1 JOAQUINA BASA, ET AL., petitioners-appellants,
MERCADO, Respondent-Appellee.
vs. ATILANO
G.
FACTS:
On June 27, 1931, The Honorable Hermogenes Reyes allowed and probated the last
will and testament of the deceased Ines Basa.
In 1932, a judge approved the estate administrator's account and declared him the
only heir. In 1934, petitioners-appellants filed a motion for the proceedings to be
reopened, claiming the court lacked jurisdiction due to non-compliance with the
Code of Civil Procedure.
The petitioners-appellants argued that the hearing occurred only 21 days after the
first publication, and the Ing Katipunan was not a general circulation newspaper as
required by law.
to the Central Bank, as CN 20 was issued on 1949 but was only published in the
Official Gazette (OG) only in 1951, thus, it can have no force and effect.
Que Po Lay, the Appellant, failed to sell $7,000. worth of US Dollars, checks, and
money orders to the Central Bank within one day, as required by CN 20.
Que Po Lay was found guilty of violating CN 20 in connection with RA No. 265. But
Que Po Lay contended that the circular had no force and effect since it was not
published until November 1951.
ISSUE:
Can Que Po Lay be convicted of violating Circular No. 20 before its publication?
RULING:
Que Po Lay cannot be convicted of violating Circular No. 20 before its publication. A
circular that has the force and effect of law in which it prescribes a penalty upon in
the event of violation should be published before it could have a binding effect.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was compliance with the publication requirement
Whether or not that the Ing Katipunan is a newspaper of general circulation
Ruling:
Yes, the language used in section 630 of the Code of Civil Procedure does not mean
that the notice, referred to therein, should be published for three full weeks before
the date set for the hearing of the will. In other words, the first publication of the
notice need not be made 21 days before the day appointed for the hearing.
Ing Katipunan is a general circulation newspaper in Pampanga, with a subscription
list of paying subscribers, regular publication, and court order for its dissemination of
local news and information.
2) PEOPLE v. QUE PO LAY
G.R. No. L-6791, March 29, 1954
Facts:
Que Po Lay appealed fro2m the decision of a lower court on finding him guilty of
violating Central Bank Circular No. 20 (CN 20) when he failed to sell foreign exchange
3 Pesigan v. Angeles (G.R. No. L-64279 April 30, 1984)
FACTS:
Publication of Presidential Executive Order No. 626-A dated October 25, 1980,
providing for the confiscation and forfeiture by the government of carabaos
transported from one province to another, in the Official Gazette of June 14, 1982.
On April 2, 1982, carabao dealers Anselmo and Marcelo Pesigan transported 26
carabaos and a calf from Sipocot, Camarines Sur, to Padre Garcia, Batangas.
Lieutenant Arnulfo V. Zenarosa and Provincial Veterinarian Bella S. Miranda
confiscated carabaos in Basud, Camarines Norte, following Executive Order No. 626A, prohibiting carabao and carabeef transportation between provinces, and
subjecting them to confiscation and forfeiture.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the Executive Order No. 626-A be enforced against the Pesigans on
April 2, 1982
RULING:
NO. The Executive Order No. 626-A should not be enforced against the Pesigans on
April 2, 1982 because it was published only in the Official Gazette on June 14, 1982.
t became effective or enforceable fifteen (15) days thereafter as provided in the Art.
2 of the Civil Code. Where the word “laws” in Art. 2 includes circulars and regulations
which prescribe penalties. The Pesigans' actions are not covered by Executive Order
No. 626-A, as they are necessary to inform the public about regulations and make
penalties binding on affected individuals.
4 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HON. REGINO VERIDIANO I
Facts:
Benito Go Bio, Jr. was charged with violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 in the then
Court of First Instance of Zambales. Go Bio, Jr. filed a motion to quash information,
arguing it did not charge an offense, as Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 had not yet taken
effect at the alleged offense.
The prosecution opposed the motion contending, among others, that the date of the
dishonor of the check, considering that the offense was committed on September 26,
1979, the said law is applicable.
Go Bio, Jr. argues that Batas Pambansa Bilang 22, published in April 1979, was
released on June 14, 1979, and he could not have violated it as it was not yet
circulated.
5 Lorenzo M. Tañ ada vs.
G.R. No. L-63915 April 24, 1985
Hon.
Juan
C.
Tuvera
🐼🐼🐼🐼🐼
Facts:
Lorenzo Tañ ada and his associates bring before the court that multiple presidential
issuances have not been published in the Official Gazette. Most of these issuances,
they believe, contain matters of public concern or have a “general applicability” on
the population.
Tañada contends that in order for laws to be valid and enforceable must be published
in the Official Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgated.
Tuvera argued that the presidential issuances in question contain special provisions
as to the date they are to take effect, publication in the Official Gazette is not
indispensable for their effectivity.
Issues:
Whether or not the presidential issuances brought into question by the petitioners
should be published in the Official Gazette.
Ruling:
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 has already taken effect when Go Bio,
Jr. committed the act
RULING:
No. It is certain that the penal statute in question was made public only on June 14,
1979 and not on the printed date April 9, 1979. Differently stated, June 14, 1979 was
the date of publication of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22. Before the public may be bound
by its contents especially its penal provisions, the law must be published and the
people officially informed of its contents and/or its penalties.
If a statute had not been published before its violation, then in the eyes of the law
there was no such law to be violated and, consequently, the accused could not have
committed the alleged crime.
The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general
applicability" is mandated by law. The Court ordered the respondents to publish in
the Official Gazette all unpublished presidential issuances which are of general
application, and unless so published, they shall have no binding force and effect.
This is to give the general public adequate notice of the various laws which are to
regulate their actions and conduct as Filipino citizens. Since to punish a citizen for
breaking a law which he or she had no notice whatsoever is a great injustice.
6 MRCA v. Court of Appeals,
Facts
Meanwhile, the respondent argue that the decision on June 7, 1988 is
adverse to the government and the case should go to an automatic review
from the Commissioner of Customs in accordance to the CMO No. 20-87 and
the memorandum order implements Section 12 of the Integrated
Reorganization Plan
:
MRCA, the petitioner of this case, pleads to set aside the CA decision
dismissing the complaint for non-payment of the proper filing fees for failure
to specify the amounts of moral & exemplary, attorney's fees and litigation
expenses sought to be recovered.
The private respondents/defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint
on July 15, 1988. The petitioner opposed the motion, but the trial court
granted it in its order of August 10, 1988.
Invoking the case of Manchester Development Corporation vs. CA, CA
upheld the decision in the trial court.
MRCA argues that since the decision in Manchester had not yet been
published in the Official Gazette, the ruling therein was ineffective.
Issue
:
Is publication in the Official Gazette a prerequisite for the effectivity of a
court ruling?
Ruling
:
No. Publication in the Official Gazette is not a prerequisite for the effectivity of a court
ruling even if it lays down a new rule of procedure. The Court held that it is a wellestablished rule of statutory construction that statutes regulating the procedure of
the courts will be construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at
the time of their passage. Procedural laws are retrospective in that sense and to that
extent.
Petitioner objects the enforcement of Section 12 of the Plan and CMO No.
20-87 on the ground that they had not been published in the Official Gazette
Issue: Whether or not CMO No. 20-87 should be published in the Official Gazette to
take effect.
Ruling:
No, Article 2 of the Civil Code, which requires laws to be published in the Official
Gazette, does not apply to CMO No. 20-87 which is only an administrative order of
the Commissioner of Customs addressed to his subordinates. the customs
collectors. The objection to the enforcement of Section 12 of the Plan and CMO No.
20-87 on the ground that they had not been published in the Official Gazette, is not
well taken.
CMO No. 20-87 requiring collectors of customs to comply strictly with
Section 12 of the Plan, is an issuance which is addressed only to particular persons or
a class of persons (the customs collectors).
7 Yaokasin v. Commissioner, 180 SCRA 591 , December 22, 1989
8. Philippine International Trading Corporation, vs. Hon. Presiding Judge Zosimo Z.
Angeles G.R. No. 108461 October 21, 1996
Facts:
Facts:
On May 27, 1988, the Philippine Coast Guard seized 9000 bags/sacks of
refined sugar that were being unloaded from the cargo of M/V Tacloban and
the Bureau of Customs embargoed the said product. Jimmy O. Yaokasin
presented a sales invoice from Jordan Trading of Iloilo to prove local sugar
production, but the Bureau of Customs proceeded with the seizure.
Philippine International Trading Corporation issued Administrative Order No. SOCPEC
89-08-01 under which applications to the PITC for importation from China must be
accompanied by a viable and confirmed export program of Philippine products. PITC
prohibited Remington Industrial Sales Corporation and Firestone Ceramics, Inc. from
importing products from China due to non-compliance with an administrative order.
Judge Zosimo Angeles, ruled the said administrative order to be void and
unconstitutional. The court contends further authority to process and approve
applications for imports SOCPEC and to issue rules and regulations pursuant to LOI
144 has already been repealed by EO 133 issued on February 27, 1987.
The original Administrative Order issued on August 30, 1989, under which the
respondents filed their applications for importation, was not published in the Official
Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation.
Issue: Whether or not PITC’s Administrative Order 89-08-01 is valid.
RULING:
No, the questioned Administrative Order, legally, until it is published, is invalid within
the context of Article 2 of Civil Code.
The fact that the amendments to Administrative Order No. SOCPEC 89-08-01 were
filed with, and published by the UP Law Center in the National Administrative
Register, does not cure the defect related to the effectivity of the Administrative
Order. The Administrative Order under consideration is one of those issuances which
should be published for its effectivity, since its purpose is to enforce and implement
an existing law pursuant to a valid delegation,9 NATIONAL ELECTRIFICATION
ADMINISTRATION VS VICTORIANO B GONZAGA
On December 12, 2000 respondent filed a motion to withdraw and amend petition
to admit second amended petition that impleaded NEA as indispensable party. Also
averred that ECEC is null and void because it has not been published.
RTC denied petitioner motion to dismiss for being filed out of time and noted NEA’s
failure to state whether ECEC was actually published. RTC noted that NEA
erroneously relied on SEC 59 of PD 269 and misapplied the cases cited. RTC and CA
nullified the ECEC for not showing proof of publication in the Office Gazatte.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the court of appeals erred in upholding the trial court’s
nullification of the ECEC.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court finds no error in the appellate and trial courts' nullification of the
ECEC. The CA correctly observed that while ZAMSURECO complied with the
requirements of filing the code with the University of the Philippines Law Center, it
offered no proof of publication in the Official Gazette nor in a newspaper of general
circulation. Without compliance with the requirement of publication, the rules and
regulations contained in the ECEC cannot be enforced and implemented.
The ECEC applies to all electric cooperatives in the country. It is not a mere internal
memorandum, interpretative regulation, or instruction to subordinates. Thus, the
ECEC should comply with the requirements of the Civil Code and the Administrative
Code of 1987.
G.R. No. 158761, December 4, 2007
FACTS:
On November 13, 2000 Victoriano B Gonzaga filed certificate of candidacy
for membership to the Board of Directors of Zamboanga del Sur II Electric
Cooperative but was disqualified because on the grounds that his spouse was a
member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Diplahan citing Electric Cooperative Election
Code (ECEC) promulgated by petitioner that prohibits anyone to run as director for
electric cooperative when their spouse occupies an elective government position
higher than Barangay Captain.
10 Commissioner of Customs v. Hypermix Feeds (G.R. No. 179579 | February 1,
2012)
Facts:
Petitioner Commissioner of Customs issued CMO 27-2003. Under the Memorandum,
for tariff purposes, wheat was classified according to the following: (1) importer or
consignee; (2) country of origin; and (3) port of discharge. The regulation provided
an exclusive list of corporations, ports of discharge, commodity descriptions and
countries of origin. Depending on these factors, wheat would be classified either as
food grade or feed grade. The corresponding tariff for food grade wheat was 3%, for
feed grade, 7%.
The RTC struck down the regulation, ruling that the basic requirements of hearing
and publication in the issuance of CMO 27­2003 were not complied with. This was
affirmed by the CA, hence the instant petition.
1. Whether the policy guidelines issued by the ERC on the treatment of
discounts extended by power suppliers are ineffective and invalid for lack of
publication
Ruling:
Issues: Whether or not CMO 27-2003 is valid without conducting hearing and
publication
The policy guidelines of the ERC on the treatment of discounts extended by
power suppliers are interpretative regulations. The policy guidelines merely interpret
R.A. No. 7832 and it‘s IRR, particularly on the computation of the cost of purchased
power. The policy guidelines did not modify, amend, or supplant the IRR. Hence, it is
exempt from the publication requirement.
Nevertheless, the grossed-up factor mechanism amends the IRR of R.A. No.
7832 as it serves as an additional numerical standard that must be observed and
applied by rural electric cooperatives in the implementation of the PPA. In light of
these, the grossed-up factor mechanism does not merely interpret R.A. No. 7832 or
its IRR. It is also not merely internal in nature. Thus, it is ineffective and therefore
invalid.
Ruling:
SC denied the petition, affirming the previous declaration that the CMO is invalid.
Since the questioned regulation will affect the substantive rights of respondent as an
importer of wheat, it therefore follows that petitioners should have applied the
pertinent provisions of Book VII, Chapter 2 of the Revised Administrative Code in the
issuance of the CMO.
Under Sec 9. Public Participation (2) It states that “In the fixing of rates, no rule or
final order shall be valid unless the proposed rates shall have been published in a
newspaper of general circulation at least two (2) weeks before the first hearing
thereon..”11 ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHERN TAGALOG ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC.
vs. ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION
On 8 June 2001, R.A. No. 9136 or the Electric Power Industry Reform Act (EPIRA) of
2001 was enacted. Subsequently, the ERC issued policy guidelines on the treatment
of discounts extended by power suppliers. The order mandates rural electric
cooperatives to only recover the actual cost of power purchased from suppliers, as
they are non-profit and serve their members' interests.
In addition, the ERC also adopted the new "grossed-up factor mechanism"
in the computation of the over-recoveries of the electric cooperatives to be remitted
to their consumers.
Thus, BATELEC I, et al. filed motion to reconsider the above orders but the
ERC denied the same. On appeal, the CA upheld the validity of the ERC Orders. Hence,
this petition. BATELEC I, et al. assert that these ERC Orders are invalid for lack of
publication, non-submission to the U.P. Law Center, and for their retroactive
application.
Issue
12 NAGKAKAISANG MARALITA vs. MILITARY SHRINE SERVICES - PHILIPPINE
VETERANS AFFAIRS OFFICE, DND
THE FACTS:
On 28 May 1967, President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Proclamation No. 208,
amending Proclamation No. 423 issued by President Carlos P. Garcia which reserved
parcels of land in the Municipalities of Pasig, Taguig, Parañaque, Province of Rizal and
Pasay City for a military reservation known as Fort William McKinley, was later on
renamed Fort Andres Bonifacio (Fort Bonifacio), which excluded a certain area of Fort
Bonifacio and reserved it for a national shrine which is now known as Libingan ng
mga Bayani.
Again, on 7 January 1986, President Marcos issued Proclamation No. 2476, which
excluded barangays Lower Bicutan, Upper Bicutan and Signal Village from the
operation of Proclamation No. 423 and declared it open for disposition.
At the bottom of Proclamation No. 2476, President Marcos made a handwritten
addendum, which reads: "P.S. – This includes Western Bicutan, (SGD.) Ferdinand E.
Marcos"”.
The crux of the controversy started when Proclamation No. 2476 was published in
the Official Gazette on 3 February 1986, without the above-quoted addendum.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT PROCLAMATION NO. 2476 DID NOT INCLUDE ANY
PORTION OF WESTERN BICUTAN AS THE HANDWRITTEN NOTATION BY PRESIDENT
MARCOS ON THE SAID PROCLAMATION WAS NOT PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL
GAZETTE.
Petitioners asserted that regardless of the execution of the MOA, the Resolutions
must still be nullified, because "most of the initiatives described in the GSIS
Manifestation appeared to be merely operational x x x which do not amend, modify,
or reverse any of the GSIS policies, and which are thus still in place."
ISSUE: Given that the parties were involved in the public discussion of GSIS' policy
resolutions concerning PBP, APL, and CLIP, can it be considered that the absence of
publication was legitimately waived?
RULING:
RULING
No, the handwritten addendum has no legal force and effect due to lack of the
required publication in the Official Gazette. Publication must be in full or there is no
publication at all for the purpose that it should inform the public of the contents of
the law.
Pursuant to Article 2 of the Civil Code, the requirement of publication is indispensable
in the effectivity of a law unless otherwise provided by the law itself.
13 Manila Public Schools Teachers’ Association v. Garcia
FACTS:
Republic Act No. 8291, also known as the "Government Service Insurance System Act
of 1997", was enacted on May 30, 1997. The law amended the "Revised Government
Service Insurance Act of 1977".
R.A. 8291 modified the employer's contribution, increasing it from 9.5% to 12%.
Despite this, no corresponding budget increase occurred. Consequently, DepEd
couldn't pay the additional 2.5% of the employer's share. In the meantime, GSIS
issued the assailed Resolutions, Resolution No. 238, Resolution No. 90 and Resolution
No. 179. GSIS maintains that the publication of the resolutions was unnecessary,
because the policies were "just a mere reiteration of the time� honored principles
of insurance law."
No, SC held that the requirements of notice, hearing, and publication should have
been observed.
According to the Court in Veterans Federation of the Philippines v. Reyes,"when xxx
an administrative rule goes beyond merely providing for the means that can facilitate
or render least cumbersome the implementation of the law but substantially adds
to or increases the burden of those governed, it behooves the agency to accord at
least to those directly affected a chance to be heard, and thereafter to be duly
informed, before that new issuance is given the force and effect of law."
SC ruled that GSIS Resolutions Nos. 238, 90, and 179, which respectively embody the
Claims and Loans Interdependency Policy, Premium-Based Policy, and Automatic
Policy Loan and Policy Lapse, are declared INVALID and OF NO FORCE AND EFFECT.
14: Cojuangco Jr. Vs Republic of the Philippines, GR No. 180705
Facts:
R.A. 6260 was enacted creating the Coconut Investment Company (CIC) to administer
the Coconut Investment Fund (CIF), which, under Section 8 thereof, was to be
sourced from a P0.55 levy on the sale of every 100 kg. of copra.
Charged with the duty of collecting and administering the Fund was PCA. Like
COCOFED with which it had a legal linkage, the PCA, by statutory provisions scattered
in different coco levy decrees, had its share of the coco levy. Per Cojuangco’s own
admission, PCA paid, out of the Coconut Consumers Stabilization Fund (CCSF), the
entire acquisition price for the 72.2% option shares.
The list of First United Bank (FUB) stockholders included Cojuangco with 14,440
shares and PCA with 129,955 shares. It would appear later that, pursuant to the
stipulation on maintaining Cojuangco’s equity position in the bank, PCA would cede
to him 10% of its subscriptions to (a) the authorized but unissued shares of FUB and
(b) the increase in FUB’s capital stock. In all, from the "mother" PCA shares,
Cojuangco would receive a total of 95,304 FUB (UCPB) shares broken down as
follows: 14,440 shares + 10% (158,840 shares) + 10% (649,800 shares) = 95,304.
Held:
No. Effectivity clause of Rep. Act No. 9006 is defective. However, the same does not
render the entire law invalid.
In Tañada v. Tuvera this Court laid down the rule:
Issue: Whether or not the agreement between PCA and Cojuangco can be accorded
the status of a law without publication.
Ruling:
NO. It bears to stress at this point that the PCA-Cojuangco Agreement referred to
above in Section 1 of P.D. 755 was not reproduced or attached as an annex to the
same law. It is wellsettled that laws must be published to be valid. In fact, publication
is an indispensable condition for the effectivity of a law. P.D. 755 did not in any way
reproduce the exact terms of the contract in the decree. Neither was a copy thereof
attached to the decree when published. The SC cannot, therefore, extend to the said
Agreement the status of a law
15. RODOLFO FARIÑAS vs EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
GR. No. 147387
Facts:
The petitioners assert that Rep. Act No. 9006 is null and void in its entirety as
irregularities attended its enactment into law. The law, not only Section 14 thereof,
should be declared null and void. Even Section 16 of the law which provides that “this
Act shall take effect upon its approval” is a violation of the due process clause of the
Constitution, as well as jurisprudence, which require publication of the law before it
becomes effective.
Finally, the petitioners maintain that Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code is a
good law; hence, should not have been repealed.
Issues:
Whether Rep. Act 9006 (The Fair Elections Act) null and void in its entirety which
provides “this act shall take effect upon its approval “ is a violation of due process?
... the clause "unless it is otherwise provided" refers to the date of effectivity and not
to the requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This
clause does not mean that the legislator may make the law effective immediately
upon approval, or on any other date without its previous publication.
Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion
provide that the usual fifteen-period shall be shortened or extended…
16 LA BUGAL-B’LAAN TRIBAL ASSOCIATION INC. VS. VICTOR O. RAMOS (G.R. No.
127882, January 27, 2004)
loaned amount with interest within 4 and ½ years from the execution of the contract.
It was also stipulated in the contract that Emiliana Ambrosio shall pay all taxes on the
property during the term of the agreement.
FACTS:
In 1987, President Cory Aquino issued EO 2796, that authorized the DENR Secretary
to accept proposals from foreign corporations or investors for large-scale mineral
exploration contracts, with the President's recommendation.
Emiliana Ambrosio agreed to sell the property if she couldn't pay the loan plus
interest. After a year, she couldn't pay the interest and land tax. She and the
petitioner entered a verbal contract, transferring possession to the petitioner on
condition of not collecting interest, paying land tax, and introducing improvements.
On March 3, 1995, then President Fidel V. Ramos approved R.A. No. 7942 to "govern
the exploration, development, utilization, and processing of all mineral resources."
Kalisag argued the Court of Appeals' erroneous ruling that he acted in bad faith in
acquiring land and claiming the value of improvements.
On April 9, 1995, 30 days following its publication on March 10, 1995, in Malaya and
Manila Times, two newspapers of general circulation, R.A. No. 7942 took effect.
Shortly before the effectivity of R.A. No. 7942, however, or on March 30, 1995, the
President entered into an FTAA with WMCP
Issues: 1. Whether or not the petitioner should be deemed a possessor in good faith
because he was unaware of any flaw in his title or in the manner of its acquisition by
which it is invalidated.
Issue : Whether or not E.O. No. 279, the law in force when the WMC FTAA was
executed, did not come into effect.
Ruling:
SC held that a reading then of Section 8 of E.O. No. 279, Section 1 of E.O. No. 200,
and Tañada v. Tuvera, this Court holds that E.O. No. 279 became effective
immediately upon its publication in the Official Gazette on August 3, 1987.
While the effectivity clause of E.O. No. 279 does not require its publication, it is not
a ground for its invalidation since the Constitution, being "the fundamental,
paramount and supreme law of the nation," is deemed written in the law. Hence, the
due process clause, which, so Tañada held, mandates the publication of statutes, is
read into Section 8 of E.O. No. 279.
PRESUMPTION OF KNOWLEDGE OF THE LAW
17
Kasilag vs. Rodrigues, 69 Phil 217
G.R. No. 46623, December 07, 1939
Facts:
The petitioner, Marcial Kalisag, entered into a contract with Emiliana Ambrosio
wherein the petitioner loaned an amount of P1000, by way of mortgage, to Emiliana
Ambrosio. It was provided in the contract that Emiliana Ambrosio shall pay the
Ruling: Yes. From the facts found established by the Court of Appeals, we can neither
deduce nor presume that the petitioner was aware of a flaw in his title or in the
manner of its acquisition, aside from the prohibition contained in section 116.
Gross and inexcusable ignorance of the law may not be the basis of good faith, but
possible, excusable ignorance may be such basis. It is a fact that the petitioner is not
conversant with the laws because he is not a lawyer. In accepting the mortgage of
the improvements, he proceeded on the well-grounded belief that he was not
violating the prohibition regarding the alienation of the land. These considerations
again bring to the conclusion that, as to the petitioner, his ignorance of the provisions
of section 116 is excusable and may, therefore, be the basis of his good faith.
18 D. M. CONSUNJI, INC vs. COURT OF APPEALS and MARIA J. JUEGO, April 20, 2001
FACTS:
At around 1:30 p.m., November 2, 1990, Jose Juego, a construction worker of D. M.
Consunji, Inc., fell 14 floors from the Renaissance Tower, Pasig City to his death. The
victim was rushed to Rizal Medical Center in Pasig, Metro Manila where investigation
disclosed that Jose A. Juego was crushed to death when the platform he was then on
board and performing work, fell. Platform fell due to pin removal or loosening from
chain block and platform connecting points without safety lock.
Maria Juego's widow filed a complaint for damages against D.M. Consunji, Inc.,
claiming the deceased's employer owed her benefits from the State Insurance Fund.
The petitioner argues that the private respondent, who had previously used death
benefits under the Labor Code, cannot claim damages from the deceased's employer
under the Civil Code.
ISSUES:
Is there a valid waiver by the private respondent?
RULING:
No, there is no valid waiver made by the private respondent in the case at bar
because there was a mistake of fact. Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a
known right. It is an act of understanding that presupposes that a party has
knowledge of its rights, but chooses not to assert them.
Where one lacks knowledge of a right, there is no basis upon which waiver of it can
rest. Ignorance of a material fact negates waiver, and waiver cannot be established
by a consent given under a mistake or misapprehension of fact. It bears stressing that
what negates waiver is lack of knowledge or a mistake of fact.
19 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs FLORENCIO GASACAO | November 11, 2005
Facts:
Gasacao (appellant) was the crewing manager of the Great Eastern Shipping Agency
Inc., a licensed local manning agency, while his nephew and co-accused, Jose
Gasacao, was the resident. The appellant and co-accused were charged with Large
Scale Illegal Recruitment under RA No. 8042 and penalized under Sec 7 (b) of the
same law in Quezon City.
The appellant and co-accused allegedly unlawfully recruited individuals as seafarers
despite the prohibitions outlined in the POEA Rules and Regulations.
Gasacao appealed to the court claiming he is just an employee of the said agency and
was unaware of the laws violated.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the appellant was guilty of Large Scale Illegal Recruitment
Ruling:
Yes. The appellant contended that he is a mere employee of the firm, however it was
clearly stated that he is the crewing manager. He also took part in recruiting the said
above and participated in collecting the cash bond. t is stated in Sec 6 of RA No. 8042
that illegal recruitment shall mean any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting,
transporting, utilizing, hiring, procuring workers and includes referring, contract
services, promising or advertising for employment abroad, whether profit or not,
when undertaken by a non-licensee or non-holder of authority contemplated under
Article 13(f) of PD No. 442 or the Labor Code.
He also failed to deploy the said above and did not provide any valid reason. Despite
the appellants' claim that he is unaware of his violations, ignorance of the law excuses
no one.
20 Puzon v Abellera Digest (G.R. No. 75082 July 31, 1989)
Facts:
The plaintiff Acosta filed an accion publiciana against the respondent Magday. The
complaint was amended on August 25, 1971, to implead the Department of
Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Bureau of Lands as additional defendants.
The oppositor appellee Alejandra Abellera (substituted upon her death by
Domondon) was the registered owner of the subject 2-hectare parcel of land situated
in Baguio City, a land which was previously part of the public domain but was titled
pursuant to RA 931.
On October 3, 1975, the court rendered its judgment, dismissing the complaint with
cost against the plaintiffs. On June 16, 1976, respondent Judge dismissed the appeal
for failure to file a record on appeal. A motion for reconsideration of the dismissal of
order was filed by the appellants on June 26, 1976.
In another case Republic v Pio Marcos, the Supreme Court declared that all titles
issued under RA 931 are null and void since the said Act was applicable only to places
covered by cadastral proceedings, and not to the City of Baguio which was covered
by a townsite reservation.
Under the rules of Court, a record of appeal is required to be filed by the pauper
appellant although it did not have to be printed. However, under the B.P. Blg. 129,
which overtaken this case before it could be decided, a record on appeal is no longer
required for the perfection of the appeal.
The ruling was incorporated into P.D. 1271, which nullified registration and title
certificates for lands in the Baguio Townsite Reservation, reverting the lot to the
public domain.
Issue: Whether or not B.P. Blg. 129 should be given retroactive effect.
In 1977, two Baguio City real properties, including the land in this appeal, were
auctioned off due to unpaid real property taxes from 1971 to 1977. The trial court
ruled that said auction sale is null and void and that the assessments were illegally
made. This was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Hence this petition with petitioner
contending that the tax assessments were valid and that PD 1271 has a curative
effect.
Ruling:
YES, B.P. Blg 129 should be given retroactive effect. The reorganization having been
declared to have been completed, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 is now in full force and
effect. A record on appeal is no longer necessary for taking an appeal.
This new rule was given retroactive effect in Alday v. Camilon. The same provisions
appear in Section 18 of the Interim Rules and Guidelines where it is ruled that being
procedural in nature, those provisions may be applied retroactively for the benefit of
the petitioners, as appellants.
Issue: Whether or not PD 1271 can be applied retroactively
YES. Article 4 of the New Civil Code prohibits the retroactive application of laws unless
expressly provided therein, such rule allows some exceptions and PD 1271 falls under
one of the exceptions. The intent of PD 1271 is necessarily to make such titles valid
from the time they were issued. The law aims to acknowledge good faith ownership
acts by Torrens title holders before the cut-off date, validating titles issued before
July 31, 1973, effective on their respective issue dates. However, the validity of these
titles would not become operative unless and after the conditions stated in PD 1271
are met.
21 ACOSTA v. PLAN (G.R. NO. L-44466 January 30, 1989)
Facts:
On October 3, 1976, the trial court was hereby ordered to forward the entire records
of Civil Case No. 1201 to the Court of Appeals for the determination and disposition
of the petitioners’ appeal on merits.
22 BPI (Bank of the Philippine Islands) v. Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC)
164 SCRA 630
August 19, 1988
Furthermore, both parties being in pari delicto, the law cannot afford either of them
a remedy.
23
Spouses Dacudao v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 188056, January 8, 2013
Facts:
FACTS:
Rizaldy T. Zshornack and his wife maintained both a dollar savings account and a peso
current account with COMTRUST (Commercial Trust) bank. An unauthorized
withdrawal resulted from an application for a dollar draft initiated by Virgillo Garcia,
the COMTRUST branch manager, and payable to Leovigilda Dizon. The application
failed to identify the purchaser of the dollar draft, despite it stating Zshornack's dollar
savings account would be charged, and COMTRUST sent a cheque to Dizon.
On February 6, 2009, the petitioners, Spouses Dacudao, initiated charges of
syndicated estafa against Delos Angeles, Jr., et al in the Office of the City Prosecutor
of Davao as a result of having been defrauded through the latter’s “buy back
agreement”. Thereafter, DOJ Secretarry issued DO No. 182 which directs Regional
State Prosecutors, Provincial, and City Prosecutors to forward cases against Delos
Angeles, Jr., et al. to the DOJ Special Panel in Manila for appropriate action.
Zshornack requested explanation from COMTRUST about an unauthorized
withdrawal, which was confirmed to be Ernesto Zshornack's equivalent in pesos,
Rizaldy's brother, who had encashed a cashier's check.
The former (DO No. 182) was opined as an obstruction of justice, violating their right
to due process, right to equal protection of the law, right to speedy disposition of the
cases, and the rule against the enactment of laws with retroactive effect.
ISSUE:
With the exception of the fourth cause of action, the Court of First Instance (CFI)
decided in Zshornack's favor, holding COMTRUST accountable for the unlawful
withdrawal. The Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC) overturned the CFI ruling on
appeal, relieving the bank of responsibility for the fourth cause of action.
Whether or not the Department Order No. 182 violated the rule that laws shall have
no retroactive effect.
Issue:
RULING:
Whether the contract that was signed is a depositum contract.
The court held yes, as defined by Art. 1962 of the NCC.
No. As a general rule, laws shall have no retroactive effect. However, exceptions exist,
and one such exception concerns a law that is procedural in nature. The reason is
that a remedial statute or a statute relating to remedies or modes of procedure does
not create new rights or take away vested rights but only operates in furtherance of
the remedy or the confirmation of already existing rights.
Art. 1962. A deposit is constituted from the moment a person receives a thing
belonging to another, with the obligation of safely keeping it and of returning the
same. If the safekeeping of the thing delivered is not the principal purpose of the
contract, there is no deposit but some other contract.
A statute or rule regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as
applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of its passage. Thus, the
retroactive application is not violative of any right of a person who may feel adversely
affected, for no vested right generally attaches to or arises from procedural laws.
Ruling:
However, according to the Court, holding money in safekeeping without selling it to
the Central Bank within one working day, as required by CB Circular No. 20, is a
prohibited transaction. As a result of the transaction's execution in violation of a
required or prohibitive legislation, it is void under Article 5 of the Civil Code.
24 Guingona v. Carague (GR No. 94571, April 22, 1991)
FACTS:
The 1990 budget consists of P98.4 Billion in automatic appropriation (with P86.8
Billion for debt service) and P155.3 Billion appropriated under Republic Act No. 6831,
otherwise known as the General Appropriations Act (GAA), or a total of P233.5 Billion,
while the appropriations for the Department of Education, Culture and Sports
amount to P27,017,813,000.00.
Petitioners argue that the said automatic appropriations under the aforesaid decrees
of then President Marcos became functus oficio when he was ousted in February,
1986; that upon the expiration of the one-man legislature in the person of President
Marcos, the legislative power was restored to Congress on February 2, 1987 when
the Constitution was ratified by the people;
Moreover, petitioners contend that assuming arguendo that P.D. No. 81, P.D. No.
1177 and P.D. No. 1967 did not expire with the ouster of President Marcos, after the
adoption of the 1987 Constitution, the said decrees are inoperative under Section 3,
Article XVIII
ISSUE:
W/N PD No. 81, PD No. 1177 AND PD No. 1967 ARE STILL OPERATIVE UNDER THE
CONSTITUTION?
RULING:
The Court ruled that the said PDs are still operative. These were not automatically
revoked upon the ouster of Marcos. The Court held that these laws remain operative
until they are amended, repealed, or revoked, and so long as they are not
inconsistent with the Constitution. In addition, the Court dismissed petitioners'
argument that the aforecited PDs fall within the ambit of Section 24, Art. VI pertaining
to "all appropriation, revenue or tariff bills," mainly because the PDs in question are
considered enacted laws and not bills.
his transitory provision of the Constitution has precisely been adopted by its framers
to preserve the social order so that legislation by the then President Marcos may be
recognized. Such laws are to remain in force and effect unless they are inconsistent
with the Constitution or, are otherwise amended, repealed or revoked.
Equally fundamental is the principle that construction of the Constitution and law is
generally applied prospectively and not retrospectively unless it is so clearly stated.
25 Aruego Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, A. Aruego
FACTS:
On March 7, 1983, a complaint for compulsory recognition and enforcement of
successional rights was filed before RTC of Manila by the minors Antonio F. Aruego
and Evelyn F. Aruego, represented by their mother Luz Fabian. The legitimate
children of Jose Aruego Jr., who died in 1982, have filed a complaint claiming they
have been illegitimate since their amorous relationship with their mother Luz Fabian.
The court then rendered judgment that Antonia Aruego is an illegitimate child of the
deceased Luz Fabian while Evelyn is not. Antonia was declared entitled to have a
share equal to ½ portion of the legitimate children of Jose Aruego.
A petition for prohibition and certiorari was filed, claiming the Family Code of the
Philippines' retroactive effect caused the trial court to lose jurisdiction over the
complaint.
SUE: Whether or not the Family Code shall have a retroactive effect in the case.
RULING:
NO. The Supreme Court upheld that the Family Code cannot be given retroactive
effect in so far as the instant case is concerned as its application will prejudice the
vested rights of respondents to have her case be decided under Article 285 of the
Civil Code. It is a well settled reception that laws shall have a retroactive effect unless
it would impair vested rights. Therefore, the Family Code in this case cannot be given
a retroactive effect.
The trial court, which acquired jurisdiction over the case by the filing of the
complaint, never lost jurisdiction over the same despite the passage of E.O. No. 209,
also known as the Family Code of the Philippines.
Ernestina contends that the complaint is already barred under Article 175 of the
Family Code which provides that complaints for recognition must be filed during the
lifetime of the parent. The RTC agreed. The CA disagreed and reversed the RTC ruling
that the Family Code cannot be given retroactive effect because it impairs a vested
right under the Civil Code (i.e., a minor can file a recognition case within 4 years from
his attainment of majority). The SC agreed with the CA.
ISSUE: WON the complaint praying that Adrian be declared an acknowledged
illegitimate son of Fiscal Bernabe is already barred.
Ruling :
NO, Family Code cannot be given retroactive effect because it affects vested right. A
vested right is defined as: One which is absolute, complete and unconditional, to the
exercise of which no obstacle exists, and which is immediate and perfect in itself and
not dependent upon a contingency.
SC held that Article 285 of the Civil Code is a substantive law, as it gives Adrian the
right to file his petition for recognition within four years from attaining majority age.
Therefore, the Family Code cannot impair or take Adrian’s right to file an action for
recognition, because that right had already vested prior to its enactment.
27 Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation V. Stockholders of Intercity Savings
And Loan Bank, Inc.
FACTS
The Central Bank of the Philippines, now known as Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, filed
on June 17, 1987 with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati a Petition for
Assistance in the Liquidation of Intercity Savings and Loan Bank, Inc. (Intercity Bank)
alleging that, inter alia, said bank was already insolvent and its continuance in
business would involve probable loss to depositors, creditors and the general public.
26 BERNABE V. ALEJO
FACTS: On May 16, 1994, Carolina, in behalf of Adrian, filed a complaint praying that
Adrian be declared an acknowledged illegitimate son of Fiscal Bernabe and as such
he be given his share in Fiscal Bernabe’s estate, which is now being held by Ernestina
as the sole surviving heir.
Republic Act No. 9302 (RA 9302) was enacted, Section 12 of which provides - After
the payment of all liabilities and claims against the closed bank, the Corporation shall
pay any surplus dividends at the legal rate of interest, from date of takeover to date
of distribution, to creditors and claimants of the closed bank in accordance with legal
priority before distribution to the shareholders of the closed bank.
On August 8, 2005, relying on RA 9302, PDIC filed a Motion for Approval of the Final
Distribution of Assets and Termination of the Liquidation Proceedings.
ISSUE
Whether or not Section 12 of RA 9302 should be applied retroactively in order to
entitle Intercity Bank creditors to surplus dividends.
RULING
The Supreme Court held that statutes are prospective and not retroactive in their
operation, they being the formulation of rules for the future, not the past. Hence, the
legal maxim lex de futuro, judex de praeterito — the law provides for the future, the
judge for the past, which is articulated in Article 4 of the Civil Code: "Laws shall have
no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided."
The reason for the rule is the tendency of retroactive legislation to be unjust and
oppressive on account of its liability to unsettle vested rights or disturb the legal
effect of prior transactions. Further, a perusal of RA 9302 shows that nothing indeed
therein authorizes its retroactive application.
Ruling: No. The provisions of the Family Code (which took effect in 1987) cannot be
applied retroactively especially because they would impair the vested rights of Ofelia
under the Civil Code which was operational during her marriage with Reyes.
Article 40 of the Family Code which provides that: “The absolute nullity of a previous
marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final
judgment declaring such previous marriage void.” This means that before one can
enter into a second marriage he must first acquire a judicial declaration of the nullity
of the previous marriage and such declaration may be invoked on the basis solely of
a final judgment declaring the previous marriage as void.
29. R.B. MICHAEL PRESS and ANNALENE REYES ESCOBIA vs. NICASIO C. GALIT
FACTS
May 1, 1997, Nicasio Galit was employed by Michael Press to work as an
offset machine operator. Galit, during his time of employment, was tardy and mostly
absent without leave. On February 22, 1999, Galit was ordered to work overtime in
order to comply with a job order deadline but refused to do so. Galit came to work
the following day, February 23, 1999, but was told not to work, and to return later in
the afternoon for a hearing.
28 Ofelia P. Ty vs. The Court of Appeals, and Edgardo M. Reyes
Facts:
Respondent Edgardo M. Reyes married Anna Maria Regina Villanueva in a civil
ceremony on March 1977 and had a church wedding in August 1977. However, the
Juvenile and Domestic Relations court of Quezon city declared their marriage null
and void for lack of valid marriage license. But even before the decree was issued
nullifying his marriage to Anan Maria, the respondent wed Ofelia Ty on 1979.
In 1991, a respondent filed a civil case for nullity of his marriage to Ofelia Ty, arguing
that he was still married to Anna Maria at the time of the marriage.
he lower court however ruled in favor of private respondent Reyes which was
affirmed by the Court of Appeals applying provisions of the Art. 40 of the Family Code.
Issue: Whether or not the absolute nullity of the first marriage be invoked in the case
at bar?
February 24, 1999, Galit was terminated from his employment and was given a
termination letter and his two-day salary by petitioner, Annalene Reyes Escobia.
On October 29, 1999, a decision was rendered by the labor arbiter stating that the
defendants shall reinstate the petitioner to his former position without loss of
seniority rights and other benefits. CA affirmed the decision of the NLRC.
ISSUES
Whether or not the defendant is entitled to backwages and other benefits despite
not wanting to be reinstated? (NOTE : FAIR WARNING, WALA SA RULING ANG
SAGOT SA TANONG)
Ruling :
It can be inferred that respondent, without any lawyer or friend to counsel him, was
not given any chance at all to adduce evidence in his defense. At most, he was asked
if he did not agree to render overtime work on February 22, 1999 and if he was late
for work for 197 days. He was never given any real opportunity to justify his inability
to perform work on those days. This is the only explanation why petitioners assert
that respondent admitted all the charges.
In the February 24, 1999 notice of dismissal, petitioners simply justified respondent’s
dismissal by citing his admission of the offenses charged. It did not specify the details
surrounding the offenses and the specific company rule or Labor Code provision upon
which the dismissal was grounded.
30 Herrera v. Borromeo GR No. L-41171 (1987)
FACTS:
Fortunato Borromeo claimed by incorporating a Waiver of hereditary Rights, that he
is an illegitimate son of the deceased, Vito Borromeo, so he was entitled to a
legitimate equal in every case to four-fifths of the legitimate of an acknowledged
natural child.
The heirs of the disputed estates, including Alfonso and Amelinda B. Talam,
relinquished their shares in the Waiver of Hereditary Rights signed by various
individuals.
Petitioners argue that there can be no effective waiver of hereditary rights before
there has been a valid acceptance of the inheritance the heirs intend to transfer.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a Waiver of Hereditary Rights can be executed without a valid
acceptance from the heirs.
of the former. The right is vested, although conditioned upon the adjudication of the
corresponding hereditary portion.
In this case, the purported “Waiver of Hereditary Rights” cannot be considered to be
effective. For a waiver to exist, three elements are essential: (1) the existence of a
right; (2) the knowledge of the existence thereof; and (3) an intention to relinquish
such right. The signatories to the waiver document did not have the clear and
convincing intention to relinquish their rights.
31 Michael C. Guy vs. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 163707 September 15, 2006
Facts
:
Sima Wei, who died intestate in Makati City on October 29, 1992, leaving an estate
valued at P10,000,000.00 consisting of real and personal properties. Private
respondents-minors Karen Oanes Wei and Kamille Oanes Wei alleged that they are
the duly acknowledged illegitimate children of the late Sima Wei. His known heirs are
his surviving spouse Shirley Guy and children, Emy, Jeanne, Cristina, George and
Michael, all bearing the surname Guy.
Karen and Kamille Oanes Wei, represented by their mother Remedios, filed a petition
for letters of administration in Makati City, seeking a regular administrator for Sima
Wei's estate settlement.
In a Manifestation/Motion as Supplement to the Joint Motion to Dismiss, petitioner
and his co-heirs alleged that private respondents' claim had been paid, waived,
abandoned or otherwise extinguished by reason of Remedios' June 7, 1993 Release
and Waiver of Claim.
Issue
: Whether the Release and Waiver of Claim prevents the private
respondents from claiming their successional rights
Ruling :
RULING:
Yes. The prevailing jurisprudence on waiver of hereditary rights is that “the
properties included in an existing inheritance cannot be considered as belonging to
third persons with respect to the heirs, who by fiction of law continue the personality
No, as regards Remedios' Release and Waiver of Claim, the same does not bar private
respondents from claiming successional rights. To be valid and effective, a waiver
must be couched in clear and unequivocal terms which leave no doubt as to the
intention of a party to give up a right or benefit which legally pertains to him. A waiver
may not be attributed to a person when its terms do not explicitly and clearly evince
an intent to abandon a right.
RULING: No. HRCC had waived its right to rescind the Subcontract Agreement. The
right of rescission is statutorily recognized in reciprocal obligations.
In this case, the Supreme Court finds that there was no waiver of hereditary rights.
The Release and Waiver of Claim does not state with clarity the purpose of its
execution. It merely states that Remedios received P300,000.00 and an educational
plan for her minor daughters "by way of financial assistance and in full settlement of
any and all claims of whatsoever nature and kind x x x against the estate of the late
Rufino Guy Susim." Considering that the document did not specifically mention
private respondents' hereditary share in the estate of Sima Wei, it cannot be
construed as a waiver of successional rights.
Despite disputes, HRCC agreed to continue its obligations under the Subcontract
Agreement, effectively waiving its right to extrajudicially rescission. Therefore, HRCC
is deemed to have effectively waived its right to effect extrajudicial rescission of its
contract with FFCCI. Accordingly, HRCC, in the guise of rescinding the Subcontract
Agreement, was not justified in implementing a work stoppage.
33 Martinez v. Van Buskirk, 18 Phil. 79
Facts:
32 F.F. CRUZ & CO., INC VS HR CONSTRUCTION CORP
FACTS:
FFCCI entered into a contract with the DPWH sometime in 2004, for the construction
of the Magsaysay Viaduct, known as the Lower Agusan Development Project. On
August 9, 2004, FFCCI, in turn, entered into a Subcontract Agreement with HRCC for
the supply of materials, labor, equipment, tools and supervision for the construction
of a portion of the said project in accordance with the specifications of the main
contract.
HRCC will submit monthly progress billing to FFCCI, paid within 30 days. Joint
measurement with DPWH representatives and consultants. HRCC began construction
under the Subcontract Agreement.
Eventually, FFCCI didn’t pay HRCC the stated amount in its second and third billing
progress, claiming that it had already paid the latter for the completed works for the
period stated therein.
On September 1908, Carmen Ong de Martinez was riding in a carromata when a
delivery wagon owned by William Van Buskirk, to which a pair of horses were
attached, came along the street from the opposite direction at a great speed and
running over Martinez’s carromata thus severely wounding her head. Carmen Ong
Martinez sued William Van Buskirk due to the latter’s cochero’s negligence.
Van Buskirk argued that the cochero, a reliable and good servant, was responsible for
the accident by tying the horses' driving lines to the wagon.
The trial court found the defendant guilty of negligence due to the actions of his
cochero and gave judgment against him for P442.50, with interest thereon at the rate
of 6 per cent per annum from the 17th day October, 1908, and for the costs of the
action.
Whether or Not the defendant be liable for the negligence of his cochero?
Held:
HRCC completely ceased the construction of the subcontracted project and filed with
Construction Industry Arbitration Commission (CIAC) a complaint against FFCCI. CIAC
held a decision in favor of HRCC.
The CA denied FFCCI's petition for review, agreeing with CIAC that FFCCI waived its
right to require joint quantification of HRCC's completed works.
ISSUE: Whether the rescission of the Subcontract Agreement by HRCC was valid.
No. The Court ruled in favor of the defendant. According to Article 12 of the Civil
Code, a custom is a “rule of conduct formed by repetition of acts, uniformly observed
as a social rule, legally binding and obligatory.” The occurrence that transpired
therein was an accident resulted from an ordinary acts of life. It was held that the
cochero of the defendant was not negligent in leaving the horses in the manner
described by the evidence in this case and the manner was proved not unreasonable
or imprudent.
Acts that the performance of which has not proved destructive or injurious and which
have, therefore, been acquiesced in by society for so long a time that they have
ripened into custom, can not be held to be of themselves unreasonable or imprudent.
In fact, the very reason why they have been permitted by society is that they are
beneficial rather than prejudicial.
34 Magkalas v. National Housing
FACTS:
On March 26, 1978, PD No. 1315 was issued, expropriating certain lots at Bagong
Barrio, Caloocan City. The National Housing Authority (NHA) was named
administrator of the Bagong Barrio Urban Bliss Project. The decree also allowed NHA
to take possession, control, and disposition of the expropriated properties through
demolition.
During NHA‟s survey, it determined that Caridad Magkalas‟ (petitioner) property was
located in what would be classified as an area center or open space. The NHA wrote
a letter to Magkalas and two others to explain why they had to leave their lots.. But
even after losing the case in RTC, Magkalas did not dismantle her structure/home.
Magkalas appealed on the basis of social justice. She also questioned the implied
repeal of PD 1472 and PD 1315.
ISSUE: W/N Magkalas could use social justice as a basis to assert permanent
residency
RULING:
NO. Magkalas cannot use the argument of social justice in her case even if she has
lived in her lot for 40 years already. She argued that the Social Justice clause of the
Constitution provided that a “poor and unlettered urban dweller like her has a right
to her property and to a decent living”.
The Constitution, however, provides that such should still be in accordance with law.
The SC also said, “Social justice…should be used only to correct an injustice.
Furthermore, RA 7279 does not repeal PD No 1315 and PD 1472. Repeals by
implication are not factored as laws are presumed to be passed with deliberation and
full knowledge of all laws existing on the subject.
35 MAJOR GENERAL CARLOS F. GARCIA vs SANDIGANBAYAN and the OFFICE OF THE
OMBUDSMAN
Fact:
Petitioner was the Deputy Chief of Staff for Comptrollership of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines.
Petitioner argues in this Petition that the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over the
"civil action" for forfeiture of unlawfully acquired properties under R.A. No. 1379,
maintaining that such jurisdiction actually resides in the Regional Trial Courts as
provided under Sec. 2 of the law, and that the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan in
civil actions pertains only to separate actions for recovery of unlawfully acquired
property against President Marcos, his family, and cronies as can be gleaned from
Sec. 4 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1606, as amended, and Executive Orders
(E.O.) Nos. 14 and 14-A.
Issue:
Whether the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over petitions for Forfeiture under RA
No. 1379?
Ruling:
Yes, under RA No. 8249, the Sandiganbayan is vested with exclusive original
jurisdiction in all cases involving violations of R.A. No. 1379, entitled “An act declaring
forfeiture in favor of the state any property found to have been unlawfully acquired
by any public officer or employee and providing for the proceedings therefor.”
P.D. No. Decree No. 1486 was later issued vesting the Sandiganbayan with
jurisdiction over R.A. No. 1379 forfeiture proceedings. Sec. 12 of P.D. No. 1486 gave
the Chief Special Prosecutor the authority to file and prosecute forfeiture cases. This
may be taken as an implied repeal by P.D. No. 1486 of the jurisdiction of the former
Courts of First Instance and the authority of the Solicitor General to file a petition for
forfeiture
36. Republic vs. Marcopper Mining
Facts:
Respondent MMC was issued a temporary permit to operate a tailings sea disposal
system. The Calancan Bay Rehabilitation Project (CBRP) was established in
accordance with the OP directive, and MMC was tasked with remitting P30,000 daily
to the Ecology Trust Fund. MMC stopped discharging its tailings in the Bay, hence, it
likewise ceased from making further deposits to the ETF.
In an Order dated April 23, 1997, the Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB) ruled that
the obligation of MMC to deposit P30,000.00 per day to the ETF of the CBRP subsists.
The Court of Appeals ruled that the PAB's authority to issue an order against
environmental policy violations by mining operators was overstepped, as the Mining
Act repealed this power.
Issue:
Are the powers and functions of the (PAB) in RA No. 3931 as amended by PD 984 and
EO 192 repealed by the Mining Act (RA 7942)?
Ruling:
NO. From a careful reading of the foregoing provisions of law, the Supreme Court
held that the provisions of RA 7942 do not necessarily repeal RA 3931, as amended
by PD 984 and EO 192. RA 7942 does not contain any provision which categorically
and expressly repeals the provisions of the Pollution Control Law. Neither could there
be an implied repeal. It is well-settled that repeals of laws by implication are not
favored and that courts must generally assume their congruent application.
From the foregoing, it readily appears that the power of the mines regional director
does not foreclose PAB's authority to determine and act on complaints filed before
it. Thus, there is no genuine conflict between RA 7942 and RA 3931 as amended by
PD 984 that precludes their co-existence.
37 Ting v. Velez-Ting March 31, 2009
FActs:
Benjamin Ting (Petitioner) and Carmen Velez-Ting (Respondent) first met in 1972
while they were classmates in medical school. The two fell in love and got married on
July 26, 1975 in Cebu City. The couple has six (6) children.
On October 21, 1993, Carmen filed a verified petition before the RTC of Cebu City
praying for the declaration of nullity of their marriage based on Article 36 of the
Family Code. She claimed that Benjamin suffered from psychological incapacity.
During the trial, Carmen’s testimony regarding Benjamin’s drinking and gambling
habits and violent behavior was corroborated by Susana Wasawas, who served as
nanny to the spouses’ children from 1987 to 1992.
On January 9, 1998, the lower court rendered a decision declaring the marriage null
and void. It gave credence to Dr. Oñate findings. However, on appeal to the Court of
Appeals, the lower court’s decision was reversed since Dr. Oñate's conclusion was
based only on theories and not on established fact.
ISSUE :
Whether the CA's decision declaring the marriage between petitioner and
respondent null and void in accordance with law and jurisprudence.
Ruling :
No, the Case involving the application of Article 36 must be treated distinctly and
judged not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but
according to its own attendant facts. Courts should interpret the provision on a caseto-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in
psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals. Stare decisis is the
principle of following precedent and not disturbing settled matters. The Supreme
Court clarifies that expert opinions on psychological incapacity are advisable but not
indispensable in granting petitions for nullity of marriage.
38 Negros Navigation Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals
In April 1980, private respondent Ramon Miranda purchased from Negros Navigation
Co., Inc. four special cabin tickets for his wife, daughter, son, and niece who were
going to Bacolod city to attend a family reunion. The Tickets were for M/V Don Juan,
leaving Manila on April 22, 1980, wherein the ship sailed on schedule.
Don Juan collided with PNOC's M/T Tacloban City, causing the ship to sink, resulting
in several deaths but the four members of the private respondent were never found.
Petitioner, denied, that the four relatives of private respondents actually boarded the
vessel as shown by the fact that their bodies were never recovered.
On January 20, 1986, the PNOC and the petitioner, Negros Navigation, entered into
a compromise agreement whereby petitioner assumed full responsibility for
payment and satisfaction of all claims in connection with the collision and releasing
PNOC from any liability.
ISSUE:
Whether the crew liable of petitioner to be equally grossly negligent in the
performance of their duties, is binding in this case.
RULING:
The Court also ruled that adherence to the ruling in the previous case, Mecenas vs.
Court of Appeals, was necessary to maintain stability in jurisprudence and prevent
relitigation of the same issue. The evidence presented in this case was the same as
that presented in the Mecenas case. The Court further held that a shipowner may be
held liable for injuries to passengers if fault can be attributed to the shipowner,
despite the real and hypothecary nature of maritime law.
The Court based its decision on the principle of stare decisis, which dictates that a
previous decision on the same issue should be followed to maintain stability in
jurisprudence.
39. ROBERTO FULGENCIO, ET AL. v. NLRC, ET AL.
GR No. 141600 September 12, 2003
FACTS :
Raycor Aircontrol Systems, Inc. hired workers for air conditioning installations,
including the petitioners. They were dismissed in 1992, leading to illegal dismissal
cases. The NLRC initially dismissed the complaints but later ordered reinstatement
and full back wages. The Supreme Court confirmed this decision on September 9,
1996. A writ of execution was issued, and garnished funds were remitted to NLRC
The private respondent appealed, and the NLRC ruled on June 16, 1998: a) Backwages
not reduced by other earnings; b) Backwage calculation stopped on July 13, 1992,
when return-to-work was refused; c) Backwages based on 1992 wage rate; d) 13th
Month Pay awarded. A motion for reconsideration was denied. Petitioners appealed
to CA, which dismissed it outrightly on September 10, 1999.
ISSUE:
WON strict adherence to technicalities in the application of the provisions of the
Rules of Court impede the cause of justice.
HELD:
Yes. Application of provisions of the Rules of Court in a very rigid, technical sense
override substantial justice.
Nonetheless, SC resolved to give due course to the petition to avert a miscarriage of
justice. For judicial cases do not come and go through the portals of a court of law by
the mere mandate of technicalities. Where a rigid application of the rules will result
in a manifest failure or miscarriage of justice, technicalities should be disregarded in
order to resolve the case.
40 OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 146486
FACTS:
The case involves the interpretation of the Philippine Constitution regarding the
impeachment of a Deputy Ombudsman.
The case involves a complaint filed by 22 officials and employees of the Office of the
Deputy Ombudsman (OMB) for the Visayas against then Deputy Ombudsman for the
Visayas, Arturo Mojica, for sexual harassment, mulcting money, and oppression.
The Ombudsman proceeded to the OMB-Visayas office and installed an officer-incharge. The Ombudsman directed his Fact-Finding and Intelligence Bureau (FFIB) to
conduct an investigation, and the FFIB found strong evidence against Mojica.
In the case of Jarque vs. Desierto, it was ruled that the Ombudsman or his deputies
must first be removed from office via impeachment before they may be held to
answer for any wrong or misbehavior which may be proven against them in
disbarment proceedings. The said decision was subsequently made the basis of the
appellate court’s assailed Decision of 18 December 2000 following principle of
adherence to judicial precedents, otherwise known as the doctrine of Stare Decisis.
Issue:
Whether or not the Deputy Ombudsman is an impeachable official and whether or
not the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the criminal and administrative cases
against Mojica.
Ruling:
No, the Supreme Court declared that the Deputy Ombudsman is not an impeachable
official. The Supreme Court held that the Constitution, the deliberations thereon, and
the commentaries of noted jurists all indicate that a Deputy Ombudsman is not an
impeachable official.
In Raul M. Gonzales and Jarque v. Desierto do not tackle the impeachability of a
Deputy Ombudsman. Thus, where the issue involved was not raised nor presented
to the court and not passed upon by the court in the previous case, the decision in
the previous case is not stare decisis of the question presented.
41 Ayala Corporation VS Rosa-Diana Realty and Development Corporation
Facts:
The case involves a dispute between Ayala Corporation (petitioner) and Rosa-Diana
Realty and Development Corporation (respondent) regarding the construction of a
building on a lot in Salcedo Village, Makati.
Ayala Corporation sold the lot to the original vendees, Manuel Sy and Sy Ka Kieng, in
1976. The sale was subject to deed restrictions, which required the construction of a
building within one year. However, the original vendees failed to comply with this
obligation. Subsequently, they sold the lot to Rosa-Diana Realty and Development
Corporation. Ayala Corporation filed a case against Rosa-Diana for non-compliance
with the deed restrictions.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals acted in manner not in accord with law and the
applicable decisions of the Supreme Court in holding that the doctrine of the law of
the case, or stare decisis
Ruling:
Yes. The law of the case or stare decisis can be held to be applicable in the case at
bench. The pronouncement made by the Court of Appeals that Ayala is barred from
enforcing the deed of restrictions can only be considered as obiter dicta. The only
issue before the Court of Appeals at the time was the propriety of the annotation of
the lis pendens.
The appellate court went beyond the sole issue and made factual findings bereft of
any basis in the record to inappropriately rule that Ayala is in estoppel and has waived
its right to enforce the subject restrictions. The Supreme Court found that the Court
of Appeals made improper findings of estoppel and exceeded its jurisdiction.
42 Floresca vs. Philex Mining Corp. G.R. No. L-30642 April 30, 1985
Facts
This case involves a complaint for damages filed by the petitioners, who are the heirs
of five employees of Philex Mining Corporation who died in a cave-in incident. The
complaint alleges gross and reckless negligence on the part of Philex, resulting in the
death of the employees. The petitioners sought damages in the amount of P825,000.
In the present case, there exists between Philex and the deceased employees a
contractual relationship.
Issue
The main issue raised in the case is whether the petitioners can file a complaint for
damages under the Civil Code, despite having received compensation benefits under
the Workmen's Compensation Act.
Ruling
The court ruled that the petitioners can file a complaint for damages under the Civil
Code. The court explained that the petitioners did not invoke the provisions of the
Workmen's Compensation Act in their complaint, and instead alleged gross
negligence and deliberate failure on the part of Philex. The court held that the cause
of action in the complaint is a claim for damages under the Civil Code, not a
workmen's compensation claim.
Under the Workmen's Compensation Act, there is a presumption in favor of the
employee, while under the Civil Code, the claimants have the burden of proving the
causal relation between the defendant's negligence and the resulting injury. The
court ruled that the claimants are not precluded from bringing an action before the
regular courts, even if they have received benefits under the Workmen's
Compensation Act.
43. CESARIO URSUA v COURT OF APPEALS AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 112170 April 10, 1996
Facts:
The case involves Cesario Ursua, who was convicted by the Regional Trial Court of
Davao City for violating Commonwealth Act No. 142, as amended. Ursua, a
Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer, was asked by his lawyer to
obtain a copy of a complaint filed against him at the Office of the Ombudsman.
Instead of going to the office himself, Ursua asked his lawyer's messenger, Oscar
Perez, to deliver the letter. However, Perez was unable to do so, and Ursua decided
to go to the office himself. Before going, Ursua spoke to Perez and expressed his
reluctance to personally ask for the document. Perez assured him that he could sign
Perez's name if required to acknowledge receipt of the complaint. When Ursua
arrived at the Office of the Ombudsman, he introduced himself as "Oscar Perez" and
was given a copy of the complaint, which he acknowledged by writing the name
"Oscar Perez." It was later discovered that Ursua had used the name "Oscar Perez"
instead of his own name.
The petitioner has never been known as "Oscar Perez" and that he only used such
name on one occasion and it was with the express consent of Oscar Perez himself.
Issue
Is Cesario Ursua in violation of Sec. 1 of C.A. No. 142 as amended by R.A. No. 6085,
otherwise known as "An Act to Regulate the Use of Aliases"?
Ruling
No, an alias is a name or names used by a person or intended to be used by him
publicly and habitually usually in business transactions in addition to his real name
by which he is registered at birth or baptized the first time or substitute name
authorized by a competent authority.
While the act of petitioner may be covered by other provisions of law, such does not
constitute an offense within the concept of C.A. No. 142 as amended under which he
is prosecuted. The confusion and fraud in business transactions which the anti-alias
law and its related statutes seek to prevent are not present here as the circumstances
are peculiar and distinct from those contemplated by the legislature in enacting C.A.
No. 142 as amended.
44. In the Matter of the Petition for Authority to Continue Use of The Firm Name
“Ozaeta, Romulo, De Leon, Mabanta, Jr., Jose Ma, Jesus S.J. Sayoc, Eduardo De Los
Angeles, And Jose F, Buenaventura, G.R. No. X92-1, July 30, 1979
Facts
Surviving partners of Atty. Herminio Ozaeta who died on February 14, 1976 filed a
petition to the court praying they would be allowed to continue using in the names
of their firms the name of a partner who passed away. The petitioners supported
their petitions based on “Canon 33 of the Canons of Professional Ethics American Bar
Association”.
Issue
Will the court still allow the petitioners to use the surname of their deceased partner.
Whether or not there were local customs that prohibits the continued use of a
deceased partner’s name in a professional firm’s name.
Ruling
The court denied the petitioners and advised them to drop the name of the deceased
partner, however they can still be included in the listing of individuals who have been
partners in their firms indicating the years during which they served as such.
Courts take no judicial notice of custom. A custom must be proved as a fact, according
to the rules of evidence. A local custom as a source of right cannot be considered by
a court of justice unless such custom is properly established by competent evidence
like any other fact.
The possibility of deception upon the public, real or consequential, where the name
of a deceased partner continues to be used cannot be ruled out. A person in search
of legal counsel might be guided by the familiar ring of a distinguished name
appearing in a firm title.
45 Yao Kee vs. Sy Gonzales G.R. No. L-55960 November 24, 1988
Facts
This case involves a dispute over the estate of Sy Kiat, a Chinese national who died in
the Philippines. Aida Sy-Gonzales, Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy-Bernabe, and Rodolfo Sy
filed a petition for letters of administration, claiming to be the acknowledged natural
children of Sy Kiat with Asuncion Gillego.
On the other hand, Yao Kee, Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai Cho, and Sy Chun Yen opposed
the petition, asserting that Yao Kee is the lawful wife of Sy Kiat and that Sze Sook
Wah, Sze Lai Cho, and Sy Chun Yen are the legitimate children of Yao Kee and Sy Kiat.
The probate court ruled in favor of the oppositors, finding that Sy Kiat was legally
married to Yao Kee. On appeal, the Court of Appeals modified the decision of the
probate court. It declared Aida Sy-Gonzales, Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy-Bernabe, and
Rodolfo Sy as the acknowledged natural children of Sy Kiat with Asuncion Gillego, but
the validity of their parents' marriage was not proven according to the laws of China.
Issue
Whether the marriage of Sy Kiat and Yao Kee was proven valid according to Chinese
law.
Ruling :
No, the Supreme COurt held that the marriage of Sy Kiat and Yao Kee was not proven
valid according to Chinese law. It also affirmed the declaration of Aida Sy-Gonzales,
Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy-Bernabe, and Rodolfo Sy as the acknowledged natural
children of Sy Kiat with Asuncion Gillego.
The court found that while the petitioners presented evidence to prove the fact of
marriage between Sy Kiat and Yao Kee, they failed to establish the validity of the
marriage according to Chinese law. To recognize a foreign marriage, two things must
be proven: the existence of the foreign law and the alleged foreign marriage. In this
case, the petitioners failed to present competent evidence regarding the Chinese law
on marriage.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE vs. PRIMETOWN PROPERTY GROUP, INC.
FACTS:
On April 14, 1998 Primetown Property Group. Inc. filed its final adjusted return. On
March 11, 1999 Gilbert Yap, vice chair of Primetown Property Group. Inc., filed for
the refund or tax credit of income tax paid in 1997. However, it was not acted upon.
Thus, Primetown filed a petition for review but the Court of Tax Appeals dismissed it
claiming that it was filed beyond the two-year reglementary period provided by
section 229 of the National Internal Revenue Code.
The Court of Tax Appeals further argued that in National Marketing Corp. vs. Tecson
the Supreme Court ruled that a year is equal to 365 days regardless of whether it is a
regular year or a leap year.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the respondent’s petition was filed within the two-year reglementary
period.
RULING:
The Supreme Court held that the petition was filed within the two-year reglementary
period because Article 13 of the New Civil Code that provides that a year is composed
of 365 years is repealed by Executive Order 292 or the Administrative Code of the
Philippines. Under Executive Order 292, a year is composed of 12 calendar months.
47 PEOPLE v. Paz M. Del Rosario
G.R. No. L-7234, May 21, 1955
FACTS:
July 27, 1953 – an information was filed charging Paz. M. del Rosario with slight
physical injuries committed on the 28th day of May 1953.
The accused presented a motion to quash the information on the ground that the
offense charged had already prescribed in accordance with the provisions of Articles
90 and 91 of the RPC.
The pertinent provisions of Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code are as follows:
Article 91. Computation of prescription of offenses. – The period of prescription shall
commence to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended
party, the authorities, or their agents, . . . …
ISSUE:
Whether or not the offense charged to the plaintiff-appellant had already prescribed.
RULING:
No. The information was filed on July 27, 1953 and the offense had not yet prescribed
because July 27 is the sixtieth day from May 29. The provision in the Revised Penal
Code does not provide the computation of the month thus it must be supplied by
Article 13 of the Civil Code to determine the length of the two-month period required
for the prescription of the offense. According to Article 13 of the Civil Code, a month
is a 30-day month not the solar or civil month. Its provision (of the said Art. 13)
contained in paragraph 3 that reads “In computing a period, the first day shall be
excluded, and the last day included” should also be applied, thus, the information
should be considered as filed on the 60th day and not the 61st day after the offense
has been committed.
48 NAMARCO v. Tecson (G.R. No. L-29131 dated August 27, 1969)
FACTS:
The National Marketing Corporation (NAMARCO), successor of the Price Stabilization
Corporation (PSC), the plaintiff, filed a complaint on December 21, 1965 which was
docketed as Civil Case no. 63701.
On November 14, 1955, the Court of First Instance of Manila rendered a judgment in
Civil Case No. 20520, ordering Tecson and Alto Surety and Insurance Co., Inc. to pay
NMC the sum of P7,200.00 plus interest, attorney's fees, and costs.
The judgment became final on December 21, 1955, and a copy of the decision was
served on the defendants on November 21, 1955. On December 21, 1965, NMC filed
a complaint for the revival of the judgment. Tecson moved to dismiss the complaint,
arguing that it was filed two days too late and had prescribed. The lower court
dismissed the complaint on the ground of prescription.
Issue:
The main issue in the case is whether the action for the revival of judgment filed by
NMC is barred by the statute of limitations.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's dismissal of the complaint. The action
for the revival of judgment was filed on December 21, 1965, exactly ten years after
the judgment became final. However, the court found that the aggregate of ten years
or 3,650 days from December 21, 1955, expired on December 19, 1965, taking into
account the leap years of 1960 and 1964. The court held that the action was barred
by prescription.
The court also referred to Article 13 of the Civil Code, which limits the connotation of
each "year" to 365 days. The court rejected NMC's argument that a calendar year
should be used as the basis of computation, as it would contravene the explicit
provision of Article 13.
49 Barreto-Gonzales v. Gonzales, 58 Phil. 67 , March 7, 1933
Facts:
Plaintiff and defendant, Philippine Islands citizens, married in Manila in 1919. They
lived together until 1926, voluntarily separated, and have not remarried since then.
Shortly after agreement for mutual support, the husband left the Islands, betook
himself to Reno, Nevada, and secured in that jurisdiction an absolute divorce on the
ground of desertion, which decree was dated November 28, 1927. Shortly thereafter
the defendant moved to California and returned to these Islands in August 1928,
where he has since remained
After his return his wife brought action in the Court of First Instance of Manila
requesting that the courts of the Philippine Islands confirm and ratify the decree of
divorce issued by the courts of the State of Nevada; that section 9 of Act No. 2710,
which reads as follows:
The decree of divorce shall dissolve the community of property as soon as such
decree becomes final, but shall not dissolve the bonds of matrimony until one year
thereafter.
The bonds of matrimony shall not be considered as dissolved with regard to the
spouse who, having legitimate children, has not delivered to each of them or to the
guardian appointed by the court, within said period of one year, xx
Issue:
Whether the divorce decree obtained in Nevada is valid
Ruling :
No.
The public policy in this jurisdiction on the question of divorce is clearly set forth in
Act No. 2710, and the decisions of this court.
it is therefore a serious question whether any foreign divorce, relating to citizens of
the Philippine Islands, will be recognized in this jurisdiction, except it be for a cause,
and under conditions for which the courts of the Philippine Islands would grant a
divorce.
The judgment of the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila must therefore be
reversed and defendant absolved from the demands made against him in this action
50 Testate Estate of Joseph G. Brimo, JUAN MICIANO, administrator, petitionerappellee, vs. ANDRE BRIMO, opponent-appellant.
Facts:
Joseph Brimo is a Turkish national, deceased with multiple properties in the
Philippines.
Andre Brimo, one of the brothers of the deceased, opposed the scheme of partition
filed by the judicial administrator, Juan Miciano.
The last part of the second clause of the deceased’s will says that the late Joseph
Brimo wishes for the laws of the Philippines be used in settling the distribution of his
estate instead of the laws that apply to him as a Turkish national. He imposes a
condition that any disposition favorable to whomsoever that does not respect this
condition shall be made null and void.
The appellant, Andre Brimo, did not present any evidence showing what the Turkish
laws are on the matter nor its differences with Philippine Laws, and in the absence of
evidence on such laws, they are presumed to be the same as those of the Philippines.
Issue/s: The partition of the estate left by the deceased Joseph G. Brimo is in question
in this case. Whether or not the deceased’s brother (the appellant), Andre Brimo
should be granted part of the partition of the estate
Ruling:
The court ruled that Andre Brimo shall be included in the distribution of the estate of
the deceased Joseph J. Brimo as one of the legatees.
The condition in the last part of the second clause of Joseph Brimo’s will is contrary
to law, because it expressly ignores the testator's national law when, according to
article 10 of the civil Code above quoted, such national law of the testator is the one
to govern his testamentary dispositions.
51 Llorente v. Court of Appeals
Gr No. 124371 / November 23, 2000
Lorenzo Llorente and petitioner Paula Llorente were married in 1937 in the
Philippines. Lorenzo was an enlisted serviceman of the US Navy from 1927 to 1957.
Before the Pacific War, Lorenzo left the Philippines for the US, becoming a US citizen
in 1943. In 1945, he found Paula living with Ceferino Llorente and had a child. He filed
for divorce in 1951.
Lorenzo returned to the Philippines and married Alicia F. Llorente, who had three
children. After Lorenzo's death in 1985, Paula filed a letter of administration over
Llorente's estate. Alicia appealed to the trial court, which affirmed and modified the
decision, declaring her co-owner of any properties acquired during their 25-year
cohabitation.
ISSUE: Whether or not the National Law shall apply.
Lorenzo Llorente was already an American citizen when he divorced Paula. Also, he
was an American citizen when he married Alicia and executed his Last Will and
Testament. As stated in Article 15 of the civil code, aliens may obtain divorces abroad,
provided that they are required in their National Law. The divorce obtained by
Llorente is valid because the law that governs him is not Philippine Law but his
National Law. Divorce is allowed in his National Law.
52 Bellis vs. Bellis G.R. No. L-23678 June 6, 1967
Amos G. Bellis, a US citizen, had five legitimate children with his first wife, Marry E.
Mallens, three legitimate children with his second wife, Violet Kennedy, and three
illegitimate children with Violet Kennedy.
Amos G. Bellis, in 1952, executed a will in the Philippines, distributing his estate to
his first wife, Mary E. Mallen, and distributing the remaining amount to his
illegitimate children, with the remainder distributed equally to his surviving wives'
legitimate children.
Amos G. Bellis's will was executed in 1958, but Maria Cristina and Miriam Palma Bellis
filed oppositions, claiming they were denied their entitled legitimes under Philippine
law.
ISSUE: Whether the Philippine law or the Texas law should apply in the instant case.
Ruling:
Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render applicable the national law
of the decedent, in intestate or testamentary successions, with regard to four items:
(a) the order of succession; (b) the amount of successional rights; (e) the intrinsic
validity of the provisions of the will; and (d) the capacity to succeed.
The illegitimate children were denied their legitimes due to Texas law's provision that
there are no compulsory heirs and thus no legitimes.
53 Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank vs. Escolin G.R. No. L-27860 March 29,
1974
Facts:
Linnie Jane Hodges, a married Texas citizen, was a domiciliary of the Philippines at
the time of her death. Her will was valid for her husband, but the laws of Texas at the
time of her death were debated, with some arguing renvoi and others stating no
renvoi.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Texas law should apply.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that what the Texas law contained at the time of Jane
Hodges’ death is a question of fact to be resolved by the evidence that would be
presented in the probate court. At the time of her death, Texas law governs, thus, it
would be the law to be applied (and not said law at any other time).
54. NORMA A. DEL SOCORRO, FOR AND IN BEHALF OF HER MINOR CHILD RODERIGO
NORJO VAN WILSEM v. ERNST JOHAN BRINKMAN VAN WILSEM G.R. No. 193707,
December 10, 2014
Facts:
Petitioner Norma A. Del Socorro and respondent Ernst Van Wilsem contracted
marriage in Holland on September 25, 1990. They were blessed with a son named
Roderigo Norjo Van Wilsem who at the time of the filing of the instant petition was
sixteen (16) years of age.
The marriage between Norma and her son ended due to a Divorce Decree in Holland,
and they returned to the Philippines. Ernst promised to provide monthly support to
their son but failed to do so. Van Wilsem remarried in Pinamungahan, Cebu, and
established Paree Catering with his new wife.
Norma filed a complaint against Ernst for violating R.A. No. 9262, alleging his unjust
refusal to provide support for his minor child with the petitioner.
ISSUE:
Does a foreign national have an obligation to support his minor child under Philippine
law?
Ruling:
Yes. Ernst argued that he is not obligated to support his son, but he failed to prove
this. It is crucial for Ernst to prove that the Netherlands' national law does not impose
parental support. The respondent's inability to prove the Netherlands' national law
in his favor leads to the doctrine of processual presumption, where courts presume
foreign law is the same as local or domestic law.
Moreover, foreign law should not be applied when its application would work
undeniable injustice to the citizens or residents of the forum.
55 Kazuhiro Hasegawa and Nippon Engineering Consultants Co., Ltd Vs. Minoru
Kitamura
G.R. No. 149177 | November 23, 2007
FACTS:
Nippon Engineering Consultants is a Japanese consultancy firm that offers technical
and management support for infrastructure projects involving Filipino nationals
permanently residing in the Philippines.
Kitamaru was hired by Nippon for a year to manage the Southern Tagalog Access
Road project. Nippon later engaged Kitamaru for the Bongabon-Baler Road
Improvement project. However, Nippon's General Manager Hasegawa announced
that Kitamaru's services would only be retained until the STAR project's completion.
Kitamaru demanded assignment to BBRI project, while Nippon claimed his contract
expired. Kitamaru filed for specific performance and damages, while Nippon claimed
the ICA was Japanese-perfected and could only be heard in Japan's proper courts,
following lex loci celebrationis & lex contractus.
The CA ruled that the principle of lex loci celebrationis was not applicable to the case,
it held that the RTC was correct in applying the principle of lex loci solutionis…
Issue: Whether or not contracts executed outside the country by foreign nationals
may be assailed on the principles of lex loci celebrationis, lex contractus and the
"state of the most significant relationship rule."
Ruling :
The Supreme Court rules that invoking these grounds is invalid. Lex loci celebrationis
relates to the "law of the place of the ceremony"63 or the law of the place where a
contract is made.. The doctrine of lex contractus or lex loci contractus means the "law
of the place where a contract is executed or to be performed."
When a foreign conflict case is brought before a court in our jurisdiction, they have
three options: dismiss the case due to lack of jurisdiction, assume jurisdiction and
apply the forum's internal law, or consider the law of another state. SC held that RTC
and CA correctly assailed that jurisdiction are inappropriate, the trial and appellate
courts correctly denied the petitioners’ motion to dismiss.
56. Pastor B. Tenchavez vs. Vicenta F. Escaño
Facts:
In front of a Catholic chaplain, Pastor and Vicenta got married in secret. After learning
of their daughter's marriage, Mamerto and Mena's spouses went to the priest for
guidance, and the priest recommended that the marriage be remarried.
Nevertheless, the reception was canceled, and the couple gradually drifted apart.
Vicenta later traveled to the US without Pastor knowing.
There, she filed a divorce complaint alleging severe mental mistreatment, and the
Court of Nevada granted her an unconditional divorce. Later on, she asked the
Archbishop of Cebu to declare her marriage null and void. Vicenta later became a
citizen of the United States and married an American in Nevada.
Issue:
Whether or not the divorce obtained by Vicenta abroad was valid and binding in the
Philippines;
Ruling:
No. The Court held that under Philippine law, the valid marriage between Tenchavez
and Escaño remained subsisting and undissolved notwithstanding the decree of
absolute divorce that the wife sought and obtained in Nevada. Article 15 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines which was already in force at the time expressly provided that
“Laws relating to family rights and duties or to the status, condition and legal capacity
of persons are binding upon the citizens of the Philippines, even though living
abroad.” Here, at the time the divorce decree was issued, Vicenta, like her husband,
was still a Filipino citizen. She was then still subject to Philippine law, which does not
admit absolute divorce. Thus, under Philippine law, the divorce was invalid.
57. Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, vs. Hon. Corona Ibay-Somera
Facts:
Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipino woman married to German Erich Geiling, filed
two adultery complaints after their divorce, alleging she had an affair with two men.
The petitioner argued that the court lacks jurisdiction to decide adultery charges, as
the complainant, a foreigner, cannot be prosecuted de officio due to a final divorce
decree.
Issue:
Whether or not an alien spouse has legal standing to file a complaint for adultery
after obtaining a divorce decree
Ruling:
No, An alien spouse cannot file a complaint for adultery after obtaining a divorce
decree, as adultery cannot be prosecuted without a sworn complaint. The initiator
must have the necessary status or representation to initiate the action. However, a
divorce granted can have no legal effect on the prosecution of the criminal
proceedings.
58. Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio, vs. Republic Of The Philippines
Facts:
Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio, a transsexual male, sought gender reassignment in
Bangkok, Thailand, resulting in a female body. In 2002, he filed a petition for the
change of his first name and sex in his birth certificate to marry his American fiancé.
The Manila RTC granted the petition, stating it was based on equity and would bring
happiness and realization of their dreams. However, the OSG filed a petition for
certiorari, which was reversed by the CA.
Issue:
Whether or not the entries pertaining to sex and first name in the birth certificate
may be changed on the ground of gender reassignment.
Ruling:
No, Silverio's birth certificate identifies him as male, as there is no legal recognition
for sex reassignment. The sex determination at birth, done by a birth attendant, is
immutable if not attended by error, as there is no law supporting such a change.
59. Orion Savings Bank, vs. Shigekane Suzuki
Facts:
Kang owned Unit No. 536 and Parking Slot No. 42 in 2003, but the mortgage was
canceled, the alleged Dacion en Pago was not annotated, Orion only paid capital gains
tax and documentary stamp tax, Parking Slot No. 42 was never mortgaged, and Suzuki
obtained possession of the titles.
Issues: Whether or not Korean Law should be applied in conveying the conjugal
property of spouses Kang?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Suzuki, stating that Suzuki was an innocent
purchaser for value whose rights over the properties prevailed over Orion's. The
court found that Orion failed to prove the South Korean law on conjugal ownership
of property, as the certification did not qualify as sufficient proof. The International
Law doctrine of presumed-identity approach or processual presumption was applied,
as under Philippine Law, the phrase "Yung Sam Kang Married to' Hyun Sook Jung" is
merely descriptive of Kang's civil status. The court also found no reason to declare
Kang's conveyance invalid for the supposed lack of spousal consent. The petitioner
failed to adduce sufficient evidence to prove the due execution of the Dacion en
Pago.
remanded back to the RTC. Meanwhile, Maria Carmen obtained a divorce decree
from a court in Hamburg-Blankenese. She moved to dismiss the case in the RTC,
which was granted. However, Wolfgang Roehr filed for partial reconsideration,
seeking resolution on child custody and property distribution issues. The RTC judge
partially set aside the dismissal order. Maria Carmen argued lack of jurisdiction and
grave abuse of discretion by the RTC judge.
60. In The Matter Of Testate Estate Of The Deceased Edward E. Christiansen
Issue: Whether or not can the courts take cognizance of the custody issue of the
children.
Facts:
Edward Christensen was born in New York but migrated to California where he
resided. Later, the Philippines became his domicile until the time of his death. In his
will, he acknowledged Maria Lucy Christensen as his only heir but left a legacy of sum
of money to Maria Helen Christensen. Helen posits that California law is clear that
the matter is referred back to the law of the domicile and therefore Philippine Law is
applicable. Lucy contends that the national law of the deceased must apply hence
Helen is not compulsory heir and so Edward could freely dispose his property.
Issue:
Which is the relevant law insofar as the amount of successional rights of Helen and
Lucy are concerned?
Ruling:
Yes. In summary, the divorce obtained abroad is recognized in the Philippines.
However, the issue of child custody, not addressed in the foreign divorce decree,
must be determined by Philippine courts. The petitioner was not adequately
represented in the foreign proceedings, and the court emphasizes the importance of
ensuring the best interests of the children in deciding custody matters. Therefore,
the Philippine court is deemed correct in setting a hearing to determine parental
custody, care, support, and education for the children involved.
62.
Ruling:
It is ultimately the Philippine Law. The California law has two rules on the matter. The
internal law which should apply to Californians domiciled in California and the
conflicts rule which should apply to Californians domiciled outside of California.
Edward being domiciled outside California (in the Philippines) follows that the law of
his domicile. The validity of the provisions of his will depriving his acknowledged
natural child, Helen, should be governed by the Philippine law in determining the
successional rights of Helen.
61.
Wolfgang O. Roehr vs Maria Carmen D. Rodriguez
G.R. No. 142820, June 20, 2003
Facts:
Maria Carmen D. Rodriguez filed for the nullity of her marriage with Wolfgang O.
Roehr in the RTC of Makati City. The case went to the Court of Appeals but was
Roel P. Gaspi vs Hon. Judge Maria Clarissa
G.R. No. 229010, November 23, 2020
Facts:
The case involves the petition for the approval of Luz Gaspe Lipson's will and the
issuance of letters testamentary. Despite her temporary residence in Iriga City, the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) dismissed the probate petition, asserting lack of
jurisdiction and suggesting that the will should be probated in the United States,
Lipson's country of citizenship. Roel P. Gaspi, the designated executor, filed a motion
for reconsideration after the initial dismissal, but it was denied by the RTC.
Issue: Whether or not the Philippine court have jurisdiction over an alien’s will
executed in the Philippines, even if it had not yet been probated before the alien
decedent’s national court.
Ruling:
Yes. The nationality principle is not applied when determining the extrinsic validity
of an alien’s last will and testament. Generally, the extrinsic validity of the will, which
is the preliminary issue in probate of wills, is governed by the law of the country
where the will was executed and presented for probate. When it comes to the form
and solemnities of wills, which are part of its extrinsic validity, the Civil Code provides
that the law of the country of execution shall govern.
accounting was unnecessary. Time Realty retained properties as security for PNTC's
unsettled obligations. PNTC failed to prove that premises' condition wasn't due to its
actions. The court computed sums owed based on Time Realty's Statement of
Account, adjusting interest rates. Unpaid rentals' interest was reduced to 1% per
month, and a 6% per annum legal interest was imposed on service charges. Time
Realty was awarded attorney's fees, totaling 20% of counterclaims, subject to a 6%
per annum interest until full payment.
64.
63.
PNTC Colleges, Inc. vs Time Realty, Inc.
G.R. No. 219698, September 27, 2021
Facts:
PNTC Colleges, Inc. leased a property from Time Realty, Inc. The lease was initially
from 2005 to 2007, but it was impliedly renewed monthly after the initial term. Time
Realty later informed PNTC that it would not extend the lease on the fourth floor and
offered two options. PNTC chose to terminate the lease on the fourth floor and move
to a new site. Time Realty alleged that PNTC had unpaid charges and withheld PNTC's
properties as security. PNTC filed a complaint for the delivery of personal properties,
but the Regional Trial Court (RTC) dismissed it, stating that PNTC violated the lease
by vacating without settling obligations. The RTC allowed Time Realty to seize PNTC's
properties. The Court of Appeals (CA) later reversed the RTC's decision, ordering
PNTC to pay unpaid rentals, utilities, restoration expenses, and attorney's fees. PNTC
appealed to the Supreme Court, challenging the CA's decision and the payment
order.
Issue: Whether or not Time Realty’s counterclaims should be granted.
Ruling:
Yes. PNTC admitted liability and did not contest Time Realty's counterclaims. The
court rejected PNTC's argument of unjust enrichment and found that prior
Albenson Enterprises Corp., et. Al. vs Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 88694, January 11, 1993
Facts:
Albenson Enterprises Corporation, Jesse Yap, and Benjamin Mendiona delivered mild
steel plates to Guaranteed Industries, Inc. and received a check as payment. The
check bounced due to "Account Closed," and the petitioners traced it to Eugenio S.
Baltao, the president of Guaranteed. Baltao denied issuing the check, claiming
Guaranteed was defunct. The petitioners filed a complaint for violating the Bouncing
Checks Law. Later, it was discovered there was a namesake, Eugenio Baltao III, who
managed a business at the same address. The Provincial Fiscal filed a case, but Baltao
claimed he wasn't heard, leading to a reinvestigation where he was exonerated.
Despite this, Baltao filed a civil case against the petitioners for malicious prosecution,
seeking damages and attorney's fees.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner are liable for damages for malicious prosecution.
Ruling:
No. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the petitioners and held that they cannot be
held liable for damages for malicious prosecution. The statement asserts that for a
case to constitute malicious prosecution, there must be clear proof of a sinister intent
to vex and humiliate, along with deliberate initiation of false charges. Mere
negligence in determining liability does not constitute bad faith, and an innocent
mistake, such as proceeding against the wrong individual, does not warrant damages.
The absence of evidence for wanton or fraudulent behavior precludes the award of
exemplary damages, and attorney's fees are not justified without proof of malicious
prosecution. Additionally, the right to litigate is considered precious, and damages
cannot be awarded without proof of loss.
supply would be disconnected. The electric service was reconnected later that day.
The Quisumbing spouses filed a complaint for damages against Meralco, alleging that
they were not given ample opportunity to dispute the alleged meter tampering.
65.
ISSUE:
Whether Meralco had the authority to immediately disconnect the Quisumbing's
electric supply based on the alleged meter tampering
Nikko Hotel Manila Garden and Ruby Lim vs Roberto Reyes
G.R. No. 154259, February 28, 2005
Facts:
This case involves a dispute between the petitioner, Ruby Lim, and the respondent,
Antonio Reyes, also known as "Amay Bisaya," over an incident that occurred at a
party held at the Hotel Nikko Manila Garden. The incident took place on October 13,
1994, when Lim, who was the banquet manager of the hotel, approached Reyes, who
was not invited to the party, and asked him to leave. Reyes refused to leave and was
eventually escorted out of the party by the police.
Issue: Whether or not Lim acted abusively in asking Reyes to leave the party and if
Hotel Nikko can be held liable for damages.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Lim and Hotel Nikko, affirming the decision of
the trial court. The Court held that Lim's actions were within her rights as the banquet
manager of the hotel and that there was no evidence of any ill-motive on her part.
The Court explained that the principles of abuse of rights and acts contra bonus
mores, as stated in Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code, require intentional acts that
are contrary to morals, good customs, or public policy. In this case, there was no
evidence to show that Lim acted with animosity or intent to injure Reyes. Therefore,
Lim and Hotel Nikko cannot be held liable for damages under Articles 19 and 21.
66.
FACTS:
This case involves a complaint for damages filed by spouses Antonio and Lorna
Quisumbing against the Manila Electric Company (Meralco). During a routine
inspection at the Quisumbing's house, Meralco inspectors discovered that the
electric meter had been tampered with. They detached the meter and brought it to
their laboratory for verification. After confirming the tampering, Meralco informed
the Quisumbing spouses that unless they paid the differential billing, their electric
RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled that Meralco did not have the authority to immediately
disconnect the electric supply without the presence of an officer of the law or an
authorized representative of the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB) during the discovery
of the alleged tampering. The law requires that the discovery of illegal use of
electricity must be personally witnessed and attested to by an officer of the law or
an authorized ERB representative.
67.
FACTS:
The case involves a law student named Romeo A. Jader who filed a lawsuit against
the University of the East (UE) for damages. Jader had received an incomplete grade
in his Practice Court I and took a removal exam for the same. However, he was not
informed that he had failed the exam and was included in the list of graduates. As a
result, Jader enrolled in a pre-bar review class but later learned of his deficiency and
was unable to take the bar examinations.
ISSUE:
Whether an educational institution can be held liable for damages for misleading a
student into believing that they have satisfied all the requirements for graduation
when this is not the case
RULING:
The court held that the school had a contractual obligation to inform and provide
sufficient notice to each student regarding their academic status and whether they
had completed all the requirements for graduation. The court also noted that the
school had exclusive control over the professors and teachers, and it was their
responsibility to ensure compliance with the school's rules and regulations.
68.
FACTS:
The case involves a motion for reconsideration filed by the defendant-appellant,
Francisco X. Velez, regarding the decision of the court promulgated on December 26,
1964. The defendant raises the issue of the validity of his affidavit of merits, which
was attached to his petition for relief in the lower court. The affidavit of merits states
that the defendant has a valid defense, claiming that his failure to marry the plaintiff,
Beatriz P. Wassmer, as scheduled was due to a fortuitous event and/or circumstances
beyond his control. The defendant argues that his affidavit of merits contains positive
and categorical statements of a valid defense, unlike previous rulings of the court
that invalidated affidavits of merits that disclosed no defense.
ISSUE:
Whether the defendant's affidavit of merits is valid, considering that it only contains
conclusions of fact and fails to provide specific details or facts regarding the
fortuitous event and circumstances that constitute his defense.
RULING:
The court denies the motion for reconsideration and affirms that the defendant's
affidavit of merits is not valid. The court emphasizes that it is the court's role, not the
defendant's, to form opinions and draw conclusions based on the facts provided in
the affidavit. The defendant's affidavit leaves the court guessing as to the facts, and
therefore, it is not valid. The court reiterates that the purpose of an affidavit of merits
is to avoid wasting the court's time, and vague or general statements do not serve
this purpose.
69.
FACTS:
The petitioner, Francisco Hermosisima, appealed a decision of the Court of Appeals
that modified the decision of the Court of First Instance of Cebu. The case involved a
complaint filed by Soledad Cagigas, who sought the acknowledgment of her child as
the natural child of the petitioner, as well as support for the child and moral damages
for breach of promise to marry. The petitioner admitted paternity but denied ever
promising to marry the complainant. The court ordered the petitioner to pay alimony
pendente lite, which was later reduced. The court ultimately rendered a decision
declaring the child as the petitioner's natural daughter and ordering him to pay
support, actual and compensatory damages, moral damages, and attorney's fees. On
appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision but increased the actual and
compensatory damages and moral damages.
ISSUE:
Whether moral damages are recoverable for breach of promise to marry under
Philippine laws.
RULING:
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals, except for the
award of moral damages. The court held that the clear and manifest intent of
Congress was not to sanction actions for breach of promise to marry. Therefore, the
award of moral damages made by the lower court was untenable.
70.
FACTS:
The case involves a petition for review on certiorari filed by Amelita Constantino and
her son Michael Constantino against Ivan Mendez. Amelita filed a complaint seeking
acknowledgment, support, and damages from Ivan, alleging that they had a sexual
relationship and that Ivan is the father of her son. The trial court initially ruled in favor
of Amelita, ordering Ivan to acknowledge the child, provide support, and pay
damages.
ISSUE:
Whether Amelita has proven by clear and convincing evidence that Ivan is the father
of her child, and whether she is entitled to damages based on their sexual
relationship.
RULING:
The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the Court of Appeals, dismissing the
complaint filed by Amelita and her son against Ivan. The Court agreed with the Court
of Appeals' finding that Amelita failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that
Ivan is the father of her child. The Court also agreed with the dismissal of Amelita's
claim for damages, stating that mere sexual intercourse is not a basis for recovery
unless it is not voluntary.
71. Cecilio Pe, et al. vs. Alfonso Pe
R. No. L-17396 May 30, 1962
FACTS
The plaintiffs filed a case seeking damages from the defendant for engaging in a love
affair with Lolita Pe, an unmarried woman, despite being married himself. Plaintiffs
are the parents, brother, and sisters of Lolita Pe, who disappeared. Defendants is a
married man, and an adopted son of Pe Beco, who is a collateral relative of Lolita’s
father. Because of that, and the similarity of their names, the defendant and Lolita
became close. Defendant frequently visits Lolita under the guise of teaching her how
to pray the rosary. The two fell in love and eventually, their relationship was
discovered by Lolita’s parents. Despite this, their relationship continued. In April of
1957 while staying in Quezon City, Lolita disappeared. The plaintiffs thus brought
this action to recover moral, compensatory, exemplary and corrective damages. The
action is based on Article 21 of the Civil Code.
ISSUE
student from Iran who was studying medicine in Dagupan. The two got really close
and intimate. On Marilou’s account, she said that Gashem later offered to marry her
at the end of the semester. Marilou then introduced Gashem to her parents where
they expressed their intention to get married. Marilou’s parents then started inviting
sponsors and relatives to the wedding. They even started looking for animals to
slaughter for the occasion.
Meanwhile, Marilou started living with Gashem in his apartment where they had
sexual intercourse. But in no time, their relationship went sour as Gashem began
maltreating Marilou. Gashem eventually revoked his promise of marrying Marilou
and he told her that he is already married to someone in Bacolod City. So Marilou
went home and later sued Gashem for damages.
The trial court ruled in favor of Marilou and awarded her P20k in moral damages. The
Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.
On appeal, Gashem averred that he never proposed marriage to Marilou and that he
cannot be adjudged to have violated Filipino customs and traditions since he, being
an Iranian, was not familiar with Filipino customs and traditions.
WON article 21 of the Civil Code can be applied.
ISSUE
RULING
Whether or not the Court of Appeals is correct in affirming the decision of RTC.
YES. The defendant cunningly pursued a relationship with Lolita by using deceitful
tactics, exploiting familial ties for access to her home. This resulted in a secret affair
despite objections and legal actions from Lolita's family. Despite being barred from
seeing her, the defendant persisted until Lolita vanished. These actions strongly imply
that the defendant strategically cultivated an inappropriate relationship, causing
significant harm to Lolita and her family. This behavior goes against moral and public
policy standards stated in Article 21 of the Civil Code.
72. Gashem Shookat Baksh vs. CA
G R. No. 97336 February 19, 1993
FACTS
In August 1986, while working as a waitress in Dagupan City, Pangasinan, Marilou
Gonzales, then 21 years old, met Gashem Shookat Baksh, a 29 year old exchange
RULING
Yes. Gashem is liable to pay damages in favor of Marilou not really because of his
breach of promise to marry her but based on Article 21 of the Civil Code which
provides:
Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary
to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
Breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong per se. In this case, it is the
deceit and fraud employed by Gashem that constitutes a violation of Article 21 of the
Civil Code. His promise of marrying Marilou was a deceitful scheme to lure her into
sexual congress. As found by the trial court, Marilou was not a woman of loose
morals. She was a virgin before she met Gashem. She would not have surrendered
herself to Gashem had Gashem not promised to marry her. Gashem’s blatant
disregard of Filipino traditions on marriage and on the reputation of Filipinas is
contrary to morals, good customs, and public policy. As a foreigner who is enjoying
the hospitality of our country and even taking advantage of the opportunity to study
here he is expected to respect our traditions. Any act contrary will render him liable
under Article 21 of the Civil Code.
The Supreme Court however agreed with legal luminaries that if the promise to marry
was made and there was carnal knowledge because of it, then moral damages may
be recovered (presence of moral or criminal seduction), Except if there was mutual
lust; or if expenses were made because of the promise (expenses for the wedding),
then actual damages may be recovered.
73. Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corp vs. Court of Appeals
GR. No. 81262, August 25, 1989
FACTS
Tobias, a former employee of GLOBE MACKAY, discovered irregularities within the
company. He was accused by Hendry, an executive, as the primary suspect, leading
to a forced leave and accusations of being a "crook" and "swindler." Despite police
clearance from involvement in the anomalies, Tobias was terminated from his job.
When he sought employment elsewhere, Hendry intervened by sending a letter to
RETELCO, alleging Tobias's dismissal due to dishonesty. Tobias then filed a civil case
against GLOBE MACKAY, citing unlawful, malicious, and abusive actions by the
company and its executives.
ISSUE
Whether or not petitioners are liable for damages to private respondents under the
Civil Code.
RULING
Yes, Petitioners are liable for damages to private respondents under the provisions
of the Civil Code. Art.19 of the Civil Code, commonly referred to as the principle of
abuse of rights, sets specific standards thatmust be observed in exercising one’s
rights and performing one’s duties. These standards are to act withjustice, give
everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith. The Court said that when a
right isexercised in a manner that does not conform to the norms enshrined in Article
19 and results in damageto another, legal wrong is committed for which the
wrongdoer must be held responsible. But whileArticle 19 lays down a rule of conduct
for the government of human relations and the maintenance ofsocial order, it does
not provide a remedy for its violation. Thus, generally, an action for damages
undereither Article 20 or Article 21 would be properIn the present case, petitioner
Hendry showed belligerence and told the private respondent that he wasthe number
one suspect and to take one-week vacation leave, not to communicate with the
office, andto leave his keys to said defendant (petitioner Hendry). Moreover, the
imputation of guilt without basisand the pattern of harassment during the
investigations of Tobias transgress the standards of humanconduct outlined in Article
19 of the Civil Code.
74. St Louis Realty vs. CA
R. No. L-46061, November 14, 1984
FACTS
This case is an appeal to the Supreme Court from the decision of the CA and the TC
awarding recovery of damages to respondent Conrado J. Aramil whose house was
mistakenly misrepresented by petitioner Saint Louis Realty Corporation in a wrongful
advertisement in the Sunday Times.
St. Louis Realty published an advertisement featuring Doctor Aramil's residence
under the name of Arcadio S. Arcadio without permission from Doctor Aramil. Upon
Aramil's protest, St. Louis Realty halted the publication, apologized to Aramil through
an officer, but failed to issue a public rectification or apology. Aramil demanded
damages, and in response, St. Louis Realty offered to rectify the mistake in the Manila
Times by publishing a new advertisement showcasing the correct property. However,
they still didn't issue an apology or explanation for the error. Eventually, St. Louis
Realty published a "NOTICE OF RECTIFICATION" in the Manila Times, but it lacked an
apology or clarification regarding the mistake made with Doctor Aramil's property.
In this appeal, St. Louis Realty contends that the decision is contrary to law and that
the case was decided in a way not in conformity with the rulings of this Court. It
argues that the case is not covered by Article 26.
ISSUE
Does the wrongful advertisement violate the privacy of private respondent, thus
entitling him to damages?
RULING
Yes, the private respondent is entitled to damages as the wrongful advertisement
violated his privacy. The damages fixed by Judge Leuterio are sanctioned by
Articles 2200, 2208 and 2219 of the Civil Code. Article 2219 allows moral
damages for acts and actions mentioned in Article 26. As lengthily explained by
Justice Gatmaitan, the acts and omissions of the firm fan under Article 26.
St. Louis Realty's employee negligently misrepresented Doctor Aramil's residence as
belonging to Arcadio in a widely circulated publication. Despite this error causing
confusion and harm to Doctor Aramil's private life and income, St. Louis Realty failed
to issue a written apology or a clear explanation. Their casual "rectification" was
insufficient in rectifying the significant impact caused by the mix-up, leading to
confusion among those familiar with Aramil's residence and resulting in both
financial loss and emotional distress for Doctor Aramil.
75
Yon Mitori International Industries v. Union Bank of the Philippines G.R. No.
225538; October 14, 2020,
FACTS
In a dispute between Union Bank and Tan over mistakenly credited funds, Union Bank
claimed a technical error led to funds being mistakenly credited to Tan's account,
while Tan argued he received the funds legitimately and wasn't at fault for
withdrawing them. The trial court ruled in favor of Union Bank, ordering Tan to return
the mistakenly credited amount and pay legal interest, attorney's fees, and costs. Tan
appealed, alleging Union Bank's negligence caused the loss. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the decision but removed the attorney's fees and reduced the interest rate.
Tan sought reconsideration, emphasizing Union Bank's negligence. The motion was
denied, leading to Tan's appeal to the Supreme Court, arguing Union Bank's gross
negligence should absolve him from liability.
ISSUE
The sole issue for the Court's resolution is whether the CA erred when it affirmed the
RTC Decision directing Tan to return the value of the BPI Check with legal interest.
RULING
The petition is denied due to a procedural issue regarding the party's legal standing.
Yon Mitori, as a single proprietorship, lacks separate legal identity from its owner,
Tan. Therefore, the petition should have been filed under Tan's name, the actual
party affected. Tan received funds due to a technical error but wasn't entitled to
them. Despite receiving the funds, Tan is obliged to return the erroneously credited
amount to Union Bank. The total due to Union Bank amounts to P385,299.40, subject
to 6% interest per annum from the time Union Bank made a demand on November
20, 2007. The decision regarding damages, attorney's fees, and costs of suit,
previously removed, was not challenged further.