BASIC LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS
MIDTERM REVIEWER
Note: Use this formula to answer
the questions in the exam:
A – Yes/No, because. . .
L – Case/Jurisprudence/Law
A – Apply/Argue
C – Hence, therefore. . .
Do not write
booklet.
behind
the
test
Revised Lawyer’s Oath
I, do solemnly swear, that I
uphold
the
honor,
duty,
privilege, and responsibility of
practicing
law
in
the
Philippines as an officer of the
court in the interest of our
people.
I
declare
fealty
to
the
Constitution of the Republic of
the Philippines.
In
so
doing,
I
shall
work
towards promoting the rule of
law
in
a
regime
of
truth,
justice,
freedom,
love,
equality, and peace.
I
shall
conscientiously
and
courageously work for justice
and
safeguard
the
meaningful
freedoms
of
all
persons,
identities, and communities. I
shall ensure greater and equal
access to justice.
I shall
shall I
unjustly
anyone.
do no falsehood nor
pervert the law to
favor
or
prejudice
I
shall
faithfully
discharge
these
duties
and
responsibilities to the best of
my ability, with
utmost civility.
integrity and
I impose all these upon myself
without mental reservation nor
purpose of evasion, so help me
God.
Importance of the Legal
Profession
Article
III
of
the
1987
Constitution
enumerates
the
rights of all citizens which
must
be
safeguarded
and
protected
(Susan
Ate
Burger
Patties, Chips, Eggs, and Drank
Float). The law also provides
for the rights of the accused
(Pinili ni Ina Pumatay, Trabaho
Eto,
Cailangang
Cailangan
Sa
Abroad).
It
is
the
responsibility of a lawyer to
ensure
that
his
client
is
afforded
an
opportunity
to
defend himself and exercise all
the rights enshrined in the
Constitution and the statutes.
In Telan v. Court of Appeals,
where the petitioner argued that
the representation by a fake
lawyer was a violation of his
due process of law, the Court
upheld
the
petitioner.
The
latter was deprived of the right
to counsel, which in civil cases
exists just as forcefully in
criminal cases. In the case of
an ongoing litigation, it is a
right that must be exercised at
every step of the way.
Furthermore, the Court also held
that to demand as much from
ordinary
citizens
whose
only
compelle intrare is their sense
of right would turn the legal
system
into
an
intimidating
monstrosity where an individual
would be stripped of his rights
not because he has no right, but
because he does not know how to
establish such right.
Legal Ethics
Definition


It is the embodiment of all
principles of morality that
governs the conduct of every
member of the Bar.
It refers to the branch of
moral science which treats of
the duty of an attorney to
the
society,
his
clients,
fellow
colleagues
in
the
profession, and the Court.
In Director of Lands v. Ababa,
the
Court
held
that
the
agreement
between
respondent
lawyer and his client that in
lieu of monetary compensation,
the latter is obliged to give
the former a half of whatever he
might recover should his case
prosper is valid and does not
violate the provisions of the
Canon of Professional Ethics.
Contingent fees may be a portion
of the property in litigation,
provided
that
the
sale
or
assignment
must
take
effect
after finality of a favorable
judgment.
Practice of Law
Rule 139-A of the Rules of Court
provides for the Integrated Bar
of
the
Philippines,
which
purposes is to:
1. Elevate the standards of
legal profession
2. Improve the administration
of justice
3. Enable the Bar to discharge
its public responsibility
more effectively
Section 9 provides the mandate
of
paying
annual
membership
dues.
Section 10 states that failure
to pay dues for six months shall
warrant SUSPENSION and default
in such payment is ground for
REMOVAL of the name in the Roll
of Attorneys.
Section 11 allows a member to
terminate
his
membership,
afterwhich his name shall be
stricken by the Court from the
Roll of Attorneys.
In Cayetano v. Monsod, where the
petitioner challenged Monsod’s
appointment to the COMELEC for
allegedly not satisfying the 10year requirement of practice of
law,
the
Court
held
that
respondent’s stint as lawyereconomist, lawyer-negotiator of
contracts, and lawyer-legislator
more
than
satisfy
the
constitutional requirement that
he has been engaged in the
practice of law.
The Court defined the practice
of law as any activity in or out
of court, which requires the
application
of
law,
legal
principles,
practice
or
procedure, and calls for legal
knowledge,
training,
and
experience.
In
Philippine
Lawyers
Association v. Agrava, the Court
held that appearance before the
Patent
Office
constitutes
practice
of
law.
Hence,
applicants are only required to
meet the minimum requirements
set by the Court:
1. Member
of
the
Bar
authorized by the Supreme
Court to practice law
2. In good standing
In Ulep v. Legal Clinic, the
Court ruled that respondent is
engaged in the practice of law,
despite arguing that it merely
operated
complex
computer
systems
and
employed
nondiagnostic
processes
in
its
legal
support
services.
It
further stated that the best
form of advertisement is a wellmerited
reputation
for
professional
capacity
and
fidelity to trust, which must be
earned
as
the
outcome
of
character and conduct.
A lawyer may also cause his name
to be published in a reputable
law list primarily for that
matter. It shall include details
such as his address, educational
background,
law
firm
or
associates, and client’s names
after being consented.
A
simple
professional
card
including his name, address, and
branch
of
specialization
may
also be done.
In Khan Jr., v. Simbillo, where
respondent allegedly advertised
his
legal
services
in
a
laudatory
manner,
the
Court
ruled that such advertisement is
in violation of the CPR. The
practice
of
law
is
not
a
business.
The
following
distinguishes
the
legal
profession from a business:
1. Duty to public service
2. Duty to the client in the
highest degree of fiduciary
3. Duty as an officer of the
court to the administration
of
justice
involving
thorough
sincerity,
integrity, and reliability
4. Duty
to
his
colleagues
characterized
by
candor,
fairness, and unwillingness
to
resort
to
business
methods of advertising and
encroachment
on
their
practice.
Regulation of the Practice of
Law
Section 5(5), Art. VIII vests
the
power
to
regulate
the
practice of law in the Supreme
Court. It includes determining
who may be admitted to the bar,
the qualifications for taking
the
bar
examination,
among
others.
In
Re
Integration
of
the
Philippine Bar, the Court upheld
the
constitutionality
of
the
integration of all lawyers in
the country under one unified
organization.
Membership
is
compulsory
because
complete
unification
is
not
possible
without an authority to regulate
it – the State. Furthermore,
integration is not violative of
the
freedom
of
association
because it does not compel a
lawyer to become a member of any
group of which he is already a
member. It also does not violate
freedom of speech and expression
as
it
does
not
regulate
positions taken by lawyers even
if it goes against that of the
IBP. The payment of dues is made
compulsory as this is the result
of being a member – in order to
defray the costs of regulating
the body and contributing to the
welfare of the entire lawyering
community.
In Re Edillon, the court upheld
the
constitutionality
and
validity of the Integrated Bar,
its compulsory membership, and
annual dues mandated from its
members. The Integrated Bar is a
“State-organized
Bar”,
differentiated
from
that
of
other
associations
where
membership
is
voluntary.
Integration to the Bar is an
opportunity
giben
to
every
member
to
do
his
share
in
carrying out the objectives of
the
Bar.
It
is
within
the
prerogative of the Court, as
authorized by the Constitution,
to promulgate rules concerning
the admission to the practice of
law and the integration of the
Bar. The mandate of annual dues
is but necessary to defray the
expenses of regulation of the
profession to which they belong.
In Re Cunanan, the Court ruled
on the constitutionality of RA
972 or the Bar Flunkers Act of
1952, which sought to fix the
passing
marks
for
the
Bar
Examinations from 1946 to 1955.
The Court upheld the validity of
the provision for 1953 to 1955,
while
invoking
as
unconstitutional that for 1946
to 1951, since the law admitted
that the petitioners failed to
pass
due
to
inadequate
preparation. It also struck down
the provision on Section 2,
which provides that any student
with a grade of 75 for any
subject shall be considered as
to
have
already
passed
the
subject, which shall apply for
an indefinite period of time.
Such legislation encroaches on
the
power
of
the
Court
to
regulate the admission to the
practice of law.
Admission to the Practice of Law
1. Must have been admitted to
the Bar
2. Must be in good
(paying
his
membership dues)
standing
annual
Requirements of Applicants
the Bar (Rule 138, Rules
Court)
to
of
1. Natural-born citizen of the
Philippines
2. At least 21 years of age
3. Ofgood moral character
4. Resident of the Philippines
5. Produce
satisfactory
evidence before the Supreme
Court
of
good
moral
character
6. No charges involving moral
turpitude
Additional
7. Academic requirements
8. Must have passed the Bar
9. Taken the Lawyer’s oath
10.
Sign
the
roll
of
attorneys
In Bueno v. Atty. Raneses, where
respondent allegedly asked for
money from his petitioner in an
attempt to bribe the judge, but
where no bribery took place; and
on top of that did not submit
the
necessary
documents
when
required
in
his
client’s
defense, the Court ruled that
respondent
is
guilty
of
extracting money from his client
for
a
fraudulent
purpose.
Respondent is DISBARRED from the
practice of law.
Additional
Requirements
other Applicants
for
1. Must
satisfactorily
show
that they have regularly
studied law for four years.
(Section
5.
Additional
requirements
for
other
applicants, Rule 138)
2.
Certificate that he had
completed in an authorized
college
requiring
for
admission to the completion
of a four-year high school
course, the course of study
prescribed therein for a
bachelor’s degree. (Section
6. Pre-Law, Rule 138)
2. Payment
of
professional
tax
3. Completion of at least 36
hours
of
mandatory
continuing legal education
4. Re-taking of the lawyer’s
oath
In
Re
Application
for
the
Philippine
Bar
(Vicente
D.
Ching),
where
petitioner
challenged the denial of the
Court to allow him to take the
lawyer’s oath due to him not
having
elected
Philippine
citizenship
within
the
reasonable time allotted, the
Court denied the petition. It
ruled that although petitioner
elected Philippine citizenship
after 14 years, the said time
period
was
not
reasonable
enough. Philippine citizenship
can never be treated like a
commodity that can be claimed
when needed and suppressed when
convenient.
In Bar Matter No. 712 (Al C.
Argosino),
petitioner
was
convicted with the crime of
homicide in connection with the
death of Raul Camaligan due to
hazing.
He
was
granted
probation,
afterwhich
he
petitioned to take the Bar exam.
Petitioner
however,
was
not
allowed to take the lawyer’s
oath.
The
Court
ruled
that
petitioner must provide evidence
that he may now be regarded as
complying with the requirement
of good moral character. The
practice
of
law
is
not
a
natural,
absolute
or
constitutional
right
to
be
granted to everyone who demands
it.
Rather,
it
is
a
high
personal privilege limited to
citizens
of
good
moral
character,
with
special
educational qualifications, duly
ascertained and certified.
In Petition for Leave to Resume
Practice
of
Law
(Benjamin
Dacanay),
petitioner
was
a
practicing
lawyer
before
he
migrated to Canada for medical
treatment.
He
acquired
a
Canadian citizenship to avail of
the free medical program. After
sometime, he decided to go back
to the Philippines and sought to
practice
law
again
by
reacquiring
his
Filipino
citizenship. The Court granted
his petition and reiterated the
requirements for a Filipino who
has re-acquired his citizenship
and wishes to practice law:
1. Updating and payment in
full
of
the
annual
membership due in the IBP;
Good Moral Character
In Rayong v. Oblena, the Court
ruled
that
the
act
of
fornication
by
respondent
committed under scandalous or
revolting circumstances as to
shock common sense of decency,
may justify positive action by
the
Court
in
disbarring
respondent. The qualification of
good moral character is equally
essential during the continuance
of the practice and the exercise
of the privilege.
Graduate of a Foreign Law School
In
Re
Adriano
Hernandez,
petitioner is a Filipino citizen
with a degree of jurisd doctor
from a school in New York and
passed the New York bar. He
subsequently took bar subjects
in Ateneo Law School and a 5month bar review course there.
The
Court
held
that
the
applicant was allowed to take
the bar exam with high regard of
Filipinos with the same case.
Thereafter, the Court added that
all applicants must comply with
the requirement stipulated under
Sec. 5 and Sec. 6 of Rule 138
including
the
completion
to
study
law
in
any
of
the
Philippine-accredited
law
schools.
Law Student Practice
Under Rule 138-A of the Rules of
Court, the Court allows limited
practice of law by students.
1. Level
1
–
For
all
law
students
who
have
successfully completed their
first year law courses
a. Interview
prospective
clients
b. Give legal advice to the
client
c. Negotiate for and on behalf
of the client
d. Draft legal documents such
as affidavits, compromise
agreements,
contracts,
demand
letter,
position
papers, etc.
e. Represent eligible parties
before
quasi-judicial
or
administrative bodies
f. Provide
public
legal
orientation
g. Assist in public interest
advocacies
for
policy
formulation
and
implementation
2. Level
2
–
For
all
law
students currently enrolled
for the second semester of
their third year. Where a
student fails to complete all
third year courses, the Level
2
certification
shall
be
revoked.
a. Perform
all
activities
under Level 1 certification
b. Assist
in
taking
of
depositions
and/or
preparing
judicial
affidavits of witnesses
c. Appear on behalf of the
client at any stage of the
proceedings
or
trial,
before any court, quasijudicial, or administrative
body
d. In
criminal
cases,
to
appear
on
behalf
of
a
government agency in the
prosecution
of
criminal
actions
e. In appealed cases, prepare
pleadings required in the
case
In Bar Matter No. 730, the RTC
judge questioned the absence of
a
supervising
lawyer
in
assisting the law student who
appeared
before
his
sala.
Section 2 of Rule 138-A provides
that a law student must always
be assisted by a supervising
lawyer at all stages. The Court
held that in inferior courts
where the issues and procedures
are relatively simple, the law
sudent may appear before it
unaccompanied.
Right of a Party to Represent
Himself
GR: Only those who are licensed
to practice law can appear and
handle cases in court.
XPNs:
1. Before the MTC – A party may
conduct
his
case
or
litigation in person with the
aid of an agent or friend
appointed by him.
2. Before any other court – A
party
may
conduct
his
litigation personally. He is
bound by the same rules in
conducting the trial of his
case.
He
cannot,
after
judgment, claim that he was
not properly represented.
3. In a criminal case before the
MTC – In a locality where a
duly-licensed member of the
Bar is not available, the
judge may appoint a nonlawyer who is a resident of
that province, of good repute
for probity and ability to
represent the accused in his
defense.
4. Student Practice Rule – Those
with Level 1 and Level 2
Certification
may
appear
without compensation in any
civil,
criminal,
or
administrative
case
before
any trial court, tribunal,
board
or
officer,
to
represent
indigent
clients
accepted by the Legal Clinic
of the school.
5. Under the Labor Code – Nonlawyers may appear before the
NLRC if they:
a. Represent themselves
b. Represent
their
organization
or
members
thereof
6. Cadastral Court
– A nonlawyer
or
layman
may
represent a claimant before
it
7. Any official or other person
appointed to appear for the
Government – In accordance
with law, shall have all the
rights of a duly-authorized
member of the bar in any case
in which said government has
an interest
Limitations in the Appearance of
a Layman on Behalf of Another:
a. Layman should confine his
work
to
non-adversary
contentions. He should not
undertake purely legal work
such
as
examination
of
witness or presentation of
evidence
b. Services
should
not
be
habitually rendered
c. Should
not
charge
or
collect attorney’s fees
Right of Party to Represent
Himself
CIVIL CASES
Individual
litigant
has
the
right
to
conduct
his
litigation
personally
He will still
be bound by the
same rules of
procedure
and
evidence
as
those
applicable to a
party appearing
with counsel
He may not be
heard
to
complain
later
that
he
has
been
deprived
of the right to
the
assistance
CRIMINAL CASES
Grave and less
grave offenses:
An accused must
always
appear
by counsel. He
cannot
conduct
his
own
defense, as the
right
to
counsel may not
be
waived
without
violating
his
right
JURIDICAL
PERSON
GR:
It
must
always
appear
in court with a
duly-licensed
member of the
Bar.
XPN:
In
the
MTC, it may be
represented
by
its
agent
or
officer who is
not a lawyer.
of counsel.
Disability of
to Practice
Public
Officials
The appointment or election to a
government office disqualifies
one to practice law.
a. Public office is a public
trust.
b. Avoids conflict of interest
c. Assures
the
people
of
impartiality
in
the
performance
of
public
functions, thereby promote
public welfare
When any of the public officials
are absolutely prohibited, they
cease as a general rule, to
engage in the private practice
of law and the right to practice
is suspended during tenure of
office.
Lawyer-members
of
the
legislature are not absolutely
prohibited.
They
are
only
prohibited
from
appearing
as
counsel in:
a. Any court of justice
b. Electoral tribunals
c. Quasi-judicial
administrative bodies
or
What
is
prohibited
is
to
personally appear. It includes:
1. Arguing a case before any
such body
2. Filing a pleading in behalf
of a client as “by simply
filing a formal motion,
plea, or answer”
He cannot allow his name to
appear
in
such
pleading
by
himself or as part of a firm
name under the signature of
another
qualified
lawyer,
because the signature of the
agent amounts to signing of a
non-qualified
Senator
or
Congressman, the office of an
attorney
being
originally
of
agency, and becausr he will be
appearing in court or quasijudicial or administrative body
in
violation
of
the
constitutional restriction.
Restriction in the Practice of
Law
of
the
Members
of
the
Sanggunian
1. Appearing as counsel before
any court in any civil
case, wherein an LGU or any
office,
agency,
or
instrumentality
of
the
government is the adverse
party
2. Appearing as counsel in any
criminal case wherein an
officer of employee of the
national
or
local
government is accused of an
offense
committed
in
relation to his office
3. Collecting
any
fee
for
their
appearance
in
administrative proceedings
involving the LGU of which
he is an official
4. Use property and personnel
of the government, except
when the Sanggunian member
concerned is defending the
interest of the government
However, Sanggunian members may
practice
their
professions,
engage in any occupation, teach
in
schools,
except
during
session hours.
CANON I
INDEPENDENCE
Ledesma v. Climaco
DECISION:
petition.
SC
denied
the
DOCTRINE: Membership to the bar
is a privilege burdened with
conditions.
The
law
is
a
profession, not a trade or a
craft.
FACTS: Petitioner Atty. Ledesma
was a counsel de parte for two
defendants in a criminal charge.
On October 13, 1964, petitioner
was appointed Election Registrar
for the municipality of Cadiz,
Negros
Occidental.
He
subsequently filed a motion to
withdraw, which was denied by
the respondent Judge. The latter
further appointed the petitioner
as
counsel
de
oficio.
On
November
3,
1964,
petitioner
filed
an
urgent
motion
to
withdraw alleging that his job
at the COMELEC requires full
time service and that he had
large volume and pressure of
work.
Respondent
denied
the
same, hence this petition.
ISSUE: WON a member of the bar
may
withdraw
as
counsel
de
oficio for being an Elections
Registrar?
RULING: No. The ends of justice
would
be
met
by
requiring
petitioner to be counsel de
oficio considering that he has
postponed the proceedings for
eight
times.
There
is
no
incompatibility between the duty
of petitioner to the accused and
to the court and performance of
his
task
as
an
election
registrar.
To
avoid
any
frustration
of
justice,
especially
in
the
case
of
indigent defendant, a lawyer may
be required to act as a counsel
de oficio.
The doctrine is found in People
v.
Daban,
“The
law
is
a
profession,
craft.”
not
a
trade
or
a
People v. Rosqueta
DECISION: Suspension of Atty.
Estacio
is
lifted.
The
requirement to file brief is
dispensed
with,
but
Atty.
Estacio
is
censured
for
negligence and inattention to
duty. Appeal is dismissed.
DOCTRINE: Law is a
and not a mere trade.
profession
FACTS: Atty. Estacio is counsel
de parte for apellants in a
criminal case. The Court issued
a resolution on May 25, 1973
requiring him to show cause why
disciplinary action should not
be taken against him for failure
to file the brief for appellants
on time. Atty. Estacio failed to
show cause and on September 7,
1973, the Court suspended him
from practice. On October 22,
1973, Atty. Estacio filed a
motion
for
reconsideration,
explaining that he was able to
draft the brief, but left it on
June 9, 1973 with his clients’
relatives to be mailed. The
latter were not able to mail the
same because their house caught
fire. On December 27, 1973, the
defendants filed a motion to
withdraw appeal after informing
Atty.
Estacio
of
the
same
because they could not afford
it.
ISSUE: WON Atty. Estacio
guilty of negligence?
is
RULING: Yes. He should be aware
that even in cases where counsel
de parte is unable to secure the
amount necessary to pursue the
appeal,
that
does
not
necessarily
conclude
his
connection with the case. He
should be aware that in the
pursuance of the duty owed this
Court, as well as to a client,
he cannot be too casual and
unconcerned about the filing of
pleadings. It is not enough that
he prepares them, he must see to
it that they are duly mailed.
People v. Estebia
DECISION: Atty. Lope Adriano is
suspended for one year.
DOCTRINE: Duty of counsel de
oficio to perform due diligence,
not mere perfunctory function.
FACTS:
Atty.
Adriano
was
appointed counsel de oficio for
defendant Estebia convicted of
rape. Counsel failed to file
appellant’s brief as ordered by
the court, despite extensions of
time granted him.
ISSUE:
WON
Atty.
Adriano
violated his oath and the Code
of Professional Ethics?
RULING:
Yes.
As
counsel
de
oficio, respondent Adriano has
as high a duty to the accused as
one
employed
and
paid
by
defendant himself. The accused
defendant expects of him due
diligence, not mere perfunctory
representation. A lawyer who is
a vanguard in the bastion of
justice is expected to have a
bigger dose of social conscience
and a little less of selfinterest.
Atty. Adriano violated his oath
that he will conduct himself as
a lawyer according to the best
of
his
“knowledge
and
discretion.” This is a clear
case of an attorney whose acts
exhibit willful disobedience of
lawful orders of this Court.
Disrespect
here
is
present.
Contumacy
is
as
patent.
Disciplinary action is in order.
People v. Ingco
DECISION: Respondent is severely
reprimanded.
DOCTRINE: Duty of counsel
oficio to perform his duty
de
FACTS: Atty. Alfredo Barrios is
counsel de oficio for defendant
convicted of rape with homicide
on
Septmber
28,
1970.
On
September 9, 1971, respondent
was asked to show cause why
disciplinary action should not
be taken against him for filing
the brief of appellant fifteen
days late. He argued that he was
busy with the preparation of the
brief
of
his
other
client
pending in the Court of Appeals
and that he had to appear in
several other courts. He further
contended that he mistook the
proceedings on his other case,
where he managed to file the
brief on time, to be that of the
present case.
ISSUE: WON
negligent?
Atty.
Barrios
was
RULING.
Yes.
Respondent
was
woefull negligent. Considering
that the accused is fighting for
his life, the least that could
be expected of a counsel de
oficio
is
awareness
of
the
period
within
which
he
was
required
to
file
appellant’s
brief. The mere fact that his
practice was extensive should
not have lessened that degree of
care necessary for fulfillment
of his responsibility.
Nestle
Sanchez
Philippines
Inc.
v.
DECISION: The
are dismissed.
contempt
charges
their cases is for causes beyond
the control of the Court.
DOCTRINE: The importance of the
legal profession in relation to
constitutional rights of freedom
to assemble
ISSUE: WON repondents and Atty.
Espinas
should
be
held
in
contempt of court?
FACTS: Between July 8-10, 1987,
pickets organized by respondents
intensified
since
its
commencement on June 17, 1987 in
front
of
the
Supreme
Court
building.
Respondents
set
up
picket quarters with provisional
shelters and kitchen. They even
littered the place and took
turns haranguing the court all
day with their loud speakers.
Prior
to
the
aforementioned,
their
leaders
together
with
their counsel Atty. Jose C.
Espinas
were
received
by
Justices Yap and Fernan and were
informed that the demonstrations
must cease immediately as it
constitutes contempt of court.
The latter also insisted that
the Court would not entertain
their petitions for as long as
pickets were maintained. On July
10, 1987, respondents were given
opportunity
to
withdraw
graciously. The respondents were
required to appear before
the
Court to show cause why they
should not be held in contempt
of
court.
Atty
Espinas
was
further required to show cause
why
he
should
not
be
administratively dealt with.
Atty.
Espinas
on
his
part
apologized to the Court for the
respondents’
acts
with
an
assurance that they will not be
repeated. He further prayed for
the court’s leniency. He had
explained to the picketers that
any delay in the resolution of
RULING: No. We realize that the
individuals herein cited who are
non-lawyers
are
not
knowledgeable in her intricacies
of
substantive
and
adjective
laws.
The
duty
and
responsibility of advising them,
rest primarily and heavily upon
the shoulders of their counsel
of record. Atty. Espinas did his
best
to
demonstrate
to
the
pickets
the
untenability
of
their acts and posture. It is
their
duty
as
officers
to
apprise their clients on matters
of decorum and proper attitude
towards courts of justice.
The
right
of
petition
is
conceded to be an inherent right
of the citizen. However, such
right has never been invoked to
shatter
the
standards
of
propriety entertained for the
conduct of courts.
Foodsphere v. Atty. Mauricio
DECISION:
SC
suspends
Mauricio for three years.
Atty.
DOCTRINE:
1. Rule
1.01
(Code
of
Professional
Responsibility)
mandates
lawyers to refrain from
engaging
in
unlawful,
dishonest,
immoral,
or
deceitful conduct.
2. Rule 13.02 mandates that a
lawyer
shall
not
make
public statements in the
media regarding a pending
case
tending
to
arouse
public
opinion
against a party.
for
or
3. Canon 1 mandates lawyers to
uphold
the
Constitution,
obey the laws of the land,
and promote respect for law
and legal processes.
4. Canon
8
states
that
a
lawyer
shall
conduct
himself
with
courtesy,
fairness,
and
candor
towards
his
professional
colleagues, and shall avoid
harassing tactics against
opposing counsel.
5. Rule 8.01 mandates that a
lawyer shall not, in his
professional dealings, use
language which is abusive,
offensive,
or
otherwise
improper,
by
using
intemperate language.
6. Canon 7 directs a lawyer to
“at all times uphold the
integrity and dignity of
the legal profession.”
FACTS:
Respondent Atty. Mauricio was
counsel for the Corderos who
filed a complaint before the
BFAD
against
Foodsphere.
The
Corderos found the CDO Liver
spread they brought from the
grocery
to
be
sour
and
discovered a colony of worms
inside the can. Cordero demanded
P150,000
as
damages
from
complainant, to which the latter
refused to heed and instead
offered to return actual medical
and
incidental
expenses.
The
Corderos turned the offer down
and threatened to bring the
matter to the attention of the
media.
Respondent sent complainant via
fax a copy of the front page of
the would-be August 10-16, 2004
issue of the tabloid Balitang
Patas
which
the
complainant
found
to
contain
articles
maligning,
discrediting,
and
imputing vices and defects to it
and
its
products.
Respondent
threatened to publish the same
unless the complainant gave in
to the monetarial demand.
After subsequent refusal to the
same
offer
by
complainant,
respondent
later
proposed
to
settle for P50,000. P15,000 of
which would go to the Corderos
and
P35,000
to
his
Batas
Foundation. Complainant is also
directed
to
place
paid
advertisements in the tabloids
and television program.
The
Corderos
forged
the
kasunduan,
where
they
would
withdraw complaint before the
BFAD. An advertising contract
was then sent by respondent to
complainant, to which the latter
agreed but only to a total of
P23,100. Respondent relayed that
he and his executive producer
were disappointed with the offer
and threatened to proceed with
the publication.
Thereafter, a series of tirades
both
on
radio
and
in
the
tabloids articles were made by
respondent against complainant.
The latter subsequently filed
criminal
complaints
against
respondent. Respondent replied
with a motion to dismiss for
lack of jurisdiction.
Complainant further filed civil
cases
and
an
administrative
complaint before the IBP. The
Investigating
Commissioner
granted
the
petition
for
a
temporary
restraining
order
enjoining
respondent
from
publishing, televising, and/or
broadcasting any matter subject
of the complaint. Undeterred,
respondent continued publishing
articles
prejudicial
to
complainant.
offensive,
or
otherwise
improper, by using intemperate
language. While a lawyer is
entitled to present his case
with vigor and courage, such
enthusiasm does not justify the
use of offensive and abusive
language.
On March 20, 2006, the IBP Board
of
Governors
adopted
the
findings and recommendations of
the Investigating Commissioner
to suspend the respondent from
practice of law for two years.
On many ocassions, the Court has
reminded members of the Bar to
abstain
from
all
offensive
personality and to advance no
fact prejudicial to the honor
and reputation of a party or
witness. In keeping with the
dignity of the legal profession,
a lawyer’s language even in his
pleadings must be dignified.
ISSUE: WON Atty. Mauricio should
be suspended?
RULING. Yes. Respondent violated
Rule 1.01 mandating lawyers to
refrain
from
engaging
in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or
deceitful
conduct.
He
took
advantage
of
the
complaint
against
CDO
to
advance
his
interest.
He also violated Rule 13.02
against making public statements
in the media regarding a pending
case tending to arouse public
opinion for or against a party.
Respondent also violated Canon
1, whihch madates lawyers to
“uphold the Constitution, obey
the laws of the land and promote
respect
for
law
and
legal
processes”
for
defying
the
status quo order of the court.
He further violated Canon 8
stating that a lawyer shall
conduct himself with courtesy,
fairness, and candor towards his
professional
colleagues,
and
shall avoid harassing tactics
against
opposing
counsel.
He
also violated Rule 8.01 stating
that a lawyer shall not, in his
professional
dealings,
use
language
which
is
abusive,
Lastly, he violated Canon 7
which directs a lawyer to “at
all times uphold the integrity
and the dignity of the legal
profession.”
Olvida v. Gonzales
DECISION:
SC
suspends
Gonzales for three years.
Atty.
DOCTRINE: Fidelity to the cause
of
the
client
and
duty
to
exercise diligence by a counsel
FACTS: Respondent Atty. Gonzales
was
counsel
de
parte
for
petitioner Olvida on a case
involving
the
termination
of
tenancy relationship between him
and Lumanta who failed to pay
his
rental
dues.
Petitioner
already paid the respondent’s
acceptance
and
advanced
appearance fee.
A case was filed on February 21,
2001 before the Department of
Agrarian
Reform
Adjudication
Board
(DARAB)
which
rendered
futile when the parties failed
to reach an agreement. The Board
subsequently
asked
the
two
parties to submit their position
papers within 40 days.
Petitioner on his part submitted
the
required
documents
to
respondent Gonzales on March 22,
2001. He followed up with the
respondent
regarding
the
position paper until the last
day of filing on April 25, 2001.
After going back and forth the
respondent’s office, petitioner
was
able
to
talk
to
the
respondent’s secretary who told
him that the position paper had
already been filed. When asked
to provide him a copy, the
secretary said there was none
because the respondent prepared
the
position
paper
on
his
computer.
Petitioner momentarily neglected
to follow up the matter due to
his prior commitments as legal
assistant, until he received a
notice from the Court dismissing
the case for lack of merit. Upon
reading
the
text
of
the
decision, he discovered that the
respondent failed to submit the
position paper on time and that
a copy of the notice had already
been delivered to the respondent
before petitioner received his
own.
Petitioner
terminated
respondent’s
services
and
availed of another counsel. The
Court
required
respondent
to
comment in a resolution dated
September 2, 2002. Respondent
filed motions to extend the time
to file comment allegedly due to
a change in office address and
attending to his ill wife.
On March 17, 2010, respondent
filed his comment. He argued
that
the
complainant
pressed
charges not because he failed to
file the position paper, which
according
to
him
could
be
dispensed with, but because his
client lost the case due to a
different
of
opinion
between
them. He further contended that
the complainant failed to submit
the necessary evidences.
The IBP investigated the case
after a referral by the Court.
Its investigating commissioner
found
that
respondent
was
negligent
in
discharging
his
duties
as
a
lawyer
and
recommended
the
respondent’s
suspension for four months. The
same was adopted by the IBP
Board of Governors. Afterwhich,
the
IBP
Commisson
on
Bar
Discipline forwarded the same to
the Court considering that no
motion of reconsideration has
been filed.
ISSUE: WON Atty. Gonzales should
be suspended?
RULING: Yes. According to Canon
17 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, a lawyer owes
“fidelity to the cause of his
client and he shall be mindful
of the trust and confidence
reposed in him.”
Furthermore,
respondent
also
failed
to
comply
with
Rule
18.04, Canon 18 that “a lawyer
shall keep the client informed
of the status of the case and
shall
respond
within
a
reasonable time to the client’s
request for information.”
Canon 18 also requires that “a
lawyer shall serve his client
with competence and diligence.”
In this case, Atty. Gonzales
failed to file the position
paper in the DARAB case on time.
He also failed to communicate
the fact that a
dismiss the case
been
given
him
petitioner
could
own.
decision to
has already
before
the
receive
his
Respondent was not only grossly
negligent in the performance of
his duties as the lawyer, he was
also
downright
dishonest
and
unethical in his dealings with
the complainant.
CANON II
PROPRIETY
Arciga v. Maniwang
DECISION:
SC
junked
disbarment petition.
the
DOCTRINE:
The
continued
possession
of
good
moral
character is also a requisite
for retaining membership to the
bar. Membership in the bar may
be terminated when a lawyer
ceases
to
have
good
moral
character.
FACTS:
Petitioner
Arciga
and
respondent
Atty.
Maniwang
engaged
in
a
pre-marital
relationship before the latter
was admitted to the bar. They
became sweethearts, eventually
finding
themselves
alone
and
having sexual intercourse. The
two began cohabiting for some
time and respondent even told
his acquaintances that he and
petitioner
were
secretly
married.
In
1972,
respondent
left
petitioner in Cebu to continue
his law studies in Davao. They
continued
exchanging
love
letters
to
each
other.
The
following year, petitioner found
out she was pregnant. Respondent
went to her hometown to apprise
petitioner’s
parents
of
her
pregnancy and told them they
were already married when in
fact,
they
were
not.
He
convinced petitioner’s father to
defer the church wedding until
he passed the bar.
Respondent
passed
the
bar
examinations. A few daws after
his
oath-taking,
he
stopped
corresponding with petitioner.
Fearing that there was something
amiss, she went to Davao to
confront
respondent.
He
told
petitioner that they could not
get married for lack of money.
Petitioner returned to Davao.
In December of the same year,
petitioner went back to Davao,
but failed to see respondent who
was in Bukidnon. There the two
met and respondent admitted that
he was already married to a
certain Erlinda Ang. Enraged,
she confronted Ang which caused
respondent’s anger and inflicted
on petitioner physical injuries.
Petitioner filed a disbarment
case
against
respondent
on
ground
of
grossly
immoral
conduct.
ISSUE: WON respondent should be
disbarred?
RULING: No. This Court found
that
respondent’s
refusal
to
marry the complainant was not so
corrupt nor unprincipled as to
warrant
disbarment.
It
is
difficult
to
state
with
precision as to what is “grossly
immoral
conduct.”
Immoral
conduct has been defined as
“that conduct which is willful,
flagrant,
or
shameless,
and
which shows a moral indifference
to the opinion of the good and
respectable
membrs
of
the
community.”
Petitioner is not subject to
disciplinary action because his
misbehavior or deviation from
the path of rectitude is not
glaringly scandalous. Whether a
lawyer’s sexual congress with a
woman not his wife or without
the benefit of marriage should
be
characterized
as
“grossly
immoral conduct” will depend on
the surrounding circumstances.
Zaguirre v. Castillo
DECISION: SC finds respondent
guilty of gross immoral conduct
and ordered to suffer indefinite
suspension.
DOCTRINE: It is a settled rule
that a lawyer may be suspended
or disbarred for any misconduct,
even if it pertains to his
private activities, as long as
it shows him to be wanting in
moral
character,
honesty,
probity, or good demeanor.
FACTS: Petitioner and respondent
were officemates in the National
Bureau
of
Investigation
and
eventually
got
into
a
relationship.
Respondent
promised
to
marry
petitioner
while representing himself to be
single. It was only after he
passed the bar examinations when
petitioner
discovered
that
respondent Castillo was already
married. Respondent’s wife went
to her office and confronted her
about
their
illicit
relationship.
Respondent subsequently executed
an
affidavit,
admitting
his
relationship with Zaguirre and
recognizing the unborn child she
was
carrying
as
his.
After
petitioner gave birth to a girl,
respondent
started
to
refuse
recognizing the child.
Respondent argued that he never
courted
petitioner,
what
transpired
between
them
was
nothing but mutual lust and
desire,
he
never
represented
himself as single, and that
petitioner knew well before hand
that he is already married. He
also alleged that the petitioner
was seeing other men. He only
executed the affidavit to save
petitioner from embarrassment.
The
IBP
Commission
on
Bar
Discipline
found
respondent
guilty of gross immoral conduct
and recommended the indefinite
suspension of respondent.
ISSUE: WON respondent is guilty
of gross immoral conduct?
RULING: Yes. Respondent violated
Rule 1.01 and Canon 7 and Rule
7.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
Rule 1.01 states that a lawyer
shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.
Canon 7 mandates that a lawyer
shall at all times uphold the
integrity and dignity of the
legal profession.
Rule 7.03 states that a lawyer
shall not engage in codnuct that
adversely reflects his fitness
to practice law, whether in
public or private, behave in
scandalous
manner
to
the
discredit
of
the
legal
profession.
Siring a child with a woman
other than his wife is a conduct
way
below
the
standards
of
morality
required
of
every
lawyer.
Moreover,
the
attempt
of
respondent to renege on his
notarized statement recognizing
and undertaking to support his
child by petitioner demonstrates
a certain unscrupulousness which
is highly censurable, unbecoming
a member of a noble profession,
tantamount
to
selfstultification.
Cordova v. Cordova
DECISION:
Respondent
Atty.
Cordova
is
suspended
indefinitely.
DOCTRINE:
The
continued
possession
of
good
moral
character
is
requisite
condition
for
the
rightful
continuance in the practice of
law.
FACTS: Petitioner Cordova and
respondent Atty. Cordova were
married with two children and
settled in Quirino Province. In
1985, respondent left his family
and went to Bislig, Surigao del
Sur with one Fely G. Holgado and
the two cohabited as husband and
wife. Respondent introduced Fely
as his wife to the public, while
Fely would use the name Fely
Cordova. The latter was given
funds by respondent to build a
sari-sari store in the public
market, all the while failing to
support his legitimate family.
On April 6, 1986, respondent
Cordova and petitioner Cordova
had an apparent reconciliation.
Respondent
promised
to
leave
Fely and brought his legitimate
family
with
him
to
Bislig.
Respondent
would
however
frequently come home drunk and
continued to neglect the support
of his legitimate family.
In
February
1987,
when
petitioner came back froma trip
to Manila to attend to her
daughter who was hospitalized,
she found out that respondent
was no longer living with her
children in their conjugal home;
and that he had taken another
mistress one Luisita Magallanes.
In addition to that, respondent
took
their
youngest
daughter
Melanie together with him and
his
mistress.
Petitioner
subsequently filed for a writ of
habeas corpus. RTC Bislig gave
her custody of their children.
Petitioner
then
filed
a
complaint before the Court which
was forwarded to the IBP. Both
she and respondent failed to
appear. A year after her initial
complaint, petitioner informed
the Commission that she and her
husband had already reconciled.
The Commission ordered the two
to appear for confirmation and
explanation
which
was
not
responded by the two parties.
The
Commission
subsequently
forwarded
their
report
reprimanding respondent for his
acts.
ISSUE:
WON
respondent
Atty.
Cordova should be suspended?
RULING. Yes. The most recent
reconciliation
between
complainant and respondent does
not excuse and wipe away the
misconduct and immoral behavior
of the respondent carried out in
public,
and
necessarily
adversely reflecting upon his as
a member of the Bar and upon the
Philippine Bar itself.
An applicant for admission to
membership
in
the
bar
is
required to show that he is
possessed
of
good
moral
character.
That
requirement
persists
as
a
continuing
condition for membership in the
Bar in good standing.
Respondent maintained for about
two
years
an
adulterous
relationship with a woman not
his wife, in full view of the
public to the humiliation and
detriment
of
his
legitimate
family
which
he
refused
to
support. After a brief period of
“reform” he took another woman
not his wife, cohabiting with
her and bringing along his young
daughter to live with them.
Respondent
flaunted
his
disregard
of
the
fundamental
institution of marriage and its
elementary
obligations
before
his
own
daughter
and
the
community at large.
Guevarra v. Atty. Eala
DECISION: SC disbars Atty. Eala
for
grossly
immoral
conduct,
violation of his oath of office,
and violation of Canon 1, Rule
1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03.
DOCTRINE: Duty of a lawyer to
uphold marriage as an inviolable
institution
FACTS:
Guevarra
filed
a
disbarment
complaint
against
Atty.
Eala
whom
the
former
alleged to have extra-marital
affairs with his wife, Irene
Moje
despite
respondent
Eala
also being married to Marianne
Tantoco.
Complainant averred that in the
course of his marriage with
Irene,
the
former
would
frequently receive calls as well
as messages that read “I love
you,” “I miss you,” or “Meet you
at Megamall.” He further alleged
that Irene would always come
home
late
or
early
in
the
morning and sometimes would not
go home from work. When asked
about
her
whereabots,
she
replied that she slept at her
parents’ house or that she was
busy with work. Complainant also
alleged that he saw the two
together on two occasions. On
the
second
occasion,
he
confronted them following which
Irene
abandoned
the
conjugal
home.
Complainant then saw a folded
social
card,
unfolding
a
handwritten letter by “Noli” to
Irene. It was also revealed that
Irene gave birth to a girl in
2002, naming respondent in the
Certificate of Live Birth as the
girl’s father.
Respondent denied having ever
flaunted
an
adulterous
relationship and that the same
was low profile and known only
to the immediate members of
their respective families. He
further
contended
that
his
relationship with Irene was not
under scandalous circumstances
nor
tantamount
to
grossly
immoral conduct.
Respondent also denied having
mocked
the
institution
of
marriage as a mere piece of
paper, because his reference to
the marriage between complainant
and Irene, according to him, was
a piece of paper merely with
respect to the formality of the
marriage contract.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent
should be disbarred for grossly
immoral conduct?
RULING: Yes. Respondent should
be disbarred as he is involved
in a relationship between a
married lawyer and a married
woman who is not his spouse even
though the affair was carried
out discreetly.
While
it
has
been
held
in
disbarment cases that there mere
fact of sexual relations between
two consenting adults is not
sufficient
an
administrative
sanction
for
such
illicit
bhehavior, it is not so with
respect to betrayals of the
marital vow of fidelity.
Respondent
also
violated
the
lawyer’s oath he took before
practicing law. Rule 1.01 of
Canon 1 prescribes a lawyer from
engaging
in
“unlawful,
dishonest, immoral, or deceitful
conduct.” Rule 7.03 of Canon 7
prescribes
a
lawyer
from
engaging in any conduct that
adversele
reflects
on
his
fitness to practice law.
In re Carlos S. Basa
DECISION:
Respondent
suspended for one year
discharge from prison.
is
after
DOCTRINE: A member of the bar
may be removed or suspended from
his office of lawyer by the
Supreme Court by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude.
FACTS: Atty. Carlo S. Basa, 29
years old, was convicted with
the crime of abduction with
consent and was sentenced to be
imprisoned for two years, eleven
months, and eleven days. The
Supreme
Court
affirmed
this
decision.
ISSUE: WON respondent should be
suspended?
RULING: Yes. Section 21 of Civil
Procedure provides that a member
of the bar may be removed or
suspended from his office of
lawyer by the Supreme Court by
reason of his conviction of a
crime involving moral turpitude.
Moral turpitude has been said to
“include
everything
which
is
done
contrary
to
justice,
honesty,
modesty,
or
good
morals.” Although no decision
can be found which has decided
the exact question, it cannot
admit of doubt that crimes of
this
character
involve
moral
turpitude.
People v. Tuanda
DECISION: SC affirms CA’s ruling
to suspend Tuanda indefinitely.
DOCTRINE: Violation of B.P Blg.
22 involves crimes of moral
turpitude, and hence may be
subject
to
suspension
or
disbarment of a member of the
bar.
FACTS: Respondent Atty. Tuanda
was convicted of violating B.P.
Blg. 22 for drawing checks with
insufficient funds. Respondent
received
several
pieces
of
jewelry from a certain Herminia
Marquez amounting to P36,000 for
sale on a commission basis, with
the
condition
that
the
respondent would turn over the
proceeds as well as return the
unsold pieces of jewelry before
the agreed upon date.
Respondent, instead of returning
the unsold pieces of jewelry,
issued
three
separate
checks
instead. Upon presentment for
payment within ninety days after
their issuance, all three checks
were
dishonored
due
to
insufficiency
of
funds.
Respondent maid no effort
settle her obligations.
to
Respondent
was
subsequently
charged
and
convicted
with
violation
of
B.P.
Blg
22.
Respondent filed an appeal with
the CA, which affirmed in toto
the decision of the lower court
and
in
addition,
suspended
respondent from the practice of
law indefinitely.
A notice of appeal was then
filed before this Court which
delcared that the decision of
the CA was final and executory
and that respondent lost her
right to appeal by certiorari
when she posted with this Court
a notice of appeal instead of a
petition
for
review
on
certiorari.
Moreover, respondent claims that
the suspension from the practice
of law is a harsh, if not
painful penalty aggravating the
court’s
penalty
of
fine,
considering that her action on
the
case
has
always
been
motivated by sincere belief that
she is innocent of the offense
charged.
malpractice,
or
other
gross
misconduct
in
such
office,
grossly immoral conduct, or by
reason of his conviction of a
crime involving moral turpitude.
Sec.
28
of
the
same
rule
provides that the CA or RTC may
suspend
an
attorney
from
practice for any of the causes
named in the last preceding
section.
The crimes of which respondent
was convicted also import deceit
and violation of her attorney’s
oath and Code of Professional
Responsibility.
In Re Al Argosino
DECISION: Petitioner must submit
evidence that he is now regarded
as
complying
with
the
requirement
of
good
moral
character.
He is further directed to inform
the Court of the names of the
father and mather (in default
the brothers or sisters) of Raul
Camaligan.
ISSUE: WON respondent should be
suspended from the practice of
law?
DOCTRINE: The practice of law is
not
a
natural,
absolte,
or
constitutional
right
to
be
granted to everyone who demands
it.
RULING: Yes. The offense of
which respondent is found guilty
involves
moral
turpitude.
Violation of B.P. Blg. 22 is a
serious criminal offense which
deleteriously
affects
public
interest and public order.
The requirement of good moral
character to be satisfied by
those who seek admission to the
bar must be more stringent than
the norm of conduct expected
from members of the general
public.
Moreover, Sec. 27 of Rule 138 of
the
Revised
Rules
of
Court
provide that “a member of the
bar may be removed or suspended
from his office as attorney by
the Supreme Court of any deceit,
FACTS: Petitioner Al Argosino
was among those convicted of
homicide
through
reckless
imprudence in connection with
the death of Raul Camaligan from
the
infliction
of
severe
physical injuries in the course
of hazing as part of university
fraternity initiation rites.
Petitioner pleaded guilty to a
lesser offense and subsequently
filed for a probation. The same
was granted for a period of 2
years. In 1993, he filed a
petition for admission to take
the bar and disclosed he fact of
his criminal conviction, as well
as his probation status. He was
allowed to take the bar, passed
the same, but was not allowed to
take
the
lawyer’s
oath
of
office.
Petitioner subsequently filed a
petition before this Court to be
allowed
to
take
the
oath,
averring that Judge Santiago had
terminated his probation, which
did not last for more than ten
months.
ISSUE: WON petitioner has purged
himself of the deficiency in
moral character?
RULING: We stress that good
moral character is a requirement
possession of which must be
demonstrated not only at the
time
of
application
for
permission to take the bar, but
also and more importantly, at
the time of application for
admission to the bar and to take
the oath of office.
Petitioner’s
participation
in
the deplorable hazing activities
certainly fell far short of the
required standard of good moral
character.
The
deliberate
infliction of severe physical
injuries
indicated
serious
character flaws. Petitioner and
his
co-accused
failed
to
discharge their moral duty to
protect the life and well-being
of
a
neophyte
who
had,
bu
seeking
admission
to
the
fraternity
involved,
reposed
trust and confidence in all of
them.
Participation
in
the
prolonged and mindless physical
beatings
inflicted
upon
the
victim
constituted
evident
rejection of that moral duty,
which makes impossible a finding
that the participant was then
possessed
of
good
moral
character.
Re: SC Decision dated May 20,
2008 in G.R. No. 161455 under
Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court
DECISION:
disbarred.
Respondent
is
DOCTRINE:
The
crime
of
falsification
of
public
documents
involves
moral
turpitude
and
warrants
disbarment.
FACTS: Elmer Abastillas, playing
coach
of
the
Ozamis
city
volleyball team, requested from
Mayor
Fuentes
financial
assistance for his team. The
latter approved the request and
designated
Ferraren,
city
council member as the OIC while
he
was
away.
Abastillas
eventually got the P10,000.00
assistance.
Respondent lawyer Pactolin got a
photocopy of Abastillas’ letter
and used it to file a case
against
Ferraren
for
illegal
disbursemnt
of
public
funds.
Respondent used what he claimed
was
a
falsified
letter
of
Abastillas,
showing
it
was
Ferraren and not Fuentes who
approved the disbursement.
Aggrieved,
Ferraren
filed
a
complaint against respondent for
falsification
of
public
document. Respondent was found
guilty by the Sandiganbayan. He
subsequently
appealed
to
the
Court, which only affirmed his
conviction.
The
Court
then
referred the case to the IBP for
appropriate
administrative
action.
FACTS: Respondent Atty. Lontok
was convicted of bigamy, but was
subsequently
pardoned
by
the
Governor-General.
Because complainant failed to
appear not submit any pleading,
the
Commission
dismissed
the
case
for
insufficiency
of
evidence.
Petitioner
attorney-general
petitioned for the removal of
respondent from his office of
lawyer on the ground that a
member of the bar may be removed
or suspended from his office of
lawyer by the Supreme Court “by
reason of his conviction of a
crime
involving
moral
turpitude.” According to him,
the conviction of the crime of
bigamy involves moral turpitude.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent
should
be
disbarred
after
conviction by final judgment of
the crime of falsification.
ISSUE:
WON
respondent
Lontok
should be disbarred after being
granted pardon by the GovernorGeneral?
RULING:
Yes.
The
crime
of
falsification
is
contrary
to
justice,
honesty,
and
good
morals, and therefore, involves
moral turpitude. Moral turpitude
includes
everything
which
is
done
contrary
to
justice,
honesty,
modesty,
or
good
morals.
RULING: Yes. A pardon reaches
both the punishment prescribed
for the offense and the guilt of
the offender. When pardon is
full, it releases the punishment
and blots out of existence the
guilt.
This Court has also consistently
pronounced that disbarment is
the
appropriate
penalty
for
conviction by final judgment for
a
crime
involving
moral
turpitude.
In Re Marcelino Lontok
DECISION: Petition denied.
DOCTRINE: Pardon reaches both
punishment prescribed for the
offense and the guilt of the
offender. When the pardon is
full, it releases the punishment
and blots out of existence the
guilt.
The conviction of the crime of
bigamy involves moral turpitude
within the meaning of the law.
But to exclude the petitioner
from the practice of law for the
offense
named
would
be
to
enforce a punishment for the
offense,
notwithstanding
the
pardon which the court had no
right to do.
Under the old Penal Code, Art.
130 provides that one of the
different ways by which criminal
liability is extinguished is by
pardon. We must also remember
that the motion for disbarment
is based solely on the judgment
of conviction for a crime of
which the respondent has been
pardoned, and that the language
of the pardon is not such as to
amount to a condition pardon
similar in nature to a parole.
In Re Juan Isada
DECISION: SC suspends respondent
for one year.
DOCTRINE: Concubinage is a crime
involving moral turpitude, and a
member of the Philippine bar may
be disbarred or suspended for
conviction of this crime.
FACTS:
Respondent
Isada
was
convicted of concubinage and is
serving his sentence in Bilibid
Prison.
ISSUE: WON respondent should be
suspended
for
the
crime
of
concubinage?
RULING:
Yes.
According
to
Section 21 of Civil Procedure,
any member of the bar may be
removed or suspended from his
office of lawyer by the Supreme
Court
by
reason
of
his
conviction of a crime involving
moral
turpitude.
Concubinage
involves moral turpitude.
In Re: Atty. Tranquilino Rovero
DECISION:
reinstated
bar.
as
Petitioner
a member of
is
the
DOCTRINE: To be reinstated to
the practice of law, it is
necessary that the respondent
must, like any other candidate
for
admission
to
the
bar,
satisfy the Court that he is a
person of good moral character.
FACTS:
Atty.
Rovero
was
convicted
of
smuggling
and
setenced to pay a fine. He was
also disbarred by the Supreme
Court. His first and second
petitions
denied.
were
subsequently
Undeterred,
petitioner
became
involved in several civic and
educational
organizations.
He
was
also
a
duly
accredited
delegate of the Aklan chapter of
the
Philippine
National
Red
Cross, a president of the Quezon
City Central Lions Club, and
president
of
the
Board
of
Trustees
of
the
Northwestern
Visayan Colleges.
Several testimonials have also
been
presented
regarding
the
high esteem accorded him in the
community to which he belongs.
His conduct has also merited the
granting
of
absolute
and
unconditional pardon by former
President Ramon Magsaysay.
ISSUE: WON petitioner should be
reinstated as a member of the
bar?
RULING: Yes. He had demonstrated
his
moral
rehabilitation
and
reformation as to be fit, once
more, to engage in the practice
of law. An absolute pardon not
only
blots
out
the
crime
committed,
but
removes
all
liabilities resulting from the
conviction.
Mondano v. Silvosa
DECISION:
The
writ
prohibition is granted.
of
DOCTRINE: The power of “general
supervision
over
local
governments” by the President
is not the same as the power
granted to the department head
in Sec. 79(c) of the Revised
Administrative Code.
FACTS: Petitioner Mondano is the
mayor of the Municipality of
Mainit, Surigao and was accused
of rape and concubinage. The
Assistant
Executive
Secretary
indorsed the complaint to the
provincial governor of Surigao
for
immediate
investigation,
action,
and
report.
The
petitioner appeared before the
provincial
governor.
He
was
subsequently
suspended
from
office
pending
the
investigation. Petitioner prays
for a writ of prohibition with
preliminary injunction.
ISSUE:
WON
the
suspension
by
the
governor was legal?
order
of
provincial
RULING: No. Section 79(c) of the
Revised
Administrative
Code
clothes the department head with
“direct control, direction, and
supervision over all bureaus and
offices under his jurisdiction.”
However, he does not have the
same
control
of
local
governments,
over
which
the
President exercises only general
supervision.
If the provisions of Section
79(c) are to be construed as
conferring
upon
the
corresponding
department
head
direct control, direction, and
supervision
over
all
local
governments, and for that reason
he may order the investigation
of
an
official
of
a
local
government for malfeasance in
office,
such
interpretation
would
be
contrary
to
the
provisions of par. 1, Sec. 10,
Art.
VII
of
the
1935
Constitution.
There
would
no
longer
be
a
distinction
or
difference between the power of
control and that of supervision.
Supervision means overseeing or
the power or authority of an
officer to see that subordinate
officers perform their duties.
If the latter fail or neglect to
fulfill them the former may take
such
action
or
step
as
prescribed by law to make them
perform their duties.
Control means the power of an
officer to alter or modify or
nullify or set aside what a
subordinate officer had done in
the performance of his duties
and to substitute the judgement
of the former for that of the
latter.
Congress has expressly lodged
the provincial supervision over
municipal
officials
in
the
provincial governor to “receive
and investigate complaints made
under
oath
against
municipal
officers for neglect of duty,
oppression, corruption, or other
form
of
maladministration
of
office, and conviction by final
judgment of any crime involving
moral
turpitude.
The
charges
against the Mondano do not fall
within
the
specifications
in
Sec. 2188 of the RAC because
rape
and
concubinage
have
nothing
to
do
with
the
performance of his duty. It is
true that they may involve moral
turpitude, but an action may be
proceeded
with
after
a
conviction by final judgment.
In Re: Dalmacio de los Angeles
DECISION: SC disbars respondent.
DOCTRINE:
The
continued
possession
of
good
moral
character
is
a
requisite
condition
for
the
rightful
continuance of the lawyer in the
practice of law.
FACTS: Respondent Atty. De
Angeles
was
convicted
los
of
attempted bribery. Apart from
his criminal liabilities, the
Court asked petitioner to show
cause why he should not be
disbarred from the practice of
his profession.
Respondent on his part appealed
to the sympathy and mercy of
this Court considering that he
had six children, the eldest
being 16 years old and the
youngest being only 4 years old
who will bear the stigma and
dishonor if disciplinary action
be taken against him. He also
insisted
that
whatever
attributed to him was merely due
to an error in judgment which he
honestly and sincerely deplores.
ISSUE: WON respondent should be
disbarred?
RULING: Yes. Section 25, Rule
127 states that a member of the
bar may be removed from his
office as attorney if he is
convicted of a crime involving
moral turpitude. Since bribery
is a felony involving moral
turpitude, the Court, much as it
sympathized with the plight of
respondent, is constrained to
decree his disbarment.
Calub v. Suller
DECISION:
disbarred.
Respondent
is
DOCTRINE:
A
lawyer
may
be
disbarred
or
suspended
for
misconduct,
whether
in
his
professional
or
private
capacity.
FACTS: Petitioner Cristino Calub
filed a complaint for disbarment
against respondent Atty. Abraham
Suller
on
grossly
immoral
conduct for having raped the
former’s wife.
One morning while petitioner was
away, respondent Atty. Suller
went to the former’s house to
ostensibly
borrowed
a
blade.
Being a friend of the family and
a
neighbor,
the
petitioner’s
wife
let him in. Thereafter,
respondent began touching her in
different parts of her body and
forced
her
to
have
sexual
intercourse with him to her
protest.
At
that
moment,
petitioner went back home to get
money to pay for real estate
taxes. Upon entering the house,
he
saw
his
wife
and
the
petitioner
having
sexual
intercourse on the bed. She was
kicking respondent with one foot
hile the latter pressed on her
arms and other leg, preventing
her from defending herself.
A criminal complaint was filed
for
rape
against
respondent.
Subsequently, petitioner filed
with
the
Supreme
Court
the
disbarment complaint. Respondent
on
his
part
denied
the
allegations and insisted that
they were all fabrications.
On March 1993, the Board of
Governors of the IBP recommended
the suspension for a period of
one year be meted on respondent.
The CFI on the other hand,
acquitted respondent for failure
of the prosecution to prove his
guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
ISSUE: WON respondent should be
disbarred?
RULING: Yes. In this case, we
find that suspension for one
year is not sufficient. The rape
of
his
neighbor’s
wife
constitutes
serious
moral
depravity even if his guilty was
not proved. He is not worthy to
remain a member of the bar.
The privilege to practice law is
bestowed upon individuals who
are
competent
intellectually,
academically,
and
equally
important, morally. Good moral
character must also be possessed
at
all
times
in
order
to
maintain one’s good standing in
that
exclusive
and
honored
fraternity.
RULING: No. Such defense may
only be availed when he is
placed in the predicament of
being prosecuted for the same
offense. The disbarment of an
attorney does not partake of a
criminal proceeding. Rather, it
is inteded “to protect the court
and the public from misconduct
of officers of the court.”
Paras v. Vailoces
Under Section 25, Rule 127 of
the Rules of Court, a member of
the
bar
may
be
removed
or
suspended from his office as
attorney if it appears that he
has been convicted of a crime
involving moral turpitude.
DECISION:
disbarred.
Respondent
is
DOCTRINE: A member of the bar
may be removed or suspended from
his office as attorney if it
appears
that
he
has
been
convicted of a crime involving
moral turpitude.
FACTS:
Respondent
Atty.
Quinciniano Vailoces was counsel
for Tarcila Visitacion de Jesus
and acknowledged the execution
of a document purported to be
his
client’s
last
will
and
testament. The same will was
impugned by the surviving spouse
and daughter of the client.
Finding that the will was a
forgery, the CFI denied the
validity of the will. Respondent
was found guilty of the crime of
falsification
of
public
document. A disbarment complaint
was also filed against him.
Respondent on his part argued
that the criminal case is based
on insufficient and inconclusive
evidence,
and
that
to
give
course
to
the
disbarment
proceeding would be tantamount
to double jeopardy.
ISSUE:
WON
disbarment
would
constitute double jeopardy on
the accused?
As enumerated by CJ Moran, it
includes the crimes of seduction
and concubinage. It is wellsettled
that
“embezzlement,
forgery, robbery, and swindling
are crimes which denote moral
turpitude and, as a general
rule, all crimes of which fraud
is an element are looked on as
involving moral turpitude.
In Re: Atty. Isidro P. Vinzon
DECISION:
disbarred.
Respondent
is
DOCTRINE: A member of the bar
may be removed or suspended from
his office as attorney if it
appears
that
he
has
been
convicted of a crime involving
moral turpitude.
FACTS: Appellant Atty. Vinzon
and his wife were convicted of
the crime of estafa for having
failed
to
deliver
and
misapproproating
the
sum
of
P7,000
which
represented
a
portion of the total amount of
P,621.60 payable to his client
Felicidad M. Bagtas, unremarried
widow
of
deceased
veteran
Maximino Bagtas.
Felicidad
was
found
to
be
mentally
incompetent
upon
examination in the course of
investigation in connection with
her application for war veteran
benefits. Appellant, on various
occasion,
had
asked
her
to
thumbmark
serial
papers
in
connection with the application.
Respondent
averred
that
the
estafa case as decided by the CA
does not bind the SC and that
there
were
errors
in
his
conviction,
specifically
insufficient evidences of his
and his wife’s guilt.
ISSUE: WON the appellant may be
disbarred upon conviction for
the crime of estafa?
RULING:
Yes.
Moral
turpitude
includes
everything
which
is
done
contrary
to
justice,
honesty, or good morals. In
essence and in all respects,
estafa, no doubt, is a crime
involving
moral
turpitude
because the act is questionable
against justice, honesty, and
good morals.
Soriano v. Dizon
DECISION:
disbarred.
Respondent
is
DOCTRINE:
Membership
in
the
legal profession is a privilege
demanding a high degree of good
moral character, not only as a
condition
precedent
to
admission,
but
also
as
a
continuing requirement for the
practice of law.
FACTS: Atty. Dizon was convicted
for the crime of frustrated
homicide. While on the way home,
a taxi driver overtook the car
driven
by
the
accused,
not
knowing that the driver of the
car was a lawyer who was under
the influence of liquor.
Incensed, the accused tailed the
taxi driver until the latter
stopped at a corner. The accused
also stopped his car, berated
the
taxi
driver
and
an
altercation
ensued.
Accused
received a blow on his chest as
a result. The accused went back
to his car and got his revolver,
making sure that the handle was
wrapped
in
handkerchief,
and
shot at the unsuspecting driver
who got hit in the neck. The
latter fell on the thigh of the
accused, so the accused pushed
him out and sped off. The driver
received
timely
medical
assistance, however he suffered
a paralysis on the left part of
his body and disabled him for
his job.
After promulgation, the accused
filed
an
application
for
probation which was granted on
several
conditions,
including
satisfaction
of
the
civil
liabilities in favor of the
offended
party.
Nevertheless,
accused failed to comply.
The IBP subsequently issued a
decision
recommending
the
disbarment of the accused for
having been convicted of a crime
involving moral turpitude.
ISSUE: WON
disbarred?
accused
should
be
RULING: Yes. Section 27 of Rule
138
of
the
Rules
of
Court
convicts a crime involving moral
turpitude, which is a ground for
disbarment or suspension. In the
instance case, respondent has
been found guilty of frustrated
homicide. Such conviction has
already been established and is
no longer open to question.
ISSUE: WON respondent should be
disbarred?
The
totality
of
the
facts
unmistakably bears the earmarks
of
moral
turpitude.
He
was
definitely
the
aggressor
and
exhibited
treachery.
He
also
transgressed Canon 1 through is
illegal
possession
of
an
unlicensed
firearm
and
his
unjust refusal to satisfy civil
liabilities.
RULING: Yes. The Court found the
subject
video
clip
as
“indisputable scandalous that it
discredits
the
legal
profession.”
Gadon
violated
Canon II on Propriety which
states that “[a] lawyer shall,
at
all
times,
act
with
propriety,
or
maintain
an
appearance
of
propriety
in
personal
and
professional
dealings,
observe
honesty,
respect,
and
courtesy,
and
uphold the dignity of the legal
profession consistent with the
highest
standards
of
ethical
behavior.
Gadon
failed
to
realize
that
lawyers
are
expected
to
avoid
scandalous
behavior,
whether
in
their
public or private life.
Law is a noble profession, and
the privilege to practice it is
bestowed only upon individuals
who
are
competent
intellectually,
academically,
and equally important, morally.
A.C. No. 13521 (In re: Lorenzo
Gadon)
DECISION:
disbarred.
Respondent
is
DOCTRINE:
The
privilege
to
practice it is bestowed only
upon
individuals
who
are
competent
intellectually,
academically,
and
equally
important, morally.
FACTS: Atty. Gadon went viral
for the video clip where he
repeatedly cursed and uttered
profane
remarks
against
journalist Raissa Robles. The
Court had motu proprio taken
cognizance of the video clip and
issued
an
earlier
order
of
preventive suspension from the
practice of law against Gadon.
Gadon
has
been
previously
convicted
by
the
Court
and
suspended from the practice of
law for 3 months for similarly
using offensive and intemperate
language.
Nunga v. Viray
DECISION:
SC
bars
respondent
from being commissioned as a
notary public for 3 years, and
suspended for 3 years.
DOCTRINE: Notarization is not an
empty,
meaningless,
routinary
act.
It
is
invested
with
substantive
public
interest,
such that only those who are
qualified or authorized may act
as notaries public.
FACTS: A disbarment complaint wa
filed against respondent Atty.
Viray for notarizing documents
when he was not commissioned to
do so at the time said documents
were executed.
According
to
the
complaint,
respondent executed the deed of
absolute sale of one of vendor
bank’s assets to Jesus Carlo
Gerard Viray, minor son of the
respondent
without
proper
bidding.
Complainant
further
alleged that the minor vendee
was not capable to buy said
property at a value of P400,000.
Respondent on his part alleged
that he was always commissioned
as notary public and further
contended that the complainant
is facing criminal charges for
plunder.
According
to
the
respondent, the sale of the lot
was done in good faith.
ISSUE:
WON
respondent
is
administratively
liable
for
notarizing documents when he was
not commissioned to do so?
RULING: Yes. It is apparent that
the
respondent
violated
the
provisions of the notarial law
by having affixed his official
signatures
to
the
aforesaid
documents with the intent to
impart
the
appearance
of
notarial authenticity thereto.
It must be underscored that the
notarization by a notary public
converts a private document into
a public document making it
admissible in evidence without
further proof of authenticity
thereof.
For
this
reason,
notaries
public
must
observe
with
utmost
care
the
basic
requirements in the performance
of their duties.
FACTS:
Atty.
Tagorda
is
a
practising attorney and a member
of
the
provincial
board
of
Isabela. In a card and a letter
authored by the respondent, he
advertised himself as a lawyer
commissioned
to
notarize
documents.
ISSUE: WON respondent should be
suspended?
RULING: Yes. Section 27 of the
Canons
of
Professional
Responsibility provide that the
best advertisement is in the
form
of
a
well-merited
reputation
for
professional
capacity and fidelity to trust,
which
cannot
be
forced.
It
further prohibits solicitation
of business by circulars or
advertisement, or by personal
communications or interviews not
warranted by personal relations.
Indirect advertisement is also
intolerable,
such
as
by
furnishing
or
inspiring
newspaper
comments
concerning
the manner of their conduct.
Section
28
also
prohibits
stirring up litigation whether
directly or through agents and
renders
it
unprofessional.
Common
barratry
consists
of
frequently stirring up suits and
quarrels between individuals.
Linsangan v. Tolentino
DECISION: Respondent Tolentino
is suspended for one year.
In re Luis Tagorda
DECISION:
Respondent
suspended for one month.
is
DOCTRINE: The solicitation of
employment by an attorney is a
ground
for
disbarrment
or
suspension.
DOCTRINE: The practice of law is
a profession and not a business.
A lawyer’s best advertisement is
a well-merited reputation for
professional
capacity
and
fidelity.
FACTS:
Petitioner
Linsangan
filed
a
complaint
against
respondent Atty. Tolentino for
solicitation
of
clients
and
encroachment
of
professional
services.
He
alleged
that
respondent, with the help of his
paralegal Labiano, convinced his
clients
to
transfer
legal
representation in exchange of
financial
assistance
and
expeditious collection on their
claims.
Respondent
allegedly
persistently called his clients
and sent them text messages.
Respondent also handed out a
“calling card”.
Respondnent on his part argued
that he did not know Labiano,
but
later
on
recanted
and
admitted it.
ISSUE: WON respondent should be
suspended?
RULING: Yes. Respondent violated
Rule 8.02 on the prohibition
against
encroachment
on
the
professional
practice
of
petitioner. He also contravened
the
rule
against
soliciting
cases for gain, personally, or
through paid agents or brokers
as provided in Section 27 of
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
Canon 3 also provides that a
lawyer, in making known his
legal services, shall use only
true, honest, fair, dignified,
and
objective
information
or
statement of facts. To allow a
lawyer
to
commercialize
the
practice of law, degrade the
profession
in
the
public’s
estimation
and
impair
its
ability to efficiently render
that high character of service.
Rule 2.03 proscribes a lawyer to
do or permit to be done any act
designed
primarily
to
solict
legal
business.
This
is
in
conjunction with Rule 1.03 which
mandates that a lawyer shall
not, for any corrupt motive or
interest, encourage any suit or
proceeding or delay any man’s
cause.
Ambulance
chasing
is
the
practice
of
solicitation
of
almost
any
kind
of
legal
business
by
an
attorney,
personally or through an agent
in order to gain employment.
This is prohibited by Rule 1.03
to
prevent
barratry
and
champerty.
Champerty
is
an
agreement in which a person with
no
previous
interest
in
a
lawsuit financs it with a view
to sharing the disputed property
if the suit succeeds.
A lawyer shall also not steal
another
lawyer’s
client
nor
induce the latter to retain him
by a promise of better service,
good result or reduced fees for
his services as provided for in
Rule 8.02.
Rule 16.04 also prohibited a
lawyer from lending money to his
client to safeguard the lawyer’s
independent mind.
Palencia v. Linsangan
DECISION:
Respondents
are
suspended for two years, the
case against Atty. Glenda M.
Linsangan-Binoya is dismissed.
DOCTRINE:
1. The practice of law is a
profession
and
not
a
business.
2. The relationship between a
lawyer and his client is
highly fiduciary.
3. The practice of law is a
profession,
a
form
of
public
trust,
the
performance of which is
entrusted to those who are
qualified and who possess
good moral character
FACTS: Petitioner Palencia was
an overseas worker seafarer who
was
seriously
injured
during
work. After initial treatment in
Singapore, he was discharged and
flown to the Philippines to
continue his medical treatment.
While confined, one “Moises” and
later
Jesherel
Millena,
paralegals in respondents’ law
office,
approached
petitioner
and convinced him to engage in
the services of respondents’ law
office to file suit against his
employers.
A contract was entered into by
petitioner
and
respondents,
including a special power of
attorney,
where
petitioner
engaged
in
the
services
of
respondents and Gurbani & Co., a
law firm based in Singapore. He
agreed
to
pay
35%
of
any
recovery
or
settlement
as
attorney’s fees.
After execution, petitioner was
paid
by
his
employer
US$60,000.00 as indemnity and
US$20,000.00 under their CBA.
35% was charged to respondents.
Respondents and Gurbani & Co.
also filed a tort case against
the owners of “Panos G” vessel.
A settlement was awarded in the
amount of US$95,000.00. Gurbani
& Co. remitted US$5,000.00 to
Justice Gancayco for his expert
opinion,
attorney’s
fees
equivalent to $35,000.00, and
other
expenses
leaving
net
amount
of
complainant.
US$18,132.43
for
Respondents tendered the amount
of US$20,756.05 to complainant,
who
refused
in
contestation.
Civil
actions
ensued
between
complainant
and
respondents.
Complainant
further
filed
an
administrative complaint before
the IBP.
Complainant on his part argued
respondents refused to remit the
amount agreed upon, deposited
complainant’s money into their
own account, and engaged in
ambulance chasing.
Respondents
explained
that
complainant
retained
their
services for urposes of filing a
claim before the Singapore High
Court.
However
complainant
unjustly refused to accept the
amount. They also argued that
the amount has been placed for
safekeeping in their vault. They
also argued that they provide
free
legal
service
to
the
public.
The
IBP
recommended
the
suspension of respondents for 1
year.
ISSUE: WON respondents should be
suspended?
RULING: Yes. A lawyer in making
known his legal services, must
do so in a dignified manner.
They
are
prohibited
from
soliciting cases for the purpose
of gain, either personally or
through paid agents.
Moreover, Canon
lawyer to:
16
requires
a
1. Hold in trust all moneys
and properties of client
2. Deliver
the
funds
propert of client when
or upon demand subject
his retaining lien
3. Account for all money
property
collected
received.
and
due
to
unpopularity
to
maliciously
malign him and influence the
decision of the Court.
or
or
Respondents
on
their
part
contended that their statements
were mere legitimate expression
of their desires, hopes and
opinons which were taken out of
context.
A lawyer is under absolute duty
to give his client a full,
detailed, and accurate account
of all money and property which
has been received and handled by
him.
The
practice
of
law
is
a
profession, a form of public
trust, the performance of which
is entrusted to those who are
qualified and who possess good
moral character.
Marantan v. Diokno
DECISION: Petition is DISMISSED.
DOCTRINE: Indirect contempt is
punishable under ec. 3(d), Rule
71 of the Rules of Court.
For a comment to be considered
as contempt of court, “it must
really appear” that such does
impede,
interfere
with,
and
embarrass the administration of
justice.
FACTS: Petitioner Marantan was
respondent in a criminal charge
of homicide in 2005, involving
the
shoot
out
which
killed
respondent’s client’s son among
others. The case was dismissed
but the disposition is yet to be
final.
In
2013,
petitioner
was
involved in yet another shooting
incident
in
Atimonan
where
thirteen men were killed. The
incident was televised, which
according
to
petitioner,
the
respondents
rode
on
its
ISSUE: WON respondent should be
held in indirect contempt?
RULING. No. The sub judice rule
restricts
comments
and
disclosures
pertaining
to
judicial proceedings to avoid
prejudging
the
issue,
influencing
the
court,
or
obstructing the administration
of justice.
For a comment to be considered
as contempt of court, “it must
really appear” that such does
impede,
interfere
with,
and
embarrass the administration of
justice.
The “clear and present danger”
rule
means
that
the
evil
consequence of the comment must
be “extremely serious and the
degree of imminence extremely
high” before an utterance can be
punished.
However,
absent
criminal intent, it cannot be
punishable.
Moreover,
the
comments seem to be what the
respondents claim to be. Freedom
of public comment should weigh
heavily
against
a
possible
tendency to influence pending
cases.
In Re: Show Cause Order in the
Decision
dated
11
May
2018
(People v. Sereno)
DECISION:
reprimanded
warning.
Respondent
with
a
is
stern
DOCTRINE: Sub judice refers to
matters under or before a judge
or
court;
or
matters
under
judicial consideration.
All lawyers should take heed
that they are licensed officers
of the courts who are mandated
to maintain the dignity of the
legal
profession
and
the
integrity
of
the
judicial
institution to which they owe
fidelity.
FACTS: The instant case is an
offshoot of G.R. No. 237428 or
People
(represented
by
the
Solicitor General) v. Sereno,
otherwise
known
as
the
quo
warranto
proceedings
against
petitioner.
An
impeachment
complaint
was
filed before the Committee on
Justice
of
the
House
of
Representatives
for
alleged
betrayal of public trust by
respondent.
Incidentally,
the
Republic, through the OSG filed
a petition for quo warranto.
In the midst of the impeachment
complaint
and
quo
warranto
proceedings,
respondent
continuously
opted
to
defend
herself in public instead of
participating in the judicial
process
and
answering
the
charges against her truthfully.
In public and before the media,
she discussed the merits of the
case and made vilified comments
against members of Congress and
casted
aspersions
of
impartiality of the members of
the Court.
The Court issued a show cause
order
asking
respondent
why
disciplinary actions should not
be meted against her.
Respondent for her part contends
the following:
1. She should not be judged on
the stringent standards of
the CPR because she is a
mere party litigant to this
case;
2. Her acts did not create any
serious or imminent threat
to the administration of
justice;
3. Assuming arguendo the CPR
and NCJC apply, she was
discharging her duty as a
Justice
and
lawyer
to
uphold the constitution and
respect the rule of law;
4. Assuming
arguendo
she
violated some provisions of
the CPR and NCJC, the same
does
not
warrant
the
exercise
of
disciplinary
powers
of
the
Court
because:
a. No less than the OSG
himself repeatedly made
personal attacks against
her
b. She was not given her
right to due process
ISSUE: WON respondent must
held administratively liable?
be
RULING:
Yes.
Respondent
miserable failed to sicharge her
duty as a member of the Bar to
observe and maintain the respect
due
to
the
court
and
its
officers as provided in Canon
11.
Canon
11
–
A
lawyer
shall
observe and maintain the respect
due
to
the
courts
and
to
judicial
officers
and
should
insist on similar conduct by
others.
The
Court
is
thus
reluctant to treat her as an
ordinary litigant.
Respondent’s reckless behavior
of imputing ill motives and
malice to the Court’s process is
plainly evident in the present
case.
Her
public
statements
incontrovertibly
brings
the
Court
in
a
position
of
disrespute and disrespect.
Despite the severity of offenses
committed
by
respondent,
the
Court is constrained to suspend
the application of the full
force of the law and impose a
lighter
penalty.
This
accommodation
is
not
a
condonation, but a second chance
to
mend
respondent’s
ways,
express
remorse,
and
be
forthright.
Velasco v. Atty. Causing
DECISION:
Atty.
SUSPENDED for one
STERN WARNING.
Causing
is
year with a
DOCTRINE:
Freedom
of
speech,
expression, and the press are
not absolute.
FACTS: Complainant is petitioner
for a case on the declaration of
nullity
of
marriage
where
respondent is counsel for the
other party.
Atty. Causing sent a direct
message
to
complainant’s
son
through
Facebook
stating:
“Pakitingnan mo ang iyong ama,
iho at huwag mo syang gayahin
ha.” The message was accompanied
by a link to a post published by
respondent
with
the
caption
“Wise Polygamous Husband?”
Respondent divulged the issues
of the pending case and even
attached a copy of complainant’s
petition
in
the
said
post.
Thereafter, he shared the post
to his other Fabeook account and
to a public group.
Respondent admitted the deed,
but denied harassing complainant
and instead was only performing
his duties as a “spokesmanlawyer”. He also argued that his
actuations did not constitute
libel for he was telling the
truth.
Furthermore,
as
a”journalist-blogger”, it was in
the exercise of his right to
press freedom when he published
the said post.
The IBP recommended that he be
suspended for one year, which
was modified by the IBP Board of
Governors
to
extend
to
two
years.
Respondent
moved
for
consideration which was denied
by the IBP Board of Governors.
ISSUE: WON respondent should be
held administratively liable for
publishing
the
post
and
photographs
of
complainant’s
petition?
RULING: Yes. A lawyer is not
allowed
to
divide
his
personality as an attorney at
one time and a mere citizen at
another. Regardless of whether a
lawyer
is
representing
his
client,
acting
as
a
spokesperson,
or
merely
practicing his right to press
freedom, his duties as a member
of the Bar remain unchanged.
Apart from the violations of the
Canons
of
Professional
Responsibility,
respondent
violated Sec. 1221 of RA 8349 or
the Family Courts Act when he
divulged the records of the
Family Court cases.
Lao v. Atty. Causing
DECISION:
DISBARRED.
Respondent
is
RULING: Yes. He cannot justify
his infractions by hiding under
these constitutional freedoms as
they are not absolute.
FACTS: Respondent published in a
Facebook post a draft and yet to
be filed copy of his ComplaintAffidavit of Plunder accusing
petitioner and others of the
said crime.
He violated Rule 1.01, 7.03, and
8.01. As a member of the Bar, he
ought to know that Facebook is
not the proper forum to air out
his grievances.
DOCTRINE:
He allegedly resorted to the use
of social media to make his
sister, one of the congressional
candidates known to the public.
His publication subjected Lao to
public
hate,
contempt,
and
ridicule, considering that no
such complaint was filed against
her before the Ombudsman.
He
alleged
Lao
to
be
the
Chairperson of the BAC of DSWD
and the one that handled the
bidding that ended up in the
awarding
of
food
packs
to
Tacuring Fit Mart, Inc.
He repeated his false imputation
in a subsequent Facebook post
and announced that a complaint
for plunder has already been
filed. Lao insisted that he made
false imputations against her.
Atty. Causing did not deny that
he is the author of the said
posts.
His
basis
for
the
complaint
were
investigative
reports from the PCIJ. He argued
that he was just exercising his
freedom of press and expression.
The
IBP
recommended
his
suspension for a period of 6
months.
The
IBP
Board
of
Governors
modified
the
resolution and imposed a penalty
of reprimand.
ISSUE: WON
the CPR.
respondent
violated
CANON III
FIDELITY
Section 1. Practice of law
In Cayetano v. Monsod, where the
petitioner challenged Monsod’s
appointment to the COMELEC for
allegedly not satisfying the 10year requirement of practice of
law,
the
Court
held
that
respondent’s stint as lawyereconomist, lawyer-negotiator of
contracts, and lawyer-legislator
more
than
satisfy
the
constitutional requirement that
he has been engaged in the
practice of law.
The Court defined the practice
of law as any activity in or out
of court, which requires the
application
of
law,
legal
principle,
practice
or
procedure, and calls for legal
knowledge,
training,
and
experience.
Section 2. Responsible and
Accountable Lawyer
In Dagala v. Atty. Quesada and
Atty. Adquilen, where petitioner
filed a case before the National
Labor
Relations
for
illegal
dismissal,
overtime
pay,
separation
pay,
damages,
and
attorney’s fees against Capitol,
Atty. Quesada failed to appear
in
two
scheduled
mandatory
conference hearings despite due
notice.
directly the lawyer for
case, but his law firm.
The
Court
held
that
Atty.
Quesada was liable for gross
negligence
in
handling
complainant’s
case
and
was
SUSPENDED for 1 year.

In
Manalang
v.
Buendia,
respondent
promised
hastened
legal services on the Nullity of
Marriage
of
petitioner
and
fabricated details in the case.
There was also no case found on
the dissolution of Manalang’s
marriage. The Court ruled that
respondent Buendia is DISBARRED
for
misrepresentations
and
deceiving the client.
Section 15. Conflict of Interest
of a Lawyer Hired by a Law Firm


When a lawyer joins a law
firm, he must disclose to the
law
firm
all
his
past
clients.
If
there
is
a
potential
conflict
of
interest,
the
new
lawyer
shall not act on the case or
cases of the affected current
client.
Section 27, Rule 138 – It
provides that a member of the
Bar
may
be
disbarred
or
suspended from the practice
of
law
for
any
deceit,
malpractice, or other gross
misconduct.

the
The
rule
on
conflict
of
interest is applied when the
lawyer represents a client
against a former client in a
controversy related directly
or indirectly to the subject
matter of the previous case
of the former client.
RATIONALE: A lawyer owes his
former
client
to
maintain
inviolate
the
client’s
confidence or to refrain from
doing
anything
which
will
injuriously affect the client
in any matter in which the
lawyer previously represented
him.
Section 16. Prohibition against
Dating, Romantic, or Sexual
Relations with a Client
GR: A lawyer shall not have
dating,
romantic,
or
sexual
relations with a client during
the engagement.
XPN: The relationship existed
before
the
lawyer-client
relationship.
RATIONALE: Every lawyer is dutybound to act and comport himself
or herself in such a manner that
would promote public confidence
in the integrity of the legal
profession.
In Rodco v. Atty. Concepcion,
respondent previously lawyered
for
petitioner.
After
termination of the lawyer-client
relationship, respondent took as
client an employee of petitioner
for a case involving the latter.
In Venzon v. Atty. Peleo III,
respondent
maintained
sexual
relation with complainant and
several
other
faithless
contemporaneous relations while
his marriage with his lawful
spouse was still subsisting.
The Court ruled that respondent
violated the rules on conflict
of interest even if he wasn’t
Section 17. Prohibition against
Conflict of Interest
Representation; Prospective
Clients


The
lawyer
shall
at
the
earliest
opportunity,
ascertain whether a conflict
of interest lies between a
prospective client and his
current clients and inform
the same.
If any of the parties object,
the lawyer shall not accept
the new engagement.
NOTE: Representation of opposing
clients,
even
in
unrelated
cases,
is
tantamount
to
representing
conflicting
interests or invites suspicion
of double-dealing.
In
Buenavista
Properties
v.
Atty.
Deloria,
respondent
represented Menguito, President
of LSDC for estafa. Thereafter,
he
filed
a
complaint
for
delivery of title with the HLURB
against BPI with LSDC as thirdparty
respondent.
Respondent
simultaneously represented LSDC
and Corazon, a buyer, who had
conflicting interests. He also
represented several lot buyers
as complainants in the HLURB
case against BPI while also
representing LSDC. He did not
obtain written consent of the
parties concerned.
The Court SUSPENDED respondent
as he was guilty of violating
Rules 15.01 and 15.03 of the
CPR.
Test to
Interest
Determine
Conflict
of
1. Whether or not in behalf of
one
client,
it
is
the
lawyer’s duty to fight for
an issue or claim, but it
is his duty to oppose it
for another client.
2. Whether the acceptance of a
new relation will prevent
an attorney from the full
discharge of his duty of
undivided
fidelity
and
loyalty to his client or
invite
suspicion
of
unfaithfulness or doubledealing in the performance
thereof.
In Legaspi v. Atty. Gonzales,
the Court held that there was
already
a
lawyer-client
relationship
during
their
consultation
where
petitioner
sought
legal
advice
which
included inquiry on the rates to
be
paid.
Subsequently,
respondent represented Aguarino
in the unlawful detainer case
filed by Legaspi’s company. The
information
received
by
respondent were material to the
issues against Aguarino. He is
found guilty of violating Rule
15.02
of
the
CPR
and
is
SUSPENDED for 1 year.
Section 18. Prohibition against
Conflict of Interest;
Representation of Former Clients
In Constantino v. Aransazo, Jr.,
petitioner engaged in the legal
services
of
respondent
in
handling the property case of a
certain Mr. Tongco, who was the
mortgagee in an extra-judicial
proceeding with Aldaba. Aldaba
obtained a loan from Tongco and
as
security,
mortgaged
his
property. For failure to pay the
loan, Mr. Tongco assigned a Deed
of Assignment to petitioner and
respondent
for
forfeiting
Aldaba’s privilege. During the
trial,
Aldaba’s
counsel
manifested
that
respondent’s
sworn statement implicated the
confidences of his client,
petitioner.
the
The Court ruled that respondent
indeed violated Canon 21 of the
CPR, now Sec. 18, Canon 3. The
contents of the sworn statement
contained information revealed
to
him
in
confidence
by
complainant
during
a
lawyerclient
relationship,
which
“begins from the moment a client
seeks the lawyer’s advice upon a
legal concern.” Respondent is
SUSPENDED for 1 year with a
STERN WARNING.
Retubando encouraged petitioner
to establish a lending company.
Afterwhich, the three borrowed
money
from
a
certain
Yu.
Petitioner was surprised to know
that respondent named himself
and
Retubando
as
principal
stockholders despite the fact
that they only contributed a
minimal amount. Atty. Jumao-as
and
Retubando
then
left
Villamor’s company and joined
Yu’s lending company. Respondent
sent a demand letter to Villamor
in
behalf
of
Yu,
demanding
payment.
In Adelfa Properties v. Atty.
Mendoza, respondent was one of
the
legal
counsels
for
the
corporation who, due to his
incompetence, was removed from
office.
In
retaliation,
respondent threatened to expose
all the corrupt deeds of Sen.
Villar,
one
of
the
major
stokholders. He also demanded
sums of money in exchange of
keeping his mouth shut and made
interviews threatening Villar.
The Court ruled that respondent
was
indeed
guilty
of
representing
conflicting
interests, and as such he is
SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for 2 years.
The Court ruled that while there
is no concrete evidence as to
whether
or
not
respondent
divulged privileged information,
he is liable for breach of trust
in office for being interviewed
by the media. As such, he is
SUSPENDED for 6 months.

Section 19. Corporate Lawyers;
Conflict of Interest

A
lawyer
representing
a
corporation or organization,
does
not
necessarily
represent any constituent or
affiliated organization such
as parent or subsidiary.
In
Villamor
v.
respondent
and
a
Jumao-as,
certain
Section 22. Public Attorney’s
Office; Conflict of Interest


The Public Attorney’s Office
is the primary legal aid
service
office
of
the
government.
It shall ensure ready access
to
its
services
by
the
marginalized
sectors
of
society.
A conflict of interest shall
only
be
imputed
to
said
lawyer
and
his
direct
supervisor. The same shall
not disqualify the rest of
the lawyers from the PAO from
representing affected client
upon full disclosure to the
latter.
In A.M. No. 23-05-05-SC, Request
of the PAO to Delete Section 22,
Canon II of the Proposed CPRA,
Atty.
Acosta
wrote
to
the
Supreme Court praying that the
said provision be deleted and
temporarily
not
implemented
pending
a
decision
on
this
contention. She argued that PAO
should be treated like a regular
law firm. The Court ruled that a
private law firm can be replaced
by another law firm by paying
clients, but indigents who count
solely
on
PAO
do
not
have
options.
The Court further ruled that
Section 22 of Canon III does not
go against RA 9406 on the PAO’s
organizational
set-up
or
the
2021
Revised
PAO
Operations
Manual. Once said rules and
procedures intersect with actual
court proceedings and judicial
remedies, what the Court directs
is supreme.