Osmena v. Pendatun (1960)
Facts:
Congressman Sergio Osmeña Jr., herein petitioner, delivered his privilege speech before the House making
serious imputations of bribery against the President of the Philippines. Because of this, a Resolution was
issued authorizing the creation of special House Committee to investigate the truth of the charges made
against the President, to summon petitioner to substantiate his charges, and in case petitioner fails to do
so, to require petitioner to show cause why he should not be punished by the House.
Petitioner then resorted to the Court seeking for the annulment of said resolution on the ground that it
infringes his constitutional absolute parliamentary immunity for speeches delivered in the House.
Meanwhile, the Special Committee continued with its proceeding, and after giving petitioner a chance to
defend himself, found the latter guilty of seriously disorderly behavior. A House resolution was issued and
petitioner was suspended from office for 15 months.
Thereafter, respondents filed their answer challenging the jurisdiction of this Court to entertain the
petition, and defended the power of Congress to discipline its members with suspension.
Issue:
Whether the House Resolution violated petitioner’s constitutionally granted parliamentary immunity for
speeches
Ruling:
NO.
Section 15, Article VI of our Constitution provides that “for any speech or debate” in Congress, the Senators
or Members of the House of Representative “shall not be questioned in any other place.” This section was
taken or is a copy of sec. 6, clause 1 of Art. 1 of the Constitution of the United States. In that country, the
provision has always been understood to mean that although exempt from prosecution or civil actions for
their words uttered in Congress, the members of Congress may, nevertheless, be questioned in Congress
itself. Observe that “they shall not be questioned in any other place” than Congress.
Our Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity which is a fundamental privilege cherished in every
legislative assembly of the democratic world. As old as the English Parliament, its purpose “is to enable and
encourage a representative of the public to discharge his public trust with firmness and success” for “it is
indispensably necessary that he should enjoy the fullest liberty of speech, and that he should be protected
from the resentment of every one, however powerful, to whom exercise of that liberty may occasion
offense.” It guarantees the legislator complete freedom of expression without fear of being made
responsible in criminal or civil actions before the courts or any other forum outside of the Congressional
Hall. But it does not protect him from responsibility before the legislative body itself whenever his words
and conduct are considered by the latter disorderly or unbecoming a member thereof.
On the question whether delivery of speeches attacking the Chief Executive constitutes disorderly conduct
for which Osmeña may be discipline, We believe, however, that the House is the judge of what constitutes
disorderly behavior, not only because the Constitution has conferred jurisdiction upon it, but also because
the matter depends mainly on factual circumstances of which the House knows best but which cannot be
depicted in black and white for presentation to, and adjudication by the Courts.
Accordingly, the petition has to be, and is hereby dismissed.
Jimenez v. Cabangbang (1966)
Facts:
On November 14, 1958, defendant Cabangbang published an open letter to the President in several
newspapers of general circulation in the Philippines. The publication talked about the alleged operational
plans of the then Secretary of National Defense to launch his presidential career in 1961 elections.
Cabangbang's letter mentioned the names of Nicanor Jimenes and his comrades as subordinates to the
'Planners' behind the alleged operation. They sued Cabangbang for the crime of libel and sought financial
compensation for the damages caused by the letter. The defendant moved to dismiss the complaint on
the grounds that the letter was a privileged form of communication and that it was not libellous.
Issue:
Whether the contested publication could be classified as a privileged form of communication under the
provisions of sec. 15, Article VI of the Constitution.
Ruling:
No. Under the provisions of sec. 15, Article VI of the Constitution, "speech or debate therein" only refers
to the utterances made by Congress members in the performance of their official duties, such as
delivering speeches, making statements, or casting votes in the Congressional hall while the same is in
session. It could also refer to the introduction of bills in Congress, whether it is session or not, and other
acts performed by Congress members in their official capacity whether there was a session or not,
whether inside or outside the premises of one's office.
In the case at bar, the Court ruled that Cabangbang's letter cannot be classified as a privileged form of
communication because it was published during a time when the Congress was not in session. Moreover,
the defendant was not performing his official duty as either a member of Congress when he intended the
letter to be published. Therefore, the open letter was not privileged. Because of these reasons,
Cabangbang's open letter cannot be classified as a privileged form of communication.
Gravel v. US (1972)
In Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606 (1972), a United States senator acquired copies of classified, top
secret documents known as the Pentagon Papers. 408 U.S. at 609, 92 S. Ct. at 2619. After calling a
meeting of a Senate subcommittee, the Senator read aloud portions of the Papers and then placed the
entire study into the record. 408 U.S. at 609, 92 S. Ct. at 2619.
As a result, a federal grand jury began a criminal investigation of the release and publication of the
documents. 408 U.S. at 608, 92 S. Ct. at 2618.
Subpoenas were issued to an aide of the Senator and to an officer of the private publisher. 408 U.S. at
608, 92 S. Ct. at 2618. The Senator then intervened in the matter and opposed questions based on
privilege. 408 U.S. at 608, 92 S. Ct. at 2618.
The Gravel court agreed that the Clause prevented questioning of the senator as to his conduct at
hearings, his motives in revealing the contents of the papers, and his communications with his aides. 408
U.S. at 616, 92 S. Ct. at 2622. In addition, immunity shielded the congressional aides to the same extent
that a lawmaker would be privileged had the lawmaker done the act himself. 408 U.S. at 622, 92 S. Ct. at
2625.
Antonino v. Valencia (1974)
Facts
This case arose as an aftermath of the November 1963 local elections when the official candidate of the
Liberal Party (Lorenzo Sarmiento) for governor in Davao lost to the Nacionalista Party standard bearer
(Vicente Duterte), and plaintiff Gaudencio E. Antonino then a senator of the Republic and LP head in that
province attributed the loss of the LP candidate to the support given by defendant Brigido R. Valencia then
Secretary of Public Works and Communications to the independent LP candidate (Constancio Maglana)
which divided the LP votes. In public statements widely quoted in the metropolitan newspapers, plaintiff
stated that had not defendant "sabotaged" and "double-crossed" the LP, its official candidate would have
won the election.
On February 28, 1964, while plaintiff was still convalescing in the hospital from a heart attack on January
27, 1964 while attending a Senate session, he filed a formal request with the said Senate committee to
investigate the actions of defendant as Secretary of Public Works and Communications in connection with
certain specified alleged anomalous acquisitions of public works supplies and equipment, as follows: " 1.
The purchase by the department of 100 jeep-rollers costing P1,398,500 from the J.G.R. Enterprises covered
by DPWC purchase order No. A-2563; 2. The purchase of road signs from the Neils Enterprises making
available the P8 million reimbursable funds of the DPWC; 3. The purchase of 250,000 metric tons of cement
valued at $3,950,250 (M) from the Central Trust of China and the sale of such cement to private parties;
and
On the same day, March 5, 1964, a two-page press release was issued by the office of the Secretary of Public
Works and Communications, Exhibit A, and the contents thereof were published or reported on the front
pages of the six metropolitan papers.
Portions of the said published press release are quoted thus: " a) Since Senator Antonino has stubbornly
continued telling lies about me, I have no recourse but start telling the truth about him; b) This is no play of
words and in due time I will file charges against the Senator before the Blue Ribbon Committee for
reportedly anomalous acts that can make him a disgrace to his Senate position; c) . . . for personal selfish
reasons, Antonino had taken advantage of his position as a member of the Monetary Board and even as a
Senator; d) Antonino `had suspicious connections with no less than 22 corporations when he became a
member of the Monetary Board;' e) Is it not the height of abuse of power to threaten an American with
deportation and make him cover from getting a concession because you are a Senator of the Philippines
and in the end you get the concession yourself? and f) I cannot avoid unmasking certain alleged high
anomalous activities of the Senator as a member of the Monetary Board and as a member of the Philippine
Senate."3
Plaintiff then filed on March 23, 1964 the present civil action in the Manila court of first instance for the
recovery against defendant of P1 million as moral damages, P100,000 as exemplary or corrective damages
and P50,000 as litigation expenses and attorney's fees.
Defendant claimed in his answer that he did not issue or cause the publication of the press release; that at
any rate, they were made in good faith and in self-defense and that they were qualifiedly privileged in
character. He sought by way of counterclaim from plaintiff the sum of P1.25 million as moral damages,
P100,000 as exemplary or corrective damages and P50,000 as litigation expense and attorney's fees, which
plaintiff disclaimed in due course as without basis.
After due trial, the lower court ruled against defendant, holding that defendant caused and was liable for
the issuance of the libelous press release and its publication in the papers and rejected his defenses of
qualified privilege and defensive libel
Hence this direct appeal to this Court under the provisions of the Judiciary Act then in force as the amount
involved was more than P200,000 November 13, 1967 on the eve of the 1967 elections. As per the Court's
resolution of March 3, 1969, the motion of Senator Magnolia W. Antonino as administratrix to substitute
her deceased husband as plaintiff-appellee was granted.
Issue:
WON the press release is libelous and that it is not protected as a qualified privilege communication.
Ruling:
Yes, it is libelous and is not protected as qualified
On the question of fact, the Court finds that no error was committed by the trial court in finding that the
press release, Exhibit A, issued by the office of defendant as Secretary of Public Works and Communications
was issued or caused to be issued by him and the contents thereof to be published in the metropolitan
press and in not giving credence to defendant's vague denial and to the vague testimonies of two newsmen
Aproniano C.
The preponderance of the evidence of record, documentary and circumstantial, as marshalled by the trial
court in its decision clearly supports its finding of liability on defe
The issues of several Manila newspapers of March 5, 1964, reproduced the specific charges filed by the
plaintiff against the defendant with the Blue Ribbon Committee, which were numbered correlatively
On the upper left corner of Exhibit A was typewritten — `For release' and immediately underneath was the
date —`March 5, 1964'
At the bottom of the first page of Exhibit A appears the following: `Valencia answered point by point, the
charges made ag
The first sentence of the press release indicates the source thereof as the herein defendant, if not directly
at least impliedly
The second paragraph of the press release quoted a statement made by the
defendant reading as follows:
Since Senator Antonino has stubbornly continued telling lies about me, I have no recourse
but start telling the truth about him.
Defendant-appellant raises questions of fact and of law in his brief.
In his second and third assignments of error, defendant claims that the trial court erred in holding that the
press release is libelous and that it is not protected as a qualified privilege communication.
There can be no serious question as to the defamatory and libelous nature of the statements in defendant's
press release which depicted plaintiff as a consistent liar; that he prostituted his high public offices as
monetary board member and senator for personal ends and pecuniary gains; and imputed to him the
commission of certain serious offenses in violation of the Constitution and the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act.6
As defendant's imputations against plaintiff were not made privately nor officially as to be qualifiedly
privilege under Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code, the trial court correctly held that by virtue of their
defamatory and libelous nature against the honor, integrity and reputation of plaintiff, malice in law was
presumed.7 It further correctly ruled that defendant had not overcome such presumption of malice, not
having shown the truth thereof, or that they were published with good intentions and with justifiable motive
or even from the most liberal standpoint that they were made in the exercise of the right of fair comment
on the character, good faith, ability and sincerity of public officials.
The trial court aptly observed that "(A)t the time of the publication of the defamatory imputation,
the plaintiff was not a candidate for any public office there being no election to be held and his term of
office as Senator would not expire until several years more. As a member of the Senate of the Philippines,
he was answerable to said body for any misconduct committed as a Senator because it had the authority to
take disciplinary action against any member thereof. Had the defendant been prompted by a sense of duty,
and not because of malice, the charge at least with respect to the alleged threat made against an American,
should have been filed with the Senate or any of its Committees. The defendant did not do so but instead
made the accusations publicly by causing them to be given widest publication by all the metropolitan
newspapers, obviously in retaliation to the charge filed against him by the plaintiff with the Blue Ribbon.
Committee of the Senate."8
The trial court likewise properly rejected defendant-appellant's claim of defensive libel thus: "(S)tress had
also been laid by the defendant on the argument that he had been libeled by the plaintiff and accordingly
the former was justified to hit back with another libel. The emphasis laid had been misplaced and based
upon a wrong premise. The defendant was charged with the commission of certain anomalous
transactions in his capacity as Secretary of Public Works and Communications and the same were filed with
the Investigation Committee (Blue Ribbon) of the Senate of the Philippines and the Commission on
Appointments. Accordingly, the said charges, even assuming that they contain defamatory imputation,
would not be libelous because the letter sent by the plaintiff was a privileged communication."
Pobre v. Defensor (2009)
Senate v. Ermita (2006)
Executive privilege may only be invoked by the President. The President may not authorize her
subordinates to exercise such power.
While it is discretionary for executive officials to show up during question hour, it is mandatory for them to
show up during inquiries in aid of legislation.
FACTS:
This case is about the railway project of the North Luzon Railways Corporation with the China National
Machinery and Equipment Group as well as the Wiretapping activity of the ISAFP, and the Fertilizer scam.
The Senate Committees sent invitations to various officials of the Executive Department and AFP officials
for them to appear before Senate on Sept. 29, 2005. Before said date arrived, Executive Sec. Ermita sent
a letter to Senate President Drilon, requesting for a postponement of the hearing on Sept. 29 in order to
“afford said officials ample time and opportunity to study and prepare for the various issues so that they
may better enlighten the Senate Committee on its investigation.” Senate refused the request.
On Sept. 28, 2005, the President issued EO 464, effective immediately, which, among others, mandated
that “all heads of departments of the Executive Branch of the government shall secure the consent of the
President prior to appearing before either House of Congress.” Pursuant to this Order, Executive Sec.
Ermita communicated to the Senate that the executive and AFP officials would not be able to attend the
meeting since the President has not yet given her consent. Despite the lack of consent, Col. Balutan and
Brig. Gen. Gudani, among all the AFP officials invited, attended the investigation. Both faced court
marshal for such attendance.
ISSUE:
Whether E.O. 464 contravenes the power of inquiry vested in Congress.
RULING:
To determine the constitutionality of E.O. 464, the Supreme Court discussed the two different functions
of the Legislature: Th?e power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation and the power to conduct inquiry
during question hour.
Question Hour:
The power to conduct inquiry during question hours is recognized in Article 6, Section 22 of the 1987
Constitution, which reads:
“The heads of departments may, upon their own initiative, with the consent of the President, or upon the
request of either House, as the rules of each House shall provide, appear before and be heard by such
House on any matter pertaining to their departments. Written questions shall be submitted to the
President of the Senate or the Speaker of the House of Representatives at least three days before their
scheduled appearance. Interpellations shall not be limited to written questions, but may cover matters
related thereto. When the security of the State or the public interest so requires and the President so
states in writing, the appearance shall be conducted in executive session.”
The objective of conducting a question hour is to obtain information in pursuit of Congress’ oversight
function. When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how department heads are implementing the
statutes which it had issued, the department heads’ appearance is merely requested.
The Supreme Court construed Section 1 of E.O. 464 as those in relation to the appearance of department
heads during question hour as it explicitly referred to Section 22, Article 6 of the 1987 Constitution.
In aid of Legislation:
The Legislature’s power to conduct inquiry in aid of legislation is expressly recognized in Article 6,
section21 of the 1987 Constitution, which reads:
“The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in
aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing
in, or affected by, such inquiries shall be respected.”
The power of inquiry in aid of legislation is inherent in the power to legislate. A legislative body cannot
legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation
is intended to affect or change. And where the legislative body does not itself possess the requisite
information, recourse must be had to others who do possess it.
But even where the inquiry is in aid of legislation, there are still recognized exemptions to the power of
inquiry, which exemptions fall under the rubric of “executive privilege”. This is the power of the
government to withhold information from the public, the courts, and the Congress. This is recognized
only to certain types of information of a sensitive character. When Congress exercise its power of inquiry,
the only way for department heads to exempt themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege. They
are not exempt by the mere fact that they are department heads. Only one official may be exempted
from this power — the President.
Section 2 & 3 of E.O. 464 requires that all the public officials enumerated in Section 2(b) should secure
the consent of the President prior to appearing before either house of Congress. The enumeration is
broad. In view thereof, whenever an official invokes E.O.464 to justify the failure to be present, such
invocation must be construed as a declaration to Congress that the President, or a head of office
authorized by the President, has determined that the requested information is privileged.
The letter sent by the Executive Secretary to Senator Drilon does not explicitly invoke executive privilege
or that the matter on which these officials are being requested to be resource persons falls under the
recognized grounds of the privilege to justify their absence. Nor does it expressly state that in view of the
lack of consent from the President under E.O. 464, they cannot attend the hearing. The letter assumes
that the invited official possesses information that is covered by the executive privilege. Certainly,
Congress has the right to know why the executive considers the requested information privileged. It does
not suffice to merely declare that the President, or an authorized head of office, has determined that it is
so.
The claim of privilege under Section 3 of E.O. 464 in relation to Section 2(b) is thus invalid per se. It is not
asserted. It is merely implied. Instead of providing precise and certain reasons for the claim, it merely
invokes E.O. 464, coupled with an announcement that the President has not given her consent.
When an official is being summoned by Congress on a matter which, in his own judgment, might be
covered by executive privilege, he must be afforded reasonable time to inform the President or the
Executive Secretary of the possible need for invoking the privilege. This is necessary to provide the
President or the Executive Secretary with fair opportunity to consider whether the matter indeed calls for
a claim of executive privilege. If, after the lapse of that reasonable time, neither the President nor the
Executive Secretary invokes the privilege, Congress is no longer bound to respect the failure of the official
to appear before Congress and may then opt to avail of the necessary legal means to compel his
appearance.
Wherefore, the petitions are partly granted. Sections 2(b) and 3 of E.O. 464 are declared void. Section
1(a) are however valid.
Garcillano v. HR (2008)
FACTS: In 2005, tapes which allegedly contained a conversation between GMA and COMELEC
Commissioner Garcillano surfaced. The said conversation contained a plan to rig the elections to favor
GMA. The recordings then became subject to legislative hearings conducted separately by each House. In
his privilege speech, Sen. Escudero motioned a congressional investigation jointly conducted by the
Committees on Public Information, Public Order and Safety, National Defense and Security, Information
and Communications Technology, and Suffrage and Electoral Reforms (respondent House Committees).
During the inquiry, several versions of the wiretapped conversation emerged. Lacson’s motion for a senate
inquiry was referred to the Committee on National Defense and Security headed by Biazon. Garcillano
subsequently filed 2 petitions. One to prevent the playing of the tapes in the each house for they are
alleged to be inadmissible and the other to prohibit and stop the conduct of the Senate inquiry on the
wiretapped conversation.
ISSUE: Whether or not to grant the petitions of Garci.
HELD: Garci’s petition to strike the tapes off the record cannot be granted. The tapes were already played
in Congress and those tapes were already highly publicized. The issue is already overtaken by these
incidents hence it has become moot and academic. The second petition must be granted however. The
Senate cannot be allowed to continue with the conduct of the questioned legislative inquiry without duly
published rules of procedure, in clear derogation of the constitutional requirement. Section 21, Article VI
of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that “[t]he Senate or the House of Representatives, or any of
its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published
rules of procedure.” The requisite of publication of the rules is intended to satisfy the basic requirements
of due process. Publication is indeed imperative, for it will be the height of injustice to punish or
otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law or rule of which he had no notice whatsoever,
not even a constructive one. What constitutes publication is set forth in Article 2 of the Civil Code, which
provides that “[l]aws shall take effect after 15 days following the completion of their publication either in
the Official Gazette, or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines.” The Senate admits in their
pleadings and even on oral argument that the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of
Legislation had been published in newspapers of general circulation only in 1995 and in 2006. With
respect to the present Senate of the 14th Congress, however, of which the term of half of its members
commenced on June 30, 2007, no effort was undertaken for the publication of these rules when they first
opened their session. The petition in G.R. No. 170338 is DISMISSED, and the petition in G.R. No. 179275 is
GRANTED. Let a writ of prohibition be issued enjoining the Senate of the Republic of the Philippines
and/or any of its committees from conducting any inquiry in aid of legislation centered on the "Hello
Garci" tapes.
Dela Paz v. Senate (2009)
Facts:
In October 2008, Gen. Eliseo Dela Paz, a senior officer of the PNP, headed a delegation of eight to attend
an Interpol General Assembly. Dela Paz brought with him his wife. Three days after the scheduled Interpol
assembly, Dela Paz was also to retire. After the assembly, Dela Paz was apprehended in the departure
area for he was carrying with him €105,000.00 (P6,930,000.00). He was also carrying with him €45,000.00
(P2,970,000.00). He failed to declare in writing that he is carrying such an amount and this is in violation
of the United Nations Convention Against Corruption and the United Nations Convention Against
Transnational Organized Crime. Dela Paz and his group was later released but the Euros were confiscated
by the Russians. Upon arrival in the Philippines, Dela Paz was issued a subpoena by the Senate Committee
on Foreign Relations for the investigation it was to conduct involving the Moscow incident. Instead of
appearing before the senate committee, Dela Paz averred that the said committee does not have
jurisdiction of the case. Dela Paz argued that the Committee is devoid of any jurisdiction to investigate
the Moscow incident as the matter does not involve state to state relations as provided in paragraph 12,
Section 13, Rule 10 of the Senate Rules of Procedure (Senate Rules). Later, the committee issued a
warrant of arrest against Dela Paz (his wife?). Dela Paz questioned the warrant as he claimed that the
Senate Rules required the signatures of the majority of the members of the Committee which was not
obtained in this case.
ISSUE: Whether or not the said Committee has jurisdiction over the matter.
HELD: Yes. The SC ruled against Dela Paz. Section 16(3), Article VI of the Philippine Constitution states:
“Each House shall determine the rules of its proceedings.” This provision has been traditionally construed
as a grant of full discretionary authority to the Houses of Congress in the formulation, adoption and
promulgation of its own rules. The challenge to the jurisdiction of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, raised by petitioner in the case at bench, in effect, asks this Court to inquire into a matter
that is within the full discretion of the Senate. The issue partakes of the nature of a political question.
Also, the signatures were properly obtained as evidenced by the approval of the Senate president and it is
shown that the gathering of the signatures is in accordance with the Rules. It is also shown that the Rules
of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation were also published in two newspapers of general
circulation.
The warrant of arrest became ineffectual because Dela Paz voluntarily appeared prior to his arrest.
Senate Blue Ribbon v. Judge Majaducon (2003)
Facts:
This case had its aegis when the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee conducted an inquiry into the alleged
mismanagement of the funds and investment of the Armed Forces Retirement and Separation Benefits
System (AFP-RSBS). During the public hearings by the Blue Ribbon Committee, it appeared that the AFP-
RSBS purchased a lot from Atty. Nilo J. Flaviano worth P10,500 per square meter. However, the deed of
sale filed with the Register of Deeds indicated that the purchase price of the lot was only P3,000 per square
meter. The Committee caused the service of a subpoena to Atty. Flaviano, directing him to appear and
testify before it. Respondent refused to appear and filed a petition for prohibition and preliminary
injunction with prayer for temporary restraining order with the RTC of General Santos City. The trial court
issued a TRO directing the committee to cease and desist from proceeding with the inquiry. The Committee
filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction and failure to state a valid cause of action.
The Trial Court denied the motion to dismiss. Hence, this petition for certiorari alleging that Judge
Majaducon committed grave abuse of discretion and acted without or in excess of jurisdiction.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent Judge Jose Majaducon committed grave abuse of discretion when he dismissed
the petition for prohibition and issued the writ of preliminary injunction.
Ruling:
The assailed resolution of respondent Judge Majaducon was issued without legal basis. The principle of
separation of powers essentially means that legislation belongs to Congress, execution to the Executive,
and settlement of legal controversies to the Judiciary. Each is prevented from invading the domain of the
others. When the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee served subpoena on respondent Flaviano to appear and
testify before it in connection with its investigation of the alleged misuse and mismanagement of the AFPRSBS funds, it did so pursuant to its authority to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. This is clearly
provided in Article 6, Section 21 of the 1987 Constitution:
The Senate of the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid
of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or
affected by such inquiries shall be respected.
Hence, the RTC of General Santos City, or any court for that matter, had no authority to prohibit the
Committee from requiring respondent t appear and testify before it.
Also, the ruling in Bengzon vs. Blue Ribbon Committee cited by the respondent does not apply in this case.
The factual circumstances therein are different from those in the case at bar. In Bengzon, no intended
legislation was involved and the subject matter of the inquiry was more within the province of the courts
rather than the legislature. On the other hand, there was in this case a clear legislative purpose, and this is
to look into the reported misuse and mismanagement of the AFP-RSBS funds, with the intention of enacting
appropriate legislation to protect the rights and interests of the officers and members of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines.
Wherefore, the petition is GRANTED.
Arnault v. Nazareno (1950)
FACTS:
In October 1949, the Philippine Government, through the Rural Progress Administration, bought two
estates known as Buenavista and Tambobong for P4.5M and P0.5M respectively, or for an aggregate
amount of P5M. Of this sum, P1.5M was paid to Ernest H. Burt, a nonresident American, supposedly as
payment for his interest in the two aforementioned estates. Jean L. Arnaut, Burt's representative in the
Philippines, collected the sum of P1.5M in the form of checks. From this amount, he encashed P400,000,
which he eventually gave to an undisclosed person as per Burt's instructions.
It turned out, however, that these transactions were dubious in nature. For one, both estates were already
owned by the Philippine Government, so there was no need to repurchase them for P5M. Second, Burt's
interest in both estates amounted to only P20,000, which he wasn't even entitled to because of his failure
to pay off his previous loans.
A Senate investigation was thereafter held to determine how the Philippine Government was duped and
who ultimately benefited from the assailed transaction. One of the issues pursued was to whom did Arnault
give the cash amounting to P400,000. Arnault's refusal to provide the name of the person, initially because
he couldn't remember it and later for fear of self-incrimination, led to his being cited for contempt. He was
thereafter held in prison, and was to be freed only after saying the name of the person he gave the
P400,000 to.
Subsequently, Arnault filed this instant petition for habeas corpus in an apparent bid to be freed from
imprisonment.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the Senate has the power to punish Arnault for contempt.
2. Whether or not the Senate can impose punishment beyond the legislative session.
3. Whether or not Arnault can invoke the right against self-incrimination as an excuse in not answering the
question he is being asked in the Senate.
HELD:
Before delving into the issues at hand, the Court laid down some general principles of law:
•
•
The Philippine Constitution is patterned after the US Constitution. But despite similarities in the
basic structure of government, one essential difference is that the Philippine legislative department
is more powerful than its US counterpart, in the sense that the latter shares power with the
congresses of individual states.
The power of inquiry -- with process to enforce it -- is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the
legislative function of the Philippine congress. Although there are no express provisions in the
constitution that invest either the House or the Senate with the power to conduct investigations
and exact testimony, such power is implied.
1. Yes, the Court ruled that such power is necessary, especially in the conduct of inquiries that fall within
the Senate's jurisdiction (see [b] above). With this in mind, it is not a requirement that each and every single
question asked of witnesses necessarily be material to the case. This is so because the necessity or lack of
necessity for legislative action and the form and character of the action itself are determined by the sum
total of the information to be gathered as a result of the investigation, and not by a fraction of such
information elicited from a single question.
2. In the instant case, the resolution holding Arnault for contempt was issued on May 15, 1950. He was
subsequently detained for 13 days, or beyond the legislative session of Congress, which session ended on
May 18 of the same year. Arnault claimed that his continued detention had no legal basis, since the body
that issued the resolution had already been dissolved by law. But the Court ruled that the Senate is a
continuing body and does not cease to exist upon the periodical dissolution of the Congress. As such, there
is no time limit to the Senate's power to punish for contempt in cases where that power may be
constitutionally exerted.
3. No, the Court held that Arnault's invocation of the right against self-incrimination has no basis. Arnault
failed in discharging his duty of providing frank, sincere, and truthful testimony before a competent
authority -- a violation of the State's right to exact fulfillment of a citizen's obligation. When a specific right
and a specific obligation conflict with each other, and one is doubtful or uncertain while the other is clear
and imperative, the former must give way to the latter.
PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS DISMISSED.
Sabio v. Gordon (2006)
On February 20, 2006, Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago introduced Senate Res. No. 455 directing an
inquiry in aid of legislation on the anomalous losses incurred by the Philippines Overseas
Telecommunications Corporation (POTC), Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation
(PHILCOMSAT), and PHILCOMSAT Holdings Corporation (PHC) due to the alleged improprieties in their
operations by their respective Board of Directors. Pursuant to this, on May 8, 2006, Senator Richard
Gordon, wrote Chairman Camilo Sabio of the PCGG inviting him to be one of the resource persons in the
public meeting jointly conducted by the Committee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises
and Committee on Public Services. Chairman Sabio declined the invitation because of prior commitment.
At the same time, he invoked Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 “No member or staff of the Commission shall be
required to testify or produce evidence in any judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding concerning
matters within its official cognizance.” Apparently, the purpose is to ensure PCGG’s unhampered
performance of its task. Gordon’s Subpoena Ad Testificandum was repeatedly ignored by Sabio hence he
threatened Sabio to be cited in contempt.
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 4 of EO No. 1 is constitutional.
HELD: No. It can be said that the Congress’ power of inquiry has gained more solid existence and
expansive construal. The Court’s high regard to such power is rendered more evident in Senate v. Ermita,
where it categorically ruled that “the power of inquiry is broad enough to cover officials of the executive
branch.” Verily, the Court reinforced the doctrine in Arnault that “the operation of government, being a
legitimate subject for legislation, is a proper subject for investigation” and that “the power of inquiry is
co-extensive with the power to legislate”. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State
adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.
Article III, Section 7
The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official
records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to
government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to
such limitations as may be provided by law.
These twin provisions of the Constitution seek to promote transparency in policy-making and in the
operations of the government, as well as provide the people sufficient information to enable them to
exercise effectively their constitutional rights. Armed with the right information, citizens can participate in
public discussions leading to the formulation of government policies and their effective implementation.
Fabian v. Disyerto (1998)
FACTS: Petitioner Teresita G. Fabian was the major stockholder and president of PROMAT Construction
Development Corporation (PROMAT) which participated in the bidding for government construction
projects including those under the First Manila Engineering District (FMED), and private respondent Nestor
V. Agustin, incumbent District Engineer, reportedly taking advantage of his official position, inveigled
petitioner into an amorous relationship. After misunderstandings and unpleasant incidents, Fabian
eventually filed the aforementioned administrative case against Agustin in a letter-complaint. The Graft
Investigator of the Ombudsman issued a resolution finding private respondent guilty of grave misconduct
and ordering his dismissal from the service with forfeiture of all benefits under the law. On a motion for
reconsideration, Agustin was exonerated of the administrative charges.
In the present appeal, petitioner argues that Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of
1989) pertinently provides that —
In all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may
be appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a petition for certiorari within ten (10) days from receipt of the
written notice of the order, directive or decision or denial of the motion for reconsideration in accordance
with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court (Emphasis supplied)
ISSUE#1: Can the Court resolve the constitutionality of Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 not raised in
the trial?
HELD#1: YES.
Constitutional questions, not raised in the regular and orderly procedure in the trial are ordinarily rejected
unless the jurisdiction of the court below or that of the appellate court is involved in which case it may be
raised at any time or on the court’s own motion. The Court ex mero motu may take cognizance of lack of
jurisdiction at any point in the case where that fact is developed. The court has a clearly recognized right
to determine its own jurisdiction in any proceeding.
ISSUE#2: Is Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 unconstitutional?
HELD#2: YES.
Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 cannot validly authorize an appeal to this Court from decisions of the
Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases. It consequently violates the proscription in
Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution against a law which increases the appellate jurisdiction of this
Court. No countervailing argument has been cogently presented to justify such disregard of the
constitutional prohibition which, as correctly explained in First Lepanto Ceramics, Inc. vs. The Court of
Appeals, et al. was intended to give this Court a measure of control over cases placed under its appellate
jurisdiction. Otherwise, the indiscriminate enactment of legislation enlarging its appellate jurisdiction
would unnecessarily burden the Court.
As a consequence of our ratiocination that Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 should be struck down as
unconstitutional, and in line with the regulatory philosophy adopted in appeals from quasi-judicial agencies
in the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, appeals from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in
administrative disciplinary cases should be taken to the Court of Appeals under the provisions of Rule 43.
All sections of legislative department
Art 17
Executive Department