1. Kida v. Senate, G.R. 196271 (2012)
FACTS
The Supreme Court addressed various motions
for reconsideration challenging its decision
upholding the constitutionality of Republic Act
(RA) No. 10153. This law postponed the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao
(ARMM) elections to May 2013 and granted the
President the authority to appoint officers-incharge (OICs) temporarily. Petitioners raised
concerns about the nature of ARMM elections,
the amendment of the Organic Act,
supermajority provisions, holdover principles,
plebiscite requirements, and the President's
appointing power.
Key arguments included the unique status of
ARMM, the alleged unconstitutionality of
appointing OICs, and the need for plebiscite
ratification for amendments. The petitioners
contested the court's interpretation of the law
and questioned the validity of RA No. 10153.
The Court was tasked with determining
constitutional
issues
related
to
the
synchronization of elections, amendment
processes, the holdover provision, the
COMELEC's authority for special elections, and
the scope of the President's powers in appointing
OICs. The case involved intricate legal
considerations surrounding ARMM governance
and electoral processes.
ISSUE
1. Whether or not the Constitution mandate the
synchronization of ARMM regional elections
with national and local elections.
2. Whether or not by granting the President the
power to appoint OICs violate the elective and
representative nature of ARMM regional
legislative and executive offices.
3. Whether or not ARMM regional officials
should be allowed to remain in their respective
positions until the May 2013 elections since there
is no specific provision in the Constitution which
prohibits regional elective officials from
performing their duties in a holdover capacity.
RULING:
1. Yes. While the Constitution does not expressly
instruct Congress to synchronize the national
and local elections, the intention can be inferred
from the following provisions of the Transitory
Provisions (Article XVIII) of the Constitution,
which states that the first elections of Members
of the Congress under this Constitution shall be
held on the second Monday of May, 1987. The
first local elections shall be held on a date to be
determined by the President, which may be
simultaneous with the election of the Members
of the Congress. It shall include the election of all
Members of the city or municipal councils in the
Metropolitan Manila area. The framers of the
Constitution during the deliberation, through
Davide could not have expressed their objective
more clearly that there will be a single election in
1992 for all elective officials – from the President
down to the municipal officials. Significantly, the
framers were even willing to temporarily
lengthen or shorten the terms of elective officials
in order to meet this objective, highlighting the
importance of this constitutional mandate.
2. No. Section 3 of RA No. 10153, which mandates
the President shall appoint officers-in-charge for
the Office of the Regional Governor, Regional
Vice Governor and Members of the Regional
Legislative Assembly who shall perform the
functions pertaining to the said offices until the
officials duly elected in the May 2013 elections
shall have qualified and assumed office. The
above-quoted provision did not change the basic
structure of the ARMM regional government. On
the contrary, this provision clearly preserves the
basic structure of the ARMM regional
government when it recognizes the offices of the
ARMM regional government and directs the
OICs who shall temporarily assume these offices
to perform the functions pertaining to the said
offices.
3. No. The clear wording of Section 8, Article X
of the Constitution expresses the intent of the
framers of the Constitution to categorically set a
limitation on the period within which all elective
local officials can occupy their offices. It is
established that elective ARMM officials are also
local officials; they are, thus, bound by the threeyear term limit prescribed by the Constitution.
It, therefore, becomes irrelevant that the
Constitution does not expressly prohibit elective
officials from acting in a holdover capacity. Short
of amending the Constitution, Congress has no
authority to extend the three-year term limit by
inserting a holdover provision in RA No. 9054.
Thus, the term of three years for local officials
should stay at three (3) years, as fixed by the
Constitution, and cannot be extended by
holdover by Congress.
2. Kilusang Mayo Uno v. Aquino III (G.R. No.
210500 (2019)
FACTS
This court case revolves around the challenge to
the validity of a Social Security System (SSS)
premium hike that came into effect in January
2014. The petitioners, including Kilusang Mayo
Uno and other labor groups, contested the
increase through a Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition. They argued against the hike,
asserting that it resulted from an unlawful
delegation of power to the SSS, citing vagueness
and lack of clarity in the relevant legal
provisions. The petitioners also contended that
the increase violated the Social Security Act by
raising contributions without a corresponding
increase in benefits. Moreover, they claimed the
hike constituted an unjust exercise of police
power, being neither reasonably necessary nor
fair to the labor sector. The revised ratio of
contributions between employers and employees
was criticized as grossly unjust. The petitioners
sought a temporary restraining order or
preliminary
injunction
to
halt
the
implementation, emphasizing the potential
adverse impact on workers' rights and financial
well-being.
ISSUE
1 WON the assailed issuances are void for having
been issued under vague and unclear standards
contained in the Social Security Act;
2 WON the increase in Social Security System
contributions is reasonably necessary for the
attainment of the purpose sought and is unduly
oppressive upon the labor sector; and
RULING
1 No, the Supreme Court held that petitioners'
argument lacks merit. The SC stressed that
collateral attacks on a presumably valid law are
NOT ALLOWED and that petitioners in this case
are collaterally attacking the validity of Social
Security Act (RA 8282) by putting in issue not
only the validity of the exercise of respondents
SSS and SSC's power under the said law but also
the validity of the delegation of power to the SSC
under the said law to fix the contribution rate by
claiming the said delegation to be incomplete in
all its terms and conditions. The SC held that not
only is the Social Security Act complete in its
terms but it also contains a sufficient standard
for the SSC to fix the monthly contribution rate
and the minimum and maximum monthly salary
credits. It found that Section 18 in relation to
Section 4 (a) of the Social Security Act has vested
the necessary powers in the SSC to fix the
minimum and maximum amounts of monthly
salary credits and the contribution rate. It
likewise found the legislature has specified the
factors that should be considered-"actual
calculations and rates of benefits"-in Section 18
of the Social Security Act as well as required the
approval of the President of the Philippines as an
additional limit to the SSC's rate fixing power.
"To question the use of 'actual calculations' as [a]
factor for fixing rates is to question the policy or
wisdom of the legislature, which is a co-equal
branch of the government," the SC declared.
2 No, the Court disagrees. The SC ruled "that an
examination of the provision and the assailed
issuances reveals that the questioned increase in
contribution rate was not solely for the increase
in members' benefits, but also to extend actuarial
life......To disregard the actuarial soundness of
the reserves would be to go against the policy of
the law on maintaining a sustainable social
security system," referring to the policy laid
down in Section 2 of the Social Security Act. The
SC also held the increases reflected in the
assailed issuances to be a valid exercise of police
power as they are reasonably necessary to
observe the constitutional mandate of
promoting social justice under the Social
Security Act. "Given the past increases since the
inception of the law, the contribution rate
increase of 0.6% applied to the corresponding
monthly salary credit does not scream of
unreasonableness or injustice." It ruled that
respondents were only complying with their
duties under the Social Security Act and that
there was no showing they went beyond their
powers under the law amounting to lack of or in
excess of their jurisdiction. Nor did it find grave
abuse of respondents' discretion as petitioner's
claims are unsubstantiated.
3. Chavez v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 168338 (2008)
FACTS
The case involves events after the 2004
Philippine elections. PressSecretary Ignacio
Bunye claimed the opposition planned to
destabilize the government by releasing an
allegedly doctored audiotape implicating
President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo in
manipulating election results. Subsequently,
Atty. Alan Paguia released an alleged authentic
tape. The Department of Justice (DOJ) Secretary
Raul Gonzales warned against possessing or
airing such tapes under the Anti-Wiretapping
Act. On June 11, 2005, the National
Telecommunications
Commission
(NTC)
cautioned radio and TV stations about
broadcasting unverified tapes, claiming they
were products of illegal wiretapping. NTC
threatened suspension or revocation for noncompliance. NTC later held a dialogue with the
Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster sa Pilipinas (KBP),
stating that it respected press freedom but
emphasized responsible reporting. Petitioner
Chavez filed a petition against Gonzales and
NTC, alleging violations of freedom of expression
and press rights. Respondents argued that the
warning was within NTC's regulatory mandate,
asserting different constitutional guarantees for
broadcast and print media.
ISSUE
Whether the official statements made by
respondents on June 8, and 11, 2005 warning the
media on airing the alleged wiretapped
conversation between the President and other
personalities constitute unconstitutional prior
restraint on the exercise of freedom of speech
and of the press.
RULING
YES, the statements made are unconstitutional.
The Supreme Court applied the Content-based
restriction test and ruled that respondents’
evidence falls short of satisfying the clear and
present danger test. With respect to contentbased restrictions, the government must show
the type of harm the speech sought to be
restrained would bring about especially the
gravity and the imminence of the threatened
harm otherwise the prior restraint will be invalid.
Prior restraint on speech based on its content
cannot be justified by hypothetical fears, but
only by showing a substantive and imminent evil
that has taken the life of a reality already on
ground. A governmental action that restricts
freedom of speech or of the press based on
content is given the strictest scrutiny, with the
government having the burden of overcoming
the presumed unconstitutionality by the clear
and present danger rule. This rule applies equally
to all kinds of media, including broadcast media.
On the basis of the records of the case at bar,
respondents who have the burden to show that
these acts do not abridge freedom of speech and
of the press failed to hurdle the clear and present
danger test. It appears that the great evil which
government wants to prevent is the airing of a
tape recording in alleged violation of the anti-
wiretapping law. The records of the case at bar,
however, are confused and confusing, and
respondents evidence falls short of satisfying the
clear and present danger test. For this failure of
the respondents alone to offer proof to satisfy the
clear and present danger test, the Court has no
option but to uphold the exercise of free speech
and free press. There is no showing that the
feared violation of the anti-wiretapping law
clearly endangers the national security of the
State.
DOCTRINE:
A governmental action that restricts freedom of
speech or of the press based on content is given
the strictest scrutiny, with the government
having the burden of overcoming the presumed
unconstitutionality by the clear and present
danger rule. This rule applies equally to all kinds
of media, including broadcast media. For this
failure of the respondents alone to offer proof to
satisfy the clear and present danger test, the
Court has no option but to uphold the exercise of
free speech and free press. There is no showing
that the feared violation of the anti-wiretapping
law clearly endangers the national security of the
State.
4. Gonzales v. COMELEC.G.R. NO. L-28196
(1967)
FACTS
The case involves an original action for
prohibition with preliminary injunction. The
petitioner seeks to restrain the Commission on
Elections from enforcing Republic Act No. 4913,
which proposes constitutional amendments.
These amendments include increasing the
House of Representatives' membership and
authorizing senators and representatives to
become delegates to a constitutional convention.
The petitioner also wants the said Act declared
unconstitutional. On March 16, 1967, resolutions
proposing these amendments were passed by
both the Senate and the House of
Representatives. Republic Act No. 4913 was
subsequently enacted, scheduling the proposed
amendments for approval in the general
elections on November 14, 1967. The petitioner,
Ramon A. Gonzales, filed the case on October 21,
1967, as a class suit on behalf of citizens,
taxpayers, and voters. The court addresses the
issue of jurisdiction, asserting its authority to
review constitutional amendments proposed by
Congress acting as a constituent assembly.
ISSUES Is Republic Act No. 4913 constitutional?
WON Congress can simultaneously propose
amendments to the Constitution and call for the
holding of a constitutional convention?
RULING
YES as to both issues. The constituent power or
the power to amend or revise the Constitution, is
different from the law-making power of
Congress. Congress can directly propose
amendments to the Constitution and at the same
time call for a Constitutional Convention to
propose amendments.
Indeed, the power to amend the Constitution or
to propose amendments thereto is not included
in the general grant of legislative powers to
Congress. It is part of the inherent powers of the
people — as the repository of sovereignty in a
republican state, such as ours— to make, and,
hence, to amend their own Fundamental Law.
Congress may propose amendments to the
Constitution merely because the same explicitly
grants such power. Hence, when exercising the
same, it is said that Senators and Members of the
House of Representatives act, not as members of
Congress, but as component elements of a
constituent assembly. When acting as such, the
members of Congress derive their authority from
the Constitution, unlike the people, when
performing the same function, for their authority
does not emanate from the Constitution — they
are the very source of all powers of government,
including the Constitution itself.
Since, when proposing, as a constituent
assembly, amendments to the Constitution, the
members of Congress derive their authority from
the Fundamental Law, it follows, necessarily,
that they do not have the final say on whether or
not their acts are within or beyond constitutional
limits. Otherwise, they could brush aside and set
the same at naught, contrary to the basic tenet
that ours is a government of laws, not of men,
and to the rigid nature of our Constitution. Such
rigidity is stressed by the fact that, the
Constitution expressly confers upon the
Supreme Court, the power to declare a treaty
unconstitutional, despite the eminently political
character of treaty-making power.
5. Cabansag v. Fernandez, G.R. No. L-8974
(1957)
FACTS
This contempt proceeding originated from Civil
Case No. 9564 in the Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan, involving Apolonio Cabansag's land
dispute. The case faced prolonged delays,
prompting Cabansag to write a letter to the
Presidential Complaints and Action Commission
(PCAC) seeking assistance in expediting the
resolution. In response, the Secretary of Justice
instructed the stenographers to transcribe their
notes. Simultaneously, Cabansag and his
lawyers, Roberto V. Merrera and Rufino V.
Merrera, faced contempt charges for the letter's
alleged derogatory remarks about a tactical
lawyer. The court found Cabansag and his
lawyers guilty of contempt, sentencing Cabansag
to a P20 fine and the lawyers to P50 each,
warning of severe consequences for a recurrence.
The delays, bureaucratic obstacles, and the
involvement of the PCAC highlight the
complexity of the case, leading to the contempt
charges against the involved parties.
ISSUE
WON petitioner should be liable for indirect
contempt.
RULING
NO, petitioner is not liable for indirect
contempt. The only disturbing effect of the letter
which perhaps has been the motivating factor of
the lodging of the contempt charge by the trial
judge is the fact that the letter was sent to the
Office of the President asking for help because of
the precarious predicament of Cabansag. While
the course of action he had taken may not be a
wise one for it would have been proper had he
addressed his letter to the Secretary of Justice or
to the Supreme Court, such an act alone would
not be contemptuous. To be so the danger must
cause a serious imminent threat to the
administration of justice. Nor can we infer that
such act has "a dangerous tendency" to belittle
the court or undermine the administration of
justice for the writer merely exercised his
constitutional right to petition the government
for redress of a legitimate grievance.
6. Lansang v. CA, GR. No. 102667 (2000)
FACTS
The case involves a petition for review of a Court
of Appeals decision that overturned the Regional
Trial Court's ruling in a dispute between Amado
J. Lansang and Jose Iglesias. Iglesias claimed a
"verbal contract of lease" for space in Rizal Park,
allegedly granted by the National Parks
Development Committee (NPDC). The NPDC,
under new leadership, terminated the verbal
agreement, leading to legal action. The trial
court dismissed the case against the state, citing
sovereign immunity, but the Court of Appeals
reversed this decision. It held that the eviction
was unlawfully executed, linking it to Iglesias's
support for striking workers and his report of
corruption. The Court of Appeals found Lansang
liable for damages under Civil Code articles and
ordered him to pay Iglesias moral and exemplary
damages, plus attorney’s fees. The court absolved
other individuals named in the complaint,
stating they acted under Lansang's orders.
ISSUE
Is this a suit against the State?
RULING
No. In this case, Lansang was being sued in his
private capacity, not as his capacity as NPDC
chairman. The complaint merely identified him
as chairman of the NPDC but did not
categorically state that he is being sued in that
capacity. Since this is the case, the suit is valid.
However, the Court found no evidence of abuse
on the part of Lansang.
Furthermore, the Court ruled that Rizal Park is
beyond the commerce of man and thus could not
be the subject of a lease contract. The verbal
agreement was only a matter of accommodation
by the previous administrator.
7. Ampatuan v. Sec. Puno, G.R. No. 190259
(2011)
DOCTRINE
President Arroyo validly exercised emergency
powers when she called out the AFP and the PNP
to prevent and suppress all incidents of lawless
violence in Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, and
Cotabato City. The calling out of the armed
forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence in
such places is a power that the Constitution
directly vests in the President. She did not need
a congressional authority to exercise the same.
Moreover, the President’s call on the armed
forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence
springs from the power vested in her under
Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution. While
it is true that the Court may inquire into the
factual bases for the President’s exercise of the
above power, it would generally defer to her
judgment on the matter.
FACTS
On November 24, 2009, following a massacre in
Maguindanao, President Gloria MacapagalArroyo declared a state of emergency in
Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, and Cotabato
through Proclamation 1946. Three days later, she
issued Administrative Order 273 (AO 273), later
amended by AO 273-A, delegating supervision of
the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao
(ARMM) to the Department of Interior and Local
Government (DILG). ARMM officials, Datu
Zaldy Uy Ampatuan, Ansaruddin Adiong, and
Regie Sahali-Generale, challenged these actions,
claiming they violated the ARMM's autonomy
under Republic Act 9054 and the Constitution.
The petitioners argued that the proclamations
empowered the DILG Secretary to take over
ARMM, violating local autonomy. The
President's use of emergency powers and troop
deployment in areas without critical incidents
were contested. The Office of the Solicitor
General defended the proclamations, asserting
they aimed to restore peace, and the delegation
to the DILG Secretary was for investigative
facilitation. The case's relevance persisted due to
potential impacts on subsequent cases related to
the proclamations and orders.
ISSUE
Whether President Arroyo invalidly exercised
emergency powers when she called out the AFP
and the PNP to prevent and suppress all
incidents of lawless violence in Maguindanao,
Sultan Kudarat, and Cotabato City.
RULING:
(NO)The deployment of AFP and PNP personnel
is not by itself an exercise of emergency powers
as understood under Section 23 (2), Article VI of
the Constitution. The President did not proclaim
a national emergency, only a state of emergency
in the three places mentioned. And she did not
act pursuant to any law enacted by Congress that
authorized her to exercise extraordinary powers.
The calling out of the armed forces to prevent or
suppress lawless violence in such places is a
power that the Constitution directly vests in the
President. She did not need a congressional
authority to exercise the same. Moreover, the
President’s call on the armed forces to prevent or
suppress lawless violence springs from the power
vested in her under Section 18, Article VII of the
Constitution. While it is true that the Court may
inquire into the factual bases for the President’s
exercise of the above power, it would generally
defer to her judgment on the matter. As the
Court acknowledged in Integrated Bar of the
Philippines v. Hon. Zamora, it is clearly to the
President that the Constitution entrusts the
determination of the need for calling out the
armed forces to prevent and suppress lawless
violence. Unless it is shown that such
determination was attended by grave abuse of
discretion, the Court will accord respect to the
President’s judgment.
8. David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 171396
(2006)
DOCTRINE
Citing Integrated Bar of the Philippines v.
Zamora, the Court ruled that the only criterion
for the exercise of the calling-out power is that
"whenever it becomes necessary," the President
may call the armed forces "to prevent or suppress
lawless violence, invasion or rebellion."
President Arroyo's declaration of a "state of
rebellion" was merely an act declaring a status or
condition of public moment or interest, a
declaration allowed under Section 4 cited above.
Such declaration, in the words of Sanlakas, is
harmless, without legal significance, and deemed
not written. In these cases, PP 1017 is more than
that. In declaring a state of national emergency,
President Arroyo did not only rely on Section 18,
Article VII of the Constitution, a provision
calling on the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion. She also relied on
Section 17, Article XII, a provision on the State's
extraordinary power to take over privatelyowned public utility and business affected with
public interest. Indeed, PP 1017 calls for the
exercise of an awesome power. Obviously, such
Proclamation cannot be deemed harmless,
without legal significance, or not written, as in
the case of Sanlakas. It is plain therein that what
the President invoked was her calling-out power.
FACTS
On February 24, 2006, during the 20th
Anniversary of the Edsa People Power I
celebration, Philippine President Arroyo
declared a state of national emergency through
Proclamation No. 1017. This was accompanied by
General Order No. 5. The government cited a
conspiracy involving military officers, leftist
insurgents, and political opposition members to
unseat or assassinate President Arroyo as a clear
and present danger. Various events, including
the escape of Magdalo Group members, plans for
bombings during a military event, and
information about defections, were presented as
reasons for the emergency declaration. The
government claimed the need to prevent unrest
and protect national security. The aftermath
involved the suspension of classes, cancellation
of rallies, and the arrest of individuals, including
professors and activists. Media outlets were also
raided. President Arroyo lifted the state of
national emergency on March 3, 2006. During
oral arguments on March 7, 2006, parties
presented
their
perspectives
on
the
constitutionality and necessity of the emergency
measures.
ISSUE Whether PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 are
unconstitutional?
RULING
PP 1017 and its implementing GO are partly
constitutional and partly unconstitutional.
The Court finds and so holds that PP 1017 is
constitutional insofar as it constitutes a call by
the President for the AFP to prevent or suppress
lawless violence. The proclamation is sustained
by Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution and
the relevant jurisprudence discussed earlier.
However, PP 1017's extraneous provisions giving
the President express or implied power (1) to
issue decrees; (2) to direct the AFP to enforce
obedience to all laws even those not related to
lawless violence as well as decrees promulgated
by the President; and (3) to impose standards on
media or any form of prior restraint on the press,
are ultra vires and unconstitutional.
In the same vein, the Court finds G.O. No. 5 valid.
But the words "acts of terrorism" found in G.O.
No. 5 have not been legally defined and made
punishable by Congress and should thus be
deemed deleted from the said G.O. Since there
is no law defining "acts of terrorism," it is
President Arroyo alone, under G.O. No. 5, who
has the discretion to determine what acts
constitute terrorism. Her judgment on this
aspect is absolute, without restrictions.
Certainly, they violate the due process clause of
the Constitution. Thus, this Court declares that
the "acts of terrorism" portion of G.O. No. 5 is
unconstitutional.
9. Mabanag v. Lopez Vito, G.R. No. L-1123
(1947)
FACTS
The
petition
involves
senators
and
representatives challenging a congressional
resolution
proposing
a
constitutional
amendment.
Eight
senators
and
17
representatives,and the presidents of the
Democratic Alliance, the Popular Front and the
Philippine Youth Party. Petitioners allege that
the resolution is contrary to the Constitution.
The three senators and eight representatives,
though duly elected, faced suspension or
restrictions in Congress. A resolution for their
suspension had been introduced in the House of
Representatives, but that resolution had not
been acted upon definitely by the House when
the petition was filed. Consequently, the 3
senators and 8 representatives did not take part
in the passage of the questioned resolution, nor
was their membership reckoned within the
computation of the necessary ¾ vote which is
required in proposing an amendment to the
Constitution. If the petitioners had been
counted, the affirmative votes in favor of the
proposed amendment would have been short of
the necessary ¾ vote in either House of
Congress. Respondents assert the court's
jurisdiction based on the conclusiveness of
enrolled bills. Petitioners argue against
confusing jurisdiction with the conclusiveness of
an enactment. The case revolves around the
constitutional validity of the amendment process
and the participation rights of the petitioners in
the legislative decision.
ISSUE
1 Whether or not the Court can take cognizance
of the issue at bar.
2 Whether or not the said resolution was duly
enacted by Congress.
RULING
1 No. Political questions are not within the
province of the judiciary, except to the extent
that power to deal with such questions has been
conferred upon the courts by express
constitutional or statutory provisions. The
difficulty lies in determining what matters fall
within the meaning of political question.
However, in Coleman v. Miller, the efficacy of
ratification by state legislature of a proposed
amendment to the Federal Constitution is a
political question and hence not justiciable. If a
ratification of an amendment is a political
question, a proposal which leads to ratification
has to be a political question. There is no logic in
attaching political character to one and
withholding that character from the other.
Proposal to amend the Constitution is a highly
political function performed by Congress. If a
political question conclusively binds the judges
out of respect to the political departments, a duly
certified law or resolution also binds the judges
under the “enrolled bill” rule born of that respect.
2 Yes. Section 313 of the Code of Civil procedure,
as amended by Act No. 220, provides two
methods of proving legislative proceedings by
the journals, or by published statutes or
resolutions, or copies certified by the clerk or
secretary or printed by their order; and in case of
acts of the Legislature, a copy signed by the
presiding officers and secretaries thereof, which
shall be conclusive proof of the provisions of
such Acts and of the due enactment thereof.
Even if both journals and an authenticate copy of
the Act had been presented, the disposal of the
issue by the Court on the basis of the journals
does not imply rejection of the enrollment
theory, for the due enactment of a law may be
proved in either of the 2 ways specified in Section
313 of The Code of Civil Procedure. No
discrepancy appears to have been noted between
the 2 documents and the court did not say or so
much as give to understand that if discrepancy
existed it would give greater weight to the
journals, disregarding the explicit provision that
duly certified copies “shall be conclusive proof of
the provisions of such Acts and of the due
enactment thereof.”
10. Tolentino v. COMELEC (G.R. No. L-34150
(1971)
FACTS
In 1971, the Philippine Congress initiated a
Constitutional Convention through Resolutions
1 and 4, outlining the qualifications and
composition of the convention and specifying
that proposed amendments would become part
of the Constitution upon majority approval in a
ratification election. The Convention, elected on
November 10, 1970, commenced on June 1, 1971.
On September 28, 1971, it passed Organic
Resolution No. 1, seeking to lower the voting age
to 18. The resolution, focusing solely on age
qualification, allowed for future amendments.
COMELEC, on September 30, 1971, decided to
conduct the plebiscite alongside the senatorial
elections on November 8, 1971. A recess from
November 1 to 9, 1971, was declared for delegates
to campaign. Petitioner Arturo Tolentino
challenged the resolutions, asserting that the
Convention lacked the authority to hold a
concurrent plebiscite and that the proposed
amendment should not be voted on separately.
The case argued the constitutional limitations on
the Convention's power, emphasizing the
exclusive role of Congress in calling and holding
plebiscites.
ISSUE
WON the Resolution approved by the 1971
Constitutional Convention constitutional.
RULING
NO. Organic Resolution No. 1 of the
Constitutional Convention of 1971 and the
implementing acts and resolutions of the
Convention, insofar as they provide for the
holding of a plebiscite, as well as the resolution
of the respondent COMELEC complying
therewith are null and void. The Court is of the
opinion that in providing for the questioned
plebiscite before it has finished, and separately
from, the whole draft of the constitution it has
been called to formulate, the Convention’s
Organic Resolution No. 1 and all subsequent acts
of the Convention implementing the same
violate the condition in Section 1, Article XV that
there should only be one “election” or plebiscite
for the ratification of all the amendments the
Convention may propose. We are not denying
any right of the people to vote on the proposed
amendment; We are only holding that under
Section 1, Article XV of the Constitution, the
same should be submitted to them not separately
from but together with all the other amendments
to be proposed by this present Convention.
All previous plebiscites for the ratification of the
proposed constitutional amendments have
almost invariably been held separately from such
elections, mid in the solitary case when Congress
provided for coincidence, six members of this
Court, only two short of the required
constitutional number, voted to declare the
practice unconstitutional.
officials, aimed to improve morality in public
service. This legislation, aligned with the
principle that public office is a public trust,
sought to repress graft and corrupt practices. The
law required public officers to submit a true,
detailed, and sworn statement of assets and
liabilities within thirty days of approval, upon
assuming office, and annually in January
thereafter. In a declaratory relief proceeding, the
periodic
submission,
specifically
the
requirement every other year after the initial
filing, was challenged as a violation of due
process and an infringement on the right to
privacy. The lower court, supporting the
plaintiff, a respected judge, deemed the periodic
submission excessive, exceeding the permissible
limits of police power and violating the due
process clause.
ISSUE
Whether or not RA 3019 is constitutional
specifically on the portion requiring periodic
submittal of sworn SALNs.
RULING
Yes, the provision is constitutional. RA 3019 was
precisely aimed at curtailing and minimizing the
opportunities for official corruption and
maintaining a standard of honesty in the public
service. It is intended to further promote
morality in public administration. A public office
must indeed be a public trust. Nobody can cavil
at its objective; the goal to be pursued commands
the assent of all. The conditions then prevailing
called for norms of such character. The times
demanded such a remedial device. The
constitutional guarantee against unreasonable
search and seizure does not give freedom from
testimonial compulsion. It appears clear that no
violation of the guarantee against unreasonable
search and seizure has been shown to exist by
such requirement. Nor does the contention of
plaintiff gain greater plausibility, much less elicit
acceptance, by his invocation of the nonincrimination clause. The court stresses that it is
not aware of any constitutional provision
designed to protect a man's conduct from
judicial inquiry or aid him in fleeing from justice.
11. Morfe v. Mutuc, G.R. No. L-20387 (1968)]
12.
Planters
Products
v.
Fertiphil
Corporation, G.R. No. 166006 (2008)
FACTS
The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act of 1960
or RA 3019, enacted by Congress in response to
the need to combat dishonesty among public
FACTS
In this case, petitioner Planters Products, Inc.
(PPI) appealed a decision affirming its liability to
Fertiphil Corporation for levies paid under Letter
of Instruction (LOI) No. 1465. The LOI, issued in
1985, imposed a capital recovery component
(CRC) on fertilizer sales in the Philippines.
Fertiphil paid P10 per bag, totaling P6,698,144, to
the Fertilizer and Pesticide Authority, which
remitted the amount to PPI's depository bank.
After the 1986 Edsa Revolution, FPA stopped the
levy, and Fertiphil sought a refund. The Regional
Trial Court (RTC) declared LOI No. 1465
unconstitutional, stating it violated the principle
that taxes must serve public purposes. The Court
of Appeals (CA) affirmed, emphasizing that the
levy, even if purportedly for police power
reasons, did not promote public welfare and
appeared to favor PPI's private interest. The CA
rejected PPI's claim that the funds benefited
Planters Foundation. The Supreme Court must
now decide on the constitutionality of LOI No.
1465, considering the inherent limitations on
taxation and police power.
ISSUE
WON LOI No. 1465 is a valid exercise of the
power of taxation and police power.
RULING
No, LOI No. 1465 is not a valid exercise of the
power of taxation and police power. The LOI is
still unconstitutional even if enacted under the
police power; it did not promote public interest.
Even if the Court consider LOI No. 1695 enacted
under the police power of the State, it would still
be invalid for failing to comply with the test of
“lawful
subjects”
and
“lawful
means.”
Jurisprudence states the test as follows: (1) the
interest of the public generally, as distinguished
from those of particular class, requires its
exercise; and (2) the means employed are
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of
the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon
individuals. 95 is invalid because it did not
promote public interest. The law was enacted to
give undue advantage to a private corporation.
13. Calalang v. Williams, G.R. No. 47800 (1940)
FACTS
Maximo Calalang, a private citizen and taxpayer
of Manila, filed a petition for a writ of prohibition
against several respondents, including the
Chairman of the National Traffic Commission
and the Mayor and Acting Chief of Police of
Manila. The petition challenged the resolution
recommending the prohibition of animal-drawn
vehicles on certain streets during specified
hours, based on Commonwealth Act No. 548.
The National Traffic Commission's resolution
was approved by the Director of Public Works
and Communications, with modifications, and
subsequently enforced by the Mayor and Acting
Chief of Police. Calalang argued that the
prohibition negatively impacted the owners of
animal-drawn vehicles and the riding public. The
petition sought to prohibit the continued
enforcement of these regulations.
ISSUE
WON Commonwealth Act No. 548 is
unconstitutional because it constitutes an undue
delegation of legislative power.
RULING
No, the statute is constitutional. The above
provisions of law do not confer legislative pOwer
upon the Director of Public Works and the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications.
The authority therein conferred upon them and
under which they promulgated the rules and
regulations now complained of is not to
determine what public policy demands but
merely to carry out the legislative policy laid
down by the National Assembly in said Act.
ISSUE
WON Commonwealth Act No. 548 infringes
upon the constitutional precept regarding the
promotion of social justice
RULING
No, CA 548 does not infringe upon social justice.
Social justice means the promotion of the welfare
of ill the people, the adoption by the Government
of measures calculated to insure economic
stability of all the competent elements of society,
through the maintenance of a proper economic
and social equilibrium in the interrelations of the
members of the community, constitutionally,
through the adoption of measures legally
justifiable, or extra constitutionally, through the
exercise of rowers underlying the existence of all
governments on the$ time-honored principle of
salus populi est suprema lex. Social justice,
therefore, must be founded on the recognition of
the necessity of interdependence among divers
and diverse units of a society and of the
protection that should be equally and evenly
extended to all groups as a combined force in our
social and economic life, consistent with the
fundamental and paramount objective of the
state of promoting the health, comfort, and quiet
of all persons, and of bringing about "the greatest
good to the greatest number."
14. Phil. Geothermal, Inc. v. NLRC, GR No.
106370 (1994)
15. Royale Homes Marketing Corporation v.
Alcantara, G.R. No. 195190, (July 28, 2014)
FACTS
Petitioner, Philippine Geothermal, sought to
reverse
the
National
Labor
Relations
Commission's decision in the case of Edilberto
M. Alvarez. Alvarez, employed since 1979,
suffered a wrist injury in 1989 while on duty.
After medical examinations and certifications,
including fitness for light work, he was advised
to return to his regular duty. However, Alvarez
continued to be absent, exhausting sick leave
credits. Despite medical certifications of fitness
to work, he failed to report from January to
February 1990. The company issued warnings,
allowing him to charge absences to sick leave
credits. When Alvarez did not report by March 5,
1990, his employment was terminated. Alvarez
filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, leading to
conflicting decisions by the labor arbiter and the
NLRC. The NLRC reversed the dismissal,
ordering reinstatement without backwages. The
motion for reconsideration was denied.
FACTS
The case involves a petition against the Court of
Appeals (CA) decision that reversed the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) ruling. The
petitioner,
Royale
Homes
Marketing
Corporation, contests the CA's decision that
Fidel P. Alcantara, formerly appointed as
Marketing Director, is an employee rather than
an independent contractor. The CA determined
Alcantara's employee status based on the
company's control over his work, adherence to
company rules, and economic dependency due
to an exclusivity clause in the contract. The court
ordered Royale Homes to pay backwages and
separation pay to Alcantara, remanding the case
to the Labor Arbiter for the computation of the
monetary awards. The CA absolved corporate
officers of liability. Royale Homes sought
reconsideration, but the CA upheld its decision
in January 2011.
ISSUE
Whether or not Edilberto M. Alvarez was validly
dismissed
RULING
Yes, Alvarez was validly dismissed. Article 282(b)
of the Labor Code provides that an employer may
validly dismiss an employee for gross and
habitual neglect by the employee of his duties. In
the present case, it is clear that private
respondent was guilty of seriously neglecting his
duties. A review of Alvarez' record of attendance
shows that from August to December 1989, he
reported for work only seventy-seven (77) times
while he incurred forty-seven (47) absences.
Petitioner, in its fourth and last warning letter to
Alvarez, was willing to allow him to resume his
work in spite of the eighteen (18) days he went
on AWOL. It was made clear, however, that
should private respondent still fail to report for
work on 5 March 1990, his employment would be
terminated. Private respondent failed to report
for work on 5 March 1990. Petitioner validly
dismissed him not only for violation of company
policy but also for violation of Section 282(b) of
the Labor Code aforecited.
ISSUE
WON Alcantara is an employee of Royale Homes
RULING
No, Alcantara is not an employee of Royale
Homes, but a mere independent contractor. In
concluding that Alcantara is an employee of
Royale Homes, the CA ratiocinated that since the
performance of his tasks is subject to company
rules, regulations, code of ethics, and periodic
evaluation, the element of control is present. The
Court disagrees. Not every form of control is
indicative of employer-employee relationship. A
person who performs work for another and is
subjected to its rules, regulations, and code of
ethics does not necessarily become an employee.
As long as the level of control does not interfere
with the means and methods of accomplishing
the assigned tasks, the rules imposed by the
hiring party on the hired party do not amount to
the labor law concept of control that is indicative
of employer-employee relationship.
16. Puncia v. Toyota Shaw/Pasig, Inc. G.R. No.
214399, (June 28, 2016)
FACTS
The case involves a petition for review on
certiorari challenging the Court of Appeals (CA)
decision and resolution that annulled the
National Labor Relations Commission's (NLRC)
ruling. The NLRC had initially declared the
petitioner, Armando N. Puncia, illegally
dismissed by Toyota Shaw/Pasig, Inc. The
petitioner, a former marketing professional for
Toyota, was terminated for failing to meet the
required monthly sales quota and for
insubordination. The NLRC found the dismissal
unjustified, citing issues with due process.
However, the CA overturned the NLRC decision,
reinstating the Labor Arbiter's ruling that upheld
Puncia's dismissal for just cause. Puncia filed a
motion for reconsideration, contesting the CA's
decision. Simultaneously, another case involving
Puncia was dismissed and later reinstated by the
CA-Eleventh Division. Puncia now seeks to set
aside the CA-First Division's decision and
resolution and requests consolidation with the
other case for a joint decision. Toyota argues that
the CA-First Division's decision was correct,
given the circumstances at the time of
promulgation.
ISSUE
Whether or not Puncia was dismissed from
employment for just cause.
RULING
Yes, Puncia was dismissed for just cause. Records
reveal that as a Marketing Professional for
Toyota, Puncia had a monthly sales quota of
seven (7) vehicles from March 2011 to June 2011.
As he was having trouble complying with said
quota, Toyota even extended him a modicum of
leniency by lowering his monthly sales quota to
just three (3) vehicles for the months of July and
August 2011; but even then, he still failed to
comply. In that six (6)-month span, Puncia
miserably failed in satisfying his monthly sales
quota, only selling a measly five (5) vehicles out
of the 34 he was required to sell over the course
of said period. Verily, Puncia's repeated failure to
perform his duties - i.e., reaching his monthly
sales quota - for such a period of time falls under
the concept of gross inefficiency. In this regard,
case law instructs that "gross inefficiency" is
analogous to "gross neglect of duty," a just cause
of dismissal under Article 297 of the Labor Code,
for both involve specific acts of omission on the
part of the employee resulting in damage to the
employer or to his business. In Aliling v.
Feliciano, the Court held that an employer is
entitled to impose productivity standards for its
employees, and the latter's non-compliance
therewith can lead to his termination from work.
Failure to observe prescribed standards of work,
or to fulfill reasonable work assignments due to
inefficiency may constitute just cause for
dismissal. Such inefficiency is understood to
mean failure to attain work goals or work quotas,
either by failing to complete the same within the
allotted reasonable period, or by producing
unsatisfactory results.
17. Tunay na Pagkakaisa ng Manggagawa sa
Asia Brewery v. Asia Brewery, Inc.. G.R.
162025, (August 3,2010)
FACTS
The petitioner filed a certiorari appeal under
Rule 45, challenging the Court of Appeals'
decision to grant the respondent company's
petition and reverse the Voluntary Arbitrator's
decision. The case involves a dispute between
Asia Brewery, Inc. (ABI) and the union (BLMAINDEPENDENT) over the exclusion of 81
employees from the bargaining unit defined in
their Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA).
The disagreement arose when ABI stopped
deducting union dues, claiming the employees'
membership violated the CBA. The Voluntary
Arbitrator ruled in favor of the union, but the
Court of Appeals reversed the decision, declaring
the employees ineligible for inclusion in the
bargaining unit. The CA stated that ABI did not
restrain employees' right to self-organization.
The union filed a motion for reconsideration, but
it was denied. Additionally, a certification
election was held, won by another union
(TPMA), further complicating the case.
ISSUE
Whether or not the 81 employees may be validly
excluded from the bargaining unit.
RULING
No, the 81 employees may not be validly
excluded. Confidential employees are defined as
those who (1) assist or act in a confidential
capacity, (2) to persons who formulate,
determine, and effectuate management policies
in the field of labor relations. The two (2) criteria
are cumulative, and both must be met if an
employee is to be considered a confidential
employee, that is, the confidential relationship
must exist between the employee and his
supervisor, and the supervisor must handle the
prescribed responsibilities relating to labor
relations. The exclusion from bargaining units of
employees who, in the normal course of their
duties, become aware of management policies
relating to labor relations is a principal objective
sought to be accomplished by the "confidential
employee rule."There is no showing in this case
that the secretaries/clerks and checkers assisted
or acted in a confidential capacity to managerial
employees
and
obtained
confidential
information relating to labor relations policies.
And even assuming that they had exposure to
internal business operations of the company,
respondent claimed, this is not per se ground for
their exclusion in the bargaining unit of the
daily-paid rank-and-file employees.
18. Batangas-l Electric Cooperative Labor
Union v. Romeo A. Young, G.R. No. 62386
(1988)
FACTS
Three petitions for certiorari were filed,
involving electric cooperatives and their
employees' right to form or join labor unions for
collective bargaining. The cases are G.R. No.
62386, G.R. No. 70880, and G.R. No. 74560. In
G.R. No. 62386, the Batangas-I Electric
Cooperative Union sought a certification
election, but the Bureau of Labor Relations,
citing Presidential Decree 269, ruled that
cooperative members couldn't form or join a
labor union. In G.R. No. 70880, the Federation of
Free Workers petitioned for certification election
for Bulacan II Electric Cooperative employees,
facing opposition based on cooperative
membership. In G.R. No. 74560, a similar issue
arose for Albay Electric Cooperative I employees.
The Bureau of Labor Relations allowed the
certification election, stating cooperative
members could join a union. The Solicitor
General noted conflicting decisions and
questioned cooperative members' eligibility. A
common issue emerged: whether employees of
electric cooperatives could form or join labor
organizations for collective bargaining, with
legal precedent suggesting that cooperative
members, as co-owners, might not qualify.
ISSUE
Whether or not employees of electric
cooperatives are qualified to form or join labor
organizations for purposes of collective
bargaining.
RULING
No, employees of electric cooperatives are not
qualified to form or join labor organizations for
purposes of collective bargaining. Section 35,
Presidential Decree 269, as amended, readily
shows that employees of an electric cooperative
who are themselves members of the cooperative
have no right to form or join a labor organization
for purposes of collective bargaining. In the first
instance, a cooperative is established primarily
for the mutual aid and protection of the
members thereof. It was never intended to
operate like an ordinary company or
corporation. A cooperative is a non-profit
organization, so that if ever there are gains,
income or benefits derived therefrom, the same
are equally divided among its members. For all
legal intents and purposes, therefore, members
of a cooperative are part-owners thereof. The fact
that these employees/members enjoy free
electrical services which are not available to nonmembers is a clear indication that these
employees are co-owners of the cooperative.
Petitioner must be reminded that benefits from
cooperative accruing to co-owners may not come
only in the form of monetary benefits but also in
the form of services, considered attributes of
ownership recognized under Article 428 of the
New Civil Code.
19.
International
Catholic
Migration
Commission v. Calleja, G.R. No. 85750 (1990)
FACTS
The cases, consolidated on December 11, 1989,
involve the International Catholic Migration
Commission (ICMC) and the International Rice
Research Institute, Inc. (IRRI) claiming
immunity from Philippine labor laws. In the
ICMC case, accredited by the Philippine
government for refugee processing, a labor union
filed a petition for certification election. Despite
diplomatic immunity, the Bureau of Labor
Relations (BLR) ordered an election. The
Department of Foreign Affairs granted ICMC
specialized agency status, but BLR proceeded.
ICMC sought certiorari, arguing immunity. The
IRRI case, consolidated with ICMC, involved a
labor union's petition for certification election.
IRRI, granted international organization status,
opposed, citing immunity under Presidential
Decree No. 1620. Despite initial BLR approval,
the Secretary of Labor later dismissed the
petition. The court is asked to determine if the
Secretary of Labor committed grave abuse of
discretion. Key issues include whether
diplomatic immunity extends to labor laws and
the constitutionality of IRRI's immunity. A
procedural question on jurisdiction is also raised.
ISSUE
Whether or not the grant of diplomatic privileges
and immunities to ICMC extends to immunity
from the application of Philippine labor laws.
RULING
Yes, the Court ruled that in both cases,
diplomatic immunity has been granted to both
ICMC and IRRI. Article II of the Memorandum of
Agreement between the Philippine Government
and ICMC provides that ICMC shall have a status
"similar to that of a specialized agency." Senate
Resolution No. 19 on 17 May 1949, explicitly
provides that specialized agencies shall enjoy
immunity from every form of legal process
except insofar as in any particular case they have
expressly waived their immunity. IRRI is
similarly situated. Pres. Decree No. 1620, Article
3, is explicit in its grant of immunity that the
Institute shall enjoy immunity from any penal,
civil and administrative proceedings, except
insofar as that immunity has been expressly
waived.The grant of immunity from local
jurisdiction to ICMC and IRRI is clearly
necessitated by their international character and
respective purposes. The objective is to avoid the
danger of partiality and interference by the host
country in their internal workings.
20. Samahan ng Manggagawa sa Hanjin
Shipyard v. Bureau of Labor Relations, G.R.
No. 211145, October 14, 2015.
DOCTRINE
The right to self-organization is not limited to
unionism. Workers may also form or join an
association for mutual aid and protection and for
other legitimate purposes.
FACTS
On February 16, 2010, the association "Samahan
ng Mga Manggagawa sa Hanjin Shipyard"
applied for registration with the Department of
Labor and Employment (DOLE). Hanjin, a
company, later petitioned for the cancellation of
Samahan's registration, arguing that only certain
types of workers could form associations, and
Samahan
misrepresented
its
members'
employment status. The DOLE Regional
Director initially ruled in favor of Hanjin,
canceling Samahan's registration. However, the
Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR) reversed this
decision on appeal, emphasizing the right of all
workers to self-organization. Hanjin sought
reconsideration, but the BLR affirmed its
decision, directing Samahan to remove "Hanjin
Shipyard" from its name. Samahan appealed to
the Court of Appeals, which dismissed the
petition, upholding the BLR's directive. The
court reasoned that Samahan's registration was
contrary to labor laws due to misrepresentation,
but removing "Hanjin Shipyard" wouldn't
infringe on its right to self-organization. The
decision reinstated the cancellation of
Samahan's registration.
is identical or deceptively or confusingly similar
to that of any existing corporation or to any other
name already protected by law or is patently
deceptive, confusing or contrary to existing laws.
the petitioner could say was that it was a
demotion and that her floating status
embarrassed her before the suppliers and her coemployees.
ISSUE
1. W/N the CA erred in canceling the registration
of Samahan – YES
2. W/N Samahan should drop the words “Hanjin
Shipyard” from its name – YES
21. Peckson v. Robinson's Supermarket
Corporation, G.R. No. 198534 (2013)
22. St. Martin Funeral Home v. NLRC, G.R.
No. 130866 (1998)
FACTS
The Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks
resolution for the dismissal of Jenny F. Peckson's
complaint for constructive dismissal. The case
originated from her reassignment from Category
Buyer to Provincial Coordinator at Robinsons
Supermarket Corporation (RSC), which she
considered a demotion. Peckson refused the new
role, citing its non-supervisory nature and filed a
complaint. RSC argued the transfer was not a
demotion and was motivated by her lack of
punctuality and diligence. The Labor Arbiter
(LA) upheld RSC's decision, citing management
prerogative. The National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) and Court of Appeals
affirmed this decision, emphasizing no demotion
occurred. Peckson claims the transfer lacked due
process and was in bad faith, manipulating facts.
The CA upheld the NLRC, emphasizing the
latter's findings' finality when supported by
substantial evidence. Peckson, in her Supreme
Court petition, alleges discrimination and bad
faith in her transfer, attempting to demonstrate
the respondents' unjust actions, making her
continued employment intolerable.
Doctrine
Despite the amendment of Section 9 of Batas
Pambansa 129 whereby labor cases where deleted
in the list of matters which fall under its
jurisdiction, all petitions for certiorari under
Rule 65 should be initially filed in the Court of
Appeals in strict observance of the doctrine on
the hierarchy of courts as the appropriate forum
for the relief desired.
RULING
1 YES, the CA erred. In this case, Samahan's
registration was cancelled not because its
members were prohibited from forming a
workers' association but because they allegedly
committed misrepresentation for using the
phrase, "KAMI, ang mga Manggagawa sa HAN
JIN Shipyard." Misrepresentation, as a ground for
the cancellation of registration of a labor
organization, is committed "in connection with
the adoption, or ratification of the constitution
and by-laws or amendments thereto, the
minutes of ratification, the list of members who
took part in the ratification of the constitution
and by-laws or amendments thereto, and those
in connection with the election of officers,
minutes of the election of officers, and the list of
voters, xxx." The records of this case reveal no
deliberate or malicious intent to commit
misrepresentation on the part of Samahan. The
use of such words "KAMI, ang mga Manggagawa
sa HANJIN Shipyard" in the preamble of the
constitution and by-laws did not constitute
misrepresentation so as to warrant the
cancellation of Samahan's certificate of
registration. Hanjin failed to indicate how this
phrase constitutes a malicious and deliberate
misrepresentation
2 YES, “Hanjin Shipyard '' must be dropped from
its name. The Court agrees with the BLR that
"Hanjin Shipyard" must be removed in the name
of the association. A legitimate workers'
association refers to an association of workers
organized for mutual aid and protection of its
members or for any legitimate purpose other
than collective bargaining registered with the
DOLE. Having been granted a certificate of
registration, Samahan's association is now
recognized by law as a legitimate workers'
association. The Court refers to the Corporation
Code, which governs the names of juridical
persons. Section 18 thereof provides that no
corporate name may be allowed by the Securities
and Exchange Commission if the proposed name
ISSUE
WON the lateral transfer was a demotion
amounting to constructive dismissal.
RULING
No, the lateral transfer was not a demotion. In
Philippine Japan Active Carbon Corporation,
[28] when the transfer of an employee is not
unreasonable, or inconvenient, or prejudicial to
him, and it does not involve a demotion in rank
or a diminution of his salaries, benefits and other
privileges, the employee may not complain that
it amounts to a constructive dismissal. In the
case at bar, we agree with the appellate court that
there is substantial showing that the transfer of
the petitioner from Category Buyer to Provincial
Coordinator
was
not
unreasonable,
inconvenient, or prejudicial to her. The Court
saw how the company sought every chance to
hear her out on her grievances and how she
ignored the memoranda of Sarte asking her to
explain her refusal to accept her transfer. All that
FACTS
The petition for certiorari arises from a
complaint for illegal dismissal filed by the private
respondent against St. Martin Funeral Home.
The respondent, claiming to be the Operations
Manager, alleged illegal termination without an
employment contract or inclusion in the payroll.
St. Martin Funeral Home countered, asserting
the respondent was merely the uncle of the
owner and assisted voluntarily. The labor arbiter
ruled in favor of St. Martin Funeral Home,
denying an employer-employee relationship.
The respondent appealed to the NLRC, which
overturned the decision and remanded the case.
St. Martin Funeral Home's motion for
reconsideration was denied, prompting the
present petition, challenging the NLRC's alleged
abuse of discretion.
The case prompts a reexamination of the judicial
review process for NLRC decisions. The Court
previously maintained its authority to review
administrative acts, particularly on questions of
law and jurisdiction. The remedy involves a
motion for reconsideration and subsequent filing
of a certiorari petition within the prescribed
period. The legal framework for judicial review,
as outlined in B.P. No. 129, is presented,
emphasizing the Court of Appeals' role in issuing
writs and handling appeals, subject to certain
exceptions.
ISSUE
Whether or not the present petition for certiorari
is the proper remedy.
RULING
NO, certiorari is not the proper remedy.
Pursuant to decisions of the Supreme Court, the
remedy of the aggrieved party is to timely file a
motion for reconsideration, and then seasonably
avail of the special civil action of certiorari under
Rule 65. All references in the amended Section 9
of B.P. No. 129 to supposed appeals from the
NLRC to the Supreme Court are interpreted and
hereby declared to mean and refer to petitions
for certiorari under Rule 65. Consequently, all
such petitions should henceforth be initially filed
in the Court of Appeals in strict observance of the
doctrine on the hierarchy of courts as the
appropriate forum for the relief desired. Apropos
to this directive that resort to the higher courts
should be made in accordance with their
hierarchical order.
23. Ku v. RCBC Securities, G.R. No. 219491,
(October 17, 2018)
The settled rule is that jurisdiction over the
subject matter of a case is conferred by law and
determined by the allegations in the complaint,
which comprise a concise statement of the
ultimate facts constituting the petitioner's cause
of action. The nature of an action, as well as
which court or body has jurisdiction over it, is
determined based on the allegations contained
in the complaint of the petitioner. The
averments in the complaint and the character of
the relief sought are the ones to be consulted.
Once vested by the allegations in the complaint,
jurisdiction also remains vested, irrespective of
whether or not the petitioner is entitled to
recover upon all or some of the claims asserted
therein. As it now stands, jurisdiction over the
cases enumerated under Section 5 of PD 902-A,
collectively
known
as
intra-corporate
controversies or disputes, now falls under the
jurisdiction of the RTCs.
Based on the allegations in petitioner's
Complaint, there is no dispute that the case falls
under the jurisdiction of the RTC. . However,
whether or not the RTC shall take cognizance of
the case in the exercise of its general jurisdiction,
or as a special commercial court, is another
matter. In resolving this issue, what needs to be
determined, at the first instance, is the nature of
the petitioner's complaint. Is it an ordinary civil
action for collection, specific performance and
damages as would fall under the jurisdiction of
regular courts or is it an intracorporate
controversy or of such nature that it is required
to be heard and tried by a special commercial
court?
The Court finds, and so holds, that the case is not
an intra-corporate dispute and, instead, is an
ordinary civil action. There are no intracorporate
relations between the parties. Petitioner is
neither a stockholder, partner, member nor
officer of respondent corporation. The parties'
relationship is limited to that of an investor and
a securities broker. Moreover, the questions
involved neither pertain to the parties' rights and
obligations under the Corporation Code, if any,
nor to matters directly relating to the regulation
of the corporation.
FACTS
Petitioner Stephen Y. Ku opened a securities
trading account with respondent on June 5, 2007.
Later, it was discovered that M.G. Valbuena's
name was fraudulently inserted in the agreement
alongside another agent, Ivan L. Zalameda.
Believing MGV to be a Sales Director of RSEC,
the petitioner conducted transactions through
her, unaware of her blacklisting for fraudulent
activities. The petitioner uncovered 467
unauthorized transactions amounting to
Php70,064,426.88 in mismanaged funds. Despite
demanding payment, RSEC's reply denied
involvement with ARPO, providing no
satisfactory explanation. On February 22, 2013,
the petitioner filed a Complaint for Sum of
Money and Specific Performance with Damages
against RSEC. The RTC of Makati initially
referred the case to a Special Commercial Court
but later re-raffled it to Branch 149, which
rejected RSEC's Motion to Dismiss. The Court of
Appeals, however, reversed this decision,
asserting that the original branch acknowledged
its lack of jurisdiction and should have dismissed
the case.
ISSUE
Which court has jurisdiction over the complaint
filed by the petitioner?
RULING
The settled rule is that jurisdiction over the
subject matter of a case is conferred by law and
determined by the allegations in the complaint,
which comprise a concise statement of the
ultimate facts constituting the petitioner's cause
of action. The nature of an action, as well as
which court or body has jurisdiction over it, is
determined based on the allegations contained
in the complaint of the petitioner. The
averments in the complaint and the character of
the relief sought are the ones to be consulted.
Once vested by the allegations in the complaint,
jurisdiction also remains vested, irrespective of
whether or not the petitioner is entitled to
recover upon all or some of the claims asserted
therein. As it now stands, jurisdiction over the
cases enumerated under Section 5 of PD 902-A,
collectively
known
as
intra-corporate
controversies or disputes, now falls under the
jurisdiction of the RTCs. Jurisdiction over intracorporate controversies is transferred by law (RA
8799) from the SEC to the RTCs in general, but
the authority to exercise such jurisdiction is
given by the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its
rule-making power under the Constitution, to
RTCs which are specifically designated as Special
Commercial Courts.
Based on the allegations in petitioner's
Complaint, there is no dispute that the case falls
under the jurisdiction of the RTC. However,
whether or not the RTC shall take cognizance of
the case in the exercise of its general jurisdiction,
or as a special commercial court, is another
matter. In resolving this issue, what needs to be
determined, at the first instance, is the nature of
petitioner's complaint. Is it an ordinary civil
action for collection, specific performance and
damages as would fall under the jurisdiction of
regular courts or is it an intra-corporate
controversy or of such nature that it is required
to be heard and tried by a special commercial
court?
The Court finds, and so holds, that the case is not
an intra-corporate dispute and, instead, is an
ordinary civil action. There are no intracorporate relations between the parties.
Petitioner is neither a stockholder, partner,
member nor officer of respondent corporation.
The parties' relationship is limited to that of an
investor and a securities broker. Moreover, the
questions involved neither pertain to the parties'
rights and obligations under the Corporation
Code, if any, nor to matters directly relating to
the regulation of the corporation.
On the basis of the foregoing, since the
Complaint filed by petitioner partakes of the
nature of an ordinary civil action, it is clear that
it was correctly raffled-off to Branch 63. Hence,
it is improper for it (Branch 63) to have ordered
the re-raffle of the case to another branch of the
Makati RTC. Moreover, while designated as a
Special Commercial Court, Branch 149, to which
it was subsequently re-raffled, retains its general
jurisdiction to try ordinary civil cases such as
petitioner's Complaint. In sum, it is error to
conclude that the questioned Orders of Branches
63 and 149 are null and void on the ground of lack
of jurisdiction, because, in fact, both branches of
the Makati RTC have jurisdiction over the
subject matter of petitioner's Complaint.
ISSUE
Whether the CA erred in reversing and setting
aside the September 12, 2013 and October 25, 2013
Orders of the RTC of Makati City, Branches 63
and 149, respectively.|||
RULING
The petition is meritorious. Jurisdiction over
intra-corporate controversies is transferred by
law (RA 8799) from the SEC to the RTCs in
general, but the authority to exercise such
jurisdiction is given by the Supreme Court, in the
exercise of its rule-making power under the
Constitution, to RTCs which are specifically
designated as Special Commercial Courts.
Petitioner contends that the allegations in his
Complaint indicate that it is an action for
collection of a sum of money and specific
performance with damages and, as such, it falls
under the general jurisdiction of the RTC. The
CA, on the other hand, did not directly resolve
the issue as to the nature of the complaint and,
instead, proceeded to decide the case by working
on the premise that Branch 63 has acknowledged
its lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of
petitioner's complaint and, as such, should have
dismissed the same and not order its re-raffle to
another branch.
The Court agrees with
petitioner.
The Court finds, and so holds, that the case is not
an intra-corporate dispute and, instead, is an
ordinary civil action. There are no intracorporate relations between the parties.
Petitioner is neither a stockholder, partner,
member or officer of respondent corporation.
The parties' relationship is limited to that of an
investor and a securities broker. Moreover, the
questions involved neither pertain to the parties'
rights and obligations under the Corporation
Code, if any, nor to matters directly relating to
the regulation of the corporation
On the basis of the foregoing, since the
Complaint filed by petitioner partakes of the
nature of an ordinary civil action, it is clear that
it was correctly raffled-off to Branch 63. Hence,
it is improper for it (Branch 63) to have ordered
the re-raffle of the case to another branch of the
Makati RTC. Nonetheless, the September 12, 2013
Order of Branch 63, although erroneous, was
issued in the valid exercise of the RTC's
jurisdiction. Such mistaken Order can, thus, be
considered as a mere procedural lapse which
does not affect the jurisdiction which the RTC of
Makati had already acquired. Moreover, while
designated as a Special Commercial Court,
Branch 149, to which it was subsequently reraffled, retains its general jurisdiction to try
ordinary civil cases such as petitioner's
Complaint. In addition, after its re-raffle to
Branch 149, the case remained docketed as an
ordinary civil case. Thus, the Order dated
October 12, 2013 was, likewise issued by Branch
149 in the valid exercise of the RTC's jurisdiction.
In sum, it is error to conclude that the
questioned Orders of Branches 63 and 149 are
null and void on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction, because, in fact, both branches of
the Makati RTC have jurisdiction over the
subject matter of petitioner's Complaint.
Hence, considering that the RTC of Makati has
jurisdiction over the subject matter of
petitioner's complaint, and that Branch 149
continued and continues to exercise jurisdiction
over the case during the pendency of the
proceedings leading to this petition and, thus,
has presumably conducted hearings towards the
resolution of petitioner's complaint, this Court,
in the interest of expediency and, in promoting
the parties' respective rights to a speedy
disposition of their case, finds it proper that Civil
Case No. 13-171 should remain with Branch 149,
instead of being remanded to Branch 63 or reraffled anew among all courts of the same RTC.
24. Reinoso v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
116121, (July 18, 2011)
Doctrine
A reiteration of the more liberal Sun Insurance
case. Where the party does not deliberately
intend to defraud the court in payment of docket
fees, and manifests its willingness to abide by the
rules by paying additional docket fees when
required by the court, the liberal doctrine
enunciated in Sun Insurance Office, Ltdand not
the strict regulations set Manchester will apply.
FACTS
This case involves a petition for review
challenging the Court of Appeals (CA) decision
that set aside a Regional Trial Court (RTC)
decision due to non-payment of docket fees. The
CA reversed the RTC's March 22, 1988 decision
favoring the heirs of Ruben Reinoso, Sr., who
filed a complaint for damages against Ponciano
Tapales and Jose Guballa after Reinoso's death in
a collision between a jeepney and a truck in 1979.
The RTC awarded damages to the heirs and
Tapales. The CA, citing Manchester v. CA,
dismissed the complaint for non-payment of
docket fees and cited prescription, barring the
petitioners from paying the fees. Despite a
motion for reconsideration being denied, the
petitioners appealed, seeking relief from the
dismissal. The central issue revolves around the
legal and procedural consequences of nonpayment of docket fees and the applicability of
prescription in this context.
ISSUE
Whether or not the dismissal of the complaint by
the CA is proper.
RULING
No, the dismissal is not proper. Notwithstanding
the mandatory nature of the requirement of
payment of appellate docket fees, it is also
recognized that its strict application is qualified
by the following failure to pay those fees within
the
reglementary
period
allows
only
discretionary, not automatic, dismissal second,
such power should be used by the court in
conjunction with its exercise of sound discretion
in accordance with the tenets of justice and fair
play, as well as with a great deal
of
circumspection in consideration of all attendant
circumstances.
In this case, it cannot be denied that the case was
litigated before the RTC and said trial court had
already rendered a decision. While it was at that
level, the matter of non-payment of docket fees
was never an issue. It was only the CA which
motu propio dismissed the case for said reason.
Considering the foregoing, there is a need to
suspend the strict application of the rules so that
the petitioners would be able to fully and finally
prosecute their claim on the merits at the
appellate level rather than fail to secure justice
on a technicality, for, indeed, the general
objective of procedure is to facilitate the
application of justice to the rival claims of
contending parties, bearing always in mind that
procedure is not to hinder but to promote the
administration of justice.
25. Anchor Savings Bank v. Furigay. GR. No.
191178 (13 March 2013)
FACTS
The case involves a Rule 45 petition filed by
Anchor Savings Bank (ASB) against the Court of
Appeals' (CA) decision dismissing their appeal
(CA-G.R. CV No. 90123). The dispute arose from
ASB's complaint for a sum of money against
Ciudad Transport Services, Inc. (CTS) and its
president, Henry Furigay. ASB won the case, but
during its pendency, the Furigay spouses
donated properties to their children. ASB then
filed a complaint for rescission of the donation,
alleging fraud. The Regional Trial Court (RTC)
initially denied Furigays' motion to dismiss but
later reversed its decision, citing ASB's failure to
pay correct docket fees and prescription of the
rescission action. The Court of Appeals disagreed
on the docket fees but ruled that ASB's action for
rescission was premature, lacking certain
requisites. Both parties sought reconsideration,
but their motions were denied.
ISSUE
WON the action for rescission has already
prescribed
RULING
No, action for rescission has not yet prescribed.
In relation to an action for rescission, it should
be noted that the remedy of rescission is
subsidiary in nature; it cannot be instituted
except when the party suffering damage has no
other legal means to obtain reparation for the
same. Article 1389 of the Civil Code simply
provides that the action to claim rescission must
be commenced within four years.’ Since this
provision of law is silent as to when the
prescriptive period would
commence, the
general rule, i.e, from the moment the cause of
action accrues, therefore, applies. It is thus
apparent that an action to rescind or an accion
pauliana must be of last resort, availed of only
after all other legal
remedies have been
exhausted and have been proven futile. Indeed,
an accion pauliana presupposes a judgment and
the issuance by the trial court of a writ of
execution for the satisfaction of the judgment
and the failure of the Sheriff to enforce and
satisfy the judgment of the court. It presupposes
that the creditor has exhausted the property of
the debtor. The date of the decision of the trial
court against the debtor is immaterial. From the
foregoing, it is clear that the four-year
prescriptive period commences to run neither
from the date of the registration of the deed
sought to be rescinded nor from the date the trial
court rendered its decision but from the day it
has become clear that there are no other legal
remedies by which the creditor can satisfy his
claims.
26. Hygienic Packaging Corporation v. NutriAsia, Inc., G.R. No. 201302, (January 23, 2019)
Doctrine
The venue for the collection of sum of money
case is governed by Rule 4, Section 2 of the Rules
of Court. Unless the parties enter into a written
agreement on their preferred venue before an
action is instituted, the plaintiff may commence
his or her action before the trial court of the
province or city either where he or she resides, or
where the defendant resides. If the party is a
corporation, its residence is the province or city
where its principal place of business is situated
as recorded in its Articles of Incorporation.
FACTS
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari
challenging the Court of Appeals' decision to
dismiss a case between Nutri-Asia, Inc. and
Hygienic Packaging Corporation. The dispute
arose from a sum of money claim by Hygienic for
plastic containers supplied to Nutri-Asia. The
trial court denied Nutri-Asia's motion to dismiss,
citing issues of venue and compliance with an
arbitration clause. However, the Court of
Appeals reversed this decision, asserting that the
trial court committed grave abuse of discretion.
The contractual relationship involved Nutri-Asia
purchasing plastic containers from Hygienic
based on purchase orders with an arbitration
clause. Nutri-Asia argued that the arbitration
clause was not valid, while Hygienic insisted on
its enforceability. The Court of Appeals ruled in
favor of Hygienic, stating that the dispute should
have been referred to arbitration as stipulated in
the purchase orders. The case was ultimately
dismissed without prejudice to arbitration. The
decision also emphasized that the venue
stipulation in the sales invoices did not override
the arbitration clause in the purchase orders.
ISSUE
Whether or not the action for collection of sum
of money was properly filed
RULING
No, action for collection was not properly filed.
It has been consistently held that an action for
collection of sum of money is a personal action.
Taking into account that no exception can be
applied in this case, the venue, then, is "where
the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs
resides, or where the defendant or any of the
principal defendants resides, ... at the election of
the plaintiff." For a corporation, its residence is
considered "the place where its principal office is
located as stated in its Articles of Incorporation.
Considering that the amount petitioner claims
falls within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial
Court, petitioner may file its Complaint for sum
of money either in the Regional Trial Court of
San Pedro, Laguna or in the Regional Trial Court
of Pasig City. Petitioner's erroneous belief on the
applicability of the venue stipulation in the Sales
Invoices led it to file an action before the
Regional Trial Court of Manila. This error is fatal
to petitioner's case. One (1) of the grounds for
dismissal of an action under Rule 16, Section 1 of
the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure is when
the venue is improperly laid. This Court reminds
litigants that while the rules on venue are for the
convenience of plaintiffs, these rules do not give
them unbounded freedom to file their cases
wherever they may please.
27. Rule 3, Sec. 11; Divinagracia v. Parilla, G.R.
No. 196750 (2015)
FACTS
This petition for review challenges the Court of
Appeals' (CA) decision and resolution that
overturned the Regional Trial Court's (RTC)
rulings in a case involving the partition of a 313square meter land in Iloilo City. Conrado
Nobleza, Sr. owned the land and had multiple
marriages, resulting in various legitimate and
illegitimate heirs. Santiago C. Divinagracia
claimed to have purchased shares of the land
from certain heirs but faced obstacles in
registering the transaction due to the refusal of
other heirs to surrender the title.
The RTC initially ordered the partition, but on
reconsideration, it directed Santiago to comply
with a supplemental contract's payment terms.
The CA later dismissed Santiago's complaint,
asserting that all heirs were indispensable parties
to the partition, and their exclusion led to the
case's dismissal. Santiago's heirs, dissatisfied,
sought reconsideration but were denied. The
present petition is brought by the administratrix
of Santiago's estate, challenging the CA's
decision and resolution.
impleaded and for the disposition of the case on
the merits.
ISSUE
Whether or not the CA correctly:
(a) ruled that Felcon’s siblings and Cebeleo, Sr.
and Maude’s children are indispensable parties
to Santiago’s complaint for judicial partition; and
28. Banda v. Ermita, G.R. No. 166620 (2010)
(b) dismissed Santiago’s complaint for his failure
to implead said omitted heirs
RULING
(a) Yes, CA Correctly ruled. Both Mateo, Sr. and
Cebeleo, Sr. pre-deceased Conrado, Sr. and, thus,
pursuant to the rules on representation under
the Civil Code, their respective interests shall be
represented by their children, namely: (a) for
Mateo, Sr.: Felcon, Landelin, Eusela, Giovanni,
Mateo, Jr., Tito, and Gaylord; and (b) for Cebeleo,
Sr.: Cebeleo, Jr. and Neobel. The said heirs –
whether in their own capacity or in
representation of their direct ascendant – have
vested rights over the subject land and, as such,
should be impleaded as indispensable parties in
an action for partition thereof. However, a
reading of Santiago’s complaint shows that as
regards Mateo, Sr.’s interest, only Felcon was
impleaded, excluding therefrom his siblings and
co-representatives. Similarly, with regard to
Cebeleo, Sr.’s interest over the subject land, the
complaint impleaded his wife, Maude, when
pursuant to Article 972 of the Civil Code, the
proper representatives to his interest should
have been his children, Cebeleo, Jr. and Neobel
(b) No, the CA erred in ordering the dismissal of
the complaint. In Heirs of Mesina v. Heirs of
Fian, Sr., the Court definitively explained that in
instances of non-joinder of indispensable parties,
the proper remedy is to implead them and not to
dismiss the case, to wit: The non-joinder of
indispensable parties is not a ground for the
dismissal of an action. At any stage of a judicial
proceeding and/or at such times as are just,
parties may be added on the motion of a party or
on the initiative of the tribunal concerned. If the
plaintiff refuses to implead an indispensable
party despite the order of the court, that court
may dismiss the complaint for the plaintiff’s
failure to comply with the order. The remedy is
to implead the non-party claimed to be
indispensable. x x x In view of the foregoing, the
correct course of action in the instant case is to
order its remand to the RTC for the inclusion of
those indispensable parties who were not
FACTS
The current dispute stems from a class-action
petition challenging the constitutionality of
Executive Order No. 378 issued by President
Gloria Macapagal Arroyo on October 25, 2004.
This order amended Executive Order No. 285,
which established the National Printing Office
(NPO) during the term of former President
Corazon C. Aquino in 1987. The amendment
removed NPO's exclusive printing jurisdiction
over government forms, allowing government
agencies to competitively source printing
services from the private sector. Executive Order
No. 378 also limited NPO's budget to its income.
The petitioners, NPO employees, argue that the
amendment threatens their job security,
asserting that only the legislative branch, not the
executive, can amend or repeal Executive Order
No. 285. They further contend that the order
jeopardizes their security of tenure by potentially
leading to the gradual abolition of the NPO. The
case revolves around the constitutional authority
to alter executive orders and the impact on the
employment stability of NPO workers.
ISSUE
Whether or not the EO no. 378 is Constitutional.
RULING
Ye, it is constitutional. In the present case,
involving neither an abolition nor transfer of
offices, the assailed action is a mere
reorganization under the general provisions of
the law consisting mainly of streamlining the
NTA in the interest of simplicity, plicity,
economy and efficiency. It is an act within the
authority of the President motivated and carried
out, according to the findings of the appellate
court, in good faith, a factual assessment that
this Court could only but accept. This Court has
already ruled in a number of cases that the
President may, by executive or administrative
order, direct the reorganization of government
entities under the Executive Department. This is
also sanctioned under the Constitution, as well
as other statutes. The power of the President to
reorganize the executive department is likewise
recognized in general appropriations laws. The
issuance of Executive Order No. 378 by President
Arroyo is an exercise of a delegated legislative
power granted by the aforementioned Section 31.
Chapter to, Title III, Book III of the
Administrative Code of 1987, which provides for
the continuing authority of the President to
reorganize the Office of the President, "in order
to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency.
29. NM Rothschild & Sons (Australia) Ltd. v.
Lepanto Consolidated Mining Co., G.R. No.
175799 (2011)
FACTS
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari
challenging the Court of Appeals' decision on
September 8, 2006, and its subsequent denial of
a Motion for Reconsideration on December 12,
2006. The case involves a complaint filed by
Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company against
NM Rothschild & Sons (Australia) Limited,
seeking the declaration of loan and hedging
contracts as void and claiming damages. The
petitioner contested the jurisdiction of the court,
citing improper service of summons and other
grounds. The trial court denied the Motion to
Dismiss, asserting proper service through the
Department of Foreign Affairs and stating that
the complaint had a valid cause of action. The
Court of Appeals upheld this decision,
emphasizing that the denial of a Motion to
Dismiss is interlocutory and should be reviewed
through an appeal after trial. The petitioner
argues that certiorari is an appropriate remedy
and contests the court's jurisdiction. The
respondent argues for dismissal due to
procedural issues and supports the trial court's
decisions.
ISSUE
I. Whether petitioner is a real party in interest
II. Whether or not it was proper for the
petitioner to resort to a petition for certiorari
with the CA
III. Whether or not the lower courts correctly
denied the Motion to Dismiss
RULING
(1) Respondent points out that as of the date of
the filing of the Petition, there is no such
corporation that goes by the name NM
Rothschild and Sons (Australia) Limited.
Petitioner claims that NM Rothschild and Sons
(Australia) Limited still exists as a corporation
under the laws of Australia under the new name
Investec Australia Limited. We find the
submissions of petitioner on the change of its
corporate name satisfactory and resolve not to
dismiss the present Petition for Review on the
ground of not being prosecuted under the name
of the real party in interest.
(2) We have held time and again that an order
denying a Motion to Dismiss is an interlocutory
order which neither terminates nor finally
disposes of a case as it leaves something to be
done by the court before the case is finally
decided on the merits. The general rule,
therefore, is that the denial of a Motion to
Dismiss cannot be questioned in a special civil
action for Certiorari which is a remedy designed
to correct errors of jurisdiction and not errors of
judgment. However, we have likewise held that
when the denial of the Motion to Dismiss is
tainted with grave abuse of discretion, the grant
of the extraordinary remedy of Certiorari may be
justified
The resolution of the present Petition therefore
entails an inquiry into whether the Court of
Appeals correctly ruled that the trial court did
not commit grave abuse of discretion in its denial
of petitioners Motion to Dismiss. A mere error in
judgment on the part of the trial court would
undeniably be inadequate for us to reverse the
disposition by the Court of Appeals.
(3) As correctly ruled by both the RTC and the
CA, the alleged absence of a cause of action, the
alleged estoppel on the part of petitioner, and the
argument that respondent is in pari delicto in the
execution of the challenged contracts, are not
grounds in a Motion to Dismiss as enumerated in
Section 1, Rule 16[17] of the Rules of Court.
Rather, such defenses raise evidentiary issues
closely related to the validity and/or existence of
respondents alleged cause of action and should
therefore be threshed out during the trial.
As regards the allegation of failure to state a
cause of action, while the same is usually
available as a ground in a Motion to Dismiss, said
ground cannot be ruled upon in the present
Petition without going into the very merits of the
main case. In the case at bar, respondent asserts
in the Complaint that the Hedging Contracts are
void for being contrary to Article 2018[25] of the
Civil Code. Respondent claims that under the
Hedging Contracts, despite the express
stipulation for deliveries of gold, the intention of
the parties was allegedly merely to compel each
other to pay the difference between the value of
the gold at the forward price stated in the
contract and its market price at the supposed
time of delivery. The determination of whether
or not the Complaint stated a cause of action
would therefore involve an inquiry into whether
or not the assailed contracts are void under
Philippine laws. This is, precisely, the very issue
to be determined. The trial court, therefore,
correctly denied the Motion to Dismiss on this
ground.
Petitioner alleges that the RTC has not acquired
jurisdiction over its person on account of the
improper service of summons. Summons was
served on petitioner through the DFA, with
respondents counsel personally bringing the
summons and Complaint to the Philippine
Consulate General in Sydney, Australia.
Moreover, by seeking affirmative reliefs from the
trial court, petitioner is deemed to have
voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of said
court. A party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a
court to secure affirmative relief against his
opponent and after obtaining or failing to obtain
such relief, repudiate or question that same
jurisdiction. Consequently, the trial court cannot
be considered to have committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in the denial of the Motion to
Dismiss on account of failure to acquire
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant.
30. Sec. 1, Rule 33, Rules of Court; Republic v.
Tuvera, 516 SCRA 113, 136
FACTS
The case involves the Republic of the Philippines'
pursuit of restitution and damages against
former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his wife
Imelda, and associates, particularly Juan and
Victor Tuvera, over alleged ill-gotten wealth.
Twin Peaks Development Corporation, linked to
Victor Tuvera, obtained a Timber License
Agreement (TLA) during Marcos's presidency.
Following Marcos's ousting, the Philippine
Commission on Good Government (PCGG)
issued a Writ of Sequestration on Twin Peaks'
assets, deeming them ill-gotten. The Republic
filed a complaint in 1988, seeking to recover
funds and cancel TLA No. 356. The case faced
delays, including jurisdictional challenges due to
Marcos's exile. The trial involved conflicting
claims regarding TLA No. 356's legitimacy, with
the Republic arguing against the lack of proper
procedures and public bidding. In 2001, the
Sandiganbayan, citing res judicata from a
previous decision in the Ysmael case, sustained a
demurrer to evidence, asserting that the validity
of TLA No. 356 had been conclusively settled.
This decision barred the Republic from
challenging its legitimacy.
ISSUE
Whether or not res judicata indeed applies in the
instant case
RULING
No, res judicata does not apply in the instant
case. For res judicata to serve as an absolute bar
to a subsequent action, the following requisites
must concur: (1) the former judgment or order
must be final; (2) the judgment or order must be
on the merits; (3) it must have been rendered by
a court having jurisdiction over the subject
matter and parties; and (4) there must be
between the first and second actions, identity of
parties, of subject matter, and of causes of action.
When there is only identity of issues with no
identity of causes of action, there exists res
judicata in the concept of conclusiveness of
judgment. The Court finds no basis to declare the
Republic as having substantial interest as that of
Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co., Inc. In the first place, the
Republic’s cause of action lies in the alleged
abuse of power on respondents’ part in violation
of R.A. No. 3019 and breach of public trust,
which in turn warrants its claim for restitution
and damages. Ysmael, on the other hand, sought
the revocation of TLA No. 356 and the
reinstatement of its own timber license
agreement. Indeed, there is no identity of parties
and no identity of causes of action between the
two cases.
31. Sps Sanchez v. Vda de Aguilar, G.R. No.
228680 (2018)
FACTS
The case involves a petition for review seeking to
reverse the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision and
Resolution that overturned the Regional Trial
Court's (RTC) ruling in favor of the petitioner
spouses Sanchez. The dispute centers on a 600square-meter lot purchased by the spouses from
Juanito Aguilar in 2000. The heirs of Aguilar later
fenced off a portion, claiming it as their own. The
Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) initially
dismissed the spouses' complaint, asserting the
heirs' prior possession. The MCTC's execution
order triggered further conflicts over the width
of a national highway. The RTC, in 2013, annulled
the MCTC decision, declaring the spouses as
legitimate owners. However, the CA, in 2016,
reversed this, citing jurisdiction and laches,
asserting the spouses' delayed action. The
petitioners argue the RTC's findings align with
the Sheriff's assessment of the highway width,
emphasizing the downward slope toward the
lake.
ISSUE
WON the MCTC erred in dismissing the forcible
entry complaint
RULING
No, the MCTC did not err. The Court deems it proper
to note that an ejectment case, such as the forcible
entry complaint filed before the MCTC below, is a
summary proceeding designed to provide
expeditious means to protect the actual possession or
the right to possession of the property involved. The
sole question for resolution in the case is the physical
or material possession (possession de facto) of the
property in question, and neither a claim of juridical
possession (possession de jure) nor an averment of
ownership by the defendant can outrightly deprive
the trial court from taking due cognizance of the case.
Hence, even if the question of ownership is raised in
the pleadings, the court may pass upon the issue but
only to determine the question of possession
especially if the question of ownership is inseparably
linked with the question of possession. The
adjudication of ownership in that instance, however,
is merely provisional, and will not bar or prejudice
an action between the same parties involving the title
to the property.
32. Neypes v. CA, G.R. No. 141524, (September
14, 2005).
FACTS
Petitioners, including Domingo Neypes, filed a
case for annulment of judgment and land titles
against various respondents in Roxas, Oriental
Mindoro. During the proceedings, the trial court
granted the petitioners' motion against certain
respondents and denied others' motions to
dismiss. Subsequently, the trial court, presided
by Judge Antonio N. Rosales, dismissed the
complaint on February 12, 1998, citing
prescription. Petitioners received the dismissal
order on March 3, 1998, filed a motion for
reconsideration on March 18, 1998, but it was
denied. They filed a notice of appeal on July 27,
1998, deemed late by the trial court. Despite
petitioners' argument that the appeal was timely,
the Court of Appeals upheld the dismissal on
September 16, 1999, considering the February 12,
1998 order as the final and appealable decision.
The Court of Appeals' decision was affirmed on
January 6, 2000.
ISSUE
Whether or not July 1, 1998 was the start of the
15-day reglementary period to appeal, did
petitioners in fact file their notice of appeal on
time.
RULING
Yes, petitioners filed their notice of appeal on
time. Under Rule 41, Section 3, petitioners had 15
days from notice of judgment or final order to
appeal the decision of the trial court. On the 15
th day of the original appeal period (March 18,
1998), petitioners did not file a notice of appeal
but instead opted to file a motion for
reconsideration. In Quelnan and Apuyan, the
Court ruled there that they only had the
remaining time of the 15-day appeal period to file
the notice of appeal. The SC consistently applied
this rule in similar cases, premised on the longsettled doctrine that the perfection of an appeal
in the manner and within the period permitted
by law is not only mandatory but also
jurisdictional. The rule is also founded on deepseated considerations of public policy and sound
practice that, at risk of occasional error, the
judgments and awards of courts must become
final at some definite time fixed by law. To
standardize the appeal periods provided in the
Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to
appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to
allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file
the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court,
counted from receipt of the order dismissing a
motion for a new trial or motion for
reconsideration. The SC held that petitioners
seasonably filed their notice of appeal within the
fresh period of 15 days, counted from July 22, 1998
(the date of receipt of notice denying their
motion for reconsideration).
33. Municipality of Biñan v. Judge Garcia,
G.R. No. 69260 (1989)]
FACTS
The certiorari proceeding involves an
expropriation suit initiated by the Municipality
of Biñan, Laguna, to acquire land for a new public
market. Erlinda Francisco, one of the
landowners, filed a motion to dismiss, asserting
various grounds, including constitutional
limitations on eminent domain. Despite being a
motion to dismiss, it functioned as a pleading,
akin to an answer in a civil action. The court
issued a writ of possession in favor of the
municipality. Francisco later filed a motion for a
separate trial, citing a constitutional defense
based on a locational clearance she obtained.
The court granted the motion, conducted a
separate trial, and eventually dismissed the
complaint against Francisco, recognizing her
vested right over the property due to the
locational clearance. The municipality's motion
for reconsideration was dismissed for being filed
out of time. Despite attempts to challenge the
orders, the court denied reconsideration. The
certiorari proceeding seeks to address perceived
errors and irregularities in the trial court's
decisions and proceedings.
ISSUE Whether the special civil action of
eminent domain under Rule 67 of the Rules of
Court is a case "wherein multiple appeals are
allowed," as regards which "the period of appeal
shall be thirty [30] days," instead of fifteen (15)
days.
RULING
Yes, period of appeal shall be thirty days. The
Court holds that in actions of eminent domain,
as in actions for partition, since no less than two
(2) appeals are allowed by law, the period for
appeal from an order of condemnation10 is thirty
(30) days counted from notice of said order, and
not the ordinary period of fifteen (15) days
prescribed for actions in general, conformably
with the provisions of Section 39 of Batas
Pambansa Bilang 129, in relation to paragraph 19
(b) of the Implementing Rules to the effect that
in "appeals in special proceedings in accordance
with Rule 109 of the Rules of Court and other
cases wherein multiple appeals are allowed, the
period of appeal shall be thirty (30) days, a record
of appeal being required.11 The Municipality's
motion for reconsideration filed on August 17,
1984 was therefore timely presented, well within
the thirty-day period laid down by law therefore;
and it was error for the Trial Court to have ruled
otherwise and to have declared that the order
sought to be reconsidered had become final and
executory.
We already emphasized in the case of
Municipality of Biñan v. Hon. Jose Mar Garcia
(G.R. No. 69260, December 22, 1989, 180 SCRA
576, 583-584) the procedure for eminent domain,
to wit:
There are two (2) stages in every action of
expropriation. The first is concerned with the
determination of the authority of the plaintiff to
exercise the power of eminent domain and the
propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts
involved in the suit. It ends with an order, if not
of dismissal of the action, "of condemnation
declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right to
take the property sought to be condemned, for
the public use or purpose described in the
complaint, upon the payment of just
compensation to be determined as of the date of
the filing of the complaint". An order of
dismissal, if this be ordained, would be a final
one, of course, since it finally disposes of the
action and leaves nothing more to be done by the
Court on the merits. So, too, would an order of
condemnation be a final one, for thereafter, as
the Rules expressly state, in the proceedings
before the Trial Court, "no objection to the
exercise of the right of condemnation (or the
propriety thereof) shall be filed or heard."
The second phase of the eminent domain action
is concerned with the determination by the
Court of "the just compensation for the property
sought to be taken." This is done by the Court
with the assistance of not more than three (3)
commissioners. The order fixing the just
compensation on the basis of the evidence
before, and findings of, the commissioners would
be final, too. It would finally dispose of the
second stage of the suit, and leave nothing more
to be done by the Court regarding the issue.
Obviously, one or another of the parties may
believe the order to be erroneous in its
appreciation of the evidence or findings of fact or
otherwise. Obviously, too, such a dissatisfied
party may seek reversal of the order by taking an
appeal therefrom.
34. Republic v. Sarabia, G.R. No. 157847 (2005)
FACTS
The case involves a petition for review on
certiorari challenging the decision of the Court
of Appeals, which affirmed the Regional Trial
Court's ruling in an expropriation case. The
petitioner, the Republic of the Philippines
represented by the Air Transportation Office,
sought to expropriate a 4,901 square-meter
portion of Lot 6068 in Aklan for public purposes
such as an airport control tower, crash fire rescue
station,
airport
terminal,
and
police
headquarters. The trial court fixed the just
compensation at P800.00 per square meter, with
legal interest, based on a commissioner's
recommendation. The petitioner contested the
decision, arguing that the possession and taking
of the property occurred in 1956. The Court of
Appeals upheld the trial court's decision,
emphasizing the petitioner's failure to prove the
nature of the possession and the timing of the
taking.
The
petitioner's
motion
for
reconsideration was denied.
ISSUE
Whether or not the precise time at which just
compensation should be fixed as of the time of
actual taking of possession by the expropriating
entity.
RULING
Yes, the Court ruled that just compensation
should be fixed as of the time of actual taking of
possession. The SC ruled
in Provincial
Government vs. Caro that the value of the
property should be fixed as of the date when it
was taken and not the date of the filing of the
proceedings. In the context of the State's
inherent power of eminent domain, there is a
"taking" when the owner is actually deprived or
dispossessed of his property; where there is a
practical destruction or a material impairment of
the value of his property; or when he is deprived
of the ordinary use thereof. In a long line of cases,
we have consistently ruled that compensation for
property expropriated must be determined as of
the time the expropriating authority takes
possession thereof and not as of the institution
of the proceedings.
35. People v. Tanes, G.R. No. 240596 (2019)
FACTS
In April 2011, a case was filed against Tanes for
violating drug laws in the Philippines. The
accusation stated that he unlawfully sold
methamphetamine
hydrochloride
to
an
undercover agent. Tanes pleaded not guilty and
applied for bail, which was granted by the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) on March 31, 2017.
The RTC found weak evidence of guilt,
questioning the chain of custody in the buy-bust
operation. The court emphasized the absence of
certain witnesses during the operation and their
presence only during the inventory.
The People filed a motion for reconsideration,
which was denied, leading them to petition the
Court of Appeals (CA). The CA upheld the RTC
decision, stating that the bail was granted based
on established jurisprudence regarding witness
presence and the chain of custody rule. The CA
also noted flaws in the prosecution's evidence,
including the absence of certain officials during
critical moments. Petitioner's claims of denial of
due process and lack of a summary of evidence
were rejected. The CA's decision was affirmed in
July 2018.
ISSUE
Whether the CA erred in affirming the Order of
the RTC which granted Tanes' application for
bail.
RULING
No, the CA did not err. The right to bail is
recognized in the Bill of Rights, as stated in
Section 13, Article III of the Constitution: SEC. 13.
All persons, except those charged with offenses
punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence
of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be
bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on
recognizance as may be provided by law. The
right to bail shall not be impaired even when the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.
In this regard, Rule 114 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure provides: SEC. 7. Capital of ense or an
of ense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, not bailable. - No person charged
with a capital offense, or an offense punishable
by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall
be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is
strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal
prosecution. Thus, before conviction, bail is a
matter of right when the offense charged is
punishable by any penalty lower than reclusion
perpetua. Bail becomes a matter of discretion if
the offense charged is punishable by death,
reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment that is,
bail will be denied if the evidence of guilt is
strong.
36. Rule 126, Sec. 4 and 5; People v. Mamaril,
G.R. No. 147607 (2004)
FACTS
The petition for review involves appellant
Benhur Mamaril, found guilty of violating
Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended
by RA No. 7659, for possessing marijuana. The
prosecution, relying on a search warrant,
presented evidence including confiscated drugs
and a positive drug test. The defense argued the
illegality of the search warrant issuance and
implementation. Appellant contended he wasn't
residing at the searched premises, suggesting the
drugs were planted due to a dispute with local
police. The defense questioned the absence of a
transcript for the warrant application process.
Despite these objections, the trial court
convicted Mamaril, sentencing him to life
imprisonment and imposing a fine. The decision
rested on the prosecution's proof of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. The case underscores issues
surrounding search warrants, police conduct,
and the reliability of evidence.
ISSUE
Whether or not the trial court erred in issuing a
search warrant.
lapses and Renalyn's neglect. The Court of
Appeals (CA) remanded the case in 2017,
criticizing the hasty dismissal and ordering a trial
to determine custody based on Queenie's best
interests. The CA granted Renalyn custody
pending the trial, with visitation rights for Ricky
James. Despite the CA's decision, the Masbates
sought reconsideration, leading to further legal
motions. The summary encompasses key events,
legal arguments, and court decisions in the
ongoing custody dispute.
ISSUES:
RULING
Yes, the issuance of a search warrant is justified
only upon a finding of probable cause. In
determining the existence of probable cause, it is
required that: (1) the judge must examine the
complainant and his witnesses personally; (2) the
examination must be under oath; and (3) the
examination must be reduced in writing in the
form of searching questions and answers. In
Mata v. Bayona the Court held that mere
affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses
are thus not sufficient. The examining Judge has
to take depositions in writing of the complainant
and the witnesses he may produce and to attach
them to the record. Such written deposition is
necessary in order that the Judge may be able to
properly determine the existence or nonexistence of the probable cause, to hold liable for
perjury the person giving it if it will be found
later that his declarations are false. Moreover, no
matter how incriminating the articles taken from
the appellant may be, their seizure cannot
validate an invalid warrant. The Court further
ruled in Mata v. Bayona, we ruled: ….[N]othing
can justify the issuance of the search warrant but
the fulfillment of the legal requisites.
1. Whether or not the remand to the RTC for
further hearing is correct.
37. Masbate v. Relucio, G.R. No. 235498 (2018)
Now, Art. 176 of the FC does provide that nonmarital children shall be under the parental
authority of their mother. But this is not absolute
for custody may be withdrawn from a mother if
it is shown that she is unfit. According to
jurisprudence, the following instances may
constitute “compelling reasons” to wrest away
custody from a mother over her child although
under seven years of age: neglect, abandonment,
unemployment,
immorality,
habitual
drunkenness, drug addiction, maltreatment of
the child, insanity or affliction with a
communicable disease. Hence, in order to
judiciously settle the allegations of Ricky, the
FACTS
Queenie, born on May 3, 2012, faced a custody
dispute between her parents, Renalyn and Ricky
James. The couple, unmarried, separated in April
2015, leaving Queenie with Ricky James.
However, Renalyn's parents, the Masbates, took
custody, presenting a Special Power of Attorney
(SPA) from Renalyn. Ricky James sought habeas
corpus and custody but was denied by the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) in December 2015.
The RTC cited Article 213 of the Family Code,
favoring the mother for children below seven
years. Ricky James appealed, claiming procedural
2. Whether or not the award of limited and
temporary custody to Ricky is correct.
HELD:
1. Yes. The RTC was wrong to not allow Ricky to
present evidence to prove his right to have
custody over Queenie. (Here the SC made a
landmark ruling on the proper interpretation of
the tender-age rule)
Article 213 of the FC states that no child under
seven years of age shall be separated from the
mother. If this is to be interpreted in its absolute
sense, then no “illegitimate father” can ever have
custody over their “illegitimate child” (Note that
the politically correct term now is “non-marital”
not “illegitimate”)
However, the SC cannot adopt such a rigid view,
without running afoul to the overarching
consideration in custody cases, which is the best
interest of the minor.
RTC must conduct trial to determine if Renalyn
is unfit.
2. No, the Court holds that the CA erred in
granting Ricky James temporary custody for a
limited period of twenty-four (24) consecutive
hours once every month, in addition to visitation
rights, invoking "humane and practical
considerations," which were based solely on
Ricky James' allegations. It should be stressed
that Section 15 of A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC provides
for temporary visitation rights, not temporary
custody. It is only after trial, when the court
renders its judgment awarding the custody of the
minor to the proper party, that the court may
likewise issue "any order that is just and
reasonable permitting the parent who is
deprived of the care and custody of the minor to
visit or have temporary custody," pursuant to
Section 18 of A.M. No. 03-04- 04-SC. By granting
temporary albeit limited custody ahead of trial,
the appellate court overturned the tender-age
presumption under Article 213 of the Family
Code, stating that "[n]o child under seven [(7)]
years of age shall be separated from the mother
unless the court finds compelling reasons to
order otherwise."
38. Alanis vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
216425, (November 11, 2020)
FACTS
The case involves a petition to change the name
of Anacleto Ballaho Alanis III to Abdulhamid
Ballaho, which was initially denied by the
Regional Trial Court. Anacleto argued that he
wished to use his mother's maiden name for
personal reasons and presented evidence of his
consistent use of the name Abdulhamid Ballaho
in various records. The trial court rejected the
petition, citing a lack of legal grounds and
potential confusion.
Anacleto's counsel, Atty. Dialo, faced a shooting
incident, leading to a delayed notice of appeal,
which was subsequently denied for being filed
out of time. The Court of Appeals upheld the
denial, emphasizing the adherence to procedural
rules. Anacleto appealed to the Supreme Court,
claiming excusable negligence and asserting his
right to use his mother's surname. The Office of
the Solicitor General argued against the petition,
highlighting procedural errors and the absence
of valid grounds for a name change. The case
revolves around the tension between personal
choices and legal principles governing name
changes.
ISSUE
Whether or not legitimate children have the
right to use their mothers' surnames as their
surnames.
RULING
Yes, legitimate children have the right to use
their mothers' surnames as their surnames.
Article 364 of the Civil Code provides that
legitimate and legitimated children shall
principally use the surname of the father. The
Regional Trial Court patently erred in denying
petitioner's prayer to use his mother's surname,
based solely on the word "principally" in Article
364 of the Civil Code. Indeed, the provision
states that legitimate children shall "principally"
use the surname of the father, but "principally"
does not mean "exclusively." This gives ample
room to incorporate into Article 364 the State
policy of ensuring the fundamental equality of
women and men before the law, and no
discernible reason to ignore it. The SC has
explicitly recognized in Alfon v. Republic, that
the word "principally" as used in the codalprovision is not equivalent to "exclusively" so
that there is no legal obstacle if a legitimate or
legitimated child should choose to use the
surname of its mother to which it is equally
entitled.
39. Aznar vs. Garcia, G.R. No. L-16749,
(January 31, 1963)
DOCTRINE
The Doctrine of Renvoi is a legal doctrine which
applies when a court is faced with a conflict of
law and must consider the law of another state,
referred to as private international law rules. This
can apply when considering foreign issues
arising in succession planning and in
administering estates. In this case, the SC found
that as the domicile of the deceased Christensen,
a citizen of California, is the Philippines, the
validity of the provisions of his will depriving his
acknowledged natural child, the appellant,
should be governed by the Philippine Law, the
domicile, pursuant to Art. 946 of the Civil Code
of California, not by the internal law of
California.
FACTS
This case involves an appeal from a decision by
the Court of First Instance of Davao, Philippines,
regarding the estate of Edward E. Christensen.
The court approved the final accounts of the
executor, directing reimbursement to Maria
Lucy Christensen and declaring her entitled to
the residue of the property. Helen Christensen
Garcia opposed this, claiming her legitime as an
acknowledged natural child. The dispute centers
on the interpretation of the deceased's will,
executed in Manila in 1951, which allocated a
specific amount to Helen and the residue to
Maria Lucy. Helen argues that Philippine law
should govern the distribution, considering her
acknowledged status. The lower court, however,
ruled that the law of California, where the
deceased was a citizen, governs the succession
rights. The appeal seeks to challenge this
decision, asserting that the entire law of
California, not just its internal law, should apply.
ISSUE
Whether or not Philippine Laws should be
applied in the instant case.
RULING
Yes, the Philippine Law shall apply in the instant
case. Hence, the case is remanded to the lower
court for the determination of the validity of the
will. A close reading of the California Law on
successional rights reveal that the law has two
aspects: the internal law which applies to
Californians domiciled in California at the time
of their death and the conflict rule for
Californians domiciled outside of California at
the time of their death. Edward Christensen at
the time of his death was undeniably a
US/California citizen domiciled in the
Philippines, hence, the law of his domicile, the
Philippines, must be followed. In coming up with
this ruling, the Supreme Court made use of the
renvoi doctrine: The recognition of the renvoi
theory implies that the rules of the conflict of
laws are to be understood as incorporating not
only the ordinary or internal law of the foreign
state or country, but its rules of the conflict of
laws as well. According to this theory ‘the law of
a country’ means the whole of its law.
40. Mata vs. Agravante, G.R. No. 147597.
(August 6, 2008)
FACTS
The petitioner, Clarissa Mata, filed a complaint
for damages against former security guards
(respondents) who had previously worked for
her security agency. The respondents filed
complaints with the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) and the Philippine National
Police (PNP) alleging non-payment of salaries
and labor law violations. Additionally, they sent
copies of the complaints to various government
offices. Mata claimed that these actions damaged
her agency's reputation, resulting in the loss of
contracts and income. The trial court initially
ruled in favor of Mata, awarding her
P1,000,000.00 in moral damages. However, the
Court of Appeals (CA) later reversed this
decision, dismissing the complaint for lack of
merit. The CA found insufficient evidence to
support Mata's claims, overturning the trial
court's judgment.
ISSUE
WON Court of Appeals committed a serious
reversible error, amounting to grave abuse of
discretion when it reversed and set aside the
decision of the RTC and further concluded that
respondents' act of furnishing copies of their
letter-complaint not only to seven (7) national
agencies but also to petitioner's biggest client,
was not tainted with bad faith and with the sole
motive to malign the good name and reputation
of petitioner.
RULING
No, the CA did not err. The SC agreed with the
respondent court's explanation that the
furnishing copies of letter-complaint to seven (7)
other executive offices of the national
government, the defendants-appellants may not
be said to be motivated simply by the desire to
"unduly prejudice the good name and
reputation" of plaintiff-appellee. Such act was
consistent with and a rational consequence of
seeking justice through legal means for the
alleged abuses defendants-appellants suffered in
the course of their employment with plaintiffappellee. Moreover, no liability could arise from
defendants-appellants' act of filing of the labor
case with the NLRC which plaintiff-appellee
claimed to have resulted in the agency's not
being able to secure contracts because of such
pending labor case, defendants-appellants
merely exercised a right granted to them by our
labor laws. The common element under Articles
19 and 21 is that the act complained of must be
intentional, and attended with malice or bad
faith. The question of whether or not this
principle has been violated, resulting in damages
under Articles 20 and 21, or other applicable
provision of law, depends on the circumstances
of each case. The SC agrees with the appellate
court that in the action of the respondents, there
was no malicious intent to injure the petitioner's
good name and reputation. The respondents
merely wanted to call the attention of
responsible government agencies in order to
secure appropriate action upon an erring private
security agency and obtain redress for their
grievances. So, we reiterate the basic postulate
that in the absence of proof that there was malice
or bad faith on the part of the respondents, no
damages can be awarded.