11
08
月
.
日
AIAA-86-1669
The T800 Turbine Engine Solicitation —
A New Thrust in Streamlining the
Acquisition Process
J. Acurio and P.E. Brown, US Army Aviation
Research and Technology Activity, Fort
Eustis, VA
AIAA/ASME/SAE/ASEE 22nd Joint
Propulsion Conference
June 16-18, 1986/Huntsville, Alabama
For permission to copy or republish, contact the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics
1633 Broadway, New York, NY 10019
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2023
年
Mr. John Acurio and Colonel Patty E. Brown
Abstract
The paper de tails activities related to formulating acquisition
strategy for the T800 engine, preparing the Request for Proposal (RFP), and
examining the considerations involved in the evaluation of proposals. A
major thrust of this solicitation was to establish a new way for the Army to
conduct business with industry. In the process, many firsts were defined,
along with many changes to previous practices• In many ways, the RFP
represented a departure from "business as usual” in that a new,
performance- oriented approach was taken by defining specific end-product
requirements to be used by the Government and the offeror in establishing
the basis for binding contractual commitments • The significance is that in
this new approach, the Government1s intent ion was to eliminate the ••howto-do-if* from the RFP・ It permits the potential contractor maximum
latitude and flexibility in meeting firm-fixed-price requirements without
Che Government1s more trad itional practice of involvement in the
contractor's day-to-day management of program details. The innovations,
new initiatives, and acquisition strategy, together, represent a considerable
departure from past practices• The primary subjects addressed during
preparation of the RFP were cost, production competition, RAM/ILS, and
product performance• In turn, the focus of the acquisition strategy became
competitive development and competitive follow-on production* With
these overall concepts in hand, it Chen became the task to select two
competing teams to develop the T800 to a point where the design that
offered the best value to the Government could be selected for continuation
into qualification and production phases. This paper addresses these prime
innovations and processes, which have significantly contributed to
streamlining the process and which now have become the standard for
major Army materiel acquisition•
Introduction
The LHX Project is a light rotorcraft development program
consisting of one vehicle for armed reconnaissance/attack roles and one for
utility missions• The objective of the program is to provide an affordable
family of aerial vehicles with al1-weather and night operation capabilities
to replace the aging, obsolete light fleet. This aging fleet includes the OH-6,
OH-58, UH-1, and AH-*1 helicopters« Replacement with the LHX family
will provide a modern, more capable, more survivable, less costly to
operate fleet that augments and complements existing operational
capabilities of the AH-64, UH-60, and AHIP helicopters. The utility version
of LHX (LHX-U) will embody extensive commonality with
the scout-attack (LHX-SCAT) version and will include Che same dynamic
systems and components (engines, transmissions, and rotors), along with
many common control and mission equipment items.
To fill these established needs, each vehicle will use new turboshaft engines
(two per vehicle) • This engine, the T800-XX-800, will be rated at 900
kilowatts (1200 horsepower class) at sealevel standard coaditions and will
possess buiLt-in growth capability • To provide these engines, a Full Scale
Development program through qualification was required, and the effort
was directed toward building upon a demonstrated technology base. The
Request for Proposal (RFP), covering the Government's end-product
requirements for the engine, was released to the industry early in December
1984, and two contracts for development were awarded in June of 1985.
Discussion
The following discussion addresses guidelines used in developing
acquisition strategy and preparing a performance-oriented Request for
Proposal (RFP) for the T800-XX~800 engine. Six subjects are addressed PRODUCTION GOMPETITLON, TECHNICAL, MANAGEMENT,
COST, RAM/ILS (Reliability and Maintainability/ Integrated Logistics
Support), and CONTRACT. The First five of these subjects are areas of the
proposed offerings that were evaluated and used in negotiat ions to de fine
the sixth - a binding and firm-fixed-price CONTRACT. Taken together,
they represent the offeror's willingness to accept the Government's
standards of expected performance♦ Emphasis was on description of the
end item and its performance, along with guarantees« To achieve this
combination of requirements, particular attention by the offerors was
directed to the Government's objectives in PRODUCTION
COMPETITION, RAM/ILS, and COST. TECHNICAL considerations,
although important, primarily were aimed at methods and plans used to
develop the engine and incorporate the available technology base.
MANAGEMENT know-how, in this case, was regarded as an existing
industry capability not requiring a rigorous examination by the
Government's proposal evaluators.
Structure of the evaluation is shown in Figure 1. Consistent with the
above objectives, note that PRODUCTION COMPETITION was elevated
as a separate area of evaluation and was given heavy emphasis as a key
driver• •Prineipal concerns and directions taken to orient the RFP toward
the Government * s real needs are covered in the paragraphs which follow.
by
This paper is declared a work of the U.S. Government and is not subject to copyright protection in (he United Slates.
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THE T800 TURBINE ENGINE SOLICITATION - A NEW THRUST IN
STREAMLINING THE ACQUISITION PROCESS
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Fig. 1 T8OO-XX-80O Engine Source Selection Evaluation Weighting
2
l QG/MANPRIHI
I”
o Emphasize planning and execution by the offeror/contrac tor, not by
the Government
o Describe end product but allow industry innovations in. details of
managing the activi ty
their proposals found nonresponsive• Those elements were：
o End Item o Parts o Producibility Engineering and Planning
o Require contractor to concentrate on core issues (who does whaj
how, when, and where) in addressing Producibi11ty Engineering
and Planning
This was Che first known procurement in Army Aviation to require that
competition initiatives be established by the offeror from the outset. In the
same way, this was the first source selection activity that emphasized
evaluation of the offeror's plans to achieve competition sourcing. If the
evaluation found that a proposal did not offer to develop al ternate sources
for the end itern and parts, the offeror would be deemed ineligible for
In proposing a plan and an approach to these expectations,
execution of the effort was to be under a firm-fixed-price coatract and
was regarded as a binding commitment.
b• Technical - Acquisition strategy and planning of the
development program for the T800 engine required that an innovative
approach be formulated before releasing the RFP to the industry. First,
it was necessary to install a new philosophy into the process, and that
meant specifying only the technical characteristics required 0f the
engine in production. In turn, It meant providing the industry with
latitude to conduct trade-off studies for optimizing their offerings. The
key here was to recognize that the engine industry need not be
required to pursue design and development along prescribed lines that
followed a course dictated by the Government. The objective was to
place responsibility for the proposed engine program directly in the
hands of the selected contractor(s)♦ Through this approach, it must be
accepted by the Government that the engine manufacturers know fullwe 11 the design and development process« Given that this procurement involved a binding commitment against a fixed-price contract
and that competicion in production from competitive sources was a
driving consideration, the offerors were given freedom to specify how
they would meet the Government's requirements• In addition, to
provide the desired latitude and flexibility in arriving at a best design
description and program, the RFP permitted offerors to fall within a
range of performance and weight objectives (given in the RFP as
bands)• However, it also required that fixed reliability and schedule
targets be met. At the Government1s option, failure to meet these
targets could have resulted in cancellation of one contractor's effort in
favor of a better, more competitive design that would meet the targets.
In this manner, it was possible to structure an RFP that was termed
''performance oriented/* It cannot be overemphasized that the move
toward providing the industry with
award, regardless QE other merits to his proposal in the areas of Technical,
Management, Cost, and RAM/ILS* Productton Competition, therefore,
represented a significant portion of the proposal, and it was evaluated only if
the offeror addressed how the initiatives would be met•
It is emphasized that the requirement for Production Competition was
established and coordinated with Indus try well in advance of releasing the
RFP. Further, the contractor was expected to pursue the initiatives at the
start of Full Scale Development, and proposed plans were to be a major
consideration during the evaluation process• Highlights of the Government's
expectations and contractorgenerated agreements that summarize this area
of the RFp are listed below.
o Allow industry (offeror) to develop necessary plans and business
arrangements for cooperative efforts
o Minimize limits on proprietary rights to data (establish expiration
dates)
o Achieve status of two qualified sources for end items in production
by first production lot (full competition by 3rd production lot for
T800 engine)
o Establish that Government will not fund £acilitization
o Establish initiatives for small, small disadvantaged, and womenowned business participation
o Develop options for qualified sources of parts
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approaches to parts competition)
a. Production Conipetition - This precedentsetting area represented a
significant change from traditional RFP-related areas and elements. It was
the long-term foundation upon which the Government expected Co control
costs of the end items and replenishment parts. Three elements were
identified) and the offerors were required to address them to avoid having
\sjj2y
\aa^
o Develop willingness to accept alternatives (new and innovative
3
o Require only essential system cost and engineering management
plans to be submitted for assessment
d.
Cos二-The requirement to assess program costs was extended
well beyond the basic Full Scale Development (FSD) phase of the
program. The evaluation included contractual commitments to control
cost: of production and follow-on operation and support. Offerors were
provided infonnatton to show the Government's assumptions, and each
was expected to propose end objectives, using these assumptions to
project a cost commitment• The three elements that received detailed and
concentrated attention in the evaluation process were:
o Eliminate "how to do it" from Statement of Work and System
Specifications
o Basic Engineering Development
o Procurement and Production o Operation and Support
o Permit the offeror maximum flexibility in proposing a program
that best meets requirements
o Minimize Government involvement in managing the development
process
o Establish firm understanding among bidders that the RFP is
departure from "business as usual"
o Provide offerers with opportuni ty to develop optimizations and
trade off the requirements
o Emphasize that contractor( s) w£ 11. be held accountable for
development program ^s^
and its internal controls
o Specify performance requirements in a s ingle place in RFP
o Eliminate Prime Item Development Specifications - Use
Government System Speci ficat ion
o Retain test requirements for Preliminary Flight Rating and
Qualification
o Retain performance, reliability, and schedule requirements
o Require only essential data items during development for
Government tracking
o Minimize number of formal Government reviews
c. Management - This area of the RFP was reduced in scope when
compared to previous procurements• It was recognized that many
management systems are in place in the industry and that these systems are
well structured to conduct an engine development program.
There fore, it was the Government's intention to
avoid intrusion into established business practices or involvement in internal control
of the contractor's program activities. Of interest in evaluating proposals, of course,
was how the offeror and his supporting organizations planned to conduct the engine
program. Therefore,
attention was placed on Management Structure, System Engineering Management,
and Configuration Management. The basis for th is view was the need to assess the
offeror's understanding of his responsibility in the role of managing and coordinating
competition initiatives and the teaming of other contractor a$sociations required to
meet the Government's objectives. This approach was necessary to improve program
efficiency and reduce end cost Co the Government. A brief summary of the positions
adopted are
listed below.
o Increase industry responsibility and role while reduc ing Government
involvement in internal management tasks
o Assign control of development to contractor and make him accountable on a
firm-fixed-price basis
o Use contractor-developed Work Breakdown Strue Cure, i f appropriate, in
minimizing cost of report ing
o Use performance specifications rather than Prime Item Development spec
ificat ions (PIDs)
o Assign configuration management to contractor during development
o Increase contractor flexibility in program decisions (permit novel and
innovative approaches)
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o Pe rmit tn ore timely decisions by contractor without requiring
study and approval by Government
maximum flexibility in proposing a streamlined program must be
accompanied by an acceptance that contracts to the winners will be used to
enforce the performance guarantees• From the above, it should be clear
that the Government did not
&" intend to manage details of the development: program, nor did the Government
wish to specify "how to design and develop the engine." To iterate for
emphasis, the Governmentf s intent ion was to place the process of engine
development in the hands of the contractor(s), and it was essential that this
departure from previous practices be made clear and recognized by the
offerors as a feature of their proposal and follow-on negotiations prior to
executing binding, firm-fixed- price contracts• A summary of the above
points is shown below.
ceiling; however, cost for production and operation and support were not
more than educated (sometimes opt imist ic) estimates without any
binding commitment on the part of the selected contractor. Th is
situation changed wi th the release of the RFP for the T800 engine. The
Reasons for this change from past practices are significant.
Contractors had been required to provide excessive amounts of data
relating to progress and justifications for design changes during Full
Scale Development (FSD). The burden, in both time and cost, was
largely unnecessary. As part of this process, the Government was
always in the approval loop, adding to the tasks and causing time
delays in closing the cycle. The objective in the T800 contract was to
fix responsibility with the contractor until completion of engine
qualification• This departure also involved meeting ambitious RAM
requirements, and will be measured by results of engine tests in the air
vehicle (Development Tests/Operational Test (DT/OT). Under such
conditions, it was deemed
negotiated contract required that developer commit the engine start to a
himself from the fixed price for each of the three elements shown• to
The features of th is new approach
controlling
contractor cost and performance are listed below.
o
Establish basis for
contract to conduct
firm-f ixed-price
Full Scale Development
o
Establish design to firm,
contractually
cost goals * Negotiate binding
commitment
and support goals Establish operating
Negotiate firm, contractually binding commi tmeut
o Define Cover nttientf s cost objectives and assumptions for
purpose of setting industry's targets
o Define the relative importance of cost elements (above) to guide
industry's emphas i s
o Establish prices of opt ions
e • Rei tab ili t工 _and Mainea Enablli ty/ Integrated Logistics
Support (RAM/工LS)・ In the RFp, Reliability and Maintainability were
regarded as so important as to be raised to a major area of evaluation• As a
topic, they were joined with Integrated Logistics Support and not included
under Technical or Management, as had been the case in most previous
proposal evaluations« By s。doing, RAM/ILS was assured of receiving
heavy emphasis and became a significant part of the contractor1s binding
commitment• Until now, RAM represented a Factor and subfactor input to
the evaluation process and was too low in the strueture to carry the needed
impact. The same was Che case with ILS. The eight factors that made up
this area were:
appropriate that the contrac tor be given every
opportunity to demonstrate product, so quality in the willing to
long as he was the specified standards of commit to reliability and
expected time under
maintainability witl)in the
a finn-fixed-price contract« Included were targe Is for mean time
between failure, mean time be tween removal, and times to repair or
replace modules. The burden, therefore, was on the contractor to produce
to an agreed level of product performance • It was beneficial to the
process that a competitive environment be maintained with at least two
sources until
completion of Preliminary Flight rating tests•
The plan to achieve success was the contractor1s, and he proposed
the steps that he believed were essential to demonstrate that the
Government's requirements were met in all areas (safety, human factors,
quality control, survivability/vulnerability, LOG/MANPRINT, and AVS)
・ With emphasis on ILS, items normally contained the SOW were
moved to the system specification. The Integrated $upport Plan (ISP),
originally required under Data Item DI-L-S138 comprising nine separate
plans, was submitted based on DI-L-10827, which allowed for greater
flexibility in ISP preparation. Therefore, the ISP represented the offeror's
insight and knowledge into requirements of an ILS program, and his
proposal was a demonstration of capability that could be evaluated
effectively during the source selection process. Additionally, the CDRL
entries of the nine plans, requiring automatic periodic updates, were
eliminated. The ISP was submitted as part of the proposal with changes
being effected via contract modification. LSA/LSAR also was tailored
differently from past programs , Instead of specifically identifying in the
RFP each LSA task and subtask to be performed ,the offeror submitted a
proposed LSA program based on MIL-STD-1383-1A and -2A. Only five
critical LSA tasks/subtasks were required as a minimum. Highlights of
the new RFP are given below•
o Reliability
o Maintainability
。Safety
o Human Factors Engineering
o Quali.ty Engineering
o Survivab ility/Vulnerability
o Logistics/Manpower Integration (LOG/MANPR
工NT)
o Air Vehicle Support (AVS)
o Develop ambitious, but achievable, RAM targets
。 Establish basis for Government-contractor
agreement on firm, binding commitments
5
Xi^/
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Previous RFPs requested voluminous substantiating data,
addressing requirements and s t Lpulat Cons on the part of the of feror•
These,
in turn, were used by the Government to develop an independent
assessment of overal1 life-cycle cost. At best, it was based on applying
judgment derived from earlier, similar programs• In some cases, cost of
FSD was "capped" to reflect a cost
o Develop plans for production to minimize ：1^/
the effects of
transitioning the
manufacturing processes betweon sources
o Performance Speci ficat ion - The RFP contained only the
Government* s major performance requirements to
allow the offerors maximum flexibility to propose the
design which they felt would provide the best value to
the Government. The contractors, then, are responsible
for delivering the engine which meets performance
requirements in accordance with their plans and theit
commitments.
o Minimize data reporting and approval cycles in FSD
o Minimize Government intervention in problem corrections during
FSD
o Enhance contrac tor initiatives to provide best product - Place
burden of responsibility for FSD with contractor
o Establish plan to shift responsibility from contractor to the
Government after FSD
o Establishment 。£ Life Cycle Cost Guarantees Contractors were required to propose Design to Cost
(DTC) and Operating and Support (0&6) goals, as well
as contractually binding language reflecting the extent
to which the contractors would commit to demonstrate
those goals. This approach in the RFP provided a direct
method 。£ evaluating commitments to cost objectives
during the source selection and established a basis to
judge the offeror1s willingness to meet these important
goals.
o De fine RAM/ILS in system specification - Establish measurable
demonstrations of reliability
o Require demonstration of reliability and maintainability goals in
test cells and aircraft installation
o Encourage innovation and erase appearance of "business as usual"
The T800 development and qualification program was more user
sensi.tive than any of those in the past. It was also producer sensitive in that it al
lowed the contractor to pursue requirements without intervention. With both the "^^
Government and industry working in unison, the T800 should be the most reliable,
maintainable, supportable, and acceptable engine produced to date.
o Fac ilit ization - The Army did not fund facilititation for
production of the T800-XX-800 engine. All brick and
mortar, special tooling, test equipment, and other
related production items are the contractor1 s
responsibility, and the contractor shall provide for
faciliti- Nation on his own. As such, he assumes the
risk that a s\i€ficleat quantity of engines will be
procured to recoup that investment.
ۥ Goqtract - The T8Q0-XK-800 engine devel- opment/acquisition
strategy embodied an innovative approach by the Government. The new
philosophy was to place the development burden on the contractor to the
maximum extent possible and reduce the amount of Government
involvement in dictating the method by which the contractor was to
perform* Major aspects of Che RFP and requirements placed on the
contractor are provided in the paragraphs which follow.
o Configuration Control 一 Contractors are required, prior
to qualification testing (QT), to deliver an engine
which meets the performance requirements and a
product spedficatton defining the configuration. At that
t ime the Government shall assume configuration
control. Design flexibility and decision authority,
therefore, remains with the contractor until
qualification.
o Competition - Awarding competitive contracts for Full Scale
Development (FSD) to more than one contractor and
subsequently selecting a winning design requires that each
continue to put his "best foot forward" at all times to develop
the best product at the 1owest cost.
o Cost: Reporting - Although the Government required
most of the data deEined by Cost/Schedule Control
System Criteria (C/SCSC), the intent was to utilize the
contractor's established cost management system rather
than requiring a specific, validated C/SCSC system.
o Type of Contract 一 A firm-fixed- price contract was required for
this procurement♦ This type contract shifts the cost risk t。 the
contractor and limits the Government * s liability.
o Data Submittals - The Government's requirements for
data have been limited to only that informacion
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o Permit contractor to produce with minimum Government
involvement in contractor's day-to-day management during FSD
of an RFP. The key, however, must be to develop an environment with
industry that will establish Che intention to hold contractors to fixed and
binding commitments throughout the program. The Government, in turn,
should be willing to provide the contractor with flexibility needed to run
the development.
o Rat tonalizat ion, Standardization and Interoperability (RSI) The Army did not establish specific requirements for RSI. It
was intended that an industry-to-industry free market approach
would be most e f fec t ive ・
On 19 July 1985, two contracts were awarded to two contract
teams. One team consists of AVCO-Lycoming and Pratt and Whitney,
and the other consists of Garrett Turbine Engine Company and Allison
Cas Turbine Division of General Motors. Each team will compete its
design against the other during early development (over about a 3-year
period) up to a Preliminary Flight Rating (PFR.) . At that time, when
many of the critical requirements and strengths will have been
demonstrated, the Government will down-select to one team based on
contract performance, other notable successes, and progress toward
commitments. The surviving team then will complete the development
and early production of the same engine design. These remaining two
manufacturers then will split and compete with each other for full~ rate
production and necessary support, using guaranteed prices (already
negotiated) as the ceilings. An important aspect of the production
initiatives is that each will bid its price to the Government independent of
the former team relationship.
The acquisition strategy for the T800-XX-800 engine was based
on establishing a competitive environment and was designed to minitnize
1 ife- cycle cost • Shifting the development risk, to the contractors during
FSD also was intended to make best use of the industry * s expertise
without detailed direction or involvement from the Government• At the
sane time, the lower level of Government involvement should reduce
administrative burdens and costs. Most important, the fixed-price nature
of the resulting contracts was recognized as a factor that would increase
development cost over other approaches; however, it “&s clear that the
competitive marketplace wi11 offset this increase over the life cycle.
Summary
'vi^/
Thus the T800 selection process is underway. It will be several
years, however, before the major innovations, initiatives and acquisition
strategy will have stood the test and been absorbed into the acquisition
community.
The T80O Request for Proposal was s true Cured to reflect the
Government's inheres匕 in a performance-oriented produc t. There fore,
the RFP stated requirements and defined boundaries without detailing
methods by which to achieve the result• In essence, the typical "how-todo-it" in previous RFPs was eliminated, and it was left to the offeror to
determine how best to meet requirements. As such, the RFP was much
shorter, and the primary section for describing the product was Che
System Specification; it also was considerably reduced in size from
previous practices. The RFP, with this specification, gave the offeror
flexibility and an opportunity to trade off parameters so as co encourage
optimization. It also called for definitive plans to accomplish the tasks.
Therefore, each offeror1s proposal detailed his overalI program
commitments and guarantees, citing liabilities that he was willing to
accept for not meeting contrac tual requirements « That understand ing
between the Government and the potential contractors was well
articulated and coordinated in draft RFPs and prelimtnary meetings•
Without these reviews, it would have been far more difficult to instill the
concepts of the new way of doing business into the industry♦ It cannot be
overemphasized that these pre-RFP steps were essential and that future
similar procurements, likewise, must prepare the ofEerors in advance•
In this case, each response was in the range of about 2000 pages. Clearly,
it is to the Governmentf s advantage to concentrate the process on
describing end-product requirements to the industry. The gains, not yet
fully realized, can be enormous, and future procurements must consider
the above (and perhaps more extensive) measures in reducing complexity
\j^j/
As shown by the innovative approach taken, it is believed that proposal offerings can be reduced in length, along with a much simpler RFP, resulting
in significant benefits in the process •
7
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essential to tracking• The number of program plans to be
submitted was reduced, as was the number of updates to the
remaining plans. Proposed test plans were negotiated prior to
contract award•