law
granting custody rights to an illegitimate father.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that the best interest of the
child should be the paramount consideration in
custody cases. It held that a proper trial should be
conducted to determine if Renalyn, the mother, had
neglected and abandoned Queenie, rendering her
unfit to exercise parental authority. If Renalyn is found
unsuitable, the court should determine whether it is in
Queenie's best interest to be in the custody of her
father or her grandparents. The court emphasized that
the preference accorded to grandparents in custody
cases is conditioned upon their fitness to take care of
the child.
380
UNSON V NAVARRO, 101 SCRA 183)
Facts:
Unson and Araneta were married on April 19, 1971,
and they have a daughter named Maria Teresa Unson,
who was born on December 1, 1971. However, they
executed an agreement for the separation of their
properties and to live separately on July 13, 1974.
They have been living separately since June 1972. The
agreement was approved by the court. There was no
specific provision in the agreement regarding the
custody of their child.
Unson also discovered that Araneta was living with
her brother-in-law, Agustin F. Reyes, and that they had
a child together. Unson argues that these
circumstances, along with the fact that Reyes is the
child's godfather and that Araneta and Reyes have left
the Roman Catholic Church, are reasons why he
should have custody of Maria Teresa.
Issue:
The main issue in this case is the custody of Maria
Teresa Unson.
Ruling:
28
The court rules in favor of Miguel R. Unson III. The
court finds that it is in the best interest of Maria
Teresa to be freed from the unwholesome and
immoral influence of the situation in which Edita N.
Araneta has placed herself.
In deciding custody cases involving minors, the court
considers the physical, education, social, and moral
welfare of the child as the sole and foremost
consideration. The court takes into account the
respective resources and social and moral situations of
the contending parents. In this case, the court finds
that it is in Maria Teresa's best interest to be with her
father, considering the circumstances and the
potential negative impact of Araneta's situation on the
child.
381
MEDINA V MAKABALI, 27 SCRA 502
Facts:
The petitioner, Zenaida Medina, gave birth to a baby
boy named Joseph Casero on February 4, 1961, with a
married man named Feliciano Casero. Zenaida left the
child with respondent Dra. Venancia Makabali, who
took care of Joseph as her own son. Dra. Makabali
provided for Joseph's needs, including medical
treatment for poliomyelitis and education. Zenaida
never visited her child or paid for his expenses.
Zenaida lived with Feliciano Casero and her two other
children, with the knowledge of Casero's lawful wife.
The court observed that Joseph considered Dra.
Makabali as his mother and chose to stay with her.
Issue: whether the custody of the minor boy, Joseph
Casero, should be granted to his biological mother,
Zenaida Medina, or to his foster mother, Dra. Venancia
Makabali.
Ruling:
The court held that it was in the best interest of the
child to be left with his foster mother, Dra. Makabali.
The court emphasized that the welfare of the child
should be paramount in all matters concerning the
care, custody, education, and property of children.
Even a child under seven may be separated from the
mother for compelling reasons. The court also noted
that the right of parents to the custody of their
children is ancillary to their duty to provide adequate
support, education, and moral development.
In this case, Zenaida Medina failed to fulfill her
parental duties and deserted her child. The court
based its decision on the principle that the welfare of
the child should be the primary consideration in
matters of custody. The court recognized that the
concept of parental authority has evolved from a right
of life and death to a duty to ensure the welfare of the
child.
382
SANTOS V COURT OF APPEALS, 242 SCRA 407
Facts:
This case involves a custody dispute over a minor child
named Leouel Santos Jr. The petitioner, Leouel Santos
Sr., is the legitimate father of the child, while the
private respondents are the child's grandparents,
Leopoldo and Ofelia Bedia. The case was initially filed
in the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 29,
under Special Proceedings No. 4588. The lower court
awarded custody of the child to the grandparents,
prompting the petitioner to appeal the decision to the
Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
lower court's decision, prompting the petitioner to file
a petition for review with the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether custody over the minor child, Leouel
Santos Jr., should be awarded to his legitimate father,
Leouel Santos Sr., or to his grandparents, Leopoldo
and Ofelia Bedia.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court granted the petition and reversed
the decision of the Court of Appeals. Custody over the
minor child, Leouel Santos Jr., was awarded to his
legitimate father, Leouel Santos Sr.
The Supreme Court based its decision on several legal
principles and provisions. Firstly, it emphasized that
under the Family Code, the father and mother are the
natural guardians of their children and are entitled to
their custody. The grandparents, on the other hand,
have no inherent right to custody over their
grandchildren. The Court also noted that the best
interests of the child should be the primary
consideration in custody disputes. In this case, the
Court found that there was no evidence to show that
the father was unfit or incapable of taking care of the
child.
383
DACASIN V. DACASIN, G.R. NO. 168785
29
Facts
This case involves a suit to enforce a post-foreign
divorce child custody agreement. Petitioner Herald
Dacasin, an American, and respondent Sharon Del
Mundo Dacasin, a Filipino, were married in Manila in
April 1994 and have one daughter, Stephanie. In June
1999, respondent obtained a divorce decree from the
Circuit Court in Illinois, which awarded her sole
custody of Stephanie and retained jurisdiction over
the case for enforcement purposes.
In 2002, petitioner and respondent executed a
contract for joint custody of Stephanie, choosing
Philippine courts as the exclusive forum for disputes
arising from the agreement. In 2004, petitioner sued
respondent in the Regional Trial Court of Makati City
to enforce the agreement. The trial court dismissed
the case for lack of jurisdiction, ruling that it is
precluded from taking cognizance over the suit due to
the Illinois court's retention of jurisdiction.
Issue: whether the trial court has jurisdiction to
enforce the agreement on joint custody of the parties'
child.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that the trial court has
jurisdiction to entertain petitioner's suit but not to
enforce the agreement, which is void. The court
explained that subject matter jurisdiction is conferred
by law, and at the time petitioner filed his suit, the
trial court had exclusive original jurisdiction over civil
actions incapable of pecuniary estimation. However,
the court clarified that the trial court cannot enforce
the agreement because it is contrary to Philippine law.
The law provides that no child under seven years of
age shall be separated from the mother, and the
agreement's object to establish joint custody
contravenes this provision. This preference can only
be overcome by compelling reasons, which were not
present in this case. Therefore, the agreement is void
and unenforceable.
384
SALIENTES V. ABANILLA, G.R. NO. 162734, 29
AUG. 2006
Facts:
Loran Abanilla and Marie Antonette Salientes are the
parents of a minor child named Lorenzo Emmanuel
Abanilla. They lived with Marie Antonette's parents,
Orlando and Rosario Salientes. Due to problems with
the in-laws, Loran suggested that he and Marie
Antonette move to their own house, but she refused.
As a result, Loran left the Salientes' house and was
subsequently prevented from seeing his son.
Loran Abanilla then filed a petition for habeas corpus
and custody of his son before the RTC. The court
issued an order directing the Salientes to produce the
child in court and show cause why he should not be
discharged from restraint.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals held that the trial
court was still conducting a full inquiry on the matter
of custody.
Issue
The main issue raised in the case is whether the Court
of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition for
certiorari against the trial court's orders. The Salientes
argue that the trial court's order is contrary to Article
213 of the Family Code.
Ruling
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court
of Appeals, stating that the trial court did not err in
issuing the orders. The court held that the remedy of
habeas corpus is available to Loran as the father of the
child. The court also noted that Article 213 of the
Family Code, which deals with the judicial adjudication
of custody, does not prevent a father from seeing his
child under seven years of age. The court held that
the provision only applies to the separation of the
child from the mother and does not prohibit the
father from exercising his right to visitation or access
to the child.
385
MASBATE V. RELUCIO, G.R. NO. 235498, 30
JULY 2018)
Facts:
This case involves a custody dispute over a minor child
named Queenie Angel M. Relucio. Queenie was born
on May 3, 2012 to Renalyn A. Masbate and Ricky
James Relucio, who were not married. After their
relationship ended in April 2015, Renalyn went to
Manila, leaving Queenie in the care of her parents.
Ricky James alleged that Renalyn's parents took
Queenie from him and refused to give her back,
presenting a Special Power of Attorney granting them
30
custody. Ricky James filed a petition for habeas corpus
and child custody, seeking the return of Queenie.
mentioned that the issue was raised by the appellee
and was previously heard in the lower court.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) ruled in favor of
Renalyn. The CA affirmed Renalyn's custody pending
the outcome of the case but granted Ricky James
visitation rights of two days per week.
ISSUE
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, while
Ricky James filed a motion for clarification regarding
visitation rights. The CA denied both motions.
Issue: whether Ricky James should be granted
custody of Queenie, considering that he is the father
of an illegitimate child and there is no provision of law
granting custody rights to an illegitimate father.
Ruling
The Supreme Court ruled that the best interest of the
child should be the paramount consideration in
custody cases. It held that a proper trial should be
conducted to determine if Renalyn, the mother, had
neglected and abandoned Queenie, rendering her
unfit to exercise parental authority. If Renalyn is found
unsuitable, the court should determine whether it is in
Queenie's best interest to be in the custody of her
father or her grandparents. The court emphasized that
the preference accorded to grandparents in custody
cases is conditioned upon their fitness to take care of
the child.
Whether the father's consent, given as the legal
guardian of the minor son, is sufficient for the
proposed transactions of a policy loan and surrender
of the policy.
RULING
The court ruled in favor of Philam Life, stating that the
proposed transactions constitute acts of disposition or
alienation of property rights and not merely acts of
management or administration. The court affirmed
the decision appealed from, which means that the
lower court's ruling was upheld. The costs of the
appeal were also ordered to be paid by the appellants,
specifically the Nario family.
The court's decision was based on the code currently
in force, which apparently does not grant parents the
authority to dispose or alienate their child's goods
without court approval. The court agreed with the
appellee's argument and the ruling of the lower court.
VISAYA VS. SUIGUITAN
NARIO V. PHILIPPINE AMERICAN LIFE INS. CO.
FACTS
FACTS
On April 23, 1941, the spouses Antonio Suguitan and
Catalina Blaz sold their homestead land in San Mateo,
Isabela to the spouses Modesto Visaya and Juana
Bayaua. The sale was approved by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources and registered on
March 30, 1951. On March 24, 1952, the spouses
Suguitan filed a lawsuit against Juana Bayaua de
Visaya, seeking to repurchase the homestead land.
The parties entered into a stipulation of facts on
August 20, 1952, agreeing that the defendant would
reconvey the land to the plaintiff for a repurchase
price of P2,400 within 60 days from the notice of
decision. If the defendant refused to accept the
payment, the deed of reconveyance would be
executed by the Clerk of Court. The plaintiff
renounced any claim for damages and counterclaim.
However, the defendant refused to accept the
31
This case involves a dispute between the plaintiffs,
Delfin Nario and Alejandra Santos-Nario, and the
defendant, the Philippine American Life Insurance
Company (Philam Life). Mrs. Santos-Nario was issued a
life insurance policy by Philam Life, with her husband
and minor son designated as irrevocable beneficiaries.
Mrs. Santos-Nario applied for a loan on the policy and
later requested to surrender the policy for its cash
value. However, Philam Life denied both requests,
stating that the consent of the minor son's father,
acting as his legal guardian, must be authorized by the
court. The specific details of the case, such as the
names of the parties involved, the date, and the place,
are not provided in the given content. However, it is
payment tendered by Agripina Siruno Vda. de Coma,
to whom the plaintiffs sold a portion of the land.
Agripina then deposited the repurchase price in court.
On April 12, 1954, Juana Bayaua filed another lawsuit
against the spouses Suguitan and Blaz to recover
ownership of the homestead land. The court
dismissed the complaint on the ground of res judicata,
and Juana Bayaua appealed.
Reynaldo, with visitation rights for Teresita. However,
the Court of Appeals reversed the decision and
awarded custody to Teresita, with visitation rights for
Reynaldo.
ISSUE
RULING
Whether the defendants can compel the plaintiff to
reconvey the homestead land to them, despite their
failure to comply with the terms of the agreement in
the previous lawsuit.
The Supreme Court granted the petition and reversed
the decision of the Court of Appeals. The decision of
the trial court, which awarded custody of the children
to Reynaldo, was reinstated.
RULING
The court reversed the dismissal of the complaint and
remanded the case to the trial court. The defendants
were ordered to answer the complaint, proceed with
the trial, and render judgment. The defendants cannot
compel the plaintiff to reconvey the land because they
failed to comply with the terms of the agreement in
the previous lawsuit. The defense of res judicata
cannot be invoked because the agreement was not
fulfilled. Additionally, more than five years had already
elapsed from the date of the execution of the deed of
sale to the filing of the complaint, so the defendants'
right to repurchase the land had already expired.
ESPIRITU VS. COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS
Reynaldo Espiritu and Guilllerma Layug, the
petitioners, are the father and aunt of the children,
respectively. Teresita Masauding, the respondent, is
the mother of the children. Reynaldo and Teresita met
in 1976 and began a common-law relationship in
1984. They had two children together, a daughter and
a son. However, their relationship deteriorated and
they decided to separate in 1990. Teresita left
Reynaldo and the children and returned to California.
Reynaldo brought the children to the Philippines and
left them with his sister, Guilllerma Layug, while he
completed his work assignment in Pittsburgh. Teresita
later filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus to gain
custody over the children. The trial court dismissed
the petition and granted sole parental authority to
ISSUE
The main issue in this case is the determination of
custody over the children.
The court's decision was based on Article 213 of the
Family Code, which provides guidelines for the
awarding of custody of minor children. The court
found that the law was satisfied by the judgment of
the trial court, as the children were both over seven
years old. The first paragraph of Article 213 states that
the parent who is deemed fit and capable of taking
care of the children shall be given custody. The court
determined that Reynaldo met the requirements of
being a fit person.
The court also noted that the presumption under the
second paragraph of Article 213, which favors the
mother in custody disputes, no longer applies as the
children are over seven years old. The court further
stated that even if the presumption should have
persuasive value for children only one or two years
beyond the age of seven, there were compelling
reasons and relevant considerations not to grant
custody to the mother. The children understood the
shortcomings of their mother and had been
emotionally affected by her behavior, which
influenced the court's decision to award custody to
Reynaldo.
LACSON VS. SANJOSE-LACSON
FACTS
The case involves three separate cases (G.R. No. L23482, L-23767, and L-24259) between Alfonso Lacson
and Carmen San Jose-Lacson. The couple got married
on February 14, 1953, and had four children together.
On January 9, 1963, Carmen left their conjugal home
32
in Bacolod City and moved to Manila. She filed a
complaint in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Court of Manila for custody of their children and
support. However, the couple reached an amicable
settlement through their lawyers and filed a joint
petition in the Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental for the dissolution of their conjugal
partnership and separation of property. The petition
was approved by the court, and custody of the two
older children was awarded to Alfonso, while custody
of the younger children was awarded to Carmen.
Alfonso was also ordered to pay Carmen a monthly
allowance for the support of the children.
court emphasized that this does not legalize the de
facto separation of the spouses, as it is considered
abnormal and dangerous.
The Supreme Court held that the agreement and
judgment are valid with respect to the separation of
property and dissolution of the conjugal partnership,
as long as judicial approval is obtained. The law allows
for the separation of property and dissolution of the
conjugal partnership, provided that judicial sanction is
secured beforehand.
PEREZ VS. CA
FACTS
Carmen later filed a motion in the Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court, stating that she only agreed
to the joint petition to have immediate custody of the
children and requested to be relieved from the
agreement. The court dismissed her case based on the
plea of bar by prior judgment and lis pendens. Carmen
appealed to the Court of Appeals, questioning the
validity of the compromise agreement regarding the
custody of their children. The Court of Appeals
certified the appeal to the Supreme Court.
Carmen also filed a motion for reconsideration of the
compromise judgment in the Court of First Instance,
claiming that she only agreed to the agreement to
have immediate custody of the children. The court
denied her motion and ordered the execution of the
compromise judgment. Carmen appealed to the Court
of Appeals, questioning the validity of the compromise
judgment. The Court of Appeals annulled the order for
execution and declared the compromise judgment null
and void in relation to the custody and visitation rights
of the children. The husband appealed to the Supreme
Court, raising several issues.
This case involves a custody dispute between Nerissa
Z. Perez (petitioner) and Ray C. Perez (respondent)
over their child, Ray Perez II. The couple got married in
1986 and had been struggling with fertility issues, with
Nerissa experiencing multiple miscarriages. Finally, in
1992, Nerissa gave birth to Ray Perez II in New York.
After the birth, Nerissa returned to the United States
to work, while Ray stayed in the Philippines to take
care of his sick mother. However, their relationship
deteriorated, and Nerissa filed a petition for habeas
corpus to gain custody of their son. The trial court
granted custody to Nerissa based on Article 213 of the
Family Code, which states that no child under seven
years old shall be separated from the mother unless
there are compelling reasons to do so.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial
court's decision and awarded custody to Ray. The
court argued that it would be in the best interest and
welfare of the child to be with his father.
ISSUE
ISSUE
Whether the compromise agreement and the
judgment based on it are valid under the law.
The main issue in this case is the determination of
who should be awarded custody of the minor child.
RULING
RULING
In this case, the spouses obtained judicial approval for
their separation of property and dissolution of the
conjugal partnership. It was also established that they
have been separated in fact for at least five years.
Therefore, the court found it appropriate to sever
their financial and proprietary interests. However, the
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the petitioner and
reinstated the trial court's decision awarding custody
to her.\
The Supreme Court, in its decision, emphasized that
the welfare and best interest of the child should
always be the primary consideration in custody cases.
33
It cited Article 213 of the Family Code and Rule 99,
Section 6 of the Revised Rules of Court, which both
state that a child under seven years old should not be
separated from the mother unless there are
compelling reasons to do so. The court explained that
the use of the word "shall" in these provisions
connotes a mandatory character.
391
PABLO-GUALBERTO V. GUALBERTO, G.R. NO.
154994
Facts
Crisanto filed a petition for the nullity of his marriage
to Joycelyn and sought custody pendente lite of their
child, who was less than four years old at the time.
Crisanto claimed that Joycelyn took the child away
from their home and school without his consent. The
trial court initially awarded custody pendente lite to
Crisanto based on testimonies and evidence
presented by him and his witnesses. However, the trial
court later reversed its decision and awarded custody
to Joycelyn, stating that there were no compelling
reasons to separate the child from the mother.
Court of Appeals (CA) which granted custody of their
child to the respondent, Crisanto Rafaelito Gualberto
V. The respondent, Crisanto, also filed a Petition for
Certiorari under Rule 65, alleging grave abuse of
discretion by the CA for denying his Motion for Partial
Reconsideration of the custody decision.
Issue: Whether the CA violated Article 213 of the
Family Code, which states that no child under seven
years of age shall be separated from the mother
unless there are compelling reasons to do so. b
Ruling:
The Court ruled that the CA correctly applied Article
213 of the Family Code, which provides that no child
under seven years of age shall be separated from the
mother unless there are compelling reasons to do so.
In this case, the child was only four years old, and
there were no compelling reasons presented to justify
separating the child from the mother. The Court also
clarified that Article 211, which provides for the
general rule that the mother is entitled to the custody
of a child below seven years old, applies in this case.
The Court emphasized that the welfare and best
interest of the child should be the primary
consideration in custody disputes.
392
BECKETT V. SARMIENTO, RTJ-12-2326
Facts:
Geoffrey Beckett, an Australian national, was
previously married to Eltesa Densing Beckett, a
Filipina. They had a child named Geoffrey Beckett, Jr.
In 2006, Eltesa filed a case against Beckett for violation
of Republic Act No. 7610 and for the declaration of
nullity of their marriage. Both cases were heard by
Judge Sarmiento. Eventually, a compromise
agreement was reached, granting Beckett full and
permanent custody of their child.
However, in 2010, Beckett allowed Eltesa to have
temporary custody of their child during the Christmas
holidays. When Eltesa refused to return the child,
Beckett filed a petition against her for violation of RA
7610. Judge Sarmiento, despite the existence of the
compromise agreement, granted provisional custody
to Eltesa and ordered a social case study on the child.
Beckett filed a complaint against Judge Sarmiento,
alleging gross ignorance of the law.
Issue: whether the judge should be held guilty of gross
ignorance of the law for granting custody of the child
to the mother, despite a previous judgment awarding
custody to the father.
Ruling:
The court dismissed the complaint against the judge,
ruling that he cannot be held guilty of gross ignorance
of the law. The court's decision was based on the
principle that the welfare and best interest of the child
should always be the primary consideration in custody
cases. The court cited the U.N. Convention on the
Rights of the Child, which states that the best interests
of the child should be a primary consideration in all
actions concerning children. The court also
emphasized that custody is not permanent and can be
re-examined and adjusted if the parent with custody
becomes unfit.
In this case, the court found that the child, who was
over 7 years old, expressed a strong preference to live
with the mother and had negative experiences with
the father. Therefore, the court concluded that the
34
judge's decision to grant custody to the mother was in
line with the best interests of the child.
394
2001
VANCIL V. BELMES, G.R. NO. 132223, 19 JUNE
Facts:
393
MASBATE AND SPOUSES MASBATE V.
RELUCIO, G.R. NO. 235498
Facts
This case involves a custody dispute over a minor child
named Queenie Angel M. Relucio. Queenie was born
on May 3, 2012 to Renalyn A. Masbate and Ricky
James Relucio, who were not married. After their
relationship ended in April 2015, Renalyn went to
Manila, leaving Queenie in the care of her parents.
Ricky James alleged that Renalyn's parents took
Queenie from him and refused to give her back,
presenting a Special Power of Attorney granting them
custody. Ricky James filed a petition for habeas corpus
and child custody, seeking the return of Queenie.
The RTC ruled in favor of Renalyn, stating that
Queenie, being under seven years old, should not be
separated from her mother. The CA affirmed Renalyn's
custody pending the outcome of the case but granted
Ricky James visitation rights of two days per week.
Issue : whether Ricky James should be granted
custody of Queenie, considering that he is the father
of an illegitimate child and there is no provision of law
granting custody rights to an illegitimate father.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that a proper trial should be
conducted to determine if Renalyn, the mother, had
neglected and abandoned Queenie, rendering her
unfit to exercise parental authority. If Renalyn is found
unsuitable, the court should determine whether it is in
Queenie's best interest to be in the custody of her
father or her grandparents. The court emphasized that
the preference accorded to grandparents in custody
cases is conditioned upon their fitness to take care of
the child.
The court also clarified that the temporary custody
granted by the CA was improper. It stated that
temporary visitation rights, not temporary custody,
should be granted to the non-custodial parent unless
found unfit or disqualified.
The case involves a petition for guardianship filed by
Bonifacia Vancil, a naturalized American citizen and
resident of Colorado, USA, over her deceased son's
minor children, Valerie and Vincent. The Regional Trial
Court (RTC) granted the petition and appointed Vancil
as the guardian. However, the children's mother,
Helen Belmes, filed an opposition to the proceedings,
arguing that she should be the natural guardian of her
children. The RTC rejected Belmes' motion to remove
and/or disqualify Vancil as the guardian.
Issue: Whether the respondent is unsuitable to be the
guardian of Vincent and if the petitioner can qualify as
a substitute guardian.
Ruling:
The court affirms the decision of the lower court,
stating that the petitioner has not provided convincing
evidence to prove the respondent's unsuitability as a
guardian. The court also notes that even if the
respondent is unfit, the petitioner cannot qualify as a
substitute guardian due to her residency in another
country. The court emphasizes that it is important for
guardians to be within the jurisdiction of the court to
effectively protect the wards. Therefore, the court
rules that Valerie, who has reached the age of
majority, will no longer be under the guardianship of
the respondent.
The court explains that in order for the petitioner to
assert her right to be Vincent's guardian, she must
prove the respondent's unsuitability. However, the
petitioner fails to provide convincing evidence to
support her claim.
395
PEOPLE V. BAYABOS, G.R. NO. 171222
Facts
This case involves the criminal liability of school
authorities under the Anti-Hazing Law in the
Philippines. The school authorities of the Philippine
Merchant Marine Academy (PMMA) were charged as
accomplices to hazing after a student, Balidoy, died
during the mandatory "Indoctrination and Orientation
Period" at the academy. The NBI conducted an
investigation and found probable cause to charge the
school authorities as accomplices to hazing. However,
35
the Sandiganbayan quashed the Information against
them on the basis of the dismissal of the case against
the principal accused and the failure to include the
necessary averments required by the Anti-Hazing Law.
Issue: Whether the prosecution of the school
authorities as accomplices to hazing can proceed
despite the dismissal of the case against the principal
accused.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that the case against the
school authorities should not be dismissed solely
because the case against the principal accused was
dismissed. The trial of those charged as accomplices
can proceed independently as long as the commission
of the crime can be proven.
The Supreme Court held that the case against the
school authorities can proceed independently of the
case against the principal accused.
The responsibility given to an academic institution for
the welfare of its students has been characterized by
law and judicial doctrine as a form of special parental
authority and responsibility. This responsibility has
been amplified by the enactment of the Anti-Hazing
Law, in that the failure by school authorities to take
any action to prevent the offenses as provided by the
law exposes them to criminal liability as accomplices
in the criminal acts. Thus, the institution and its
officers cannot stand idly by in the face of patently
criminal acts committed within their sphere of
responsibility. They bear the commensurate duty to
ensure that the crimes covered by the Anti-Hazing Law
are not committed.
396
ST. JOSEPH’S COLLEGE V. MIRANDA, G.R. NO.
182353, 29 JUNE 2010
undergo surgery and incurred medical expenses. His
mother, who was working abroad, had to return home
and spend money on fares and forego her salary.
Jayson and his parents also suffered mental anguish
and wounded feelings. Jayson filed a complaint for
damages against SJC, Sr. Josephini Ambatali, SFIC, and
Rosalinda Tabugo, seeking compensation for his
medical expenses, litigation expenses, and moral
damages.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) ruled in favor of Jayson
and ordered the petitioners to pay him actual
damages, mitigated moral damages, attorney's fees,
and costs of suit. The petitioners appealed to the
Court of Appeals (CA), but the CA affirmed the RTC's
decision. The petitioners then filed a petition for
review on certiorari before the Supreme Court.
Issue: (1) whether Jayson's contributory negligence
absolves the petitioners from liability; (2) whether the
award of moral damages is justified;
Ruling:
The Supreme Court upheld the findings of the lower
courts that the petitioners were negligent and failed
to exercise the required reasonable care, prudence,
caution, and foresight to prevent or avoid injuries to
the students. The court emphasized that the
immediate and proximate cause of Jayson's injury was
the negligence of the school, its administrators, and
teachers.
As found by both lower courts, the proximate cause of
Jayson’s injury was the concurrent failure of
petitioners to prevent the foreseeable mishap that
occurred during the conduct of the science
experiment. Petitioners were negligent by failing to
exercise the higher degree of care, caution and
foresight incumbent upon the school, its
administrators and teachers.
Facts:
The case involves a science experiment conducted by
students in a school. On November 17, 1994, at St.
Joseph's College (SJC), a science experiment was being
conducted by the class of the respondent, Jayson
Miranda. The experiment involved the fusion of sulfur
powder and iron fillings. During the experiment,
Jayson looked into the test tube with a magnifying
glass, causing the compound to spurt out and hit his
eye, resulting in chemical burns. Jayson had to
36