Stuck in fiscal fantasyland
Around the world budgets are in bigger mess than politicians are prepared to admit
Wrangling over budgets is always part of politics, but today’s fiscal brinkmanship is truly frightening. In America Democrats and Republicans are playing a game of
chicken over raising the government’s debt ceiling. As the drama intensifies, the stakes are getting dangerously high. Janet yellen, the treasury secretary, says ther
department could run out of cash to pay the government’s bills on June 1st if no deal is stuck. Investors are beginning to price in the risk of what would be
America’s first-ever sovereign default.
The political point-scoring also misses a bigger and more enduring problem. America’s budget deficit is set to balloon as its population ages, the cost of handouts
swells and the government’s interest bill rises. We estimate that deficits could reach around 7% of GDP a year by the end of this decade-shortfalls America has no
seen outside of wars and economic slumps. Worryingly, no one has a sensible plan to shrink them.
Governments elsewhere face similar pressures--and appear just a oblivious. Those in Europe are locked in a silly debate about how to tweak debt rules, at a time
when the European Central Bank is indirectly propping up the finances of its weakest
members. China’s official debt figures purport to be healthy even as the
central government prepares to bail out a province. Governments are stuck in a fifantasyland, and they must find a way out before disaster strikes.
For the decade after the global financial crisis of 2007-09 falling interest rates allowed governments to sustain vast debt piles. Although Europe and , to a degree,
America took an axe to public spending after the crisis, by the late 2010s it looked as if they needn’t have bothered. Long-term interest rates kept falling even as
debt rose. Japan’s net debt passed 150% of GDP without consequence. When covid-19 struck, rich-world governments spent another 10% of GDP; Europe’s energy
crisis led to yet more handouts. Hardly anyone worried about more debt.
Those days of forgivingly low interest rates have now passed. This week the federal Reserve raised rates again, to 5-5.25%. America will spend more on debt
interest this year, as a share of GDP, than at any time so far this century; by 2030 the bill will be at an all-time high, even is rates fall as markets expect. Japan no
longer looks so safe. Even though rates there are super-low the government spends 8% of its budget on interest, a figure that will shoot up should the central bank
begin tightening monetary policy.
Rising rates are squeezing budgets just as pressures to spend are mounting. Ageing populations mean that by the end of the decade the annual health-care and
pension bill in the rich world will have risen by 3% of GDP. The figure is 2% even in emerging markets, including China, where by 2035 there will be 420m over-65s.
in the west policymakers have yet to deliver on promises to spend more on defence in light of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and tensions between America and
China over Taiwan. And the whole world needs more green public spending if it is to decarbonise rapidly.
All told, the picture is forbidding. Take America’s Inflation
Reduction Act, which was supposed to reduce deficits. Its green tax credits were forecast to cost
$391bn over a decade, but are now expected by Goldman Sachs to cost an eye-watering $1.2trn. Add that and the likely extension of temporary tax cuts enacted
during Donald Trump’s presidency to official projections, and America is on a path to budget deficits of 7% of GDP, even as the economy grows.
Such looming pressures make politician’s proposals look wildly unrealistic. The bill to raise America’s debt ceiling passed by Republicans in the House of
Representatives on April 27th caps spending in 2024 at its level in 2022, and then raises budgets by 1% a year. That may sound reasonable but it excludes
mandatory spending on pensions and health care and ignores inflation. Exclude defence spending as well and it implies a real-terms budget cut of 27% compared
with current plans.
Germany’s government seems to think that a target of 60% for debt-to-GDP ratios can credibly apply to places like Italy, which has net debts of more than twice
that amount. In Britain the government makes a mockery of its rules, for example by promising tax rises that are perennially postponed. A few months of
better-than-expected receipts are enough to set off a clamour for tax cuts among the ruling Conservatives, only months after Britain faced a bond-market crisis.
China’s increasing indebtedness is kept off the books in opaque “financing vehicles” used by local governments. Include everything and China’s total public debts
are over 120% of GDP, and will rise to nearly 150% by 2027, on IMF forecasts. Such levels of debt are affordable only because China has an ocean of domestic
savins,kept captive by its restrictions on capital flows. Public indebtedness means that the government cannot achieve its plan to rebalance its economy towards
consumption and internationalise the yuan.
Politicians need to get real, fast. Public debts are in danger of becoming unmanageable,especially if interest rates stay high. Every step up in borrowing hampers
governments’ ability to respond to the next crisis. And there are limits to how far spending can be controlled. Politicians could dial down their promises to
pensioners or ensure that their role in the green transition is not larger than it needs to be. But there is little public appetite for austerity, and spending is bound to
rise as populations age. More defense spending and green investment are essential.
All this makes tax rises inevitable. And more taxation makes it crucial to raise money in ways that are friendly to economic growth. Britain’s under-taxation of posh
houses is scandalous; America lacks a value-added tax and China sorely needs its long-promised property tax. Carbon emissions should be taxed sufficiently
everywhere, which would also encourage the private sector to invest more in decarbonisation and thereby reduce the need for public spending to that end.
Leaving fiscal fantasyland will be painful, and there will undoubtedly be call to put off consolidation for another day. But it is are better to make a careful exit now
than to wail for the illusion to come crashing down.
Seriously? Yes
Donald Trump’s chances of a comeback are uncomfortably high
Agitch-Plagued chat with Elon Musk, live on Twitter, is an unconventional way to launch a presidential campaign. But with the entry of Florida’s governor, Ron
Desantis, the race for the Republican nomination is now properly under way. The first states will not vote until January. Primaries are hard to predict, because it is
expensive to conduct enough high-quality polls of primary voters in the key states. But, with that disclaimer over, on candidate has a huge, perhaps
insurmountable, lead: Donald Trump. Mr. Trump thus has a real chance of becoming America’s next president. Betting markets put his odds of returning to the
White House at one in three.
If you decide to pay less attention to Mr Trump after he lost in 2020, to preserve your sanity, you may be wondering how this can be the case. Parties do not
usually stick with losers. Mr Trump led the Republicans to defeats in the 2018 midterm and the 2020 presidential elections. After he encouraged his supporters to
“stop the steal”, some of them broke into congress, with the result that one police officer died of a stroke and four committed suicide. He has since been found
liable for sexual assault, too. Would the Republican Party really nominate him again?
Yes, it probably would. In 2016 and in 2020 it made some sense to think of the Trump movement as a hostile takeover of the party. In 2023 it no longer does. He is
the front-runner because a large proportion of Republicans really like him. His supporters have had their hands on the Republican National Committee for six years
now. More than half of Republicans in the House of Representatives were elected for the first time since 2016, and therefore under Mr Trump’s banner. Almost all
of those House and Senate Republicans who refused to make their peace with him have stood down or retired. Of the ten House members who voted to impeach
Mr Trump in January 2021, only two are still there. They are outnumbered in their own caucus by more than 100 to 1.
Mr Trump’s campaign is also better organised than in either 2016 or 2020. our analysis of the primaries shows how hard he will be to beat. He has a stunning lead:
polling for The Economist by YouGov suggests Republican primary voters prefer Mr Trump to Mr DeSantis by 33 percentage points. He also has a big lead in
endorsements from elected Republicans,which are usually a good predictor of what will happen. In 2016, the last time Mr Trump contested a primary, he won the
early primaries with much less support than he has now.
There are still Republican voters who would like an alternative-his 58% poll share meas that close to half of primary voters must be open to choosing someone else.
Yet the difficulties of co-ordinating the opposition to Mr Trump are daunting. People close to the Trump campaign say privately that the more candidates who
enter the primary dividing the field, the better for their candidate. Some big donors are giving money to non-Trump candidates on the condition that they drop out
after South Carolina, an early primary, if told to do so. The idea is to engineer unity around a single non-Trump candidates, just as establishment Democrats united
around Joe Biden in 2020 to stop Bernie Sanders, a leftist. Backroom manoeuvring by party bigwigs is less likely to work against Mr Trump, however, for the simple
reason that he is the Republican establishment.
The way the primary calendar and pending legal cases against Mr Trump intersect is nightmarish. His trial for falsifying records in New York will get under way
shoartly after Super Tuesday, when more than a dozen states vote. Neither this case nor any of the other investigations he faces are likely to be resolved by the
primaries are over. It is therefore possible that the candidate of one of the two great parties could be subject to criminal charges when he is on the ballot. America
has had badly behaved presidents before. It has never had one who is also the defendant in a criminal trial.
You might think that ,at this point, voters would abandon Mr Trump in large numbers. Maybe. But when, earlier this year, a jury found that he has sexually abused
a woman 30 years ago, the verdict had no measurable effect on his poll numbers. Mr Trump, it turns out, is adept at persuading Republican voters that he is the
real victim. Democrats, and plenty of America’s allies, think Mr Trump is a threat to democracy. His campaign is already turning this accusation back on the
accuser:”The 2024 election”, a recent Trump campaign email announced,” will determine whether we can keep our Republic or whether America has succumbed
to the dark forces of tyranny.” those who accept that these are the stakes will probably overlook Mr Trump’s innumerable and obvious flaws.
Imagine, then, that it is November 2024 and Mr Trump and President Biden are having a rematch-the first since Dwight Eisenhower beat Adlai Stevenson back in
the 1950s. could Mr Trump win?
The general election will surely be close. The electoral college gives Republicans a slight edge. The most recent landslide was 40 years ago. America has since
become evenly divided politically and calcified because voters seldom switch sides. Mr Biden has some under-appreciated strengths, but he is no one’s idea of
formidable. Were the country to enter a recession, Mr Trump’s chances would go up. Some mooted post-primary tactics intended to stop him, such as running a
third-party candidate, smack of desperation: they could easily backfire and boost him further.
Prima Donald
All of which means that you should take seriously the possibility that America’s next president will be someone who would divide the West and delight Vladimir
Putin; who accepts the results of elections only if he wins;who calls the thugs who broke into the Capitol on January 6th 2021 martyrs and wants to pardon them;
who has proposed defaulting on the national debt to spite Mr Biden; and who is under multiple investigations for breaking criminal law, to add to his civil-law rap
sheet for sexual assault. Anyone who cares about America, about democracy, about conservatism or about decency should hope that Mr Desantis or one of the
other non-Trump Republican Candidates can defy the odds and beat him.
Seriously? Yes
Donald Trump’s Chances of a comeback are uncomfortably high
AGLITCH-PLAGUED chat with Elon Musk, live on Twitter, is an unconventional way to launch a presidential campaign.But with the entry of Florida’s governor, Ron
DEsantis, the race for the Republican nomination is now properly under way. The first states will not vote until January. Primaries are hard to predict, because it is
expensive to conduct enough high-quality polls of primary voters in the key states. But, with that disclaimer over, one candidate has a huge, perhaps
insurmountable, lead: Donald Trump. Mr Trump thus has a real chance of becoming America’s next president. Betting markets put his odds of returning to the
White House at one in three.
If you decided to pay less attention to Mr Trump after he lost in 2020, to preserve your sanity, you may be wondering how this can be the case. Parties do not
usually stick with losers. Mr Trump led the Republicans to defeats in the 2018 midterm and four committed suicide. He has since been found liable for sexual
assault, too. Would the Republican Party really nominate him again?
Yes, it probably would. In 2016 and in 2020 it made some sense to think of the Trump movement as a hostile takeover of the party. In 2023 it no longer does. He is
the front-runner because a large proportion of Republicans really like him. His supporters have had their hands on the Republican National Committee for six years
now. More than half of Republicans in the House of Representatives were elected for the first time since 2016, and therefore under Mr Trump’s banner. Almost all
of those House and Senate Republicans who refused to make their peace with him have stood down or retired. Of the ten House members who voted to impeach
Mr Trump in January 2021, only two are still there. They are outnumbered in their own caucus by more than 100 to 1.
Mr Trump’s campaign is also better organised than in either 2016 or 2020. Our analysis of the primaries shows how hard he will be to beat. He has a stunning lead:
polling for the Economist by YouGov suggests Republican primary voters prefer Mr Trump to Mr Desantis by 33 percentage points. He also has a big lead in
endorsements from elected republicans, which are usually a good predictor of what will happen. In 2016, the last time Mr Trump contested a primary, he won the
early primaries with much less support than he has now.
There are still Republican voters who would like an alternative-his 58% poll share means that close to half of primary voters must be open to choosing someone
else. Yet the difficulties of co-ordinating the opposition to Mr Trump are daunting. People close to the Trump campaign say privately that the more candidates who
enter the primary, dividing the field, the better for their candidate. Some big donors are giving money to non-Trump candidates on the condition that they drop
out after south Carolina, an early primary, if told to do so. The idea is to engineer unity around a single non-Trump candidate, just as establishment Democrats
united around Joe Biden in 2020 to stop Bernie Sanders, a leftist. Backroom manoeuvring by party bigwigs is less likely to work against Mr Trump, however, for the
simple reason that he is the Republican establishment.
The way the primary calendar and pending legal cases against Mr Trump intersect is nightmarish. His trial for falsifying records in New York will get under way
shortly after Super Tuesday, when more than a dozen states vote. Neither this case nor any of the other investigations he faces are likely to be resolved by the time
the primaries are over. It is therefore possible that the candidate of one of the two great parties could be subject to criminal charges when he is on the ballot.
America has had badly behaved presidents before. It has never had one who is also the defendant in a criminal trial.
You might think that, at this point, voters would abandon Mr Trump in larger numbers. Maybe. But when, earlier this year, a jury found that he had sexually abused
a woman 30 years ago, the verdict had no measurable effect on his poll numbers. Mr Trump, it turns out, is adept at persuading Republican voters that he is the
real victim. Democrats,and plenty of America’s allies, think Mr Trump is a threat to democracy. His campaign is already turning this accusation back on the
accuser:”the 2024 election”,a recent Trump campaign email announced,”will determine whether we can keep our Republic or whether America has succumbed to
the dark forces of tyranny.” those who accept that these are the stakes will probably overlook Mr Trump’s innumerable and obvious flaws.
Imagine,then,that it is November 2024 and Mr Trump and President Biden are having a rematch-the first since Dwight Eisenhower beat Adlai Stevenson back in the
1950s. could Mr Trump win?
The general election will surely be close. The electoral college gives Republicans a slight edge. The most recent landslide was 40 years ago. America has since
become evenly divided politically and calcified because voters seldom switch sides. Mr Biden has some under-appreciated strengths, but he is no one’s idea of
formidable. Were the country to enter a recession,Mr Trump’s chances would go up. Some mooted post-primary tactics intended to stop him, such as running a
third-party candidate, smack of desperation: they could easily backfire and boost him further.
Prima Donald
All of which means that you should take seriously the possibility that America’s next president will be someone who would divide the West and delight Vladimir
Putin; who accepts the results of elections only if he wins; who calls the thugs who broke into the Capitol on January 6 th 2021 martyrs and wants to pardon them;
who has proposed defaulting on the national debt to spite Mr Biden; and who is under multiple investigations for breaking criminal law, to add to his civil-law rap
sheet for sexual assault. Anyone who cares about America, about democracy, about conservatism or about decency should hoe that Mr Desantis or one of the
other non-Trump Republican candidates can defy the odds and beat him.
Seriously? Yes
Donald Trump’s chance of a comeback are uncomfortably high
AGLITCH-PLAGUED chat with Elon Musk, live on Twitter, is an unconventional way to launch a presidential campaign. But with the entry of Florida’s governor, Ron
DeSantis, the race for the Republican nomination is now properly under way. The first states will not vote until January. Primaries are hard to predict, because it is
expensive to conduct enough high-quality polls of primary voters in the key states. But, with that disclaimer over, one candidate has a huge, perhaps
insurmountable, lead: Donald Trump. Mr Trump thus has a real chance of becoming America’s next president. Betting markets put his odds of returning to the
White House at one in three.
If you decided to pay less attention to Mr Trump after he lost in 2020, to preserve your sanity, you may be wondering how this can be the case. Parties do not
usually stick with losers. Mr Trump led the Republicans to defeats in the 2018 midterm and the 2020 presidential elections. After he encouraged his supporter to
“stop the steal”, some of them broke into Congress,with the result that one police officer died of a stroke and four committed suicide. He has since been found
liable for sexual assault, too. Would the Republican Party really nominate him again?
Yes,it probably would. In 2016 and in 2020 it made some sense to think of the Trump movement as a hostile takeover of the party. In 2023 it no longer does he is
the front-runner because a large proportion of Republicans really cause a large proportion of Republicans really like him. His supporters have had their hands on
the Republican National Committee for six years now. More than half of Republicans in the House of Representatives were elected for the first time since 2016,
and therefore under Mr Trump’s banner. Almost all of those House and Senate Republicans who refused to make their peace with him have stood down or retired.
Of the ten House members who voted to impeach Mr Trump in January 2021, only two are still there. They are outnumbered in their own caucus by more than 100
to 1.
Mr Trump’s campaign is also better organised than in either 2016 or 2020. our analysis of the primaries shows how hard he will be to beat. He has a stunning
lead:polling for The Economist by YouGov suggests Republican primary voters prefer Mr Trump to Mr DeSantis by 33 percentage points. He also has a big lead in
endorsements from elected Republicans, which are usually a good predictor of what will happen. In 2016, the last time Mr Trump contested a primary, he won the
early primaries with much less support than he has now.
There are still Republican voters who would like an alternative-his 58% poll share means that close to half of primary voters must be open to choosing someone
else. Yet the difficulties of co-ordinating the opposition to Mr Trump are daunting. People close to the Trump campaign say privately that the
more candidates
who enter the primary, dividing the field, the better for their candidate. Some big donors are giving money to non-Trump candidates on the condition that they
drop out after South Carolina, an early primary, if told to do so. The idea is to engineer unity around a single non-Trump candidate,just as establishment Democrats
united around Joe Biden in 2020 to stop Bernie Sanders, a leftist. Backroom manoeuvring by party bigwigs is less likely to work against Mr Trump, however, for the
simple reason that he is the Republican establishment.
The way the primary calendar and pending legal cases against Mr Trump intersect is nightmarish. His trial for falsifying records in New York will get under way
shortly after Super Tuesday, when more than a dozen states vote. Neither this case nor any of the other investigations he faces are likely to be resolved by the time
the primaries are over. It is therefore possible that the candidate of one of the two great parties could be subject to criminal charges when he is on the ballot.
America has had badly behaved presidents before. It has never had one who is also the defendant in a criminal trial.
You might think that, at this point, voters would abandon Mr Trump in large numbers. Maybe. But when, earlier this year, a jury found that he had sexually abused
a woman 30 years ago, the verdict had no measurable effect on his poll numbers. Mr Trump, it turns out, is adept at persuading Republican voters that he is the
real victim. Democrats, and plenty of America’s allies, think Mr Trump is a threat to democracy. His campaign is already turning this accusation back on the
accuser:”The 2024 election”, a recent Trump campaign email announced,”will determine whether we can keep our Republic or whether America has succumbed to
the dark forces of tyranny.” those who accet that these are the stakes will probably overlook Mr Trump’s innumerable and obvious flaws.
Imagine, then, that it is November 2024 and Mr Trump and President Biden are having a rematch---the first since Dwight Eisenhower beat Adlai Stevenson back in
the 1950s. could Mr Trump win?
The general election will surely be close. The electoral college gives Republicans a slight edge. The most recent landslide was 40 years ago. America has since
become evenly divided politically and calcified because voters seldom switch sides. Mr Biden has some under-appreciated strengths, but he is no one’s idea of
formidable. Were the country to enter a recession, Mr Trump’s chances would go up. Some mooted post-primary tactics intended to stop him, such as running a
third-party candidate, smack of desperation:they could easily backfire and boost him further.
Prima Donald
All of which means that you should take seriously the possibility that America’s next president will be someone who would divide the West and delight Vladimir
Putin; who accepts the results of elections only if he wins; who calls the thugs who broke into the Capitol on January of 6 th 2021 martyrs and wants to pardon them;
who has proposed defaulting on the national debt to spite Mr Biden; and who is under multiple investigations for breaking criminal law to add to his civil-law rap
sheet for sexual assault. Anyone who cares about America, about democracy,about conservatism for about decency should hope that Mr Desantis or one of the
other non-Trump Republican candidates can defy the odds and beat him.
Seriously?yes
Donald Trump’s chances of a comeback are uncomfortably high
AGLITCH-PLAGUED chat with Elon Musk, live on Twitter, is an unconventional way to launch a presidential campaign. But with the entry of Florida’s governor, Ron
DeSantis, the race for the Republican nomination is now properly under way. The first states will not vote until January. Primaries are hard to predict, because it is
expensive to conduct enough high-quality polls of primary voters in the key states. But, with that disclaimer over, on candidate has a huge, perhaps
insurmountable, lead:Donald Trump. Mr Trump thus has a real chance of becoming America’s next president.Betting markets put his odds of returning to the
White House at one in three.
If you decided to pay less attention to Mr Trump after he lost in 2020, to preserve your sanity, you may be wondering how this can be the case. Parties do not
usually stick with losers. Mr Trump led the Republicans to defeats in the 2018 midterm and the 2020 presidential elections. After he encouraged his supporters to
“stop the steal”, some of them broke into Congress, with the result that one police officer died of a stroke and four committed suicide. He has since been found
liable for sexual assault, too. Would the Republican Party really nominate hie again?
Yes, it probably would. In 2016 and in 2020 it made some sense to think of the Trump movement as a hostile takeover of the party. In 2023 it no longer does. He is
the front-runner because a large proportion of Republicans really like him. His supporters have had their hands on the Republican National Committee for six years
now. More than half of Republicans in the House of Representatives were elected for the first time since 2016, and therefore under Mr Trump’s banner. Almost all
of those House and Senate Republicans who refused to make their peace with him have stood down or retired. Of the ten House members who voted to impeach
Mr Trump in January 2021, only two are still there. They are outnumbered in their own caucus by more than 100 to 1.
Mr Trump’s campaign is also better organised than in either 2016 or 2020. our analysis of the primaries shows how hard he will be to beat. He has a stunning lead:
polling for the Economist by YorGov suggests Republican primary voters prefer Mr Trump to Mr Desantis by 33 percentage points. He also has a big lead in
endorsements from elected Republicans, which are usually a good predictor of what will happen. In 2016, the last time Mr Trump contested a primary, he won the
early primaries with much less support than he has now.
There are still Republican voters who would like and alternative-his 58% poll share means that close to half of primary voters must be open to choosing someone
else. Yet the difficulties of co-ordinating the opposition to Mr Trump are daunting. People close to the Trump campaign say privately that eh more candidates who
enter the primary, dividing the field, the better for their candidate. Some big donors are giving money to non-Trump candidates on the condition that they drop
out after South Carolina, an early primary, if told to do so . The idea is to engineer unit around a single non-Trump candidate, just as establishment Democrats
united around Joe Biden in 2020 to stop Bernie Sanders, a leftist. Backroom manoeuvring by party bigwigs is less likely to work against Mr Trump, however, for the
simple reason that he is the Republican establishment.
The way the primary calendar and pending legal cases against Mr Trump intersect is nightmarish. His trial for falsifying records in New York will get under way
shortly after Super Tuesday, when more than a dozen states vote. Neither this case nor any of the other investigations he faces are likely to be resolved by the time
the primaries are over. It is therefore possible that the candidate of one of the two great parties could be subject to criminal charges when he is on the ballot.
America has had badly behaved presidents before. It has never had one who is also the defendant in a criminal trial.
You might think that, at this point, voters would abandon Mr trump in large numbers. Maybe. But when, earlier this year, a jury found that he had sexually abused
a woman 30 years ago, the verdict had no measurable effect on his poll numbers. Mr Trump, it turns out, is adept at persuading Republican voters that he is the
real victim. Democrats,and plenty of America’s allies, think Mr Trump is a threat to democracy. His campaign is already turning this accusation back on the
accuser:”The 2024 election”,a recent Trump campaign email announced,”will determine whether we can keep our Republic or whether America has succumbed to
the dark forces of tyranny”.those who accept that these are the stakes will probably overlook Mr Trump’s innumerable and obvious flaws.
Imagine, then, that it is November 2024 and Mr Trump and President Biden are having a rematch-the first since Dwight Eisenhower beat Adlai Stevenson back in
the 1950s.Could Mr trump win?
The general election will surely be close. The electoral college gives Republicans a slight edge. The most recent landslide was 40 years ago. America has since
become evenly divided politically and calcified because voters seldom switch sides. Mr Biden has some under-appreciated strengths,but he is no one’s idea of
formidable. Were the country to enter a recession, Mr Trump’s chances would go up. Some mooted post-primary tactics intended to stop him, such as running a
third-party candidate, smack of desperation: they could easily backfire and boost him further.
Prima Donald
All if which means that you should take seriously the possibility that America’s next president will be someone who would divide the West and delight Vladimir
Putin; who accepts the results of elections only if he wins; who calls the thugs who broke into the Capitol on January 6 th 2021 martyrs and wants to pardon them;
who had proposed defaulting on the national debt to spite Mr Biden; and who is under multiple investigations for breaking criminal law, to add to his civil-law rap
sheet for sexual assault. Anyone who cares about America, about democracy, about conservatism for about decency should hope that Mr Desantis or one of the
other non-Trump Republican candidates can defy the odds and beat him.
Ukraine strikes back
The counter-offensive is getting underway. The next few weeks will be critical
Trailed ten days early with a blood-stirring video in which Ukrainian troops asked God to bless their”sacred revenge”,Ukraine’s counter-offensive is under way. For
weeks its armed forces have conducted probing and shaping operations along the 1000km front line ,looking for weaknesses and confusing the Russians. Now
Ukraine is testing enemy defences with an intensity not seen for months, with attacks against the occupiers in a series of positions in the east and south. The
apparent demolition of the Kakhovka dam on June 6th, if it was indeed Russian sabotage as Western military sources believe, would be clear evidence that they are
already feeling the pressure.
More will come in the days ahead. The main force has yet to be sent into battle. The operation will last well into the summer. However, what happens in these next
weeks will shape the future not just of Ukraine itself, but of the whole security order in Europe. The point of decision has arrived.
The task for Ukraine, bluntly, is to show Vladimir Putin, his henchmen,his compatriots and the wider watching world that Russia cannot win; that this invasion has
been misconceived from the outset; that Russia cannot outlast Ukraine and its Western backers; and that the Kremlin’s best option is to give up before Russia
suffers yet more losses and humiliation.
That is no easy task, and the risk of failure is real. But thanks to Ukraine’s astonishing determination, and the strong and unexpectedly united backing of the west,
success is possible. It requires, right now, the strongest diplomatic and military support, and the clearest commitment from the west that it will stand by Ukraine
for many years to come. Mr Putin must no longer be able to lie to himself or his people about the foolishness of the direction he has chosen.
This is why this moment is so critical. The Russians are well dug in and reinforced after months of a mobilisation drive that has replenished the supply of
cannon-fodder. Imagine the worst case: that Ukraine’s counter-offensive peters out, its troops spread too thin, or used too sparingly, to make an impact.
If that happens, it would be a damaging failure. Despite the Russian army’s woeful performance in the months-long fight to take the city of Bakhmut, it would
nonetheless start to seem well matched against Ukraine’s. the voices urging Ukraine to stop fighting and start talking would grow louder, even though a ceasefire
would leave Russia in possession of almost 20% of Ukraine and Russian promises of peace would be worthless.
This would be a win for Mr Putin--not the total victory he once dreamed of,but success in his backup objective, to cripple Ukraine if it cannot be returned to the
Russian imperium. There would be recriminations within NATO and the European Union. In America, as it heads towards a divisive presidential election, the
pressure to cut back funds that Republican critics already claim are being wasted would grow. In Europe the backsliders would slide further.
But the fighting may also go differently. Imagine that the invaders break, their troops running back to Mother Russia in fear of encirclement, as they did from
Kharkiv last September. That would be a grave setback for Mr Putin. He has lost more than 100,000 dead and wounded,expended tens of billions of dollars’-worth
of military hardware, and shattered his economic relationships with Europe and America: and it would be all for nothing. He would struggle to survive the
humiliation. Although Russia might suffer deep and dangerous instability, many in the West would be glad to see the back of him.
The most likely outcome lies in between. As the summer wears on, Ukraine is likely to push back the Russians in two main areas,gaining territory but not
precipitating a full-scale collapse. The first, and the one where most of the new activity is so far going on, is in Donbas. One clear Ukrainian objective is to reverse
Russian gains there. If Mr Putin starts losing even the territory he has seized since last February, it will be apparent to him, his generals and the Russian people
what a blunder he has made.
The other objective will surely be a push south. Ukraine will seek to break the “land bridge” that connects Russia to Crimea. If it can do that, everything changes.
Crimea would become isolated, hard to resupply and protect. The collapse of the dam has already threatened its water supply. Large numbers of Russian troops
might be cut off and captured. Ukraine would get back some of its coast on the Sea of Azov. Even if it cannot reach the coast, advancing far enough to put the
east-west roads and railways that supply Crimea in range of its guns would be an important step.
Yet neither Ukraine nor Europe will be safe while Mr Putin believes he can launch another invasion later. So the West should understand its commitment must last
for years. While Russia remains a threat, Ukraine will need enough weaponry to hold the line, wherever it settles.
What that means in practice needs to be agreed on now--as a further signal to Russia of the folly of dreaming that this war could one day turn out well. NATO
members are split on whether Ukraine should become a member, and in any case it cannot happen while the war still rages. So willing Western powers must
immediately craft a set of security guarantees for Ukraine that will have credibility, unlike the empty words of the past.
Make Ukraine Putin-proof-and Trump-proof
Short of an explicit treaty that will be hard, but not impossible. America, for instance, has legal commitments that oblige it to provide Israel and Taiwan with the
arms they need to defend themselves. The guarantees should cover weapons systems, ammunition, training and support to beef up Ukraine’s own defence
industries. The more countries that sign up to them, the more convincing they would become--and the harder they would be to overturn if a Ukraine-sceptic like
Donald Trump were elected. After the fighting stops, Western “tripwire” forces could be stationed on Ukrainian soil.
Ukraine’s fear, and Mr Putin’s hope, is that the West will lose focus. Only a successful counter-offensive and credible security pledges can get Russians to realise hat
Mr Putin’s war is futile-that he will never succeed, but can only fail, or fall.
Ukraine strikes back
The counter-offensive is getting under way. The next few weeks will be critical
Trailed ten days early with a blood-stirring video in which Ukrainian troops asked God to bless their “sacred revenge”, Ukraine’s counter-offensive is under way. For
weeks its armed forces have conducted probing and shaping operations along the 1000km front line, looking for weaknesses and confusing the Russians. Now
Ukraine is testing enemy defences with an intensity not seen for months, with attacks against the occupiers in a series of positions in the east and south. The
apparent demolition of the Kakhovka dam on June 6th, if it was indeed Russian sabotage as Western military sources believe, would be clear evidence that they are
already feeling the pressure.
More will come in the days ahead. The main force has yet to be sent into battle. The operation will last well into the summer. However, what happens in these next
weeks will shape the future not just of Ukraine itself, but of the whole security order in Europe. The point of decision has arrived.
The task for Ukraine, bluntly, is to show Vladimir Putin, his henchmen, his compatriots and the wider watching world that Russia cannot win; that this invasion has
been misconceived from the outset; that Russia cannot outlast Ukraine and its Western backers; and that the Kremlin’s best option is to give up before Russia
suffers yet more losses and humiliation.
That is no easy task, and the risk of failure is real. But thanks to Ukraine’s astonishing determination, and the strong and unexpectedly united backing of the
West,success is possible. It requires, right now, the strongest diplomatic and military supports, and the clearest commitment from the West that it will stand by
Ukraine for many years to come. Mr Putin must no longer be able to lie to himself or his people about the foolishness of the direction he has chosen.
This is why this moment is so critical. The russians are well dug in and reinforced after months of a mobilisation drive that has replenished the supply of
cannon-fodder. Imagine the worst case: that Ukraine’s counter-offensive peters out, its troops spread to thin, or used too sparingly, to make an impact.
If that happens, it would be a damaging failure. Despite the Russian army’s woeful performance in the months-long fight to take the city of Bakhmut, it would
nonetheless start to seem well matched against Ukraine’s. the voices urging Ukraine to stop fighting and start talking would grow louder, even though a ceasefire
would leave Russia in possession of almost 20% of Ukraine and Russian promises of peace would be worthless.
This would be a win for Mr Putin--not the total victory he once dreamed of, but success in his backup objective, to cripple Ukraine if it cannot be returned to the
Russian imperium. There would be recriminations within NATO and the European Union. In America, as it heads towards a divisive presidential election, the
pressure to cut back funds that Republican critics already claim are being wasted would grow. In Europe the backsliders would slide further.
But the fighting may also go differently. Imagine that the invaders break, their troops running back to Mother Russia in fear of encirclement, as they did from
kharkiv last September. That would be a grave setback for Mr Putin. He has lost more than 100,000 dead and wounded, expended tens of billions of dollars’-worth
of military hardware, and shattered his economic relationships with Europe and America: and it would be all for nothing. He would struggle to survive the
humiliation. Although Russia might suffer deep and dangerous instability many in the West would be glad to see the back of him.
The most likely outcome lies in between. As the summer wears on, Ukraine is likely to push back the Russians in two main areas, gaining territory but not
precipitating a full-scale collapse. The first, and the one where most of the new activity is so far going on, is in
Donbas. One clear Ukrainian objective is to reverse
Russian gains there. If Mr Putin starts losing even the territory he has held since his first incursion, in 2014, as well as what he has seized since last February, it will
be apparent to him, his generals and the Russian people what a blunder he has made.
The other objective will surely be a push south. Ukraine will seek to break the “land bridge” that connects Russia to Crimea. If it can do that, everything changes.
Crimea would become isolated, hard to resupply and protect. The collapse of the dam has already threatened its water supply. Large numbers of Russian troops
might be cut off and captured. Ukraine would get back some of its coast on the Sea of Azov. Even if it cannot reach the coast, advancing far enough to put the
east-west road and railways that supply Crimea in range of its guns would be an important step.
Yet neither Ukraine nor Europe will be safe while Mr Putin believes he can launch another invasion later. So the West should understand its commitment must last
for years. While Russia remains a threat, Ukraine will need enough weaponry to hold the line, wherever it settles.
What that means in practice needs to be agreed on now--as a further signal to Russia of the folly of dreaming that this war could one day turn out well.NATO
members are split on whether Ukraine should become a member, and in any case it cannot happen while the war still rages. So willing Western powers must
immediately craft a set of security guarantees for Ukraine that will have credibility, unlike the empty words of the past.
Make Ukraine Putin-proof--and Trump-proof
Short of an explicit treaty that will be hard, but not impossible. America, for instance, has legal commitments that oblige it to provide Israel and Taiwan with the
arms they need to defend themselves. The guarantees should cover weapons systems, ammunition, training and support to beef up Ukraine’s own defence
industries. The more countries that sign up to them, the more convincing they would become----and the harder they would be to overturn if a Ukraine-sceptic like
Donald Trump were elected. After the fighting stops, Western “tripwire” forces could be stationed on Ukrainian soil.
Ukraine’s fear, and Mr Putin’s hope, is that the West will lose focus. Only a successful counter-offensive and credible security pledges can get Russians to realise
that Mr Putin’s war is futile----hat he will never succeed, but can only fail for fall.
Ukraine strikes back
The counter-offensive is getting under way. The next few weeks will be critical
Trailed ten days early with a blood-stirring video in which Ukrainian troops asked God to bless their “sacred revenge”, Ukraine’s counter-offensive is under way. For
weeks its armed forces have conducted probing and shaping operations along the 1000km front line, looking for weaknesses and confusing the Russians. Now
Ukraine is testing enemy defences with an intensity not seen for months, with attacks against the occupiers in a series of positions in the east and south. The
apparent demolition of the Kakhovka dam on June 6th, if it was indeed Russian sabotage as Western military sources believe, would be clear evidence that they
are already feeling the pressure.
More will come in the days ahead. The main force has yet to be sent into batttle. The operation will last well into the summer. However, what happens in these
next weeks will shape the future not just of Ukraine itself, but of the whole security order in Europe. The point of decision has arrived.
The task for Ukraine, bluntly, is to show Vladimir Putin, his henchmen, his compatriots and the wider watching world that Russia cannot win; that this invasion has
been misconceived from the outset; that Russia cannot outlast Ukraine and its Western backers; and that the Kremlin’s best option is to give up before Russia
suffers yet more losses and humiliation.
That is no easy task, and the risk of failure is real. But thanks to Ukraine’s astonishing determination, and the strong and unexpectedly unit backing of the West,
success is possible. It requires, right now, the strongest diplomatic and military support, and the clearest commitment from the West that it will stand by Ukraine
for many years to come. Mr Putin must no longer be able to lie to himself or his people about the foolishness of the direction he has chosen.
This is why this moment is so critical. The Russians are well dug in and reinforced after months of a mobilisation drive that has replenished the supply of
cannon-fodder. Imagine the worst case: that Ukraine’s counter-offensive peters out, its troops spread too thin, or used too sparingly, to make an impact.
If that happens,it would be a damaging failure. Despite the Russian army’s woeful performance in the months-long fight to take the cit
of Bakhmut, it would
nonetheless start to seem well matched against Ukraine’s. the voice urging Ukraine to stop fighting and start talking would grow louder, even though a ceasefire
would leave Russia in possession of almost 20% of Ukraine and Russian promises of peace would be worthless.
This would be worthless.
This would be a win for Mr Putin--not the total victory he once dreamed of ,but success in his backup objective, to cripple Ukraine if it cannot be returned to the
Russian imperium. There would be recriminations within NATO and the European Union. In America, as it heads towards a divisive presidential election, the
pressure to cut back funds that Republican critics already claim are being wasted would grow. In Europe the backsliders would slide further.
but the fighting may also go differently. Imagine that the invaders break, their troops running back to Mother Russia in fear of encirclement, as they did from
kharkiv last September. That would be a grave setback for Mr Putin. He has lost more than 100,000 dead and wounded, expended tens of billions of dollars’-worth
of military hardware, and shattered his economic relationships with Europe and America: and it would be all for nothing. He would struggle to survive the
humiliation. Although Russia might suffer deep and dangerous instability, many in the West would be glad to see the back of him.
The most likely outcome lies in between. As the summer wears on,Ukraine is likely to push back the Russians in two main ares, gaining territory but not
precipitating a full-scale collapse. The first, and the one where most of the new activity is so far going on, is in Donbas. One clear Ukrainian objective is to reverse
Russian gains there. If Mr Putin starts losing even the territory he has held since his first incursion, in 2014, as well as what he has seized since last February, it will
be apparent to him, his generals and the Russian people what a blunder he has made.
The other objective will surely be a push south. Ukraine will seek to break the “land bridge” that connects Russia to Crimea. If it can do that, everything changes.
Crimea would become isolated, hard to resupply and protect. The collapse of the dam has already threatened its water supply. Large numbers of Russian troops
might be cut off and captured. Ukraine would get back some of its coast on the Sea of Azov. Even if it cannot reach the coast, advancing fare enough to put the
east-west roads and railways that supply Crimea in range of its guns would be an important step.
Yet neither Ukraine Nor Europe will be safe while Mr Putin believes he can launch another invasion later. So the West should understand its commitment must last
for years. While Russia remains a threat, Ukraine will need enough weaponry to hold the line, wherever it settles.
What that means in practice needs to be agreed on now--as a further signal to Russia of the folly of dreaming that this war could one day turn out well. NATO
members are split on whether Ukraine should become a member, and in any case it cannot happen while the war still rages. So willing Western powers must
immediately craft a set of security guarantees for Ukraine that will have credibility, unlike the empty words of the past.
Make Ukraine Putin-proof--Trump--proof
Short of an explicit treaty that will be hard, but not impossible. America, for instance, has legal commitments that oblige it to provide Israel and Taiwan with the
arms they need to defend themselves. The guarantees should cover weapons systems, ammunition, training and support to beef up Ukraine’s own defence
industries. The more countries that sign up to them, the more convincing they would become and the harder they would be to overturn if a Ukraine-sceptic like
Donald Trump were elected. After the fighting stops, Western “tripwire” forces could be stationed on Ukrainian soil.
Ukraine’s fear, and Mr Putin’s hope, is that the West will lose focus. Only a successful counter-offensive and credible security pledges can get Russians to realise
that Mr Putin’s war is futile--that he will never succeed, but can only fail, for fall.
Ukraine strikes back
The counter-offensive is getting under way. The next few weeks will be critical.
Trailed ten days early with a blood-stirring video in which Ukrainian troops asked God to bless their “sacred revenge”, Ukraine’s counter-offensive is under way. For
weeks its armed forces have conducted probing and shaping operations along the 1000 km front line, looking for weaknesses and confusing the Russians. Now
Ukraine is testing enemy defences with an intensity not seen for months, with attacks against the occupiers in a series of positions in the east and south. The
apparent demolition of the kakhovka dam on June 6th, if it was indeed Russian sabotage as Western military sources believe, would be clear evidence that they are
already feeling the pressure.
More will come in the days ahead. The main force has yet to be sent into battle. The operation will last well into the summer. However, what happens in these
next weeks will shape the future not jsut of Ukraine itself, but of the whole security order in Europe. The point of decision has arrived.
The task for Ukraine, bluntly, is to show Vladimir Putin, his henchmen, his compatriots and the wider watching world that Russia cannot win; that this invasion has
been misconceived from the outset;that Russia cannot outlast Ukraine and its Western backers; and that the Kremlin’s best option is to give up before Russia
suffers yet more losses and humiliation.
That is no easy task, and the risk of failure is real. But thanks to Ukraine’s astonishing determination, and the strong and unexpectedly united backing of the west,
success is possible. It requires, right now , the strongest diplomatic and military support, and the clearest commitment from the west that it will stand by Ukraine
for many yeas to come. Mr Putin must no longer be able to lie to himself or his people about the foolishness of the direction he has chosen.
This is why this moment is so critical. The Russians are well dug in and reinforced after months of a mobilisation drive that has replenished the supply of
cannon-fodder. Imagine the worst case: that Ukraine’s counter-offensive peters out, its troops spread too thin, or used to sparingly, to make an impact.
It that happens, it would be a damaging failure.despite the Russian army’s woeful performance in the months-long fight to take the city of Bakhmut, it would
nonetheless start to seem well matched against Ukraine’s. the voice urging Ukraine to stop fighting and start talking would grow louder, even though a ceasefire
would leave Russia in possession of almost 20% of Ukraine and Russian promises of peace would be worthless.
This would be a win for Mr Putin--not the total victory he once dreamed of, but success in his backup objective, to cripple Ukraine if it cannot be retrurned to the
Russian imperium. There would be recriminations within NATO and the European Union. In America, as it heads towards a divisive presidential election, the
pressure to cut back funds that Republican critics already claim are being wasted would grow. In Europe the backsliders would slide further.
But the fighting may also go differently. Imagine that the invaders break, their troops running back to Mother Russia in fear of encirclement, as they did from
kharkiv last September. That would be a grave setback for Mr Putin. He has lost more than 100,000 dead and wounded, expended tens of billions of dollars’-worth
of military hardware, and shattered his economic relationships with Europe and America; and it would be all for nothing. He would struggle to survive the
humiliation, although Russia might suffer deep and dangerous instability, many in the West would be glad to see the back of him.
The most likely outcome lies in between. As the summer wears on, Ukraine is likely to push back the Russians in two main areas, gaining territory but not
precipitating a full-scale collapse. The first, and the one where most of the new activity is so far going on, is in Donbas. One clear Ukrainian objective is to reverse
Russian gains there. If Mr Putin starts losing even the territory he has held since his first incursion, in 2014, as well as what he has seized since last February, it will
be apparent to him, he generals and the Russian people what a blunder he has made.
The other objective will surely be a push south. Ukraine will seek to break the “land bridge’ that connects Russia to Crimea. If it can do that, everything changes.
Crimea would become isolated, hard to resupply and protect. The collapse of the dam has already threatened its water supply. Large numbers of Russian troops
might be cut off and captured. Ukraine would get back some of its coast on the Sea of Azov. Even if it cannot reach the coast, advancing far enough to put the
east-west roads and railways that supply Crimea in range of its guns would be an important step.
Yet neither Ukraine nor Europe will be safe while Mr Putin believes he can launch another invasion later. So the West should understand its commitment must last
for years. While Russia remains a threat, Ukraine will need enough weaponry to hold the line, wherever it settles. What that means in practice needs to be agreed
on now--as a further signal to Russia of the folly of dreaming that this war could one day turn out well. NATO members are split on whether Ukraine should
become a member, and in any case it cannot happen while the war still rages. So willing Western powers must immediately craft a set of security guarrantees for
Ukraine that will have credibility, unlike the empty words of the past.
Make Ukraine Putin-proof--and Trump-proof
Short of an explicit treaty that will be hard, but not impossible. America, for instance, has legal commitments that oblige it to provide Israel and Taiwan with the
arms they need to defend themselves. The guarantees should cover weapons systems, ammunition, training and support to beef up Ukraine’s own defence
industries. The more countries that sign up to them, the more convincing they would become--and the harder they would be to overturn if a Ukraine-sceptic like
Donald Trump were elected. After the fighting stops, Western “tripwire” forces could be stationed on Ukrainian soil.
Ukraine’s fear, and Mr Putin’s hope, is that the West will lose focus. Only a successful counter-offensive and credible security pledges can get Russians to realise
that Mr Putin’s war is futile--that he will never succeed, but can only fail, or fall.
America’s new best friend
India does not love the west. Even so, America needs it
No country except China has propped up Russia’s war economy as much as oil-thirsty India. And few bid democracies have slid further in the rakings of democratic
freedom. But you would not guess it from the rapturous welcome Narendra Modi will receive in Washington next week. India’s prime minister has been afforded
the honour of a state visit by President Joe Biden. The Americans hope to strike defence deals. Mr Modi will be one of the few foreign leaders, along with Winston
Churchill, Nelson Mandela and Volodymyr Zelensky, to address a joint session of Congress more than once. The praise gushed on Capitol Hill about the partnership
makes no mention of Ukraine, democracy or grit in the gears of America’s new best friendship.
As our Asia section explains the global clout of the South Asian giant is rising fast. Its economy is the world’s fifth biggest. Its 18m-strong diaspora is thriving,from
America to the Gulf. And India has become indispensable to America’s effort to assert itself in Asia and deter Chinese aggression. Yet though huge, capitalist,
democratic and wary of China, India is also poor, populist and, as our interview with Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, its foreign minister, outlines, dismissive of the
vestiges of the post-1945 Western order. The relationship is therefore a test case for the messy alliance of democracies emerging in a multipolar world. Can both
sides gain the business and security benefits of cooperation even as they share fewer principles than they may care to admit?
India’s ascent is an uplifting story. One of the fastest-growing economies, its GDP is expected to overtake Japan’s and Germany’s by 2028, even as it treads a novel
path towards getting rich. In contrast to East Asia’s Tigers, India’s exports are powered by services, of which it is the world’s seventh-largest vendor. Think not just
of call centres but data scientists for Goldman Sachs. Infrastructure has also improved under Mr Modi and his immediate predecessors, and manufacturing may
pick up as supply chains diversify from China: Apple assembles 7% of iPhones in India. India’s chief failing is its vast numbers of unskilled, jobless young people. It is
trying to help them by pioneering a digital welfare state.
Thanks in part to its diaspora, India’s soft power is world-beating. The bosses of Alphabet, IBM and Microsoft are of Indian descent, as are the heads of three of
America’s five top business schools. Reflecting the accomplishment of Indian-Americans, 70% of the wider American public view India favourably, compared with
15% for China.
You might think all this makes America and India natural partners. Certainly, a 25-year effort to develop ties has been unaffected by political changes in either
country. India is part of the Quad, a security grouping that includes America,Australia and Japan. In order to augment India’s hard power,America is promoting a
series of defence deals, some of which may be signed in Washington next week, to enhance military-technology cooperation. The Biden administration reckons this
would be the biggest milestone in the bilateral relationship since the striking, in 2005, of a civil-nuclear cooperation agreement.
Ye the relationship faces two potential sources of friction.
First, India’s pro-Western tilt--which became more pronounced after border skirmishes with Chinese troops in 2020--is essentially pragmatic. Ideologically, it is
suspicious of Western countries and flatly rejects their claim to global leadership. From Jawaharlal Nehru to Mr Modi, India considers the post-war order to have
offered it little more than another bout to domination by other countries. The result of these contradictory impulses is disorientating. India is an American strategic
partner that mistrust the West, is unlikely ever to enter a formal alliance with America and is attached to Russia, which supplies it with arms. It is not clear how
much support, if push came to shove, America could expect from India. It wants to bolster its land defences against China, not fight over Taiwan.
The second stick-point is Mr Modi’s attacks on liberal norms. Under his Hindu nationalist, Islampophobic party, India is increasingly hostile to over 200m of its own
people. Lynchings and the dispossession of Christians and Muslims are largely pliant. Though India seems sure to remain a democracy--not least because Mr Modi
is almost guaranteed re-election next year--it is an illiberal one. The fact that only 60m of its 1.4bn people have formal jobs is a potentially explosive situation in a
country prone to rabble-rousing.
Some suggest that America risks repeating its history with China, by showering economic advantages on a rival that ends up turning against it. That seems unlikely.
Mutual suspicion of China alone should keep India close. Primly rejecting cooperation with India because its ideology and democracy do not comform to Western
ideals would only empower China. It would also show that America has failed to adapt to the multipolar world that lies ahead.
Instead, America and tis allies should be realistic about where India’s sympathy lies--with its interests, not theirs--and creative in their efforts to find overlaps
between the two. That means layering the relationship with common endeavours. The Biden administration’s efforts to accelerate technology transfer to India
seem a promising example. By boosting India’s defence industry, America hopes to wean it off dud Russian weapons and provide an affordable new source of arms
for other Asian democracies. Other areas of cooperation could include clean energy and tech, where both seek to avoid relying on China.
An alignment of interests, not principles
America’s foreign policy has always combined realism with idealism. So America must speak out against attacks on democratic norms and human rights, even as it
works more closely with India. For its part, India must get used to the idea that, as it grows more powerful, it will face more scrutiny. Discount the expressions of
unconditional friendship and brotherhood in Washington next week. To work, the relationship will have to function like a long-term business partnership: India and
America may not like everything about it , but think of the huge upside. It may be the most important transaction of the 21 st century.
America’s new best friend
India does not love the West. Even so, America needs it.
No country except China has propped up Russia’s war economy as much as oil-thirsty India. And few big democracies have slid further in the rankings of
democratic freedom. But you would not guess it from the rapturous welcome Narendra Modi will receive in Washington next week. India’s prime minister has
been afforded the honour of a state visit by President Joe Biden. The Americans hope to strike defence deals. Mr Modi will be one of the few foreign leaders, along
with Winston Churchill, Nelson Mandela and Volodymyr Zelensky, to address a joint session of Congress more than once. The praise gushed on Capitol Hill about
the partnership makes no mention of Ukraine, democracy or grit in the gears of America’s new best friendship.
As our Asia section explains,the global clout of the South Asian giant is rising fast. Its economy is the world’s fifth biggest. Its 18m-strong diaspora is thriving, from
America to the Gulf. And India has become indispensable to America’s effort to assert itself in Asia and deter Chinese aggression.Yet though huge, capitalist,
democratic and wary of China, India is also poor, populist and, as our interview with Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, its foreign minister, outlines, dismissive of the
vestiges of the post-1945 Western order. The relationship is therefore a test case for the messy alliance of democracies emerging in a multipolar world. Can both
sides gain the business and security benefits of cooperation even as they share fewer principles than they may care to admit?
India’s ascent is an uplifting story. One of the fastest-growing economies, its GDP is expected to overtake Japan’s and Germany’s by 2028, even as it treads a novel
path towards getting rich. In contrast to East Asia’s Tigers,India’s exports are powered by services, of which it is the world’s seventh-largest vendor. Think not just of
call centres but data sientists for Goldman Sachs. Infrastructure has also improved under Mr Modi and his immediate predecessors, and manufacturing may pick
up as supply chains diversify from China: Apple assembles 7% of iPhones in India. India’s chief failing is its vast numbers of unskilled, jobless young people. It is
trying to help them by pioneering a digital welfare state.
Thanks in part to its diaspora, India’s soft power is world-beating. The bosses of Alphabet, IBM and Microsoft are of India descent, as are he heads of three of
America’s five top business schools. Reflecting the accomplishment of India-Americans, 70% of the wider American public views India favourably, compared with
15% for China.
You might think all this makes America and India natural partners. Certainly, a 25-year effort to develop ties has been unaffected by political changes in either
country. India is part of the Quad, a security grouping that includes America, Australia and Japan. In order to augment India’s hard power, America is promoting a
series of defence deals, some of which may be signed in Washington next week, to enhance military-technology cooperation. The Biden administration reckons this
would be the biggest milestone in the bilateral relationship since the striking, in 2005, of a civil-nuclear cooperation agreement.
Yet the relationship faces two potential sources of friction.First, India’s pro-Western tilt--which became more pronounced after order skirmishes with Chinese
troops in 2020-- is essentially pragmatic. Ideologically, it suspicious of Western countries and flatly rejects their claim to global leadership. From Jawaharlal Nehru
to Mr Modi, India considers the post-ware order to have offered it little more than another bout of domination by other countries. The result of these
contradictory impulses is disorientating. India is an American strategic partner that mistrusts the West, is unlikely ever to enter a formal alliance with America and
is attached to Russia, which supplies it with arms. It is not clear how much support, if push came to shove, America could expect from India. It wants to bolster its
land defences against China, not fight over Taiwan.
The second sticking-point is Mr Modi’s attacks on liberal norms. Under his Hindu nationalist, Islamophobic party, India is increasingly hostile to over 200m of its
own people. Lynchings and the dispossession of Christians and Muslims are becoming more common. The press is cowed and the courts are largely pliant. Though
India seems sure to remain a democracy--not least because Mr Modi is almost guaranteed re-election next year--it is an illiberal one. The fact that only 60m of its
1.4bn people have formal jobs is a potentially explosive situation in a country prone to rabble-rousing.
Some suggest that America risks repeating its history with china, by showering economic advantages on a rival that ends up turning against it. That seems unlikely.
Mutual suspicion of china alone should keep India close. Primly rejecting cooperation with India because its ideology and democracy do not conform to Western
ideals would only empower China. It would also show that America has failed to adapt to the multipolar world that lies ahead.
Instead, America and its allies should be realistic about where India’s sympathy lies--with its interests, not theirs--and creative in their efforts to find overlaps
between the two. That means layering the relationship with common endeavours. The Biden administration’s efforts to accelerate technology transfer to India
seem a promising example. By boosting India’s defence industry, America hopes to wean it off dud Russian weapons and provide an affordable new source of arms
for other Asian democracies. Other areas of cooperation could include clean energy and tech, where both seek to avoid relying on China.
An alignment of interests, not principles.
America’s foreign policy has always combined realism with idealism. So America must speak out against attacks on democratic norms and human rights,even as it
works more closely with India. For its part, India must get used to the idea that, as it grows more powerful, it will face more scrutiny. Discount the expressions of
unconditional friendship and brotherhood in Washington next week. To work, the relationship will have to function like a long-term business partnership: India and
America may not like everything about it, but think of the huge upside. It may be the most important transaction of the 21 st century.
America’s new best friend
India does not love the West. Even so, America needs it.
No country except China has propped up Russia’s war economy as much as oil-thirsty India. And few big democracies have slid further in the rankings of
democratic freedom. But you would not guess it from the rapturous welcome Narendra Modi will receive in Washington next week. India’s prime minister has
been afforded the honour of a state visit by President Joe Biden. The Americans hope to strike defence deals. Mr Modi will be one of the few foreign leaders, along
with Winston Churchill, Nelson Mandela and Volodymyr Zelensky, to address a joint session of Congress more than once. The praise gushed on Capitol Hill about
the partnership makes no mention of Ukraine, democracy or grit in the gears of America’s new best friendship.
As our Asia section explains, the global clout of the South Asian giant is rising fast. Its economy is the world’s fifth biggest. Its 18m-strong diaspora is thriving, from
America to the Gulf. And India has become indispensable to America’s effort to assert itself in Asia and deter Chinese aggression. Yet though huge, capitalist,
democratic and wary of China, India is also poor, populist and ,as our interview with Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, its foreign minister, outlines, dismissive of the
vestiges of the post-1945 Western order. The relationship is therefore a test case for the messy alliance of democracies emerging in a multipolar world. Can both
sides gain the business and security benefits of cooperation even as they share fewer principles than they may care to admit?
India’s ascent is an uplifting story. One of the fastest-growing economies, its GDP is expected to overtake Japan’s and Germany’s by 2028, even as it treads a novel
path towards getting rich. In contrast to East Asia’s Tiger, India’s exports are powered by services, of which it is the world’s seventh-largest vendor. Think not just of
call centres but data scientists for Goldman Sachs. Infrastructure has also improved under Mr Modi and his immediate predecessors, and manufacturing may pick
up as supply chains diversify from China: Apple assembles 7% of iPhone in India. India’s chief failing is its vast numbers of unskilled,jobless young people.it is trying
to help them by pioneering a digital welfare state.
Thanks in part to its diaspora, India’s soft power is world-beating. The bosses of Alphabet, IBM and Microsoft are of Indian descent, as are the heads of three of
America’s five top business schools. Reflecting the accomplishment of Indian-Americans, 70% of the wider American public views India favourably, compared with
15% for China.
You might think all this makes America and India natural partners. Certainly,a 25-year effort to develop ties has been unaffected by political changes in either
country. India is part of the Quad, a security grouping that includes America, Australia and Japan. In order to augment India’s hard power, America is promoting a
series of defence deals, some of which may be signed in Washington next week, to enhance military-technology cooperation. The Biden administration reckons this
would be the biggest milestone in the bilateral relationship since the striking, in 2005, of a civil nuclear cooperation agreement.
Yet the relationship faces two potential sources of friction. First, India’s pro-Western tilt--which became more pronounced after border skirmishes with Chinese
troops in 2020--is essentially pragmatic. Ideologically, it is suspicious of Western countries and flatly rejects their claim to global leadership. From Jawaharlal Nehru
to Mr Modi, India considers the post-war order to have offered it little more than another bout of domination by other countries. The result of these contradictory
impulses is disorientating. India is an American strategic partner that mistrusts the West, is unlikely ever to enter a formal alliance with America and is attached to
Russia, which supplies it with arms. It is not clear how much support, if push came to shove, America could expect from India. It wants to bolster its land defences
against China, not fight over Taiwan.
The second sticking-point is Mr Modi’s attack on liberal norms. Under his Hindu nationalist, Islamophobic party, India is increasingly hostile to over 200m of its own
people. Lynchings and the dispossession of Christians and Muslims are becoming more common. The press is cowed and the courts are largely pliant. Though India
seems sure to remain a democracy--not least because Mr Modi is almost guaranteed re-election next year--it is an illiberal one. The fact that only 60m of its 1.4bn
people have formal jobs is a potentially explosive situation in a country prone to rabble-rousing.
Some suggest that America risks repeating its history with China, by showering economic advantages on a rival that end up turning against it. That seems
unlikely.mutual suspicion of China alone should keep India close. Primly rejecting cooperation with India because its ideology and democracy do not conform to
Western ideals would only empower China. It would also show that America has failed to adapt to the multipolar world that lies ahead.
Instead, America and its allies should be realistic about where India’s sympathy lies--with its interests, not theirs--and creative in their efforts to find overlaps
between the two. That means layering the relationship with common endeavours. The Biden administration’s efforts to accelerate technology transfer to India
seem a promising example. By boosting India’s defence industry, America hopes to wean it off dud Russian weapons and provide an affordable new source of arms
for other Asian democracies. Other areas of cooperation could include clean energy and tech, where both seek to avoid relying on China.
An alignment of interests, not principles
America’s foreign policy has always combined realism with idealism. So America must speak out against attacks on democratic norms and human rights, even as it
works more closely with India. For its part, India must get used to the idea that,as it grows more powerful, it will face more scrutiny. Discount the expression of
unconditional friendship and brotherhood in Washington next week. To work, the relationship will have to function like a long-term business partnership: India and
America may not like everything about it, but think of the huge upside. It may be the most important transaction of the 21st century.
America’s new best friend
India does not love the West. Even so, America needs it.
No country except China has propped up Russia’s war economy as much as oil-thirsty India. And few big democracies have slid further in the rankings of
democratic freedom. But you would not guess it from the rapturous welcome Narendra Modi will receive in Washington next week. India’s prime minister has
been afforded the honour of a state visit by President Joe Biden. The Americans hope to strike defence deals. Mr Modi will be one of the few foreign leaders, along
with Winston Churchill, Nelson Mandela and Volodymyr Zelensky, to address a joint session of Congress more than once. The praise gushed on Capitol Hill about
the partnership makes no mention of Ukraine, democracy of grit in the gears of America’s new best friendship.
As our Asia section explains, the global clout if the South Asian giant is rising fast. Its economy is the world’s fifth biggest. Its 18m-strong diaspora is thriving, from
America to the Gulf. And India has become indispensable to America’s effort to assert itself in Asia and deter Chinese aggression.yet though huge,
capitalist,democratic and wary of China, India is also poor, populist and ,as our interview with Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, its foreign minister, outlines ,dismissive of
the vestiges of the post-1945 Western order. The relationship is therefore a test case for the messy order. The relationship is therefore a test case for the messy
alliance of democracies emerging in multipolar world. Can both sides gain the business and security benefits of cooperation even as they share fewer principles
than they may care to admit?
India’s ascent is an uplifting story. One of the fastest-growing economies, its GDP is expected to overtake Japan’s and Germany’s by 2028,even as it treads a novel
path towards getting rich. In contrast to East Asia’s Tiger, India’s exports are powered by services, of which it is the world’s seventh-largest vendor. Think not just of
call centres but data scientists for Goldman Sachs. Infrastructure has also improved under Mr Modi and his immediate predecessors, and manufacturing may pick
up as supply chains diversify from China: Apple assembles 7% of iPhone in India. India’s chief failing is its vast numbers of unskilled, jobless young people. It is
trying to help them by pioneering a digital welfare state.
Thanks in part to its diaspora, India’s soft power is world-beating. The bosses of Alphabet, IBM and Microsoft are of Indian decent, as are the heads of three of
America’s five top business schools. Reflecting the accomplishment of Indian-Americans, 70% of the wider American public views India favourably, compared 15%
for China.
You might think all this makes America and India natural partners. Certainly, a 25-year effort to develop ties has been unaffected by political changes in either
country. India is part of the Quad, a security grouping that includes America, Australia and Japan. In order to augment India’s hard power, America is promoting a
series of defence deals, some of which may be signed in Washington next week, to enhance military-technology cooperation. The Biden administration reckons this
would be the biggest milestone in the bilateral relationship since the striking,in 2005, of a civil nuclear cooperation agreement.
Yet the relationship faces two potential source of friction. First, India’s pro-Western tilt--which become more pronounced after border skirmishes with Chinese
troops in 2020--is essentially pragmatic. Ideologically, it is suspicious of Western countries and flatly rejects their claim to global leadership. From Jawaharlal Nehru
to Mr Modi, India considers the post-war order to have offered it little more than another bout of domination by other countries. The result of these contradictory
impulses is disorientating. India is an American strategic partner that mistrusts the West, is unlikely ever to enter a formal alliance with America and is attached to
Russia, which supplies it with arms. It is not clear how much support, if push came to shove, America could expect from India. It wants to bolster its land defences
against China, not fight over Taiwan.
The second sticking-point is Mr Modi’s attacks on liberal norms. Under his Hindu nationalist, Islamophobic part, India is increasingly hostile to over 200m of its own
people. Lynchings and the dispossession of Christians and Muslims are becoming more common. The press is cowed and he courts are largely pliant. Though India
seems sure to remain a democracy--not least because Mr Modi is almost guaranteed re-election next year--it is an illiberal one. The fact that only 60m of its 1.4bn
people have formal jobs is a potentially explosive situation in a country prone to rabble-rousing.
Some suggest that America risks repeating its history with China, by showering economic advantages on a rival that ends up turning against it. That seems unlikely.
Mutual suspicion of China alone should keep India close. Primly rejecting cooperation with India because its ideology and democracy do not conform to Western
ideals would only empower China. It would also show that America has failed to adapt to the multipolar world that lies ahead.
Instead, America and its allies should be realistic about where India’s sympathy lies--with its interests,not theirs--and creative in their efforts to find overlaps
between
the two. That means layering the relationship with common endeavours. The Biden administration’s efforts to accelerate technology transfer to India
seem a promising example. By boosting India’s defence industry, America hopes to wen it off dud Russian weapons and provide an affordable new source of arms
for other Asian democracies. Other areas of cooperation could include clean energy and tech, where both seek to avoid relying on China.
An alignment of interests, not principles
America’s foreign policy has always combined realism with idealism. So America must speak out against attacks on democratic norms and human rights, even as it
works more closely with India. For its part, India must get used to the idea that, as it grows more powerful, it will face more scrutiny. Discount the expressions of
unconditional friendship and brotherhood in Washington next week. To work, the relationship will have to function like a long-term business partnership: India and
America may not like everything about it, but think of the huge upside. It may be the most important transaction of the 21 st century.
Creating Ukraine 2.0
For Russia’s war to fail, Ukraine must emerge prosperous,democratic and secure
Ukraine’s war is raging on two fronts. On the 1000km battlefront its armies are attacking the Russians’ deep defences. At the same time, on the home front
Ukraine is defining what sort of country it will be when the fighting stops. Both matter, and both will pose a severe test for Ukraine and its backers.
After two weeks Ukraine’s counter-offensive is falling behind plan. Its forces have retaken some territory, but they have suffered losses and have yet to penetrate
the kilometres-deep array of Russian minefields, tank traps and trenches. Even if they break through some lines, they risk being pinned down and destroyed by
enemy artillery and drones.
That is a sobering prospect. However, the vast majority of Ukraine’s troops have yet to enter the battle and, until they do, nobody--not even Ukraine’s
generals--can know the two sides’ true strength. In the coming weeks the Ukrainian army will establish whether or not Vladimir Putin can hold his ground, and set
the military terms for the rest of the conflict.
The home front is less dramatic, but everything depends on it. Russia may continue to occupy tracts of land, but if Ukraine ends up prosperous, democratic and
secure, then Mr Putin’s war will have failed utterly. By contrast, if Ukraine takes back territory only to sink into a morass of corruption,poverty and political violence,
it will have surrendered the ideals for which its citizens have fought so bravely. A conference in London this week and a NATO summit in Vilnius, in Lithuania, on
July 11th-12th are laying the foundations for success for failure.
Ukraine’s nation-builders face formidable obstacles. The greatest is that, while Mr Putin is in power, this war is unlikely to end with a solid peace treaty. The two
sides may talk--if only to avoid being seen as war-crazy. But Mr Putin’s word is not to be trusted and Ukraine will be unwilling to formally sign away its claim
to
any territory that Russia still occupies. Instead the two armies could dig in. An informal ceasefire could follow, or a low-intensity conflict broken by missile strikes,a
continued blockade and fitful, probing offensives.
The other obstacles are almost as formidable, though at least it is in the power of Ukraine and its allies to overcome them. About 6.2m Ukrainians have fled abroad:
their country needs them back. More than 1m fighters will return from battle, many bearing injuries and mental trauma. The World Bank has estimated that
repairing the damage from the first year of war will cost more than $400bn--and that was before the collapse of the dam at Nova kakhovka, most likely because of
Russian sabotage. Last, as Ukraine leaves behind martial law, it must overcome a history of corruption and misgovernment that Russia has long exploited to
corrode Ukrainians’ faith in their leaders.
To succeed, Ukraine must work on many dimensions at the same time. To attract workers and private capital, it needs to rebuild itself. To unleash the creativity and
enterprise of its citizens, it must ensure that its skies and cities are safe enough from Russian aggression for normal life to flourish. Each of these depends on the
others, and work should start on them now, despite the fighting. Progress will help lock in Western support, which may ebb-especially if Donald Trump is elected in
2024. it will also signal to Mr Putin and his cronies that their war is futile.
The effort starts with money for rebuilding on a vast scale. Ukraine’s economy has stabilised at about two-thirds of its former size. Ultimately, its future rests on
private investment, but government money will be needed first. The London conference set out to galvanise support from development banks and Western
backers as well as tempt businesses to consider a reformed Ukraine as a placed to invest.
Many countries have a vital interest in Ukraine succeeding and Russian aggression being seen to have failed, but these are straitened times. Governments will not
raise enough money, especially if they protect their aid budgets, as they should. Instead they should find a legal process that allows them to treat the $330bn or so
of Russian state money they have frozen as a fund for paying out compensation to Ukraine.
Next comes good government. The war has shunted aside many of the oligarchs who held Ukraine back. Their place has been taken by a cohort of entrepreneurs
and activists, many of them with a background in technology. The government of volodymyr Zelensky has moved against some corruption, including detaining the
head of the Supreme Court on allegations of bribery.
However, Western officials warn that, for all his strengths, Mr Zelensky is bored by the detail that dogged reform entails. When Ukraine finally holds elections it
risks lapsing back into the old, corrupt politics. That is why accession to the European Union is so important. It creates an incentive for reform and the application
of the law. It also submits the government to scrutiny and creates allies for those who dream of transforming their country.
Finally comes security. Eventually, Ukraine needs to join NATO. That would offer permanent security at the lowest cost, because NATO’s Article 5 guarantee would
signal to Mr Putin and his successors that an attack on Ukraine was an attack on the entire alliance--a battle Russia could not win. By binding what will be Europe’s
biggest and best-equipped army into NATO’s structures, it would also help stabilise Ukaine and its borders.
However, Ukraine gains little from joining while battle rages--because that would require suspending Article 5 and any doubt about when it applies would weaken
NATO. Instead Ukraine needs bilateral security guarantees and an accelerated path to NATO membership. These guarantees need to be written into law, as they are
between America and Israel. They should involve money, weapons, intelligence and investment in Ukraine’s arms industry. Western troops may eventually be
based in the country. The aim is to make Ukraine indigestible, rendering a future Russian invasion less feasible.
This is a fearsome agenda. If Ukraine struggles on the battlefront, a greater burden will fall on the home front and the higher will be the obstacles to success. All
the more reason for Ukraine and its allies to press ahead.
The humbling of Vladimir Putin
The Wagner mutiny exposes the Russian tyrant’s growing weakness. But don’t count him out yet.
The Last pretence of Vladimir Putin to be ,as he imagines, one of his nation’s historic rulers was tripped away on June 24th. A band of armed mercenaries swept
through his country almost unopposed, covering some 750km(470 miles) in a single day, seizing control of two big cities and getting to within 200km of Moscow
before withdrawing unharmed.
Mr Putin long ago failed as a reformer, having presided over ever-deepening corruption and economic stagnation and unable to make Russia anything more than a
purveyor of hydrocarbons just as the age of oil and gas is coming to an end. He is failing ever more obviously as a great wartime commander, 16 months after
starting an invasion of Ukraine that he expected to be over in a matter of days but which has turned into a quagmire.Now he has shown that he cannot even
discharge a leader’s first and greatest responsibility, to ensure the security of the state.
Whether Mr Putin’s fall comes soon, or in months or years, he stands revealed as a blunderer. He is not so much a tsar as simply the top thug in the hollowed-out
gangland to which he has reduced Mother Russia. What is more, in a world where power is everything, he now looks like a weakened thug.
Yevgeny Prigozhin, the leader of the Wagner Group,serves as an encapsulation of everything that is despicable about Mr Putin. An ex-con turned restaurateur
turned murderous mercenary in Africa,Syria and Ukraine, Mr Prigozhin ascended only because of Mr Putin’s paranoia and brutality. Mr Putin mistrusts his own
army,so he needed a loyal band of thugs. He wanted deniability for some of his gorier actions abroad, so “private military contractors” like Wagner went on to
commit war crimes on three continents. And Mr Putin used Mr Prigozhin to interfere(again,deniably) in foreign electons, including the one that brought Donald
Trump to power in 2016.
Wagner’s mutiny also encapsulates the rottenness of the state that Mr Putin has created. Amid a feud with his rivals in the regular army, Mr Putin decreed that
Wagner should be brought directly under the defence ministry’s control. That threatened to destroy Mr Prigozhin’s power base, so he mutinied, railing against Mr
Putin’s misconceived war, the incompetence of the Russian army and the losses it was suffering in Ukraine. For all Mr Prigozhin’s brutality, it was a truth that cut
through the Kremlin’s empty propaganda.
Even more shocking, Mr Prigozhin has exposed Mr Putin as out of touch. The mutiny seems to have taken the Kremlin by surprise--so corroded are the intelligence
agencies under the presidency of a former spy. On the morning of June 24th a shaken Mr Putin denounced his creature as a traitor and vowed he would be
punished. Ye just hours later, he agreed to let Mr Prigozhin go scot-free to Belarus, taking Wagner troops with him.
Having created one-man rule, Mr Putin also seemed unable to command loyalty. Although support did not flock to Mr Prigozhin, neither did it to Mr Putin, either
on the streets or among the political and military elites. For 24 nerve-jangling hours Russia stayed silent and inactive,waiting to see which way the wind would
blow.
Optimists will take Mr Putin’s weakness as proof that his rule is doomed. If only that were so. The reality is that despots, even weak ones, can survive for a long
time if no obvious alternative is available, and if they still have plenty of guns on their side and the ruthlessness to use them. Look at Alexander Lukashenko in
next-door Belarus, or Bashar al-Assad in Syria.
However,two extra factors are working against Mr Putin. The first is the war itself. Ukraine’s counter-offensive continues to make steady progress. Although it is
slower than hoped for, it is chipping away at the territorial gains Russia has made since February 2022, and in some places even taking back ground that Russia
seized in its first incursion, in 2014.
Mr Putin’s theory of victory is that Russia can wait out the West. If Ukraine cannot accomplish the breakthroughs it needs--severing the land bridge connecting
Russia to Crimea is the key one--Western support might in time start to fracture. But Mr Putin’s theory is looking ever less plausible. Yes, Russia has succeeded in
hurting Ukraine; but far from being conquered, it has been forged as a nation, and is on a path to membership of the European Union and perhaps of NATO, too.
And far from Mr Putin’s vision of Western disarray, NATO has expanded to take in Finland, and soon Sweden; European defence spending has risen; and
dependence on Russian energy has been eliminated.
By contrast, the loss of over 100,000 Russians, dead and wounded, has brought little for even the Kremlin’s best propagandists to spin as success. The narrative
instead is for the need for ever more sacrifice. Every piece of bad news for Russia from the front adds to the pressure
on Mr Putin. That is why the
counter-offensive is so critical, and why the evidence of division in the Russian ranks is so welcome.
Mr Putin’s second problem is the economy. Last year it held up pretty well, thanks to oil and gas prices that rocketed as the war took hold. Oil shipment have
continued and the state still has plenty of cash. Though growth is down, a full-blown economic crisis looks unlikely this year at least.
However, Mr Putin does not have the resource for a big new offensive. Russia’s gas revenues have crashed( it cut off its best customer, after all), and the global oil
price is down, too. The gap between government spending(including the huge costs of the war) and receipts is widening, forcing Russia to raid its sovereign-wealth
fund. The rouble has lost almost 40% of its value in the past year. China has bought Russian oil--at a discount--but it has not yet supplied large amounts of
weapons.
Mr Putin now appears to be bent on re-establishing his authority by presiding over savage repression and purges. But sooner or later, his ability to ride out trouble
will desert him. The world will need to be ready for that. Of the many possible outcomes, the collapse of order in a country with more than 4,000 nuclear
warheads would be terrifying. Yet Mr Putin has shown that corrupt, one-man rule is no way to run a superpower. The path back to order and sanity for Russia will
be perilous, but for as long as Mr Putin wears the crown and his soldiers dream of imperial rule over Ukraine, the journey cannot even begin.
The humbling of Vladimir Putin
The Wagner mutiny exposes the Russian tyrant’s growing weakness. But count him out yet
The last pretence of Vladimir Putin to be ,as he imagines, one of his nation’s historic rulers was tripped away on June 24th. A band of armed mercenaries swept
through his country almost unopposed, covering some 750km(470miles) in a single day, seizing control of two big cities and getting to within 200km of Moscow
before withdrawing unharmed.
Mr Putin long ago failed as a reformer, having presided over ever-deepening corruption and economic stagnation and unable to make Russia anything more than a
purveyor of hydrocarbons just as the age of oil and gas is coming to an end. He is failing ever more obviously as a great wartime commander, 16 months after
starting an invasion of Ukraine that he expected to be over in a matter of days but which has turned into a quagmire. Now he has shown that he cannot even
discharge a leader’s first and greatest responsibility, to ensure the security of the state.
Whether Mr Putin’s fall comes soon, or in months or years, he stands revealed as a blunderer. He is not so much a tsar as simply the top thug in the hollowed-out
gangland to which he has reduced Mother Russia. What is more, in a world where power is everything, he now looks like a weakened thug.
Yegeny Prigozhin, the leader of the Wagner Group, serves as an encapsulation of everything that is despicable about Mr Putin. An ex-con turned restaurateur
turned murderous mercenary in Africa, Syria and Ukraine, Mr Prigozhin ascended only because of Mr Putin’s paranoia and brutality. Mr Putin mistrusts his own
army, so he needed a loyal band of thugs. He wanted deniability for some of his gorier actions abroad, so “private military contractors” like Wagner went on to
commit war crimes on three continents. And Mr Putin used Mr Prigozhin to interfere(again, deniably)in foreign elections, including the one that brought Donald
Trump to power in 2016.
Wagner’s mutiny also encapsulates the rottenness of the state that Mr Putin has created. Amid a feud with his rivals in the regular army, Mr Putin decreed that
Wagner should be brought directly under the defence ministry’s control. That threatened to destroy Mr Putin’s misconceived war, the incompetence of the Russian
army and the losses it was suffering in Ukraine. For all Mr Prigozhin’s brutality, is was a truth that cut through the Kremlin’s empty propaganda.
Even more shocking, Mr Prigozhin has exposed Mr Putin as out of touch. The mutiny seems to have taken the Kremlin by surprise--so corroded are the intelligence
aagencies under the presidency of a former spy. On the morning of June 24th a shaken Mr Putin denounced his creature as a traitor and vowed he would be
punished. Yet just hours later, he agreed to let Mr Prigozhin go scot-free to Belarus, taking Wagner troops with him.
Having created one-man rule, Mr Putin also seemed unable to command loyalty. Although support did not flock to Mr Prigozhin, neither did it to Mr Putin, either
on the streets or among the political and military elites. For 24 nerve-jangling hours Russia stayed silent and inactive, waiting to see which way the wind would
blow.
Optimists will take Mr Putin’s weakness as proof that his rule is doomed. If only that were so. The reality is that despots, even weak ones, can survive for a long
time is no obvious alternative is available, and if they still have plenty of guns on their side and the ruthlessness to use them. Look at Alexander Lukashenko in
next-door Belarus, or Bashar al-Assad in Syria.
However, two extra factor are working against Mr Putin. The first is the war itself. Ukraine’s counter-offensive continues to make steady progress. Although it is
slower than hoped for, it is chipping away at the territorial gains Russia has made since February 2022, and in some place even taking back ground that Russia
seized in its first incursion, in 2014.
Mr Putin’s theory of victory is that Russia can wait out the West. If Ukraine cannot accomplish the breakthroughs it needs---severing the land bridge connecting
Russia to Crimea is the key one--Western support might in time start to fracture. But Mr Putin’s theory is looking ever less plausible. Yes, Russia has succeed in
hurting Ukraine; but far from being conquered, it has been forged as a nation, and is on a path to membership of the European Union and perhaps of NATO, too.
And far from Mr Putin’s vision of Western disarray, NATO has expanded to take in Finland, and soon Sweden; European defence spending has risen; and
dependence on Russian energy has been eliminated.
By contrast, the loss of over 100,000 Russians, dead and wounded, has brought little for even the Kremlin’s best propagandists to spin as success. The narrative
instead is for the need for ever more sacrifice. Every piece of bad news for Russia from the front adds to the pressure on Mr Putin. That is why the
counter-offensive is so critical, and why the evidence of division in the Russian ranks is so welcome.
Mr Putin’s second problem is the economy. Last year it held up pretty well, thanks to oil and gas prices that rocketed as the war took hold. Oil shipments have
continued and the state still has plenty of cash. Though growth is down, a full-blown economic crisis looks unlikely this year at least.
However, Mr Putin does not have crashed(it cut off its best customer, after all), and the global oil price is down, too. The gap between government
spending(including the huge costs of the war) and receipts is widening, forcing Russia to raid its sovereign wealth fund. The rouble has lost almost 40% of its value
in the past year. China has bought Russian oil--at a discount--but it has not yet supplied large amounts of weapons.
Mr Putin now appears to be bent on re-establishing his authority by presiding over savage repression and purges. But sooner or later, his ability to ride out trouble
will desert him. The world will need to be ready for that. Of the many possible outcomes, the collapse of order in a country with more than 4,000 nuclear
warheads would be terrifying. Yet Mr Putin has shown that corrupt, one-man rule is no way to run a superpower. The path back to order and sanity for Russia will
be perilous, but for as long as Mr Putin wears the crown and his soldiers dream of imperial rule over Ukraine, the journey cannot even begin.
The humbling of Vladimir Putin
The Wagner mutiny exposes the Russian tyrant’s growing weakness. But don’t count him out yet.
The last pretence of Vladimir Putin to be , as he imagines, on of his nation’s historic rulers was stripped away on June 24th. A band of armed mercenaries swept
through his country almost unopposed, covering some 750km(470 miles) in a single day, seizing control of two big cities and getting to within 200km of Moscow
before withdrawing unharmed.
Mr Putin long ago failed as a reformer, having presided over ever-deepening corruption and economic stagnation and unable to make Russian anything more than
a purveyor of hydrocarbons just as the age of oil and gas is coming to and end. He is failing ever more obviously as a great wartime commander,16 months after
starting an invasion of Ukraine that he expected to be over in a matter of days but which has turned into a quagmire. Now he has shown that he cannot even
discharge a leader’s first and greatest responsibility, to ensure the security of the state.
Whether Mr Putin’s fall comes soon, or in months or years, he stands revealed as a blunderer. He is not so much a tsar as simply the top thug in the hollowed-out
gangland to which he has reduced Mother Russia. What is more, in a world where power is everything, he now looks like a weakened thug.
Yevegeny Prigozhin, the leader of the Wagner Group, serves as an encapsulation of everything that is despicable about Mr Putin. An ex-con turned restaurateur
turned murderous mercenary in Africa,Syria and Ukraine, Mr Prigozhin ascended only because of Mr Putin’s paranoia and brutality. Mr Putin mistrust his own army
so he needed a loyal band of thugs. He wanted deniability for some of his gorier actions abroad, so “private military contractors” like Wagner went on to commit
war crimes on three continent. And Mr Putin used Mr Prigozhin to interfere(age, deniably) in foreign elections, including the one that brought Donald Trump to
power in 2016.
Wagner’s mutiny also encapsulates the rottenness of the state that Mr Putin has created. Amid a feud with his rivals in the regular army, Mr Putin decreed that
Wagner should be brought directly under the defence ministry’s control. That threatened to destroy Mr Prigozhin’s power base, so he mutinied, railing against Mr
Putin’s misconceived war, the incompetence of the Russian army and the losses it was suffering in Ukraine. For all Mr Prigozhin’s brutality, it was a truth that cut
through the Kremlin’s empty propaganda.
Even more shocking, Mr Prigozhin has exposed Mr Putin as out of tough. The mutiny seems to have taken the Kremlin by surprise--so corroded are the intelligence
agencies under the presidency of a former spy. On the morning of June 24 th a shaken Mr Putin denounced his creature as a traitor and vowed he would be
punished. Yet just hours later, he agreed to let Mr Prigozhin go scot-free to Belarus, taking Wagner troops with him.
Having created one-man rule, Mr Putin also seemed unable to command loyalty. Although support did not flock to Mr Prigozhin, neither did it to Mr Putin, either
on the streets or among the political and military elites. For 24 nerve-jangling hours Russia stayed silent and inactive, waiting to see which way the wind would
blow.
Optimists will take Mr Putin’s weakness as proof that his rule is doomed. If only that were so. The reality is that despots, even weak ones, can survive for a long
time if no obvious alternative is available, and if they still have plenty of guns on their side and the ruthlessness to use them. Look at Alexander Lukashenko in
next-door Belarus, or Bashar al-Assad in Syria.
However, two extra factors are working against Mr Putin. The first is the war itself. Ukraine’s counter-offensive continues to make steady progress. Although it is
slower than hoped for, it is chipping away at the territorial gains Russia has made since February 2022, and in some places even taking back ground that Russia
seized in its first incursion, in 2014.
Mr Putin’s theory of victory is that Russia can wait out the West. If Ukraine cannot accomplish the breakthroughs it needs--severing the land bridge connecting
Russia to Crimea is the key one--Western support might in time start to fracture. But Mr Putin’s theory is looking ever less plausible. Yes, Russia has succeeded in
hurting Ukraine; but far from being conquered, it has been forged as a nation, and is on a path to membership of the European Union and perhaps of NATO, too.
And far from Mr Putin’s vision of Western disarray, NATO has expanded to take in Finland, and soon Sweden; European defence spending has risen; and
dependence on Russian energy has been eliminated.
By contrast, the loss of over 100,000 Russians, dead and wounded, has brought little for even the Kremlin’s best propagandists to spin as success. The narrative
instead is for the need for ever more sacrifice.every piece of bad news for Russia from the front adds to the pressure on Mr Putin. That is why the
counter-offensive is so critical, and why the evidence of division in the Russian ranks is so welcome.
Mr Putin’s second problem is the economy. Last year it held up pretty well, thanks to oil and gas prices that rocketed as the war took hold. Oil shipments have
continued and the state still has plenty of cash. Though growth is down, a full-blown economic crisis looks unlikely this year at least.
However, Mr Putin does not have the resources for a big new offensive. Russia’s gas revenues have crashed(it cut off its best customer, after all), and the global oil
price is down,too. The gap between government spending(including the huge costs of the war) and receipts is widening, forcing Russia to raid its sovereign-weatlth
fund. The rouble has lost almost 40% of its value in the past year. China has bought Russian oil-at a discount-but it has not yet supplied large amounts of weapons.
Mr Putin now appears to be bent on reestablishing his authority by presiding over savage repression and purges. But sooner or later, his ability to ride out trouble
will desert him. The world will need to be ready for that. Of the many possible outcomes, the collapse of order in a country with more than 4,000 nuclear
warheads would be terrifying. Yet Mr Putin has shown that corrupt, one-man rule is no way to run a superpower. The path back to order and sanity for Russia will
be perilous, but for as long as Mr Putin wears the crown and his soldiers dream of imperial rule over Ukraine, the journey cannot even begin.
The future of war
A new era of high-tech war has begin. Democracies must prepare
Big wars are tragedies for the people and countries that fight them. They also transform how the world prepares for conflict, with momentous consequences for
global security. Britain, France and Germany sent observers to the American civil war to study battles like Gettysburg. The tank duels of the Yom Kippur war in 1973
accelerated the shift of America’s army from the force that lost in Vietnam to the one that thumped Iraq in 1991. that campaign, in turn, led China’s leaders to
rebuild the People’s Liberation Army into the formidable force it is today.
The war in Ukraine is the largest in Europe since 1945. it will shape the understanding of combat for decades to come. It has shattered any illusions that modern
conflict might be limited to counterinsurgency campaigns or evolve towards low-casualty struggles in cyberspace. Instead it points to a new kind of high-intensity
war that combines cutting-edge tech with industrial scale killing and munitions consumption, even as it draws in civilians, allies and private firms. You can be sure
that autocratic regimes are studying how to get an edge in any coming conflict.rather than recoiling from the death and destruction,liberal societies must recognise
that wars between industrialised economies are an all-too-real prospect--and start to prepare.
As our special report explains. Ukraine’s killing fields hold three big lessons. The first is that the battlefield is becoming transparent. Forget binoculars or maps;
think of all-seeing sensors on satellites and fleets of drones. Cheap and ubiquitous, they yield data for processing by ever-improving algorithms that can pick out
needles from haystacks: the mobile signal of a Russian general, say, or the outline of a camouflaged tank. This information can then be relayed by satellites to the
lowliest soldier at the front, or used to aim artillery and rockets with unprecedented precision and range.
This quality of hyper-transparency means that future wars will hinge on reconnaissance. The priorities will be to detect the enemy first, before they spot you; to
build their sensors, whether drones or satellites; and to disrupt their means of sending data across the battlefield, whether through cyber-attacks, electronic
warfare or old-fashioned explosives. Troops will have to develop new ways of fighting, relying on mobility, dispersal, concealment and deception. Big armies that
fail to invest in new technologies or to do develop new doctrines will be overwhelmed by smaller ones that do.
Even in the age of artificial intelligence, the second lesson is that war may still involve an immense physical mass of hundreds of thousands of humans, and millions
of machines and munitions. Casualties in Ukraine have been severe: the ability to see targets and hit them precisely sends the body-count soaring. The adapt,
troops have shifted mountains of mud to dig tranches worthy of Verdun or Passchendaele. The consumption of munitions and equipment is staggering:Russian has
fired 10m shells in a year. Ukraine loses 10,000 drones per month. It is asking its allies for old-school cluster munitions to help its counter-offensive.
Eventually,technology may change how this requirement for physical “mass” is met and maintained. On June 30th General Mark Milley, America’s most senior
soldier, predicted that a third of advanced armed forces would be robotic in 10-15 years’ time: think of pilotless air forces and crewless tanks. Yet armies need to
be able to fight in this decade as well as the next one. That means replenishing stockpiles to prepare for high attrition rates, creating the industrial capacity to
manufacture hardware at far greater scale and ensuring that armies have reserves of manpower. A NATO summit on July 11 th and 12th will be a test of whether
Western countries can continue to reinvigorate their alliance to these ends.
The third lesson-one that also applies for much of the 20th century--is that the boundary of a big war is wide and indistinct. The West’s conflicts in Afghanistan and
Iraq were fought by small professional armies and imposed a light burden on civilians at home(but often lots of misery on local people). in Ukraine civilians have
been sucked into the war as victims--over 9,000 have died--but also participants: a provincial grandmother can help guide artillery fire through a smartphone app.
And beyond the old defence-industrial complex, a new cohort of private firms has proved crucial. Ukraine’s battlefield software is hosted on big tech’s cloud
servers abroad; finnish firms provide targeting data and American ones satellite comms. A network of allies, with different levels of commitment, has helped
supply Ukraine and enforce sanctions and an embargo on Russian trade.
New boundaries create fresh problems. The growing participation of civilians raises legal and ethical questions. Private companies located outside the physical
conflict zone may be subject to virtual or armed attack. As new firms become involved, governments need to ensure that on company is single point of failure.
No two wars are the same. A fight between India and China may take place on the rooftop of the world. A Sino-American clash over Taiwan would feature more air
and naval power, long-rang missiles and disruptions to trade. The mutual threat of nuclear use has probably acted to limit escalation in Ukraine: NATO has not
directly engaged a nuclear-armed enemy and Russia’s threats have been bluster so far. But in a fight over Taiwan, America and China would be tempted to attack
each other in space, which would lead to nuclear escalation, especially if early warning and command-and-control satellites were disabled.
Silicon Valley and the Somme
For liberal societies the temptation is to step back from the horrors of Ukraine, and from the vast cost and effort of modernising their armed forces. Yet they
cannot assume that such a conflict, between large industrialised economies, will be a one-off event. An autocratic and unstable Russia may pose a threat to the
West for decade to come.China’s rising military clout is a destabilising factor in Asia, and a global resurgence of autocracy could make conflicts more likely. Armies
that do not learn the lessons of the new kind of industrial war on display in Ukraine risk losing to those that do.
The future of war
A new era of high-tech war has begun. Democracies must prepare
Big wars are tragedies for the people and countries that fight them. They also transform how the world prepares for conflict,with momentous consequences for
global security. Britain, France and Germany sent observers to the American civil war to study battles like Gettysburg. The tank duels of the Yom Kippur war in 1973
accelerated the sift of America’s army from the force that lost in Vietnam to one that thumped Iraq in 1991. that campaign, in turn, led China’s leaders to rebuild
the People’s Liberation Army into the formidable force it is today.
The war in Ukraine is the largest in Europe since 1945. it will shape the understanding of combat for decades to come. It has shattered any illusions that modern
conflict might be limited to counterinsurgency campaigns or evolve towards low-casualty struggles in cyberspace. Instead it points to a new kind of high-intensity
war that combines cutting-edge tech with industrial-scale killing and munitions consumption, even as it draws in civilians, allies and private firms. You can be sure
that autocratic regimes are studying how to get an edge in any coming conflict. Rather than recoiling from the death and destruction, liberal societies must
recognise that wars between industrialised economies are an all-too-real prospect--and start to prepare.
As our special report explains, Ukraine’s killing fields hold three big lessons. The first is that the battlefield is becoming transparent. Forget binoculars or maps;
think of all-seeing sensors on satellites and fleets of drones. Cheap and ubiquitous, they yield data for processing by ever-improving algorithms that can pick out
needles from haystacks: the mobile signal of a Russian general, say, or the outline of a camouflaged tank. This information can then be relayed by satellites to the
lowliest soldier at the front, or used to aim artillery and rockets with unprecedented precision and range.
This quality of hyper-transparency means that future wars will hinge on reconnaissance. The priorities will be to detect the enemy first, before they spot you; to
blind their sensors, whether drones or satellites; and to disrupt their means of sending data across the battlefield, whether through cyber-attacks, electronic
warfare or old-fashioned explosives. Troops will have to develop new ways of fighting, relying on mobility, dispersal, concealment and deception. Big armies that
fail to invest in new technologies or to develop new doctrines will be overwhelmed by smaller ones that do.
Even in the age of artificial intelligence, the second lesson is that war may still involve an immense physical mass of hundreds of thousands of humans, and millions
of machines and munitions. Casualties in Ukraine have been severe: the ability to see targets and hit them precisely sends the body-count soaring. To adapt, troops
have shifted mountains of mud to dig trenches worthy of Verdun or Passchendaele. The consumption of munitions and equipment is staggering: Russian has fired
10m shells in a year. Ukraine loses 10,000 drones per month. It is asking it allies for old-school cluster munitions to help its counter-offensive.
Eventually, technology may change how this requirement for physical “mass” is met and maintained. On June 30th General Mark Milley, America’s most senior
soldier, predicted that a third of advanced armed forces would be robotic in 10-15 years time: think of pilotless air forces and crewless tanks. Yet armies meed to
be able to fight in this decade as well as the next one. That means replenishing stockpiles to prepare for high attrition rates, creating the industrial capacity to
manufacture hardware at far greater scale and ensuring that armies have reserves of manpower. A NATO summit on July 11 th and 12th will be a test of whether
Western countries can continue to reinvigorate their alliance to these ends.
The third lesson--one that also applied for much of the 20th century--is that the boundary of a big war is wide and indistinct. The West’s conflict in Afghanistan and
Iraq were fought by small professional armies and imposed a light burden on civilians at home(but often lots of misery on local people). in Ukraine civilians have
been sucked into the war as victims--over 9,000 have died--but also participants; a provincial grandmother can help guide artillery fire through a smartphone app.
And beyond the old defence-industrial complex, a new cohort of private firms has prove crucial. Ukraine’s battlefield software is hosted on big tech’s cloud servers
abroad; Finnish firms provide targeting data and American ones satellite commons. A network of allies, with different levels of commitment, has helped supply
Ukraine and enforce sanctions and an embargo on Russian trade.
New boundaries create fresh problems. The growing participation of civilians raises legal and ethical questions. Private companies located outside the physical
conflict zone may be subject to virtual or armed attack. As new firms become involved, governments need to ensure that on company is a single point of failure.
No two wars are the same. A fight between India and China may take place on the rooftop of the world. A Sino-American clash over Taiwan would feature more air
and naval power, long-range missiles and disruptions to trade. The mutual threat of nuclear use has probably acted to limit escalation in Ukraine: NATO has not
directly engaged a nuclear-armed enemy and Russia’s threats have been bluster so far. But in a fight over Taiwan, America and China would be tempted to attack
each other in space, which could lead to nuclear escalation, especially if early-warning and command-and-control satellites were disabled.
Silicon Valley and the Somme
For liberal societies the temptation is to step back from the horrors of Ukraine, and from the vast cost and effort of modernising their armed forces. Yet they
cannot assume that such a conflict, between large industrialised economies, will be a one-off event. An autocratic and unstable Russia may pose a threat to the
West for decades to come. China’s rising military clout is a destabilising factor in Asia, and a global resurgence of autocracy could make conflicts more likely. Armies
that do not learn the lessons of the new kind of industrial war on display in Ukraine risk losing to those that do.
The future of war
A new era of high-tech war has begun. Democracies must prepare.
Big wars are tragedies for the people and countries that fight them. They also transform how the world prepares for conflict, with momentous consequences for
global security. Britain,France and Germany sent observers to the American civil war to study battles like Gettysburg. The tank duels of the Yom Kippur war in 1973
accelerated the shift of America’s army from the force that lost in Vietnam to the one that thumped Iraq in 1991. that campaign, in turn, led China’s leaders to
rebuil the People’s Liberation Army into the formidable force it is today.
The ware in Ukraine is the largest in Europe since 1945. it will shape the understanding of combat for decades to come. It has shattered any illusions that modern
conflict might be limited to counterinsurgency campaigns or evolve towards low-casualty struggles in cyberspace. Instead it points to a new kind of high-intensity
war that combines cutting-edge tech with industrial-scale killing and munitions consumption, even as it draws in civilians, allies and private firms. You can be sure
that autocratic regimes are studying how to get an edge in any coming conflict. Rather than recoiling from the death and destruction, liberal societies must
recognise that wars between industrialised economies are an all-too-real prospect--and start to prepare.
As our special report explains. Ukraine’s
killing fields hold three big lessons. The first is that the battlefield is becoming transparent. Forget binoculars or maps;
think of all-seeing sensors on satellites and fleets of drone. Cheap and ubiquitous, they yield data for processing by ever-improving algorithms that can pick out
needles from haystacks: the mobile signal of a
Russian general, say, or the outline of a camouflaged tank. This information can then be relayed by satellites to the
lowliest soldier at the front, or used to aim artillery and rockets with unprecedented precision and range.
This quality of hyper-transparency means that future wars will hinge on reconnaissance. The priorities will be to detect the enemy first, before they spot you; to
blind their sensors, whether drones or satellites; and to disrupt their means of sending data across the battlefield, whether through cyber-attacks, electronic
warfare or old-fashioned explosives. Troops will have to develop new ways of fighting, relying on mobility, dispersal, concealment and deception. Big armies that
fail to invest in new technologies or to develop new doctrines will be overwhelmed by smaller ones that do.
Even in the age of artificial intelligence, the second lesson is that war my still involve an immense physical mass of hundreds of thousands of humans, and millions
of machines and munitions. Casualties in Ukraine have been severe: the ability to see targets and hit them precisely sends the body-count soaring. To adapt, troops
have shifted mountains of mud to dig trenches worthy of Verdun or Passchendaele. The consumption of munitions and equipment is staggering: Russia has fired
10m shells in a year. Ukraine loses 10,000 drones per month. It is asking its allies for old-school cluster munitions to help its counter-offensive.
Eventually, technology may change how this requirement for physical “mass” is met and maintained. On June 30th General Mark Milley, America’s most senior
soldier, predicted that a third of advanced armed forces would be robotic in 10-15 years’ time: think of
pilotless air forces and crewless tanks. Yet armies need to
be able to fight in this decade as well as the next one. That means replenishing stockpiles to prepare for high attrition rates, creating the industrial capacity to
manufacture hardware at far greater scale and ensuring that armies have reserves of manpower. A NATO summit on July 11 th and 12th will be a test of whether
Western countries can continue to reinvigorate their alliance to these ends.
The third lesson--one that also applied for much of the 20th century--is that the boundary of a big war is wide and indistinct. The West’s conflicts in Afghanistan and
Iraq were fought by small professional armies and imposed a light burden on civilians at home( but often lots of misery on local people). In Ukraine civilians have
been sucked into the war as victims--over 9,000 have died--but also participants: a provincial grandmother can help guide artillery fire through a smartphone app.
And beyond the old defence-industrial complex, a new cohort of private firms has proved crucial. Ukraine’s battlefield software is hosted on big tech’s cloud
servers abroad; Finnish firms provide targeting data and American ones satellite comms. A network of allies, with different levels of commitment, has helped
supply Ukraine and enforce sanctions and an embargo on Russian trade.
New boundaries create fresh problems. The growing participation of civilians raises legal and ethical questions. Private companies located outside the physical
conflict zone may be subject to virtual or armed attack. As new firms become involved, governments need to ensure that no company is a single point of failure.
No two wars are the same. A fight between India and China may take place on the rooftop of the world. A Sino-American clash over Taiwan would feature more air
and naval power, long-range missiles and disruptions to trade. The mutual threat of nuclear use has probably acted to limit escalation in Ukraine: NATO has not
directly engaged a nuclear-armed enemy and Russia’s threats have been bluster so far. But in a fight over Taiwan, America and China would be tempted to attack
each other in space, which could lead to nuclear escalation, especially if early warning and command-and-control satellites were disabled.
Silicon Valley and the Somme
For liberal societies the temptation is to step back from the horrors of Ukraine, and from the vast cost and effort of modernising their armed forces. Yet they
cannot assume that such a conflict, between large industrialised economies, will be a one-off event. An autocratic and unstable Russia may pose a threat to the
West for decade to come. China’s rising military clout is a destabilising factor in Asia, and a global resurgence of autocracy could make conflicts more likely. Armies
that do not learn the lessons of the new kind of industrial war on display in Ukraine risk losing to those that do.
Preparing the way
MAGA Republicans think they know how to make a second Trump term focused and effective
The overwhelming memory of Donald Trump’s time in office is of chaos and resentment. It was summed up by the shameful end to his presidency, when his
whipped-up supporters sacked the Capital in a bid to keep him in power. Mr Trump has since lurched from an ignominious post-electoral impeachment to two
criminal indictments ,with perhaps more in the offing. The former president seems obsessed with relitigating his election loss in 2020:” i am your justice,” he
thundered to a crowd of supporters this year. “I am your retribution”.
Mr Trump is likely to win the Republican presidential nomination for 2024. You might think victory in the general election would foreshadow even more chaos--this
time without the grown-ups who, it turns out, at first reined in their impulsive new boss. In fact, a professional corps of America First populists are dedicating
themselves to ensuring that Trump Two will be disciplined and focused on getting things done. They are preparing the way and you should not dismiss their efforts.
In contrast to the slapdash insurgency that captured the White House in 2016, the veterans of Mr Trump’s first term have been years at work, as our Briefing this
week lays out. Even at this early stage, the details are something to behold. Thousandpage policy documents set out ideas that were once outlandish in Republican
circles but have now become orthodox: finishing the order wall, raising tariffs on allies and competitors alike, making unfunded tax cuts permanent and ending
automatic citizenship for anyone born in the United States. They evince scepticism for NATO and pledge to “end the war on fossil fuels”, by nixing policies designed
to limit climate change.
Alongside these proposals is something that aims to revolutionise the structure of government itself. MAGA Republicans believe that they will be able to enact
their programme only if they first defang the deep state by making tens of thousands of top civil servants sackable. Around 50000 officials would be newly subject
to being fired at will, under a proposed scheme known as Schedule F.
At the same time, to fill the thousands of political appointments at the top of the American civil service, the America Firsters are creating a “conservative LinkedIn”
of candidates whose personal loyalty to Mr Trump is beyond question. Merely expressing qualms about the storming of the Capitol on January 6th 2021 is grounds
for disqualification. None of this is a shadowy conspiracy: it is being planned in the open.
America Firsters will argue that civil-service reform promises to enhance democracy by preventing the unelected bureaucracy from stymying the programme of an
elected president. Although checks and balances are an important part of America’s constitutional design, the civil service is not one of the three branches of
government it enshrines.
That argument does not wash. One objection is practical. The draining of brains from government would come just as the expansion of the American state across
the economy makes a competent bureaucracy more important than ever. Running a modern nation state requires expertise in administration, economics, foreign
affairs and science. If officials cannot challenge political appointees’ madder proposals for fear of being fired, policy will rot from the inside.
A second objection is political. A future Democratic president endowed with imperial powers and unchecked by reality is not something Republicans should wish
for.one reason for the professionalisation of the bureaucracy in the 19th century was to provide the ship of sate with enough ballast to keep sailing from one
administration to the next.
A third objection is that these changes would give an over-mighty president direct control of the Department of Justice. By being able to sack all of its purported
dissenters, the administration would obliterate the norm of legal independence. If so, Trumpian resentment would be channelled into concrete vengeance. That
prospect should concern all Americans.
Having encountered resistance from his previous attorneys-general, the prime criterion for Mr Trump’s next one would be suppleness of spine: a willingness to
quashinvestigations into the president and his allies and to authorise them against his long list of real and perceived political enemies. Although Mr Trump would
have little practical reason to continue to foment distrust in the electoral system--since the constitution precludes a third term--the need to be vindicated about his
supposedly stolen election in 2020 may lead him to do so,all the same.
if the Republicans win both housed of Congress, as is possible, nobody in the executive or the legislature will be in a position to stop Mr Trump. After all, most of
those in charge will already have publicly attested to the legitimacy of storming the Capitol. The federal courts will be come one of the few remaining redoubts of
independence and expertise in the American system. It is hard to see how they will not also come under sustained attack.
If these carefully laid plans were enacted, America would follow Hungary and Poland down the path of illiberal democracy. True, America has more guardrails
against backsliding--including centuries of democratic history and a more raucous and more decentralised media. However, these guardrails are weaker than in the
past. Moreover, many Americans would be left worse off by these plans. Trust in institutions and the rule of the law would suffer, leaving the country yet more
divided.
Donaldus imperator
Some people will try to take comfort from the idea that Mr Trump will not win the primary, or that he will lost the general election. Perhaps his nominees will not
be confirmed, or the emperor of entropy will sabotage his own supporters’ designs. That is unforgivably complacent.
Mr Trump is favourite to win the nomination in a country where general elections are determined by a few tens of thousands of votes. In victory ,a team of
practised demolition experts would prime their explosive ideas. The deconstruction of the administrative state could begin. The vain and tyrannical whims of an
emperor-president would emerge from the rubble.
Preparing the way
MAGA Republicans think they know how to make a second Trump term focused and effective
The overwhelming memory of Donald Trump’s time in office is of chaos and resentment. It was summed up by the shameful end to his presidency, when his
whipped-up supporters sacked the Capitol in a bid to keep him in power. Mr Trump has since lurched from an ignominious post-electoral impeachment to two
criminal indictments, with perhaps more in the offing. The former president seems obsessed with relitigating his election loss in 2020:” I am your justice,” he
thundered to a crowd of supporters this year.”I am your retribution.”
Mr Trump is likely to win the Republican presidential nomination for 2024. You might think victory in the general election would foreshadow even more chaos--this
time without the grown-ups who, it turns out, at first reined in the impulsive new boss. In fact, a professional corps of America First populists are dedicating
themselves to ensuring that Trump Two will be disciplined and focused on getting things done. They are preparing the way and you should not dismiss their efforts.
In contrast to the slapdash insurgency that captured the White House in 2016, the veterans of Mr Trump’s first term have been years at work, as our Briefing this
week lays out. Even at this early stage, the details are something to behold. Thousand-page policy documents set out ideas that were once outlandish in
Republican circles but have now become orthodox: finishing the border wall, raising tariffs on allies and competitors alike, making unfunded tax cuts permanent
and ending automatic citizenship for anyone born in the United States. They evince scepticism for NATO and pledge to “end the war on fossil fuels”, by nixing
policies designed to limit climate change.
Alongside these proposals is something that aims to revolutionise the structure of governments itself. MAGA Republicans believe that they will be able to enact
their programme only if they first defang the deep state by making tens of thousands of top civil servants sackable. Around 50,000 officials would be newly subject
o being fired at will,under a proposed scheme known as Schedule F.
At the same time, to fill the thousands of political appointments at the top of the American civil service, the America Firsters are creating a “conservative LinkedIn”
of candidates whose personal loyalty to Mr Trump is beyond question. Merely expressing qualms about the storming of the Capital on January 6th 2021 is grounds
for disqualification. None of this is a shadowy conspiracy: it is being planned in the open.
America Firsters will argue that civil-service reform promises to enhance democracy by preventing the unelected bureaucracy from stymying the programme of an
elected president. Although checks and balances are an important part of America’s constitutional design, the civil service is not one of the three branches of
government it enshrines.
That arguments does not wash. One objection is practical. The draining of brains from government would come just as the expansion of the American state across
the economy makes a competent bureaucracy more important than ever. Running a modern nation state requires expertise in administration, economics, foreign
affairs and science. If officials cannot challenge political appointees’ madder proposals for fear of being fired, policy will rot from the inside.
A second objection is political. A future Democratic president endowed with imperial powers and unchecked by reality is not something Republicans should wish
for. One reason for the professionalisation of the bureaucracy in the 19th century was to provide the ship of state with enough ballast to keep sailing from on
administration to the next.
A third objection is that these changes would give an overmighty president direct control of the Department of Justice. By being able to sack all of its purported
dissenters, the administration would obliterate the norm of legal independence. If so, Trumpian resentment would be channelled into concrete vengeance. That
prospect should concern all Americans.
Having encountered resistance from his previous attorneys-general, the prime criterion for Mr Trump’s next one would be a suppleness of spine: a willingness to
quash investigations into the president and his allies and to authorise them against his long list of real and perceived political enemies. Although Mr Trump would
have little practical reason to continue to foment distrust in the electoral system--since the constitution precludes a third term--the next to be vindicated about his
supposedly a stolen election in 2020 may lead him to do so ,all the same.
If the Republicans win both houses of Congress, as is possible, nobody in the executive or the legislature will be in a position to stop Mr Trump. After all, most of
those in charge will already have publicly attested to the legitimacy of storming the Capitol. The federal courts will become one of the few remaining redoubts of
independence and expertise in the American system. It is hard to see how they will not also come under sustained attack.
If these carefully laid plans were enacted, America would follow Hungary and Poland down the path of illiberal democracy. True, America has more guardrails
against backsliding--including centuries of democratic history and a more raucous and more decentralised media. However, these guardrails are weaker than in the
past. Moreover, many Americans would be left worse off by these plans. Trust in institutions and the rule of the law would suffer, leaving the country yet more
divided.
Donaldus imperator
Some people will try to take comfort from the idea that Mr Trump will not win the primary, or that he will lose the general election. Perhaps his nominees will no
be confirmed, or the emperor of entropy will sabotage his own supporters’ designs. That is unforgivably complacent.
Mr Trump is favourite to win the nomination in a country where general elections are determined by a few tens of thousands of votes. In victory, a team of
practised demolition experts would prime their explosive ideas. The deconstruction of the administrative state could begin. The vain and tyrannical whims of an
emperor-president would emerge from the rubble.
Preparing the way
MAGA Republicans thinks they know how to make a second Trump term focused and effective
The overwhelming memory of Donald Trump’s time in office is of chaos and resentment. It was summed up by the shameful end to his presidency, when his
whipped-up supporters sacked the Capitol in a bid to keep him in power. Mr Trump has since lurched from an ignominious post-electoral impeachment to two
criminal indictments, with perhaps more in the offing. The former president seems obsessed with relitigating his election loss in 2020:” I am your justice,” he
thundered to a crowd of supporters this year.” I am your retribution.”
Mr Trump is likely to win the Republican presidential nomination for 2024. You might think victory in the general election would foreshadow even more chaos--this
time without the grown-ups who, it turns out, at fist reined in their impulsive new boss. In fact, a professional corps of America First populists are dedicating
themselves to ensuring that Trump Two will be disciplined and focused on getting things done. They are preparing the way and you should not dismiss their efforts.
In contrast to the slapdash insurgency that captured the White House in 2016, the veterans of Mr Trump’s first term have been years at work, as our Briefing this
week lays out. Even at this early stage, the details are something to behold. Thousand-page policy documents set out ideas that were once outlandish in
Republican circles but have now become orthodox: finishing the border wall, raising tariffs on allies and competitors alike, making unfunded tax cuts permanent
and ending automatic citizenship for anyone born in the United States. They evince scepticism for NATO and pledge to “end the war on fossil fuels”, by nixing
policies designed to limit climate change.
Alongside these proposals is something that aims to revolutionise the structure of government itself. MAGA Republicans believe that they will be able to enact
their programme only if they first defang the deep state by making tens of thousands of top civil servants sackable. Around 50,000 officials would be newly subject
to being fired at will, under a proposed scheme known as Schedule F.
At the same time, to fill the thousands of political appointments at the top of the American civil service, the America Firsters are creating a “conservative LinkedIn”
of candidates whose personal loyalty of Mr Trump is beyond question. Merely expressing qualms about the storming of the Capitol on January 6 th 2021 is grounds
for disqualification. None of this is a shadowy conspiracy: it is being planned in the open.
America Firsters will argue that civil-service reform promises to enhance democracy by preventing the unelected bureaucracy from stymying the programme of an
elected president. Although checks and balances are an important part of America’s constitutional design, the civil service is not one of the three branches of
government it enshrines.
That argument does not wash. One objection is practical. The draining of brains from government would come just as the expansion of the American state across
the economy makes a competent bureaucracy more important than even. Running a modern nation state requires expertise in administration, economics, foreign
affairs and science. If officials cannot challenge political appointees’ madder proposals for fear of being fired, policy will rot from the inside.
A second objection is political. A future Democratic president endowed with imperial powers and unchecked by reality is not something Republicans should wish
for. One reason for the professionalisation of the bureaucracy in the 19th century was to provide the ship of state with enough ballast to keep sailing from one
administration to the next.
A third objection is that these changes would give an over-mighty president direct control of the Department of Justice. By being able to sack all of its purported
dissenters, the administration would obliterate the norm of legal independence. If so , Trumpian resentment would be channelled into concrete vengeance. That
prospect should concern all Americans.
Having encountered resistance from his previous attorneys-general, the prime criterion for Mr Trump’s next one would be a suppleness of spine: a willingness to
quash investigations into the president and his allies and to authorise them against his long list of real and perceived political enemies. Although Mr Trump would
have little practical reason to continue to foment distrust in the electoral system--since the constitution precludes a third term--the need to be vindicated about his
supposedly stolen election in 2020 may lead him to do so , all the same.
If the Republicans win both houses of Congress, as is possible, nobody in the executive or the legislature will be in a position to stop Mr Trump. After all, most of
those in charge will already have publicly attested to the legitimacy of storming the Capitol. The federal courts will become one of the few remaining redoubts of
independence and expertise in the American system. It is hard to see how they will not also come under sustained attack.
If these carefully laid plans were enacted, America would follow Hungary and Poland down the path of illiberal democracy. True, America has more guardrails
against backsliding--including centuries of democratic history and a more raucous and more decentralised media. However, these guardrails are weaker than in the
past. Moreover, many Americans would be left worse off by these plans. Trust in institutions and the rule of the law would suffer, leaving the country yet more
divided.
Donaldus imperator
Some people will try to take comfort from the idea that Mr Trump will not win the primary, or that he will lose the general election. Perhaps his nominees will not
be confirmed, or the emperor of entropy will sabotage his own supporters’ designs. That is unforgivably complacent.
Mr Trump is favourite to win the nomination in a country where general elections are determined by a few tens
of thousands of votes. In victory, a team of
practised demolition experts would prime their explosive ideas. The deconstruction of the administrative state could begin. The vain and tyrannical whims of an
emperor-president would emerge from the rubble.
Preparing the Way
MAGA Republicans think they know how to make a second Trump term focused and effective
The overwhelming memory of Donald Trump’s time in office is of chaos and resentment. It was summed up by the shameful end to his presidency. It was summed
up by the shameful end to his presidency, when his whipped-up supporters sacked the Capitol in a bide to keep him in power. Mr Trump has since lurched from an
ignominious post-electoral impeachment to two criminal indictments, with perhaps more in the offing. The former president seems obsessed with relitigating his
election loss in 2020:” I am your justice,” he thundered to a crowd of supporters this year.” I am your retribution.”
Mr Trump is likely to win the Republican presidential nomination for 2024. You might think victory in the general election would foreshadow even more chaos--this
time without the grown-ups who, it turns out, at first reined in their impulsive new boss. In fact, a professional corps of America First populists are dedicating
themselves to ensuring that Trump Two will be disciplined and focused on getting things done. They are preparing the way and you should not dismiss their efforts.
In contrast to the slapdash insurgency that captured the White House in 2016, the veterans of Mr Trump’s first term have been years at work, as our Briefing this
week lays out. Even at this early stage, the details are something to behold. Thousand-page policy documents set out ideas that were once outlandish in
Republican circles but have know become orthodox: finishing the border wall, raising
tariffs on allies and competitors alike, making unfunded tax cuts permanent
and ending automatic citizenship for anyone born in the United States. They evince scepticism for NATO and pledge to “end the war on fossil fuels”, by nixing
policies designed to limit climate change.
Alongside these proposals is something that aims to revolutionise the structure of government itself. MAGA Republicans believe that they will be able to enact
their programme only if they first defang the deep state by making tens of thousands of top civil servants sackable. Around 50,000 officials would be newly subject
to being fired at will, under a proposed scheme known as Schedule F.
At the same time, to fill the thousands of political appointments at the top of the American civil service, the America Firsters are creating a “conservative LinkedIn”
of candidates whose personal loyalty to Mr Trump is beyond question. Merely expressing qualms about the storming of the Capitol on January 6th 2021 is grounds
for disqualification. None of this is a shadowy conspiracy: it is being planned in the open.
America Firsters will argue that civil-service reform promises to enhance democracy by preventing the unelected bureaucracy from stymying the programme of an
elected president. Although checks and balances are an important part of America’s constitutional design, the civil service is not one of the three branches of
government in enshrines.
That argument does not wash. One objection is practical. The draining of brains from government would come just as the expansion of the American state across
the economy makes a competent bureaucracy more important than ever. Running a modern nation state requires expertise in administration, economics,foreign
affairs and science. If officials cannot challenge political appointees’ madder proposals for fear of being fired, policy will not rot from the inside.
A second objection is political. A future Democratic president endowed with imperial powers and unchecked by reality is not something Republicans should wish
for. One reason for the professionalisation of the bureaucracy in the 19th century was to provide the ship of state with enough ballast to keep sailing from one
administration to the next.
A third objection is that these changes would give an over-mighty president direct control of the Department of Justice. By being able to sack all of its purported
dissenters, the administration would obliterate the norm of legal independence. If so, Trumpian resentment would be channelled into concrete vengeance. That
prospect should concern all Americans.
Having encountered resistance from his previous attorneys-general, the prime criterion for Mr Trump’s next one would be a suppleness of spine: a willingness to
quash investigations into the president and his allies and to authorise them against his long list of real and perceived political enemies. Although Mr Trump would
lave little practical reason to continue to foment distrust in the electoral system--since the constitution precludes a third term--the need to be vindicated about his
supposedly a third term--the need to be vindicated about his supposedly stolen election in 2020 may lead him to do so, all the same.
If these carefully laid plans were enacted, America would follow Hungary and Poland down the path of illiberal democracy. True, America has more guardrails
against backsliding---including centuries of democratic history and a more raucous and more decentralised media. However, these guardrails are weaker than in
the past. Moreover, many Americans would be left worse off by these plans. Trust in institutions and the rule of the law would suffer, leaving the country yet more
divided.
Donaldus imperator
Some people will try to take comfort from the idea that Mr Trump will not win the primary, or that he will lose the general election. Perhaps his nominees will no
be confirmed, or the emperor of entropy will sabotage his down supporters’ designs. That is unforgivably complacent.
Mr Trump is favourite to win the nomination in a country where general elections are determined by a few tens of thousands of voters. In victory of practised
demolition experts would prime their explosive ideas. The deconstruction of the administrative state could begin. The vain and tyrannical whims of an
emperor-president would emerge from the rubble.
Making babymaking better
IVF is failing most women today. New research holds out hope for the future
After Louise Brown was born in Manchester in July 1978,her parents’ neighbours were surprised to see that the world’s first “test-tube baby” was “normal”: two
eyes, ten fingers, ten toes. In 45 years since, in vitro fertilisation has become the main treatment for infertility around the world. At least 12m people have been
conceived in glassware. An IVF baby takes its first gulp of air roughly every 45 seconds. IVF babies are just as healthy and unremarkable as any others. Yet to their
parents, most of whom struggle with infertility for months or years, they are nothing short of miraculous.
In a world where one person in six suffers from infertility, such successes are rightly celebrated. Less discussed are the problems of IVF. Most courses of treatment
fail. That subjects women and couples to cycles of dreaming and dejection--and gives the fertility industry an incentive to sell false hope. The obstacle is a lack of
progress in understanding the basic mechanisms that determine fertility. At last, however, the science is making headway, holding out more promise and less
heartache for generations of parents to come.
Over the years IVF has become better at making babies and safer for the women who bear the brunt of the treatment. The rate of twin and triplet deliveries has
plummeted, reducing the number of risky pregnancies. Hormone treatments are safer. Combined with egg and sperm freezing, donation and surrogacy, IVF has
given many, including same-sex couples and singletons, a path to parenthood where they had none.
yet the process remains gruelling and costly. It is physically painful for women, and emotionally draining for both sexes. For many, fertility treatment is an
unaffordable luxury; in America, for instance, a cycle can cost $20,000. some countries ration treatment according to a conservative moral code. Until 2021 French
law permitted IVF only for married heterosexual couples. Many countries including China forbid egg freezing, which extends reproductive years.
All too often, the pain and the cost come to nothing. The 770,000 IVF babies born in 2018 required some 3m cycles. Many women go through round after round of
hormone injections, sometimes moving from one clinic to the next. In America and Britain roughly half go home with a baby in their arms, even after several years
and as many as eight cycles of treatment.
This has fostered a fertility industry selling to repeat customers desperate to conceive. When a cycle fails, many clinics offer poorly regulated menus of “add-ons”
that do not demonstrably raise the chances of success, and may even reduce them. They can charge hundreds to thousands of dollars for a treatment.
These problems all share a fundamental cause. Although reproduction is one of the most basic aspects of human biology, scientists have an astonishingly poor
grasp of how a new life comes about. The essentials are obvious: a sperm and an egg must meet. But many of the cellular, molecular and genetic underpinnings of
babymaking remain a mystery.
Little is known about how a woman’s stock of eggs is set before she is even born; or why they fade in number and quality until menopause, which among mammals
is known to occur only in humans and five species of whale. The intricacies of how an embryo buries into the womb and connects to the blood supply are also
mysterious. Infertility is often classed as “women’s health”, yet male factors play at least some role in roughly half of heterosexual infertile couples--though how is
often unclear.
In the face of all this, IVF is woefully inadequate. It was devised as a fix for the blocked Fallopian tubes that prevented Ms Brown’s mother from conceiving. But
today, when more couples try for children later in life, a woman’s declining stock of eggs is increasingly likely to be the problem. Here, IVF works by giving people
more rolls of the dice, by collecting more eggs and maximising the odds that they will be fertilised. That will work for the lucky few, but without an entirely new
approach and new treatments, many aspiring parents will endure one disappointment after another.
As our Technology Quarterly reports, recent scientific work offers some hope. Researchers in Japan and America are exploiting stem cells, which have the ability to
become any of the body’s many specialised tissues, to make eggs from skin and blood cells, a process called in vitro gametogenesis(IVG).
In Japan healthy mouse
pups have been created from cells that originated on the tips of their mothers’ tails. Earlier this year researchers announced that they had delivered mouse pups
that shared two genetic fathers. One had contributed sperm, the other skin, which was first turned into stem cells and then into eggs.
Some teams are working towards applying these techniques to humans. If cells safe enough to make healthy babies will ever be available, they are still far off. But
the research is providing new insights into how sperm and eggs are made. IVG
means that researchers may no longer need to rely for their studies on donated
eggs, sperm and embryos, often generously provided by IVF patients. Other teams are using stem cells to build embryo modes(dubbed “embryoids”). These will
never see the inside of a womb but they can help show what happens to the real embryos that do.
In time, novel treatments may follow. Gay couples could have children that are as genetically related to them as those of straight ones.Trans people who are
undergoing gender reassignment could possibly do so without sacrificing their fertility.
All this will take time--which is why IVF will remain important, and why it needs investment and regulation. A better understanding of fertility should help raise the
success rate of IVF, bringing down its emotional and financial costs.
New treatments could eventually herald the biggest transformation in fertility technology since Ms Brown was born. Polling shows that in many countries people
have fewer children than they would like, partly because they are putting off babymaking until later. Where the sexual revolution of the 1960s and ‘70s gave
women the choice not to have babies if they did not wish to, emerging technology could usher in a new revolution, empowering women--and men--to have the
babies they want, when they want them.
Making babymaking better
IVF is failing most women today. New research holds out hope for the future
After Louise Brown was born in Manchester in July 1978, her parent’s neighbours were surprised to see that the world’s first “test-tube baby” was “normal”: two
eyes, ten fingers,ten toes. In the 45 years since, in vitro fertilisation has become the main treatment for infertility around the world. At least 12m people have been
conceived in glassware. An IVF baby takes its first gulp of air every 45 seconds. IVF babies re just as healthy and unremarkable as any others .yet to their parents,
most of whom struggle with infertility for months or years, they are nothing short of miraculous.
In a world where on person in six suffers from infertility, such successes are rightly celebrated. Less discussed are the problems of IVF. Most courses of treatment
fail. That subjects women and couples to cycles of dreaming and dejection--and gives the fertility industry and incentive to sell false hope. The obstacle is a lack of
progress in understanding the basic mechanisms that determine fertility. At last, however, the science is making headway, holding out more promise and less
heartache for generations of parents to come.
Over the years IVF has become better at making babies and safer for the women who bear the brunt of the treatment. The rate of twin and triplet deliveries has
plummeted,reducing the number of risky pregnancies. Hormone treatments are safer. Combined with egg and sperm freezing, donation and surrogacy, IVF has
given many, including same-sex couples and singletons, a path to parenthood where they had none.
Yet the process remains gruelling and costly. It is physically painful for women, and emotionally draining for both sexes. For many, fertility treatment is an
unaffordable luxury; in America, for instance, a cycle can cost $20,000. some countries ration treatment according to a conservative moral code. Until 2021 French
law permitted IVF only for married heterosexual couples. Many countries including China for bid egg freezing, which extends reproductive years.
All too often, the pain and the cost come to nothing. The 770,000 IVF babies born in 2018 required some 3m cycles. Many women go through round after round of
hormone injections, sometimes moving from one clinic to the next. In America and Britain roughly half go home with a baby in their arms, even after several years
and as many as eight cycles of treatment.
This has fostered a fertility industry selling to repeat customers desperate to conceive. When a cycle fails, many clinics offer poorly regulated menus of
“add-ons”that do not demonstrably raise the chances of success, and may even reduce them. They can charge hundreds of dollars for a treatment.
These problems all share a fundamental cause. Although reproduction is one of the most basic aspects of human biology, scientists have an astonishingly poor
grasp of how a new life comes about. The essentials are obvious: a sperm and an egg must meet. But many of the cellular, molecular and genetic underpinnings of
babymaking remain a mystery.
Little is known about how a woman’s stock of eggs is set before she is even born; or why they fade in number and quality until menopause, which among mammals
is known to occur only in humans and five species of whale. The intricacies of how an embryo buries into the womb and connects to the blood supply are also
mysterious. Infertility is often classed as “women’s health”, yet male factors play at least some role in roughly half of heterosexual infertile couples--though how is
often unclear.
In the face of all this, IVF is woefully inadequate. It was devised as a fix for the blocked Fallopian tubes that prevented Ms Brown’s mother from conceiving. But
today, when more couples try for children later in life, a woman’s declining stock of eggs is increasingly likely to be the problem. Here IVF works by giving people
more rolls of the dice, by collecting more eggs and maximising the odds that they will be fertilised. That will work for the lucky few, but without an entirely new
approach and new treatments, many aspiring parents will endure on disappointment after another.
As our Technology Quarterly reports, recent scientific work offers some hope. Researchers in Japan and America are exploiting stem cells, which have the ability to
become any of the body’s many specialised tissues, to make eggs from skin and blood cells, a process called in vitro gametogenesis(IVF). In Japan healthy mouse
pups have been created from cells that originated on the tips of their mothers’ tails. Earlier this year researchers announced that they had delivered mouse pups
that shared two genetic fathers. One had contributed sperm the other skin which was first turned into stem cells and then into eggs.
Some teams are working towards applying these techniques to humans. If cells safe enough to make healthy babies will never be available, they are still far off. But
the research is providing new insights into how sperm and eggs are made. IVG means that researchers may no longer need to rely for their studies on donated
eggs,sperm and embryos, often generously provided by IVF patients. Other teams are using stem cells to build embryo models(dubbed “embryoids”). these will
never see the inside of a womb but they can help show what happens to the real embryos that do.
In time, novel treatments may follow. Gay couples could have children that are as genetically related to them as those of straight ones. Trans people who are
undergoing gender reassignment could possibly do so without sacrificing their fertility. All this will take time--which is why IVF will remain important, and why it
needs investment and regulation. A better understanding of fertility should help raise the success rate of IVF, bringing down its emotional and financial costs.
New treatments could eventually herald the biggest transformation in fertility technology since Ms Brown was born. Polling shows that in many countries people
have fewer children than they would like, partly because they are putting off babymaking until later. Where the sexual revolution of the 1960s and 70s gave
women the choice not to have babies if they did not wish to, emerging technology could usher in a new revolution, empowering women--and men--to have the
babies they want, when they want them.
Making babymaking better
IVF is failing most women today. New research holds out hope for the future
After Louise Brown was born in Manchester in July 1978, her parents’ neighbours were surprised to see that the world’s first “test-tube baby” was “normal”: two
eyes, ten fingers, ten toes. In the 45 years since, in vitro fertilisation has become the main treatment for infertility around the world. At least 12m people have
been conceived in glassware. An IVF baby takes its first gulp of air roughly every 45 seconds. IVF babies are just as healthy and unremarkable as any others. Yet to
their parents, most of whom struggle with infertility for months or years, they are nothing short of miraculous.
In a world where one person in six suffers from infertility, such successes are rightly celebrated. Less discussed are the problems of IVF. Most courses of treatment
fail. That subjects women and couples to cycles of dreaming and dejection--and gives the fertility industry an incentive to sell false hope. The obstacle is a lack of
progress in understanding the basic mechanisms that determine fertility. At last, however, the science is making headway, holding out more promise and less
heartache for generations of parents to come.
Over the years IVF has become better at making babies and safer for the women who bear the brunt of the treatment. The rate of twin and triplet deliveries has
plummeted, reducing the number of risky pregnancies. Hormone treatments are safer. Combined with egg and sperm freezing, donation and surrogacy, IVF has
given many, including same-sex couples and singletons, a path to parenthood where they had none.
Yet the process remains gruelling and costly. It is physically painful for women, and emotionally draining for both sexes. For many, fertility treatment is an
unaffordable luxury; in America, for instance, a cycle can cost $20,000. some countries ration treatment according to a conservative moral code. Until 2021 French
law permitted IVF only for married heterosexual couples. Many countries including China forbid egg freezing, which extends reproductive years.
All too often, the pain and the cost come to nothing. The 770,000 IVF babies born in 2018 required some 3m cycles. Many women go through round after round of
hormone injections, sometimes moving from one clinic to the next. In America and Britain roughly half go home with a baby in their arms, even after several years
and as many as eight cycles of treatment.
This has fostered a fertility industry selling to repeat customers desperate to conceive. When a cycle fails, many clinics offer poorly regulated menus of “add-ons”
that do not demonstrably raise the chances of success, and may even reduce them. They can charge hundreds to thousands of dollars for a treatment.
These problems all share a fundamental cause. Although reproduction is one of the most basic aspects of human biology, scientists have an astonishingly poor
grasp of how a new life comes about. The essentials are obvious: a sperm and an egg must meet. But many of the cellular, molecular and genetic underpinnings of
babymaking remain a mystery.
Little is known about how a woman’s stock of eggs is set before she is even born;
or why they fade in number and quality until menopause, which among
mammals is known to occur only in humans and five species of whale. The intricacies of how an embryo buries into the womb and connects to the blood supply
are also mysterious. Infertility is often classed as “women’s health”, yet male factors play at least some role in roughly half of heterosexual infertile couples--though
how is often unclear.
In the face of all this, IVF is woefully inadequate. It was devised as a fix for the blocked Fallopian tubes that prevented Ms Brown’s mother from conceiving. But
today, when more couples try for children later in life, a woman’s declining stock of eggs is increasingly likely to be the problem. Here, IVF works by giving people
more rolls of the dice, by collecting more eggs and maximising the odds that they will be fertilised. That will work for the lucky few, but without an entirely new
approach and new treatments, many aspiring parents will endure on disappointment after another.
As our Technology Quarterly reports, recent scientific work offers some hope. Researchers in Japan and America are exploiting stem cells, which have the ability to
become any of the body’s many specialised tissues, to make eggs from skin and blood cells, a process called in vitro gametogenesis(IVG). In Japan healthy mouse
pups have been created from cells that originated on the tips of their mothers’ tails. Earlier this year researchers announced that they had delivered mouse pups
that shared two genetic fathers. One had contributed sperm, the other skin, which was first turned into stem cells and then into eggs.
Some teams are working towards applying these techniques to humans. If cells safe enough to make healthy babies will never be available, they are still far off. But
the research is providing new insights into how sperm and eggs are made. IVG means that researchers may no longer need to rely for their studies on donated eggs,
sperm and embryos, often generously provided by IVF patients. Other teams are using stem cells to build embryo models(dubbed “embryoids”). these will never
see the inside of a womb but they can help show what happens to the real embryos that do.
In time, novel treatments may follow. Gay couples could have children that are as genetically related to them as those of straight ones. Trans people who are
undergoing gender reassignment could possibly do so without sacrificing their fertility.
All this will take time--which is why IVF will remain important, and why it needs investment and regulation. A better understanding of fertility should help raise the
success rate of IVF, bringing down its emotional and financial costs.
New treatments could eventually herald the biggest transformation in fertility technology since Ms Brown was born. Polling shows that in many countries people
have fewer children than they would like, partly because they are putting off babymaking until later. Where the sexual revolution of the 1960s and ‘70s gave
women the choice not to have babies if they did not wish to,emerging technology could usher in a new revolution, empowering women--and men--to have the
babies they want, when they want them.
Peak China
China’s economy will neither collapse nor overtake America’s by much. That could make the world safer.
The rise of China has been a defining feature of the world for the past four decades. Since the country began to open up and reform its economy in 1978, its GDP
has grown by a dizzying 9% a year, on average. That has allowed a staggering 800m Chinese citizens to escape from poverty. Today China accounts for almost a fifth
of global output. The sheer size of its market and manufacturing base has reshaped the global economy. Xi Jinping, who has ruled china for the past decade, hopes
to use his country’s increasing heft to reshape the geopolitical order, too.
There is just one catch: china’s rapid rise is slowing down. Mr Xi promises a “great rejuvenation” of his country in the coming decades, but the economy is now
undergoing something more prosaic: a great maturation. Whereas a decade ago forecasters predicted that China’s GDP would zoom past America’s during the
mid-221st century and retain a commanding lead, now a much less dramatic shift is in the offing, resulting in something closer to economic parity.
This change in economic trajectory is the subject of fierce debate among China-watchers. They are thinking again about China’s clout and its rivalry with America.
One view is that Chinese power will fall relative to that of its rivals, which could paradoxically make it more dangerous. In a book last year, Hal Brands and Michael
Beckley, two scholars, popularised a theory they called “Peak China”. The country faces decay, they argue, and has reached “the point where it is strong enough to
aggressively disrupt the existing order but is losing confidence that time is on its side”. their study opens with an imagined war over Taiwan.
The peak China thesis rests on the accurate observation that certain tailwinds are turning to headwinds, hindering Chinese progress. The first big gust come from
demography. China’s working-age population has been declining for about a decade. Last year its population as a whole peaked, and India has now overtaken it.
The Communist Party’s attempts to convince Chinese couples to have more children are not working. As a result, the UN thinks that by mid-century China’s
working-age population could decline by over a quarter. Wave goodbye to the masses of young workers who once filled “the world’s factory”.
Adding workers is one way for an economy to grow. Another is to make better use of the existing population. But China’s second problem is that output per worker
is unlikely to rise as fast as forecasters once hoped. More of its resources will go to caring for the elderly. After decades of building houses, roads and railways,
spending on infrastructure faces diminishing returns. Mr Xi’s autocratic tendencies have made local entrepreneurs more nervous, which may reduce China’s
capacity to innovate in the long run. Geopolitical tensions have made foreign firms eager to diversify supply chains away from China. America wants to hobble
China’s capabilities in some “foundational” technologies. Its ban on exporting certain semiconductors and machines to Chinese firms is expected to cut into China’s
GDP.
All of this is dampening long-run forecasts of China’s economic potential. Twelve years ago Goldman Sachs thought China’s GDP would overtake America’s in 2026
and become over 50% larger by mid-century. Last year it revised that prediction, saying China would surpass America only in 2035 and peak at less than 15% bigger.
Others are more gloomy. Capital Economics, a research firm, argues that the country’s economy will never become top dog,instead peaking at 90% of America’s
size in 2035. these forecasts are, of course, uncertain. But the most plausible ones seem to agree that China and America will approach economic parity in the next
decade or so--and remain locked in this position for decades to come.
how might China handle this flatter trajectory? In the most optimistic scenario, Mr Xi would make changes to boost productivity growth. With income per person
less than half of America’s, China’s population will be keen to improve their living standards. He could try to unleash growth by giving the animal spirits of China’s
economy freer rein and his people more freedom of movement. The Chinese government could stop relying on wasteful state-owned banks and enterprises to
allocate capital. And it could adopt a less prickly posture abroad, easing geopolitical tensions and reassuring firms that it is safe to do business in China. Such
reforms might ultimately make China more powerful--but also, one would hope, less aggressive. The trouble is that Mr Xi, who is 69 and now probably China’s ruler
for life, shows no sign of embracing economic or political liberalisation.
Pessimists fear that China will become more combative as its economic trajectory falters.there are plenty of reasons to think this plausible. Mr Xi stokes a
dangerous nationalism, to persuade ordinary Chinese that critics of his rule are slighting China itself. China’s military budget is forecast to rise by over 7% this year,
in line with nominal GDP. Its military spending is lower than America’s, but still catching up. Its navy could be 50% bigger than America’s by 2030, and its nuclear
arsenal will almost quadruple by 2035. “Beijing’s economic power may be peaking, but no other country is so capable of challenging America globally,” write
Messrs Brands and Beckley.
Peer review
Yet the most likely scenario is in the middle ground. The speed of China’s rise in the past two decades has been destabilising, forcing adjustments in he global
economic disruption may now be over. And for all its troubles China’s economy is unlikely to shrink, triggering the kind of nihilistic and destructive thinking that
Messrs Brands and Beckley fear. Mr Xi is unpredictable but his country’s long-run economic prospect is neither triumph nor disaster. Faced with decades of being a
near-peer of America, China has good reason to eschew hubris and resist invading Taiwan. A Crucial question is whether the superpowers can avoid misreading
each other’s intentions, and thus stumbling into a conflict. Next week we will examine America’s global leadership--and how it should respond to China in the
coming age of superpower parity.
The overstretched CEO
Companies are increasingly caught up in government’s competing aims. What to do?
Chief executives have long had to be contortionists, balancing the needs of employees, suppliers and above all shareholders while staying within the limits set by
governments. But the twisting and stretching is now more fiendish than ever. The world is becoming dangerous and disorderly as governments try to manipulate
corporate behaviour. Global companies and their bosses find themselves being pulled in all directions.
Few multinationals are unscathed. As tensions between China and America ratchet up, chipmakers from Micron to Nvida have been the target of sanctions. Tiktok,
a Chinese-owned short-video app, is in the sights of American lawmakers. The Biden administration’s plan to curb outbound investment will encompass
private-equity giants and venture capitalists. Once-staid carmakers now find their investments in the spotlight, as countries vie to host the next electric-vehicle
factory. China’s tech behemoths have been tamed by Xi Jinping. Everyone from bankers to brewers has been ensnared in America’s toxic culture wars.
All this rips up the unspoken agreement between government and business that held sway in America and much of the West after the 1970s. businesses aimed for
shareholder value, by maximising wealth for their owners, promising efficiency, prosperity and jobs. Governments set taxes and wrote rules but broadly left
business alone. Although the gains of the system were not evenly spread across society, trade flourished and consumers benefited from greater choice and
cheaper goods.
The rules have changed. Governments are becoming more dirigiste, spurred by fragile supply chains in the pandemic, a more menacing China and the dangers of
climate change. Company CEOs need a new approach for a new age.
Businesses’ re-entry into politics began in the run-up to the Trump era. By taking a stand on social issues bosses saw a way to signal their distaste for populism--and
surely also a way to signal their virtue to their employees and customers. It was around this time that Larry Fink, the boss of BlackRock, America’s largest asset
manager, became a proponent of investing using environmental, social and governance principles, or ESG.
Yet instead of solving social problems, that seemed only to deepen divisions. As we set out in an extended profile, Mr Fink has been demonished by the right for
going too far and the left for not going far enough. He is not alone. Disney’s former boss, Bob Chapek, waged a battle over gay rights with Florida’s Republican
governor, Ron DeSantis, one reason he lost his job. In Britain Dame Alison Rose, head of NatWest, has resigned over the bank’s cancellation of the Brexiteer Nigel
Farage, partly over his political views. Such encounters bruise egos but do little for the long-term bottom line.
The real front is broader and the stakes are higher. Governments seem to be everywhere all at once. They want to correct the problems of globalisation by winning
back manufacturing jobs. They want to enhance national security by protecting vital technologies. And they want to right climate change by speeding up
decarbonisation.
Each aim is worthy in its own terms. But the means to bring it about are flawed, or involve trade-offs. Manufacturing jobs are not the high-earning prize they are
cracked up to be. Roughly $1trn of green subsidies in America will reduce efficiency and raise costs for firms and consumers. America says national security
requires “a small yard and high fence”, but unless policymakers are clear about the risks from subsidies, export controls and investment curbs,the yard is likely to
get bigger and the fence grow taller. These convulsions affect big firms far more than arguments over who should use which bathroom.yet, out of joint after the
wokelash, few bosses are prepared to say so.
Some companies are wrapping themselves in the flag, so as to become national champions. That has long been the norm in places like China and India, but it is
heading West. After Intel broke ground on two chipmaking fabs in America last year, Pat Gelsinger, its head, said that he “could feel the national pride welling up”.
similar jingoism is on display over generative AI. Grandees of venture capital such as Marc Andreessen express horror at the risk of Chinese AI conquering the
world.
Others hope that by keeping under the radar, they will avoid political flak. Taking their cue from Jack Ma, the once-outspoken boss of Alibaba who was mercilessly
brought to heel by the Chinese government, CEOs have ducked out of public view. Pony Ma, the founder of Tencent, surfaced recently only to pay lip service to
new guidelines set by the Chinese Communist Party. In America Shein, a fast-fashion giant that is a favourite with Gen Z shoppers, does its best to hide its Chinese
roots. So does TikTok, which says it is a “myth” that Bytedance, its owner, is Chinese. Among Western CEOs even a loudmouth like Elon Musk is learning the value
of silence in China. His recent visit to Tesla’s factory in Shanghai privided no media access. He did not even tweet.
Yet both of these strategies could easily go wrong.patriotic cheerleading is a problem when you do business elsewhere in the world. Intel is building fabs not just in
America but in Germany, too. The average American multinational has eight foreign subsidiaries; a giant like General Motors has a hundred. And what the boss
may see as a stealthy below-the-radar strategy can look to others like sticking your head in the sand. Just ask an American lawmaker where they think TikTok is
from.
Corner-office diplomacy
What to do? In a fractious world, businesses cannot hide from politics and geopolitics. But the lesson of the wokelash is that outspokenness can backfire. When
deciding whether to speak up, bosses of global firms should use long-term shareholder value as their lodestar. The more directly what they say affects their
business, the more credibility they have and the less risk of appearing a fraud or a hypocrite.
This approach may include reminding politicians of the benefits that efficiency and openness once brought to economies around the world. When governments
seem to contain a dearth of champions for either, that would be no bad thing.
The overstretched CEO
Companies are increasingly caught up in governments’ competing aims. What to do?
Chief Executives have long had to be contortionists, balancing the needs of employees, suppliers and above all shareholders while staying within the limits set by
governments. But the twisting and stretching is now more fiendish than ever. The world is becoming dangerous and disorderly as governments try to manipulate
corporate behavior. Global companies and their bosses find themselves being pulled in all directions.
Few multinationals are unscathed. As tensions between China and America ratchet up, chipmakers from Micron to Nvidia have been the target of sanctions. Tiktok,
a Chinese-owned short-video app, is in the sights of American lawmakers. The Biden administration’s plans to curb outbound investment will encompass
private-equity giants and venture capitalists. Once-staid carmakers now find their investments in the spotlight, as countries vie to host the next electric-vehicle
factory. China’s tech behemoths have been tamed by Xi Jinping. Everyone from bankers to brewers has been ensnared in America’s toxic culture wars.
All this rips up the unspoken agreement between government and business that held sway in America and much of the West after the 1970s. Businesses aimed for
shareholder value, by maximising wealth for their owners, promising efficiency, prosperity and jobs. Governments set taxes and wrote rules but broadly left
business alone. Although the gains of the system were not evenly spread across society, trade flourished and consumers benefited from greater choice and cheap
goods.
The rules have hanged. Governments are becoming more dirigiste, spurred by fragile supply chains in the pandemic, a more menacing China and the dangers of
climate change. Company CEOs need a new approach for a new age.
Businesses’ re-entry into politics began in the run-up to the Trump era. By taking a stand on social issues bosses saw a way to signal their distaste for populism--and
surely also a way to signal their virtue to their employees and customers. It was around this time that Larry Fink, the boss of BlackRock, America’s largest asset
manager, became a proponent of investing using environmental, social and governance principles, or ESG.
Yet instead of solving social problems, that seemed only to deepen divisions. As we set out in an extended profile,Mr Fink has been demonised by the right for
going too far and the left for not going far enough. He is not alone. Disney’s former boss, Bob Chapek, waged a battle over gay rights with Florida’s Republican
governor, Ron Desantis, one reason he lost his job. In Britain Dame Alison Rose, head of NatWest, has resigned over the bank’s cancellation of the Brexiteer Nigel
Farage, partly over his political views. Such encounters bruise egos but do little for the long-term bottom line.
The real front is broader and the stakes are higher. Governments seem to be everywhere all at once. They want to correct the problems of globalisation by winning
back manufacturing jobs. They watn to enhance national security by protecting vital technologies. And they want to fight climate change by speeding up
decarbonisation.
Each aim is worthy in its own terms. But the means to bring it about are flawed, or involve trade-offs. Manufacturing jobs are not the high earning prize they are
cracked up to be. Roughly $1trn of green subsidies in America will reduce efficiency and raise costs for firms and consumers. America says national security
requires “a small yard and high fence”, but unless policy-makers are clear about the risks from subsidies, export controls and investment curbs, the yeard is likely to
get bigger and the fence grow taller. These convulsions affect big firms far more than arguments over who should use which bathroom. Yet out of joint after the
wokelash, few bosses are prepared to say so .
Some companies are wrapping themselves in the flag, so as to become national champions. That has long been the norm in places like China and India, but it is
heading West. After Intel broke ground on two chipmaking
fabs
in America last year, Pat Gelsinger, its head, said that he “could feel the national pride welling
up”. similar jingoism is on display over generative AI. Grandees of venture capital such as Marc Andreessen express horror at the risks of Chinese AI conquering the
world.
Others hope that by keeping under the radar, they will avoid political flak. Taking their cue from Jack Ma, the once-outspoken boss of Alibaba who was mercilessly
brought to heel by the Chinese government, CEOs have ducked out of public view. Pony Ma, the founder of Tencent, surfaced recently only to pay lip service to
new guidelines set by the Chinese Communist Party. In America Shein, a fast-fashion giant that is a favorite with Gen Z shoppers, does its best to hide its Chinese
roots. So does Tiktok, which says it is a “myth” that Bytedance, its owner, is Chinese. Among Western CEOs even a loudmouth like Elon Musk is learning the value
of silence in China. His recent visit to Tesla’s factory in Shanghai provided no media access. He did not even tweet.
Yet both of these strategies could easily go wrong. Patriotic cheerleading is a problem when you do business elsewhere in the world. Intel is building fabs not just
in America but in Germany, too. The average American multinational has eight foreign subsidiaries; a giant like General Motors has a hundred. And what the boss
may see as a stealthy below-the-radar strategy can look to others like sticking your head in the sand. Just ask an American lawmaker where they think Tiktok is
from.
Corner-office diplomacy
What to do? In a fractious world, businesses cannot hide from politics can geopolitics. But the lesson of the wokelash is that outspokenness can backfire.when
deciding whether to speak up, bosses of global firms should use long-term share holder value as their lodestar. The more directly what they say affects their
business., the more credibility they have and the less risk of appearing a fraud or a hypocrite.
This approach may include reminding politicians of the benefits that efficiency and openness once brought to economies around the world. When governments
seem to contain a dearth of champions for either, that would be no bad thing.
The overstretched CEO
Companies are increasingly caught up in governments’ competing aim. What to do?
Chief executives have long had to be contortionists, balancing the needs of employees, suppliers and above all shareholders while staying within the limits set by
governments. But the twisting and stretching is now more fiendish than ever. The world is becoming dangerous and disorderly as governments try to manipulate
corporate behaviour. Global companies and their bosses find themselves being pulled in all directions.
Few multinationals are unscathed. As tensions between China and America ratchet up, chipmakers from Micron to Nvidia have been the target of sanctions. Tiktok,
a Chinese-owned short video app, is in the sights of American lawmakers. The Biden administrations’ plans to curb outbound investment will encompass
private-equity giants and venture capitalists. Once-staid carmakers now find their investments in the spotlight, as countries vie to host the next electric-vehicle
factory. China’s tech behemoths have been tamed by Xi Jinping. Everyone from bankers to brewers has been ensnared in America’s toxic culture wars.
All this rips up the unspoken agreement between government and business that held sway in America and much of the West after the 1970s. Business aimed for
shareholder value, by maximising wealth for their owners, promising efficiency, prosperity and jobs. Governments set taxes and wrote rules but broadly left
business alone. Although the gains of the system were not evenly spread across society, trade flourished and consumers benefited from greater choice and
cheaper goods.
The rules have changed. Governments are becoming more dirigiste, spurred by fragile supply chains in the pandemic, a more menacing China and the dangers of
climate change. Company CEOs need a new approach for a new age.
Businesses’ re-entry into politics began in the run-up to the Trump era. By taking a stand on social issues bosses saw a way to signal their distaste for populism--and
surely also a way to signal their virtue to their employees and customers. It was around this time that Larry Fink, the boss of BlackRock, America’s largest asset
manager, became a proponent of investing using environmental, social and governance principles, or ESG.
Yet instead of solving social problems, that seemed only to deepen divisions. As we set out in an extended profile, Mr Fink has been demonised by the right for
going too far and the left for not going far enough. He is not alone. Disney’s former boss, Bob Chapek, waged a battle over gay rights with Florida’s Republican
governor, Ron Desantis, one reason he lost his job. In Britain Dame Alison Rose, head of NatWest, has resigned over the bank’s cancellation of the Brexiteer Nigel
Farage, partly over his political views. Such encounters Bruise Egos but do little for the long-term bottom line.
The real front is broader and the stakes are higher. Governments seem to be everywhere all at once. They want to correct the problems of globalisation by winning
back manufacturing jobs. They want to enhance national security by protecting vital technologies. And they want to fight climate change by speeding up
decarbonisation.
Each aim is worthy in its own terms. But the means to bring it about are flawed, or involve trade-offs. Manufacturing jobs are not the high-earning prize they are
cracked up to be. Roughly $1trn of green subsidies in America will reduce efficiency and raise costs for firms and consumers. America says national security
requires”a small yard and high fence”, but unless policy-makers are clear about the risks from subsidies, export controls and investment curbs, the yard is likely to
ge bigger and the fence grow taller. These convulsions affect big firms far more than arguments over who should use which bathroom. Yet, out of joint after the
wokelash, few bosses are prepared to say so.
Some companies are wrapping themselves in the flag, so as to become national champions. That has long been the norm in place like China and India, but it is
heading West. After Intel broke ground on two chipmaking fabs in America last year, Pat Gelsinger, its head, said that he “could feel the national pride welling up”.
similar jingoism is on display over generative AI. Grandees of venture capital such as Marc Andreessen express horror at the risks of Chinese AI conquering the
world.
Others hope that by keeping under the radar, they will avoid political flak. Taking their cue from Jack Ma, the once-outspoken boss of Alibaba who was mercilessly
brought to heel by the Chinese government, CEOs have ducked out of public view. Pony Ma, the founder of Tencent, surfaced recently only to pay lip service to
new guidelines set by the Chinese Communist Party. In America Shein, a fast-fashion giant that is a favourite with Gen Z shoppers, does its best to hide its Chinese
roots. So does Tiktok, which says it is a “myth” that Bytedance, its owner, is Chinese. Among Western CEOs even a loudmouth like Elon Musk is learning the value
of silence in China. His recent visit to Tesla’s factory in Shanghai provided no media access. He dis not even tweet.
Yet both of these strategies could easily go wrong. Patriotic cheerleading is a problem when you do business elsewhere in the world. Intel is building fabs not just
in America but in Germany, too. The average American multinational has eight foreign subsidiaries; a giant like General Motors has a hundred. And what the boss
may see as a stealthy below-the-radar strategy can look to others like sticking your head in the sand. Just ask an American lawmaker where they think TikTok is
from.
Corner-office diplomacy
What to do? In a fractious world, business cannot hide from politics and geopolitics. But the lesson of the wokelash is that outspokenness can backfire. When
deciding whether to speak up, bosses of global firms should use-long term shareholder value as their lodestar. The more directly what they say affects their
business, the more credibility they have and the less risk of appearing a fraud or a hypocrite.
This approach may include reminding politicians of the benefits that efficiency and openness once brought to economies around the world. When governments
seem to contain a dearth of champions for either, that would be no bad thing.
The overstretched CEO
Companies are increasingly caught up in governments’ competing aims. What to do?
Chief executives have long had to be contortionists, balancing the needs of employees, suppliers and above all shareholders while staying within the limits set by
governments. But the twisting and stretching is now more fiendish than ever. The world is becoming dangerous and disorderly as governments try to manipulate
corporate behaviour. Global companies and their bosses find themselves being pulled in all directions.
Few multinationals are unscathed. As tensions between China and America ratchet up, chipmakers from Micron to Nvidia have been the target of sanctions. Tiktok,
a /chinese-owned short-video app, is in the sights of American lawmakers. The Biden administration’s plans to curb outbound investment will encompass
private-equity giants and venture capitalists. Once-staid carmakers now find their investments in the spotlight, as countries vie to host the next electric-vehicle
factory. China’s tech behemoths have been tamed by Xi Jinping. Everyone from bankers to brewers has been ensnared in America’s toxic culture wars.
All this rips up the unspoken agreement between government and business that held sway in America and much of the West of after the 1970s. businesses aimed
for shareholder value, by maximising weather for their owners, promising efficiency, prosperity and jobs. Governments set taxes and wrote rules but broadly left
business alone. Although the gains of the system were not evenly spread across society, trade flourished and consumers benefited from greater choice and cheap
goods.
The rules have changed. Governments are becoming more dirigiste, spurred by fragile supply chains in the pandemic, a more menacing China and the dangers of
climate change. Company CEOs need a new age.
Businesses’ re-entry into politics began in the run-up to the Trump era. By taking a stand on social issues bosses saw a way to signal their distaste for populism--and
surely also a way to signal their virtue to their employees and customers. It was around this time that Larry Fink, the boss of BlackRock, America’s largest asset
manager, became a proponent of investing using environmental, social and governance principles, or ESG.
Yet instead of solving social problems, that seemed only to deepen divisions. As we set out in an extended profile, Mr Fink has been demonised by the right for
going
too far and the left for not going far enough. He is not alone. Disney’s former boss, Bob Chapek, waged a battle over gay rights with Florida’s Republican
governor, Ron DeSantis, one reason he lost his job. In Britain Dame Alison Rose, head of NatWest Nigel Farage, partly over his political views. Such encounters
bruise egos but do little for the long-term bottom line.
The real front is broader and the stakes are higher. Governments seem to be everywhere all at once. They want to correct the problems of globalisation by winning
back manufacturing jobs. They want to enhance national security by protecting vital technologies. And they want to fight climate change by speeding up
decarbonisation.
Each aim is worthy in its own terms. But the means to bring it about are flawed, or involve trade-offs. Manufacturing jobs are not the high-earning prize they are
cracked up to be. Roughly $1trn of green subsidies in America will reduce efficiency and raise costs for firms and consumers. America says national security
requires “a small yard and high fence”, but unless policy-makers are clear about the risks from subsidies, export controls and investment curbs,the yard is likely to
get bigger and the fence grow taller. These convulsions affect big firms far more than arguments over who should use which bathroom. Yet, out of joint after the
wokelash, few bosses are prepared to say so.
Some companies are wrapping themselves in the flag, so as to become national champions. That has long been the norm in place like China and India, but it is
heading West. After Intel broke ground on two chipmaking fabs in America last year, Pat Gelsinger, its head, said that he “could feel the national pride welling up”.
similar Jingoism is on display over generative AI. Grandees of venture capital such as Marc Andreessen express horror at the risks of Chinese AI conquering the
world.
Others hope that by keeping under the radar, they will avoid political flak. Taking their cue from Jack Ma, the once-outspoken boss of Alibaba who was mercilessly
brought to heel by the Chinese government, CEOs have ducked out of public view. Pony Ma, the founder of Tencent, surfaced recently only to pay lip service to
new guidelines set by the Chinese Communist Party. In America Shein, a fast-fashion giant that is a favourite With Gen Z shoppers, does its best to hide its Chinese
Roots. So does TikTok, which says it is a “myth” that Bytedance, its owner, is Chinese. Among Western CEOs even a loudmouth like Elon Musk is learning the value
of silence in China. His recent visit to Tesla’s factory in Shanghai provided no media access. He did not even tweet.
Yet both of these strategies could easily go wrong. Patriotic cheerleading is a problem when you do business elsewhere in the world. Intel is building fabs not just
in America but in Germany, too. The average American multinational has eight foreign subsidiaries; a giant like General Motors has a hundred. And what the boss
may see as a stealthy below-the-radar strategy can look to others like sticking your head in the sand. Just ask an American lawmaker where they think TikTok is
from.
Corner-office diplomacy
What to do? In a fractious,businesses cannot hide from politics and geopolitics. But the lesson of the wokelash is that outspokenness can backfire. When deciding
whether to speak up, bosses of global firms should use long-term shareholder value as their lodestar. The more directly what they say affects their business, the
more credibility they have and the less risk of appearing a fraud or a hypocrite.
This approach may include reminding politicians of the benefits that efficiency and openness once brought to economies around the world. When governments
seem to contain a dearth of champions for either that would be no bad thing.
Costly and dangerous
Joe Biden’s China strategy is not working
On August 9th President Joe Biden unveiled his latest weapon in America’s economic war with China. New rules will police investments made abroad by the private
sector, and those into the most sensitive technologies in China will be banned. The use of such curbs by the world’s strongest champion of capitalism is the latest
sign of the profound shift in America’s economic policy as it contends with the rise of an increasingly assertive and threatening rival.
For decades America cheered on the globalisation of trade and capital, which brought vast benefits in terms of enhanced efficiency and lower costs for consumers.
But in a dangerous world, efficiency alone is no longer enough. In America, and across the West, China’s rise is bringing other aims to the fore. Understandably,
officials want to protect national security, by limiting China’s access to cutting-edge technology that could enhance its military might, and to build alternative
supply chains in areas where China maintains a vice-like grip.
The result is a sprawl of tariffs, investment reviews and export controls aimed at China, first under the previous president, Donald Trump, and now Mr Biden.Janet
Yellen, America’s treasury secretary, has travelled to Delhi and Hanoi to tout the benefits of “friendshoring”, signalling to company bosses that shifting from China
would be wise. Although such “de-risking” measures would lower efficiency, the thinking goes, sticking to sensitive products would limit the damage. And the extra
cost would be worth it, because America would be safer.
The consequences of this new thinking are now becoming clear. Unfortunately, it is bringing neither resilience nor security. Supply chains have become more
tangled and opaque as they have adapted to the new rules. And is you look closely, it becomes clear that America’s reliance on Chinese critical inputs remains.
More worrying, the policy has has had the perverse effect of pushing America’s allies closer to China.
All his may come as a surprise, because, at first glance, the new policies look like a smashing success. Direct economic links between China and America are
shrivelling. In 2018 two-thirds of American imports from a group of “low-cost” Asian countries came from China; last year just over half did. Instead, America has
turned towards India, Mexico and South-East Asia.
Investment flows are adjusting, too. In 2016 Chinese firms invested a staggering $48bn in America; six years on, the figure had shrunk to a mere $3.1bn. For the
first time in a quarter of century, China is no longer one of the top three investment destination for most members of the American Chamber of Commence in
China. For the best part of two decades, China claimed the lion’s share of new foreign-investment projects in Asia. Last year it received less than India or Vietnam.
Dig deeper, though, and you find that America’s reliance on China remains intact. America may be redirecting its demand from China to other countries. But
production in those places now relies more on Chinese inputs than ever. As South-East Asia’s exports to America have risen, for instance, its imports of
intermediate inputs from China have exploded. China’s exports of car parts to Mexico, another country that has benefited from American de-risking, have doubled
over the past five years. Research published by the IMF finds that even in advanced-manufacturing sectors, where America is keenest to shift away from China, the
countries that have made most inroads into the American market are those with the closest industrial links to China. Supply chains have become more complex,
and trade had become more expensive. But China’s dominance is undiminished.
What is going on? In the most egregious cases, Chinese goods are imply being repackaged and sent via third countries to America. At the end of 2022, America’s
Department of Commerce found that four major solar suppliers based in South-East Asia were doing such minor processing of otherwise Chinese products that
they were, in effect, circumventing tariffs on Chinese goods. In other areas, such are rare-earth metals, China continues to provide inputs that are hard to replace.
More often, though, the mechanism is benign. Free markets are simply adapting to find the cheapest way to supply goods to consumers. And in many cases China,
with its vast workforce and efficient logistics, remains the cheapest supplier. America’s new rules have the power to redirect its own trade with China. But they
cannot rid the entire supply chain of Chinese influence. Much of the decoupling, then, is phoney. Worse, from Mr Biden’s perspective, his approach is also
deepening economic links between China and other exporting counties. In so doing, it perversely pits their interests against America’s. Even where governments
are worried about the growing assertiveness of China, their commercial relationships with the biggest economy in Asia are deepening. The regional
Comprehensive Economic Partnership, a trade deal signed in November 2020 by many South-East Asian countries and China, creates a sort of single market in
precisely the intermediate goods in which trade has boomed in recent years.
For many poorer countries, receiving Chinese investment and intermediate goods and exporting finished products to America is a source of jobs and prosperity.
America’s reluctance to support new trade agreements is one reason why they sometimes see it as an unreliable partner. If asked to choose between China and
America, they might not side with Uncle Sam.
Putting the risk into de-risking
All this carries important lessons for American officials. They say that they want to be precise in how they guard against China using a “small yard and high fence”.
but without a clear sence of the trade-offs from their tariffs and restrictions, the risk is that each security scare makes the yard bigger and the fence taller. The fact
that the benefits have so far been illusory and the costs greater than expected underscores the need for laser focus.
Moreover, the more selective the approach, the greater the likelihood that trading partners can be persuaded to reduce their reliance on China in the areas that
really matter. Without it, de-risking will make the world not safer but more dangerous.
The disillusioned generation
China’s young people are disenchanted and full off angst. That is bad for their country---and perhaps the world
The crowd dis not seem excited to see George Michael and Andrew Ridgeley. When Wham! Became the first Western pop group to perform in Communist China,
the audience was instructed to stay in their seats. It was 1985 and, despite appearances, the young people in attendance were in fact joyous. The country around
them was by no means free, but it was starting to reform and open up. Over the next three decades the economy would grow at a rapid pace, producing new
opportunities. An increasing number of Chinese travelled and studied abroad. Even the Communist Party showed signs of relaxing(a bit). those brought up during
this period had high hopes for the future.
Today, reality is falling short of expectations. A dark cloud hangs over Chinese born in the 1990s and 2000s. Since Xi Jinping won power in 2012, the government
has grown more repressive and society less vibrant. Censors have turned the internet into a drearier place, while letting nationalist trolls drum in the state’s
talking-points. At university students must grapple with Mr Xi’s forbidding personal ideology. Worst of all for some, China’s economy is stagnating. The
unemployment rate for those aged 16 to 24 in cities is over 21%--a number so disheartening that earlier this month the government stopped publishing the data,
pending a review.
For our Briefing this week, we talked to young Chinese men and women about how they feel. Plenty still have faith in the party and support Mr Xi’s calls to make
China strong. But many are suffering a deep sense of angst. University graduates are finding that the skills they spent years learning are not the ones employers
want. Scare jobs and punishing property prices have dashed their hopes of buying a home and starting a family. We scraped social media and found that the mood
is growing darker. Disillusioned youth talk of tangping (lying flat) and bailan(letting it rot), synonyms for giving up.
China is hardly the only country where young people are gloomy. Nearly half of Americans aged 18 to 34 say they lack confidence in the future. When Chinese lie
flat, Americans “quiet quit”. perhaps Gen Z and millennials the world over have a tendency to mope. Yet in China, where some 360m people are between the ages
of 16 and 35, something more serious seems to be happening. The ladder to a better life if being lifted away. In response, many are choosing to abandon the rat
race and inwards.for a country that Mr Xi promises to mould into a great power by mid-century, their ennui raises profound questions.
One is whether their malaise carries political risks. Frustrated young folk jolted China in the past, notably in 1989, when students converged on Tiananmen Square
to demand more freedom and less corruption. Last year, fed up with the government’s harsh covid-19 controls , young people gathered in cities across China. Some
called for Mr Xi and the party to relinquish power.
Nobody can rule out the possibility of more unrest. But last year’s protest were small and our reporting suggests that China’s young are not bursting with
revolutionary fevour. They have grown up with an internet bounded by the great firewall, limiting their access to uncensored news and information.brought up on
propaganda about the party’s accomplishments, many continue to support it wholeheartedly. Even hip young urbanites say the government ought to limit some
freedoms.
The real question the party faces is more prosaic: not the threat of revolution, but a quiet rejection of its ambitions. In order to accomplish his goal of restoring
China’s greatness, Mr Xi needs the young to get married, have children and reverse the country’s demographic decline. In order to refocus the economy on
manufacturing and away from consumer-internet technology, he’d like them to study hard sciences, not dream of designing video games. And he wants more
youngsters to work in factories, including the type that might produce weapons for China’s growing armed forces. “Endure hardships” and “eat bitterness”, Mr Xi
tells the young. Many cannot see why they should.
The party is mindful of their disenchantment. Policymakers have taken steps to curb speculation the property market in hope of bringing down prices. Firms have
been pressed to treat their overworked young employees better. Under the banner of “common prosperity”, Mr Xi has aimed to increase social mobility and
reduce inequality. But much of this has backfired. In going after property developers, tech firms and the tutoring industry, he had harmed new graduate’s most
reliable employers.
That leads to the biggest question of all. China’s leader are fond of contrasting their one-party rule with what they tell their people is a flawed and dysfunctional
West, a view stoked but not wholly fabricated by the official media. The unhappiness of young people sets the strengths and weaknesses of each system in clear
relief. It is not comparison that favours China.
Dropouts in America have alternatives to pursue. The country offers many routes to a fulfilling life. An ambitious few have even been able to harness their dissent
to create great art, music or a multi-billion-dollar company. Mr Xi would like young Chinese to find enlightenment in their hardship,too, but not that sort. Advance
comes exclusively through the Communist Party. China’s artists are yoked to its message. Having been branded as the party’s rivals, tech entrepreneurs have been
humiliated.
A small but growing number of well-educated, high-potential young Chinese seem likely to abandon their country. Politicians in America and the wider West often
say they are on the side of ordinary Chinese. They could prove it by ensuring Western universities and economies welcome young people who feel that their
opportunities at home are limited.
Let them dream
However, most young Chinese will stay at home. When Mr Xi plays down their individual aspirations in favour of the collective interest, he adds to their gloom. He
also ignores the role that dreams and choices in their hundreds of millions played in fueling China’s four decades of growth.the party needs to offer its
disenchanted young new paths to peaceful prosperity. The alternatives, including the stoking of angry, militaristic nationalism, would pose a threat to China and
the world.
Xi’s failing model
China’s economy is suffering because an increasingly autocratic government is making bad decisions
Whatever has gone wrong? After China rejoined the world economy in 1978, it became the most spectacular growth story in history. Farm reform, industrialisation
and rising incomes lifted nearly 800m people out of extreme poverty. Having produced just a tenth as much as America in 1980, China’s economy is now about
three-quarters the size. Yet instead of roaring back after the government abandoned its “zero-covid” policy at the end of 2022, it is lurching from one ditch toi the
next.
The economy grew at an annualised rate of just 3.2% in the second quarter, disappointment that looks even worse given that, by one prominent estimate,
America’s may be growing at almost 6%. House prices have fallen and property developers, who tend to sell houses before they are built, have hit the wall, scaring
off buyers. Consumer spending, business investment and exports have all fallen short. And whereas much of the world battles inflation that is too high, China is
suffering from the opposite problem: consumer prices fell in year to July. Some analysts warn that China may enter a deflationary trap like Japan’s in the 1990s.
Yet in some ways Japanification is too mild a diagnosis of China’s ills. A chronic shortfall in growth would be worse in China because its people are poorer. Japan’s
living standards were about 60% of America’s by 1990; China’s today are less than 20%. And, unlike Japan, China is also suffering from something more profound
than weak demand and heavy debt. Many of its economic policy-making--which are getting worse as President Xi Jinping centralise power.
A decade or so ago China’s technocrats were seen almost as savants. First they presided over an economic marvel. Then China was the only big economy to
respond to the global financial crisis of 2007-09 with sufficient stimulatory force---some commentators went as far as to say that China had saved the world
economy. In the 2010s, every time the economy wobbled,officials defied predictions of calamity by cheapening credit, building infrastructure or stimulating the
property market.
During each episode, however, public and private debts mounted. So did doubts about the sustainability of the housing boom and whether new infrastructure was
really needed. Today policymakers are in a bind. Wisely, they do not want more white elephants or to reflate the property bubble. Nor can they do enough of the
more desirable kinds of stimulus, such as pension spending and handouts to poor households to boost consumption, because Mr Xi has disavowed “welfarism”
and the government seeks an official deficit of only 3% of GDP.
As a result, the response to the slowdown has been lacklustre. Policymakers are not even willing to cut interest rates much. On August 21st they disappointed
investors with an underwhelming cut of 0.1 percentage points in the one-year lending rate.
This feeble response to tumbling growth and inflation is the latest in a series of policy errors. China’s foreign-policy swagger and its mercantilist industrial policy
have aggravated an economic conflict with America. At home it has failed to deal adequately with incentives to speculate on housing and a system in which
developers have such huge obligations that they are systemically important. Starting in 2020 regulators tanked markets by cracking down on successful
consumer-technology firms that were deemed to unruly and monopolistic. During the pandemic, officials bought time with lockdowns but failed to use it to
vaccinate enough people for a controlled exit, and then were overwhelmed by the highly contagious Omicron variant.
Why does the government keep making mistakes? One reason is that short-term growth is no longer the priority of the Chinese Communist Party. The signs are
that Mr Xi believes China must prepare for sustained economic and, potentially, military conflict with America. Today, therefore, he emphasises China’s pursuit of
national greatness, security and resilience. He is willing to make material sacrifices to achieve those goals, and to the extent he wants growth, it must be “high
quality”.
Yet even by Mr Xi’s criteria, the CCP’s decisions are flawed. The collapse of the zero-covid policy undermined Mr Xi’s prestige. The attack on tech firms has scared
off entrepreneurs. Should China fall into persistent deflation because the authorities refuse to boost consumption, debts will rise in real value and weigh more
heavily on the economy. Above all, unless the CCP continues to raise living standards, it will weaken its grip on power and limit its ability to match America.
Mounting policy failures therefore look less like a new, self-sacrificing focus on national security, than plain bad decision-making. They have coincided with Mr Xi’s
centralisation of power and his replacement of technocrats with loyalists in top jobs. China used to tolerate debate about its economy, but today it cajoles analysts
into fake optimism. Recently it has stopped publishing unflattering data on youth unemployment and consumer confidence. The top ranks of government still
contain plenty of talent, but it is naive to expect a bureaucracy to produce rational analysis of inventive ideas when the message from the top is that loyalty
matters above all. Instead, decisions are increasingly governed by in ideology that fuses a left-wing suspicion of rich entrepreneurs with a right-wing reluctance to
hand money to the idle poor.
The fact that China’s problems start at the top means they will persist. They even worsen, as clumsy policymakers confront the economy’s mounting challenges.
The populations is ageing rapidly. America is increasingly hostile, and is trying to choke the parts of China’s economy, like chipmaking, that it sees as strategically
significant. The more China catches up with America, the harder the gap will be to close further, because centralised economies are better at emulation than at
innovation.
Liberals’ predictions about China have often betrayed wishful thinking. In the 2000s Western leaders mistakenly believed that trade, markets and growth would
boost democracy and individual liberty. But China is now testing the reverse relationship: whether more autocracy damages the economy. The evidence is
mounting that it does--and that after four decades of fast growth China is entering a period of disappointment.
Costly and dangerous
Joe Biden’s China strategy is not working
On August 9th President Joe Biden unveiled his latest weapon in America’s economic war with China. New rules will police investments made abroad by the private
sector, and those into the most sensitive technologies in China will be banned. The use of such curbs by the world’s strongest champion of capitalism is the latest
sign of the profound shift in America’s economic policy as it contends with the rise of an increasingly assertive and threatening rival.
For decades America cheered on the globalisation of trade and capital, which brought vast benefits in terms of enhanced efficiency and lower costs for consumers.
But in a dangerous world, efficiency alone is no longer enough. In America, and across the West, China’s rise is bringing other aims to the fore. Understandably,
officials want to protect national security, by limiting China’s access to cutting-edge technology that could enhance its military might, and to build alternatively
supply chains in areas where China maintains a vice-like grip.
The result is a sprawl of tariffs, investment reviews and export controls aimed at China, first under the previous president, Donald Trump, and now Mr Biden, Janet
Yellen, America’s treasury secretary, has travelled to Delhi and Hanoi to tout the benefits of “friendshoring”, signalling to company bosses that shifting away from
China would be wise. Although such “de-risking” measures would lower efficiency, the thinking goes, sticking to sensitive products would limit the damage. And
the extra cost would be worth it, because America would be safer.
The consequences of this new thinking are now becoming clear. Unfortunately, it is bringing neither resilience more security. Supply chains have become more
tangled and opaque as they have adapted to the new rules. And, if you look closely, it becomes clear that America’s reliance on Chinese critical inputs remains.
More worrying, the policy has had the perverse effect of pushing America’s allies closer to China.
All this may come as a surprise, because, at first glance, the new policies look like a smashing success. Direct economic links between China and America are
shrivelling. In 2018 two-thirds of American imports from a group of “low-cost” Asian countries came from China; last year just over half did. Instead, America has
turned towards India, Mexico and South-East Asia.
Investment flows are adjusting,too. In 2016 Chinese firms invested a staggering $48bn in America; six years on, the figure had shrunk to a mere $3.1bn. For the first
time in a quarter of a century, China is no longer one of the top three investment destinations for most members of the American Chamber of Commerce in China.
For the best part of two decades, China claimed the lion’s share of new foreign-investment projects in Asia. Last year it received less than India or Vietnam.
Dig deeper, though, and you find that America’s reliance on China remains intact. America may be redirecting its demand from China to other countries. But
production in those places now relies more on Chinese inputs than ever. As South-East Asia’s exports to America have risen, its imports of intermediate inputs from
China have exploded. China’s exports of car parts to Mexico, another country that has benefited from American de-risking, have doubled over the past five years.
Research published by the IMF finds that even in advanced-manufacturing sectors, where America is keenest to shift away from China, the countries that have
made more inroads into the American market are those with the closest industrial links to China. Supply chains have become more complex, and trade has become
more expensive. But China’s dominance is undiminished.
What is going on? In the most egregious cases, Chinese goods are simply being repackaged and sent via third countries to America. At the end of 2022, America’s
Department of commerce found that four major solar suppliers based in South-East Asia were doing such minor processing of otherwise Chinese products that
they were, in effect, circumventing tariffs on Chinese goods. In other areas, such as rare-earth metals, China continues to provide inputs that are hard to replace.
More often, though, the mechanism is benign. Free markets are simply adapting to find the cheapest way to supply goods to consumers. And in many cases China,
with its vast workforce and efficient logistics, remains the cheapest supplier. America’s new rules have the power to redirect its own trade with China. But they
cannot rid the entire supply chain of Chinese influence.
Much of the decoupling, then, is phoney. Worse, from Mr Biden’s perspective, his approach is also deepening the economic links between China and other
exporting countries. In so doing, it perversely pits their interests against America’s. even where governments are worried about the growing assertiveness of China,
their commercial relationship with the biggest economy in Asia are deepening. The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, a trade deal signed in
November 2020 by many South East Asian countries and China, creates a sort of single market in precisely the intermediate goods in which trade had boomed in
recent years.
For many poorer countries, receiving Chinese investment and intermediate goods and exporting finished products to America is a source of jobs and prosperity.
America’s reluctance to support new trade agreements is one reason why they sometimes see it as an unreliable partner. If asked to choose between China and
America, they might not side with Uncle Sam.
Putting the risk into de-risking
All this carries important lessons for American officials. They say that they want to be precise in how they guard against China using a “small yard and high fence”.
but without a clear sense of the trade-offs from their tariffs and restrictions, the risk is that each security scare makes the yard bigger and the fence taller. The fact
that eh benefits have so far been illusory and the costs greater than expected underscores the need for laser focus.
Moreover, the more selective the approach, the greater the likelihood that trading partners can be persuaded to reduce their reliance on China in the areas that
really matter. Without it, de-risking will make the world not safer, but more dangerous.
The disillusioned generation
China’s young people are disenchanted and full of angst. That is bad for their country--and perhaps the world
The crowd did not seem excited to see George Michael and Andrew Ridgeley. When Wham! Became the first Western pop group to perform in Communist China,
the audience was instructed to stay in their seats. It was 1985 and ,despite appearances, the young people in attendance were in fact joyous. The country around
them was by no means free, but it was starting to reform and open up. Over the next three decades the economy would grow at a rapid pace, producing new
opportunities. An increasing number of Chinese travelled and studied abroad. Even the Communist Party showed signs of relaxing(a bit). those brought up during
this period had high hopes for the future.
Today, reality is falling short of expectations. A dark cloud hangs over Chinese born in the 1990s and 2000s. Since Xi Jinping won power in 2012, the government
has grown more repressive and society less vibrant, while letting nationalist trolls drum in the state’s talking-points. At university students must grapple with Mr
Xi’s forbidding personal ideology. Worst of all for some, China’s economy is stagnating. The unemployment rate for those aged 16 to 24 in cities is over 21%--a
number so disheartening that earlier this month the government stopped publishing the data, pending a review.
For our Briefing this week, we talked to young Chinese men and women about how they feel. Plenty still have faith in the party and support Mr Xi’s calls to make
China strong. But many are suffering a deep sense of angst. University graduates are finding that the skills they spent years learning are not the ones empoyers
want. Scarce jobs and punishing property prices have dashed their hopes of buying a home and starting a family. We scraped social media and found that the
mood is growing darker. Disillusioned youth talk of tangping(lying flat) and bailan( letting it rot), synonyms for giving up.
China is hardly the only country where young people are gloomy. Nearly half of Americans aged 18 to 34 say they lack confidence in the future. When Chinese lie
flat, Americans “quiet quit”. perhaps Gen Z and millennials the world over have a tendency to mope.yet in China, where some 360m people are between tha ages
of 16 and 35, something more serious seems to be happening. The ladders to a better life is being lifted away. In response, many are choosing to abandon the rat
race and turn inwards. For a country that Mr Xi promises to mould into a great power by mid-century, their ennui raises profound questions.
One is whether their malaise carries political risks. Frustrated young folk jolted China in the past, notably in 1989, when students converged on Tiananmen Square
to demand more freedom and less corruption. Last year, fed up with the government’s harsh covid-19 controls, young people gathered in cities across China. Some
called for Mr Xi and the party to relinquish power.
Nobody can rule out the possibility of more unrest. But last year’s protests were small and our reporting suggests that China’s young are not bursting with
revolutionary fervour. They have grown up with an internet bounded by the great firewall, limiting their access to uncensored news and information. Brought up
on propaganda about the party’s accomplishments, many continue to support it wholeheartedly. Even hip young urbanites say the government ought to limit some
freedoms.
The real question the party faces is more prosaic: not the threat of revolution, but a quiet rejection its ambitions. In order to accomplish his goal of restoring
China’s greatness, Mr Xi needs the young to get married, have children and reverse the country’s demographic decline. In order to refocus the economy on
manufacturing and away from consumer-internet technology, he’d like them to study hard sciences, not dream of designing video games. And he wants more
youngsters to work in factories, including the type that might produce weapons for China’s growing armed forces. “endure hardships” and “eat bitterness”, Mr xi
tells the young. Many cannot see why they should.
The party is mindful of their disenchantment. Policymakers have taken steps to curb speculations in the property market in hope of bringing down prices. Firms
have been pressed to treat their overworked young employees better. Under the banner of “common prosperity”, Mr Xi has aimed to increase social mobility and
reduce inequality. But much of this has backfired. In going after property developers, tech firms and the tutoring industry, he has harmed new graduates’ most
reliable employers.
That leads to the biggest question of all. China’s leaders are fond of contrasting their one-party rule with what they tell their people is a flawed and dysfunctional
West, a view stocked but not wholly fabricated by the official media. The unhappiness of young people sets the strengths and weaknesses of each system in clear
relief. It is not a comparison that favours China.
Dropouts in America have alternatives to pursue. The country offers many routes to a fulfilling life. An ambitious few have even been able to harness their dissent
to create great art, music or a multi-billion-dollar company. Mr Xi would like young Chinese to find enlightenment their hardship,too, but not that sort. Advance
comes exclusively through the Communist Party. China’s artists are yoked to its message. Having been branded as the party’s rivals, tech entrepreneurs have been
humiliated.
A small but growing number of well-educated, high-potential young Chinese seem likely to abandon their country. Politicians in America and the wider West often
say they are on the side of ordinary Chinese. They could prove it by ensuring Western universities and economies welcome young people who fell that their
opportunities at home are limited.
Let them dream
However, most young Chinese will stay at home. When Mr Xi plays down their individual aspirations in favour of the collective interest, he adds to their gloom. He
also ignores the role that dreams and choices in their hundreds of millions played in fuelling China’s four decades of growth. The party needs to offer its
disenchanted young new paths to peaceful prosperity. The alternatives, including the stocking of angry, militaristic nationalism, would pose a threat to China and
the world.
Xi’s failing model
China’s economy is suffering because an increasingly autocratic government is making bad decisions.
Whatever has gone wrong? After China rejoined the world economy in 1978, it became the most spectacular growth story in history. Farm reform, industrialisation
and rising incomes lifted nearly 800m people out of extreme poverty. Having produced just a tenth as much as America in 1980, China’s economy is now about
three-quarters the size. Yet instead of roaring back after the government abandoned its “zero-covid” policy at the end of 2022, it is lurching from one ditch to the
next.
The economy grew at an annualised rate of just 3.2% in the second quarter, a disappointment that looks even worse given that, by one prominent estimate,
America’s may be growing at almost 6%. house prices have fallen and property developers, who tend to sell houses before they are built, have hit the wall, scaring
off buyers. Consumer spending, business investment and exports have all fallen short. And whereas much of the world battles inflation that is too high, China is
suffering from the opposite problem: consumer prices fell in the year to July. Some analysts warn that China may enter a deflationary trap like Japan’s in the 1990s.
Yet in some ways Japanification is too mild a diagnosis of China’s ills. A chronic shortfall in growth would be worse in China because its people are poorer. Japan’s
living standards were about 60% of America’s by 1990; China’s today are less than 20%. and, unlike Japan, China is also suffering from something more profound
than weak demand and heavy debt. Many of its economic policy-making--which are getting worse as President Xi Jinping centalises power.
A decade or so ago China’s technocrats were seen almost as savants. First they presided over an economic marvel. Then China was the only big economy to
respond to the global financial crisis of 2007-09 with sufficient stimulatory force--some commentators went as far as to say that China had saved the world
economy. In the 2010s, every time the economy wobbled, officials defied predictions of calamity by cheapening credit, building infrastructure of stimulating the
property market.
During each episode, however, public and private debts mounted. So did doubts about the sustainability of the housing boom and whether new infrastructure was
really needed. Toady policymakers are in a bind.wisely, they do not want more white elephants or to reflate the property bubble. Nor can they do enough of the
more desirable kinds of stimulus, such as pension spending and handouts to poor households to boost consumption, because Mr Xi has disavowed “welfarism”
and the government seeks an official deficit of only 3% of GDP.
As a result, the response to the slowdown has been lacklustre. Policymakers are not even willing to cut interest rates much. On August 21st they disappointed
investors with an underwhelming cut of 0.1 percentage points in the one-year lending rate.
This feeble response to tumbling growth and inflation is the latest in a series of policy errors. China’s foreign-policy swagger and its mercantilist industrial policy
have aggravated an economic conflict with America. At home it has failed to deal adequately with incentives to speculate on housing and a system in which
developers have such huge obligations that they are systemically important. Starting in 2020 regulators tanked markets by cracking down on successful
consumer-technology firms that were deemed too unruly and monopolistic. During the pandemic, officials bought time with lockdowns but failed to sus it to
vaccinate enough people for a controlled exit, and then were overwhelmed by the highly contagious Omicron variant.
Why does the government keep making mistakes? One reason is that short-term growth is no longer the priority of the Chinese Communist Party. The signs are
that Mr Xi believes China must prepare for sustained economic and, potentially, military conflict with America. Today, therefore, he emphasises China’s pursuit of
national greatness, security and resilience. He is willing to make material sacrifices to achieve those goals, and to the extent that he wants growth, it must be “high
quality”.
Yet even by Mr Xi’s criteria, the CCP’s decisions are flawed. The collapse of the zero-covid policy undermined Mr Xi’s prestige. The attack on tech firms has scared
off entrepreneurs. Should China fall into persistent deflation because the authorities refuse to boost consumption, debts will rise in real value and weigh more
heavily on the economy. Above all, unless the CCP continues to raise living standards, it will weaken its grip on power and limit its ability to match America.
Mounting policy failures therefore look less like a new, self-sacrificing focus on national security, than plain bad decision-making. They have coincided with Mr Xi’s
centralisation of power and his replacement of technocrats with loyalists in top jobs. China used to tolerate debate about its economy, but today it cajoles analysts
into fake optimism. Recently it has stopped publishing unflattering data on youth unemployment and consumer confidence. The top ranks of government still
contain plenty of talent, but it is naive to expect a bureaucracy to produce rational analysis of inventive ideas when the message from the top is that loyalty
matters above all. Instead, decisions are increasingly governed by an ideology that fuses a left-wing suspicion of rich entrepreneurs with a right-wing relectance to
hand money to the idle poor.
The fact that China’s problems start at the top means they will persist. They may even worsen, as clumsy policymakers confront the economy’s mounting
challenges.the population is ageing rapidly. America is increasingly hostile, and is trying to choke the parts of China’s economy, like chipmaking, that is sees as
strategically significant. The more China catches up with America, the harder the gap will be to close further, because centralised economies are better at
emulation than at innovation.
Liberals’ prediction about China have often betrayed wishful thinking. In the 2000s Western leaders mistakenly believed that trade,markets and growth would
boost democracy and individual liberty. But China is now testing the reverse relationship: whether more autocracy damages the economy. The evidence is
mounting that it does--and that after four decades of fast growth China is entering a period of disappointment.
Costly and dangerous
Joe Biden’s China strategy is not working
On August 9th President Biden unveiled his latest weapon in America’s economic war with China. New rules will police investments made abroad by the private
sector, and those into the most sensitive technologies in China will be banned. The use of such curbs by the world’s strongest champion of capitalism is the latest
sign of the profound shift in America’s economic policy as it contends with the rise of an increasingly assertive and threatening rival.
For decades America cheered on the globalisation of trade and capital, which brought vast benefits in terms of enhanced efficiency and lower costs for consumers.
But in a dangerous world, efficiency alone is no longer
enough. In America, and across the West, China’s rise is bringing other aims to the fore. Understandably,
officials want to protect national security, by limiting China’s access to cutting-edge technology that could enhance its military might, and to build alternative
supply chains in areas where China maintains a vice-like grip.
The result is a sprawl of tariffs, investment reviews and export controls aimed at China, first under the previous president, Donald Trump, and now Mr Biden. Janet
Yellen, America’s treasury secretary, has travelled to Delhi and Hanoi to tout the benefits of “friendshoring”, signalling to company bosses that shifting away from
China would be wise. Although such “de-risking” measures would lower efficiency, the thinking goes, sticking to sensitive products would limit the damage. And
the extra cost would be worth it,because America would be safer.
The consequences of this new thinking are now becoming clear. Unfortunately, it is bringing neither resilience nor security. Supply chains have become more
tangled and opaque as they have adapted to the new rules. And, if you look closely, it becomes clear that America’s reliance on Chinese critical inputs remains.
More worrying, the policy has had the perverse effect of pushing America’s allies closer to China.
All this may come as a surprise, because, at first glance, the new policies look like a smashing success. Direct economic links between China and America are
shrivelling. In 2018 two-thirds of American imports from a group of “low-cost” Asian countries came from China; last year just over half did. Instead, America has
turned towards India, Mexico and South-East Asia.
\investment flows are adjusting,too. In 2016 Chinese firms invested a staggering $48bn in America; six years on, the figure had shrunk to a mere $3.1bn. For the
first time in a quarter of a century, China is no longer one of the American Chamber of Commerce in China.for the best part of two decades, China claimed the
lion’s share of new foreign-investment projects in Asia. Last year it received less than India or Vietnam.
Dig deeper, though, and you find that America’s reliance on China remains intact. America may be redirecting its demand from China to other countries. But
production in those places now relies more on Chinese inputs than ever. As South-East Asia’s exports to America have risen, for instance, its imports of
intermediate inputs from China have exploded. China’s exports of car parts to Mexico, another country that has benefited from American de-risking, have doubled
over the past five years. Research published by the IMF finds that even in advanced-manufacturing sectors, where America is keenest to shift away from China, the
countries that have made most inroads into the American market are those with the closest industrial links to China. Supply chains have become more complex,
and trade has become more expensive. But China’s dominance is undiminished.
What is going on? In the most egregious cases, Chinese goods are simply being repackaged and sent via third countries to America. At the end of 2022, America’s
Department of Commerce found that four major solar suppliers based in South-East Asia were doing such minor processing of otherwise Chinese products that
they were, in effect, circumventing tariffs on Chinese goods. In other areas, such as rear-earth metals, China continues to provide inputs that are hard to replace.
More often, though, the mechanism is benign. Free markets are simply adapting to find the cheapest way to supply goods to consumers. And in many cases China,
with its vast workforce and efficient logistics, remains the cheapest supplier. America’s new rules have the power to redirect its won trade with China. But they
cannot rid the entire supply chain of Chinese influence. Much of the decoupling, then, is phoney. Worse, from Mr Biden’s perspective, his approach is also
deepening the economic links between China and other exporting countries.in so doing, it perversely pits their interests against America’s. even where
governments are worried about the growing assertiveness of China, their commercial relationships with the biggest economy in Asia are deepening. The Regional
Comprehensive Economic partnership, a trade deal signed in November 2020 by many South-East Asian countries and China, creates a sort of single market in
precisely the intermediate goods in which trade has boomed in recent years.
For many poorer countries, receiving Chinese investment and intermediate goods and exporting finished products to America is a source of jobs and prosperity.
America’s reluctance to support new trade agreements is one reason why they sometimes see it as unreliable partner. If asked to choose between China and
America, they might not side with Uncle Sam.
Putting the risk into de-risking
All this carries important lessons for American officials. They say that they want to be precise in how they guard against China using a “small yard and high fence”.
but without a clear sense of the trade-offs from their tariffs and restrictions, the risk is that each security scare makes the yard bigger and the fence taller. The fact
that the benefits have so far been illusory and the costs greater than expected underscores the need for laser focus.
Moreover, the more selective the approach, the greater the likelihood that trading partners can be persuaded to reduce their reliance on China in the areas that
really matter. Without it , derisking will make the world not safer, but more dangerous.
The disillusioned generation
China’s young people are disenchanted and full of angst. That is bad for their country----and perhaps the world
The crowd did not seem exited to see George Michael and Andrew Ridgeley. When Wham! Became the first Western pop group to perform in Communist China,
the audience was instructed to stay in their seats. It was 1985 and, despite appearances, the young people in attendance were in fact joyous. The country around
them was by no means free, but it was starting to reform and open up. Over he next three decades the economy would grow at a rapid pace, producing new
opportunities. An increasing number of Chinese travelled and studied abroad. Even the Communist Party showed signs of relaxing(a bit). those brought up during
this period had high hopes for the future.
Today, reality is falling short of expectation. A dark cloud hangs over Chinese born in the 1990s and 2000s. since Xi Jinping won power in 2012, the government has
grow more repressive and society less vibrant. Censors have turned the internet into a drearier place, while letting nationalist trolls drum in the state’s
talking-points. At university students must grapple with Mr Xi’s forbidding personal ideology. Worst of all for some,China’s economy is stagnating. The
unemployment rate for those aged 16 to 24 in cities is over 21%--a number so disheartening that earlier this month the government stopped publishing the data,
pending a review.
For our Briefing this week, we talked to young Chinese men and women about how they feel. Plenty still have faith in the party and support Mr Xi’s calls to make
China strong. But many are suffering a deep sense of angst. University graduates are finding that the skills they spent years learning are not the one employers
want. Scarce jobs and punishing property prices have dashed their hopes of buying a home and starting a family. We scraped social media and found that the
mood is growing darker. Disillusioned youth talk of tangping (lying flat) and bailan(letting it rot), synonyms for giving up.
China is hardly the only country where young people are gloomy. Nearly half of Americans aged 18 to 34 say they lack confidence in the future. When Chinese lie
flat, Americans “quiet quit”. perhaps Gen Z and millennials the world over have a tendency to mope. Yet in China, where some 360m people are between the age
of 16 and 35, something more serious seems to be happening. The ladder to a better life is being lifted away. In response, many are choosing to abandon the rat
race and turn inwards. For a country that Mr Xi promises to mould into a great power by mid-century, their ennui raises profound questions.
One is whether their malaise carries political risks. Frustrated young folk jolted China in the past, notably in 1989, when students converged on Tiananmen Square
to demand more freedom and less corruption. Last year, fed up with the government’s harsh covid-19 controls, young people gathered in cities across China. Some
called for Mr Xi and the party to relinquish power.
Nobody can rule out the possibility of more unrest. But last year’s protests were small and our reporting suggests that China’s young are not bursting with
revolutionary fervour. They have grown up with an internet bounded by the great firewall, limiting their access to uncensored news and information. Brought up
on propaganda about the party’s accomplishments, many continue to support it wholeheartedly. Even hip young ubanites say the government ought to limit some
freedoms.
The real question the party faces is more prosaic: not the threat of revolution, but a quiet rejection of its ambitions. In order to accomplish his goal of restoring
China’s greatness, Mr Xi needs the young to get married, have children and reverse the country’s demographic decline. In order to refocus the economy on
manufacturing and away from consumer-internet technology, he’d like them to study hard sciences, not dream of designing video games. And he wants more
youngsters to work in factories, including the type that might produce weapons for China’s growing armed forces. “endure hardships” and “eat bitterness”, Mr xi
tells the young. Many cannot see why they should.
The party is mindful of their disenchantment. Policymakers have taken steps to curb speculation in the property market in hope of bringing down prices. Firms
have been pressed to treat their overworked young employees better. Under the banner of “common prosperity”, Mr Xi has aimed to increase social mobility and
reduce inequality. But much of this has backfired. In going after property developers, tech firms and the tutoring industry, he has harmed new graduates’ most
reliable employers. That leads to the biggest questions of all. China’s leaders are fond of contrasting their one-party rule with what they tell their people a flawed
and dysfunctional West, a view stoked but not wholly fabricated by the official media. The unhappiness of young people sets the strengths and weaknesses of each
system in clear relief. It is not a comparison that favours China.
Dropouts in America have alternatives to pursue. The country offers many routes to a fulfilling life. An ambitious few have even been able to harness their dissent
to create great art, music or a multi-billion-dollar company. Mr Xi would like young Chinese to find enlightenment in their hardship, too, but not that sort. Advance
comes exclusively through the Communist Party. China’s artiest are yoked to its message. Having been branded as the party’s rivals, tech entrepreneurs have been
humiliated.
A small but growing number of well-educated, high-potential young Chinese seem likely to abandon their country. Politicians in America and the wider West often
say they are on the side of ordinary Chinese. They could prove it by ensuring Western universities and economies welcome young people who fell that their
opportunities at home are limited.
Let them dream
However, most young Chines will stay at home. When Mr Xi plays down their individual aspirations in favour of the collective interest, he adds to their gloom. He
also ignores the role that dreams and choices in their hundreds of millions played in fuelling China’s four decades of growth. The party needs to offer its
disenchanted young new paths to peaceful prosperity. The alternatives, including the stoking of angry, militaristic nationalism, would pose a threat to China and
the world.
AI voted
How artificial intelligence will affect the election of 2024
Politics is supposed to be about persuasion; but it has always been stalked by propaganda. Campaigners dissemble, exaggerate and fib. They transmit lies, rangeing
from bald-faced to white, through whatever means are available. Anti-vaccine conspiracies were once propagated through pamphlets instead of podcasts. A
century before covid-19, anti-maskers in the era of Spanish flue waged a disinformation campaign. They sent fake messages from the surgeon-general via
telegram(the wires, not the smartphone app). because people are not angels, elections have never been free from falsehoods and mistaken beliefs.
But as the world contemplates a series of votes in 2024, something new is causing a lot of worry. In the past, disinformation has always been created by humans.
Advances in generative artificial intelligence---with models that can spit out sophisticated essays and create realistic images from text prompts--make synthetic
propaganda possible. The fear is that disinformation campaigns may be supercharged in 2024, just as countries with a collective population of some 4bn--including
America, Britain, India, Indonesia, Mexico and Taiwan---prepare to vote. How worried should their citizens be?
It is important to be precise about what generative-AI tools like ChatGPT do and do not change. Before they came along, disinformation was already a problem in
democracies. The corrosive idea that America’s presidential election in 2020 was rigged brought rioters to the Capitol on January 6 th--but it was spread by Donald
trump, Republican elites and conservative mass-media outlets using convetional means.Activists for the BJP in India spread rumours via WhatApp threads.
Propagandists for the Chinese Communist Party transmit talking points to Taiwan through seemingly legitimate news outfits. All of this is done without using
generative-AI tools.
What would large-language models change in 2024? one thing is the quantity of disinformation: if the volume of nonsense were multiplies by 1000 or 100000, it
might persuade people to vote differently. A second concerns quality. Hyper-realistic deepfakes could sway voters before false audio, photos and videos could be
debunked. A third is microtargeting. With AI, voters may be inundated with highly personalised propaganda at scale. Networks of propaganda bots could be made
harder to detect than existing disinformation efforts are. Voters trust in their fellow citizens, with in America has been declining for decades, may well suffer as
people began to doubt everything.
This is worrying, but there are reasons to believe AI is not about to wreck humanity’s 2500-year-old experiment with democracy. Many people think that others are
more gullible than they themselves are. In fact, voters are hard to persuade, especially on salient political issues such as whom they want to be president. (ask
yourself what deepfake would change your choice between Joe Biden and Mr Trump). the multi-billion-dollar campaign industry in America that uses humans to
persuade voters can generate only minute changes in their behaviour. Tools to produce believable fake images and text have existed for decades. Although
generative AI might be a labour-saving technology for internet troll farms, it is not clear that effort was the binding constraint in
the production of disinformation.
New image-generation algorithms are impressive, but without tuning and human judgment they are still prone to produce pictures of people with six fingers on
each hand, making the possibility of personalised deepfakes remote for the time being. Even if these AI-augmented tactics were to prove effective, they would
soon be adopted by many interested parties: the cumulative effect of these influence operations would be to make social networks even more cacophonous and
unusable. It is hard to prove that mistrust translates into a systematic advantage for one party over the other.
Social-media platforms, where misinformation spreads, and AI firms say they are focused on the risk. Open AI, the company behind ChatGPT, says it will monitor
usage to try to detect political-influence operations. Big-tech platforms, criticised both for propagating disinformation in the 2016 election and taking down too
much in 2020, have become better at identifying suspicious accounts(though they have become loth to arbitrate the truthfulness of content generated by real
people). alphabet and Meta ban the use of manipulated media in political advertising and say they are quick to respond to deepfakes. Other companies are trying
to craft a technological standard establishing the provenance of real images and videos.
Voluntary regulation has limits, however, and involuntary sort poses risks. Opensource models, like Meta’s Llama, which generates text, and Stable diffusion, which
makes images, can be used without oversight. And not all platforms are created equal--TikTok, the video-sharing social-media company, has ties to China’s
government, and the app is designed to promote virality from any source, including new accounts. Twitter(chich is now called X) cut its oversight team after it was
bought by Elon Musk, and the platform is a haven for bots. The agency regulating elections in America is considering a disclosure requirement for campaigns using
synthetically generated images. This is sensible, though malicious actors will not comply with it. Some in America are calling for a Chinese-style system of extreme
regulation. There, AI algorithms must be registered with a government body and somehow embody core socialist values. Such heavy-handed control would erode
the advantage America has in AI innovation.
Politics was never pure
Technological determinism, which pins all the foibles of people on the tools they use, is tempting. But it is also wrong. Although it is important to be mindful of the
potential of generative AI to disrupt democracies, panic is unwarranted. Before the technological advances of the past two years, people were quite capable of
transmitting all manner of destructive and terrible ideas to one another. The American presidential campaign of 2024 will be marred by disinformation about the
rule of law and the integrity of elections. But its progenitor will not be something newfangled like Chat GPT. It will be Mr Trump.
AI voted
How artificial intelligence will affect the elections of 2024
Politics is supposed to be about persuasion; but it has always been stalked by propaganda. Campaigners dissemble, exaggerated and fib. They transmit lies, ranging
from bald-faced to white, through whatever means are available. Anti-vaccine conspiracies were once propagated through pamphlets instead of podcasts. A
century before covid-19, anti-maskers in the era of Spanish flu waged a disinformation campaign. They sent fake messages from the surgeon-general via
telegram(the wires ,not the smartphone app). because people are not angels, elections have never been free from falsehoods and mistaken beliefs.
But as the world contemplates a series of votes in 2024, something new is causing a lot of worry. In the past, disinformation has always been created by humans.
Advances in generative artificial intelligence--with models that can spit out sophisticated essays and create realistic images from text prompts--make synthetic
propaganda possible. The fear is that disinformation campaigns may be supercharged in 2024, just as countries with a collective population of some 4bn--including
America, Britain, India, Indonesia, Mexico and Taiwan--prepare to vote. How worried should their citizens be?
It is important to be precise about what generative-AI tools like ChatGPT do and do not change. Before they came along, disinformation was already a problem in
democracies. The corrosive idea that America’s presidential election in 2020 was rigged brought rioters to the Capitol on January 6 th--but it was spread by Donald
Trump, Republican elites and conservative mass-media outlets using conventional means. Activists for the BJP in India spread rumours via WhatsApp threads.
Propagandist for the Chinese Communist Party transmit talking points to Taiwan through seemingly legitimate news outfits. All of this is done without using
generative-AI tools.
What could large-language models change in 2024? One thing is the quantity if disinformation: if the volume of nonsense were multiplied by 1000 or 100000, it
might persuade people to vote differently. A second concerns quality. Hyper-realistic deepfakes could sway voters before false audio, photos and videos could be
dbunked. A third is microtargeting. With AI, voters may be inundated with highly personalised propaganda at scale. Networks of propaganda bots could be made
harder to detect than existing disinformation efforts are. Voters’ trust in their fellow citizens, which in America has been declining for decades, may well suffer as
people began to doubt everything.
This is worrying, but there are reasons to believe AI is not about to wreck humanity’s 2500-year-old experiment with democracy. Many people think that others are
more gullible than they themselves are. In fact, voters are hard to persuade, especially on salient political issues such as whom they want to be president. (ask
yourself what deepfake would change your choice between Joe Biden and Mr Trump.) the multi-billion-dollar campaign industry in America that uses humans to
persuade voters can generate only minute changes in their behaviour.
Tools to produce believable fake images and text have existed for decades. Although generative AI might be a labour-saving technology for internet troll farms, it is
not clear that effort was the binding constraint in the production of disinformation. New image-generation algorithms are impressive, but without tuning and
human judgement they are still prone to produce pictures of people with six fingers on each hand, making the possibility of personalised deepfakes remote for the
time being. Even if these AI-augmented tactics were to prove effective, they would soon be adopted by many interested parties: the cumulative effect of these
influence operations would be to make social networks even more cacophonous and unusable. It is hard to prove that mistrust translates into a systematic
advantage for one party over the other.
Social media platforms, where misinformation spreads, and AI firms say they are focused on the risks. OpenAI, the company behind ChatGPT, says it will monitor
usage to try to detect political-influence operations. Big-tech platforms, criticised both for propagating disinformation in the 2016 election and taking down too
much in the 2020, have become better at identifying suspicious accounts( though they have become loth to arbitrate the truthfulness of content generated by real
people). alphabet and Meta ban the use of manipulated media in political advertising are trying to craft a technological standard establishing the provenance of
real images and videos.
Voluntary regulation has limits, however, and the involuntary sort poses risks. Open source models, like Meta’s Llama, which generates text and Stable Diffusion
which makes images, can be used without oversight. And not all platforms are created equal--TikTok, the video-sharing social-media company, has ties to China’s
government, and the app is designed to promote virality from any source, including new accounts. Twitter( which is now called X) cut its oversight team after it was
bought by Elon Musk, and the platform is a haven for bots. The agency regulating elections in America is considering a disclosure requirement for campaigns suing
synthetically generated images. This is sensible, though malicious actors will not comply with it. Some in America are calling for a Chinese-style system of extreme
regulation. There, AI algorithms must be registered with a government body and somehow embody core socialist values. Such heavy-handed control would erode
the advantage America has in AI innovation.
Politics was never pure
Technological determinism, which pins all the foibles of people on the tools they use, is tempting. But it is also wrong. Although it is important to be mindful of the
potential of generative AI to disrupt democracies, panic is unwarranted. Before the technological advances of the past two years, people were quite capable of
transmitting all manner of destructive and terrible ideas to one another. The American presidential campaign of 2024 will be marred by disinformation about the
rule of law and the integrity of elections. But its progenitor will not be something newfangled like ChatGPT. It will be Mr Trump.
AI voted
How artificial intelligence will affect the elections of 2024
Politics is supposed to be about persuasion; but it was always been stalked by propaganda. Campaigners dissemble, exaggerated and fib. They transmit lies,
ranging from bald-faced to white, through whatever means are available. Anti-vaccine conspiracies were once propagated through pamphlets instead of podcasts.
A century before covid-19, anti-maskers in the era of Spanish flu waged a disinformation campaign. They sent fake messages from the surgeon-general via
telegram( the wires, not the smartphone app). because people are not angels, elections have never been free from falsehoods and mistaken beliefs.
But as the world contemplates a series of votes in 2024, something new is causing a lot of worry. In the past, disinformation has always been created by humans.
Advances in generative artificial intelligence--with models that can spit out sophisticated essays and create realistic images from text prompts--make synthetic
propaganda possible. The fear is that disinformation campaigns may be supercharged in 2024, just as countries with a collective population of some 4bn--including
America, Britain, India, Indonesia, Mexico, and Taiwan--prepare to vote. How worried should their citizens be?
It is important to be precise about what generative--AI tools like ChatGPT do and do not change. Before they came along, disinformation was already a problem in
democracies. The corrosive idea that America’s presidential election in 2020 was rigged brought rioters to the Capitol on January 6 th--but it was spread by Donald
Trump, Republican elites and conservative mass-media outlets using conventional means. Activists for the BJP in India spread rumours via WhatsApp threads.
Propagandists for the Chinese Communist Party transmit talking points to Taiwan through seemingly legitimate news outfits. All of this done without using
generative-AI tools.
What could large-language models change in 2024? One thing is the quantity of disinformation: if the volume of nonsense were multiplied by 1000 or 100000, it
might persuade people to vote differently. A second concerns quality. Hyper-realistic deepfakes could sway voters before false audio, photos and videos could be
debunked. A third is microtargeting. With AI, voters may be inundated with highly personalised propaganda at scale. Networks of propaganda bots could be made
harder to detect than existing disinformation efforts are. Voters’ trust in their fellow citizens, which in America has been declining for decades, may well suffer as
people began to doubt everything.
This is worrying, but there are reasons to believe AI is not about to wreck humanity’s 2,500-year-old experiment with democracy. Many people think that others
are more gullible than they themselves are. In fact, voters are hard to persuade, especially on salient political issues such as whom they want to be president( ask
yourself what deepfake would change your choice between Joe Biden and Mr Trump). the multi-billion-dollar campaign industry in America that uses humans to
persuade voters can generate only minute changes in their behaviour.
Tools to produce believable fake images and text have existed for decades. Although generative AI might be a labour-saving technology for internet troll farms, it is
not clear that effort was the binding constraint in impressive, but without tuning and human judgement they are still prone to produce pictures of people with six
fingers on each hand, making the possibility of personalised deepfakes remote for the time being. Even if these AI-augmented tactics were to prove effective, they
would soon be adopted by many interested parties: the cumulative effect of these influence operations would be to make social networks even more cacophonous
and unusable. It is hard to prove that mistrust translates into a systematic advantage for one party over the other.
Social-media platforms, where misinformation spreads, and AI firms say they are focused on the risks. openAI, the company behind ChatGPT, says it will monitor
usage to try to detect political-influence operations. Big-tech platforms, criticised both for propagating disinformation in the 2016 election and taking down too
much in 2020, have become better at identifying suspicious accounts(though they have become loth to arbitrate the truthfulness of content generated by real
people). Alphabet and Meta ban the use of manipulated media in political advertising and say they are quick to respond to deepfakes. Other companies are trying
to craft a technological standard establishing the provenance of real images and videos.
Voluntary regulation has limits, however, and the involuntary sort poses risks. Open-source models, like Meta’s Llama, which generates text, and Stable Diffusion,
which makes images, can be used without oversight. And not all platforms are created equal--TikTok, the video-sharing social media company, has ties to China’s
government, and the app is designed to promote virality from any source, including new accounts. Twitter( which is now called X) cut its oversight team after it was
bought by Elon Musk, and the platform is a haven for bots. The agency regulating elections in America is considering a disclosure requirement for campaigns using
synthetically generated images. This is sensible, though malicious actors will not comply with it. Some in America are calling for a Chinese-style system for extreme
regulation. There, AI algorithms must be registered with a government body and somehow embody core socialist values. Such heavy-handed control would erode
the advantage America has in AI innovation.
Politics was never pure
Technological determinism, which pins all the foibles of people on the tools they use, is tempting. But it is also wrong. Although it is important to be mindful of the
potential of generative AI to disrupt democracies, panic is unwarrated. Before the technological advances of the past two years, people were quite capable of
transmitting all manner of destructive and terrible ideas to one another. The America presidential campaign of 2024 will be marred by disinformation about the
rule of law and the integrity of elections. But its progenitor will not be something newfangled like ChatGPT. It will be Mr Trump.
The new Middle East
More money and less mayhem. For now
If you thought the Middle East was stagnant, think again. The Gulf economies are among the richest and most vibrant on the planet, helped by a Brent crude oil
price that rose back to over $90 per barrel this week. A $3.5trn fossil-fuel bonanza is being spent on everything from home-grown artificial intelligence models and
shiny new cities in the desert, to filling the coffers of giant sovereign-wealth funds that roam the world’s capital markets looking for deals.
As the cash flows in, the chaos shows signs of receding, thanks to the biggest burst of diplomacy for decades.Saudi Arabia and Iran have negotiated detente in Syria
and Yemen are killing fewer people, as their sponsors seek de-escalation. Following the Abraham accords between Israel and some Arab governments, Saudi Arabia
is considering recognising the Jewish state, 75 years after its creation. The region’s global clout is rising--four countries are about to join the BRICs club of
non-aligned powers that want a less Western-dominated world.
As our Briefing explains, these shifts begin a new chapter in the Middle East marked by fresh opportunities and new dangers. The region’s leaders are testing ideas
that ave caught on in much of the world, including embracing autocratic pragmatism as a substitute for democracy, and multipolar diplomacy instead of the
post-1945 American-led order. The Middle East is also a place where threats that will menace the world in the 2030s may play out early including nuclear
proliferation, extreme weather and even greater inequality, as weak countries fall further behind.
Many occupants of the White House have left office wishing they could forget all about the Middle East. But whether you run a superpower or a small business, it
matters as much as ever. Although it has only 6% of the world’s people, it has a chokehold on the global economy. As the lowest-cost oil producer, its share of
crude exports is 46% and rising. Its share of exports of liquefied natural gas, in great demand since Russia’s pipelines to Europe shut down, is 30% and going up, too.
Thanks to its location, 30% of all container trade and 16% of air cargo passes through the region. With $3trn of assets, its sovereign-wealth funds are among the
world’s largest. Its wars and disorder often spill across borders; its refugees affect politics as far away as Europe.
The past two decades have been miserable in the Middle East. Democratic projects ended in failure and bloodshed, in Iraq after the American-led invasion of 2003
and in several countries after the Arab spring in 2011. Islamic State sought to kill its way to creating a caliphate, while in Syria Bashar al-Assad douses his own
people in chlorine and nerve agents.
Yet now, as the fighting ebbs, three big changes are visible. First, the region is having to take more responsibility for its own security, as America’s appetite to
intervene militarily has evaporated. Alongside this, trade patterns have become multipolar: the IMF reckons 26% of Middle Eastern goods exports go to China and
India, almost double the level in 2000 and roughly twice the share headed for America and Europe. Recently, this geopolitical realignment has led to a desire to
de-escalate conflicts.
Second, the energy transition creates an urgent need to escape the familiar pattern of oil booms and busts. Instead there is a powerful incentive for the Gulf to lift
fossil-fuel production in the next decade before demand dwindles permanently, and spend the proceeds on diversifying local economies.
The final shift is a weariness in public opinion. Political experiments, whether democratic or Islamist, are tarnished. Instead, people across the Middle East yearn
for economic opportunity. Forget Canada or Sweden: polls show the country young Arabs admire most is the UAE, with its stability and thriving economy under
iron-fisted dynastic rule. At the same time, less Western involvement in security and trade also means less pressure for human rights or democracy.
Some of the region’s changes invite ridicule--think of a vanity project like NEOM, a gaudy new city being built for an estimated $500bn by Muhammad bin Salman,
Saudi Arabia’s de facto ruler. But other changes are durable and profound. More women are working in the Gulf. Israeli tourists are thronging to Dubai. Across the
region, the non-oil economy is growing at a healthy annual rate of 4% and cross border multinational investment is rising. It is possible to imagine how a virtuous
cycle of stability and peace might lead to more investment and trade that raises living standards and broadens prosperity, reversing a long-lasting spiral of failure in
a part of the world with some 500m people.
Yet to achieve that, the Middle East will have to overcome some big problems. Many of these are familiar. The region’s more enlightened autocrats argue that they
face a kind of “performance accountability” to improve the lot of their populations. But regimes with absolute rule tend towards decay. Other dangers are new-or,
rather, looming more menacingly than ever. Now that Iran is on the threshold of becoming a nuclear-armed states, proliferation is a grave worry. Climate change
means that one of the world’s hottest, driest places faces even more extreme weather. Only some countries can afford the investment, such as redesigned cities
and desalination projects, that they need to remain habitable.
80:20 rule
Most starkly, the new Middle East is more lopsided than in recent memory. The success stories, the Gulf and Israel, account for only 14% of the population but 60%
of GDP, 73%of goods exports and 75% of inward multinational investment. From Israel and the West Bank to Saudi Arabia and Yemen. Modern economies border
places trapped in despair. Lebanon is mired in financial crisis; Egypt could be heading the same way. The new Middle East’s winners embody a transactional
mindset that may yet make them richer. Its losers are reminder that in a world with fewer rules and principles, no one is coming to the rescue. As you rill up your
car or wait for your air-freighted parcel, remember they depend on a region that is an economic and political laboratory--and hope the experiment does not blow
up.
The new Middle East
More money and less mayhem. For now.
If you thought the Middle East was stagnant, think again. The Gulf economies are among the richest and most vibrant on the planet, helped by a Brent crude oil
price that rose back to over $90 per barrel this week. A $3.5trn fossil-fuel bonanza is being spent on everything from home-grown artificial intelligence models and
shiny new cities in the desert, to filling the coffers of giant sovereign-wealth funds that roam the world’s capital markets looking for deals.
As the cash flows in, the chaos shows signs of receding, thanks to the biggest burst of diplomacy for decades. Saudi Arabia and Iran have negotiated detente in a
rivalry that has lasted since the Iranian revolution in 1979. civil wars in Syria and Yemen are killing fewer people, as their sponsors seek de-escalation. Following the
Abraham accords between Israel and some Arab governments, Saudi Arabia is considering recognising the Jewish state, 75 years after its creation. The region’s
global clout is rising-four countries are about to join the BRICS club of non-aligned powers that want a less Western-dominated world.
As our Briefing explains, these shifts begin a new chapter in the Middle East marked by fresh opportunities and new dangers. The region’s leaders are testing ideas
that have caught on in much of the world, including embracing autocratic pragmatism as a substitute of democracy, and multipolar diplomacy instead of post-1945
American-led order. The Middle East is also a place where threats that will menace the world in the 2030s may play out early, including nuclear
proliferation,extreme weather and even greater inequality, as weak countries fall further behind.
Many occupants of the White House have left office wishing they could forget all about the Middle East. But whether you run a superpower or a small business, it
matters as much as ever. Although it has only 6% of the world’s people, it has a chokehold on the global economy. As the lowest-cost oil producer, its share of
crude exporters is 46% and rising. Its share of exports of liquefied natural gas, in great demand since Russia’s pipelines to Europe shut down, is 30% and going
up,too. Thanks to its location, 30% of all container trade and 16% of air cargo passes through the region. With $3trn of assets, its sovereign-wealth funds are
among the world’s largest. It wars and disorder often spill across borders; its refugees affect politics as far away as Europe.
The past two decades have been miserable in the Middle East. Democratic projects ended in failure and bloodshed, in Iraq after the American-led invasion of 2003
and in several countries after the Arab spring in 2011. Islamic State sought to sill its way to creating a caliphate, while in Syria Bashar al-Assad doused his own
people in chlorine and nerve agents.
Yet now, as the fighting ebbs, three big changes are visible. First, the region is having to take more responsibility for its own security, as America’s appetite to
intervene militarily has evaporated. Alongside this trade patterns have become multipolar: the IMF reckons 26% of Middle Eastern goods exports go to China and
India, almost double the level in 2000 and roughly twice the share headed for America and Europe. Recently, this geopolitical realignment has led to a desire to
de-escalate conflicts.
Second, the energy transition creates an urgent need to escape the familiar pattern of oil booms and busts. Instead there is powerful incentive for the Gulf to lift
fossil-fuel production in the next decade before demand dwindles permanently, and spend the proceeds on diversifying local economies.
The final shift is a weariness in public opinion. Political experiments, whether democratic or Islamist, are tarnished. Instead, people across the Middle East yearn
for economic opportunity. Forget Canada or Sweden: polls show the country young Arabs admire most is the UAE, with its stability and thriving economy under
iron-fisted dynastic rule. At the same time, less Western involvement in security and trade also means less pressure for human rights or democracy.
Some of the region’s changes invite ridicule--think
of a vanity project like NEOM, a gaudy new city being built for an estimated $500bn by Muhammad bin
Salman,Saudi Arabia’s de facto ruler. But other changes are durable and profound. More women are working in the Gulf. Israeli tourists are thronging to Dubai.
Across the region, the non-oil economy is growing at a healthy annual rate of 4% and cross-border multinational investment is rising. It is possible to imagine how a
virtuous cycle of stability and peace might lead to more investment and trade that raises living standards and broadens prosperity, reversing a long-lasting spiral of
failure in a part of the world with some 500m people.
Yet to achieve that, the Middle East will have to overcome some big problems. Many of these are familiar. The region’s more enlightened autocrats argue that they
face a kind of “performance accountability” to improve the lot of their populations. But regimes with absolute rule tend towards decay. Other dangers are new--or,
rather, looming more menacingly than
ever. Now that Iran is on the threshold of becoming a nuclear-armed state, proliferation is a grave worry. Climate changes
means that one of the world’s hottest, driest places faces even more extreme weather. Only some countries can afford the investments, such as redesigned cities
and desalination projects, that they need to remain habitable.
80:20 rule
Most starkly,the new Middle East is more lopsided than in recent memory. The success stories, the Gulf and Israel, account for only 14% of the population but 60%
of GDP, 73% of goods exports and 75%of inward multinational investment. From Israel and the West Bank to Saudi Arabia and Yemen, modern economies border
places trapped in despair. Lebanon is mired in financial crisis; Egypt could be heading the same way. The new Middle East’s winners embody a transactional
mindset that may yet make them richer. Its losers are a reminder that in a world with fewer rules and principles, no one is coming to the rescue. As you fill up your
car or wait for your air-freighted parcel, remember they depend on a region that is an economic and political laboratory--and hope that experiment does not blow
up.
How AI can revolutionise science
The technology is being applied many fields--and could lead to a surge in scientific progress
Debate about artificial intelligence tends to focus on its potential dangers: algorithmic bias and discrimination, the mass destruction of jobs and even, some say,
the extinction of humanity. As some observers fret about these dystopian scenarios, however, others are focusing on the potential rewards. AI could, they claim,
help humanity solve some of its biggest and thorniest problems. And, they say, AI will do this in a very specific way: by radically accelerating the pace of scientific
discovery, especially in areas such as medicine, climate science and green technology. Luminaries in field such as Demis Hassabis and Yann LeCun believe that AI
can turbocharge scientific progress and lead to a golden age of discovery. Could they be right?
Such claims are worth examining, and may provide a useful counterbalance to fears about large-scale unemployment and killer robots. Many previous technologies
have, of course, been falsely hailed as panaceas. The electric telegraph was lauded in the 1850s as a herald of world peace, as were a aircraft in the 1900s; pundits
in the 1990s said the internet would reduce inequality and eradicate nationalism. But the mechanism by which AI will supposedly solve the world’s problems has a
stronger historical basis, because there have been several periods in history when new approaches and new tools dis indeed help bring about bursts of
world-changing scientific discovery and innovation.
In the 17th century microscopes and telescopes opened up new vistas of discovery and encouraged researchers to favour their own observations over the received
wisdom of antiquity, while the introduction of scientific journals gave them ways to share and publicise their findings. The result was rapid progress in astronomy,
physics and other fields, and new inventions from the pendulum clock to the steam engine--the prime mover of the Industrial Revolution.
Then, starting in the late 19th century, the establishment of research laboratories, which brought together ideas, people and materials on an industrial scale, gave
rise to further innovations such as artificial fertiliser, pharmaceuticals and the transistor, the building block of the computer. From the mid-20th century, computers
in turn enabled new forms of science based on simulation and modelling, from the design of weapons and aircraft to more accurate weather forecasting.
And the computer revolution may not be finished yet. As we report in a special Science section, AI tools and techniques are now being applied in almost every field
of science, though the degree of adoption varies widely: 7.2% of physics and astronomy papers published in 2022 involved AI, for example, compared with 1.4% in
veterinary science. AI is being employed in many ways. It can identify promising candidates for analysis, such as molecules with particular properties in drug
discovery, or materials with the characteristics needed in batteries or solar cells. It can sift through piles of data such as those produced by particle colliders or
robotic telescopes, looking for patterns. And AI can model and analyse even more complex systems, such as the folding of proteins and the formation of galaxies.
AI tools have been used to identify new antibiotics, reveal the Higgs boson and spot regional accents in wolves, among other things.
All this is to be welcomed. But the journal and the laboratory went further still: they altered scientific practice itself and unlocked more powerful means of making
discoveries, by allowing people and ideas to mingle in new ways and on a larger scale. AI, too, has the potential to set off such a transformation.
Two areas in particular look promising. The first is “literature-based discovery”, which involves analysing existing scientific literature, using Chat GPT-styple
language analysis, to look for new hypotheses, connections or ideas that humans may have missed. LBD is showing promise in identifying new experiments to
try--and even suggesting potential research collaborators. This could stimulate interdisciplinary work and foster innovation at the boundaries between fields. LBD
systems can also identify”blind spots” in a given field, and even predict future discoveries and who will make them.
The second area is “robot scientists”, also known as “self-driving labs”. these are robotic systems that use AI to form new hypotheses, based on analysis of existing
data and literature, and then test those hypotheses by performing hundreds or thousands of experiments, in fields including systems biology and materials science.
Unlike human scientists, robots are less attached to previous results, less driven by bias--and,crucially, easy to replicate. They could scale up experiment research,
develop unexpected theories and explore avenues that human investigators might not have considered.
The idea that AI might transform scientific practice is therefore feasible. But the main barrier is sociological: it can happen only if human scientists are willing and
able to use such tools. Many lack skills and training; some worry about being put out of a job. Fortunately, there are hopeful signs. AI tools are now moving from
being pushed by AI researchers to being embraced by specialists in other fields.
Governments and funding bodies could help by pressing for greater us of common standards to allow AI systems to exchange and interpret laboratory results and
other data. They could also fund more research into the integration of AI smarts with laboratory robotics, and into forms of AI beyond those being pursued in the
private sector, which has bet nearly all its chips on language-based systems like ChatGPT. Less fashionable forms of AI, such as model-based machine learning, may
be better suited to scientific tasks such as forming hypotheses.
The adding of the artificial
In 1665, during a period of rapid scientific progress, Robert Hooke, an English polymath, described the advent of new scientific instruments such as the microscope
and telescope as “the adding or artificial organs to the natural”. they let researchers explore previously inaccessible realms and discover things in new ways, “with
prodigious benefit to all sorts of useful knowledge”. for Hook’s modern-day successors, the adding of artificial intelligence to the scientific toolkit is poised to do
the same in the coming years--with similarly world-changing results.
How AI can revolutionise science
The technology is being applied in many fields--and could lead to a surge in scientific progress
Debate about artificial intelligence tends to focus on its potential dangers: algorithmic bias and discrimination, the mass destruction of jobs and even, somesay, the
extinction of humanity. As some observers fret about these dystopian scenarios,however, others are focusing on the potential rewards. AI could, they claim, help
humanity solve some of its biggest and thorniest problems. And, they say, AI will do this in a very specific way: by radically accelerating the pace of scientific
discovery, especially in areas such as medicine, climate science and green technology. Luminaries in the field such as Demis Hassabis and Yann LeCun believe that
AI can turbocharge scientific progress and lead to a golden age of discovery. Could they be right?
Such claims are worth examining, and may provide a useful counterbalance to fears about large-scale unemployment and killer robots. Many previous technologies
have, of course, been falsely hailed as panaceas. The electric telegraph was lauded in the 1850s as a herald of world peace, as were aircraft in 1900s; pundits in the
1990s said the internet would reduce inequality and eradicate nationalism. But the mechanism by which AI will supposedly solve the world’s problems has a
stronger historical basis, because there have been several periods in history when new approaches and new tools dis indeed help bring about bursts or
world-changing scientific discovery and innovation.
In the 17th century microscopes and telescopes opened up new vistas of discovery and encouraged researchers to favour their own observations over the received
wisdom of antiquity, while the introduction of scientific journals gave them new ways to share and publicise their findings. The result was rapid progress in
astronomy, physics and other fields, and new inventions from the pendulum clock to the steam engine--the prime mover of the Industrial revolution.
Then starting in the late 19th century, the establishment of research laboratories, which brought together ideas, people and materials on an industrial scale, gave
rise to further innovations such as artificial fertiliser, pharmaceuticals and the transistor, the building block of the computer. From the mid-20th century, computers
in turn enabled new forms of science based on simulation and modelling, from the design of weapons and aircraft to more accurate weather forecasting.
And the computer revolution may not be finished yet. As we report in a special Science section, AI tools and techniques are now being applied in almost every field
of science, though the degree of adoption varies widely: 7.2% of physics and astronomy papers published in 2022 involved AI, for example, compared with 1.4% in
veterinary science. AI is being employed in many ways. It can identify promising candidates for analysis, such as molecules with particular properties in drug
discovery, or materials with the characteristics needed in batteries or solar cells. It can sift through piles of data such as those produced by particle colliders or
robotic telescopes, looking for patterns. And AI can model and analyse even more complex systems, such as the folding of proteins and the formation of galaxies.
Ai tools have been used to identify new antibiotics, reveal the Higgs boson and spot regional accents in wolves, among other things.
All this is to be welcomed. But the journal and the laboratory went further still: they altered scientific practice itself and unlocked more powerful means of making
discoveries, by allowing people and ideas to mingle in new ways and on a larger scale. AI, too, has the potential to set off such a transformation.
Two areas in particular look promising. The first is “literature-based discovery”(LBD), which involves analysing existing scientific literature, using ChatGPT-style
language analysis, to look for new hypotheses, connections or ideas that humans may have missed. LBD is showing promise in identifying new experiments to
try--and even suggesting potential research collaborators. This could stimulate interdisciplinary work and foster innovation at the boundaries between fields. LBD
systems can also identify “blind spots” in a given field, and even predict future discoveries and who will make them.
The second area is “robot scientists”, also know as “self-driving labs”. these are robotic systems that use AI to form new hypotheses,based on analysis of existing
data and literature and then test those hypotheses by performing hundreds of thousands of experiments, in fields including systems biology and materials science.
Unlike human scientists, robots are less attached to previous results, less driven by bias--and,crucially, easy to replicate. They could scale up experimental research,
develop unexpected theories and explore avenues that human investigators might not have considered.
The idea that AI might transform scientific practice is therefore feasible. But the main barrier is sociological: it can happen only if human scientists are willing and
able to use such tools. Many lack skills and training: some worry about being put out of a job. Fortunately, there are hopeful signs. Ai tools are now moving from
being pushed by AI researchers to being embraced by specialists in other fields.
Governments and funding bodies could help by pressing for greater use of common standards to allow AI systems to exchange and interpret laboratory results and
other data. They could also fund more research into the integration of AI smarts with laboratory robotics,and into forms of AI beyond those being pursued in the
private sector, which has bet nearly all its chips on language-based systems like ChatGPT. Less fashionable forms of AI, such as model-based machine learning, may
be better suited to scientific tasks such as forming hypotheses.
The adding of the artificial
In 1665, during a period of rapid scientific progress, Robert Hooke, an English polymath, described the advent of new scientific instruments such as the microscope
and telescope as “the adding of artificial organs to the natural”. They let researchers explore previously inaccessible realms and discover things in new ways,”with
prodigious benefit to all sorts of useful knowledge”. For Hooke’s modern-day successors, the adding of artificial intelligence to the scientific toolkit is poised to do
the same in the coming years--with similarly world-changing results.
Time for a rethink
Ukraine and its allies need a new plan
The war in Ukraine has repeatedly confounded expectations. It is now doing so again. The counter-offensive that began in June was based on the hope that
Ukrainian soldiers, equipped with modern Western weapons and after training in Germany, would recapture enough territory to put their leaders in a strong
position at any subsequent negotiations.
This plan is not working. Despite heroic efforts and breaches of Russian defences near Robotyne, Ukraine has liberated less than 0.25% of the territory that Russia
occupied in June. The 1000km front line has barely shifted. Ukraine’s army could still make a breakthrough in the coming weeks, triggering the collapse of brittle
Russian forces. But on the evidence of the past three months, it would be a mistake to bank on that.
Asking for a ceasefire or peace talks is pointless. Vladimir Putin shows no sign of wanting to negotiate and ,even if he did, could not be trusted to stick to a deal. He
is waiting for the West to tire and hoping that Donald Trump is re-elected. Mr Putin needs war to underpin his domestic dictatorship; and ceasefire would simply
be a pause to re-arm and get ready to attack again. If Ukrainians stop fighting, they could lose their country.
Both Ukraine and its Western supporters are coming to realise that this will be a grinding war of attrition. President Volodymyr Zelensky visited Washington this
week for talks. “I have to be ready for the long war,” he told The Economist. But unfortunately, Ukraine is not yet ready; nor are its Western partners. Both are still
fixated on the counter-offensive. They need to rethink Ukraine’s military strategy and how its economy is run. Instead of aiming to “win” and then rebuild, the goal
should be to ensure that Ukraine has the staying power to wage a long war--and can thrive despite it.
The first recalibration is military. Ukraine’s soldiers are exhausted; many of its finest have been killed. Despite conscription,it lacks the manpower to sustain a
permanent large-scale counter-offensive. It needs to husband resources, and to change the game. New tactics and technologies can take the fight to Russian.
Ukraine’s tech-savvy entrepreneurs are ramping up drone production: Ukrainian drones recently destroyed Russian warship; its missiles seem to have damaged a
big air-defence system in Crimea. Many more strikes are likely, to degrade Russia’s military infrastructure and deny its navy sanctuary in the Black Sea. Don’t expect
a knockout blow. Russia has also scaled up its drone production. Still, Ukraine can hit back when Russian bombs it, and perhaps even deter some attacks.
Alongside this offensive capability, Ukraine needs to boost its resilience. As well as heavy weaponry, it needs help with maintenance to sustain a multi-year fight:
humdrum repairs, reliable supplies of artillery and training. More than anything, a long war requires better air defence. Ukraine cannot thrive if Russia blasts
infrastructure and civilians with impunity, as it has for the past 18 months. Kyiv is a surprisingly vibrant city because it has effective defences against non-stop
aeraial attacks. The same set-up is needed for other cities, which is why squadrons of F-16s and more missile-defence systems are essential.
An economic recalibration is needed, too. That means fewer highfalutin plans for post-war reconstruction and more attention to boosting output and almost half
of Ukraine’s budget is paid for with Western cash. In an odd kind of wartime Dutch disease the currency, the hryvnia, has strengthened even as private investment
has plunged. With around 1m people bearing arms and millions having fled from the country, workers are scarce.
Ukraine’s economy needs to shift from relying on aid to attracting investment, even as the conflict keeps raging. From making more arms to processing more of
what it grows on its farms, Ukraine has plenty of potential. The challenge is to get local and foreign firms to invest more, and to lure more Ukrainians back toi the
calmer pats of the country in the west.
Better security can help. The stronger Ukraine’s air defences, the lower the risk that a new factory will be blown up. The farther Russia’s navy is pushed back, the
more safely exports can flow through Ukraine’s ports on the Black Sea. But economic reforms matter,too. More must be done to curb Ukraine’s long-standing
corruption, with a priority on making the judiciary clean and impartial. And more action is needed to make doing business easier, from recognising qualifications
that refugees have earned abroad to offering firms war insurance.
All this requires political will from Ukraine, but also from its friends in the West. In the long term, the best guarantee of Ukraine’s security is NATO membership.
Short of that, partners have promised a web of bilateral security guarantees. Equally important is what the European Union can offer: not just cash, but the
prospect of membership. It is not easy to nurture a flourishing economy while being barraged with explosives--even Israel never had to face such a powerful
aggressor. But Ukraine, unlike Israel, could one day be integrated into the world’s richest economic bloc. A roadmap for EU accession over, say, a decade, with clear
milestones, would offer hope to Ukrainians and accelerate economic reforms, just as the same promise galvanised much of eastern Europe in the 1990s.
A new member of the club
For that to happen a shift in mindset is needed in Europe, it has committed as much weaponry as America and far more financial aid. Yet it needs to step up further.
If Mr Trump wins in 2024, he may cut back American military assistance. Even if he loses, Europe will eventually need to carry more of the burden. That means
beffing up its defence industry and reforming the EU’s decision-making so it can handle more members.
The stakes could hardly be higher. Defeat would mean a failed state on the EU’s flank and Mr Putin’s killing machine closer to more of its borders. Success would
mean a new EU member with 30m well-educated people, Europe’s biggest army and a large agricultural and industrial base. Too many conversations about Ukraine
are predicted on an “end to the war”. that needs to change. Pray for a speedy victory, but plan for a long struggle and a Ukraine that can survive and thrive
nonetheless.
Time for a rethink
Ukraine and its allies needs a new plan
The war in Ukraine has repeatedly confounded expectations. It is now doing so again. The counter-offensive that began in June was based on the hope that
Ukrainian soldiers, equipped with modern Western weapons and after training in Germany, would recapture enough territory to put their leaders in a strong
position at any subsequent negotiations.
This plan is not working. Despite heroic efforts and breaches of Russian defences near Robotyne, Ukraine has liberated less than 0.25% of the territory that Russia
occupied in June. The 1000km front line has barely shifted. Ukraine’s army could still make a breakthrough in the coming weeks, triggering the collapse of brittle
Russian forces. But on the evidence of the pas three months, it would be a mistake to bank on that.
Asking for a ceasefire or peace talks is pointless. Vladimir Putin show no sign of wanting to negotiate and, even if he did, could not be trusted to stick to a deal. He
is waiting for the West to tire and hoping that Donald Trump is re-elected. Mr Putin needs war to underpin his domestic dictatorship; and ceasefire would simply
be a pause to re-arm and get ready to attack again. If Ukrainians stop fighting, they could lose their country.
Both Ukraine and its Western supporters are coming to realise that this will be a grinding war of attrition. President Volodymyr Zelensky visited Washington this
week for talks. “I have to be ready for the long war,” he told The Economist. But unfortunately, Ukraine is not yet ready; nor are its Western partners. Both are still
fixated on the counter-offensive. They need to rethink Ukraine’s military strategy and how its economy is run. Instead of aiming to “win” and then rebuild, the goal
should be to ensure that Ukraine has the staying power to wage a long war--and can thrive despite it.
The first recalibration is military. Ukraine’s soldiers are exhausted; many of its finest have been killed. Despite conscription, it lacks the manpower to sustain a
permanent large-scale counter-offensive. It needs to husband resources, and to change the game. New tactics and technologies can take the fight to Russia.
Ukraine’s tech-savvy entrepreneurs are ramping up drone production: Ukrainian drones recently destroyed Russian warship; its missiles seem to have damaged a
big air defence system in Crimea. Many more strikes are likely, to degrade Russia’s military infrastructure and deny its navy sanctuary in the Black Sea. Don’t expect
a knockout blow. Russia has also scaled up it drone production. Still, Ukraine can hit back when Russia bombs it, and perhaps even deter some attacks.
Alongside this offensive capability, Ukraine needs to boost its resilience. As well as heavy weaponry, it needs help with maintenance to sustain a multi-year fight:
humdrum repairs; reliable suppliers of artillery and training. More than anything, a long war requires better air defence. Ukraine cannot thrive if Russia blasts
infrastructure and civilians with impunity, as it has for the past 18 months. Kyiv is a surprisingly vibrant city because it has effective defenses against non-stop aerial
attacks. The same set-up is needed for other cities, which is why squadrons of F-16s and more missile-defence systems are essential.
An economic recalibration is needed, too. That means fewer highfalutin plans for post-war reconstruction and more attention to boosting output and capital
spending now. The economy has shrunk by a third and almost half of Ukraine’s budget is paid for with Western cash. In an odd kind of wartime Dutch disease the
currency, the kryvnia, has strengthened even as private investment has plunged. With around 1m people bearing arms and millions having fled from the country,
workers are scarce.
Ukraine’s economy needs to shift from relying on aid to attracting investment, even as the conflict keeps raging. From farms, Ukraine has plenty of potential. The
challenge is to get local and foreign firms to invest more, and to lure more Ukrainians back to the calmer parts of the country in the west.
Better security can help. The stronger Ukraine’s air defences, the lower the risk that a new factory will be blown up. The farther Russia’s navy is pushed back, the
more safely exports can flow through Ukraine’s ports on the Black Sea. But economic reforms mater, too. More must be done to curb Ukraine’s long-standing
corruption, with a priority on making the judiciary clean and impartial. And more action is needed to make doing business easier, from recognising qualifications
that refugees have earned abroad to offering firms war insurance.
All this requires political will from Ukraine, but also from its friends in the West. In the long term, the best guarantee of Ukraine’s security is NATO membership.
Short of that, partners have promised a web of bilateral security guarantees. Equally important is what the European Union can offer: not just cash, but the
prospect of membership. It is not easy to nurture a flourishing economy while being barraged with explosives--even Israel never had to face such a powerful
aggressor. But Ukraine, unlike Israel, could one day be integrated into the world’s richest economic bloc. A roadmap for EU accession over, say, a decade, with clear
milestones, would offer hope to Ukrainians and accelerate economic reforms, just as the same promise galvanised much of eastern Europe in the 1990s.
A new member of the club
For that to happen a shift in mindset is needed in Europe. It has committed as much weaponry as America and far more financial aid. Yet it needs to step up further.
If Mr Trump wins in 2024, he may cut back American military assistance. Even if he loses, Europe will eventually need to carry more of the burden. That means
beefing up its defence industry and reforming the EU’s decision-making so it can handle more members.
The stakes could hardly be higher. Defeat would mean a failed state on the EU’s flank and Mr Putin’s killing machine closer to more of its borders. Success would
mean a new EU member with 30m well-educated people, Europe’s biggest army and a large agricultural and industrial base. Too many conversations about Ukraine
are predicated on an “end to the war”. that needs to change,pray for a speedy victory, but plan for a long struggle and a Ukraine that can survive and thrive
nonetheless.
Time for a rethink
Ukraine and its allies need a new plan
The war in Ukraine has repeatedly confounded expectations. It is now doing so again. The counter-offensive that began in June was based on the hope that
Ukrainian soldiers, equipped with modern Western weapons and after training in Germany, would recapture enough territory to put their leaders in a strong
position at any subsequent negotiations.
This plan is not working. Despite heroic efforts and breaches of Russian defences near Robotyne, Ukraine has liberated less than 0.25% of the territory that Russia
occupied in June. The 1000km front line has barely shifted. Ukraine’s army could still make a breakthrough in the coming weeks, triggering the collapse of brittle
Russian forces. But on the evidence of the past three months, it would be a mistake to bank on that.
Asking for a ceasefire or peace talks is pointless. Vladimir Putin show no sign of wanting to negotiate and, even if he did, could not be trusted to stick to a deal. He
is waiting for the west to tire and hoping that Donald Trump is re-elected. Mr Putin needs war to underpin his domestic dictatorship; any ceasefire would simply be
a pause to re-ram and get ready to attack again. If Ukrainians stop fighting, they could lose their country.
Both Ukraine and its Western supporters are coming to realise that this will be a grinding war of attrition. President Volodymyr Zelensky visited Washington this
week for talks. “I have to be ready for the long war”, he told The Economist. But unfortunately, Ukraine is not yet ready; nor are its Western partners. Both are still
fixated on the counter-offensive. They need to rethink Ukraine’s military strategy and how its economy is run. Instead of aiming to “win” and then rebuild, the goal
should be to ensure that Ukraine has the staying power to wage a long war-and can thrive despite it.
The first recalibration is military. Ukraine’s soldiers are exhausted; many of its finest have been killed. Despite conscription, it lacks the manpower to sustain a
permanent large-scale counter-offensive. It needs to husband resources, and to change the game. New tactics and technologies can take the fight to Russia.
Ukraine’s tech-savvy entrepreneurs are ramping up drone production: Ukrainian drones recently destroyed Russian warships; its missiles seem to have damaged a
big air-defence system in Crimea. Many more strikes are likely, to degrade Russia’s military infrastructure and deny its navy sanctuary in the Black Sea. Don’t expect
a knockout blow. Russia has also scaled up its drone production. Still, Ukraine can hit back when Russia bombs it, and perhaps even deter some attacks.
Alongside this offensive capability, Ukraine needs to boost its resilience. As well as heavy weaponry, it needs help with maintenance to sustain a multi-year fight:
humdrum repairs, reliable supplies of artillery and training. More than anything, a long war requires better air defence. Ukraine cannot thrive if Russia blasts
infrastructure and civilians with impunity, as it has for the past 18 months. Kyiv is a surprisingly vibrant city be cause it has effective defences against non-stop
aerial attcks. The same set-up is needed for other cities, which is why squadrons of F-16s and more missile-defence systems are essential.
An economic recalibration is needed, too. That means fewer highfalutin plans for post-war reconstruction and more attention to boosting output and almost half
of Ukraine’s budget is paid for with Western cash. In an odd kind of wartime Dutch disease the currency, the hryvnia, has strengthened even as private investment
plunged. With around 1m people bearing arms and millions having fled from the country, workers are scarce.
Ukraine’s economy needs to shift from relying on aid to attracting investment, even as the conflict keeps raging. From making more arms to processing more of
what if grows on its farms, Ukraine has plenty of potential. The challenge is to get local and foreign firms to invest more, and to lure more Ukrainians back to the
calmer parts of the country in the west.
Better security can help. The stronger Ukraine’s air defences, the lower the risk that a new factory will be blown up. The farther Russia’s navy is pushed back,the
more safely exports can flow through Ukraine’s ports on the Black Sea. But economic reforms matter, too. More must be done to curb Ukraine’s long-standing
corruption, with a priority on making the judiciary clean and impartial. And more action is needed to make doing business easier, from recognising qualifications
that refugees have earned abroad to offering firms war insurance.
All this requires political will from Ukraine, but also from its friends in the West. In the long term, the best guarantee of Ukraine’s security is NATO membership.
Short of that, partners have promised a web of bilateral security guarantees. Equally important is what the European Union can offer: not just cash, but the
prospect of membership. It is not easy to nurture a flourishing economy while being barraged with explosives--even Israel never had to face such a powerful
aggressor. But Ukraine, unlike Israel, could one day be integrated into the world’s richest economic bloc. A roadmap for EU accession over, say, a decade, with clear
milestones, would offer hope to Ukrainians and accelerate economic reforms, just as the same promise galvanised much of eastern Europe in the 1990s.
A new member of the club
For that to happen a shift in mindset is needed in Europe. It has committed as much weaponry as America and far more financial aid. Yet it needs to step up further.
If Mr Trump wins in 2024, he may cut back American military assistance. Even if he loses, Europe will eventually need to carry more of the burden. That means
beefing up its defence industry and reforming the EU’s decision-making so it can handle more members. The stakes could hardly be higher. Defeat would mean a
failed state on the EU’s flank and Mr Putin’s killing machine closer to more of its borders. Success would mean a new EU member with 30m well-educated people,
Europe’s biggest army and a large agricultural and predicated on an “end to the war”. That needs to change. Pray for a speedy victory, but plan for a long struggle
and a Ukraine that can survive and thrive nonetheless.
Time for a rethink
Ukraine and its allies need a new plan
The war in Ukraine has repeatedly confounded expectations. It is now doing so again. The counter-offensive that began in June was based on the hope that
Ukrainian soldiers, equipped with modern Western weapons and after training in Germany, would recaptured enough territory to put their leaders in a strong
position at any subsequent negotiations.
This plan is not working. Despite heroic efforts and breaches of Russian defences near Robotyne, Ukraine has liberated less than 0.25% of the territory that Russian
occupied in June. The 1000km front line has barely shifted. Ukraine’s army could still make a breakthrough in the coming weeks, triggering the collapse of brittle
Russian forces. But on the evidence of the past three months, it would be a mistake to bank on that.
Asking for a ceasefire or peace talks is pointless. Vladimir Putin shows no sign of wanting to negotiate and, even if he did, could not be trusted to stick to a deal. He
is waiting for the West to tire and hoping that Donald Trump is re-elected. Mr Putin needs war to underpin his domestic dictatorship; and ceasefire would simply
be a pause to re-arm and get ready to attack again. If Ukrainians stop fighting, they could lose their country.
Both Ukraine and its Western supporters are coming to realise that this will be a grinding war of attrition. President Volodymyr Zelensky visited Washington this
week for talks.”I have to be ready for the long war,”he told The Economist. But unfortunately, Ukraine is not yet ready; not are its Western partners. Both are still
fixated on the counter-offensive. They need to rethink Ukraine’s military strategy and how its economy is run. Instead of aiming to “win” and then rebuild, the goal
should be to ensure that Ukraine has the staying power to wage a long war--and can thrive despite it.
The first recalibration is military. Ukraine’s soldiers are exhausted;many of its finest have been killed. Despite conscription, it lacks the manpower to sustain a
permanent large-scale counter-offensive. It needs to husband resources, and to change the game. New tactics and technologies can take the fight to Russia.
Ukraine’s tech-savvy entrepreneurs are ramping up drone production: Ukrainian drones recently destroyed Russian warships; its missiles seem to have damaged a
big air-defence system in Crimea. Many more strikes are likely, to degrade Russia’s military infrastructure and deny its navy sanctuary in the Black Sea.Don’t expect
a knockout blow. Russia has also scaled up its drone production. Still,Ukraine can hit back when Russia bombs it, and perhaps even deter some attacks.
Alongside this offensive capability, Ukraine needs to boost its resilience. As well as heavy weaponry, it needs help with maintenance to sustain a multi-year fight:
humdrum repairs, reliable supplies of artillery and training. More than anything, a long war requires better air defence. Ukraine cannot thrive if Russia blasts
infrastructure and civilians with impunity, as it has for the past 18 months. Kyiv is surprisingly vibrant city because it has effective defences against non-stop aerial
attacks. The same set-up is needed for other cities, which is why squdrons of F-16s and more missile-defence systems are essential.
An economic recalibration is needed, too. That means fewer highfalutin plans for post-war reconstruction and more attention to boosting output and capital
spending now. The economy has shrunk by a third and almost half of Ukraine’s budget is paid for with Western cash. In an odd kind of wartime Dutch disease the
currency, the hryvnia, has strengthened even as private investment has plunged. With around 1m people bearing arms and millions having fled from the country,
workers are scarce.
Ukraine’s economy needs to shift from relying on aid to attracting investment, even as the conflict keeps raging. From making more arms to processing more of
what it grows on its farms, Ukraine has plenty of potential. The challenge is to get local and foreign firms to invest more, and to lure more Ukrainians back to the
calmer parts of the country in the west.
Better security can help. The stronger Ukraine’s air defences, the lower the risk that a new factory will be blown up. The farther Russia’s navy is pushed back, the
more safely exports can flow through Ukraine’s ports on the Black Sea. But economic reforms matter,too. More must be done to curb Ukraine’s long-standing
corruption, with priority on making he judiciary clean and impartial. And more action is needed to make doing business easier, from recognising qualification that
refugees have earned abroad to offering firms war insurance.
All this requires political will from Ukraine, but also from its friends in the West. In the long term, the best Guarantee of Ukraine’s security is NATO membership.
Short of that,partners have promised a web of bilateral security guarantees. Equally important is what the European Union can offer: not just cash, but the
prospect of membership. It is not easy to nurture a flourishing economy while being barraged with explosives-even Israel never had to face such a powerful
aggressor. But Ukraine, unlike Israel, could one day be integrated into the world’s richest economic bloc. A roadmap for EU accession over, say, a decade, with clear
milestones, would offer hope to Ukrainians and accelerate economic reforms, just as the same promise galvanised much of eastern Europe in the 1990s.
A new member of club
For that to happen a shift in mindset is needed in Europe. It has committed as much weaponry as America and far more financial aid. Yet it needs to set up further.
If Mr Trump wins in 2024, he may cut back American military assistance. Even if he loses, Europe will eventually need to carry more of the burden. That means
beffing up its defence industry and reforming the EU’s decision-making so it can handle more members.
The stakes could hardly be higher. Defeat would mean a failed state on the EU’s flank and Mr Putin’s killing machine closer to more of its borders. Success would
mean a new EU member with 30m well educated people, Europe’s biggest arm and a large agricultural and industrial base. Too many conversations about Ukraine
are predicated on an “end to the war”. that needs to change. Pray for a speedy victory, but plan for a long struggle and a Ukraine that can survive and thrive
nonetheless.
Living to 120
Efforts to slow human ageing are taking wing
Want to live longer? For centuries the attempt to stop ageing was the preserve of charlatans touting the benefits of mercury and arsenic, or assortments of herbs
and pills, often to disastrous effect. Yet after years of false starts, the idea of a genuine elixir of longevity is taking wing. Behind it is a coterie of fascinated and
ambitious scientists and enthusiastic and self-interested billionaires. Increasingly, they are being joined by ordinary folk who have come to think that the right
behaviour and drugs could add years, maybe decades, to their lives.
Living to 100 today is not unheard of, but is still rare. In America and Britain centenarians make up around 0.03% of the population. Should the latest efforts to
prolong life reach their potential, living to see your 100th birthday could become the norm; making it to 120 could become a perfectly reasonable aspiration.
More exciting still, those extra years would be healthy. What progress has been made in expanding lifespans has so far come by countering the causes of death,
especially infectious disease. The process of ageing itself, with its attendant ills such as dementia, has not yet been slowed. This time, that is the intention.
The idea, as we set out in out Technology Quarterly, is to manipulate biological processes associated with ageing that, when dampened in laboratory animals, seem
to extend their lives. Some of these are familiar,such as severely restricting the number of calories an animal consumes as part of an otherwise balanced diet.
Living such a calorie-restricted life is too much to ask of most people; but drubs that affect the relevant biological pathways appear to bring similar results. One is
metformin, which has been approved for use against type-2 diabetes; another is rapamycin, an immunosuppressant used in organ transplants. Early adopters are
starting to take these drugs “off label”, off their own bat or by signing what amount to servicing contracts with a new class of longevity firms.
Another path is to develop drugs that kill”senescent” cells for which the body has no further use. The natural means for disposing of these cells, like a number of
other repair mechanisms, themselves weaken with age. Giving them a helping hand is not just a matter tidying up. Senescent cells cause all forts of malfunctions in
their healthy neighbours. “Senolytic” drugs which target them pose obvious risks: it is hard to kill off one type of cell without inconveniencing others. But the
promise is clear.
For true believers that is just the beginning. Groups of academic and commercial researchers are studying how to rejuvenate cells and tissues by changing the
“epigenetic” markers on chromosomes, which tell cells which genes they should activate. These markers accumulate with age; strip them back and you might
produce the cells of a 20-year-old body inside one that is in fact 65. mimicking calorie restriction and clearing out senescent cells would delay ageing. Boosters
claim that epigenetic rejuvenation could halt or reverse it.
One cause for concern is people’s brains. Slowing bodily ageing will not change the fact that the brain has a finite capacity, and is presumably adapted by natural
selection to conventional lifespans. This is quite separate from worries about dementia,which is caused by specific diseases. Society will thus have to find ways to
adapt to the normal ageing in brains: centenarians may,for instance, find themselves increasingly occupied with asking their AI diary assistants questions for which
once they would have remembered the answer.
An even greater concern is that none of these ideas has yet been tested formally on people. That is partly because drug-approval agencies do not yet recognise old
age as a treatable condition, making trials hard to register. By their very nature, such trials must follow thousands of people over many years, adding to their cost
and complexity. The lack of testing is also partly because many of the initial proposals use out-of-patent molecules that are of little interest to drug companies.
Nevertheless some trials are now in the works. The Targeting Ageing with Metformin trial will follow 3,000 Americans in their 60s and 70s to see whether the drug
does in fact aid survival overall. Such studies will necessarily take time. But more of them are needed, and governments should be helping bring them about.
Any development that causes people to live healthily for longer, and to take fuller advantage of what the world has to offer, is cause for cheer. Some people,
observing billionaires’ interests in longevity-promoting startups, worry that the benefits will be captured mainly by the rich, leading to a class of long-lived
Ubermenschen lording it over short-lived ordinary fold. But technologies have a record of spreading, and cheapening as they do so. It is hard to imagine a privilege
more likely to spark rebellion than a ruling class that hoards age-treatments to escape the great leveller.
The fact of many people living much longer would have wide ramifications. Most obviously, working lives will be extended, as they have already as life expectancies
have lengthened, and possible even more so for women, who will lose less of their careers to having children, perhaps narrowing inequality in the workplace.over
time there could be deeper shifts. People who live longer may care more about threats that are further away,such as the state of the world in 2100. longevity
permits the patient accumulation of capital, a factor in the emergence of a middle class. And times when political power is exercised mainly by young men, such as
the Middle Ages in Europe, tend to be more violent than when older, cooler head prevails. Families will span even more generations and, presumably, larger
networks of exes, half-siblings and quarter-cousins. Will that atomise them, or bring them together? Will a surfeit of centenarians marginalise the young, create a
cult of youth--or both?
For ever and a day
People will seize on the elixir of life if it becomes available. Natural selection has no interest in indefinite longevity per se: the traits that spread best are those that
make organisms fit in their prime; those that help them live on when reproduction is a distant memory must work through children and grandchildren. Yet the
visceral drive to cling to life is the most basic trait of all. Indeed, it is prevailing today--to tantalising effect.
Living to 120
Efforts to slow human ageing are taking wing
Want to live longer? For centuries the attempt to stop ageing was the preserve of charlatans touting the benefits of mercury and arsenic, or assortments of herbs
and pills, often to disastrous effect. Yet after years off false starts, the idea of a genuine elixir of longevity is taking wing. Behind it is a coterie of fascinated and
ambitious scientists and enthusiastic and self-interested billionaires. Increasingly, they are being joined by ordinary folk who have come to think that the right
behaviour and drugs could add years, maybe decades, to their lives.
Living to 100 today is not unheard of,but is still rare. In America and Britain centenarians make up around 0.03% of the population. Should the latest efforts to
prolong life reach their potential, living to see your 100th birthday could become the norm; making it to 120 could become a perfectly reasonable aspiration.
More exciting still, those extra years would be health. What progress has been made in expanding lifespans has so far come by countering the causes of death,
especially infectious disease. The process of ageing itself, with its attendant ills such as dementia,has not yet been slowed. This time, that its the intention.
The idea, as we set out in our Technology Quarterly, is to manipulate biological processes associated with ageing that, when dampened in laboratory animals, seem
to extend their lives. Some of these are familiar, such as severely restricting the number of calories an animal consumes as part of an otherwise balanced diet.
Living such a calorie-restricted life is too much to ask of most people; but drugs that affect the relevant biological pathways appear to bring similar results. One is
metformin, which has been approved for use against type-2 diabetes; another is rapamycin, an immunosuppressant used in organ transplants. Early adopters are
starting to take these drugs “off label”,off their own bat or by signing what amount to servicing contracts with a new class of longevity firms.
Another path is to develop drugs that kill”senescent” cells for which the body has no further use. The natural means for disposing of these cells, like a number of
other repair mechanisms, themselves weaken with age. Giving them a helping hand is not just a matter of tidying up. Senescent cells cause all sorts of
malfunctions in their healthy neighbours. “Senolytic” drugs which target them pose obvious risks: it is hard to kill off one type of cell without inconveniencing other.
But the promise is clear.
For true believers that is just the beginning. Groups of academic and commercial researchers are studying how to rejuvenate cells and tissues by changing the
“epigenetic” markers on chromosomes, which tell cells which genes they should activate. These markers accumulate with age; strip them back and you might
produce the cells of a 20-year-old body inside one that is in fact 65. mimicking calorie restriction and clearing out senescent cells would delay ageing. Boosters
claim that epigenetic rejuvenation could halt or reverse it.
One cause for concern is people’s brains. Slowing bodily ageing will not change the fact the brain has a finite capacity, and is presumably adapted by natural
selection to conventional lifespans. This is quite separate from worries about dementia, which is caused by specific diseases. Society will thus have to find ways to
adapt to the normal ageing in brains: centenarians may, for instance, find themselves increasingly occupied with asking their AI diary assistants questions for which
once they would have remembered the answer.
An even greater concern is that none of these ideas has yet been tested formally on people. That is partly because drug-approval agencies do not yet recognise old
age as a treatable condition, making trials hard to register. By their very nature, such trials must follow thousands of people over many years, adding to their cost
and complexity. The lack of testing is also partly because many of the initial proposals use out-of-patent molecules that are of little interest to drug companies.
Nevertheless some trials are now in the works. The Targeting Ageing with Metformintrial will follow 3000 Americans in their 60s and 70s to see whether the drug
does in fact aid survival overall. Such studies will necessarily take time. But more of them are needed, and governments should be helping bring them about.
Any development that causes people to live healthily for longer, and to take fuller advantage of what the world has to offer, is cause for cheer. Some people,
observing billionaires’ interest in longevity-promoting startups, worry that the benefits will be captures mainly by the rich, leading to a class of long-lived
Ubermenschen lording it over short-lived ordinary folk. But technologies have a record of spreading, and cheapening as they do so. It is hard to imagine a privilege
more likely to spark rebellion than a ruling class that hoards age-treatments to escape the great leveller.
The fact of many people living much longer would have wide ramifications. Most obviously, working lives will be extended, as they have already as life expectancies
have lengthened, and possibly even more so for women, who will lose less of their careers to having children, perhaps narrowing inequality in the workplace. Over
time there could be deeper shifts. People who live longer may care more about
threats that are further away, such as the state of the world in 2100. longevity
permits the patient accumulation of capital, a factor in the emergence of a middle class. And times when political power is exercised mainly by young men, such as
the Middle Ages in Europe, tend to be more violent than when older, cooler heads prevail. Families will span even more generations and, presumably, larger
networks of exes, half-siblings and quarter-cousins. Will that atomise them, or bring them together? Will a surfeit of centenarians marginalise the young, create a
cult of youth--or both?
For ever and a day
People will seize on the elixir of life if it becomes available. Natural selection has no interest in indefinite longevity per se: the traits that spread best are those that
make organisms fit in their prime; those that help them live on when reproduction is a distant memory must work through children and grandchildren. Yet the
visceral drive to cling to life is the most basic trait of all. Indeed, it is prevailing today--to tantalising effect.
Living to 120
Efforts to slow human ageing are taking wing
Want to live longer? For centuries the attempt to stop ageing was the preserve of charlatans touting the benefits of mercury and arsenic, or assortments of herbs
and pills, often to disastrous effect. Yet after years of false starts, the idea of a genuine elixir of longevity is taking wing. Behind it is a coterie of fascinated and
ambitious scientists and enthusiastic and self-interested billionaires. Increasingly, they are being joined by ordinary folk who have come to think that the right
behaviour and drugs could add years, maybe decades, to their lives.
Living to 100 toady is not unheard of, but is still rare. In America and Britain centenarians make up around 0.03% of the population. Should the latest efforts to
prolong life reach their potential, living to see your 100th birthday could become the norm; making it to 120 could become a perfectly reasonable aspiration.
More exciting still, those extra years would be healthy. What progress has been made in expanding lifespans has so far come by countering the causes of death,
especially infectious disease. The process of ageing itself, with its attendant ills such as dementia, has not yet been slowed. This time, that is the intention.
The idea, as we set out in our Technology Quarterly, is to manipulate biological processes associated with ageing that, when dampened in laboratory animals,seem
to extend their lives. Some of these are familiar, such as severely restricting the number of calories an animal consumes as part of an otherwise balanced diet.
Living such a calorie-restricted life is too much to ask of most people; but drugs that affect the relevant biological pathways appear to bring similar results. One is
metformin, which has been approved for use against type-2 diabetes; another is rapamycin, an immunosuppressant used in organ transplants. Early adopters are
starting to take these drug “off label”, off their own bat or by signing what amount to servicing contracts with a new class of longevity firms.
Another path is to develop drug that kill “senescent” cells for which the body has nor further use. The natural means for disposing of these cells, like a number of
other repair mechanisms, themselves weaken with age. Giving them a helping had is not just a matter of tidying up. Senescent cells cause all sorts of malfunctions
in their healthy neighbours. “senolytic” drugs which target them pose obvious risks: it is hard to kill off one type of cell without inconveniencing others. But the
promise is clear.
For true believers that is just the beginning. Groups of academic and commercial researchers are studying how to rejuvenate cells and tissues by changing the
“epigenetic” markers on chromosomes, which tell cells which genes they should activate. These markers accumulate with age; strip them back and you might
produce the cells of a 20-year-old body inside one that is in fact 65. mimicking calorie restriction and clearing out senescent cells would delay ageing. Boosters
claim that epigenetic rejuvenation could halt or reverse it.
One cause for concern is people’s brains. Slowing bodily ageing will not change the fact that the brain has a finite capacity, and is presumably adapted by natural
selection to conventional lifespans. This is quite separate from worries about dementia, which is caused by specific diseases. Society will thus have to find ways to
adapt to the normal ageing in brains: centenarians may, for instance, find themselves increasingly occupied with asking their AI diary assistants questions for which
once they would have remembered the answer.
An even greater concern is that none of these ideas has yet been tested formally on people. That is partly because drug-approval agencies do not yet recognise old
age as a treatable condition, making trials hard to register. By their very nature, such trials must follow thousands of people over many years, adding to their cost
and complexity.the lack of testing is also partly because many of the initial proposals use out-of-patent molecules that are of little interest to drug companies.
Nevertheless some trials are now in the works. The Targeting Ageing with Metformin trial will follow 3000 Americans in their 60s and 70s to see whether the drug
does in fact aid survival overall. Such studies will necessarily take time. But more of them are needed, and governments should be helping bring them about.
Any development that causes people to live healthily for longer, and to take fuller advantage of what the world has to offer, is cause for cheer. Some people,
observing billionaires’ interest in longevity-promoting startups, worry that the benefits will be captured mainly by the rich, leading to a class of long-lived
Ubermenschen lording it over short-lived ordinary folk. But technologies have a record of spreading, and cheapening as they do so. It is hard to imagine a privilege
more likely to spark rebellion than a ruling class that hoards age-treatments to escape the great leveller.
The fact of many people living much longer would have wide ramifications. Most obviously, working lives will be extended, as they have already as life expectancies
have lengthened, and possibly even more so for women, who will lose less of their careers to having children, perhaps narrowing inequality in the workplace. Over
time there could be deeper shifts. People who live longer may care more about threats that are further away, such as the state of the world in 2100. longevity
permits the patient accumulation of capital, a factor in the emergence of a middle class. And times when political power is exercised mainly by young men, such as
the Middle Ages in Europe, tend to be more violent than when older, cooler heads prevail. Families will span even more generations and, presumably, larger
networks of exes, half-siblings and quarter-cousins. Will that atomise them, or bring them together? Will a surfeit of centenarians marginalise the young, create a
cult of youth--or both?
For ever and a day
People will seize on the elixir of life if it becomes available. Natural selection has no interest in indefinite longevity per se: the traits that spread best are those that
make organisms fit in their prime; those that help them live on when reproduction is a distant memory must work through children and grandchildren.yet the
visceral drive to cling to life is the most basic trait of all. Indeed, it is prevailing today--to tantalising effect.
Are free markets history?
Governments have jettisoned the principles that made the world rich
Sometimes, in wars and revolutions, fundamental change arrives with a bang. More often, it creeps up on you. That is the way with what we care calling
“homeland economics”, a protectionist, high-subsidy, intervention-heavy ideology administered by an ambitious state. Fragile supply chains, growing threats to
national security, the energy transition and the cost-of-living crisis have each demanded action by governments and for good reason. But when you lump them all
together, it becomes clear just how systematically the presumption of open markets and limited government has been left in the dust.
For this newspaper, this is an alarming trend. We were founded in 1843 to campaign for, among other things, free trade and a modest role for government. Toady
these classical liberal values are not only unpopular, they are increasingly absent from political debate. Less than eight years ago President Barack Obama was
trying to sign America up to a giant Pacific trade pact. Today if you argue for free trade in Washington, you will be scoffed at as hopelessly naive. In the emerging
world, you will be painted as a neocolonial relic from the era when the West knew best.
Our special report this week argues that homeland economics will ultimately prove to be a disappointment. It misdiagnoses what has gone wrong, it overburdens
the state with unmeetable responsibilities and it will botch a period of rapid social and technological change. The good news is that eventually it will bring about its
own demise.
Central to the new regime is the idea that protectionism is the way to cope with the buffeting of open markets. China’s success convinced working-class
Westerners that they had a lot to lose from the free movement of goods across borders. The covid-19 pandemic left elites thinking that global supply chains had to
be “derisked”, often by moving production closer to home. China’s rise under “state capitalism”, with its disregard for rules-based trade and challenge to American
power, was seized on in rich and emerging economies as a justification for intervention.
This protectionism goes along with extra government spending. Industry is gobbling up subsidies to boost the energy transition and guarantee the supply of
strategic goods. Vast handouts to households during the pandemic have raised expectations of the state as a bulwark against life’s misfortunes. The Spanish and
Italian governments are even bailing out borrowers who cannot afford the rising cost of mortgages.
And, inevitably, state handouts go along with extra regulation. Antitrust has become activist. Regulators are eyeing nascent markets, from cloud gaming to artificial
intelligence. Because carbon prices are still too low, governments end up micro-managing the energy transition by decree.
This mix of protection, spending and regulation comes at a heavy cost. For a start, it is a misdiagnosis. The pooling of risks is indeed an essential function of
governments. But not all risks: for markets to work, actions must have consequences.
In contrast to the accepted view, covid and the Ukraine war have shown that markets deal with shocks better than planners do. Globalised trade coped with huge
swings in consumer demand: throughput at America’s ports in 2021 was 11% higher than in 2019. in 2022 germany’s economy repeated the trick, suffering no
calamity as it switched rapidly from Russian gas to other sources of energy. By contrast, state-dominated markets like the supply of shells for Ukraine are still
struggling. Just like the old complaints about trade with China--which has boosted American’s real incomes-gripes about globalisation’s supposed fragility have
built a cathedral of fear over a grain of truth.
Another flaw in homeland economics is to overburden the state. Governments are losing all restraint just when they need to curtail welfare spending. Ageing
populations weigh down budgets with extra bills for pensions and health care. Rising interest rates make everything worse. After a bond-market crisis in 2022,
Britain’s right-wing government is raising taxes, as a share of GDP, by more than in any parliamentary term in the country’s history. As yields rise on long-dated
bonds, indebted Italy looks wobbly again. America’s rising debt-service bill will probably match its all-time high before the end of the decade--testimony to the
fiscal fragility of the new era.
The least visible, but potentially most costly flaw is that homeland economics is a blunt instrument in a time of rapid change. The energy and AI transitions are too
big for any government to plan. Nobody knows the cheapest ways to decarbonise or the best uses of new technology. Ideas need to be tested and channelled by
markets, not governed by checklists from the centre. Excessive regulation will inhibit innovation and, by raising costs, make change slower and more painful.
Despite its flaws, homeland economics will be tough to restrain. People enjoy spending other people’s money. As government budgets get bigger, the special
interests that feed on them will grow in size and influence. It is harder to withdraw protection and handouts than to grant them-particularly with more elderly
voters, who have less of a stake in economic growth. Anyone doe-eyed about the arc of history bending towards progress should remember that a century ago
Argentina was about as rich as Switzerland.
Plan for the road ahead
Yet disillusionment will eventually set in. That may be because fiscal extravagance catches up with indebted governments. Perhaps the rent-seekers’ greed will
become too hard to conceal. Or a stagnating, repressive China may no longer hold out the promise of state-directed prosperity.
When change comes, it can be surprisingly swift--in democracies, at least. In the 1970s the tide turned in favour of free markets almost as fast as it has turned
against them today, leading to the election of Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan. The task for classical liberals is to prepare for that moment by defining a new
consensus that adapts their ideas to a more dangerous, interconnected and fractious world. That will not be easy, especially in the face of the rivalry between
America and China. But it has been done in the past. And think of the prize.
Are free markets history?
Governments have jettisoned the principles that made the world rich
Sometimes, in wars and revolutions, fundamental change arrives with a bang. More often, it creeps up on you. That is the way with what we are calling “homeland
economics”, a protectionist, high-subsidy, intervention-heavy ideology administered by an ambitious state. Fragile supply chains, growing threats to national
security, the energy transition and the cost-of-living crisis have each demanded action by governments-- and for good reason. But when you lump them all
together, it becomes clear just how systematically the presumption of open markets and limited government has been left in the dust.
For this newspaper,this is an alarming trend. We were founded in 1843 to campaign for, among other things, free trade and a modest role for government. Today
these classical liberal values are not only unpopular, they are increasingly absent from political debate. Less than eight years ago President Barack Obama was
trying to sign America up to a giant Pacific trade pact. Today if you argue for free trade in Washington, you will be scoffed at as hopelessly naive. In the emerging
world, you will be painted as a neocolonial relic from the era when the West knew best.
Our special report this week argues that homeland economics will ultimately prove to be a disappointment. It misdiagnoses what has gone wrong, it overburdens
the state with unmeetable responsibilities and it will botch a period of rapid social and technological change. The good news is that eventually it will bring about its
own demise.
Central to the new regime is the idea that protectionism is the way to cope with the buffeting of open markets. China’s success convinced working-class
Westerners that they had a blot to lose from the free movement of goods across borders. The covid-19 pandemic left elites thinking that global supply chains had
to be “derisked”, often by moving production closer to home. China’s rise under “state capitalism”, with its disregard for rules-based trade and challenge to
American power, was seized on in rich and emerging economics as a justification for intervention.
This protectionism goes along with extra government spending. Industry is gobbling up subsidies to boost the energy transition and guarantee the supply of
strategic goods. Vast handouts to households during the pandemic have raised expectations. Of the state as a bulwark against life’s misfortunes. The Spanish and
Italian governments are even bailing out borrowers who cannot afford the rising cost of mortgages.
And, inevitably, state handouts go along with extra regulation. Antitrust has become activist. Regulators are eyeing nascent markets, from cloud gaming to artificial
intelligence. Because carbon prices are still too low, governments end up micro-managing the energy transition by decree.
This mix of protection, spending and regulation comes at a heavy cost. For a start, it is a misdiagnosis. The pooling of risks is indeed an essential function of
governments. But not all risks: for markets to work, actions must have consequences.
In contrast to the accepted view, covid and the Ukraine war have shown that markets deal with shocks better than planners do. Globalised trade coped with huge
swings in consumer demand: throughput at America’s ports in 2021 was 11% higher than in 2019. in 2022 Germany’s economy repeated the trick, suffering no
calamity as it switched rapidly from Russian gas to other sources of energy. By contrast, state-dominated markets like the supply of shells for Ukraine are still
struggling. Just like the old complaints about trade with China--which has boosted Americans’ real incomes-gripes about globalisation’s supposed fragility have
built a cathedral of fear over a grain of truth.
Another flaw in homeland economics is to overburden the state. Governments are losing all restraint just when they need to curtail welfare spending. Ageing
populations weigh down budgets with extra bills for pensions and health care. Rising interest rates make everything worse. After a bond-market crisis in 2022,
Britain’s right-wing government is raising taxes, as a share of GDP, by more than in any parliamentary term in the country’s history. As yields rise on long-dated
bonds, indebted Italy looks wobbly again. America’s rising debt-service bill will probably match its all-time high before the end of the decade testimony to the fiscal
fragility of the new era.
The least visible, but potentially most costly flaw is that homeland economics is a blunt instrument in a time of rapid change. The energy and AI transitions are too
big for any government to plan. Nobody knows the cheapest ways to decarbonise or the best uses of new technology. Ideas need to be tested and channelled by
markets, not governed by checklists from the centre. Excessive regulation will inhabit innovation and, by raising costs, make change slower and more painful.
Despite its flaws, homeland economics will be tough to restrain. People enjoy spending other people’s money. As government budgets get bigger, the special
interests that feed on them will grow in size and influence. It is harder to withdraw protection and handouts than to grant them--particularly with more elderly
voters, who have less of a stake in economic growth. Anyone doe-eyed about the arc of history bending towards progress should remember that a century ago
Argentina was about as rich as Switzerland.
Plan for the road ahead
Yet disillusionment will eventually set in. That may be because fiscal extravagance catches up with indebted governments. Perhaps the rent-seeker’s greed will
become too hard to conceal. Or a stagnating, repressive China may no longer hold out the promise of state-directed prosperity. When change comes, it can be
surprisingly swift--in democracies, at least. In the 1970s the tide turned in favour of free markets almost as fast as it had turned against them today, leading to the
election of Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan. The task for classical liberals is to prepare for that moment by defining a new consensus that adapts their ideas
to a more dangerous, interconnected and fractious world. That will not be easy, especially in the face of the rivalry between America and China. But it has been
done in the past. And think of the prize.
Israel’s agony
And its retribution
In a static decade-long conflict that has rotted for the past 20 years, it can be hard to believe that real change is possible. Be in no doubt, however, that Hamas’s
murderous assault has blown up the status quo between Israel and the Palestinians. The coming weeks will determine whether war in Gaza sinks the Middle East
deeper into chaos or whether, despite Hamas’s
atrocities, Israel can begin to create the foundations for regional stability--and, one day, peace.
Change is inevitable because of the gravity of Hamas’s crimes. More than 1200 Israelis, most of them civilians, many of those women and children, were murdered
in their homes, on the street, in kibbutzim, at a music festival. Perhaps 150 more have been dragged to Gaza and shut in makeshift dungeons. Israel’s belief that it
could indefinitely manage Palestinian hostility with money and air strikes crumpled early on October 7 th, as the first Hamas bulldozer breached the security fence.
Hamas has chosen mass murder and there is no going back.
Gaza is now awaiting a huge Israeli ground offensive. Its extent and success will determine the legacy of Hamas’s bloody assault. So will the fundamental choice
that Israel’s politicians face after the worst catastrophe in their country’s history: do they unite or continue to exploit divisions for their own advantage? A third
factor is the choices of Israel’s Middle Eastern neighbours, including Iran.
In the weeks and months ahead Israel’s leaders carry a heavy responsibility to temper their understandable desire for fire and retribution with a hard-headed
calculation about their country’s long-term interests and an unwavering respect for the rules of war. They left their people vulnerable by failing to foresee Hamas’s
looming attack. They must not compound their error by failing to see ahead clearly for a second time.
The need for vision begins with the imminent ground offensive. The Israel Defence Forces will rightly strike deep and hard at Hamas. But how deep and how hard?
Israel will be tempted to unleash a spasm of briefly satisfying violence. Its defence minister has called Hamas fighters “human animals”, and announced a blockade
of food, water and energy. Israeli officials--and President Joe Biden--have taken to comparing Hamas to Islamic state, or ISIS, an Islamist group that America vowed
to eradicate.
That comparison is dangerous because, although Hamas deserves to be eradicated, achieving that goal in an enclave of 2m impoverish people with nowhere to
flee will be impossible. A better comparison than ISIS is the 9/11 attacks in 2001, not just because of Israel’s agony, but also because America’s invasions of
Afganistan and Iraq show how steeply the costs of invasion mount--which is precisely Hamas’s calculation.
At such a moment, self-restraint mattes more than ever. It is in Israel’s interest, because street fighting is perilous and the hostages are defenceless. It makes the
operation militarily sustainable and preserves international support. It avoids playing into the hands of foes who calculate that dead Palestinian women and
children will further their cause. By clinging to its identity as a state that values human life, Israel becomes stronger.
Restraint in the ground offensive depends on the choices of Israel’s politicians. Before the war they were tearing the country apart over a new law curbing the
Supreme Court. For now grief and horror have brought people back together, but the left blames the far-right government of Binyamin Netanyahu, the prime
minister, for poisoning relations with the army and security services over the court, and neglecting security in Gaza because of a fixation with helping Jewish
settlers in the West Bank. The right counters that calls for civil disobedience by senior officials opposed to Mr Netanyahu were a green light for Hamas.
Mr Netanyahu must try to use his new war cabinet, announced this week, to unite Israel. Only by healing its own politics will the country be able to deal with Gaza.
Mr Netanyahu will not want to help his most plausible rivals for office. Yet he was the man in charge when Hamas struck and his political career is ending. Having
spent a lifetime seeking power at any price, he should finally put his country before himself.
A unified, centrist government would also be better placed to cope with the last set of challenges: the politics of the Middle East. Israel will be in grave peril if the
war in Gaza spreads to its northern border with Lebanon, where tensions with Hizbullah, a formidably armed militia, are already growing ominously. The longer
and bloodier the fighting in Gaza, the more Hizbullah will fell it must be seen to support its brethren.there is also a possibility of war with Iran, which has replaced
Arab governments as the sponsor of Palestinian violence. Even Iran hawks in the West should not wish for that.
A wider war around wreck the detente, built on the Abraham accords, between Israel and its Arab neighbours, including Bahrain, Morocco, the United Arab
Emirates and potentially Saudi Arabia. This grouping stands for a new Middle East that is pragmatic and focused on economic development rather than ideology. It
is still inchoate, but is has the potential to become a force for moderation--and possible even security.
Simply by surviving, the Abraham accords could emerge from this crisis stronger. However, Hamas has shown that the signatories’s neglect of the Palestinians is a
mistake. Israel and its Arab partners need a new,optimistic vision for Gaza and the West Bank, as an alternative to Iran’s cult of violence and killing.
And that leads back to the fighting in Gaza. How does it end? Israel has no good options: occupation is unsustainable, a Hamas government is unacceptable; rule
by its rival, Fatah, is untenable; an Arab peacekeeping force is unattainable; and a puppet government is unimaginable. If Israel destroys Hamas in Gaza and pulls
out, who knows what destructive forces will fill the vacuum left behind?
Israeli strategists must therefore start thinking about how to create the conditions for life alongside the Palestinians, however remote that seems today. All those
elements may have a part: a short period of martial law in Gaza, a search for Palestinian leaders acceptable to both sides, and the good offices of Arab
intermediaries. The only way to eradicate Hamas is for Israel and its Arab allies to create
stability--and, one day, peace.
Israel’s agony
And its retribution
In a static decade-long conflict that has rotted for the past 20 years, it can be hard to believe that real change is possible. Be in no doubt, however, that Hamas’s
murderous assault has blown up the status quo between Israel and the Palestinians. The coming weeks will determine whether war in Gaza sinks the Middle East
deeper into chaos or whether, despite Hamas’s atrocities, Israel can begin to create the foundations for regional stability---and, one day, peace.
Change is inevitable because of the gravity of Hamas’s crimes. More than 1200 Israel’s, most of them civilians, many of those women and children, were murdered
in their homes, on the street, in kibbutzim, at a music festival. Perhaps 150 more have been dragged to Gaza and shut in makeshift dungeons. Israel’s belief that it
could indefinitely manage Palestinian hostility with money and air strikes crumpled early on October 7 th, as the first Hamas bulldozer breached the security fence.
Hamas has chosen mass murder and there is no going back.
Gaza is now awaiting a huge Israeli ground offensive. Its extent and success will determine the legacy of Hamas’s bloody assault. So will the fundamental choice
that Israel’s politicians face after the worst catastrophe in their country’s history: do they unite or continue to exploit divisions for their own advantage? A third
factor is the choices of Israel’s Middle Eastern neighbours, including Iran.
In the weeks and months ahead Israel’s leaders carry a heavy responsibility to temper their understandable desire for fire and retribution with a hard-headed
calculation about their country’s long-term interests and an unwavering respect fort the rules of war. They left their people vulnerable by failing to foresee Hamas’s
looming attack. They must not compound their error by failing to see ahead clearly for a second time.
The need for vision begins with the imminent ground offensive. The Israel Defence Force will rightly strike deep and hard at Hamas. But how deep and how hard?
Israel will be tempted to unleash a spasm of briefly satisfying violence. Its defence minister has called Hamas fighters “human animals”, and announced a blockade
of food, water and energy. Israeli officials--and President Joe Biden--have taken to comparing Hamas to Islamic State, or ISIS, an Islamist group that America vowed
to eradicate.
That comparison is dangerous because, although Hamas deserves to be eradicated, achieving that goal in an enclave of 2m impoverished people with nowhere to
flee will be impossible. A better comparison than ISIS is the 9/11 attacks in 2001, not just because of Israel’s agony, but also because America’s invasions of
Afghanistan and Iraq show how steeply the costs of invasion mount--which is precisely Hamas’s calculation.
At such a moment, self-restrain matters more than ever. It is in Israel’s interest, because street fighting is perilous and the hostages are defenceless. It makes the
operation militarily sustainable and preserves international support. It avoids playing into the hands of foes who calculate the dead Palestinian women and
children will further their cause. By clinging to its identity as a state that values human life, Israel becomes stronger.
Restraint in the ground offensive depends on the choices of Israel’s politicians. Before the war they were tearing the country apart over a new law curbing the
Supreme Court. For now grief and horror have brought people back together, but the left blames the far-right government of Binyamin Netanyahu, the prime
minister, for poisoning relations withe army and security services over the court, and neglecting security in Gaza because of a fixation with helping Jewish settlers
in the West
Bank
. The right counters that calls for civil disobedience by senior officials opposed to Mr Netanyahu were a green light for Hamas.
Mr Netanyahu must try to use his new war cabinet, announced this week, to unite Israel. Only by healing its own politics will the country be able to deal with Gaza.
Mr Netanyahu will not want to help his most plausible rivals for office. Yet he was the man in charge when Hamas struck and his political career is ending. Having
spent a lifetime seeking power at any price, he should finally put his country before himself.
A unified, centrist government would also be better placed to cope with the last set of challenges: the politics of the Middle East. Israel will be in grave peril if the
war in Gaza spreads to its Northern border with Lebanon, where tensions with Hizbullah, a formidably armed militia, are already growing ominously. The longer
and bloodier the fighting in Gaza, the more Hizbullah will fell it must be seen to support its brethren. There is also a possibility of war with Iran, which has replaced
Arab governments as the sponsor of Palestinian violence. Even Iran hawks in the West should not wish for that.
A wider war would wreck the detente, built on the Abraham accords, between Israel and its Arab neighbours, including Bahrain, Morocco, the United Arab
Emirates and potentially Saudi Arabia. This grouping stands for a new Middle East that is pragmatic and focused on economic development rather than ideology. It
is still inchoate, but is has the potential to become a force for moderation--and possibly even security.
Simply by surviving, the Abraham accords could emerge from this crisis stronger. However, Hamas has shown that the signatories neglect of the Palestinians is a
mistake. Israel and its Arab partners need a new, optimistic vision for Gaza and the West bank, as an alternative to Iran’s cult of violence and killing.
And that leads back to the fighting in Gaza. How does it end? Israel has no good options: occupation is unsustainable, a Hamas government is unacceptable; rule
by tis rival, Fatah, is untenable; an Arab peacekeeping force is unattainable; and a puppet government is unimaginable. If Israel destroys Hamas in Gaza and pulls
out, who knows what destructive forces will will the vacuum left behind?
Israeli strategists must therefore start thinking about how to create the conditions for life alongside the Palestinians, however remote that seems today. All those
elements may have a part: a short period of martial law in Gaza, a search for Palestinian leaders acceptable to both sides, and the good offices of Arab
intermediaries. The only way to eradicate Hamas is for Israel and its Arab allies to crate stability--and, one day, peace.
Israel’s agony
And its retribution
In a static decades-long conflict that has rotted for the past 20 years, it can be hard to believe that real change is possible. Be in no doubt, however, that Hamas’s
murderous assault has blown up the status qua between Israel and the Palestinians. The coming weeks will determine whether are in Gaza sinks the Middle East
deeper into chaos or whether, despite Hamas’s atrocities, Israel can begin to create the foundations for regional stability--and,one day, peace.
Change is inevitable because of the gravity of Hamas’s crimes. More than 1200 Israelis, most of them civilians, many of those women and children, were murdered
in their homes, on the street, in kibbutzim, at a music festival. Perhaps 150 more have been dragged to Gaza and shut in makeshift dungeons. Israel’s belief that it
could indefinitely manage Palestinian hostility with money and air strikes crumpled early on October 7 th, as the first Hamas bulldozer breached the security fence.
Hamas has chosen mass murder and there is no going back.
Gaza is now awaiting a huge Israeli ground offensive. Its extent and success will determine the legacy of Hamas’s bloody assault. So will the fundamental choice
that Israel’s politicians face after the worst catastrophe in their country’s history: do they unite or continue to exploit divisions for their own advantage? A third
factor is the choices of Israel’s Middle Eastern neighbours, including Iran.
In the weeks and months ahead Israel’s leaders carry a heavy responsibility to temper their understandable desire for fire and retribution with a hard-headed
calculation about their country’s long-term interests and an unwavering respect for the rules of war. They left their people vulnerable by failing to foresee Hamas’s
looming attack. They must not compound their error by failing to see ahead clearly for a second time.
The need for vision begins with the imminent ground offensive. The Israel Defence Forces will rightly strike deep and hard at Hamas. But how deep and how hard?
Israel will be tempted to unleash a spasm of briefly satisfying violence. Its defence minister has called Hamas fighters”human animals”, and announced a blockade
of food, water and engergy. Israeli officials--and President Joe Biden--have taken to comparing Hamas to Islamic State, or ISIS, an Islamist group that America
vowed to eradicate.
That comparison is dangerous because, although Hamas deserves to be eradicated, achieving that goal in an enclave of 2m impoverished people with nowhere to
flee will be impossible. A better comparison than ISIS is the 9/11 attacks in 2001, not just because of Israel’s agony, but also because America’s invasions of
Afganistan and Iraq show how steeply the costs of invasion mount--which is precisely Hamas’s calculation.
At such a moment, self-restraint matters more than ever. It is in Israel’s interest, because street fighting is perilous and the hostages are defenceless. It makes the
operation militarily sustainable and preserves international support. It avoids playing into the hands of foes who calculate that dead Palestinian women and
children will further their cause. By clinging to its identity as a state that values human life, Israel becomes stronger.
Restraint in the ground offensive depends on the choices of Israel’s politicians. Before the war they were tearing the country apart over a new law curbing the
Supreme Court. For now grief and horror have brought people back together, but the left blames the far-right government of Binyamin Netanyahu, the prime
minister, for poisoning relations with the army and security services over the court, and neglecting security in Gaza because of a fixation with helping Jewish
settlers in the West Bank. The right counters that calls for civil disobedience by senior officials opposed to Mr Netanyahu were a green light for Hamas.
Mr Netanyahu must try to use his new war cabinet, announced this week, to unite Israel. Only by healing its own politics will the country be able to deal with Gaza.
Mr Netanyahu will not want to help his most plausible rivals for office. Yet he was the man in charge when Hamas struck and his political career is ending. Having
spent a lifetime seeking power at any price, he should finally put his country before himself.
A unified, centrist government would also be better placed to cope with eh last set of challenges: the politics of the Middle East. Israel will be in grave peril if the
war in Gaza spreads to its northern border with Lebanon, where tensions with Hizbullah, a formidably armed militia, are already growing ominously. The longer
and bloodier the fighting in Gaza, the more Hizbullah will feel it must be seen to support its brethren. There is also a possibility of war with Iran, which has replaced
Arab governments as the sponsor of Palestinian violence. Even Iran hawks in the West should not wish for that.
A wider war would wreck the detente, built on the Abraham accords, between Israel and its Arab neighbours, including Baharain, Morocco, the United Arab
Emirates and potentially Saudi Arabia. This grouping stands for a new Middle East that is pragmatic and focused on economic development rather than ideology. It
is still inchoate, but it has the potential to become a force for moderation--and possible even security.
Simply by surviving, the Abraham accords could emerge from this crisis stronger. However, Hamas has shown that the signatories’ neglect of the Palestinians is a
mistake. Israel and it Arab partners need a new,optimistic vision for Gaza and the West Bank, as an alternative to Iran’s cult of violence and killing.
And that leads back to the fighting in Gaza. How does it end? Israel has no good options: occupation is unsustainable, a Hamas government is unacceptable; rule
by its rival, Fatah, is untenable; an Arab peacekeeping force is unattainable; and a puppet government is unimaginable. If Israel destroys Hamas in Gaza and pull
out, who knows what destructive forces will fill the vacuum left behind?
Israeli strategists must therefore start thinking about how to create the conditions for life alongside the Palestinians, however remote that seems today. All those
elements may have a part :a short period of martial law in Gaza, a search for Palestinian leaders acceptable to both sides, and the good offices of Arab
intermediaries. The only way to eradicate Hamas is for Israel and Its Arab allies to create stability--and, one day, peace.
Israel’s agony
And its retribution
In a static decades-long conflict that has rotted for the past 20 years, it can be hard to believe that real change is possible. Be in no doubt, however, that Hamas’s
murderous assault has blown up the status quo between Israel and the Palestinians. The coming weeks will determine whether war in Gaza sinks the Middle East
deeper into chaos or whether, despite Hamas’s atrocities, Israel can begin to create the foundations for regional stability--and, one day, peace.
Change is inevitable because of the gravity of Hamas’s crimes. More than 1200 Israelis, most of them civilians, many of those women and children, were murdered
in their homes, on the street, in kibbutzim, at a music festival. Perhaps 150 more have been dragged to Gaza and shut in makeshift dungeons. Israel’s belief that it
could indefinitely manage Palestinian hostility with money and air strikes crumpled early on October 7th, as the first Hamas bulldozer breached the security fence.
Hamas has chosen mass murder and there is no going back.
Gaza is now awaiting a huge Israeli ground offensive. Its extent and success will determine the legacy of Hamas’s bloody assault. So will the fundamental choice
that Israel’s politicians face after the worst catastrophe in their country’s history: do they unite or continue to exploit divisions for their own advantage? A third
factor is the choices of Israel’s Middle Eastern neighbours, including Iran.
In the weeks and months ahead Israel’s headers carry a heavy responsibility to temper their understandable desire for fire and retribution with a hard-headed
calculation about their country’s long-term interests and an unwavering respect for the rules of war. They left their people vulnerable by failing to foresee Hamas’s
looming attack. They must not compound their error by failing to see ahead clearly for a second time.
The need for vision begins with the imminent ground offensive. The Israel Defence Forces will rightly strike deep and hard at Hamas. But how deep and how hard?
Israel will be tempted to unleash a spasm of briefly satisfying violence. Its defence minister has called Hamas fighters “human animals”, and announced a blockade
of food, water and energy. Israeli officials--and President Joe Biden--have taken to comparing Hamas to Islamic State, or ISIS, an ISlamist group that America vowed
to eradicate.
That comparison is dangerous because, although Hamas deserves to be eradicated, achieving that goal in an enclave of 2m impoverished people with nowwhere
to flee will be impossible. A better comparison that ISIS is the 9/11 attacks in 2001, not just because of Israel’s agony, but also because America’s invasions of
Afghanistan and Iraq show how steeply the costs of invasion mount--which is precisely Hamas’s calculation.
At such a moment, self-restraint matters more than ever. It is in Israel’s interest, because street fighting is perilous and the hostages are defenceless. It makes the
operation militarily sustainable and preserves international support. It avoids playing into the hands of foes who calculate that dead Palestinian women and
children will further their cause. By clinging to its identity as a state that values human life, Israel becomes stronger.
Restraint in the ground offensive depends on the choice of Israel’s politicians. Before the war they were tearing the country apart over a new law curbing the
Supreme Court. For now grief and horror have brought people back together, but the left blames the far-right government of Binyamin Netanyahu, the prime
minister, for poisoning relations with the army and security in Gaza because of a fixation with helping Jewish settlers in the West Bank. The right counters that calls
for civil disobedience by senior officials opposed to Mr Netanyahu were a green light for Hamas.
Mr Netanyahu must try to use his new war cabinet, announced this week, to unite Israel. Only by healing its own politics will the country be able to deal with Gaza.
Mr Netanyahu will not want to help his most plausible rivals for office. Yet he was the man in chage when Hamas struck and his political career is ending. Having
spent a lifetime seeking power at any price, he should finally put his country before himself.
A unified, centrist government would also be better placed to cope with the last set of challenges: the politics of the Middle East. Israel will be in grave peril if the
wa in Gaza spread to its northern border with Lebanon, where tensions with Hizbullah, a formidably armed militia, are already growing ominously. The longer and
bloodier the fighting in Gaza, the more Hizbullah will feel it must be seen to support its brethren. There is also a possibility of war with Iran, which has replaced
Arab governments as the sponsor of Palestinian violence. Even Iran hawks in the West should not wish for that. A wider war would wreck the detente, built on the
Arab neighbours, including Bahrain, Morocco, the United Arab Emirates and potentially Saudi Arabia. This grouping stands for a new Middle East that is pragmatic
and focused on economic development rather than ideology. It is still inchoate, but is has the potential to become a force for moderation--and possibly even
security.
Simply by surviving, the Abraham accords could emerge from this crisis stronger. However, Hamas has shown that the signatories’ neglect of the Palestinians is a
mistake. Israel and its Arab partners need a new, optimistic vision for Gaza and the West Bank, as a alternative to Iran’s cult of violence and killing.
And that leads back to the fighting in Gaza. How does it end? Israel has no good options: occupation is unsustainable, a Hamas government is unacceptable; rule
by its rival, Fatah, is untenable; an Arab peacekeeping force is unattainable; and a puppet government is unimaginable. If Israel destroys Hamas in Gaza and pulls
out, who knows what destructive forces will fill the vacuum left behind?
Israeli strategists must therefore start thinking about how to create the conditions for life alongside the Palestinians, however remote that seems today. All those
elements may have a part: a short period of martial law in Gaza, a search for Palestinian leaders acceptable to both sides, and the good offices of Arab
intermediaries. The only way to eradicate Hamas is for Israel and its Arab allies to create stability--and, one day, peace.
Israel’s Agony
And its retribution
In a static decades-long conflict that has rotted for the past 20 years, it can be hard to believe that real change is possible. Be in no doubt, however, that Hamas’s
murderous assault has blown up the status quo between Israel and the Palestinians. The coming weeks will determine whether war in Gaza sinks the Middle East
deeper into chaos or whether, despite Hamas’s atrocities, Israel can begin to create the foundations for regional stability--and, one day, peace.
Change is inevitable because of the gravity of Hamas’s crimes. More than 1200 Israelis, most of them civilians, many of those women and children, were murdered
in their homes, on the street, in kibbutzim, at a music festival. Perhaps 150 more have been dragged to Gaza and shut in makeshift dungeons. Israel’s belief that it
could indefinitely manage Palestinian hostility with money and air strikes crumpled early on October 7 th, as the first Hamas bulldozer breached the security fence.
Hamas has chosen mass murder and there is no going back.
Gaza is now awaiting a huge Israeli ground offensive. Its extent and success will determine the legacy of Hamas’s bloody assault. So will the fundamental choice
that Israel’s politicians face after the worst catastrophe in their country’s history: do they unite or continue to exploit divisions for their own advantage? A third
factor is the choices of Israel’s Middle Eastern neighbours, including Iran.
In the weeks and months ahead Israel’s leaders carry a heavy responsibility to temper their understandable desire for fire and retribution with a hard-headed
calculation about their country’s long-term interests and an unwavering respect for the rule of war. They left their people vulnerable by failing to foresee Hamas’s
looming attack. They must not compound their error by failing to see ahead clearly for a second time.
The need for vision begins with the imminent ground offensive. The Israel Defence Force will rightly strike deep and hard at Hamas. But how deep and how hard?
Israel will be tempted to unleash a spasm of briefly satisfying violence. Its defence minister has called Hamas fighters “human animals”, and announced a blockade
of food, water and energy. Israeli officials--and President Joe Biden-have taken to comparing Hamas to Islamic State, or ISIS, and Islamic group that America vowed
to eradicate.
That comparison is dangerous because, although Hamas deserves to be eradicated, achieving that goal in an enclave of 2m impoverished people with nowhere to
flee will be impossible. A better comparison than ISIS is the 9/11 attacks in 2001, not just because of Israel’s agony, but also because America’s invasions of
Afghanistan and Iraq show how steeply the costs of invasion mount--which is precisely Hamas’s calculation.
At such a moment, self-restraint matters more than ever. It is in Israel’s interest, because street fighting is perilous and the hostages are defenceless. It makes the
operation militarily sustainable and preserves international support. It avoids playing into the hands of foes who calculate that dead Palestinian women and
children will further their cause. By clinging to its identity as a state that values human life, Israel becomes stronger.
Restraint in the ground offensive depends on the choice of Israel’s politicians. Before the war they were tearing the country apart over a new law curbing the
Supreme Court. For now grief and horror have brought people back together, but the left blames the far-right government of Binyamin Netanyahu, the prime
minister, for poisoning relations with the army and security services over the court, and neglecting security in Gaza because of a fixation with helping Jewish
settlers in the West Bank. The right counters that calls for civil disobedience by senior officials opposed to Mr Netanyahu were a green light for Hamas.
Mr Netanyahu must try to use his new war cabinet, announced this week, to unite Israel. Only by healing its own politics will the country be able to deal with Gaza.
Mr Netanyahu will not want to help his most plausible rivals for office. Yet he was the man in charge when Hamas struck and his political career is ending. Having
spent a lifetime seeking power at any price, he should finally put his country before himself.
A unified, centrist government would also be better placed to cope with the last set of challenges: the politics of the Middle East. Israel will be in grave peril if the
war in Gaza spreads to its northern border with Lebanon, where tensions will Hizbullah, a formidably armed militia, are already growing ominously. The longer and
bloodier the fighting in Gaza, the more Hizbullah will feel it must be seen to support its brethren.there is also a possibility of war with Ira, which has replaced Arab
governments as the sponsor of Palestinian violence. Even Iran hawks in the West should not wish for that.
A wider war would wreck the detente, built on the Abraham accords, between Israel and its Arab neighbours, including Bahrain, Morocco, the United Arab
Emirates and potentially Saudi Arabia. This grouping stands for a new Middle East that is pragmatic and focused on economic development rather than ideology. It
is still inchoate, but it has the potential to become a force for moderation--and possibly even security.
Simply by surviving, the Abraham accords could emerge from this crisis stronger. However, Hamas has shown that he signatories’ neglect of the Palestinians is a
mistake. Israel and its Arab partners need a new, optimistic vision for Gaza and the West Bank, as an alternative to Iran’s cult of violence and killing.
And that leads back to the fighting in Gaza. How does it end? Israel has no good options: occupation is unsustainable, a Hamas government is unacceptable; rule
by its rival, Fatah, in untenable; an Arab peacekeeping force is unattainable. If Israel destroys Hamas in Gaza and pulls out, who knows what destructive forces will
fill the vacuum left behind?
Israeli strategists must therefore start thinking about how to create the conditions for life alongside the Palestinians, however remote that seems today. All those
elements may have a part: a short period of martial law in Gaza, a search for Palestinian leaders acceptable to both sides, and the good offices of Arab
intermediaries. The only way to eradicate Hamas is for Israel and its Arab allies to create stability---and, one day, peace.
Scotland’s holiday from reality
The collapse of the Scottish National Party holds lessons for populists everywhere
Scotland was the first part of Britain to get high on populist referendums. In 2014, two years before the Brexit vote, the Scottish independence campaign exhorted
people to ignore the experts and revel in a glorious national renewal. The Scottish National Party lost that battle but it won the peace. Since then the SNP has
triumphed in election after election. It has made the intoxicating cause of independence
the principal dividing-line among Scottish voters. Nicola Sturgeon, the
party’s leader until her resignation in February, managed to make liberal giddy, too, by being not just populist but progressive.
The wheels have come off the camper van in spectacular fashion. Ms Sturgeon’s abrupt exit amid a police investigation into her party’s finances has shattered the
SNP’s credibility. The inability of the Scottish government to call another referendum unilaterally means that the path to independence is blocked. Under Humza
Yousaf, the party’s new leader, the SNP is projected to suffer heavy losses to Labour in the next Westminster election, making it more likely that Sir Keir Starmer
will win the keys to 10 Downing Street. The SNP’s grip on Holyrood, where it has held power continuously since 2007, will in 2026. Scottish politics is suddenly,
dramatically, in flux.
Any yet Scotland is also stuck. The country remains split down the middle on independence. Even if the chances of another referendum in the foreseeable future
are very slim, the simplest electoral strategy for both the SNP and the Scottish Tories, the strongest unionist voice, will be to whip up the prospect for years to
come. The SNP itself has become incapable of thinking beyond the next strategic gambit for divorce. Elementary tasks---procuring ferries, conducting a
administration that once claimed it could build an independent state in just 18 months. Genuine problems have been left to fester. Scotland is a parable with
lessons that both encourage and dismay: the a populist movement can suddenly unravel and that the damage it causes can still endure.
Highland dudgeon
Scotland’s problem is slow growth. Productivity has been stuck since 2014, and parts of the country remain shockingly poor. Business investment as a share of GDP
has been flat since 1998--were Scotland an independent country, it would have been third from bottom in OECD. In 2018 Scots launched 46 companies for every
10,000 of the population, versus 71 in the rest of Britain. North Sea oil is in long-term decline. Scotland’s banking industry has become more dependent on London
since the financial crisis. Good universities are constrained from admitting as many Scots as they should by a policy of free education.
Low growth is a problem that Scotland shares with the rest of the United Kingdom. But its predicament is worse, for two reasons. One is demography. The Scottish
population is expected to peak sometime this decade and then fall back over the next 50 years. It will age more rapidly than England’s. The over-65s will rise from a
fifth to a third of the population by 2072. all this will knock half a percentage point off annual economic growth.
The second reason is that the flow of money from Westminster is becoming less lavish. The SNP has been able to recreate the trapping of a Nordic-style social
democracy--free university tuition, free eye tests, free prescriptions---in part because of a generous supply of cash from the British government. An arrangement
known as the “Barnet formula” determines by how much the biggest grant changes each year. This formula is going to become a squeeze in coming decades: the
premium of per-person public spending in Scotland will fall from 124% of English levels in 2027 to 115% in 2057.
Improving Scotland’s economic prospects,and reversing its demographic decline, ought to be the SNP’s
focus--not just for the sake of the country, but also as a
route to the party’s revival. However, manufacturing outrage is electorally easier and more instantly rewarding than the long haul of fixing real problems.
As with all populism, weaning activists and voters off a habit of constitutional confrontation will require a cultural shift. Every issue is seen through the lens of
social outcomes first and implications for growth last. The SNP has grown chilly to businesses and made the fuzzy idea of a “well-being economy” the centrepiece
of its agenda; its Green coalition partners repudiate the measure of GDP growth. The party has hoarded power centrally in Edinburgh, when cities such as Glasgow
ought to have been able to try out their own growth-enhancing policies.
In a country where devotion to the cause counts for more than competence, scrutiny has been sorely lacking. Hoyrood lacks a vibrant backbench culture; the
poison of polarisation has made think-tanks and academics hesitant to criticise the SNP. Mr Yousaf still seems wedded to a mix of giveaways, tax rises and
constitutional fights. It will take a new party leader--perhaps Kate Forbes, the runner up in the race to succeed Ms Sturgeon--to put growth first.
Giving populists what they want sometimes makes things worse. Westminster’s tactic of heaping powers on Holyrood in an attempt to quell separatism has failed.
Instead the British government needs to police the boundaries of devolution. It was within its rights go reject Scottish demands for another referendum and to
strike down proposed gender-recognition reforms. Westminster needs a stronger role in overseeing strategic infrastructure in energy and transport. Ms Sturgeon
refused to take questioning from parliamentary committees in Westminster; that should change. The Public Accounts Committee should take more interest in how
the Scottish government spends its money.
This more businesslike approach will inevitably prompt nationalists to say that the English makes it all the more likely that he will seek to win over SNP activists
with one last heave for independence. Politics is about vision and emotion. But the parable of Scotland shows that even populists must eventually demonstrate
that they can solve genuine problems. The country’s political class has been on a long holiday from reality. Scotland cannot afford another wasted decade.
Where will this end?
Only America can pull the Middle East back from the brink. The stakes could hardly be high.
How rapidly things fall apart. The deadly blast in Gaza at Ahli Arab hospital on the evening of October 17th killed many Palestinians who were taking shelter. Despite
strong evidence that their deaths were caused by the failure of a Palestinian rocket laden with fuel, Arab countries rushed to condemn Israel. Hizbullah, a heavily
armed Lebanese militia, is lurching closer to outright war with Israel. Bridges built painstakingly between Israel and its Arab neighbours lie in ruins.
How fragile are the forces trying to hold things together. Fifteen hours after the blast, President Joe Biden landed in Israel, an old man with the weight of the world
on his shoulders. Mr Biden’s diplomacy is a geopolitical moment. As well as signalling grief and support for Israel, it brings into focus how much this crisis matters
to the Middle East and to America.
For the past half-century the United States has been the only country willing and able to bring any kind of order to the region. Regardless of the many failures of
American policy there, including in Iraq and Syria, Mr Biden and his secretary of state, Antony Blinken, have once again taken up that burden. Death and disease
hang over Gaza. The poison is spreading across the Arab world. They do not have long.
The imminent danger is on that second front in the north of Israel. The death toll at Ahli Arab means that Hizabullah and its Iranian sponsors risk losing face if they
fail to avenge lost Palestinian lives. Hizbullah will now also have strong backing in Arab world if it attacks. If Israel concludes war is inevitable, it may strike first.
America has tasked two aircraft-carriers with deterring Hizbullah and Iran from opening a second front. If they defy if, it should use them for a show of force.
A second danger is of Arab-Israeli relations being put back decades. Amid Israel’s unprecedented bombing, Arabs remember previous wars in which Israel hit
schools and hospitals. Israel has imposed a total siege of Gaza; its president has said all Gazans share responsibility. Despite Israel’s excesses, Arab leaders could
have called for calm and for an independent investigation of the hospital blast. What looks like the mass killing of Palestinians by Palestinians ought to have
redoubled their efforts to safeguard Gaza’s civilians and spurred them on to create a regional plan for a better Palestinian future.
Instead, the blast has deepened hatred and grievances. In words that cannot easily be taken back, Israel’s Arab partners heaped blame upon the Jewish state.
Jordan immediately canceled a summit between Mr Biden and Arab leaders that has been the best hope for regional diplomacy. Egypt is more resolved than ever
to keep temporary refugees out of the Sinai, partly for fear of being seen to abet Israel in what Palestinians worry is a plan to empty Gaza permanently.
This is a lamentable failure of leadership, with profound regional and global implications. Most Arab governments loathe Hamas and its backer, Iran. Countries like
the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia need stability and benefit from good relationships with Israel. However, they are so wary of testing their citizens’ anger
with the truth about the rocket’s origin that they have chosen to sabotage their people’s long-term interests.
For Iran, that looks like victory. For years it has had a strategy of financing, arming and training proxies like Hamas and Hizbullah. It calculates that violence and
mayhem weaken Israel and discredit Arab governments. If the sight of America fighting Hizbullah alongside Israel leads to a rupture of Mr Biden’s relations with e
Arab world, an exultant Iran will have built the foundations for its own regional dominance.
Russian and China are winning, too. There is a perception in the global south that his complex story is actually a simple one of oppressed Palestinians and Israeli
colonisers. China and Russia will exploit this caricature to argue that America is revealing its true contempt for brown-skinned people in Gaza and its hypocrisy over
human rights and war crimes--just as they claim it did by supposedly provoking a war in Ukraine.
What can Mr Biden do? His analysis must start with the need for peace between the Palestinians and Israeli and a recognition that there can be none for as long as
Hamas governs Gaza not after it has demonstrated that it puts Jew-hatred before any other goal. Gaza city is honeycombed by tunnels. Destroying Hamas’sability
to wage war therefore requires a ground offensive.
Everything follows from the prosecution of that ground war, the tragedy of Ahli Arab validates the cynical calculation that Palestinian casualties help Hamas by
undermining support for Israel. The Israeli army needs to be seen to spare civilians, not least because it needs time to destroy Hamas’s tunnels.Gaza is on the brink.
Poor sanitation threatens epidemic disease. Israel has at last agreed that some aid can cross into Gaza. Much more will be needed. If Egypt continues to bar
refugees, Israel should go further by creating havens on its own territory in the Negev, supervised by UN agencies.
It is also vital to spell out what comes after the invasion. Israel needs to show that its fight is with the terrorists,not the people of Gaza. It should pledge a new
beginning after the war, with a programme of rebuilding and the promise that it will not strangle Gaza’s economy. It should support a new Palestinian constitution
and new elected leaders. All this would be easier under a new Israeli government voted in when the war is done.
Even is Mr Biden can persuade Israel to take these steps, that leaves the hardest question of all. How to provide security in post-Hamas Gaza? Israel cannot occupy
the enclave permanently. That idea was rightly abandoned in 2005. an international commitment is therefore needed. Because it is not clear who would join this,
Mr Biden should start building a coalition now. The more Israel show the Arab world that it is serious about protecting civilians and planning for the day after, the
more likely Arab leaders are to play their part.
This is a tall order. Much can and will go wrong. Ordinary Arab’s ingrained anti-Zionism will gnaw at their leaders’ willingness to help. But the alternative is the
decay that feeds scavenger states like Iran and Russia. Mr Biden is the only leader who can pull things back together. If he fails, and the security of the Middle East
crumbles, it will be a catastrophe for America,too.
Where will this end?
Only America can pull the Middle East back from the brink. The stakes could hardly be higher
How rapidly things fall apart. The deadly blast in Gaza at Ahli Arab hospital on the evening of October 17th killed many Palestinians who were taking shelter. Despite
strong evidence that their deaths were caused by the failure of a Palestinian rocket laden with fuel, Arab countries rushed to condemn Israel. Hizbullahd, a heavily
armed Lebanese militia, is lurching closer to outright war with Israel. Bridges built painstakingly between Israel and its Arab neighbours lie in ruins.
How fragile are the forces trying to hold things together. Fifteen hours after the blast, President Joe Biden landed in Israel, an old man with the weight of the world
on his shoulders. Mr Biden’s diplomacy is a geopolitical moment. As well as signalling grief and support for Israel, it brings into focus how much this crisis matters
to Middle East and to America.
For the past heal-century the United States has been the only country willing and able to bring any kind of order to the region. Regardless of the many failures of
American policy there, including in Iraq and Syria, Mr Biden and his secretary of State, Antony Blinken, have once again taken up that burden. Death and disease
hang over Gaza. The poison is spreading across the Arab world. They do not have long.
The imminent danger is on that second front in the north of Israel. The death toll at Ali Arab means that Hizbullah and its Iranian sponsors risk losing face if they
fail to avenge lost Palestinian lives. Hizbullah will now also have strong backing in the Arab world if it attacks. If Israel concludes war is inevitable, it may strike first.
America has tasked two air-craft-carriers with deterring Hizbullah and Iran from opening a second front. If they defy it, it should use them for a show of force.
A second danger is of Arab-Israeli relations being put back decades. Amid Israel’s unprecedented bombing, being put back decades. Amid Israel’s unprecedented
bombing, Arabs remember previous wars in which Israel hit schools and hospitals. Israel has imposed a total siege of Gaza; its president has said all Gazans share
responsibility. Despite Israel’s excesses, Arab leaders could have called for calm and for an independent investigation of the hospital blast. What looks like the mass
killing of Palestinians by Palestinians ought to have redoubled their efforts to safeguard Gaza’s civilians and spurred them on to create a regional plan for a better
Palestinian future.
Instead, the blast has deepened hatred and grievances. In words that cannot easily be taken back, Israel’s Arab partners heaped blame upon the Jewish state.
Jordan immediately cancelled a summit between Mr Biden and Arab leaders that has been the best hope for regional diplomacy. Egypt is more resolved than ever
to keep temporary refugees out of the Sinai,partly for fear of being seen to abet Israel in what Palestinians worry is a plan to empty Gaza permanently.
This is a lamentable failure of leadership, with profound regional and global implications. Most Arab governments loathe Hamas and its backer, Iran. Countries like
the Unite Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia need stability and benefit from good relations with Israel. However, they are so wary of testing their citizens’ anger with
the truth about the rocket’s origin that they have chosen to sabotage their people’s long-term interests.
For Iran, that looks like victory. For years it has had a strategy of financing, arming and training proxies like Hamas and Hizbullah. It calculates that violence and
mayhem weaken Israel and discredit Arab governments. If the sight of America fighting Hizbullah alongside Israel leads to a rupture of Mr Biden’s relations with the
Arab world, an exultant Iran will have built the foundations for its own regional dominance.
Russia and China are winning, too. There is a perception in the global south that this complex story is actually a simple one of oppressed Palestinians and Israeli
colonisers. China and Russia will exploit this caricature to argue that America is revealing its true contempt for brown-skinned people in Gaza and its hypocrisy over
human rights and war crimes--just as they claim it did by supposedly provoking a war in Ukraine.
What can Mr Biden do ? his analysis must start with the need for peace between the Palestinians and Israelis and recognition that there can be none for as long as
Hamas governs Gaza--not after it has demonstrated that it puts Jew-hatred before any other goal. Gaza city is honeycombed by tunnels. Destroying Hamas’s ability
to wage war therefore requires a ground offensive.
Everything follows from the prosecution of that ground war. The tragedy of Ahli Arab validates the cynical calculation that Palestinian casualties help Hamas by
undermining support for Israel. The Israeli army needs to be seen to spare civilians, not least because it needs time to destroy Hamas’s tunnels. Gaza is on the brink.
Poor sanitation threatens epidemic disease. Israel has at last agreed that some aid can cross into Gaza. Much more will be needed. If Egypt continues to bar
refugees, Israel should go further by creating havens on its own territory in the Negev, supervised by UN agencies.
It is also vital to spell out what comes after the invasion. Israel needs to show that its fight is with the terrorists, not the people of Gaza. It should pledge a new
beginning after the war, with a programme of rebuilding and the promise that it will not strangle Gaza’s economy. It should support a new Palestinian constitution
and new elected leaders. All this would be easier under a new Israeli government voted in when the war is done.
Even is Mr Biden can persuade Israel to take these steps, that leaves the hardest question of all. How to provide security in post-Hamas Gaza? Israel cannot occupy
the enclave permanently. That idea was rightly abandoned in 2005. an international commitment is therefore needed. Because it is not clear who would join this,
Mr Biden should start building a coalition now. The more Israel shows the Arab world that it is serious about protecting civilians and planning for the day after, the
more likely Arab leaders are to play their part.
This is a tall order. Much can and will go wrong. Ordinary Arabs’ ingrained anti-Zionism will gnaw at their leaders’ willingness to help. But the alternative is the
decay that feeds scavenger states like Iran and Russia. Mr Biden is the only leader who can pull things back together. If he fails, and the security of the Middle East
crumbles, it will be a catastrophe for America, too.
Where will this end?
Only America can pull the Middle East back from the brink.the stakes could be hardly be higher.
How rapidly things fall apart. The deadly blast in Gaza at Ahli Arab hospital on the evening of October 17th killed many Palestinians who were taking shelter. Despite
strong evidence that their deaths were caused by the failure of a Palestinian rocket laden with fuel, Arab countries rushed to condemn Israel. Hizbullah, a heavily
armed Lebanese militia, is lurching closer to outright war with Israel. Bridges built painstakingly between Israel and Its Arab neighbours lies in ruins.
How fragile are the forces trying to hold things together. Fifteen hours after the blast, President Joe Biden landed in Israel, an old man with the weight of the world
on his shoulders. Mr Biden’s diplomacy is geopolitical moment. As well as signalling grief and support for Israel, it brings into focus how much this crisis matters to
the Middle East and to America.
For the past half-century the United States has been the only country willing and able to bring any kind of order to the region. Regardless of the many failures of
American policy there, including in Iraq and Syria Mr Biden and his secretary of state, Anotny Blinken, have once again taken up that burden. Death and disease
hang over Gaza. The poison is spreading across the Arab world. They do not have long.
The imminent danger is on that second front in the north of Israel. The death toll at Ahli Arab means that Hizbullah and its Iranian sponsors risk losing face if they
fail to avenge lost Palestinian lives. Hizbullah will now also have strong backing the Arab world. If it attacks. If Israel concludes war is inevitable, it may strike first.
America has tasked two aircraft-carriers with deterring Hizbullah and Iran from opening a second front. If they defy it, it should use them for a show of force.
A second danger is of Arab-Israeli relations being put back decades. Amid Israel’s unprecedented bombing,Arabs remember previous wars in which Israel hit
schools and hospitals. Israel has imposed a total siege of Gaza; its president has said all Gazans share responsibility. Despite Israel’s excesses, Arab leaders could
have called for calm and for an independent investigation of the hospital blast. What looks like the mass killing of Palestinians by Palestinians ought to have
redoubled their efforts to safeguard Gaza’s civilians and spurred them on to create e regional plan for a better Palestinian future.
Instead, the blast has deepened hatred and grievances. In words that cannot easily be taken back, Israel’s Arab partners heaped blame upon the Jewish state.
Jordan immediately cancelled a summit between Mr Biden and Arab leaders that had been the best hope for regional diplomacy. Egypt is more resolved than ever
to keep temporary refugees out of the Sinai, partly for fear of being seen to abet Israel in what Palestinians worry is a plan to empty Gaza permanently.
This is a lamentable failure of leadership, with profound regional and global implications. Most Arab governments loathe Hamas and its backer, Iran. Countries like
the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia need stability and benefit from good relations with Israel. However, they are so wary of testing their citizens’ anger
withe the truth about the rockets’ origin that they have chosen to sabotage their people’s long-term interests.
For Iran, that looks like victory. For years it has had a strategy of financing, arming and training proxies like Hamas and Hizbullah. It calculates that violence and
mayhem weaken Israel and discredit Arab governments. If the sight of America fighting Hizbullah alongside Israel leads to a rupture of Mr Biden’s relations with the
Arab world, an exultant Iran will have built the foundations for its own regional dominance.
Russia and China are winning,too. There is a perception in the global south that this complex story is actually a simple one of oppressed Palestinians and Israeli
colonisers. China and Russia will exploit this caricature to argue that America is revealing its true contempt for brown-skinned people in Gaza and its hypocrisy over
human rights and war crimes--just as they claim it did by supposedly provoking a war in Ukraine.
What can Mr Biden do? His analysis must start with the need for peace between the Palestinians and Israelis and a recognition that there can be none for as long
as Hamas governs Gaza--not after it has demonstrated that it puts Jew-hatred before any other goal. Gaza city is honeycombed by tunnels. Destroying Hamas’s
ability to wage are therefore requires a ground offensive.
Everything follows from the prosecution f that ground war. The tragedy of Ahli Arab validates the cynical calculation that Palestinian casualties help Hamas by
undermining support for Israel. The Israeli army needs to be seen to spare civilians, not least because it needs time to destroy Hamas’s tunnels. Gaza is on the brink.
Poor sanitation threatens epidemic disease. Israel has at last agreed that some aid can cross into Gaza. Much more will be needed. If Egypt continues to bar
reguees, Israel should go further by creating havens on its own territory in the Negev, supervised by UN agencies.
It is also vital to spell out what comes after the invasion. Israel needs to show that its fight is with the terrorists, not the people of Gaza. It should pledge a new
beginning after the war, with a programme of rebuilding and the promise that it will not strangle Gaza’s economy. It should support a new Palestinian constitution
and new elected leaders. All this would be easier under a new Israeli government voted in when the war is done.
Even if Mr Biden can persuade Israel to take these steps, that leaves the hardest question of all. How to provide security in Post-Hamas Gaza? Israel cannot occupy
the enclave permanently. That idea was rightly abandoned in 2005. an international commitment is therefore needed. Because it is not clear who would join this,
Mr Biden should start building a coalition now. The more Israel shows the Arab world that it is serious about protecting civilians and planning for the day after, the
more likely Arab leaders are to play their part.
This is a tall order. Much can and will go wrong. Ordinary Arab’s ingrained anti-Zionism will gnaw at their leader’s willingness to help. But the alternative is the
decay that feeds scavenger states like Iran and Russian. Mr Biden is the only leader who can pull things back together. If he fails, and the security of the Middle
things back together. If he fails, and the security of the Middle East crumbles, it will be a catastrophe for America, too.
America’s test
War between Israel and Hamas will define America’s role as a superpower
As Massed Israeli troops await the command to invade Gaza, two hulking US Navy aircraft-carries have been sent to support Israel. Their task is to deter Hizbullah
and its sponsor Iran from opening a second front across the Lebanese border. No other country could do this. The carriers are s 200000-tonne declaration of
American power at a time when much of the world believes that American power is in decline.
The coming months will test that view. It is hard to exaggerate the stakes. On October 20 th President Joe Biden called this “an inflection point”. he warned of the
need to repulse Hamas’s terror as well as Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. China’s threat to invade Taiwan lurked unspoken in the background.
Yet things are even more dangerous than Mr Biden suggests. Abroad, America faces a complex and hostile world. For the first time since the Soviet Union
stagnated in the 1970s it has a serious, organised opposition, led by China. At home, politics is plagued by dysfunction and a Republican Party that is increasingly
isolationist. This moment will define not only Israel and the Middle East but America and the world.
The foreign threat has three parts. One is the chaos spread by Iran across the Middle East and by Russia in Ukraine. Aggression and instability consume American
political, financial and military resources. Conflict will spread in Europe if Russia gets its way in Ukraine. Bloodshed could radicalise people in the Middle East,
turning them against their governments. Wars draw in America, which becomes an easy target for accusation of warmongering and hypocrisy. All this undermines
the idea of a world order.
A second threat is complexity. A group of countries, including India and Saudi Arabia, are increasingly transactional, bent on fiercely pursuing their own interest.
Unlike Iran and Russia, such countries do not want chaos, yet neither will they take orders from Washington--and why should they? For America, this makes the job
of being a superpower harder. Look, for example, at Turkey’s games over Sweden’s membership of NATO, seemingly resolved this week after 17 months of
tiresome wrangling.
The third threat is the biggest. China has ambitions to create an alternative to the values enshrined in global institutions. It would reinterpret concepts like
democracy, freedom and human rights to suit its own preference for development over individual freedom and national sovereignty over universal values. China,
Russia and Iran are forming a loosely co-ordinated group. Iran supplies drones to Russia and oil to China. Russia and China have given Iran’s client Hamas
diplomatic cover at the UN.
These threats are magnified by politics at home in Washington. Republican politicians are reverting to the isolationism in trade and foreign affairs that their party
embraced before the second world war. This goes deeper than Donald Trump, and it raises the question of whether America can act as a superpower if one of its
parties rejects the entire notion of global responsibilities. Remember that it took Pearl Harbour for America to enter the war in 1941.
To see how this can damage American interests, consider Ukraine, which MAGA Republicans want to stop supplying with weapons and money. That makes no
sense, even in terms of the narrowest self-interest. The war presents America with a chance to defang Vladimir Putin and deter China from invading Taiwan
without putting its own troops at risk. Deserting Ukraine, by contrast, invites a Russian attack on NATO that would cost far more American lives and treasure, and
signals to friend and foe that America is no longer a dependable ally. If isolationist Republicans fail the Ukraine test, there is no knowing there America might end
up, were Mr Trump to return to the White House.
These are formidable obstacles. However, America also has formidable strengths. One is its military heft. It has not only deployed those two carrier strike groups to
the Middle East, just as it has to Ukraine. China has rapidly increased its budget for the People’s Liberation Army, but at market exchange rates America still spent
as much last year on defence as the ten next countries combined, and most of them are its allies.
America’s economic heft is impressive, too. The country generates a quarter of the world’s output with a twentieth of its population, and the share is unchanged
over the past four decades, despite China’s rise. This newspaper worries about the inefficiency and creeping protectionism of Mr Biden’s industrial policy, but we
do not doubt America’s technological muscle and underlying dynamism---especially when set against China, where it has become increasingly clear that the goal of
economic growth has been subordinated to the goal of maximising Communist Party control.
America’s other underestimated strength is its reinvigorated diplomacy. The war in Ukraine has prove the value of NATO. In Asia, America has created AUKUS and
shored up its relations with a host of countries, including Japan, the Philippines and South Korea. In Foreign Affairs this week America’s national security adviser,
Jake Sulliva, spells out how countries which pursue their own interests can still be essential partners. The model is India, which is increasingly part of America’s
designs for security in Asia, despite its determination to remain outside any alliance.
Centrifugal force
Where does that leave America, as it hugs Israel close in an attempt to stop a wider war? Some will say that an ageing superpower is once again being sucked back
into the Middle East, after nearly 15 years of trying to get out. However, this crisis is not as all-consuming as the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq were.
Mr Biden’s formulation is better: this is indeed an inflection point, which will test whether America can adapt to a more complex and threatening world. It still has
a lot to offer, especially if it works with its allies to enhance security and keep trade open. Its values, however imperfectly they are realised, still attract people from
all across the planet in a way that Chinese communism does not. If Mr Biden succeeds in managing the crisis over Gaza, that would be good for America, good for
the Middle East and good for the world.
America’s test
War between Israel and Hamas will define America’s role as a superpower
As massed Israeli troops await the command to invade Gaza, two hulking US Navy aircraft-carriers have been sent to support Israel. Their task is to deter Hizbullah
and its sponsor Iran from opening a second front across the Lebanese border. No other country could do this. The carriers are a 200,000-tonne declaration of
American power at a time when much of the world believes that American power is in decline.
The coming months will test that view. It is hard to exaggerate the stakes. On October 20 th President Joe Biden called this “an inflection point”. he warned of the
need to repulse Hamas’s terror as well as Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. China’s threat to invade Taiwan lurked unspoken in the background.
Yet things are even more dangerous than Mr Biden suggests. Abroad, America faces a complex and hostile world. For the first time since the Soviet Union
stagnated in the 1970s it has a serious, organised opposition, led by China. At home, politics is plagued by dysfunction and a Republican Party that is increasingly
isolationist. This moment will define not only Israel and the Middle East but America and the world.
The foreign threat has three parts. One is the chaos spread by Iran across the Middle East and by Russian in Ukraine. Aggression and instability consume American
political, financial and military resources. Conflict will spread in Europe if Russia gets its way in Ukraine. Bloodshed could radicalise people in Middle East, turning
them against their governments. Wars draw in America, which becomes an easy target for accusations of warmongering and hypocrisy. All this undermines the
idea of a world order.
A second threat is complexity. A group of countries, including India and Saudi Arabia, are increasingly transactional, bent on fiercely pursuing their own interests.
Unlike Iran and Russian, such countries do not want chaos, yet neither will they take orders from Washington---and why should they? For America, this makes the
job of being a superpower harder. Look, for example, at Turkey’s games over Sweden’s membership of NATO, seemingly resolved this week after 17 months of
tiresome wrangling.
The third threat is the biggest. China has ambitious to create an alternative to the values enshrined in global institutions. It would reinterpret concepts like
democracy, freedom and human rights to suit its own preference for development over individual freedom and national sovereignty over universal values. China
Russia and Iran are forming a loosely co-ordinated group. Iran supplies drones to Russia and oil to China. Russian and China have given Iran’s client Hamas
dilomatic cover at UN.
These threats are magnified by politics at home in Washington. Republican politicians are reverting to the isolationism in trade and foreign affairs that their party
embraced before the second world war. This goes deeper than Donald Trump, and it raises the question of whether America can act as a superpower if one of its
parties rejects the entire notion of global responsibilities. Remember that it tool Peal Harbour for American to enter the war in 1941.
To see how this can damage America interests, consider Ukraine, which MAGA Republicans want to stop supplying with weapons and money. That makes no sense,
even in terms of the narrowest self-interest. The war presents America with a chance to defang Vladimir Putin and deter China from invading Taiwan without
putting its own troops at risk. Deserting Ukraine, by contrast, invites a Russian attack on NATO that would cost far more American lives and treasure, and signals to
friend and foe that America is no longer a dependable ally. If isolationist Republicans fail the Ukraine test, there is no knowing where America might end up, were
Mr Trump to return to the White House.
These are formidable obstacles. However, America also has formidable strengths. One is its military left. It has not only deployed those two carrier strike groups to
the Middle East, but it also supplying arms, intelligence and expertise to Israel, just as it has to Ukraine. China has rapidly increased its budget for the People’s
Liberation Army, but at market exchange rates America still spent as much last year on defence as the ten next countries combined, and most of them are its allies.
America’s economic heft is impressive too. The country generates a quarter f the world’s output with a twentieth of its population, and the share is unchanged
over the past four decades, despite China’s rise. This newspaper worries about the inefficiency and creeping protectionism of Mr Biden’s industrial policy, but we
do not doubt America’s technological muscle and underlying dynamism---especially when set against China, where it has become increasingly clear that goal of
economic growth has been subordinated to goal of maximising Communist Part Control.
America’s other underestimated strength is its reinvigorated diplomacy. The war in Ukraine has proved the value of NATO. In Asia, America has created AUKUS and
shored up its relations with a host of countries, including Japan, the Philippines and South Korea. In Foreign Affairs this week America’s national security adviser,
Jake Sullivan, spells out how countries which pursue their own interests can still be essential partners. The model is India, which is increasingly part of America’s
designs for security in Asia, despite its determinations to remain outside any alliance.
Centrifugal force
Where does that leave America, as it hugs Israel close in attempt to stop a wider war? Some will say that an ageing superpower is once again being sucked back
into the Middle East, after nearly 15 years of trying to get out. However, this crisis is not as all-consuming as the war in Afghanistan and Iraq were.
Mr Biden’s formulation is better: this is indeed an inflection point, which will test whether America can adapt to a more complex and threatening world. It still has
a lot to offer,especially if it works with its allies to enhance security and keep trade open. Its values, however imperfectly they are realised, still attract people from
all across the planet in a way that Chinese communism does not. If Mr Biden succeeds in managing the crisis over Gaza, that would be good for America, good for
the Middle East and good for the world.
America’s test
War between Israel and Hamas will define America’s role as a superpower
As massed Israeli troops await the command to invade GAZA, two hulking us Navy aircraft-carriers have been sent to support Israel. Their task is to deter Hizbullah
and its sponsor Iran from opening a second front across the Lebanese border. No other country could do this. The carriers are a 200,000-tonne declaration of
American power at a time when much of the world believes that American power is in decline.
The coming months will test that view. It is hard to exaggerate the stakes. On October 20 th President Joe Biden called this “an inflection point”. He warned of the
need to repulse Hamas’s terror as well as Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. China’s threat to invade Taiwan lurked unspoken in the background.
Yet things are even more dangerous than Mr Biden suggests. Abroad, America faces a complex and hostile world. For the first time since the Soviet Union
stagnated in the 1970s it has a serious, organised opposition, led by China. At home, politics is plagued by dysfunction and a Republican Party that is increasingly
isolationist. This moment will define not only Israel and the Middle East but America and the world.
The foreign threat has three parts. One is the chaos spread by Iran across the Middle East and by Russian in Ukraine. Aggression and instability consume American
political, financial and military resources. Conflict will spread in Europe if Russian gets its way in Ukraine. Bloodshed could radicalise people in the Middle East,
turning them against their governments. Wars draw in America, which becomes an easy target for accusations of warmongering and hypocrisy. All this undermines
the idea of a world order.
A second threat is complexity. A group of countries, including India and Saudi Arabia, are increasingly transactional, bent on fiercely pursuing their own interests.
Unlike Iran and Russia, such countries do not want chaos, yet neither will they take orders from Washington--and why should they? For America, this makes the job
of being a superpower harder. Look, for example, at Turkey’s games over Sweden’s membership of NATO, seemingly resolved this week after 17 months of
tiresome wrangling.
The third threat is the biggest. China has ambitions to create an alternative to the values enshrined in global institutions. It would reinterpret concepts like
democracy, freedom and human rights to suit its own preference for development over individual freedom and national sovereignty over universal values.China,
Russia and Iran are forming a loosely co-ordinated group. Iran supplies drones to Russia and oil to China. Russia and China have given Iran’s client Hamas
diplomatic cover at the UN.
These threats are magnified by politics at home in Washington. Republican politicians are reverting to the isolationism in trade and foreign affairs that their party
embraced before the second world war. This goes deeper than Donald Trump, and it raises the questions of whether American act as a superpower if one of its
parties rejects the entire notion of global responsibilities. Remember that it tool pearl Harbour for American to enter the war in 1941.
To see how this can damage American interests, consider Ukraine,which MAGA Republicans want to stop supplying with weapons and money. That makes no sense,
even in terms of the narrowest self-interest. The war presents America with a chance to defang Vladimir Putin and deter China from invading Taiwan without
putting its own troops at risk. Deserting Ukraine, by contrast, invites a Russian attack on NATO that would cost far more American lives and treasure, and signals to
friend and foes that America is no longer a dependable ally. If isolationist Republicans fail the Ukraine test, there is no knowing where America might end up, were
Mr Trump to return to the White House.
These are formidable obstacles. However, America also has formidable strengths. One is its military heft. It has not only deployed those two carrier strike groups to
the Middle East, but is also supplying arms, intelligence and expertise to Israel, just as it has to Ukraine. China has rapidly increased its budget for the People’s
Liberation Army, but at market exchange rates America still spent as much last year on defence as ten next countries combined, and most of them are its allies.
America’s economic heft is impressive, too. The country generates a quarter of the world’s output with a twentieth of its population, and the share is unchanged
over the past four decades, despite China’s rise. This newspaper worries about the inefficiency and creeping protectionism of Mr Biden’s industrial policy, but we
do not doubt America’s technological muscle and underlying dynamism--especially when set against China, where it has become increasingly clear that the goal of
economic growth has been subordinated to the goal of maximising Communist party control.
America’s other underestimated strength is its reinvigorated diplomacy. The war in Ukraine has proved the value of NATO. In Asia, America has created AUKUS and
shored up its relations with a host of countries, including Japan, the Philippines and South Korea. In Foreign Affairs this week America’s national security adviser,
Jake Sullivan, spells out how countries which pursue their own interests can still be essential partners. The model is India, which is increasingly part of America’s
designs for security in Asia, despite its determination to remain outside any alliance.
Centrifugal force
Where does that leave America, as it hugs Israel close in an attempt to stop a wider war? Some will say that an ageing superpower is once again being sucked back
into the Middle East, after nearly 15 years of trying to get out. However, this crisis is not as all-consuming as the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq were.
Mr Biden’s formulation is better: this is indeed an inflection point,which will test whether America can adapt to a more complex and threatening world. It still has a
lot to offer, especially if it works with its allies to enhance security and keep trade open. Its values, however imperfectly they are realised, still attract people from
all across the planet in a way that Chinese communism does not. If Mr Biden succeeds in managing the crisis over Gaza, that would be good for America, good for
the Middle East and good for the world.
America’s test
War between Israel and Hamas will define America’s role as a superpower
As massed Israeli troops await the command to invade Gaza, two hulking US Navy aircraft-carriers have been sent to support Israel. Their task is to deter Hizbullah
and its sponsor Iran from opening a second front across the Lebanese order. No other country could do this. The carriers are a 200,000-tonne declaration of
American power at a time when much of the world believes that American power is in decline.
The coming months will test that view. It is hard to exaggerate the stakes. On October 20th President Biden called this “an inflection point”. He warned of the need
to repulse Hamas’s terror as well as Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. China’s threat to invade Taiwan lurked unspoken in the background.
Yet things are even more dangerous than Mr Biden suggests. Abroad, America faces a complex and hostile world. For the first time since the Soviet Union
stagnated in the 1970s it has a serious, organised opposition, led by China. At home, politics is plagued by dysfunction and a Republican Party that is increasingly
isolationist. This moment will define not only Israel and the Middle East but America and the world.
The foreign threat has three parts. One is the chaos spread by Iran across the Middle East and by Russian in Ukraine. Aggression and instability consume American
political and military resources. Conflict will spread in Europe if Russia gets its way in Ukraine. Bloodshed could redicalise people in the Middle East, turning them
against their governments. Wars draw in America, which becomes an easy target for accusations of warmongering and hypocrisy. All this undermines the idea of a
world order.
A second threat is complexity. A group of countries, including India and Saudi Arabia, are increasingly transactional, bent on fiercely pursuing their own interests.
Unlike Iran and Russia, such countries do not want chaos, yet neither will they take orders from Washington--and why should they? For America, this makes the job
of being a superpower harder. Look, for example, at Turkey’s games over Sweden’s membership of NATO, seemingly resolved this week after 17 months of
tiresome wrangling.
The third threat is the biggest. China has ambitious to create an alternative to the values enshrined in global institutions. It would reinterpret concepts like
democracy, freedom and human rights to suit its own preference for development over individual freedom and national sovereignty over universal
values.China,Russia and Iran are forming a loosely co-ordinated group. Iran supplies drones to Russia and oil to China.Russia and China have given Iran’s client
Hamas diplomatic cover at the UN.
Thewe threats are magnified by politics at home in Washington. Republican politicians are reverting to the isolationism in trade and foreign affairs that their aprty
embraced before the second world war. This goes deeper than Donald Trump, and it raises the question of whether America act as a superpower if one of its
parties rejects the entire notion of global responsibilities. Remember that it took Pearl Harbour for America to enter the war in 1941.
To see how this can damage American interests, consider Ukraine, which MAGA Republicans want to stop supplying with weapons and money. That makes no
sense, even in terms of the narrowest self-interest. The war presents America with a chance of defang Vladimir Putin and deter China from invading Taiwan
without putting its own troops at risk. Deserting Ukraine, by contrast, invites a Russian attack on NATO that would cost far more American lives and treasure, and
signals to fiend and foe that America is no longer a dependable ally. If isolationist Republicans fail the Ukraine test, there is no knowing where America might end
up, were Mr Trump to return to the White House.
These are formidable obstacles. However, America also has deployed those two carrier strike groups to the Middle East, but is also supplying arms, intelligence and
expertise to Israel, just as it has to Ukraine. China has rapidly increased its budget for the People’s Liberation Army, but at market exchanges rates America still
spent as much last year on defence as the ten next countries combined, and most of them are its allies.
America’s economic heft is impressive, too. The country generates a quarter of the world’s output with a twentieth of its population, and the share is unchanged
over the past four decades, despite China’s rise. This newspaper worries about the inefficiency
and creeping protectionism of Mr Biden’s industrial policy, but we
do not doubt America’s technological muscle and underlying dynamism---especially when set against China, where it has become increasingly clear that the goal of
economic growth has been subordinated to the goal of maximising Communist Party control.
America’s other underestimated strength is its reinvigorated diplomacy. The war in Ukraine has proved the value of NATO. In Asia, America has created AUKUS and
shore up its relations with a host of countries, including Japan, the Philippines and South Korea. In Foreign Affairs this week America’s national security adviser,
Jake Sullivan, spells out how countries which pursue their own interests can still be essential partners. The model is India, which is increasingly part of America’s
designs for security in Asia, despite its determination to remain outside any alliance.
Centrifugal force
Where does that leave America, as it hugs Israel chose in an attempt to stop a wider war? Some will say that an ageing superpower is once again being sucked back
into the Middle East, after nearly 15 years of trying to get out. However, this crisis is not as all-consuming as the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq were.
Mr Biden’s formulation is better: this is indeed an inflection point, which will test whether America can adapt to a more complex and threatening world. It still has
a lot to offer, especially if it works with its allies to enhance security and keep trade open. Its values, however imperfectly they are realised, still attract peoplefrom
all across the planet in a way that Chinese communism does not. If Mr Biden succeeds in managing the crisis over Gaza, that would be good for America, good for
the Middle East and good for the world.
America’s test
War between Israel and Hamas will define America’s role as a superpower
As massed Israeli troops await the command to invade Gaza, two hulking US Navy aircraft-carriers have been sent to support Israel. Their task is to deter Hizbullah
and its sponsor Iran from opening a second front across the Lebanese border. No other country could do this. The carriers are a 200,000-tonne declaration of
American power at a time when much of the world believes that American power is in decline.
The coming months will test that view. It is hard to exaggerate the stakes. On October 20 th President Joe Biden called this “an inflection point”. He warned of the
need of repulse Hamas’s terror as well as Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. China’s threat to invade Taiwan lurked unspoken in the background. Yet things are
even more dangerous than Mr Biden suggests. Abroad, America faces a complex and hostile world. For the first time since the Soviet Union stagnated in the 1970s
it has a serious, organised opposition, led by China. At home, politics is plagued by dysfunction and a Republican Party that is increasingly isolationist. This moment
will define not only Israel and the Middle East but America and the world.
The foreign threat has three parts. One is the chaos spread by Iran across the Middle East and by Russia in Ukraine. Aggression and instability consume American
political, financial and military resources. Conflict will spread in Europe if Russia gets its way in Ukraine. Bloodshed could radicalise people in Midle East, turning
them against their governments. Wars draw in America, which becomes an easy target for accusations of warmongering and hypocrisy. All this undermines the
idea of a world order.
A second threat is complexity. A group of countries, including India and Saudi Arabia, are increasingly transactional, bent on fiercely pursuing their own interest.
Unlike Iran and Russia, such countries do not want chaos, yet neither will they take orders from Washington--and why should they? For America, this makes the job
of being a superpower harder. Look, for example, at Turkey’s games over Sweden’s membership of NATO, seemingly resolved this week after 17months of tiresome
wrangling.
The third threat is the biggest. China has ambitions to create an alternative to the value enshrined in global institutions. It would reinterpret concepts like
democracy, freedom and human rights to suit its own preference for development over individual freedom and national sovereignty over universal values. China,
Russia and Iran are forming a loosely co-ordinated group. Iran supplies drones to Russia and oil to China. Russia and China have given Iran’s client Hamas
diplomatic cover at the UN.
These threats are magnified by politics at home in Washington. Republican politicians are reverting to the isolationism in trade and foreign affairs that their party
embraced before the second world war. This goes deeper than Donald Trump, and it raises the question of whether America can act as a superpower if one of its
parties rejects the entire notion of global responsibilities. Remember that it tool Pearl Harbour for America to enter the war in 1941.
To see how this can damage American interests, consider Ukraine, which MAGA Republicans want to stop supplying with weapons and money. That makes no
sense, even in terms of the narrowest self-interest. The war presents America with a chance to defang Vladimir Putin and deter China from invading Taiwan
without putting its own troops at risk. Deserting Ukraine, by contrast, invites a Russian attack on NATO that would cost far more America is no longer a dependable
ally. If isolationist Republicans fail the Ukraine test, there is no knowing there America might end up, were Mr Trump to return to the White House.
These are formidable obstacles. However, America also has formidable strengths. One is its military heft. It has not only deployed those two carriers strike groups
to the Middle East, but is also supplying arms, intelligence and expertise to Israel, just as it has to Ukraine. China has rapidly increase its budget for the People’s
Liberation Army, but at market exchange rates America still spent as much last year on defence as the ten next countries combined, and most of them are its allies.
America’s economic heft is impressive, too. The country generates a quarter of the world’s output with a twentieth of its population, and the share is unchanged
over the past four decades, despite China’s rise. This newspaper worries about the inefficiency and creeping protectionism of Mr Biden’s industrial policy, but we
do not doubt America’s technological muscle and underlying dynamism----especially when set against China, where it has become increasingly clear that the goal
of economic growth has been subordinated to the goal of maximising Communist Party control.
America’s other underestimated strength is it reinvigorated diplomacy. The war in Ukraine has proved the value of NATO. In Asia, America has created AUKUS and
shored up its relations with a host of countries, including Japan, the Philippines and South Korea. In Foreign Affairs this week America’s national security adviser,
Jake Sullivan, spells out how countries which pursue their own interests can still be essential partners. The model is India, which is increasingly part of America’s
designs for security in Asia, despite its determination to remain outside any alliance.
Centrifugal force
Where does that leave America, as it hugs Israel close in an attempt to stop a wider war? Some will say that an ageing superpower is once again being sucked back
into the Middle East, after nearly 15 years of trying to get out. However, this crisis is not as all-consuming as the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq were.
Mr Biden’s formulations is better: this is indeed an inflection point, which will test whether America can adapt to a more complex and threatening world. It still has
a lot to offer, especially if it works with its allies to enhance security and keep trade open. Its values, however imperfectly they are realised, still attract people from
all across the planet in a way that Chinese Communism does not. If Mr Biden succeeds in managing the crisis over Gaza, that would be good for America, good for
the Middle East and good for the world.
Too good to be true
The world economy is defying gravity. That cannot last.
Even as wars rage and the geopolitical climate darkens, the world economy has been an irrepressible source of cheer. Only a year ago everyone agreed that high
interest rates would soon bring about a recession. Now even the optimists have been confounded. American’s economy roared in the third quarter,growing at a
stunning annualised pace of 4.9%. around the world, inflation is falling, unemployment has mostly stayed low and the big central banks may have stopped their
monetary tightening. China, stricken by a property crisis, looks likely to benefit from a modest stimulus. Unfortunately, however, this good cheer cannot last. The
foundations for today’s growth look unstable. Peer ahead, and threats abound.
The irrepressible economy has encouraged bets that interest rates, though no longer rising rapidly, will not fall by much. Over the past week the European Central
Bank and Federal Reserve have held rates steady; the Bank of England was expected to follow suit shortly after we published this on November 2nd. Long-term
bond yields have accordingly risen sharply. America’s government must now pay 5% to borrow for 30 years, up from just 1.2% in the depths of the pandemic
recession. Even economies know for low rates have seen sharp increases. Not long ago Germany’s borrowing costs were negative; now its ten-year bond yield is
nearly 3%. the Bank of Japan has all but given up on its promise to peg ten-year borrowing costs at 1%.
Some people, including Janet Yellen, America’s treasury secretary, say these higher interest rates are a good thing--a reflection of a world economy in the rudest of
health. In fact, they are a source of danger. Because higher rates are likely to persist, today’s economic policies will fail and so will the growth they have fostered.
To see why today’s benign conditions cannot continue, consider on reason why America’s economy in particular has fared better than expected .its consumes have
been spending the cash they accumulated during the pandemic from handouts and staying at home. Those excess savings were expected to have been depleted by
now. But recent data suggest households still have $1trn left, which explains why they can get away with saving less out of their incomes than at any point in the
2010s.
When those excess savings buffers have been rundown, high interest rates will start to bite, forcing consumers to spend less freely. And, as our Briefing explains,
trouble will start to emerge across the world economy if rates stay higher for longer. In Europe and America business bankruptcies are already rising; even
companies that locked in low rates by issuing long-term debt will in time have to face higher financing cost. House prices will fall, at least in inflation-adjusted
terms, as they respond to dearer mortgages. And banks holding long-term securities--which have been supported by short-term loans, including from the Fed-will
have to raise capital or merge to plug the holes blown in their balance-sheets by higher rates.
Fiscal largesse has added to the world economy’s sugar rush. In a higher-for-longer world, it too looks unsustainable. According to the IMF, Britain, France, Italy and
Japan are all likely to run deficits in the region of 5% of GDP in 2023. in the 12 months to September America’s deficit was a staggering $2trn, or 7.5% of GDP after
adjusting for accounting distortions--about double what was expected in mid-2022. at a time of low unemployment, such borrowing is jaw-droppingly reckless. All
told, government debt in the rich world is now higher, as a share of GDP, than at any time since after the Napoleonic wars.
When interest rates were low, even towering debts were manageable. Now that rates have risen, interest bills are draining budgets. Higher-for-longer therefore
threatens to pit governments against inflation-targeting central bankers. Already, Ms Yellen has felt obliged to argue that Treasuries carry no risk premium, and
Jerome Powell, the Fed’s chairman, has insisted that his bank would never cut rates and let inflation rip to ease pressure on the government’s budget.
Whatever Mr Powell says, a higher-for-longer era would lead investors to question governments’ promises both to keep inflation low and also to pay their debts.
The ECB’s bondholdings are already becoming skewed towards the Italian government debt that it tacitly backstops--a task that has become far harder in a
high-rate world. Even when Japanese government-bond yields were a paltry 0.8% last year, 8% of Japan’s budget went on interest payments. Imagine the stain if
yields reached even Germany’s relatively modest levels. Some governments would go on to tighten their belts as a result. But doing so may bring economic pain.
These strains make it hard to see how the world economy could possibly accomplish the many thins that markets currently expect of it: a dodged recession, low
inflation, mighty debts and high interest rates all at the same time. It is more likely that the higher-for-longer era kills itself off, by bringing about economic
weakness that lets central bankers cut rates without inflation soaring.
A more hopeful possibility is that productivity growth soars, perhaps thanks to generative artificial intelligence. The resulting boost to incomes and revenues would
make higher rates bearable. Indeed, figures published on November 2nd are expected to show that America’s measured productivity surged in the third quarter.
The potential of Ai to unleash further productivity gains may explain why higher-for-longer has so far not punctured stockmarkets. Were it not for the rising
valuations of seven tech firms, including Microsoft and Nvidia, the S&P 500 index of American stocks would have fallen this year.
Don’t look down
Set against that hope, though, is a world stalked by threats to productivity growth. Donald Trump vows swingeing new tariffs should he return to the White House.
Governments are increasingly distorting markets with industrial policy. State spending is growing as a share of the economy as populations age, the green-energy
transition beckons and conflicts around the world require more spending on defence. In the face of all this, anyone betting that the world economy can just keep
carrying on is taking a huge gamble.
Too good to be true
The world economy is defying gravity. That can not last.
Even as wars rage and the geopolitical climate darkens, the world economy has been an irrepressible source of cheer. Only a year ago everyone agreed that high
interest rates would soon bring about a recession. Now even the optimists have been confounded. America’s economy roared in the third quarter, growing at a
stunning annualised pace of 4.9%. around the world, infalation is falling, unemployment has mostly stayed low and the big central banks may have stopped their
monetary tightening. China, stricken by a property crisis, looks likely to benefit from a modest stimulus. Unfortunately, however, this good cheer cannot last. The
foundations for today’s growth look unstable. Peer ahead, and threats abound.
The irrepressible economy has encouraged bets that interest rates, though no longer rising rapidly, will not fall by much. Over the past week the European Central
Bank and Federal Reserve has held rates steady; the Bank of England was expected to follow suit shortly after we published this on November 2 nd. Long-term bond
yields have accordingly risen sharply. America’s government must now pay 5% to borrow for 30 years, up from just 1.2% in the depths of the pandemic recession.
Even economies known for low rates have seen sharp increases. Not long ago Germany’s borrowing costs were negative; now its ten-year bond yield is nearly 3%.
the Bank of Japan has all but given up on its promise to peg ten-year borrowing costs at 1%.
Some people, including Janet Yellen, American’s treasury secretary, say these higher interest rates are a good thing--a reflection of a world economy in the rudest
of health. In fact, they are a source of danger. Because higher rates are likely to persist, today’s economic policies will fail and so will the growth they have fostered.
To see why today’s benign conditions cannot continue, consider one reason why America’s economy in particular has fared better than expected. Its consumers
have been spending the cash they accumulated during the pandemic from handouts and saying at home. Those excess savings were expected to have been
depleted by now. But recent data suggest households still have $1trn left, which explains why they can get away with saving less out of their incomes than at any
point in the 2010s.
When those excess savings buffers have been run down, high interest rates will start to bite, forcing consumers to spend less freely. And , as our Briefing explains,
trouble will start to emerge across the world economy if rates stay higher for longer. In Europe and America business bankruptcies are already rising; even
companies that locked in low rates by issuing long-term debt will in time have to face higher financing costs. House prices will fall, at least in inflation-adjusted
terms, as they respond to dearer mortgages. And banks holding long-term securities--which have been supported by short-term loans, including from the Fed--will
have to raise capital or merge to pub the holes blown in their balance-sheets by higher rates.
Fiscal largesse has added to the world economy’s sugar rush. In a higher-for-longer world, it too looks unsustainable. According to the IMF, Britain, France, Italy and
Japan are all likely to run deficits in the region of 5% of GDP in 2023. in the 12 months to September America’s deficit was a staggering $2trn, or 7.5% of GDP after
adjusting for accounting distortions--about double what was expected in mid-2022. at a time of low unemployment, such borrowing is jaw-droppingly reckless. All
told, government debt in the rich world is now higher, as a share of GDP, than at any time since after the Napoleonic wars.
When interest rates were low, even towering debts were manageable. Now that rates have risen, interest bills are draining budgets. Higher-for-longer therefore
threatens to pit government against inflation-targeting central bankers. Already, Ms Yellen has felt obliged to argue that Treasuries carry no risk premium, and
Jerome Powell, the Fed’s chairman, has insisted that his bank would never cut rates and let inflation rip to ease pressure on the governments’ budget.
Whatever Mr Powell says, a higher-for-longer era would lead investors to question governments’ promises both to keep inflation low and also to pay their debts.
The ECB’s
bondholdings are already becoming skwed toards the Italian government debt that it tacitly backstops---a task that has become far harder in a
high-rate world. Even when Japanese government-bond yields were a paltry 0.8% last year, 8% of Japan’s budget went on interest payments. Imagine the strain if
yields reached even German’s relatively modest levels. Some governments would go on to tighten their belts as a result. But doing so may bring economic pain.
These strains make it hard to see how the world economy could possibly accomplish the many things that markets currently expect of it: a dodged recession, low
inflation, mighty debts and high interest rates all at the same time. It is more likely that the higher-for-longer era kills itself off, by bringing about economic
weakness that lets central bankers cut rates without inflation soaring.
A more hopeful possibility is that productivity growth soars, perhaps thanks to generative artificial intelligence. The resulting boost to incomes and revenues would
make higher rates bearable. Indeed, figures published on November 2nd are expected to show that America’s measured productivity surged in the third quarter.
The potential of AI to unleash further productivity gains may explain why higher-for-longer has so far not punctured
stockmarkets. Were it not for the rising
valuations of seven tech firms, including Microsoft and Nvidia, the S&P 500 index of American stocks would have fallen this year.
Don’t look down
Set against that hope, though, is a world staked by threats to productivity growth. Donald Trump vows swingeing new tariffs should he return to the White House.
Governments are increasingly distorting markets with industrial policy. State spending is growing as a share of the economy as populations age, the green-energy
transition beckons and conflicts around the world require more spending on defence. In the face of all this, anyone betting that the world economy can just keep
carrying on is taking a huge gamble.
How scary is china?
America must understand china’s weaknesses as well as its strengths
When Joe Biden meets Xi Jinping in San Francisco next week, the stakes will be high. Fighting in the Middle East threatens to become another theatre for
great-power rivalry, with America backing Israel, and China(along with Russia) deepening links to Iran. In the South China Sea, China is harassing Philippine ships
and flying its planes dangerously close to American ones. Next year will test Sino-American relations even more. In January a candidate despised by Beijing may
win Taiwan’s presidential election. For most of the year, the race for the White House will be a cacophony of Chia-bashing.
America’s anti-China fervour is partly an overcorrection for its previous complacency about the economic, military and ideological threat the autocratic giant poses.
The danger from China is real, and there are many areas where Mr Biden’s administration should stand up to its Communist rulers. But there is also a risk that
America’s view of Chinese power slides into caricature, triggering confrontations and, at worst, an avoidable conflict. Even without war, that rush would incur huge
economic costs, split America from its allies and undermine the values that make it strong. Instead, America needs a sober assessment not just of China’s strengths,
but also of its weaknesses.
What re those weaknesses? Among the least understood are its military shortcoming, which we describe in a special report on the People’s Liberation Army(PLA).
after decades of modernization, it is formidable--terrifying, even. With 2m personnel and an annual budget of $225bn, it has the world’s biggest army and navy
and a vast missile force. By 2030 it could have 1000 nuclear warheads. Mr Xi had ordered it to be capable of invading Taiwan by 2027, say America’s spies. And the
PLA projects force more widely, too. It intimidates China’s neighbours in the South China Sea and skirmishes with India. It has a base in Africa and is seeking one in
the Middle East.
Yet look more closely and the problems leap out. Drilled for decades on Soviet and then Russian military dogma, the PLA is trying to absorb the lessons from
Ukraine and to co-ordinate “joint” operations between services, which would be key to any successful invasion of Taiwan. Recruitment is hard. Despite the efforts
of films such as “Wolf Warrior” to glamorise dreary military careers with mediocre pay, the PLA struggles to hire skilled people, from fighter pilots to engineers. It
has almost no experience of combat--Mr Xi calls this “the peace disease”. its most deadly engagement in the past four decades or so was massacring its own
citizens around Tiananmen Square in 1989.
Although China has made technological leaps, from hypersonic missiles to stealth fighters, its military-industrial complex trails behind in areas such as engines for
aircraft and ships, and still relies on some foreign parts. American embargoes on semiconductors and components could make it harder to catch up with the global
technological frontier. Despite Mr Xi’s endless purges, corruption appears to be pervasive. It may explain why General Li Shangfu was sacked as China’s defence
minister this year after only a few months in the job.
China’s military frailties exist alongside its better-known economic ones. A property crunch and the Communist Party’s growing hostility towards the private sector
and foreign capital are impeding growth. China’s GDP will increase by 5.4% this year and by only 3.5% in 2028, say the IMF. Investment by multinational firms into
China turned negative in the third quarter, for the first time since records began in 1998. China’s $18trn economy is big. But despite its much larger population, its
GDP is unlikely to exceed America’s by much of at all by mid-century.
Behind China’s military and economic weaknesses lies a third, and deeper problem: Mr Xi’s dominance of an authoritarian system that no longer allows serious
internal policy debate. Decision-making is deteriorating as a result. Economic technocrats have been sidelined by loyalists. By one estimate, PLA troops spend a
quarter of their time on political education, poring over such inspiring works as “Xi JinPing Thought on Strengthening the Military”. Mr Xi’s ideology is that the party
led by him, should command all things, always.
Personalised rule is bad for China---and perilous for the world. Lacking sound advice, Mr Xi might miscalculate, as Vladimir Putin did on Ukraine. However, he may
be deterred by the knowledge that if he invades Taiwan but fails to conquer it, he could lose power. One thing is clear: despite periodic and welcome bouts of
constructive diplomacy, such as recently resumed ministerial contacts with America, Mr Xi’s commitment to undermining liberal values globally will not diminish.
How should America respond? Judiciously. Trying to cripple China’s economy by isolating it could cut global GDP by 7%, reckons the IMF. Closing America’s borders
to Chinese talent would count as self-sabotage. Any excessively hawkish policy risk dividing America’s network of alliances. Worst of all, too rapid an American
military escalation could provoke a disastrous war if Mr Xi mistakes it for the prelude to American aggression, or worries that unifying Taiwan with the
mainland--peacefully or by force--will only grow harder should he continue to bide his time.
From complacency to confrontation to calibration
Instead, America needs to calibrate its China policy for the long run. Regarding the economy, that means openness, not isolation. The economist supports limited
controls on exports of technology with possible military applications, but not the broad embrace of tariffs and industrial policy that began under President Donald
Trump and has continued under Mr Biden. To maintain its economic and technological edge, America should stay open for business--unlike China.
Militarily, America should seek deterrence but not domination. The Biden administration has rightly sold more arms to Taiwan, built up forces in Asia and renewed
defence alliances there. But America should avoid a nuclear arms race or being seen to support formal independence for Taiwan. Dealing with China requires a
realistic view of its capabilities. The good news is that its weaknesses and Mr Xi’s mistakes give the West time to counter the threat it poses.
How scary is China?
America must understand China’s weaknesses as well as its strengths
When Joe Biden meets Xi Jinping in San Francisco next week, the stakes will be high. Fighting in the Middle East threatens to become another theatre for
great-power rivalry, with America backing Israel, and China( along with Russia) deepening links to Iran. In the South China Sea, China is harassing Philippine ships
and flying its planes dangerously close to American ones. Next year will test Sino-American relations even more. In January a candidate despised by Beijing may
win Taiwan’s presidential election. For the most of the year, the race for the White House will be a cacophony of China-bashing.
America’s anti-China fervour is partly an overcorrection for its previous complacency about the economic, military and ideological threat the autocratic giant poses.
The danger from China is real, and there are many ares where Mr Biden’s administration should stand up to its Communist rulers. But there is also a risk that
America’s view of Chinese power slides into caricature, triggering confrontations and ,at worst, an avoidable conflict. Even without war, that rush would incur huge
economic costs, split America from its allies and undermine the values that make it strong. Instead, America needs a sober assessment, not just of China’s
strengths, but also of its weaknesses.
What are those weaknesses? Among the least understood are its military shortcomings, which we describe in a special report on the People’s Liberation Army.
After decades of modernisation, it is formidable--terrifying, even. With 2m personnel and an annual budget of $225bn, it has the world’s biggest army and navy
and a vast missile force. By 2030 it could have 1000 nuclear warheads. Mr Xi has ordered it to be capable of invading Taiwan by 2027, say America’s spies. And the
PLA projects force more widely, too. It intimidates China’s neighbours in the South China Sea and skirmishes with India. It has a base in Africa and is seeking one in
the Middle East.
Yet look more closely and the problems leap out. Drilled for decades on Soviet and then Russian military dogma, the PlA is trying to absorb the lessons from
Ukraine and to co-ordinate “joint” operations between services, which would be key to any successful invasion of Taiwan. Recruitment is hard. Despite the efforts
of films such as “Wolf Warrior” to glamorise dreary military careers with mediocre pay, the PLA struggles to hire skilled people, from fighter pilots to engineers. It
has almost no experience of combat--Mr Xi calls this “the peace disease”. its most deadly engagement in the past four decades or so was massacring its own
citizens around Tiananmen Square in 1989.
Although China has made technological leaps, from hypersonic missiles to stealth fighters, its military-industrial complex trails behind in areas such as engines for
aircraft and ships, and still relies on some foreign parts. American embargoes on semiconductors and components could make it harder to catch up with the global
technological frontier. Despite Mr Xi’s endless purges, corruption appears to be pervasive. It may explain why General Li Shangfu was sacked as China’s defence
minister this year after only a few months in the job.
China’s military frailties exist alongside its better-known economic ones. A property crunch and the Communist Party’s growing hostility towards the private sector
and foreign capital are impeding growth. China’s GDP will increase by 5.4% this year and by only 3.5% in 2028, says the IMF. Investment by multinational firms into
china turned negative in the third quarter, for the first time since records began in 1998. China’s $18trn economy is big. But despite its much larger population, its
GDP is unlikely to exceed America’s by much or at all by mid-century.
Behind China’s military and economic weaknesses lies as a third, and deeper problem: Mr Xi’s dominance of an authoritarian system that no longer allows serious
internal policy debate. Decision-making is deteriorating as a result. Economic technocrats have been sidelined by loyalists. By one estimate, PLA troops have been
sidelined by loyalists. By one estimate, PLA troops spend a quarter of their time on political education, poring over such inspiring works as “Xi Jinping thought on
Strengthening the Military” Mr Xi’s ideology is that the party, led by him, should command all things, always.
Personalized rule is bad for China--and perilous for the world. Lacking sound advice, Mr Xi might miscalculate, as Vladimir Putin did on Ukraine. However, he may
be deterred by the knowledge that if he invades Taiwan but fails to conquer it, he could lose power. One thing is clear: despite periodic and welcome bouts of
constructive diplomacy, such as recently resumed ministerial contacts with America, Mr Xi’s commitment to undermining liberal values globally will not diminish.
How should America respond? Judiciously. Trying to cripple China’s economy by isolating it could cut global GDP by 7%, reckons the IMF. Closing America’s borders
to Chinese talent would count as self-sabotage. Any excessively hawkish policy risks dividing America’s network of alliances. Worst of all, too rapid an American
military escalation could provoke a disastrous war is Mr Xi mistakes it for the prelude to America aggression, or worries that unifying Taiwan with the
mainland--peacefully or by force--will only grow harder should he continue to bide his time.
From complacency to confrontation to calibration
Instead, America needs to calibrate its China policy for the long run. Regarding the economy, that means openness, not isolation. The Economist supports limited
controls on exports of technology with possible military applications, but not the broad embrace of tariffs and industrial policy that began under President Donald
Trump and has continued under Mr Biden. To maintain its economic and technological edge, America should stay open for business--unlike China.
Military, America should seek deterrence but not domination. The Biden administration has rightly sold more arms to Taiwan. Built up forces in Asia and renewed
defence alliances there. But America should avoid a nuclear arms race or being seen to support formal independence for Taiwan. Dealing with China requires a
realistic view of its capabilities. The good news is that its weaknesses and Mr Xi’s mistakes give the West time to counter the threat it poses.
Donald Trump poses the biggest danger to the world in 2024
What his victory in America’s election would mean
A shadow looms over the world. In this week’s edition we publish The World Ahead 2024, our 38th annual predictive guild to the coming year, and in all that time
no single person has ever eclipsed our analysis as much as Donald Trump eclipses 2024. that a Trump victory next November is a coin-toss probability to sink in.
Mr Trump dominates the Republican primary. Several polls have him a head of President Joe Biden in swing states. In one, for the New York Times, 59% of voters
trusted him on the economy, compared with just 37% for Mr Biden. In the primaries, at least,
civil lawsuits and criminal prosecutions have only strengthened Mr
Trump. For decades Democrats have relied on support among black and Hispanic voters, but a meaningful number are abandoning the party. In the next 12
months a stumble by either candidate could determine the race--and thus upend the world.
This is a perilous moment for a man like Mr Trump to be back knocking on the door of the Oval Office. Democracy is in trouble at home. Mr Trump’s claim to have
won the election in 2020 was more than a lie: it was a cynical bet that he could manipulate and intimidate his compatriots, and it has worked. America also faces
growing hostility abroad, challenged by Russian in Ukraine, by Iran and its allied militias in the Middle East and by China across the Taiwan Strait and in the South
China Sea. Those three countries loosely co-ordinate their efforts and share a vision of a new international order in which might is right and autocrats are secure.
Because MAGA Republicans have been planning his second term for months, Trump 2 would be more organised than Trump 1, True believers would occupy the
most important positions. Mr Trump would be unbound in his pursuit of retribution, economic protectionism and theatrically extravagant deals. No wonder the
prospect of a second Trump term fills the world’s parliaments and boardrooms with despair. But despair is not a a plan. It is past time to impose order on anxiety.
The greatest threat Mr Trump poses is to his own country. Having won back power because of his election-denial in 2020, he would surely be affirmed in his gut
feeling that only losers allow themselves to be bound by the norms, customs and self-sacrifice that make a nation. In pursuing his enemies, Mr Trump will wage
war on any institution that stands in his way, including the courts and the Department of Justice.
Yet a Trump victory next year would also have a profound effect abroad. China and its friends would rejoice over the evidence that American democracy is
dysfunctional. If Mr Trump trampled due process and civil rights in the United States, his diplomats could not proclaim them abroad. The global south would be
confirmed in its suspicion that American appeals to do what is right are really just an exercise in hypocrisy. America would become just another big power.
Mr Trump’s protectionist instincts would be unbound, too. In his first term the economy thrived despite his China tariffs. His plans for a second term would be
more damaging. He and his lieutenants are contemplating a universal 10% levy on imports, more than three times the level today. Even if the Senate reins him in,
protectionism justified by an expansive view of national security would increase prices for Americans. Mr Trump also fired up the economy in his first term by
cutting taxes and handing out covid-19 payments. This time, America is running budget deficits on a scale only
seen in war and the cost of servicing debts is
higher. Tax cuts would feed inflation, not growth.
Abroad, Mr Trump’s first term was better than expected. His administration provided weapons to Ukraine, pursued a peace deal between Israel. The UAE and
Bahrain, and scared European countries into raising their defence spending. America’s policy towards China became more hawkish. If you squint, another
transactional presidency could bring some benefits. Mr Trump’s indifference to human rights might make the Saudi government more biddable once the Gaza war
is over, and strengthen relations with Narendra Modi’s government in India.
But a second term would be different, because the world has changed. There is nothing wrong in countries being transactional: they are bound to put their own
interests first. However, Mr Trump’s lust for a deal and his sense of America’s interests are unconstrained by reality and unanchored by values.
Mr Trump judges that for America to spend blood and treasure in Europe is a bad deal. He has therefore threatened to end the Ukraine war in a day and wreck
NATO, perhaps by reneging on America’s commitment to treat an attack on one country was an attack on all. In the Middle East Mr Trump is likely to back Israel
without reserve, however much that stirs up conflict in the region. In Asia he may be open to doing a deal with China’s president Xi Jinping, to abandon Taiwan
because he cannot see why America would go to war with a nuclear-armed superpower to benefit a tiny island.
But knowing that America would abandon Europe, Mr Putin would have an incentive to fight on in Ukraine and to pick off former Soviet countries such as Moldova
or the Baltic states. Without American pressure, Israel is unlikely to generate an internal consensus for peace talks with the Palestinians. Calculating that Mr Trump
does not stand by his allies, Japan and South Korea could acquire nuclear weapons. By asserting that America has no global responsibility to help deal with climate
change, Mr Trump would crush efforts to slow it. And he is surrounded by China hawks who believe confrontation is the only way to preserve America dominance.
Caught between a dealmaking president and his warmongering officials, China could easily miscalculate over Taiwan, with catastrophic consequences.
The election that matters
A second Trump term would be a watershed in a way the first was not. Victory would confirm his most destructive instincts about power. His plans would
encounter less resistance. And because America will have voted him in while knowing the worst, its moral authority would decline. The election will be decided by
tens of thousands of voters in just a handful of states. In 2024 the fate of the world will depend on their ballots.
Donald Trump poses the biggest danger to the world in 2024
What his victory in America’s election would mean
A shadow looms over the world. In this week’s edition we publish the world ahead 2024,our 38th annual predictive guide to the coming year, and in all that time no
single person has ever eclipsed our analysis as much as Donald Trump eclipses 2024. that a Trump victory next November is a coin-toss probability is beginning to
sink in.
Mr Trump dominates the Republican primary. Several polls have him ahead of President Joe Biden in swing states. In one, for the New York Times, 59% of voters
trusted him on the economy, compared with just 37% for Mr Biden. In the Primaries, at least, civil lawsuits and criminal prosecutions have only strengthened Mr
Trump. For decades Democrats have relied on support among black and Hispanic voters, but a meaningful number are abandoning the party. In the next 12
months a stumble by either candidate could determine the race--and thus upend the world.
This is a perilous moment for a man like Mr Trump to be back knocking on the door of the Oval Office. Democracy is in trouble at home. Mr Trump’s claim to have
won the election in 2020 was more than a lie: it was a cynical bet that he could manipulate and intimidate his compatriots, and it has worked. America also faces
growing hostility abroad, challenged by Russia in Ukraine, by Iran and its allied militias in the Middle East and by China across the Taiwan Strait and in the South
China Sea. Those three countries loosely co-ordinate their efforts and share a vision of a new international order in which might is right and autocrats are secure.
Because MAGA Republicans have been planning his second term
For months, Trump 2 would be more organised than Trump 1. True believers would occupy the most important positions. Mr Trump would be unbound in his
pursuit of retribution, economic protectionism and theatrically extravagant deals. No wonder the prospect of a second Trump term fills the world’s parliaments
and boardrooms with despair. But despair is not a plan. It is past time to impose order on anxiety.
The greatest threat Mr Trump poses is to his own country. Having won back power because of his election-denial in 2020, he would surely be affirmed in his gut
feeling that only losers allow themselves to be bound by the norms, customs and self-sacrifice that make a nation. In pursuing his enemies, Mr Trump will wage
war on any institution that stands in his way, including the courts and the Department of Justice.
Yet a Trump victory next year would also have a profound effect abroad. China and its friends would rejoice over the evidence that American democracy is
dysfunctional. If Mr Trump trampled due process and civil rights in the United States, his diplomats could not proclaim them abroad. The global south would be
confirmed in its suspicion that American appeals to do what is right are really just an exercise in hypocrisy. America would become just another big power.
Mr Trump’s protectionist instincts would be unbound, too. In his first term the economy thrived despite his China tariffs. His plans for a second term would be
more damaging. He and his lieutenants are contemplating a universal 10% levy on imports, more than three times the level today. Even if the Senate reins him in,
protectionism justified by an expansive view of national security would increase prices for Americans. Mr Trump also fired up the economy in his first term by
cutting taxes and handing out covid-19 payments. This time, America is running budget deficits on a scale only seen in war and the cost of servicing debates is
higher. Tax cuts would feed inflation, not growth.
Abroad, Mr Trump’s first term was better than expected. His administration provided weapons to Ukraine, pursued a peace deal between Israel, the UAE and
Bahrain, and scared European countries into raising their defence spending. America’s policy towards China became more hawkish. If you squint, another
transactional presidency could bring some benefits. Mr Trump’s indifference to human rights might make the Saudi government more biddable once the Gaza war
is over, and strengthen relations with Narendra Modi’s government in India.
But a second term would be different, because the world has changed. There is nothing wrong in countries being transactional: they are bound to put their own
interests first. However, Mr Trump’s lust for a deal and his sense of America’s interest are unconstrained by reality and unanchored by values
Mr Trump judges that for America to spend blood and treasure in Europe is a bad deal. He has therefore threatened to end the Ukraine war in a day and to wreck
NATO, perhaps by reneging on American’s commitment to treat an attack on one country as an attack on all. In the Middle East Mr Trump is likely to back Israel
without reserve, however much that stirs up conflict in the region. In Asia he may be open to doing a deal with China’s president, Xi Jinping, to abandon Taiwan
because he cannot see why America would go to war with a nuclear-armed superpower to benefit a tiny island.
But knowing that America would abandon Europe, Mr Putin would have an incentive to fight on in Ukraine and to pick off former Soviet countries such as Moldova
or the Baltic states. Without American pressure, Isreal is unlikely to generate an internal consensus for peace talks with the Palestinians. Calculating that Mr Trump
does not stand by his allies, Japan and South Korea could acquire nuclear weapons. By asserting that America has no global responsibility to help deal with climate
change, Mr Trump would crush efforts to slow it. And he is surrounded by China hawks who believe confrontation is the only way to preserve American dominance.
Caught between a dealmaking president and his warmongering officials, China could easily miscalculate over Taiwan, with catastrophic consequences.
The election that matters
A second Trump term would be a watershed in a way the first was not. Victory would confirm his most destructive instincts about power. His plans would
encounter less resistance. And because America will have voted him in while knowing the worst, its moral authority would decline. The election will be decided by
tens of thousands of voters in just a handful of states. In 2024 the fate of the world will depend on their ballots.
Donald Trump poses the biggest danger to the world in 2024
What his victory in America’s election would mean
A shadow looms over the world. In this week’s edition we publish the world ahead 2024, our 38th annual predictive guide to the coming year, and in all that time
no single person has ever eclipsed our analysis as much as Donald Trump eclipse 2024. that a Trump victory next November is a coin-toss probability is beginning
to sink in.
Mr Trump dominates the Republican primary. Several polls have him ahead of President Joe Biden in swing states. In one, for the New York Times, 59% of voters
trusted him on the economy, compared with just 37% Mr Biden. In the primaries, at least, civil lawsuits and criminal prosecutions have only strengthened Mr
Trump. For decades Democrats have relied on support among black and Hispanic voters, but a meaningful number are abandoning the party. In the next 12
months a stumble by either candidate could determine the race--and thus upend the world.
This is a perilous moment for a man like Mr Trump to be back knocking on the door of the Oval office. Democracy is in trouble at home. Mr Trump’s claim to have
won the election in 2020 was more than a lie: it was cynical bet that he could manipulate and intimidate his compatriots, and it has worked. America also faces
growing hostility abroad, challenged by Russia in Ukraine, by Iran and its allied militias in the Middle East and by China across the Taiwan Strait and in the South
China Sea. Those three countries loosely co-ordinate their efforts and share a vision of a new international order in which might is right and autocrats are secure.
Because MAGA Republican have been planning his second term for months, Trump 2 would be unbound in his pursuit of retribution, economic protectionism and
theatrically extravagant deals. No wonder the prospect of a second Trump term fills the world’s parliaments and boardrooms with despair. But despair is not a plan.
It is past time to impose order on anxiety.
The greatest threat Mr Trump poses is to his own country. Having won back power because of his election-denial in 2020, he would surely be affirmed in his gut
feeling that only losers allow themselves to be bound by norms, customs and self-sacrifice that make a nation. In pursuing his enemies, Mr Trump will wage war on
any institution that stands in his way, including the courts and the Department of Justice.
Yet a Trump victory next year would also have a profound effect abroad. China and its friends would rejoice over the evidence that American democracy is
dysfunctional. If Mr Trump trampled due process and civil rights in the United States, his diplomats could not proclaim them abroad. The global south would be
confirmed in its suspicion that American appeals to do what is right are really just an exercise in hypocrisy. America would become just another big power.
Mr Trump’s protectionist instincts would be unbound, too. In his first term the economy thrived despite his China tariffs. His plans for a second term would be
more damaging. He and his lieutenants are contemplating a universal 10% levy on imports, more than three times the level today. Even if the Senate reins him in,
protectionism justified by an expansive view of national security would increase prices for Americans. Mr Trump also fired up the economy in his first term by
cutting taxes and handing out covid-19 payments. This time, America is running budget deficits on a scale only seen in war and the cost of servicing debts is higher.
Tax cuts would feed inflation, not growth.
Abroad, Mr Trump’s first term was better than expected. His administration provided weapons to Ukraine, pursued a peace deal between Israel, the UAE and
Bahrain, and scared European countries into raising their defence spending. America’s policy towards China became more hawkish. If you squint, another
transactional presidency could bring some benefits. Mr Trump’s indifference to human rights might make the Saudi government more biddable once the Gaza war
iw over, and strengthen relations with Narendra Modi’s government in India.
But a second term would be different, because the world has changed. There is nothing wrong in countries being transactional: they are bound to put their own
interests first. However, Mr Trump’s lust for a deal and his sense of America’s interests are unconstrained by reality and unanchored by values.
Mr Trump judges that for America to spend blood and treasure in Europe is a bad deal. He has the refore threatened to end the Ukraine war in a day and to wreck
NATO, perhaps by reneging on America’s commitment to threat an attack on the country as an attack on all. In the Middle East Mr Trump is likely to back Israel
without reserve, however much that stirs up conflict in the region. In Asia he may be open to doing a deal with China’s president, Xi Jinping, to abandon Taiwan
because he cannot see why America would go to war with a nuclear-armed superpower to benefit a tiny island.
But knowing that America would abandon Europe, Mr Putin would have an incentive to fight on in Ukraine and to pick off former Soviet countries such as Moldova
or the Baltic states. Without American pressure, Israel is unlikely to generate an internal consensus for peace talks with the Palestinians. Calculating that Mr Trump
does not stand by his allies, Japan and South Korea could acquire nuclear weapons. By asserting that America has no global responsibility to help deal with climate
change, Mr Trump would crush efforts to slow it. And he is surrounded by China hawks who believe confrontation is the only way to preserve American dominance.
Caught between a dealmaking president and his warmongering officials, China could easily miscalculate over Taiwan, with catastrophic consequences.
The election that matters
A second Trump term would be a watershed in a way the first was not. Victory would confirm his most destructive instincts about power. His plans would
encounter less resistance. And because America will have voted him in whiling knowing the worst, its moral authority would decline. The election will be decided
by tens of thousands of voters in just a handful of states. In 2024 the fate of the world will depend on their ballots.
Some progress, must to better
Progress on climate change has not been deep or fast enough, but it has been real
The agreement at the conference of the parties(COP) to the UN framework Convention on Climate Change, which took place in Paris in 2015, was somewhat
impotent. As many pointed out at the time, it could not tell countries what to do; it could not end the fossil-fuel age by fiat; it could not draw back the seas, placate
the winds or dim the noonday sun. But it could at least lay down the law for subsequent COPs, decreeing that this year’s should see the first “global stocktake” of
what had and had not been done to bring the agreement’s overarching goals closer.
As the world gathers in Dubai for the 28th COP, the assessment of the first part of that stocktake is in some ways surprisingly positive. At the time of the Paris COP,
the global warming expected by 2100 if policies did not change was more than 3℃ above pre-industrial levels. If policies in place today are followed, central
estimates put it around 2.5-2.9℃,though the uncertainties are large. That is still so high as to be disastrous for billions. But it is also a marked
improvement.
A lot of this progress has come from cheaper and more widespread renewable energy. In 2015 global installed solar capacity was 230
gigawatts; last year it was 1050GW. Better policies have spread, too. In 2014 just 12%of energy-related carbon dioxide emissions came
under carbon-pricing schemes and the average price per tonne was $7; today 23% of greenhouse-gas emissions do, and the price is around
$32.
Those and other steps forward explain why the International Energy Agency, and intergovernmental think-tank which, at the time of Paris,
saw carbon-dioxide emissions continuing to rise into the 2040s, today says they are likely to peak within a few years. Peaking is not enough;
emissions must then fall very quickly to bring the projected warming down to just 2℃. but the almost ceaseless increase in emissions has
been a fact of economic growth for two centuries. To reverse that could be seen as the end of the beginning of the fight for a stable climate.
To ascribe all this progress to Paris would be daft. But the progress it put in motion set new expectations; it made climate something that
countries had to talk about. And by spelling out that a stable climate needs to balance residual sources of carbon dioxide with “sinks”
which remove it from the atmosphere, it brought the idea of net-zero goals into the mainstream. One country had such a goal in 2025. now
101 do.
In a world where the seasons themselves are increasingly out of whack-witness last week’s extraordinary springtime heatwave in
Brazil--the COPs provide a predictable annual space in the international calendar for side-agreements and new expressions of intent. A
recent statement by Joe Biden, America’s president, and his Chinese counterpart, Xi Jinping, helped build momentum for a cop-adjacent
deal on methane emissions. They also pledged their countries to do their bit in the tripling of renewable generating capacity by 2030,
another goal for which the United Arab Emirates wants its COP remembered.
None of this means that COPs have saved the world. Paris provided a context for the boom in renewable energy, but it did not provide the
investment that made it happen. The doubling of investment levels that BloombergNEF, a data outfit, sees as necessar y for the proposed
tripling in capacity will have to come from the private sector. To draw it forth is not a matter of COppery. To attract funds,counties will need
to redesign energy markets, hurry through permits, hugely improve grids and remove policies that still favour fossil fuels.
And none of this has stopped the climate from worsening. Nor could it. The main driver of global warming is the cumulative amount of
carbon dioxide in the atmosphere. For as long as net emissions continue, temperatures will rise. Since Paris, that ineluctable warming has
reached a level where it can no longer be treated as a problem of the future. This year climate change has felt particularly acute: the hottest
August on record followed the hottest July, the hottest September the hottest August, the hottest October the hottest September.
That pace will not continue for ever. But the only way to stop the warming before reaching net zero is to cut the amount of sunshine the
planet absorbs, perhaps by inserting particles into the stratosphere to whitening clouds over the ocean. The idea of “solar geoengineering
alarms many climate scientists, activists and policymakers; but a number rightly see it as worth researching. That research needs an
international debate about the proper restrictions on it and the possibilities it could lead to. The incrementalist, institution-bound COPs are
not the place for those discussions. But before the next stocktake, set for 2028, some forum must be found.
Mechanisms for removing carbon dioxide fall more comfortably within COPs remit. Like solar geoengineering, this process also concerns
many. Hearing oil companies, in particular, talking about carbon-dioxide removal as a justification for keeping production up strikes them as
likely to lead to a world where emissions continue but only a small amount of removal ever takes place. Given the industry’s history, this is
not unreasonable.
To allay such fears, countries will have to be explicit about their removal plans in the next round of “nationally determined contributions”
the proposals for further action that they have to present to each other by 2025. in order to guard against fudging, they should also be
required to keep their targets for removals and emission reduction separate.
Not just COPy and paste
This may seem a low priority compared with emissions and adaptation: removals begin to matter materially only when emissions fall far
below their peak. But at that point the scale of the removals needed will be thousands of times greater than can be achieved today. Best get
cracking. Being explicit about the fact that, eventually, polluters will be paying for the removal of their waste will both spur investment in
technologies and concentrate the minds of emitters again, a UN process cannot force the changes the world required. But when it frames
debates wisely and sets appropriate rules, it can help galvanise progress. That is just as well, seeing how much more is needed.
Some progress, must do better
Progress on climate change has not been deep or faster enough, but is has been real
The agreement at the conference of the parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, which took place in Paris in 2015, was
somewhat impotent. As many pointed out at the time, it could not tell countries what to do; it could not end the fossil-fuel age by fiat; it
could not draw back the seas; placate the winds or dim the noonday sun. But it could at least lay down the law for subsequent COPs,
decreeing that this year’s should see the first “global stocktake”of what had and hand not been done to bring the agreement’s
overarching goals closer.
As the world gathers in Dubai for the 28th COP, the assessment of the first part of that stocktake is in some ways surprisingly positive. At the
time of the Paris COP, the global warming expected by 2100 if policies did not change was more than 3℃ above pre-industrial levels. If
policies in place today are followed, central estimates put it around 2.5-2.9℃, though the uncertainties are large. That is still so high as to be
disastrous for billions. But it is also a marked improvement.
A lot of this progress has come from cheaper and more widespread renewable energy. In 2015 global installed solar capacity was 230
gigawatts; last year it was 1050GW. Better policies have spread,too. In 2014 just 12% of energy-related carbon-dioxide emissions came
under carbon-pricing shemes and the average price per tonne was $7; today 23% of greenhouse-gas emissions do, and the price is around
$32.
Those and other steps forward explain why the international energy Agency, an intergovernmental think-tank which, at the time of Paris,
saw carbon-dioxide emissions continuing to rise into the 2040s, today says they are likely to peak within a few years. Peaking is not enough;
emissions must then fall very quickly to bring the projected warming down to just 2℃. but the almost ceaseless increase in emissions has
been a fact of economic growth for two centuries. To reverse that could be seen as the end of the beginning of the fight for a stable climate.
To ascribe all this progress to Paris would be daft. But the process it put in motion set new expectations; it made climate something that
countries had to talk about. And by spelling out that a stable climate needs to balance residual sources of carbon dioxide with “sinks”
which remove it from the atmosphere, it brought the idea of net-zero goals into the mainstream. One country has such a goal in 2015. now
101 do.
In a world where the seasons themselves are increasingly out of whack--witness last week’s extraordinary springtime heatwave in
Brazil-the COPs provide a predictable annual space in the international calendar for side-agreements and new expressions of intent. A
recent statement by Joe Biden, America’s president, and his Chinese counterpart, Xi jinping, helped build momentum for a COP-adjacent
deal on methane emissions. They also pledged their countries to do their bit in the tripling of renewable generating capacity by 2030,
another goal for which the United Arab Emirates wants its COP remembered.
None of this means that COPs have saved the world. Paris provided a context for the boom in renewable energy, but it did not provide the
investment that made it happen. The doubling of investment levels that BloombergNEF, a data outfit, sees as necessary for the proposed
tripling in capacity will have to come from the private sector. To draw it forth is not a matter of COPpery. To attract funds, countries will need
to redesign energy markets, hurry through permits, hugely improve grids and remove polices that still favour fossil fuels.
And none of this has stopped the climate from worsening. Nor could it. The main driver of global warming is the cumulative amount of
carbon dioxide in the atmosphere. For as long as net emissions continue, temperatures will rise. Since Paris, that ineluctable warming has
reached a level where it can no longer be treated as a problem of the future. This year climate change has felt particularly acute: the hottest
August on record followed the hottest July, the hottest September the hottest August, the hottest October the hottest September.
That pace will not continue for ever. But the only way to stop the warming before reaching net zero is to cut the amount of sunshine the
planet absorbs, perhaps by inserting particles into the stratosphere or whitening clouds over the ocean. The idea of “solar
geoengineering”alarms many climate scientists, activists and policymakers; but a number rightly see it as worth researching. That research
needs an international debate about the proper restrictions on it and the possibilities it could lead to. The incrementalist, institution-bound
COPs are not the place for those discussions. But before the next stocktake, set for 2028, some forum must be found.
Mechanism for removing carbon dioxide fall more comfortably within COP’s remit. Like solar geoengineering, this process also concerns
many. Hearing oil companies, in particular, talking about carbon-dioxide removal as a justification for keeping production up strikes them as
likely to lead to a world where emissions continue but only a small amount of removal ever takes place. Given the industry’s history, this is
not unreasonable.
To allay such fears, countries will have to be explicit about their removal plans in the next round of “National Determined
Contributions”--the proposals for further action that they have to present to each other by 2025. in order to guard against fudging, they
should also be required to keep their targets for removals and emission reduction separate.
Not Just Copy and paste
This may seem a low priority compared with emissions and adaption: removals begin to matter materially only when emissions fall far below
their peak. But at that point the scale of the removals needed will be thousands of times greater than can be achieved toady. Best get
cracking. Being explicit about the fact that, eventually, polluters will be paying for the removal of their waste will both spur investment in
technologies and concentrate the minds of emitters. Again, a UN process cannot force the changes the world requires. But when it frames
debates wisely and sets appropriate rules, it can help galvanise progress. That is just as well, seeing how much more is needed.
Some progress, must do better
Progress on climate change has not been deep or fast enough,but it has been real
The agreement at the conference of the parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, which took place in Paris in 2015, was
somewhat impotent. As many pointed out at the time, it could not tell countries what to do; it could not end the fossil-fuel age by fiat; it
could not draw back the seas, placate the winds or dim the noonday sun. But it could at least lay down the law for subsequent COPs,
decreeing that this year’s should see the first “global stocktake” of what had and had not been done to bring the agreement’s
overarching goals closer.
As the world gathers in Dubai for the 28th COP, the assessment of the first part of that stocktake is in some ways surprisingly positive. At the
time of the Paris COP, the globale warming expected by 2100 if policies did not change was more than 3℃ above pre-industrial levels. If
policies in place today are followed, central estimates put it around 2.5-2.9℃, though the uncertainties are large. That is still so high as to be
disastrous for billions. But it is also a marked improvement.
A lot of this progress has come from cheaper and more widespread renewable energy. In 2015 global installed solar capacity was 230
gigawatts; last year it was 1050GW. Better policies have spread, too. In 2014 just 12% of energy-related carbon-dioxide emissions came
under carbon-pricing schemes and the average price per tonne was $7; today 23% of greenhouse-gas emissions do, and the price is around
$32.
Those and other steps forward explain why the International Energy Agency, and intergovernmental think-tank which, at the time of Paris,
saw carbon-dioxide emissions continuing to rise into the 2040s, today says the are likely to peak within a few years. Peaking is not enough;
emissions must then fall very quickly to bring the projected warming down to just 2℃. but the almost ceaseless increase in emission has
been a fact of economic growth for two centuries. To reverse that could be seen as the end of the beginning of the fight for stable climate.
To ascribe all this progress to Paris would be daft. But the process it put in motion set new expectations; it made climate something that
countries had to talk about. And by spelling out that a stable climate needs to balance residual sources of carbon dioxide with “sinks”
which remove it from the atmosphere, it brought the idea of net-zero goals into the mainstream. One country had such a goal in 2015. Now
101 do.
In a world where the seasons themselves are increasingly out of whack--witness last week’s extraordinary springtime heatwave in
Brazil--the COPs provide a predictable annual space in the international calendar for side-agreements and new expressions of intent. A
recent statement by Joe Biden,America’s president, and his Chinese counterpart, Xi Jinping, helped build momentum for a COP-adjacent
deal on methane emissions. They also pledged their countries to do their bit in the tripling of renewable generating capacity by 2030,
another goal for which the United Arab Emirates wants its COP remembered.
None of this means that COPs have saved the world. Paris provided a context for the boom in renewable energy, but it did not provide the
investment that made it happen. The doubling of investment levels that BloombergNEF, a data outfit, sees as necessary for the proposed
tripling in capacity will have to come from the private sector. To draw it forth is not a matter of COPpery. To attract funds, countries will need
to redesign energy markets, hurry through permits, hugely improve grids and remove policies that still favour fossil fuels.
And none of this has stopped the climate from worsening. Nor could it. The main driver of global warming is the cumulative amount of
carbon dioxide in the atmosphere. For as long as net emissions continue, temperatures will rise. Since Paris, that ineluctable warming has
reached a level where it can no longer be treated as a problem of the future. This year climate change has felt particularly acute: the hottest
August on record followed the hottest July, the hottest September the hottest August, the hottest October the hottest September.
That pace will not continue forever. But the only way to stop the warming before reaching net zero it to cut the amount of sunshine the
planet absorbs, perhaps by inserting particles into the stratosphere or whitening clouds over the ocean. The idea of “solar geoengineering
alarms many climate scientists, activists and policymakers; but a number rightly see it as worth researching. That research needs an
international debate about the proper restrictions on it and the possibilities it could lead to. The incrementalist, institution-bound COPs are
not the place for those discussions. But before the next stocktake, set for 2028, some forum must be found.
Mechanisms for removing carbon dioxide fall more comfortably within COP’s remit. Like solar geoengineering, this process also concerns
many. Hearing oil companies, in particular, talking about carbon-dioxide removal as a justification for keeping production up strikes them as
likely to lead to a world where emissions continue but only a small amount of removal ever takes place. Given the industry’s history, this is
not unreasonable.
To allay such fears, countries will have to be explicit about their removal plans in the next round of “Nationally Determined
Contributions”--the proposals for further action that they have to present to each other by 2025. in order to guard against fudging,they
should also be required to keep their targets for removals and emission reduction separate.
Not just COPy and paste
This may seem a low priority compared with emissions and adaptation: removals begin to matter materially only when emissions fall far
below their peak. But at that point the scale of the removals needed will be thousands of times greater than can be achieved today. Best get
cracking. Being explicit about the fact that, eventually, polluters will be paying for the removal of their waste will both spur investment in
technologies and concentrate the world requires. But when it frames debates wisely and sets appropriate rules, it can help galvanise
progress.that is just as well, seeing how much more is needed.
Some progress, must do better
Progress on climate change has not been deep or fast enough, but it has been real
The agreement at the conference of the parties(COP) to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, which took place in Paris in
2015, was somewhat impotent. As many pointed out at the time, it could not tell countries what to do; it could not end the fossil-fuel age by
fiat; it could not draw back the seas, placate the winds or dime the noonday sun. But it could at least lay down the law for subsequent COPs,
decreeing that this year’s should see the first “global stocktake” of what had and had not been done to bring the agreement’s
overarching goals closer.
As the world gathers in Dubai for the 28th COP, the assessment of the first part of that stocktake is in some ways surprisingly positive. At the
time of the Paris COP, the global warming expected by 2100 if policies did not change was more than 3℃ above pre-industrial levels. If
policies in place today are followed, central estimates put it around 2.5-2.9℃, though the uncertainties are large. That is still so high as to be
disastrous for billions. But it is also a marked improvement.
A lot of this progress has come from cheaper and more widespread renewable energy. In 2015 global installed solar capacity was 230
gigawatts; last year it was 1050 GW. Better policies have spread, too. In 2014 just 12% of energy-related carbon-dioxide emissions came
under carbon-pricing schemes and the average price per tonne was $7; toady 23% of greenhouse-gas emissions do, and the price is around
$32.
Those and other steps forward explain why the International Energy Agency, an intergovernmental think-tank which, at the time of Paris,
saw carbon-dioxide emissions continuing to rise into the 2040s, today says they are likely to peak within a few years. Peaking is not
enough;emissions must then fall very quickly to bring the projected warming down to just 2℃. but the almost ceaseless increase in
emissions has been a fact of economic growth for two centuries. To reverse that could be seen as the end of the beginning of the fight for a
stable climate.
To ascribe all this progress to Paris would be daft. But the process it put in motion set new expectations; it made climate something that
countries had to talk about. And by spelling out that a stable climate needs to balance residual sources of carbon dioxide with “sinks”
which remove it from the atmosphere, it brought the idea of net-zero goals into the mainstream. One country had such a goal in 2015. Now
101 do.
In a world where the seasons themselves are increasingly out of whack--witness last week’s extraordinary springtime heatwave in
Brazil--the COPs provide a predictable annual space in the international calendar for side-agreements and new expressions of intent. A
recent statement by Joe Biden, America’s president, his Chinese counterpart, Xi Jinping, helped build momentum for a COP-adjacent deal
on methane emissions. They also pledged their countries to do their bit in the tripling of renewable generating capacity by 2030, another
goal for which the United Arab Emirates want its COP remembered.
None of this means that COPs have saved the world. Paris provided a context for the boom in renewable energy, but it did not provide the
investment that made it happen. The doubling of investment levels that BloombergNEF, a data outfit, sees as necessary for the proposed
tripling in capacity will have to come from the private sector. To draw it forth is not a matter of COPpery. To attract funds, countries will need
to redesign energy markets, hurry through permits, hugely improve grids and remove policies that still favour fossil fuels.
And none of this has stopped the climate from worsening. Nor could it. The main driver of global warming is the cumulative amount of
carbon dioxide in the atmosphere. For as long as net emissions continue, temperatures will rise. Since Paris, that ineluctable warming has
reached a level where it can no longer be treated as a problem of the future. This year climate change has felt particularly acute: the hottest
August on record followed the hottest July, the hottest September the hottest August, the hottest October the hottest September.
Tat pace will not continue for ever. But the only way to stop the warming before reaching net zero is to cut the amount of sunshine the
planet absorbs, perhaps by inserting particles into the stratosphere or whitening clouds over the ocean. The idea of “solar geoengineering
alarms many climate scientists, activists and policymakers; but a number rightly see it as worth researching. That research needs an
international debate about the proper restrictions on it and the possibilities it could lead to. The incrementalist, institution-bound COPs are
not the place for those discussions. But before the next stocktake,set for 2028, some forum must be found.
Mechanisms for removing carbon dioxide fall more comfortable within COP’s remit. Like solar geoengineering, this process also concerns
many. Hearing oil companies, in particular, talking about carbon-dioxide removal as a justification for keeping production up strikes them as
likely to lead to a world where emissions continue but only a small amount of removal ever takes place. Given the industry’s history, this is
not unreasonable.
To allay such fears, countries will have to explicit about the removal plans in the next round of “Nationally Determined
Contributions”--the proposals for further action that they have to present to each other by 2025. in order to guard against fudging, they
should also be required to keep their targets for removals and emissions reduction separate.
Not just COPy and paste
This may seem a low priority compared with emissions and adaptation: removals begin to matter materially only when emissions fall far
below their peak. But at that point the scale of the removals needed will be thousands of times greater than can be achieved today. Best get
cracking. Being explicit about the fact that, eventually, polluters will be paying for the removal of their waste will both spur investment in
technologies and concentrate the minds of emitters. Again, a UN process cannot force that changes the world required. But when it frames
debates wisely and sets appropriate rules, it can help galvanise progress. That it just as well, seeing how much more is needed.
Some progress, must do better
Progress on climate change has not been deep or fast enough, but it has been real
The agreement at the conference of the parties(COP) to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, which took place in Paris in
2015, was somewhat impotent. As many pointed out at the time, it could not tell countries what to do; it could not end the fossil-fuel age by
fiat; it could not draw back the seas, placate the winds or dim the noonday sun. But it could at least lay down the law for subsequent COPs,
decreeing that this year’s should see the first “global stocktake” of what had and had not been done to bring the agreement’s
overarching goals closer.
As the world gathers in Dubai for the 28th COP, the assessment of the first part of that stocktake is in some ways surprisingly positive. At the
time of the Paris COP, the global warming expected by 2100 if policies did not change was more than 3℃ above pre-industrial level. If
policies in place today are followed, central estimates put it around 2.5-2.9℃, though the uncertainties are large. That is still so high as to be
disastrous for billions. But it is also a marked improvement.
A lot of this progress has come from cheaper and more widespread renewable energy. In 2015 global installed solar capacity was 230
gigawatts; last year it was 1050GW. Better policies have spread, too. In 2014 just 12% of energy-related carbon-dioxide emissions came
under carbon-pricing schemes and the average price per tonne was $7; toady 23% of greenhouse-gas emissions do, and the price is around
$32.
Those and other steps forward explain why the international Energy Agency, an intergovernmental think-tank which, at the time of Paris,
saw carbon-dioxide emissions continuing to rise into the 2040s, today says they are likely to peak within a few years. Peaking is not enough;
emissions must then fall very quickly to bring the projected warming down to just 2℃. but the almost ceaseless increase in emissions has
been a fact of economic growth for two centuries. To reverse that could be seen as the end of the beginning of the fight for a stable climate.
To ascribe all this progress to Paris would be daft. But the process it put in motion set new expectations; it made climate something that
countries had to talk about. And by spelling out that a stable climate needs to balance residual sources of carbon dioxide with “sink”
which remove it from the atmosphere, it brought the idea of net-zero goals into the mainstream. One country has such a goal in 2015. Now
101 do.
In a world where the seasons themselves are increasingly out of whack--witness last week’s extraordinary springtime heatwave in
Brazil--the COPs provide a predictable annual space in the international calendar for side-agreements and new expressions of intent. A
recent statement by Joe Biden, America’s president, and his Chinese counterpart, Xi Jinping, helped build momentum for a COP adjacent
deal on methane emissions. They also pledged their countries to do their bit in the tripling of renewable generating capacity by 2030,
another goal for which the United Arab Emirates wants its COP remembered.
None of this means that COPs have saved the world. Paris provided a context for the boom in renewable energy, but it did not provide the
investment that made it happen. The doubling of investment levels that BloombergNEF, a data outfit, sees as necessary for the proposed
tripling in capacity will have to come from the private sector. To draw it forth is not a matter of COPpery. To attract funds, counties will need
to redesign energy markets, hurry through permits, hugely improve grids and remove policies that still favour fossil fuels.
And none of this has stopped the climate from worsening. Nor could it. The main driver of global warming is the cumulative amount of
carbon dioxide in atmosphere. For as long as net emissions continue, temperatures will rise. Since Paris, that ineluctable warming has
reached a level where it can no longer be treated as a problem of the future. This year climate change has felt particularly acute: the hottest
august on record followed the hottest July, the hottest September the hottest August, the hottest October the hottest September.
That pace will not continue for ever. But the only way to stop the warming before reaching net zero is to cut the amount of sunshine the
planet absorbs, perhaps by inserting particles into the stratosphere or whitening clouds over the ocean. The idea of “solar geoengineering
alarms many climate Scientists, activists and policymakers; but a number rightly see it as worth researching. That research needs an
international debate about the proper restrictions on it and the possibilities it could lead to. The incrementalist, institution-bound COPs are
not the place for those discussions. But before the next stocktake, set for 2028, some forum must be found.
Mechanisms for removing carbon dioxide fall more comfortably within COP’s remit. Like solar geoengineering, this process also concerns
many. Hearing oil companies, in particular, talking about carbon-dioxide removal as a justification for keeping production up strikes them as
likely to lead to a world where emissions continue but only a small amount of removal ever takes place. Given the industry’s history, this is
not unreasonable.
To allay such fears, countries will have to be explicit about their removal plans in the next round of “Nationally Determined
Contributions”--the proposals for further action that they have to present to each other by 2025. in order to guard against fudging, they
should also be required to keep their targets for removals and emission reduction separate.
Not just COPy and paste
This may seem a low priority compared with emissions and adaptation: removals begin to matter materially only when emissions fall far
below their peak. But at that point the scale of the removals needed will be thousands of times greater than can be achieved today. Best get
cracking. Being explicit about the fact that, eventually, polluters will be paying for the removal of their waste will both spur investment in
technologies and concentrate the minds of emitters. Again,a UN process cannot force the changes the world requires. But when it frames
debates wisely and sets appropriate rules, it can help galvanise progress. That is just as well, seeing how much more is needed.
Blue-collar bonanza
The conventional view that inequality is rising inexorably is wrong
Few ideas are more unshakable than the notion that the rich keep getting richer while ordinary folks fall ever further behind. The belief that
capitalism is rigged to benefit the wealthy and punish the workers had shaped how millions view the world, whom they vote for and whom
they shake their fists at. It has been a spur to political projects on both left and right, from the interventionism of Joe Biden to the populism
of Donald Trump. But is it true?
Even as the suspicion of free markets has hardened, evidence for the argument that inequality is rising in the rich world has become flimsier.
Wage gaps are shrinking. Since 2016 real weekly earnings for those at the bottom of America’s pay distribution have grown faster than
those at the top. Since the coivd-19 pandemic this wage compression has gone into overdrive; according to one estimate, it has been
enough to reverse an extraordinary 40% of the pre-tax wage inequality that emerged during the previous 40 years. A blue-collar bonanza is
under way.
Across the Atlantic, such trends are more nascent, but still apparent. In Britain wage growth has been healthier at the bottom of the jobs
market; in continental Europe wage agreements are building in higher increases for the lower paid. Long-running trends in inequality are
being questioned, too. A decade ago Thomas Piketty, a French economist, became a household name by arguing that it has surged. Now
increasing weight is being given to research which funds that, after taxes and government transfers, American income inequality has barely
increased since the 1960s.
All this can be discombobulating, not least when the prices you pay for food and energy have risen at an unusually fast pace. So ingrained is
the idea that workers are suffering in today’s world that claiming otherwise is almost heretical; the dissenting inequality research has
sparked an ill-tempered debate among economists.
To understand what is going on, it helps to consider that the blue-collar bonanza is not just an artefact of the statistics: it makes intuitive
sense, too. As we explain this week, three forces that shape labour markets--demand, demography and digitisation--have each shifted in
ways that benefit workers.
Take demand. After quiescent inflation in the mid-2010s, America’s Federal Reserve resolved to run the economy hot in the hope that
doing so would bring more people into work. Then after covid-19 struck, governments across the rich world untied the purse-strings. This
year the pandemic is a memory, but America has continued to run deficits of a size usually seen in depressions or wartime. As a
consequence, demand for labour has stayed high even as central banks have raised interest rates.
That higher demand has met with constrained supply. Owing to shifts in demography. In 2015 a long-running global demographic dividend
came to an end as China’s working-age population is growing at its slowest pace on record, and will probably start falling by the end of
the decade. That adds to the tightness in labour markets. The unemployment rate across the rich world, at less than 5%, is at historical lows
and the working-age employment rate in more than half of OECD countries is running close to an all-time high. As populations shrink, the
workforce gaps are likely to become so wide that it is hard to imagine politicians letting in enough immigrants to fill them.
Shifts in digitisation, meanwhile, have changed who stands to benefit most in today’s labour market. At the end of 20th century the
information revolution vastly increased the demand for college graduates with brains and computing kills. From wall Street to Walmart
these stars were put to work transforming how firms dis business, making use of new tools including email and spreadsheets.
By the mid-2010s, however, the revolution had matured and the college wage premium began to shrink. In 2015 the average rich-world
worder with a bachelor’s degree or more was paid two-thirds more than the average high-school leaver; four years later, the gap had
narrowed to a half. According to one estimate, the college premium for white graduates born in America in the 1980s has been lower than
that enjoyed by those born in any of the preceding five decades.
Generative artificial intelligence looks likely to reinforce this equalising trend. Early research suggests that AI bots provide a bigger
productivity boost for lower performers, helping the laggards catch up with the vanguard. And until robotics matures, AI may add to the
value of the sorts of tasks that only humans can do, such as manual labour, or providing emotional support.
This golden age is still young--and it may be vulnerable. One danger is that recession strikes, cooling demand for workers. On both sides of
the Atlantic labour markets have shown signs of softening. In a downturn the least paid tend to suffer most. Another threat is that
governments kill it off. Mr Biden’s industrial policy came too recently to a account for the blue-collar bonanza. In fact, plentiful
opportunities and rising pay make it wasteful to spend taxpayer cash promoting manufacturing jobs. Protection and handouts stand to
make the economy less productive and more sclerotic, meaning less of a bounty for all.
Blue-sky thinking
If the blue-collar age endures, the effect will be profound. The idea that capitalism fails workers is so pervasive that it may explain why
people consistently tell pollsters they are unhappy about the state of the economy-even as they themselves continue to spend freely and to
benefit from low unemployment. The idea has shaped view on everything from the dangers of immigration and low-cost manufacturers, to
the desirability of more handouts and higher tariffs.
The bonanza for workers, though, show governments need not shackle markets for workers to do well--and that the best route to
prosperity for all is to increase the size of the economic pie. If you fight too much over distribution, you risk bringing the golden age to a
premature end.
Blue-collar bonanza
The conventional view that inequality is rising inexorably is wrong
Few ideas are more unshakable than the notion that the rich keep getting richer while ordinary folks fall ever further behind. The belief that
capitalism is rigged to benefit the wealthy and punish the workers has shaped how millions view the world, whom they vote for and whom
they shake their fists at. It has been a spur to political projects on both left and right, from the interventionism of Joe Biden to the populism
of Donald Trump. But is it true?
Even as the suspicion of free markets has hardened, evidence for the argument that inequality is rising in the rich world has become flimsier.
Wage gaps are shrinking. Since 2016 real weekly earnings for those at the bottom of America’s pay distribution have grown faster than
those at the top. Since the covid-19 pandemic this wage compression has gone into overdrive; according to one estimate, it has been
enough to reverse an extraordinary 40% of the pre-tax wage inequality that emerged during the previous 40 years. A blue collar bonanza is
under way.
Across the Atlantic, such trends are more nascent, but still apparent. In Britain wage growth has been healthier at the bottom of the jobs
market; in continental Europe wage agreements are building in higher increases for the lower paid. Long-running trends in inequality are
being questioned, too. A decade ago Thomas Piketty, a French economist, became a household name by arguing that it had surged. Now
increasing weight is being given to research which finds that, after taxes and government transfers, American income inequality has barely
increased since the 1960s.
All this can be discombobulating, not least when the prices you pay for food and energy have risen at an unusually fast pace. So ingrained is
the idea that workers are suffering in today’s world that claiming otherwise is almost heretical; the dissenting inequality research has
sparked an ill-tempered debate among economists.
To understand what is going on, it helps to consider that the blue-collar bonanza is not just an artefact of the statistics: it makes intuitive
sense, too. As we explain this week, three forces that shape labour markets--demand,demography and digitisation--have each shifted in
ways that benefit workers.
Take demand. After quiescent inflation in the mid-2010s, America’s Federal reserve resolved to run the economy hot in the hope that
doing so would bring more people into work. Then after covid-19 struck, governments across the rich world untied the purse-strings.this
year the pandemic is a memory, but America has continued to run deficits of a size usually seen in depressions or wartime. As a
consequence, demand for labour has stayed high even as central banks have raised interest rates.
That higher demand has met with constrained supply, owing to shifts in demography. In 2015 a long-running global demographic dividend
came to an end as China’s working-age population is growing at its slowest pace on record, and will probably start falling by the end of
the decade. That adds to the tightness in labour markets. The unemployment rate across the rich world, at less than 5%, is at historical lows
and the working-age employment rate in more than half of OECD countries is running close to an all-time high. As populations shrink, the
workforce gaps are likely to become so wide that it is hard to imagine politicians letting in enough immigrants to fill them.
Shifts in digitisation, meanwhile, have changed who stands to benefit most in today’s labour market. At the end of the 20th century the
information revolution vastly increased the demand for college graduates with brains and computing skill. From Wall Street to Walmart
these stars were put to work transforming how firms did business, making use of new tools including email and spreadsheets.
By the mid-2010s, however, the revolution had matured and the college wage premium began to shrink. In 2015 the average rich-world
worker with a bachelor’s degree or more was paid two-thirds more than the average high-school leaver; four years later, the gap had
narrowed to a half. According to one estimate, the college premium for white graduates born in America in the 1980s had been lower than
that enjoyed by those born in any of the preceding five decades.
Generative artificial intelligence looks likely to reinforce this equalising trend. Early research suggests that AI bots provide a bigger
productivity boost for lower performers, helping the laggards catch up with the vanguard. And until robotics matures, AI may add to the
vlue of the sorts of tasks that only humans can do, such as manual labour, or providing emotional support.
This golden age is still young--and it may be vulnerable. One danger is that recession strikes, cooling demand for workers. On both sides of
the Atlantic labour markets have shown signs of softening. In a downturn the least paid tend to suffer most. Another threat is that
governments kill it off. Mr Biden’s industrial policy came too recently to account for the blue-collar bonanza. In fact, plentiful opportunities
and rising pay make it wasteful to spend taxpayer cash promoting manufacturing jobs. Protection and handouts stand to make the
economy less productive and more sclerotic, meaning less of a bounty for all.
Blue-sky thinking
If the blue-collar age endures, the effect will be profound. The idea that capitalism fails workers is so pervasive that it may explain why
people consistently tell pollsters they re unhappy about the state of the economy--even as they themselves continue to spend freely and to
benefit from low unemployment. The idea has shaped views on everything from the dangers of immigration and low-cost manufacturers, to
the desirability of more handouts and higher tariffs.
The bonanza for workers, though, shows governments need not shackle markets for workers to do well--and that the best route to
prosperity for all is to increase the size of the economic pie. If you fight too much over distribution, you risk bringing the golden age to a
premature end.
Blue-collar bonanza
The conventional view that inequality is rising inexorably is wrong
Few ideas are more unshakable than the notion that the rich keep getting richer while ordinary folks fall ever further behind. The belief that
capitalism is rigged to benefit the wealthy and punish the workers has shaped how millions view the world, whom they vote for and whom
they shake fist at. It has been a spur to political projects on both left and right, from the interventionism of Joe Biden to the populism of
Donald Trump. But is it true?
Even as the suspicion of free markets has hardened, evidence for the argument that inequality is rising in the rich world has become flimsier.
Wage gaps are shrinking. Since 2016 real weekly earnings for those the bottom of America’s pay distribution have grown faster than those
at the top. Since the covid-19 pandemic this wage compression has gone into overdrive; according to one estimate, it has been enough to
reverse an extraordinary 40% of the pre-tax wage inequality that emerged during the previous 40 years. A blue-collar bonanza is under way.
Across the Atlantic, such trends are more nascent, but still apparent. In Britain wage growth has been healthier at the bottom of the jobs
market; in continental Europe wage agreements are building in higher increases for the lower paid. Long-running trends in inequality are
being questioned, too. A decade ago Thomas Piketty, a French economist, became a household name by arguing that it had surged. Now
increasing weight is being given to research which finds that, after taxes and government transfers, American income inequality has barely
increased since the 1960s.
All this can be discombobulating, not least when the prices you pay for food and energy have risen at an unusually fast pace. So in today’s
world that claiming otherwise is almost heretical; the dissenting inequality research has sparked an ill-tempered debate among economists.
To understand what is going on, it helps to consider that the blue-collar bonanza is not just an artefact of the statistics: it makes intuitive
sense, too. As we explain this week, three forces that shape labour markets--demand, demography and digitisation--have each shifted in
ways that benefit workers.
Take demand. After quiescent inflation in the mid-2010s, America’s Federal Reserve resolved to run the economy hot in the hope that
doing so would bring more people into work. Then, after covid-19 struck, governments across the rich world united the purse-strings. This
year the pandemic is a memory, but America has continued to run deficits of a size usually seen in depressions or wartime. As a
consequence, demand for labour has stayed high even as central banks have raised interest rates.
That higher demand has met with constrained supply, owing to shifts in demography. In 2015, a long-running global demographic dividend
came to an end as China’s working-age population peaked. In the rich world the prime working-age population is growing at its slowest
pace on record, and will probably start falling by the end of the decade. That adds to the tightness in labour markets. The unemployment
rate across the rich world, at less than 5%, is at historical lows and the working-age employment rate in more than half of OECD countries is
running close to an all-time high. As populations shrink, the workforce gaps are likely to become so wide that it is hard to imagine
politicians letting in enough immigrants to fill them.
Shifts in digitisation, meanwhile, have changed who stands to benefit most in today’s labour market. At the end of the 20th century the
information revolution vastly increased the demand for college graduates with brains and computing skills. From Wall Street to Walmart
these stars were put to work transforming how firms dis business, making use of new tools including email and spreadsheet.
By the mid-2010s, however, the revolution had matured and the college wage premium began to shrink. In 2015 the average rich-world
worker with a bachelor’s degree or more was paid two-thirds more than the average high-school leaver; four years later, the gap had
narrowed to a half. According to one estimate, the college premium for white graduates born in America in the 1980s has been lower than
that enjoyed by those born in any of the preceding five decades.
Generative artificial intelligence looks likely to reinforce this equalising trend. Early research suggests that AI bots provide a bigger
productivity boost for lower performers, helping the laggards catch up with the vanguard. And until robotics matures, AI may add to the
value of the sorts of tasks that only humans can do, such as manual labour, or providing emotional support.
This golden age is still young--and it may be vulnerable. One danger is that recession strikes, cooling demand for workers. On both sides of
the Atlantic labour markets have shown signs of softening. In a downturn the least paid tend to suffer most. Another threat is that
governments kill it off. Mr Biden’s industrial policy came to recently to account for the blue-collar bonanza. In fact, plentiful opportunities
and rising pay make it wasteful to spend tax-payer cash promoting manufacturing jobs. Protection and handouts stand to make the
economy less productive and more sclerotic, meaning less of a bounty for all.
Blue-sky thinking
If the blue-collar age endures, the effect will be profound. The idea that capitalism fails workers is so pervasive that it may explain why
people consistently tell pollsters they are unhappy about the state of the economy--even as they themselves continue to spend freely and
to benefit from low unemployment. The idea has shaped views on everything from the dangers of immigration and low-cost manufacturers,
to the desirability of more handouts and higher tariffs.
The bonanza for workers, though, shows governments need not shackle markets for workers to do well--and that the best route to
prosperity for all is to increase the size of the economic pie. If you fight too much over distribution, you risk bringing the golden age to a
premature end.
How peace is possible?
Do not dwell on the many ways a peace process can go wrong, but on bolstering the real possibility that it goes right.
If you want to understand how desperately Israelis and Palestinians need peace, consider what would become of them in a state of
perpetual war. Against a vastly superior Israeli army, the Palestinians’ most powerful weapon would remain the death and suffering of their
own people. Israel’s fate would be woeful, too, if it wants to be a flourishing, modern democracy. If Israel permanently replies on its army
to subjugate the Palestinians, it would become an apartheid-enforcing pariah. Israelis carrying out daily acts of oppression punctuated by
rounds of killing would themselves be corrupted. For two peoples locked in a violent embrace, peace is the only deliverance.
But how to get there? Israelis are still reeling from the rape and murder of October 7 th; Palestinians are watching the mangled bodies of
women and children pile up in Gaza. Amid the carnage, outsiders’ urging of peace seems naive. Besides, jaded Palestinians and Israelis see
endless talks as a mechanism for delaying peace, not forging it. Negotiators in the past have thrashed out almost every imaginable
permutation of land swaps and security arrangements. All failed.
And yet something changed after October 7th. Israels strategy of marginalising the Palestinians and their dreams is broken. Both sides have
a chance to find new leaders with a new vision. And after years of neglect, outsiders may be ready to help,crucially including a group of Arab
countries. They must not fall into the rap of thinking that peace requires sweating the detail yet again. Success depends on the two sides
wanting peace and--much harder--believing in it.
If the fighting is to make any sense it must lead to peace, which means two nations living side by side. Israel’s bombardment has killed
over 16,ooo Palestinians, including Hamas fighters. Although some Palestinians have been radicalised by that and the daily humiliations for
occupation, many detest Hamas and its unwinnable wars and would live with Israel if they could proper. So long as the men with guns do
not get in their way, those people will week peace. Israel, too, needs a new strategy. The old one failed to fulfil the state’s basic promise to
create a land safe for Jews; 1,400 people were killed or kidnapped by Hamas, hundreds of thousands more have been evacuated.
Peace also requires new leaders, because the present ones are discredited. In Israel Binyamin Netanyahu is an obstacle to a genuine
reconciliation, the sooner he goes the better. America could usefully signal that it expects Israel to hold elections soon. Polls suggest that he
will be replaced by Benny Gantz, a former general who understands the toll of war. Mr Gantz has not endorsed a Palestinian state, but
neither has the ruled one out.
New Palestinian leadership is needed, too. Hamas is an avowed enemy of peace: for as long as it runs Gaza, Palestinian pledges to embrace
peace will not be believable. On the West Bank, Mahmoud Abbas, who runs the Palestinian Authority(PA), is corrupt, ossified and lacks any
democratic legitimacy. Amid the rubble of war, Gaza will need time to rebuild and re-establish some kind of stable administration. Moderate
Arab countries should sponsor a transitional Palestinian leadership for the West Bank and Gaza that can begin building trust among its own
people and, vitally, with the Israelis, before holding elections. By running both Gaza and the West Bank, it would become a more credible
partner for peace.
That leads to the process. The Oslo accords, marked in 1993 with a wary handshake on the White House lawn, left the hardest details until
last. Every inch of progress had to be wrung out of the two sides. This sapped belief that success was possible.
A new process must make early progress. Both sides will have to take on their own extremists, who would sabotage coexistence. The PA
must shut down armed groups, foil terrorists and tackle corruption. Boosting the economy demands numerous agreements with Israel over
trade, utilities and work permits. Palestinians need to know they are gaining freedoms and rights.
Lad swaps can wait, but Israel should deal with the settlements too deep in the West Bank ever to be part of Israel. It must start policing
them and stop them from expanding further. It needs to be clear that the 100,000 or so settlers who live in them will eventually have to
move or come under Palestinian rule.
This is too hard for the Israelis and Palestinians to do on their own, so the outside world must be involved. Under Oslo, America was the
sponsor, but it struggled to exert pressure on Israel, which can muster formidable support in Congress.
This time, the Arab world should play a decisive role. Under the Abraham accords, negotiated during the Trump administration, several
countries recognised Israel. That was part of a vision for the Middle East based around trade and prosperity rather than ideology. Their
money will be required to rebuild Gaza. Their soldiers can help provide security when Israel leaves the strip, which should happen as early as
possible. If they work together, they can starve Hamas of money and shelter, diverting funds to reconstruction instead. Their heft can give a
transitional Palestinian leader diplomatic cover while he establishes himself and his administration.
The key is early pressure exerted by America and Saudi Arabia on Israel and the Palestinians. The PA argues that peace could be kick-started
if America and the European Union sent Israel a signal by recognising a Palestinian state upfront--and idea endorsed by Spain, which holds
the EU presidency. America should fulfill its promise to open a diplomatic mission for the Palestinians in Jerusalem. But full recognition of
Palestine by the West and of Israel by Saudi Arabia should be held out as rewards for the future, as an incentive for progress.
Time for that is short. Israel’s anti-Palestinian right will remain strong. Once this government falls, then next may have only the PA a new
leader will face enemies who got fat under toady’s rotten system. Whatever remains of Hamas will seek to wreck peace, as will Iran and its
proxies, who thrive on chaos and strife. The Biden administration may be willing to press Israel; a Trump administration might not. If
permanent war is not to ruin two nations, Israelis, Palestinians and all who cherish them must seize the moment.
The media and the message
Next year’s election in America will test whether a healthy democracy needs a common set of facts
Journalists should not spend much of their time writing about journalism. The world is more interesting than the inky habits of the people
who report on it. but this week we are making an exception, because the discovery and dissemination of information matters a lot to
politics. Don’t take our word for it: “A popular government,” wrote James Madison in 1822, “without popular information, or the means
of acquiring it, is but a prologue to a farce or a tragedy; or, perhaps both.” were Thomas Jefferson offered a choice between a government
without newspapers without a government, he said that he would choose the press( though that is probably going a bit far).
As the turmoil at America’s elite universities over antisemitism shows, creating a political culture in which people can argue constructively,
disagree and compromise is not something that happens spontaneously. In media, business models, technology and culture can work
together to create those conditions. They can also pull in the opposite direction. Our analysis of over 600,000 pieces of written and
television journalism shows that the language of the mainstream American media has drifted away from the political centre, towards the
Democratic Party’s preferred terminology and topics. That could lower the media’s credibility among conservatives.
As the country braces for next year’s election, it is worth thinking about the internal forces that deepened this rift. You can take comfort
from the fact that the industry has been buffeted time and again during its long history, yet somehow survived. The worry is that today’s
lurch may prove worse than any before.
One of those forces is technological disruption. From printing to the mobile web, new media tend to disrupt authority. That is good news if
you live in an autocracy. In America, though, technologies have often brought trouble. Father Charles Coughlin, a pioneering demagogue in
the 1930s, used radio to reach a mass audience before Republicans and Democrats got the hang of it. Cable news helped foment a
revolution in the Republican Party. It is hard to see how Donald Trump could have become the party’s nominee in 2016 without the ability
to speak directly to tens of millions of Americans in messages of 140 characters. Artificial intelligence will up-end media once again, for
good or ill. It may feed mind-scrambling fakery to anyone who hankers after conspiracy. But, for anyone who wishes to know what is really
going on, AI may put a great premium on filtering out the nonsense.
Disruption powers fragmentation. The American media have passed through narrowcast ages and broadcast ages. In Madison’s and
Jefferson’s day, narrowcasting was the norm: small-circulation partisan journals spoke to different factions of a small elite. Later the spread
of the telegraph and the penny press created mass media. Narrow partisanship was no longer good business. Advertisers wanted to reach
as many people as possible and scarce electromagnetic spectrum, which limited the numbers of radio and television stations, led to a
system of regulation. All that favoured objectivity: journalists should try to put their opinions aside and stick to the facts.
Today, however, the smartphone has caused fragmentation and American media are back in a narrowcast age. As much of the advertising
revenue that once paid for reporters has flowed to Google and Meta, this has created new business models. There is a lot to like about the
subscription-based outfits that now rule: what better test of the quality of the work than whether people will pay for it? But such businesses
can also be built on pandering to people’s prejudices. Tucker Carlson was fired from Fox News only to create a new venture as
subs-based, one-man broadcast company. This is closer to a business model the Founding Fathers would have recognised, but rather than
creating content for curly wigged merchants steeped in 18th- century learning, he wants to tear down such Enlightenment values.
This is not just happening on the fringes. Our package this week also contains an essay by James Bennet, our Lexington columnist, a former
editorial-page editor of the New York Times who was fired for publishing a piece by a Republican senator that sparked a newsroom revolt.
He argues that the Times increasingly affirms its readers’ leftish bias even as it reassures them that it is independent. Unlike the right-wing
media, the mainstream lot do not routinely peddle falsehoods or conspiracy theories. But their bias undermines their ability to put the
record straight. They used to be like the best public broadcasters in other Western democracies, establishing common facts and setting the
boundaries for debate; today, less so.
Why does this matter? Although most Americans do not regularly read a newspaper or watch cable news, elites matter in democracies.
When different political camps exist in separate information universes, they tend to demonise each other. If you are told Joe Biden is in the
grip of a cabal of antisemitic socialists, then voting for Mr Trump makes perfect sense. If Trump supporters are anti-democratic racists, why
bother trying to win them over? As a result, the parties will find it even harder to reach the compromises that are essential for sustained
good government. If the elites cannot see the world as it is, they will make bad decisions.
As swell as being a problem for politics and journalism, this is also a threat to core liberal ideas: that arguments need to be strength-tested,
that insights can be found in unusual places and that encountering opposing views and uncomfortable facts is usually a good thing. These
ideas will be challenged by news-rooms that see “objectivity” as a sleight of hand which privileged groups use to embed their own power.
Old-style liberals may have go adapt to AI-powered business models that reward those who tell people everything they already think is true
is is true.
Breaking news
America progressed from narrowcast media and a limited franchise in the early days of the republic to broadcast media and universal
suffrage. It has never had narrowcast media and universal suffrage at the same time. As a newspaper founded to promote classical
liberalism, the Economist would like to think they can coexist happily. Next year’s election will be the test.
The media and the message
Next year’s election in America will test whether a healthy democracy needs a common set of facts
Journalists should not spend much of their time writing about journalism. The world is more interesting than the inky habits of the people
who report on it. But this week we are making an exception, because the discovery and dissemination of information matters of a lot of
politics. Don’t take our word for it: “a popular government”, wrote James Madison in 1822, “without popular information, or the means
of acquiring it, is but a prologue to a farce or tragedy; or, perhaps both”.were Thomas Jefferson offered a choice between a government
without newspapers and newspapers without a government, he said that he would choose the press( though that is probably going a bit
far).
As the turmoil at America’s elite universities over antisemitism shows, creating a political culture in which people can argue constructively,
disagree and compromise if not something that happens spontaneously. In media, business models, technology and culture can work
together to create those conditions. They can also pull in the opposite direction. Out analysis of over 600,000 pieces of written and
television journalism shows that the language of the mainstream America media has drifted away from the political centre, towards the
Democratic Party’s preferred terminology and topics. That could lower the media’s credibility among conservatives.
As the country braces for next year’s election, it is worth thinking about the internal forces that deepened this rift. You can take comfort
from the fact that the industry has been buffeted time and again during its long history, yet somehow survived. The worry is that today’s
lurch may prove worse than any before.
One of those forces is technological disruption. From printing to the mobile web, new media tend to disrupt authority. That is good news if
you live in an autocracy. In America, though, technologies have often brought trouble. Father Charles Coughlin, a pioneering demagogue in
the 1930s, used radio to reach a mass audience before Republicans and Democrats got the hang of it. Cable news helped foment a
revolution in Republican Party. It is hard to see how Donald Trump could have become the party’s nominee in 2016 without the ability to
speak directly to tens of millions of Americans in messages of 140 characters. Artificial intelligence will up-end media once again, for good
or ill. It may feed mind-scrambling fakery to anyone who hankers after conspiracy. But for anyone who wishes to know what is really going
on, AI may put a greater premium on filtering out the nonsense.
Disruption powers fragmentation. The American media have passed through narrowcast ages and broadcast ages. In Madison’s and
Jefferson’s day, narrowcasting was the norm: small circulation partisan journals spoke to different factions of a small elite. Later, the spread
of the telegraph and the penny press created mass media. Narrow partisanship was no longer good business. Advertisers wanted to reach
as many people as possible and scarce electromagnetic spectrum, which limited the numbers of radio and television stations, led to a
system of regulation. All that favoured objectivity: journalists should try to put their opinions aside and stick to the facts.
Today, however, the smartphone has caused fragmentation and American media are back in a narrowcast age. As much of the advertising
revenue that once paid for reporters has flowed to Google and Meta, this has created new business models. There is a lot to like about the
subscription-based outfits that now rule: what better test of the quality of the work than whether people will pay for it? But such businesses
can also be built on pandering to people’s prejudices. Tucker Carlson was fired from FoxNews only to create a new venture as a subs-based
one-man broadcast company. This is closer to a business model the Founding Fathers would have recognised, but rather than creating
content for curly-wigged merchants steeped in 18th-century learning, he wants to tear down such Enlightenment values.
This is not just happening on the fringes. Our package this week also contains an essay by James Bennet, out Lexington columnist, a former
editorial-page editor of the New York Times who was fired for publishing a piece by a Republican senator that sparked a newsroom revolt.
He argues that the Times increasingly affirms its readers’ leftish bias even as it reassures them that it is independent. Unlike the right-wing
media, the mainstream lot do not routinely peddle falsehoods or conspiracy theories. But their bias undermines their ability to put the
record straight. They used to be like the best public broadcasters in other Western democracies, establishing common facts and setting the
boundaries for debate; today, less so.
Why does this matter? Although most Americans do not regularly read a newspaper or watch cable news, elites matter in democracies when
different political camps exist in separate information universes, they tend to demonise each other. If you are told Joe Biden is in the grip of
a cabal of antisemitic socialists, then voting for Mr Trump makes perfect sense. If Trump supporters are anti-democratic racists, why bother
trying to win them over? As a result the parties will find it even harder to reach the compromises that are essential for sustained good
government. If the elites cannot see the world as it is, they will make bad decisions.
As well as being a problem for politics and journalism, this is also a threat to core liberal ideas: that arguments need to be strength-tested,
that insights can be found in unusual places and that encountering opposing views and uncomfortable facts is usually a good thing. These
ideas will be challenged by newsrooms that see”objectivity” as a sleight of hand which privileged groups use to embed their own power.
Old-style liberals may have to adapt to AI-powered business models that reward those who tell people everything they already think is true
is true.
Breaking news
America progressed from narrowcast media and a limited franchise in the early days of the republic to broadcast media and universal
suffrage. It has never has narrowcast media and universal suffrage at the same time. As a newspaper founded to promote classical liberalism
the Economist would like to think they can coexist happily. Next year’s election will be the test.
The media and the message
Next year’s election in America will test whether a healthy democracy needs a common set of facts
Journalists should not spend much of their time writing about journalism. The world is more interesting than the inky habits of the people
who report on it. But this week we are making an exception, because the discovery and dissemination of information matters a lot to politics
Don’t take our word for it: “A popular government,” wrote James Madison in 1822, “without popular information, or the means of
acquiring it, is but a prologue to a farce or a tragedy; or, perhaps both.” were Thomas Jefferson offered a choice between a government
without newspapers and newspapers without a government, he said that he would choose the press (though that is probably going a bit
far).
As the turmoil at America at America’s elite universities over antisemitism shows, creating a political culture in which people can argue
constructively, disagree and compromise is not something that happens spontaneously. In media, business models, technology and culture
can work together to create those conditions. They can also pull in the opposite direction. Our analysis of over 600,000 pieces of written and
television journalism shows that the language of the mainstream American media has drifted away from the political centre, toward the
Democratic Party’s preferred terminology and topics. That could lower the media’s credibility among conservatives.
As the country braces for next year’s election, it is worth thinking about the internal forces that deepened this rift. You can take comfort
from the fact that the industry has been buffeted time and again during its long history, yet somehow survived. The worry is that today’s
lurch may prove worse than any before.
One of those forces is technological disruption. From printing to mobile web, new media tend to disrupt authority. That is good news if you
live in an autocracy. In America, though, technologies have often brought trouble. Father Charles Coughlin, a pioneering demagogue in the
1930s, used radio to reach a mass audience before Republicans and Democrats got the hang of it. Cable news helped foment a revolution in
the Republican Party. It is hard to see how Donald Trump could have become the party’s nominee in 2016 without the ability to speak
directly to tens of millions of Americans in messages of 140 characters. Artificial intelligence will up-end media once again, for good or ill. It
may feed mind-scrambling fakery to anyone who hankers after conspiracy. But, for anyone who wishes to know that is really going on, AI
may put a greater premium on filtering out the nonsense.
Disruption powers fragmentation. The American media have passed through narrowcast ages and broadcast age. In Madison’s and
Jefferson’s day, narrowcasting was the norm: small-circulation partisan journals spoke to different factions of a small elite. Later, the spread
of the telegraph and the penny press created mass media. Narrow partisanship was no longer good business. Advertisers wanted to reach
as many people as possible and scarce electromagnetic spectrum, which limited the number of radio and television stations, led to a system
of regulation. All that favoured objectivity: journalists should try to put their opinions aside and stick to the facts.
Toady, however, the smartphone has caused fragmentation and American media are back in a narrowcast age. As much of the advertising
revenue that once paid for reporters had flowed to Google and Meta, this has created new business models. There is a lot to like about the
subscription-based outfits that now rule: what better test of the quality of the work than whether people will pay for it? But such businesses
can also be built on pandering to people’s prejudices. Tucker Carlson was fired from Fox News only to create a new venture as a
subs-based, one-man broadcast company. This is closer to a business model the Founding Fathers would have recognised, but rather than
creating content for curly-wigged merchants steeped in 18th-century learning, he wants to tear down such Enlightenment values.
This is not just happening on the fringes. Our package this week also contains an essay by James Bennet, our Lexington columnist, a former
editorial-page editor of the New York Times who was fired for publishing a piece by a Republican senator that sparked a newsroom revolt.
He argues that the Times increasingly affirms its readers’ leftish bias even as it reassures them that it is independent. Unlike the right-wing
media, the mainstream lot do not routinely peddle falsehoods or conspiracy theories. But their bias undermines their ability to put the
record straight. They used to be like the best public broadcasters in other Western democracies, establishing common facts and setting the
boundaries for debate; today, less so.
Why does this matter? Although most Americans do not regularly read a newspaper or watch cable news, elites matter in democracies.
When different political camps exist in separate information universes, they tend to demonise each other. If you are told Joe Biden is in the
grip of a cable of antisemitic socialists, then voting for Mr Trump makes perfect sense. If Trump supporters are anti-democratic racists, why
bother trying to win them over? As a result, the parties will find it even harder to reach the compromises that are essential for sustained
good government. If the elites cannot see the world as it is, they will make bad decisions.
As well as being a problem for politics and journalism, this is also a threat to core liberal ideas: that arguments need to be strength-tested,
that insights can be found in unusual places and that encountering opposing views and uncomfortable facts is usually a good thing. These
ideas will be challenged by newsrooms that see “objectivity” as a sleight of hand which privileged groups use to embed their own power.
Old-style liberals may have to adapt to AI-powered business models that reward those who tell people everything they already think is true
is true.
Breaking news
America progresses from narrowcast media and a limited franchise in the early days of the republic to broadcast media and universal
suffrage. It has never had narrowcast media and universal suffrage at the same time. As a newspaper founded to promote classical
liberalism, the Economist would like to think they can coexist happily. Next year’s election will be the test.
The media and the message
Next year’s election in America will test whether a healthy democracy needs a common set of facts
Journalists should not spend much of their time writing about journalism. The world is more interesting than the inky habits of the people
who report on it. But this week we are making a exception, because the discovery and dissemination of information matters a lot to politics.
Don’t take our word for it: “A popular government,” wrote James Madison in 1822,”without popular information, or the means of
acquiring it, is but a prologue to a farce or a tragedy; or, perhaps both.” Were Thomas Jefferson offered a choice between a government
without newspapers and newspapers without a government, he said that he would choose the press (though that is probably going a bit
far).
As the turmoil at America’s elite universities over antisemitism shows, creating a political culture in which people can argue constructively,
disagree and compromise is not something that happens spontaneously. In media, business models, technology and culture can work
together to create those conditions. They can also pull in the opposite direction. Our analysis of over 600,000 pieces of written and
television journalism shows that the language of the mainstream American media has drifted away from the political centre, towards the
Democratic Party’s preferred terminology and topics. That could lower the media’s credibility among conservatives.
As the country braces for next year’s election, it is worth thinking about the internal forces that deepened this rift. You can take comfort
from the fact that the industry has been buffeted time and again during its long history, yet somehow survived. The worry is that today’s
lurch may prove worse than any before.
One of those forces is technological disruption. From printing to the mobile web, new media tend to disrupt authority. That is good news if
you live in an autocracy. In America, though, technologies have often brought trouble. Father Charles Coughlin, a pioneering demagogue in
1930s, used radio to reach a mass audience before Republican and Democrats got the hang of it. Cable news helped foment a revolution in
the Republican Party. It is hard to see how Donald Trump could have become the party’s nominee in 2016 without the ability to speak
directly to tens of millions of Americans in messages of 140 characters. Artificial intelligence will up-end media once again, for good or ill. It
may feed mind-scrambling fakery to anyone how hankers after conspiracy. But for anyone who wishes to know what is really going on, AI
may put a greater premium on filtering out the nonsense.
Disruption powers fragmentation. The American media have passed through narrowcast ages and broadcast ages. In Madison’s and
Jefferson’s day, narrowcasting was the norm: small circulation partisan journals spoke to different factions of a small elite. Later, the spread
of the telegraph and the penny press created mass media. Narrow partisanship was no longer good business. Advertisers wanted to reach
as many people as possible and scarce electromagnetic spectrum, which limited the numbers of radio and television stations, led to a
system of regulation. All that favoured objectivity: journalists should try to put their opinions aside and stick to the facts.
Today, however, the smartphone has caused fragmentation and American media are back in a narrowcast age. As much of advertising
revenue that once paid for reporters has flowed to Google and Meta, this has created new business models. There is a lot to like about the
subscription-based outfits that now rule: what better best of the quality of the work than whether people will pay for it? But such businesses
can also be built on pandering to people’s prejudices. Tucker Carlson was fired from Fox News only to create a new venture as subs-based,
one-man broadcast company. This is closer to a business model the Founding Fathers would have recognised, but rather than creating
content for curly-wigged merchants steeped in 18th-centurty learning, he wants to tear down such Enlightenment values.
This is not just happening on the fringes. Our package this week also contains an essay by James Bennet, our Lexington columnist, a former
editorial-page editor of New York Times who was fired for publishing a piece by a Republican senator that sparked a newsroom revolt. He
argues that the Times increasingly affirms its readers’ leftish bias even as it reassures them that it is independent. Unlike the right-wing
media, the mainstream lot do not routinely peddle falsehoods or conspiracy theories. But their bias undermines their ability to put the
record straight. They used to be like the best public broadcasters in other Western democracies, establishing common facts and setting the
boundaries for debate; today, less so.
Why does this matter? Although most Americans do not regularly read a newspaper or watch cable news, elites matter in democracies.
When different political camps exist in separate information universes, they tend to demonise each other. If you are told Joe Biden is in the
grip of a cabal of antisemitic socialists, then voting for Mr Trump makes perfect sense. If Trump supporters are anti-democratic racists, why
bother trying to win them over? As a result, the parties will find it even harder to reach the compromises that are essential for sustained
good government. If the elites cannot see the world as it is, they will make bad decisions.
As well as being a problem for politics and journalism, this is also a threat to core liberal ideas: that arguments need to be strength-tested,
that insights can be found in unusual places and that encountering opposing views and uncomfortable facts is usually a good thing. These
ideas will be challenged by newsrooms that see “objectivity” as a sleight of hand which privileged groups use to embed their own power.
Old-style liberals may have to adapt to AI-powered business models that reward those who tell people everything they already think is true
is true.
Breaking news
America progressed from narrowcast media and a limited franchise in the early days of the republic to broadcast media and universal
suffrage. It has never had narrowcast media and universal suffrage at the same time. As a newspaper founded to promote classical
liberalism, the Economist would like to think they can coexist happily. Next year’s election will be the test.
The media and the message
Next year’s election in America will test whether a healthy democracy needs a common set of facts
Journalists should not spend much of their time writing about journalism. The world is more interesting than the inky habits of the people
who report on it. But this week we are making an exception, because the discovery and dissemination of information matters a lot to politics
Don’t take our word for it “ A popular government,” wrote James Madison in 1822,” without popular information, or the means of
acquiring it, is but a prologue to a farce or a tragedy; or, perhaps both.” Were Thomas Jefferson offered a choice between a government
without newspapers and newspapers without a government, he said that he would choose the press (though that is probably going a bit
far).
As the turmoil at America’s elite universities over antisemitism shows, creating a political culture in which people can argue constructively,
disagree and compromise is not something that happens spontaneously. In media, business models, technology and culture can work
together to create those conditions. They can also pull in the opposite direction. Our analysis of over 600,000 pieces of written and
television journalism shows that the language of the mainstream American media has drifted away from the political centre, towards the
Democratic Party’s preferred terminology and topics. That could lower the media’s credibility among conservatives.
As the country braces for next year’s election, it is worth thinking about the internal forces that deepened this rift. You can take comfort
from the fact that the industry has been buffeted time and again during its long history, yet somehow survived. The worry is that today’s
lurch may prove worse than any before.
One of those forces is technological disruption. From printing to the mobile web, new media tend to disrupt authority. That is good news if
you live in an autocracy. In America, though, technologies have often brought trouble. Father Charles Coughlin, a pioneering demagogue in
the 1930s, used radio to reach a mass audience before Republicans and Democrats got the hang of it. Cable news helped foment a
revolution in the Republican Party. It is hard to see how Donald Trump could have become the party’s nominee in 2016 without the ability
to speak directly to tens of millions of Americans in messages of 140 characters. Artificial intelligence(AI) will up-end media once again, for
good or ill. It may feed mind-scrambling fakery to anyone who hankers after conspiracy. But, for anyone who wishes to know what is really
going on, AI may put a greater premium on filtering out the nonsense.
Disruption powers fragmentation. The American media have passed through narrowcast ages and broadcast ages. In Madison’s and
Jefferson’s day, narrowcasting was the norm: small-circulation partisan journals spoke to different factions of a small elite. Later, the spread
of the telegraph and the penny press created mass media. Narrow partisanship was no longer good business. Advertisers wanted to reach
as many people as possible and scarce electromagnetic spectrum, which limited the numbers of radio and television stations, led to a
system of regulation. All that favoured objectivity: journalists should try to put their opinions aside and stick to the facts.
Today, however, the smartphone has caused fragmentation and American media are back in a narrowcast age. As much of the advertising
revenue that once paid for reporters has flowed to Google and Meta, this has created new business models. There is a lot to like about the
subscription-based outfits that now rule: what better test for the quality of the work than whether people will pay for it? But such businesses
can also be built on pandering to people’s prejudices. Tucker Carlson was fired from Fox News only to create a new venture as s
subs-based, one-man broadcast company. This is closer to a business model the Founding Fathers would have recognised, but rather than
creating content for curly-wigged merchants steeped in 18th-century learning, he want to tear down such Enlightenment values.
This is not just happening on the fringes. Our package this week also contains an essay by James Bennet, our Lexington columnist, a former
editorial page editor of the New York Times who was fired for publishing a piece by a Republican senator that sparked a newsroom revolt.
He argues that the Times increasingly affirms its readers’ leftish bias even as it reassures them that it is independent. Unlike the right-wing
media, the mainstream lot do not routinely peddle falsehoods or conspiracy theories. But their bias undermines their ability to put the
record straight. They used to be like the best public broadcasters in other Western democracies, establishing common facts and setting the
boundaries for debate; today, less so.
Whey does this matter? Although most Americans do not regularly read a newspaper or watch cable news, elites matter in democracies
when different political camps exist in separate information universes, they tend to demonise each other. If you are told Joe Biden is in the
grip of a cabal of antisemitic socialists, then voting for Mr Trump makes perfect sense. If Trump supporters are anti-democratic racists, why
bother trying to win them over? As a result, the parties will find it even harder to reach the compromises that are essential for sustained
good government. If the elites cannot see the world as it is, they will make bad decisions.
As well as being a problem for politics and journalism, this is also a threat to core liberal ideas: that arguments need to be strength-tested,
that insights can be found in unusual places and that encountering opposing views and uncomfortable facts is usually a good thing. These
ideas will be challenged by newsrooms that see “objectivity” as a sleight of hand which privileged groups use to embed their own power.
Old-style liberals may have to adapt to AI-powered business models that reward those who tell people everything they already think is true
is true.
Breaking news
America progressed from narrowcast media and a limited franchise in the early days of the republic to broadcast media and universal
suffrage. It has never had narrowcast media and universal suffrage at the same time. As a newspaper founded to promote classical
liberalism, the Economist would like to think they can coexist happily. Next year’s election will be the test.
How to detoxify migration politics
Cooler heads and calmer words are needed, on both the left and the right
Every day, screens around the world fill with grim pictures from Gaza, where nearly 2m Palestinians have been forced out of their homes.
Even larger numbers have been displaced in Congo, Sudan, Syria and Ukraine. Most people feel compassion when they see fellow humans
fleeing from bombs, bullets or machetes. But many also experience another emotion: fear.
See through a screen, the world can seem violent and scary even to residents of safe, rich places. Many worry that ever-swelling numbers of
refugees and other migrants will surge across their borders. Nativist politicians talk of an “invasion”.
Fear has curdled rich-world politics. A man who once advocated banning the Koran could be the next Dutch prime minister. Britain’s
Conservative Party is trampling on constitutional norms to try to send asylum-seekers on a one-way trip to Rwanda. Donald Trump tells
hollering crowds that unlawful immigrants are “poisoning the blood of our country”.
Some perspective is in order. The vast majority of people who migrate do so voluntarily and without drama. For all the talk of record
numbers and unprecedented crisis, the share of the world’s people who live outside their country of birth is just 3.6%; it has barely
changed since 1960, when it was 3.1%, the numbers forcibly displaced fluctuated wildly, depending on how many wars are raging, but show
no clear long-term upward trend. The total has risen alarmingly in the past decade or so. From 0.6% in 2012 to 1.4% in 2022.but this is only
a sixth of what of what it was in the aftermath of the second world war.
The notion that refugees post a serious threat to rich countries is also far-fetched. Most fugitives from danger do not go far. Of the 110m
people whom the UN classified as forcibly displaced as of mid-2023, more than half remained in their own countries. Barely 10% had made
it to the rich world-slightly more than the population of London. This is not a trivial number, but it is plainly manageable if governments
co-operate. Overall, poorer countries host nine times more displaced people with skimpier resources and less hysteria.
The populist right drums up fears of overwhelming numbers in order to win votes. Some on the left inflame the issue in different ways.
Lavishing benefits on asylum-seekers while making it hard for them to work guarantees that they will be a burden, which is why Sweden’s
anti-immigrant party now has a slice of power. Calling for the abolition of border controls, as some America radicals do, terrifies the median
voter. Insisting that everyone should be defined by race and given a pecking order with the majority group ranked last, and then demadning
that America admit millions more members of minority groups, is a recipe for ensuring Mr Trump’s re-election.
A wiser approach to migration would bear in mind two things. First, moving tends to make people much better off than they would have
been, has they stayed put. Those who flee from danger find safety. Those who seek a new start find opportunity Migrants from poor
countries to rich ones vastly raise their own wages and have little or no effect on those of the native-born. Mobility also allows families to
spread risks. Many pool cash to send a relative to a city or a richer country, so they have at least one income that doesn’t depend on the
local weather.
Second, recipient countries can benefit from immigration, especially if they manage it well. The most desirable destination can attract the
world’s most talented and enterprising people. Immigrants in America are nearly twice as likely to start a company as the native born and
four times likelier to win a Nobel science prize. Less-skilled migrants fill gaps in ageing labour forces and free up locals for more productive
tasks( for example, when a foreign nanny enables two parents to work full-time).
A more mobile planet would be richer: by one estimates, completely free movement would double global GDP. These colossal gains remain
unrealised because they would accrue mostly to the migrants, who cannot vote in the countries they want to move to. Still, rather than
leaving all these trillions of dollars on the floor, wise governments should find ways to share some of them. That means persuading voters
tht migration can be orderly and legal, and proving that immigrants not only pay their way but enhance the collective good.
So border security should be tight, while the slow process of denying or granting entry is streamlined. A realistic number of workers should
be admitted--and pay taxes--but not to draw the same welfare benefits as citizens, at least for a while. Some day, the creaking global
asylum system should be modernised and the task of offering sanctuary should be shared more fairly. A provisional EU deal announced on
December 20th is a small step in the right direction.
Pessimists on the right argue that more migration will breed disorder, since people from alien cultures will not assimilate. Yet studies find no
solid evidence that diverse countries are less stable--contrast homogeneous Somalia with many-hued Australia.
Pessimists on the left say the West will never let in many people or treat newcomers fairly because it is incorrigibly racist. Yet though racist
persists, it has dwindled more than many people realise. When Barack Obama was born, mixed-race marriages were illegal in much of
America, and many Brits still thought they had a right and a duty to rule other nations. Now a fifth of new American marriages are mixed,
and Brits find it unremarkable that a descendant of colonial subjects is their prim minister. British Indians,Chinese-Canadians and
Nigerian-Americans all earn more than their white compatriots, suggesting racism is not the main determinant of their life chances.
Westward leading, still proceeding
In the future, climate change may spur people to move more. But this will be gradual, and two forces may have the opposite effect. The shift
from farms to cities--a much bigger mass movement than cross-border migration--will slow, as most of the world is already urban. And
humanity will grow less mobile as it ages. Toady, rich countries have a wonderful opportunity to import youth, brains and dynamism. It may
not last for ever.
How to detoxify migration politics
Cooler heads and calmer words are needed, on both the left and the right
Every day, screens around the world fill with grim pictures from Gaza, where nearly 2m Palestinians have been forced out of their homes.
Even large numbers have been displaced in Congo, Sudan, Syria and Ukraine. Most people feel compassion when hey see fellow humans
fleeing from bombs, bullets or machetes. But many also experience another emotion: fear.
Seen through a screen, the world can seem violent and scary even to residents of safe, rich places. Many worry that ever-swelling numbers
of refugees and other migrants will surge across their borders. Nativist politicians talk of an “invasion”.
Fear has curdled rich-world politics. A man who once advocated banning the Koran could be the next Dutch prime minister. Britain’s
Conservative Party is trampling on constitutional norms to try to send asylum-seekers on a one-way trip to Rwanda. Donald Trump tells
hollering crowds that unlawful immigrants are “poisoning the blood of our country”.
Some perspective is in order. The vast majority of people who migrate do so voluntarily and without drama. For all the talk of record
numbers and unprecedented crisis, the share of the world’s people who live outside their country of birth is just 3.6%; it has barely
changed since 1960, when it was 3.1%. the numbers forcibly displaced fluctuate wildly, depending on how many wars are raging, but show
no clear long-term upward trend. The total has risen alarmingly in the past decade or so, from 0.6% in 2012 to 1.4% in 2022. but this is only
a sixth of what it was in the aftermath of the second world war.
The notion that refugees pose a serious threat to rich countries is also far-fetched. Most fugitives from danger do not go far. Of the 110m
people whom the UN classified as forcibly displace as of mid-2023, more than half remained in their own countries. Barely 10% had made it
to the rich world--slightly more than the population of London. This is not a trivial number, but it is plainly manageable if governments
cooperate. Overall, poorer countries host nine times more displaced people with skimpier resources and less hysteria.
The populist right drums up fears of overwhelming numbers in order to win votes. Some on the left inflame the issue in different ways.
Lavishing benefits on asylum-seekers while making it hard for them to work guarantees that they will be a burden, which is why Sweden’s
anti-immigrant party now has a slice of power. Calling for the abolition of border controls, as some American radicals do, terrifies the
median voter. Insisting that everyone should be defined by race and given a pecking order with the majority group ranked last, and then
demanding that America admit millions more members of minority groups, is a recipe for ensuring Mr Trump’s re-election.
A wiser approach to migration would bear in mind two things. First, moving tends to make people much better off than they would have
been, had they stayed put. Those who flee from danger find safety. Those who seek a new start find opportunity. Migrants from poor
countries to rich ones vastly raise their own wages and have little or no effect on those of the native-born. Mobility also allows families to
spread risks. Many pool cash to send a relative to a city or a richer country, so they have at least one income that doesn’t depend on the
local weather.
Second, recipient countries can benefit from immigration, especially if they manage it well. The most desirable destinations can attract the
world’s most talented and enterprising people. Immigrants in America are nearly twice as likely to start a company as the native-born and
four times likelier to win a Nobel science prize. Less-skilled migrants fill gaps in ageing labour forces and free up locals for more productive
tasks( for example, when a foreign nanny enables two parents to work full-time).
A more mobile planet would be richer: by one estimate, completely free movement would double global GDP. These colossal gains remain
unrealised because they would accrue mostly to the migrants, who cannot vote in the countries they want to move to. Still, rather than
leaving all these trillions of dollars on the floor, wise governments should find ways to share some of them. That means persuading voters
that migration can be orderly and legal, and proving that immigrants not only pay their way but enhance the collective good.
So border security should be tight, while the slow process of denying or granting entry is streamlined. A realistic number of workers should
be admitted--and selected primarily by market forces, such as visa auctions. Immigrants should be free to work--and pay taxes--but not to
draw the same welfare benefits as citizens, at least for a while. Some day, the creaking global asylum system should be modernised and the
task of offering sanctuary should be shared more fairly. A provisional EU deal announced on December 20 th is a small step in the right
direction.
Pessimists on the right argue that more migration will breed disorder, since people from alien cultures will not assimilate. Yet studies find no
solid evidence that diverse countries are less stable--contrast homogeneous Somalia with many-hued Australia.
Pessimist on the left say the West will never let in many people or treat newcomers fairly because it is incorrigibly racist. Yet though racism
persists, it has dwindled more than many people realise. When Barack Obama was born, mixed-race marriages were illegal in much of
America, and many Brits still thought they had a right and a duty to rule other nations. Now a fifth of new American marriages are mixed,
and Brits find it unremarkable that a descendant of colonial subjects is their prime minister. British Indians, Chinese-Canadians and
Nigerian-Americans all earn more than their white compatriots, suggesting racism is not the main determinant of their life chances.
Westward leading, still proceeding
In the future, climate change may spur people to move more. But this will be gradual, and two forces may have the opposite effect. The shift
from farms to cities--a much bigger mass movement than cross-border migration--will slow, as most of the world is already urban. And
humanity will grow less mobile as it ages. Today, rich countries have a wonderful opportunity to import youth, brains and dynamism. It may
not last forever.
How to detoxify migration politics
Cooler heads and calmer words are needed, on both the left and the right
Every day, screens around the world fill with grim pictures from Gaza, where nearly 2m Palestinians have been forced out of their homes.
Even larger numbers have been displaced in Congo, Sudan, Syria and Ukraine. Most people feel compassion when they see fellow humans
fleeing from bombs, bullets or machetes. But many also experience another emotion: fear.
Seen through a screen, the world can seem violent and scary even to residents of safe, rich places. Many worry that ever swelling numbers
of refugees and other migrants will surge across their borders. Nativist politicians talk of an “invasion”.
Fear has curdled rich-world politics. A man who once advocated banning the Koran could be the next Dutch prime minister. Britain’s
Conservative Party is trampling on constitutional norms to try to send asylum-seekers on a one-way trip to Rwanda. Donald Trump tells
hollering crowds that unlawful immigrants are “poisoning the blood of our country”.
Some perspective is in order. The vast majority of people who migrate do so voluntarily and without drama.for all the talk of record numbers
and unprecedented crisis, the share of the world’s people who live outside their country of birth is just 3.6%; it has barely changed since
1960, when it was 3.1%. the numbers forcibly displaced fluctuated wildly, depending on how many wars are raging, but show no clear
long-term upward trend. The total has risen alarmingly in the past decade or so, from 0.6% in 2012 to 1.4% in 2022. But this is only a sixth of
what it was in the aftermath of the second world war.
The notion that refugees pose a serious threat to rich countries is also far-fetched. Most fugitives from danger do not go far. Of the 110m
people whom the UN classified as forcibly displaced as of mid-2023, more than half remained in their own countries. Barely 10% had made
it to the rich world--slightly more than the population of London. This is not a trivial number, but it is plainly manageable if governments
cooperate. Overall, poorer countries host nine time more displaced people with skimpier resources and less hysteria.
The populist right drums up fears of overwhelming numbers in order to win votes. Some on the left inflame the issue in different ways.
Lavishing benefits on asylum-seekers while making it hard for them to work guarantees that they will be a burden, which is why Sweden’s
anti-immigrant party now has a slice of power. Calling for the abolition of border controls, as some American radicals do, terrifies the
median voter. Insisting that everyone should be defined by race and given a pecking order with the majority group ranked last, and then
demanding that America admit millions more members of minority groups, is a recipe for ensuring Mr Trump’s re-election.
A wiser approach to migration would bear in mind two things. First, moving tends to make people much better off than they would have
been, had they stayed put. Those who flee from danger find safety. Those who seek a new start find opportunity. Migrants from poor
countries to rich ones vastly raise their own wages and have little or no effect on those of the native born. Mobility also allows families to
spread risks. Many pool cash to send a relative to a city or a richer country, so they have at least one income that doesn’t depend on the
local weather.
Second, recipient countries can benefit from immigration, especially if they manage it well. The most desirable destinations can attract the
world’s most talented and enterprising people. Immigrants in America are nearly twice as likely to start a company as the native-born and
four times likelier to win a Nobel Science and free up locals for more productive tasks (for example, when a foreign nanny enables two
parents to work full-time).
A more mobile planet would be richer: by one estimate, completely free movement would double global GDP. These colossal gains remain
unrealised because they would accrue mostly to the migrants, who cannot vote in the countries they want to move to. Still, rather than
leaving all these trillions of dollars on the floor, wise governments should find ways to share some of them. That means persuading voters
that migration can be orderly and legal, and proving that immigrants not only pay their way but enhance the collective good.
So border security should be tight, while the slow process of denying or granting entry is streamlined. A realistic number of workers should
be admitted--and selected primarily by market forces, such as visa auctions. Immigrants should be free to work--and pay taxes--but not to
draw the same welfare benefits as citizens, at least for a while. Some day, the creaking global asylum system should be modernised and the
task of offering sanctuary should be shared more fairly. A provisional EU deal announced on December 20 th is a small step in the right
direction.
Pessimists on the right argue that more migration will breed disorder, since people from alien cultures will not assimilate. Yet studies find no
solid evidence that divers countries are less stable--contrast homogeneous Somalia with many-hued Australia.
Pessimists on the left say the West will never let in many people or treat newcomers fairly because it is incorrigibly racist. Yet though racism
persists, it has dwindled more than many people realise. When Barack Obama was born, mixed-race marriages were illegal in much of
America, and many Brits still thought they had a right and a duty to rule other nations. Now a fifth of new American marriages are mixed,
and Brits find it unremarkable that descendant of colonial subjects is their prime minister. British Indians, Chinese-Canadians and
Nigerian-Americans all earn more than their white compatriots, suggesting racism is not the main determinant of their life chances.
Westward leading, still proceeding
In the future, climate change may spur people to move more. But this will be gradual, and two forces may have the opposite effect. The shift
from farms to cities--a much bigger mass movement than cross-border migration--will slow, as most of the world is already urban. And
humanity will grow less mobile as it ages. Today, rich countries have a wonderful opportunity to import youth, brains and dynamism. It may
not last for ever.
How to detoxify migration politics
Cooler heads and calmer words are needed, on both the left and the right
Every day, screens around the world fill with grim pictures from Gaza, where nearly 2m Palestinians have been forced out of their homes.
Even large numbers have been displaced in Congo, Sudan, Syria and Ukraine. Most people feel compassion when they see fellow humans
fleeing from bombs, bullets or machetes. But many also experience another emotion: fear.
Seen through a screen, the world can seem violent and scary even to residents of safe, rich places. Many worry that ever-swelling numbers
of refugees and other migrants will surge across their borders. Nativist politicians talk of an “invasion”.
Fear has curdled rich-world politics. A man who once advocated banning the Koran could be the next Dutch prime minister. Britain’s
Conservative Party is trampling on constitutional norms to try to send asylum-seekers on a one-way trip to Rwanda. Donald Trump tells
hollering crowds that unlawful immigrants are “poisoning the blood of our country”.
Some perspective is in order. The vast majority of people who migrate do so voluntarily and without drama. For all the talk of record
numbers and unprecedented crisis, the share of the world’s people who live outside their country of birth is just 3.6%; it has barely
changed since 1960, when it was 3.1%. the numbers forcibly displaced fluctuate wildly, depending on how many wars are raging, but show
no clear long-term upward trend. The total has risen alarmingly in the past decade or so, from 0.6% in 2012 to 1.4% in 2022. but this is only
a sixth of what it was in the aftermath of the second world war.
The notion that refugees pose a serious threat to rich countries is also far-fetched. Most fugitives from danger do not go far. Of the 110m
people whom the UN classified as forcibly displaced as of mid-2023, more than half remained in their own countries. Barely 10% had mad it
to the rich world--slightly more than the population of London. This is not a trivial number, but it is plainly manageable if governments
co-operate. Overall, poorer countries host nine times more displaced people with skimpier resources and less hysteria.
The populist right drums up fears of overwhelming numbers in order to win votes. Some on the left inflame the issue in different ways
lavishing benefits on asylum-seekers while making it hard for them to work guarantees that they will be a burden, which is why Sweden’s
anti-immigrant party now has a slice of power. Calling for the abolition of border controls, as some American radicals do, terrifies the
median voter. Insisting that everyone should be defined by race and given a pecking order with the majority group ranked last, and then
demanding that America admit millions more members of minority groups, is a recipe for ensuring Mr Trump’s re-election.
A wiser approach to migration would bear in mind two things. First, moving tends to make people much better off than they would have
been, had they stayed put. Those who flee from danger find safety, Those who week a new start find opportunity. Migrants from poor
countries to rich ones vastly raise their own wages and have little or no effect on those of the native-born. Mobility also allows families to
spread risks. Many pool cash to send a relative to a city or a richer country, so they have at least one income that doesn’t depend on the
local weather.
Second, recipient countries can benefit from immigration, especially if they manage it well. The most desirable destinations can attract the
world’s most talented and enterprising people. Immigrants in America are nearly twice as likely to start a company as the native-born and
four times likelier to win a Nobel science prize. Less-skilled migrants fill gaps in ageing labour forces and free up locals for more productive
tasks( for example, when a foreign nanny enables two parents to work full-time).
A more mobile planet would be richer: by one estimate, completely free movement would double global GDP. These colossal gains remain
unrealised because they would accrue mostly to the migrants, who cannot vote in the countries they want to move to. Still, rather than
leaving all these trillions of dollars on the floor, wise governments should find ways to share some of them. That means persuading voters
that migration can be orderly and legal, and proving that immigrants not only pay their way but enhance the collective good.
So border security should be tight, while the slow process of denying or granting entry is streamlined. A realistic number of workers should
be admitted--and selected primarily by market forces, such as visa auctions. Immigrants should be free to work--and pay taxes--but not to
draw the same welfare benefits as citizens, at least for a while. Some day, the creaking global asylum system should be modernised and the
task of offering sanctuary should be shared more fairly. A provisional EU deal announced on December 20 th is a small step in the right
direction.
Pessimists on the right argue that more migration will breed disorder, since people from alien cultures will not assimilate. Yet studies find no
solid evidence that diverse countries are less stable--contrast homogeneous Somalia with many-hued Australia.
Pessimists on the left say the West will never let in many people or treat newcomers fairly because it is incorrigibly racist. Yet though racism
persists, it has dwindled more than many people realise. When Barack Obama was born, mixed-race marriages were illegal in much of
America, and many Brits still thought they had a right and a duty to rule other nations. Now a fifth of new American marriages are mixed,
and Brits find it unremarkable that a descendant of colonial subjects is their prime minister. British Indians, Chinese-Canadians and
Nigerian-Americans all earn more than their white compatriots, suggesting racism is not the main determinant of their life chances.
Westward leading, still proceeding
In the future, climate change may spur people to move more. But this will be gradual, and two forces may have the opposite effect. The sift
from farms to cities--a much bigger mass movement than cross-border migration--will slow, as most of the world is already urban. And
humanity will grow less mobile as it ages. Today, rich countries have a wonderful opportunity to import youth, brains and dynamism. It may
not last for ever.
Red sea, red alert
Houthi attacks pose a grave threat to global shipping, they must be deal with firmly
For the world to prosper,ships must reach their ports. They are most vulnerable when passing through narrow passages, such as the Strait of
Malacca or the Panama Canal. So a recent surge of attacks on vessels in the Red Sea, the only southern conduit into the Suez Canal, poses a
grave threat to global trade. The Houthis, militants in Yemen backed by Iran, have fired over 100 drones and missiles at ships linked to more
than 35 countries, ostensibly in support of the Palestinians. Their campaign is an affront to the principle of freedom of navigation, which is
already at risk from the Black Sea to the South China Sea. America and its allies must deal firmly with it--without escalating the conflict in
the Middle East.
A hefty 20% of global container volumes, 10T of seaborne trade and 8-10% of seaborne gas and oil pass through the Red Sea and Suez
route. After weeks of mayhem four of the world’s five largest container shipping firms have suspended voyages through it; BP has paused
oil shipments. The effect on energy prices has been muted, owing to ample supply. But the share prices of container firms have soared, as
investors anticipate a capacity squeeze. The cost to ship a container between Asia and Europe has spiked. If unresolved, the crisis will cause
a supply-chain crunch.
The Thouthi’s drone-and missile stockpile, supplied by Iran, is the envy of many armies. They are one of the proxy forces Iran uses to attack
Israeli, Gulf Arab and Western interests. In 2022 they launched multiple attacks on the facilities of Saudi Aramco, which is responsible for
over 10% of global oil output. It is unprecedented for a militia in a failed state, whose motto promises” Death to America, Death to Israel”,
to have ballistic missiles capable of flying 2,000km and hitting tankers.
American, British and French warships have spent weeks shooting drones and missiles out of the sky: on December 16 th they took down 15.
yet this defensive approach is hard to sustain.
Surface-to-air missiles costing millions of dollars are being used against a blizzard of cheap Iranian drones. Only a handful need to get
through and ships and their insurers will stay away.
That points to a three-step approach. First, a bigger international naval presence in the Middle East. On December 18 th America announced
a new task force to patrol the area. Then mostly Western countries have signed up publicly; nine others, including Egypt and Saudi Arabia,
are thought to be helping more discreetly. Others, including India, which depends on Suez and has ships in the area, should come aboard.
At least five American destroyers are now in the Red Sea. The USS Dwight Eisenhower, an air craft-carrier, is poised off Djibouti, its four
squadrons of strike aircraft with range of Houthi territory. Its destroyer escorts have some 600 missile-launch tubes between them. For now
the task force will play defence. One option is to provide armed escorts for merchant ships, as America did in the Gulf in the 1980s during
the so-called tanker wars. But over time this requires too many warships. The task force is more likely to establish a safe corridor, with an
air-defence bubble against drones and missiles.
That points to the second step: diplomacy. Saudi Arabia is on the cusp of a deal to extend a ceasefire with the Houthis which could end a
war that has devastated Yemen for nine years. It could include commitments to end naval attacks. That might suit America, which is keen to
dampen down regional tensions. Its navy is stretched and its carriers are sorely needed in Asia.
Yet diplomacy may fail and the Houthis may not respect any deal: they will surely find it tempting to hold global trade to ransom again. That
is why, third, America and its allies must retain the option of strikes on the Houthis. Though malign and reckless, Iran surely does not want
an all-out regional war war and may be persuaded to rein in its client. But it should understand that if it fails to do so., retaliation against the
Houthis is inevitable.
Red sea, red alert
Houthi attacks pose a grave threat to global shipping. They must be dealt with firmly
For the world to prosper, ships must reach their ports. They are most vulnerable when passing through narrow passages, such as the Strait
of Malacca or the Panama Canal. So a recent surge of attacks on vessels in the Red Sea, the only southern conduit into the Suez Canal, poses
a grave threat to global trade. The Houthis, militants in Yemen backed by Iran, have fired over 100 drones and missiles at ships linked to
more than 35 countries, ostensibly in support of the Palestinians. Their campaign is an affront to the principle of freedom of navigation,
which is already at risk from the Black Sea to the South China Sea. America and its allies must deal firmly with it--without escalating the
conflict in the Middle East.
A hefty 20% of global container volumes, 10% of seaborne trade and 8-10% of seaborne gas and oil pass through the Red Sea and Suez
route. After weeks of mayhem four of the world’s five largest containers-shipping firms have suspended voyages through it; BP has paused
oil shipments. The effect on energy prices has been muted, owing to ample supply. But the share prices of container firms have soared, as
investors anticipate a capacity squeeze. The cost to ship a container between Asia and Europe has spiked. If unresolved, the crisis will cause
a supply-chain crunch.
The Houthis’s drone-and-missile stockpile, supplied by Iran, is the envy of many armies. They are one of the proxy forces Iran uses to
attack Israeli, Gulf Arab and Western interests. In 2022 they launched multiple attacks on the facilities of Saudi Aramco, which is responsible
for over 10% of global oil output. It is unprecedented for a militia in a failed state, whose motto promises “death to America, death to
Israel”, to have ballistic missiles capable of flying 2000km and hitting tankers.
American, British and French warships have spent weeks shooting drones and missiles out of the sky: on December 16th they took down 15.
yet this defensive approach is hard to sustain.surface-to-air missiles costing millions of dollars are being used against a blizzard of cheap
Iranian drones. Only a handful need to get through and ships and their insurers will stay away.
That points to a three-step approach. First, a bigger international naval presence in the Middle East. On December 18 th America announced
a new task force to patrol the area. Ten mostly Western countries have signed up publicly; nine others, including Egypt and Saudi Arabia, are
thought to be helping more discreetly. Others, including India, which depends on Suez and has ships in the area, should come aboard.
At least five American destroyers are now in the Red Sea. The USS Dwight Eisenhower, an aircraft-carrier, is poised off Djibouti, its four
squadrons of strike aircraft within range of Houthi territory. Its destroyer escorts have some 600 missile-launch tubes between them. For
now the task force will play defence. One option is to provide armed escorts for merchant ships, as America did in the Gulf in the 1980s
during the so-called tanker wars. But over time this requires too many warships. The task force is more likely to establish a safe corridor, with
an air-defence bubble against drones and missiles. That points to the second step: diplomacy. Saudi Arabia is on the cusp of a deal to
extend a ceasefire with the Houthis which could end a war that has devastated Yemen for nine years. It could include commitments to end
naval attacks. That might suit America, which is keen to dampen down regional tensions. Its navy is stretched and its carriers are sorely
needed in Asia.
Yet diplomacy may fail and the Houthis may not respect any deal: they will surely find it tempting to hold global trade to ransom again. That
is why, third, America and its allies must retain the option of strikes on the Houthis. Though malign and reckless, Iran surely does not want
an all-out regional war and may be persuaded to rein in its client. But it should understand that if it fails to do so, retaliation against the
Houthis is inevitable.
Red sea, red alert
Houthi attacks pose a great threat to global shipping.they must be dealt with firmly
For the world to prosper, ships must reach their ports. They are most vulnerable when passing through narrow passages, such as the Strait
of Malacca or the Panama Canal. So a recent surge of attacks on vessels in the Red Sea, the only southern conduit into the Suez Canal, poses
a grave threat to global trade. The Houthis, militants in Yemen backed by Iran, have fired over 100 drones and missiles at ships linked to
more than 35 countries, ostensibly in support of the Palestinians. Their campaign is an affront to the principle of freedom of navigation,
which is already at risk from the Black Sea to the South China Sea. America and its allies must deal firmly with it--without escalating the
conflict in the Middle East.
A hefty 20% global container volumes, 10% of seaborne trade and 8-10% of seaborne gas and oil pass through the Red Sea and Suez route.
After weeks of mayhem four of the world’s five largest container-shipping firms have suspended voyages through it; BP has paused oil
shipments. The effect on energy princes has been muted, owing to ample supplying. But the share prices of container firms have soared, as
investors anticipate a capacity squeeze. The cost to ship a container between Asia and Europe has spiked. If unresolved, the crisis will cause
a supply-chain crunch.
The Houthis’drone-and-missile stockpile, supplied by Iran, is the envy of many armies. They are one of the proxy forces Iran uses to attack
Israeli, Gulf Arab and Western interests. In 2022 they launched multiple attacks on the facilities of Saudi Aramco, which is responsible for
over 10% of global oil output. It is unprecedented for a militia in a failed state, whose motto promises “Death to America, Death to
Israel”,to have ballistic missiles capable of flying 2000km and hitting tankers.
American, British and French warships have spent weeks shooting drones and missiles out of the sky: one December 16th they took down 15
yet this defensive approach is hard to sustain. Surface-to-air missiles costing millions of dollars are being used against a blizzard of cheap
Iranian drones. Only a handful need to get through and ships and their insurers will stay away.
That points to a three-step approach. First, a bigger international naval presence in the Middle East. On December 18 th America announced
a new task force to patrol the area. Ten mostly Western countries have signed up publicly; nine others, including Egypt and Saudi Arabia, are
thought to be helping more discreetly. Others, including India, which depends on Suez and has ships in the area, should come aboard.
At least five American destroyers are now in the Red Sea. The USS Dwight Eisenhower, an aircraft-carrier, is poised off Djibouti, its four
squadrons of strike aircraft within range of Houthi territory. Its destroyers escorts have some 600 missile-launch tubes between them. For
now the task force will play defence. One option is to provide armed escorts for merchant ships, as America did in the Gulf in the 1980s
during the so-called tanker wars. But over time this requires too many warships. The task force is more likely to establish a safe corridor, with
an air-defence bubble against drones and missiles. That points to the second step: diplomacy. Saudi Arabia is on the cusp of a deal to
extend a ceasefire with the Houthis which could end a war that has devastated Yemen for nine years. It could include commitments to end
naval attacks. That might suit America, which is keen to dampen down regional tensions. Its navy is stretched and its carries are sorely
needed in Asia.
Yet diplomacy may fail and the Houthis may not respect any deal: they will surely find it tempting to hold global trade to ransom again. That
is why, third, America and its allies must retain the option of strikes on the Houthis. Though malign and reckless, Iran surely does not want
an all-out regional war and may be persuaded to rein in its client. But it should understand that if it fails to do so, retaliation against the
Houthis is inevitable.
Roadworthy in 24
The man supposed to block the return of Donald Trump is an unpopular 81-years-old.
Blame Democrat’s cowardice and complacency
American politics is paralysed by a contradiction as big as the Grand Canyon. Democrats rage about how re-electing Donald Trump would
doom their country’s democracy. And yet, in deciding who to put up against him in November ’s election, the party looks as if it will
meekly submit to the candidacy of an 81-year-old with the worst approval rating of any modern president at this stage in his term. How did
it come to this?
Joe Biden’s net approval rating stands at minus 16 points. Mr Trump, leading polls in the swing states where the election will be decided, is
a coin-toss away from a second presidential win. Even if you do not see Mr Trump as a potential dictator, that is an alarming prospect. A
substantial share of Democrats would rather Mr Biden did not run. But instead of either challenging him of knuckling down to support his
campaign, they have instead taken to muttering glassy-eyed about the mess they are in.
There are no secrets about what makes Mr Biden so unpopular. Part of it is the sustained burst of inflation that has been laid at his door.
Then there is his age. Most Americans know someone in their 80s who is starting to show their years. They also know that no matter how
fine that person’s character, they should not be given a four-year stint in the world’s hardest job.
Back in 2023 Mr Biden could-and should-have decided to be a one-term president. He would have been reversed as a paragon of public
service and a rebuke to Mr Trump’s boundless ego. Democratic bigwigs know this. In fact before their party’s better-than-expected
showing in the midterms, plenty of party members thought that Mr Biden would indeed stand aside. This newspaper first argued that the
president should not seek re-election over a year ago.
Unfortunately, Mr Biden and his party had several reasons for him fighting one more campaign, none of them good. His sense of duty was
tainted by vanity. Having first stood for president in 1987 and laboured for so long to sit behind the Resolute desk, he has been seduced
into believing that his country needs him because he is a proven Trump-beater.
Likewise, his staff’s desire to serve has surely been tainted by ambition. It is in the nature of administrations that many of a president’s
closest advisers will never again be so close to power. Of course they do not want to see their man surrender the White House in order to
focus on his president library.
Democratic leaders have been cowardly and complacent. Like many pusillanimous congressional Republicans, who disliked Mr Trump and
considered him dangerous--but could not find it within themselves to impeach or even criticise him--Democratic stalwarts have been
unwilling to act on their concerns about Mr Biden’s folly. If that was because of the threat to their own careers, their behaviour was
cowardly. If it was thinking that Mr Trump is his own worst enemy, it was complacent. Mr Biden’s approval ratings have continued to slide,
while the 91 criminal charges Mr Trump faces have, so far, only made him stronger.
Given this, you might think that the best thing would be for Mr Biden to stand aside. After all, the election is still ten months away and the
Democratic Party has talent. Alas, not only is that exceedingly unlikely, but the closer you look at what would happen, finding an alternative
to Mr Biden at this stage would be a desperate and unwise throw of the dice.
Were he to withdraw toady, the democratic Party would have to frantically recast its primary, because filing deadlines have already passed in
many states and the only other candidates on the ballot are a little-known congressman called Dean Phillips and a self-help guru called
Marianne Williamson. Assuming this was possible, and that the flurry of ensuing lawsuits was manageable, state legislatures would have to
approve new dates for the primaries closer to the convention in August. A series of debates would have to be organised so that primary
voters knew what they were voting for. The field could well be vast, with no obvious way of narrowing it quickly: in the Democratic primary
of 2020, 29 candidates put themselves forward.
The chaos might be worth it if the party could be sure of going into the election with a young, electable candidate. However, it seems
equally possible that the eventual winner would be un-electable--Bernie Sanders, say, a self-declared democratic socialist who is a year
older than Mr Biden. More likely, the nomination would go to Kamala Harris, the vice-president. Ms Harris has the advantage of not being
old, though it says something about the Democratic Party’s gerontocracy that she will be 60 in November and is considered youthful.
Unfortunately she has proven to be a poor communicator, a disadvantage in office as well as on the stump. Ms Harris is a creature of
California’s machine politics and has never successfully appealed to voters outside her state. Her campaign in 2020 was awful. Her autocue
sometimes seems to have been hacked by a satirist. Immigration and the southern border--a portfolio she handles for Mr Biden--is Mr
Trump’s strongest issue and the Democrats’ weakest. Ms Harrist’s chances of beating Mr Trump look even worse than her boss’s.
Better, therefore, for Democrats to focus on electing Mr Biden. The economy promises a soft landing; workers are seeing real-wage growth
and full employment. Were Mr Trump convicted, he could yet be punished by voters. Most important is to invigorate the campaign.
Democrats need to unlock some excitement and create a sense of possibility about a second term.
Ridin’with Biden
The president is not a good campaigner and is up against a candidate whose rallies are a cult meeting crossed with vaudeville show. He
needs someone who can speak to crowds and go on television for him. That person is not Ms Harris.
One way she could serve her party and her country, and help keep Mr Trump out of the White House, would be to forswear another term as
vice-president. Mr Biden could present his second term as a different kind of presidency, one in which he would share more responsibility
with a vice-president acting more like a CEO. Either way, Mr Biden needs the help of an army of enthusiastic Democrats willing to campaign
alongside him. At the moment he and his party are sleepwalking towards disaster.
Roadworthy in ‘24?
The man supposed to block the return of Donald Trump is an unpopular 81-year-old.
Blame Democrats’ cowardice and complacency
American politics is paralysed by a contradiction as big as the Grand Canyon. Democrats rage about how re-electing Donald Trump would
doom their country’s democracy. And yet, in deciding who to put up against him in November’s election, the party looks as if it will
meekly submit to the candidacy of an 81-year-old with the worst approval rating of any modern president at this stage in his term. How did
it come to this?
Joe Biden’s net approval rating stands at minus 16 points. Mr Trump, leading polls in the swing states where the election will be decided, is
a coin-toss away from a second presidential win. Even if you do not see Mr Trump as a potential dictator, that is an alarming prospect. A
substantial share of Democrats would rather Mr Biden did not run. But instead of either, challenging him or knuckling down to support his
campaign, they have instead taken to muttering glassy-eyed about the mess they are in.
There are no secrets about what makes Mr Biden so unpopular. Part of it is the sustained burst of inflation that has been laid at his door.
Then there is his age. Most Americans know someone in their 80s who is starting to show their years. They also know that no matter how
fine that person’s character, they should not be given a four-year stint in the world’s hardest job.
Back in 2023 Mr Biden could-and should have decided to be a one-term president. He would have been revered as a paragon of public
service and a rebuke to Mr Trump’s boundless ego. Democratic bigwigs know this. In fact before their party’s better-than-expected
showing in the midterms, plenty of party members thought that Mr Biden would indeed stand aside. This newspaper first argued that the
president should not seek re-election over a year ago.
Unfortunately, Mr Biden and his party had several reasons for him fighting one more campaign, none of them good. His sense of duty was
tainted by vanity. Having first stood for president in 1987 and laboured for so long to sit behind the Resolute desk, he has been seduced
into believing that his country needs him because he is a proven Trump-beater.
Likewise, his staff’s desire to serve has surely been tainted by ambition. It is in the nature of administrations that many of a president’s
closest advisers will never again be so close to power. Of course they do not want to see their man surrender the White House in order to
focus on his presidential library.
Democratic leaders have been cowardly and complacent. Like many pusillanimous congressional Republicans, who disliked Mr Trump and
considered him dangerous--but could not find it within themselves to impeach or even criticise him--Democratic stalwarts have been
unwilling to act on their concerns about Mr Biden’s folly. If that was because of the threat to their own careers, their behaviour was
cowardly. If it was thinking that Mr Trump is his own worst enemy, it was complacent. Mr Biden’s approval ratings have continued to slide,
while the 91 criminal charges Mr Trump faces have, so far, only made him stronger.
Given this, you might think that the best thing would be for Mr Biden to stand aside. After all, the election is still ten months away and the
Democratic party has talent. Alas, not only is that exceedingly unlikely, but the closer you look at what would happen, finding an alternative
to Mr Biden at this stage would be a desperate and unwise throw of the dice.
Were he to withdraw today, the Democratic party would have to frantically recast its primary, because filing deadlines have already passed
in many states and the only other candidates on the ballot are a little-known congressman called Dean Phillips and a self-help guru called
Marianne Williamson. Assuming this was possible, and that the flurry of ensuing lawsuits was manageable, state legislatures would have to
approve new dates for the primaries closer to the convention in August. A series of debates would have to be organised so that primary
voters knew what they were voting for. The field could well be vast, with no obvious way of narrowing it quickly: in the Democratic primary
of 2020, 29 candidates put themselves forward.
The chaos might be worth it if the party could be sure of going into the election with a young, electable candidate. However, it seems
equally possible that the eventual winner would be unelectable---Bernie Sanders, say, a self-declared democratic socialist who is a year
older than Mr Biden. More likely, the nomination would go to Kamala Harris, the vice-president. Ms Harris has the advantage of not being
old, though it says something about the Democratic Party’s gerontocracy that she will be 60 in November and is considered youthful.
Unfortunately she has proven to be a poor communicator, a disadvantage in office as well as on the stump. Ms Harris is a creature of
California’s machine politics and has never successfully appealed to voters outside her state. Her campaign in 2020 was awful. Her autocue
sometimes seems to have been hacked by a satirist. Immigration and the southern border--a portfolio she handles for Mr Biden--is Mr
Trump’s strongest issue and the Democrats’ weakest. Ms Harris’s chances of beating Mr Trump look even worse than her boss’s.
Better, therefor, or Democrats to focus on electing Mr Biden. The economy promises a soft landing; workers are seeing real-wage growth
and full employment. Were Mr Trump convicted, he could yet be punished by voters. Most important is to invigorate the campaign.
Democrats need to unlock some excitement and create a sense of possibility about a second term.
Ridin’s with Biden
The president is not a good campaigner and is up against a candidate whose rallies are a cult meeting crossed with vaudeville show. He
needs someone who can speak to crowds and go on television for him. That person is not Ms Harris.
One way she could serve her party and her country, and help keep Mr Trump out of the White House, would be to forswear another term as
a different kind of presidency, one in which he would share more responsibility with a vice-president acting more like a CEO. Either way, Mr
Biden needs the help of an army of enthusiastic Democrats willing to campaign alongside him. At the moment he and his party are
sleepwalking towards disaster.