Islamist Strategies
Though different Islamist groups have similar end goals, they employ varied strategies in
order to accomplish those goals. One of the strategical axes along which they differ is that of the
near versus far enemy: some Islamists argue that attacking non-Islamist regimes in the region –
i.e., the near enemy – should take precedence, while others argue that they should first attack the
root of the problem – i.e., the far enemy – consisting of countries in the West (Aaron, 2008, pp.
195-196).
Related to this axis of near versus far enemies is that of long-term versus short-term
strategies. The Wahabis in particular embody the long-term approach: having come to power in
Saudi Arabia, the Wahabis decided to use a “realist” strategy (in the international relations sense)
in which they would supposedly befriend one enemy (i.e., the United States) in order to
undermine another enemy (i.e., the Soviet Union) during the Cold War (Phares, 2005, “Wahabi
Strategy: Using the Infidels’ Power” section). Thus the Wahabis chose to deal with the near
enemy first, as the Soviet Union/Russia is closer and has a more direct impact on the region than
the United States (though of course, they would eventually attack the far enemy indirectly by
supporting jihadists).
Inside Saudia Arabia itself, Islamist policies would rule, including the draconian
application of sharia; furthermore, the country would back external Islamism by building
“charities, mosques, hospitals, orphanages, and…religious schools,” thereby gaining the support
of the people as well as providing backing to jihadists (Phares, 2005, “Wahabi Strategy: Using
the Infidels’ Power” section). Outside the country, Saudi Arabia courted countries in the West,
including the United States, to win them as allies by participating in the fight against
Communism, at which point would those Western countries would provide protection and
assistance to Saudi Arabia (Phares, 2005, “Wahabi Strategy: Using the Infidels’ Power” section).
While the Wahabis had the legitimacy and resources of a state, another Islamist group,
the Muslim Brothers, did not, so they adopted a different tack. The Brothers also took a longterm approach like the Wahabis did, but they started their subversion locally by converting elites
to their beliefs, including members of the military and political leaders; once those conversions
had been effect, the Brothers would either stage a coup via those military officers or “advise” the
political leaders so that they would rule in a more Islamist fashion (Phares, 2005, “Muslim
Brotherhood Strategy: Using the Power of Muslims” section). In this way, the Muslim Brothers
have also tended to deal with the near enemy first, in this case secular Middle Eastern regimes.
Finally, the Khomeinist strategy involved state Islamism just like the Wahabis’, but
instead of working with infidel nations, Khomeini chose to reject all such alliances to maintain
revolutionary purity, which could win more support for this form of Shia jihad among Sunnis,
and to maintain freedom of action (Phares, 2005, “Khumeinist Strategy: Becoming a
Superpower” section). Iran’s plan was to acquire strategic weapons, including chemical,
biological, and perhaps eventually nuclear ones, so as to pose a sufficient threat that their
activities and those of their allies like Syria could not be easily contested by enemy actors
(Phares, 2005, “Khumeinist Strategy: Becoming a Superpower” section). Those activities include
“direct jihad” when possible, including through its proxies like Hezbollah, which carried out
several notable terrorist attacks against the U.S. presence in Lebanon in the 1980s (Phares, 2005,
“Khumeinist Strategy: Becoming a Superpower” section). In this fashion, the Khomeinist
strategy involves fighting both near enemies like Israel as well as far enemies like the United
States.
References
Aaron, D. (ed.). (2008). In their own words: Voices of jihad. RAND Corporation.
Phares, W. (2005). Future Jihad. St. Martin's Press.