Altruism and Spite in Politics:
How the Mind Makes Welfare Tradeoffs About Political Parties
Appendix
Study 1: MTurk
Instructions
Imagine you are given a decision between two options. Your choice determines how much
money you and a given political party would receive.
If you choose the first option, a sum of money will be given to you and no money will be given
to the {In-party}. If you choose the second option, a sum of money will be given to the {Inparty} and no money will be given to you.
For example, consider the decisions below:
Option 1:
Option 2:
You get $10
The {In-party} gets $50.
Option 1:
Option 2:
You get $30
The {In-party} gets $50.
In the first decision, you must choose between $10 for you and $50 for the {In-party}. If you
choose the first option, then you get $10 and the {In-party} gets zero. If you choose the second
option, you get zero and the {In-party} gets $50.
In the second decision, you must choose between $30 for you and $50 for the {In-party}. If you
choose the first option, then you get $30 and the {In-party} gets zero. If you choose the second
option, then you get zero and the {In-party} gets $50.
As an example, consider the decisions made by a hypothetical decision-maker. They are shown
below:
Option 1:
Option 2:
You get $10
The {In-party} gets $50.
Option 1:
You get $30
1
Option 2:
The {In-party} gets $50.
Based on the choices in the example above, for the first decision the decision-maker would
receive $10 and the {In-party} zero. In the second decision, the decision-maker would
receive zero and the {In-party} $50.
As you work through the decisions, assume that you cannot later give any money you receive to
any party and that both parties will not give any money back to you. Also, assume that no one
will know what choices you make.
Do your best to make each decision independently of all the others. Do not let previous decisions
you have made influence any decisions you are thinking about. To make this easier, imagine that
at the end of the experiment, we randomly select just one of the decisions that you made and we
make this one, single decision real. If only one decision can become real, you want to make each
decision independently of all others because you just do not know which decision might be real.
In other words, make each decision as if it were the only decision you were making and you had
to live with that decision alone.
In the following pages, you will be faced with a series of such decisions. For each decision,
please select your preferred option. There are no “right” or “wrong” answers to the
questions. Although the decisions are only hypothetical, please do your best to make them as if
they involved real money. Please respond based on what feels appropriate to you.
2
Additional measures
We also measured anxiety (analysis not included in the main text) using a single item
(“How worried do you feel about the {In-party/Out-Party}?”). Anxiety was assessed on a 7-point
scale ranging from “Not worried at all” to “Very worried”. Below, we report the correlations
between tradeoff ratios and anxiety. Anxiety is also included in all of the following analyses.
Table A1. Correlations between tradeoff ratios and anxiety.
Altruism Task
Spite Task
Inparty WTR
Outparty WTR
r
p
r
p
Anxiety
-0.13
.09
-0.27
< .001
Note. Anxiety refers to the inparty or outparty for the left and right
columns, respectively. Higher WTRs in the altruism task indicate
greater altruism. Lower WTRs in the spite task indicate greater spite.
3
Table A2. Wording of measures.
Measure
Text
Welfare Tradeoff Ratio Altruism Task
Please make your choice between the following options:
Options
_ You get [$0 / $5 / $10 / $15 / $20 / $25 /
$30 / $35 / $40 / $45 / $50 / $55 / $60]
_ The {In-Party} gets $50
Please make your choice between the following options:
_ You get [$0 / $10 / $20 / $30 / $40 / $50 /
$60 / $70 / $80 / $90 / $100] and the {OutParty} gets $50
Partisan Identity
How strongly or weakly do you identify with the {In-Party}?
_ Nobody gets any money
7-point scale from Very weakly to Very
strongly
Ideology (folded)
We hear a lot of talk these days about liberals and conservatives. Here is a 7-point
scale on which the political views people might hold are arranged. Where would you
place yourself on this scale?
7-point scale from Very liberal to Very
conservative
Party identification
What political party do you identify with?
Democratic Party / Republican Party /
Independent / Other
Welfare Tradeoff Ratio Spite Task
Party identification (follow- If you had to pick, which party do you feel comes closer to representing your political
Democratic Party / Republican Party
views?
up if does not pick party)
Anger
Enthusiasm
Anxiety
How angry do you feel about the {In-party/Out-Party}?
How enthusiastic do you feel about the {In-party/Out-Party}?
How grateful do you feel toward the {In-party/Out-Party}?
How proud do you feel about the {In-party/Out-Party}?
How worried do you feel about the {In-party/Out-Party}?
7-point scale from Not at all [] to Very
[angry / enthusiastic / grateful / proud /
worried]
Note. All variables have been rescaled to range from 0 to 1.
4
Table A3. Demographic characteristics of the MTurk sample.
M
0.23
0.55
0.55
0.45
0.29
SD
0.19
0.27
0.34
0.16
0.25
%
Age
Partisan Identity
Ideology
Education
Income
Satisfaction with personal economic
0.38 0.27
situation
Care in completing survey
0.88 0.17
Female
31.87
White
67.03
Immediately picks a party
70.88
Republican (including leaners)
24.18
In employment
69.79
Completed survey quite or very carefully
91.21
Note. N =182. All variables have been rescaled to range from 0
to 1 (low to high). Age is measured in seven age categories,
where 0 indicates the youngest (18-24 years) and 1 indicates
the oldest (75+) category. For ideology, the 0-1 range goes
from “neither liberal nor conservative” to “very liberal” or
“very conservative”. Income is measured in thirteen income
brackets, where 0 indicates the lowest (< $10,000) and 1
indicates the highest income bracket (>$150,000). Education is
measured on a 7-point scale (Grade school/High school or
professional diploma/Some college(unfinished)/Bachelor’s
degree/Master’s degree/Other post-graduate degree/PhD). Care
in completing the survey is measured on a 5-point scale
ranging from Not at all to Very carefully. Satisfaction with
personal economic situation in measured on a 6-point scale
ranging from Very dissatisfied to Very satisfied.
5
Table A4. Regressions of WTRs on emotions
toward the inparty (altruism task) and outparty (spite task).
Enthusiasm
Anger
Anxiety
Constant
WTR for
Inparty Altruism
0.46 ***
(0.06)
0.03
(0.10)
-0.08
(0.09)
0.00
(0.06)
WTR for
Outparty Spite
0.75 ***
(0.21)
-0.50 *
(0.23)
-0.31
(0.20)
-0.21 *
(0.10)
Note. N =182. Regressions with robust standard
errors in parentheses.
*** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05.
Table A5. Regressions of WTRs toward the inparty
(altruism task) and outparty (spite task).
WTR for
WTR for
Inparty Altruism
Outparty Spite
Partisanship
0.40 ***
-0.29
(0.08)
(0.25)
Ideology
0.02
-0.46 *
(0.06)
(0.18)
Constant
-0.01
-0.17
(0.04)
(0.14)
Note. N =182. Regressions with robust standard errors
in parentheses. Partisanship and ideology measure
extremity. *** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05.
6
Analysis of extreme WTRs
Participants who made extreme choices (altruism task: WTR = 0 or WTR > 1; spite task:
WTR < -1 or WTR = 0) deserve closer scrutiny because identifying the determinants of these
people’s tradeoff ratios can help us better understand how ratios are related to key political
variables. We focus on partisanship and ideology (both coded in terms of extremity) and emotions
(anger, anxiety, and enthusiasm). We compare the average values of participants who made extreme
choices to the average values of all other participants. Keep in mind that for some of these
comparisons, the sample size can be quite small, so we view them as illustrative, not definitive.
For the altruism task, we find that participants who were completely unwilling to sacrifice
for their inparty (i.e., WTR = 0) were also more tepid partisans than average, both in terms of
partisan strength and ideology. Also, they were less enthusiastic and angrier at their inparty than the
other participants. We turn next to the most altruistic participants, those who treated money for the
party as altogether more valuable than money for the self (i.e., WTR > 1). These participants were
much stronger partisans (though not stronger ideologues), more enthusiastic, and less anxious about
their party.
In the spite task we find that participants who valued spiting the outparty more than giving
themselves money (i.e., WTR < -1), were stronger ideologues (though not stronger partisans) and
were less enthusiastic, more anxious, and angrier toward the outparty. In contrast, participants who
did not spite at all (i.e., WTR = 0), were ideologically more moderate, moderately enthusiastic, and
less anxious about the outparty. Also, these analyses revealed overall anxiety was almost never a
distinctive factor of participants who made extreme choices.
7
Table A6. Profile of the most altruistic participants in the altruism task toward the inparty.
All other
participants
Partisanship
Ideology
Enthusiasm
Anxiety
Anger
N
M
SD
0.53 0.27
0.55 0.34
0.47 0.26
0.43 0.30
0.35 0.27
171
All other
> 1 vs.
= 0 vs.
WTR > 1
participant WTR = 0
all others
all others
s
M
SD
p
M
SD
M
SD
p
0.80 0.18 < .01
0.58 0.26 0.45 0.30 < .05
0.67 0.33
.26
0.61 0.32 0.40 0.34 < .01
0.77 0.22 < .001 0.52 0.25 0.39 0.29 < .05
0.14 0.26 < .01
0.40 0.29 0.41 0.30
.84
0.29 0.32
.48
0.31 0.26 0.49 0.33 < .01
11
134
48
Table A7. Profile of the most spiteful participants in the spite task toward the outparty.
All other
participants
M
SD
Partisanship 0.53 0.26
Ideology
0.52 0.34
Enthusiasm 0.16 0.20
Anxiety
0.51 0.32
Anger
0.57 0.30
N
140
WTR < -1
M
0.62
0.67
0.05
0.81
0.70
42
SD
0.31
0.32
0.12
0.28
0.32
< -1 vs.
All other
WTR = 0
all others participants
p
.06
< .05
< .05
< .001
< .001
M
0.56
0.60
0.09
0.57
0.57
SD
0.28
0.33
0.14
0.34
0.34
144
M
0.50
0.39
0.32
0.49
0.50
SD
0.27
0.32
0.23
0.30
0.28
= 0 vs.
all others
p
.24
< .01
< .001
< .05
.24
38
8
Study 2: Lab
Instructions
Imagine you are given a decision between two options. Your choice determines how much money
you and a given political party would receive. Depending on the scenario, the party might be the
Democratic or the Republican party.
You will be asked to complete two different decision-making tasks that are described below. Please
keep in mind that while we will refer to "dollars", in reality you and/or a given political party will
receive raffle tickets, which will be honored with $10 prizes. The more tickets you and/or a given
political party get, the higher are the chances to win the $10 prize.
Decision Type 1:
If you choose the first option, a sum of money will be given to you and no money will be given to
the {In-party}. If you choose the second option, a sum of money will be given to the {Inparty} and no money will be given to you.
For example, consider the decisions below:
Option 1:
Option 2:
You get $10
The {In-party} gets $50.
Option 1:
Option 2:
You get $30
The {In-party} gets $50.
In the first decision, you must choose between $10 for you and $50 for the {In-party}. If you
choose the first option, then you get $10 and the {In-party} gets zero. If you choose the second
option, you get zero and the {In-party} gets $50.
In the second decision, you must choose between $30 for you and $50 for the {In-party}. If you
choose the first option, then you get $30 and the {In-party} gets zero. If you choose the second
option then you get zero and the {In-party} gets $50.
As an example, consider the decisions made by a hypothetical decision-maker. They are shown
below:
Option 1:
Option 2:
You get $10
The {In-party} gets $50.
Option 1:
Option 2:
You get $30
The {In-party} gets $50.
9
Based on the choices in the example above, for the first decision the decision-maker would receive
$10 and the {In-party} zero. In the second decision the decision-maker would receive zero and
the {In-party} $50.
Decision Type 2:
If you choose the first option, a sum of money will be given to you and simultaneously another sum
of money will be given to the {Out-party}. If you choose the second option, no sum will be given
to anyone.
For example, consider the choices below:
Option 1:
Option 2:
You get $10 and the {Out-party} gets $50.
Nobody gets any money.
Option 1:
Option 2:
You get $30 and the {Out-party} gets $50.
Nobody gets any money.
In the first decision, you must choose between $10 for you and $50 for the {Out-party} versus no
one receiving any money. If you choose the first option, then you get $10 and the {Out-party} gets
$50. If you choose the second option, no one receives any money.
In the second decision, you must choose between $30 for you and $50 for the {Out-party} versus no
one receiving any money. If you choose the first option, then you get $30 and the {Out-party} gets
$50. If you choose the second option, no one receives any money.
As an example, consider the decisions made by a hypothetical decision-maker. They are shown
below:
Option 1:
Option 2:
You get $10 and the {Out-party} gets $50.
Nobody gets any money.
Option 1:
Option 2:
You get $30 and the {Out-party} gets $50.
Nobody gets any money.
Based on the choices in the example above, the first decision the decision-maker would receive
$10 and the {Out-party} $50. In the second decision neither the decision-maker nor the {Outparty} would receive anything.
As you work through the decisions, assume that you cannot later give any money you receive to
any party and that both parties will not give any money back to you.
10
You will make BOTH types of decisions about BOTH parties. So, you will make decision types 1
and 2 about Democrats and you will make decision types 1 and 2 about Republicans.
Finally, remember that we will select ONLY ONE decision you make about the Democrats and
ONLY ONE decision you make about the Republicans. These decisions, one for each party, will
then be what is actually entered into the lottery for $10 at the end of the experiment.
Do your best to make each decision independently of all the others. Do not let previous decisions
you’ve made influence any decisions you are thinking about. To make this easier, remember that at
the end of the experiment we randomly select just one of the decisions that you made for each party
and we make this one, single decision real. If only one decision can become real, you want to make
each decision independently of all others because you just don’t know which decision might be real.
In other words, make each decision as if it were the only decision you were making and you had to
live with that decision alone.
In the following pages, you will be faced with a series of such decisions. For each decision, please
select your preferred option. There are no “right” or “wrong” answers to the questions. Please
respond based on what feels appropriate to you.
11
Additional measures
After the tasks, participants also answered questions about anxiety directed at each party,
political participation, interest in politics, and political knowledge. We did not include the analyses
with these items in the main text for brevity. However, we report them here for interested readers.
Anxiety was assessed as in Study 1. For political knowledge, we followed the approach suggested
by Barabas et al. (2014) and included questions that pertain to the two dimensions of political
knowledge: temporal/topical and static/surveillance. Specifically, we combined questions from
Delli Carpini and Keeter (1996), which tap into static knowledge, with batteries about current
political facts at the time of the study. We utilized items directly from or adapted from Pew
Research (2015). We combined items into a single political knowledge variable. For political
participation (including for example: taking part in a protest or march, contributing money to a
political organization, contacting a government official, or participating in political activities in the
community), participants answered the same seven questions asked by Fowler and Kam (2007),
which formed a reliable scale (alpha = 0.71). Finally, participants answered two standard items on
their interest in politics and public affairs (r = 0.87; all item wordings are available in table A8).
12
Table A8. Wording of measures.
Measure
Text
Welfare Tradeoff Ratio - Please make your choice between the following options:
Altruism Task
Welfare Tradeoff Ratio - Please make your choice between the following options:
Spite Task
Options
_ You get [$0 / $5 / $10 / $15 / $20 / $25 /
$30 / $35 / $40 / $45 / $50 / $55 / $60]
_ The {In-Party/Out-Party} gets $50
_ You get [$0 / $5 / $10 / $15 / $20 / $25 /
$30 / $35 / $40 / $45 / $50 / $55 / $60/ $65/
$70/ $75/ $80/ $85/ $90/ $95/ $100] and the
{In-Party / Out-Party} gets $50
How important is being a {In-Party adjective} to you?
_ Nobody gets any money
4-point scale from Not important at all to
Extremely important
To what extent do you consider yourself a typical {In-Party adjective}?
4-point scale from Not at all to A great deal
How well does the term {In-Party adjective} describe you?
4-point scale from Not at all to Extremely
well
When talking about {In-Party adjective}, how often do you say "we" instead of "they"?
4-point scale from Never to All of the time
Ideology (folded)
We hear a lot of talk these days about liberals and conservatives. Here is a 7-point scale
on which the political views people might hold are arranged. Where would you place
yourself on this scale?
7-point scale from Very liberal to Very
conservative
Party identification
What political party do you identify with?
Democratic Party / Republican Party /
Independent / Other
Party identification
(follow-up if no party is
picked)
Anger
If you had to pick, which party do you feel comes closer to representing your political
views?
Democratic Party / Republican Party
Partisan identity
Enthusiasm
How angry do you feel about the {In-Party / Out-Party}?
How enthusiastic do you feel about the {In-Party / Out-Party}?
How grateful do you feel toward the {In-Party / Out-Party}?
How proud do you feel about the {In-Party / Out-Party}?
7-point scale from Not at all [] to Very
[angry / enthusiastic / grateful / proud /
worried]
13
Anxiety
How worried do you feel about the {In-Party / Out-Party}?
Some people don't pay much attention to political campaigns. How about you, would you
4-point scale from Not interested at all to
say that you have been very much interested, somewhat interested, or not much interested
Very much interested
in following the political campaigns (so far) this year?
Political interest
Some people seem to follow what's going on in government and public affairs most of
the time, whether it's an election going on or not. Others aren't that interested. Would you 4-point scale from Hardly at all to Most of
the time
say you follow what's going on in government and public affairs most of the time, some
of the time, only now and then, or hardly at all?
Aside from contacts made as a regular part of your job, have you ever initiated any
contacts with a government official or someone on the staff of such an official, such as
someone in the White House, a Congressional or Senate Office, or a federal agency like
the EPA or IRS?
Have you ever contributed money – to an individual candidate, a party group, a political
action committee, or any other organization that supports candidates in elections?
Political participation
Aside from membership on a board or council or attendance at meetings, have you ever
informally gotten together with or worked with others in your community or
neighborhood to try to deal with some community problem?
Yes/No
Have you ever regularly attended meetings of such an official local government board or
council?
Have you ever taken part in a protest, march, or demonstration on some national or local
issue (other than a strike against your employer)?
Aside from contacts made as a regular part of your job, have you ever initiated any
contacts with a state or local official or someone on the staff of such an official, such as
14
someone in the office of the governor, mayor, a state legislator, a city councilperson, or
an official in a local government agency or board?
Do you happen to know which party has the most Congressmen in Washington right
now?
Whose responsibility is it to determine whether a law is constitutional or not?
Do you happen to know which job or political office is held by Joe Biden right now?
How much of a majority is required for the U.S. Senate and the House to override a
presidential veto?
Political knowledge
Would you say that one of the parties is more conservative than the other at the national
level? Which party is more conservative?
Which dot on this map represents where the U.S. military prison at Guantanamo Bay is
located?
What country does this person [picture of Kim Jong-un] lead?
Who is Malala Yousafzai [picture of the 2014 Nobel Peace Prize recipient]?
What is the name of this person [picture of Martin Luther King]?
There are nine justices on the Supreme Court of the United States. How many are
women?
Who has been the most recent Speaker of the US House of Representatives?
[Each question has only one correct answer]
Who is the Democratic Party front-runner in the primary elections?
What is the recently signed Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, a treaty signed by
China, the European Union, France, Germany, Iran, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the
United States about?
What is the name of this person [picture of Pope Francis]?
Who is Ban Ki-moon?
15
Table A9. Correlations between WTRs for in-party and out-party in the altruism and spite tasks.
WTR for Altruism
WTR for Spite
In-Party
Out-Party
In-Party
Out-Party
-
0.48
-0.08
-0.09
-
-0.24
0.29
-
0.18
In-Party Altruism
Out-Party Altruism
In-Party Spite
Note. Bolded coefficients indicate a significant correlation (p < .05)
Table A10. Regressions of WTRs on emotions
for in-party and out-party in the altruism and spite tasks.
WTR for
WTR for
WTR for
WTR for
Inparty
Inparty
Outparty
Outparty
Altruism
Spite
Altruism
Spite
Enthusiasm 0.82 ***
0.24 *
1.09 ***
1.14 ***
(0.20)
(0.12)
(0.26)
(0.31)
Anger
0.25
-0.30
-0.15
-0.32
(0.31)
(0.17)
(0.16)
(0.28)
Anxiety
0.08
0.08
-0.02
-0.08)
(0.27)
(0.15)
(0.12)
(0.25)
Constant
0.20
-0.28 **
0.18
-0.84 ***
(0.13)
(0.09)
(0.11)
(0.17)
Note. N = 167. Linear regressions with robust standard errors in
parentheses. *** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05
Table A11. Regressions of WTRs on partisanship and ideology
for in-party and out-party in the altruism and spite tasks.
Partisanship
Ideology
Constant
WTR
for Inparty
Altruism
WTR for
Inparty Spite
WTR for
Outparty
Altruism
WTR for
Outparty
Spite
(1)
(3)
(2)
(4)
0.38
(0.24)
-0.10
(0.20)
0.65 ***
0.40 **
(0.15)
-0.05
(0.11)
-0.33 ***
0.13
(0.17)
-0.49 **
(0.17)
0.52 ***
-0.43
(0.27)
-0.68 **
(0.21)
-0.27 **
(0.11)
(0.07)
(0.10)
(0.10)
Note. N =167. Linear regressions with robust standard errors in
parentheses. *** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05
16
Anxiety and WTRs
Table A12. Pairwise correlations between tradeoff ratios and anxiety.
Inparty WTRs
Altruism Task
Spite Task
Outparty WTRs
Altruism Task
Spite Task
r
p
r
p
r
p
r
p
Anxiety
0.04
.60
-0.04
.58
-0.10
.22
-0.13
.08
Note. The table displays correlations between tradeoff ratios and anxiety toward the respective
party. Higher WTRs in the altruism task indicate greater altruism. Lower WTRs in the spite
task indicate greater spite.
Analysis of extreme WTRs
Since in Study 2 participants completed both tasks for each party, we can gather a more
complete picture of the determinants of tradeoff ratios at both ends of the scales (altruism task: WTR
= 0; or, WTR > 1; spite task: WTR < -1; or, WTR = 0) for each party. ). Again, we compare the
average values of participants with extreme tradeoff ratios to the average values of all other
participants. As before, keep in mind that some sample sizes are quite small in these comparisons.
Looking at tasks for the inparty, in the altruism task the extreme altruists were more
enthusiastic, less anxious, and less angry about the inparty whereas there were no differences in
partisanship or ideology. The least altruistic ones were more tepid partisans, less enthusiastic, and
angrier at the inparty. No distinct patterns occurred for extreme spite toward the inparty except that
the few participants who spited their party the most were weak partisans. The results for extreme spite
are likely due to the fact that only 8 participants fell in this category and thus there is not enough
power to detect small- to medium-size effects. In contrast, participants who never spited the inparty
were stronger partisans, more enthusiastic, and less angry about the inparty compared to the rest of
participants.
Turning to the outparty tasks, the greatest altruists were more ideologically moderate and
substantially more enthusiastic than the rest whereas the opposite pattern occurred among the least
altruistic. The most spiteful participants were stauncher partisans than the rest and less enthusiastic
about the outparty. Among the least spiteful, the opposite trend appeared.
17
Table A13. Profile of the most altruistic participants in the inparty tasks.
All other
WTR > 1
participants
M SD
Partisanship 0.38 0.27
Ideology
0.52 0.33
Enthusiasm 0.52 0.24
Anxiety
0.38 0.24
Anger
0.24 0.21
N
113
M
SD
0.44 0.24
0.54 0.30
0.62 0.17
0.27 0.21
0.38 0.22
54
> 1 vs.
all
others
p
.17
.71
< .01
< .01
< .001
All other
WTR = 0
participants
M
SD
0.42 0.26
0.55 0.32
0.57 0.22
0.37 0.23
0.24 0.20
150
M
0.24
0.33
0.40
0.44
0.36
17
SD
0.20
0.26
0.20
0.28
0.24
=0 vs.
all
others
p
< .01
< .01
< .01
.25
< .01
Table A14. Profile of the most spiteful participants in the inparty tasks.
All other
participants
Partisanship
Ideology
Enthusiasm
Anxiety
Anger
N
M
SD
0.41 0.26
0.53 0.33
0.56 0.22
0.38 0.24
0.25 0.21
159
WTR < -1
M
0.22
0.54
0.48
0.38
0.33
SD
0.18
0.25
0.13
0.15
0.13
8
< -1 vs.
all
others
p
.05
.93
.31
1
.29
All other
WTR = 0
participants
M
SD
0.31 0.21
0.44 0.33
0.49 0.20
0.39 0.25
0.32 0.22
63
M
SD
0.45 0.28
0.58 0.31
0.59 0.23
0.37 0.22
0.21 0.19
104
=0 vs.
all
others
p
< .001
< .01
< .01
.59
< .001
18
Table A15. Profile of the most altruistic participants in the outparty tasks.
All other
WTR > 1
participants
M SD
Partisanship 0.40 0.27
Ideology
0.55 0.32
Enthusiasm 0.19 0.17
Anxiety
0.54 0.30
Anger
0.52 0.28
N
147
M
SD
0.37 0.20
0.33 0.31
0.43 0.23
0.48 0.22
0.43 0.23
20
> 1 vs.
all
others
p
.62
< .01
< .001
.47
.22
All other
participants
M
SD
0.33 0.24
0.40 0.30
0.29 0.17
0.48 0.25
0.44 0.26
63
WTR = 0
M
0.45
0.63
0.15
0.57
0.57
94
SD
0.27
0.30
0.15
0.33
0.28
=0 vs. all
others
p
< .001
< .001
< .001
.07
< .01
Table A16. Profile of the most spiteful participants in the outparty tasks.
All other
< -1 vs.
participants WTR < -1
all
others
M SD
M
SD
p
Partisanship 0.35 0.24 0.48 0.28 < .01
Ideology
0.45 0.30 0.66 0.32 < .001
Enthusiasm 0.24 0.18 0.15 0.15 < .01
Anxiety
0.50 0.28 0.59 0.32
.06
Anger
0.47 0.26 0.58 0.29 < .05
N
107
60
All other
WTR = 0 =0 vs. all
participants
others
M
SD
M
SD
p
0.44 0.27 0.25 0.19
< .001
0.56 0.33 0.37 0.26
< .01
0.19 0.16 0.29 0.21
< .01
0.56 0.30 0.41 0.24
< .01
0.54 0.28 0.38 0.23
< .01
134
33
19
Subgroup analysis of welfare tradeoff ratios
We begin by looking at differences between leaners’ and partisans’ WTRs. Recall that in the
study, participants who did not pick the Republican or the Democratic party when asked the
standard partisanship question were forced to pick one of the two parties. Leaners’ WTRs were
similar to partisans’ except for in the inparty altruism task, where partisans were substantially more
altruistic toward the inparty (Table A15).
Table A17. Mean welfare tradeoff ratios toward the inparty and the outparty by leaner/partisan.
Leaner
WTR Inparty altruism
Inparty spite
Outparty altruism
Outparty spite
Partisan
M
SD
M
SD
t
p
0.53
-0.25
0.27
-0.70
0.62
0.49
0.57
0.80
0.84
-0.17
0.34
-.85
0.70
0.40
0.57
0.73
2.74
1.03
0.72
1.16
< .01
.30
.48
.25
Political interest, participation, and knowledge
Next, we turn to another possible explanation: differences in political interest and political
participation. The reasoning is that highly interested and politically active participants could be
more spiteful and less inclined to give to the outparty whereas the politically uninterested might
give indiscriminately to either party. We split participants by political interest and political
participation, respectively.
For political interest, Low-interest participants (47.9% of the sample) scored up to 0.5 on the
political interest scale, which ranged from 0 to 1. We coded the remaining participants as highly
interested in politics. We find that weakly interested participants spited the out-party substantially
less (WTR: M = -0.67; SD = 0.71) than highly interested ones (WTR: M = -0.93; SD = 0.79), t(165)
= 2.23, p < .05. Tradeoff ratios did not differ in the other tasks.
For political participation, we split participants between those who do not participate
(44.31% of the sample) and those who do. We find a similar pattern: those who do not participate in
politics spited the out-party substantially less (WTR: M = -0.67; SD = 0.73) than those who do
(WTR: M = -0.91; SD = 0.77), t(165) = 1.99, p < .05. Tradeoff ratios did not differ in the other
tasks.
Finally, we check whether differences in political knowledge are behind the results. We split
the sample between low- and high-knowledge participants. We used the 0.7 cutoff on a scale from 0
to 1, which yielded approximately equal groups (43.71% of participants were classified as lowknowledge).
It is possible that low-knowledge participants may be more likely to help the outparty and
hurt the in-party. This is what we find. Table A16 shows the results. There was no significant
difference between low- and high-knowledge participants in WTRs in the inparty altruism task.
However, there were substantial differences for the WTRs in all other tasks, most notably for the
outparty tasks. Less knowledgeable participants spited the inparty more than twice as much as
highly knowledgeable ones. Moreover, knowledge also discriminated between levels of outparty
20
giving. Less knowledgeable individuals were more than twice as altruistic toward the outparty and
30% less spiteful toward the outparty than highly knowledgeable ones.
Table A18. Mean welfare tradeoff ratios toward the inparty and the outparty by low and high
knowledge.
Low Knowledge
WTR Inparty altruism
Inparty spite
Outparty altruism
Outparty spite
High Knowledge
M
SD
M
SD
t
p
0.85
-0.28
0.47
-0.65
0.74
0.53
0.67
0.66
0.67
-0.13
0.21
-0.92
0.64
0.32
0.46
0.82
1.69
2.31
3.04
2.28
.09
< .05
< .01
< .05
Taken together, these results indicate that greater altruism toward the outparty was driven
primarily by participants with less political knowledge. These participants were more favorable
toward the outparty across the board and spited the inparty more. For out-party spite, we found a
similar pattern among the politically disengaged and among those who are less interested in
politics. Overall, however, knowledge was the best discriminant between higher and lower WTRs
toward the outparty.
Political emotions
Table A19. Mean welfare tradeoff ratios toward the outparty by low and high emotion directed at
the outparty.
Low
M
High
SD
M
SD
t
p
0.69
0.68
4.87
3.13
< .001
< .01
0.47
0.76
2.11
0.93
< .05
.36
0.43
0.76
3.07
2.85
< .01
< .01
Enthusiasm
Altruism
Spite
0.13
-0.98
0.34
0.79
0.53
-0.61
Anxiety
Altruism
Spite
0.40
-0.76
0.63
0.76
0.21
-0.87
Anger
Altruism
Spite
0.43
-0.67
0.63
0.73
0.16
-1.01
We followed the same procedure for emotions (enthusiasm, anxiety, anger) directed at the
outparty. For enthusiasm directed at the outparty, the cutoff between low and high was 0.2 (51.5%
low-enthusiasm participants); for anxiety and anger, it was 0.5 (58.08% low-anxiety and 61.08 lowanger participants). Table A17 shows the results. Participants with relatively high enthusiasm
toward the outparty were four times more altruistic than those who reported little or no enthusiasm
at all; more highly enthusiastic participants were also less spiteful toward the outparty. We find the
21
opposite pattern for anxiety and anger. Participants who reported little anxiety toward the outparty
were twice as altruistic toward it. Participants with little anger toward the outparty were three times
as altruistic and 30% less spiteful.
Together, these results show that emotions directed at the outparty predict large differences
in tradeoff ratios toward it.
We complete our analysis by reporting also how the intensity of emotions directed at the
inparty relates to welfare tradeoff ratios toward the inparty.
Table A20. Mean welfare tradeoff ratios toward the inparty by low and high emotion directed at the
inparty.
Low
M
High
SD
M
SD
t
p
Enthusiasm
Altruism
Spite
0.61
-0.28
0.64
0.48
0.90
-0.10
0.71 2.71 < .01
0.35 2.71 < .01
Anxiety
Altruism
Spite
0.72
-0.17
0.67
0.40
0.78
-0.23
0.72 0.54
0.47 0.83
.59
.41
Anger
Altruism
Spite
0.73
-0.12
0.65
0.34
0.77
-0.30
0.74 0.32 .75
0.51 2.73 < .01
Echoing the results reported in the main text, we find that participants who were highly
enthusiastic about the inparty (cutoff: 0.6: 52.10% low-enthusiasm participants) were more
altruistic and less spiteful towards it. Differences in anxiety toward the inparty (cutoff: 0.5; 56.89%
low-anxiety participants) did not affect welfare tradeoff ratios. Finally, participants who were most
angry toward the inparty (cutoff: 0.2; 55.69% low-anger participants) spited the inparty almost
three times as much as those participants who reported no or little anger.
Partisanship and Ideology
We performed an analysis of subgroups also for partisanship and ideology. We divided the
sample into weak vs. strong partisans and moderate vs. extreme ideologues, respectively. Table
A19 shows the results. As before, we determined a cutoff point that would split the sample
approximately evenly, so we split participants in the middle of each scale. Starting with partisanship
(59.28% weak partisans), we find that strong partisans spited the inparty substantially less than
weak partisans. However, weak and strong partisans displayed similar levels of altruism toward the
in-party. Echoing previous results with emotions and political activism, we find that weak partisans
were more altruistic and less spiteful toward the outparty.
22
Table A21. Mean tradeoff ratios toward the inparty and the outparty by weak and strong
partisanship and ideology.
Weak
M
Strong
SD
M
SD
t
p
0.68
0.31
0.47
0.76
0.80
2.12
1.92
3.96
.43
< .05
.06
< .001
0.70
0.42
0.46
0.78
0.88
1.30
2.67
3.40
.38
.20
< .01
< .001
Partisanship
Inparty altruism
Inparty spite
Outparty altruism
Outparty spite
0.71
-0.25
0.39
-0.62
0.70
0.49
0.63
0.70
0.80
-0.11
0.22
-1.07
Ideology
Inparty altruism
Inparty spite
Outparty altruism
Outparty spite
0.69
-0.24
0.45
-0.58
0.68
0.45
0.68
0.67
0.79
-0.16
0.22
-0.97
Turning to ideology, weak ideologues were more altruistic and less spiteful toward the
outparty than strong ideologues. In contrast, as we noted in the main text, ideology made no
difference for welfare tradeoffs toward the inparty.
Finally, we investigate the relationship between ideology and spite more closely. Specifically,
we look at the interaction between political ideology and political knowledge. Political sophistication
may affect the decision to spite political parties: strong ideologues who are highly knowledgeable
about politics may have higher tradeoff ratios toward the inparty and spite it less because they are
more responsive to elite discourse on policy issues (Zaller 1992) compared to low-knowledge
individuals. Also, high sophisticates may have lower tradeoff ratios toward the outparty and spite it
more as they are more ideologically consistent than low sophisticates (Campbell et al. 1960; Converse
1964).
23
Figure A1. Marginal effects of ideology and political knowledge on welfare tradeoff ratios toward
the inparty (left panel) and the outparty (right panel) in the spite task.
Panel A.
Panel B.
Note. A positive marginal effect indicates less spite. Interactions were tested following
Hainmueller, Mummolo, and Xu (2019). The histogram shows the distribution of political
knowledge. L, M, and H represent binning estimates of the marginal effect of ideology at low,
medium, and high values of political knowledge.
We find that the interaction between ideology and political knowledge is positive and
significant (p < .05) for inparty spite (Figure A1, panel A): among high-knowledge participants,
ideology substantially reduces spite toward the inparty. In contrast, for participants who know less
about politics, the marginal effect of ideology is indistinguishable from zero. For outparty spite
(panel B), the interaction coefficient is not significant (p = .16). However, the marginal effect of
ideology on tradeoff ratios is significantly negative at all levels of political knowledge except for
participants with the lowest knowledge.
24
References
Barabas, J., Jerit, J., Pollock, W., & Rainey, C. (2014). The question (s) of political
knowledge. American Political Science Review, 840-855.
Delli Carpini, M. X., & Keeter, S. (1996). What Americans know about politics and why it matters.
Yale University Press.
Hainmueller, J., Mummolo, J., & Xu, Y. (2019). How much should we trust estimates from
multiplicative interaction models? Simple tools to improve empirical practice. Political
Analysis, 27(2), 163-192.
Pew Research (2015). What the public knows - In pictures, words, maps, and graphs.
https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2015/04/28/what-the-public-knows-in-pictures-wordsmaps-and-graphs/. Accessed online in October 2020.
Zaller, J. R. (1992). The nature and origins of mass opinion. Cambridge University Press.
25