Supreme Court of the Philippines
388 Phil. 1100
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 135297, June 08, 2000
GAVINO CORPUZ,PETITIONER, VS. SPOUSES GERONIMO GROSPE AND
HILARIA GROSPE, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The sale, transfer or conveyance of land reform rights are, as a rule, void in order
to prevent a circumvention of agrarian reform laws. However, in the present
case, the voluntary surrender or waiver of these rights in favor of the Samahang
Nayon is valid because such action is deemed a legally permissible conveyance in
favor of the government. After the surrender or waiver of said land reform
rights, the Department of Agrarian Reform, which took control of the property,
validly awarded it to private respondents.
The Case
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the May 14, 1998
Decision[1] and the August 19, 1998 Resolution[2] in CA-GR SP No. 47176, in
which the Court of Appeals (CA)[3] dismissed the petitioner's appeal and denied
reconsideration respectively.
The decretal portion of the assailed Decision reads:[4]
"IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Petition is denied due
course and is hereby dismissed. The Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.
With costs against the Petitioner."
The Facts
Petitioner Gavino Corpuz was a farmer-beneficiary under the Operation Land
Transfer (OLT) Program of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR).
Pursuant to Presidential Decree (PD) No. 27, he was issued a Certificate of Land
Transfer (CLT) over two parcels of agricultural land (Lot Nos. 3017 and 012)
with a total area of 3.3 hectares situated in Salungat, Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija.
The lots were formerly owned by a certain Florentino Chioco and registered
under Title No. 126638.
To pay for his wife's hospitalization, petitioner mortgaged the subject land on
January 20, 1982, in favor of Virginia de Leon. When the contract period
expired, he again mortgaged it to Respondent Hilaria Grospe, wife of Geronimo
Grospe, for a period of four years (December 5, 1986 to December 5, 1990) to
guarantee a loan of P32,500. The parties executed a contract denominated as
"Kasunduan Sa Pagpapahiram Ng Lupang Sakahan,"[5] which allowed the
respondents to use or cultivate the land during the duration of the mortgage.
Before the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) in
Cabanatuan City (Region III), petitioner instituted against the respondents an
action for recovery of possession.[6] In his Complaint, he alleged that they had
entered the disputed land by force and intimidation on January 10 and 11, 1991,
and destroyed the palay that he had planted on the land.
Respondents, in their Answer, claimed that the "Kasunduan" between them and
petitioner allowed the former to take over the possession and cultivation of the
property until the latter paid his loan. Instead of paying his loan, petitioner
allegedly executed on June 29, 1989, a "Waiver of Rights"[7]
over the landholding in favor of respondents in consideration of P54,394.
Petitioner denied waiving his rights and interest over the landholding and alleged
that his and his children's signatures appearing on the Waiver were forgeries.
Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) Ernesto P. Tabara ruled that
petitioner abandoned and surrendered the landholding to the Samahang Nayon
of Malaya, Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija, which had passed Resolution Nos. 16
and 27 recommending the reallocation of the said lots to the respondent spouses,
who were the "most qualified farmer[s]-beneficiaries."[8]
The Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB),[9] in a
Decision promulgated on October 8, 1997 in DARAB Case No. 1251, affirmed
the provincial adjudicator's Decision.[10] Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration
was denied in the Resolution dated February 26, 1998.[11] As earlier stated,
petitioner's appeal was denied by the Court of Appeals.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The appellate court ruled that petitioner had abandoned the landholding and
forfeited his right as a beneficiary. It rejected his contention that all deeds
relinquishing possession of the landholding by a beneficiary were unenforceable.
Section 9 of Republic Act (RA) 1199 and Section 28 of RA 6389 allow a tenant
to voluntarily sever his tenancy status by voluntary surrender. The waiver by
petitioner of his rights and his conformity to the Samahang Nayon Resolutions
reallocating the landholding to the respondents are immutable evidence of his
abandonment and voluntary surrender of his rights as beneficiary under the land
reform laws.
Furthermore, petitioner failed to prove with clear and convincing evidence the
alleged forgery of his and his sons' signatures.
Hence, this recourse.[12]
Issues
Feeling aggrieved, the petitioner alleges in his Memorandum that the appellate
court committed these reversible errors:[13]
"I
xxx [I]n relying on the findings of fact of the DARAB and PARAD as conclusive
when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts and the inference
taken is manifestly mistaken.
"II
xxx [I]n disregarding and/or ignoring the claim of petitioner that the alleged
waiver documents are all forgeries.
"III
xxx [I]n ruling that petitioner had forfeited his right to become a beneficiary
under PD No. 27.
"IV
xxx [I]n failing to rule on the legality and/or validity of the waiver/transfer
action."
In short, the focal issues are: (1) Was the appellate court correct in finding that
the signatures of petitioner and his sons on the Waiver were not forged? (2)
Assuming arguendo that the signatures in the Waiver were genuine, was it null and
void for being contrary to agrarian laws? (3) Did the petitioner abandon his
rights as a beneficiary under PD 27? (4) Did he, by voluntary surrender, forfeit
his right as a beneficiary?
The Court's Ruling
The Petition is devoid of merit.
First Issue: Factual Findings
Alleging that an information for estafa through falsification was filed against the
respondents, petitioner insists that his signature on the Waiver was forged.
We are not persuaded. The filing of an information for estafa does not by itself
prove that the respondents forged his signature. It only means that the public
prosecutor found probable cause against the respondents, but such finding does
not constitute binding evidence of forgery or fraud.[14] We agree with the wellreasoned CA ruling on this point:[15]
"xxx We are not swayed by Petitioner's incantations that his signature on the
`Waiver of Rights' is a forgery. In the first place, forgery is never presumed. The
Petitioner is mandated to prove forgery with clear and convincing evidence. The
Petitioner failed to do so. Indeed, the `Waiver of Rights' executed by the
Petitioner was even with the written conformity of his four (4) sons (at page 11,
Rollo). The Petitioner himself signed the Resolution of the Board of Samahang
Nayon of Malaya, Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija, surrendering his possession of the
landholding to the Samahang Nayon, (idem, supra). Under Memorandum Circular
No. 7, dated April 23, 1979 of the Secretary of Agrarian Reform, transactions
involving transfer of rights of possession and or cultivation of agricultural lands
are first investigated by a team leader of the DAR District who then submits the
results of his investigation to the District Officer who, in turn, submits his report
to the Regional Director who, then, acts on said report. In the present recourse,
the requisite investigation was conducted and the report thereon was submitted
to and approved by the Regional Director. Under Section 3(m), Rule 131 of the
Rules of Evidence, public officers are presumed to have performed their duties
regularly and in accordance with law."
As a rule, if the factual findings of the Court of Appeals coincide with those of
the DARAB -- an administrative body which has acquired expertise on the
matter - such findings are accorded respect and will not be disturbed on
appeal.[16] The presence or the absence of forgery was an issue of fact that was
convincingly settled by the agrarian and the appellate tribunals. Petitioner utterly
failed to convince us that the appellate court had misapprehended the facts.
Quite the contrary, its findings were well-supported by the evidence.
Second Issue: Validity of the "Waiver of Rights"
Petitioner insists that agreements purportedly relinquishing possession of
landholdings are invalid for being violative of the agrarian reform laws.
Private respondents contend that petitioner was no longer entitled to recognition
as a farmer-beneficiary because of the series of mortgages he had taken out over
the land. They also cite his "Waiver of Rights" and abandonment of the farm.
We have already ruled that the sale or transfer of rights over a property covered
by a Certificate of Land Transfer is void except when the alienation is made in
favor of the government or through hereditary succession. This ruling is
intended to prevent a reversion to the old feudal system in which the landowners
reacquired vast tracts of land, thus negating the government's program of freeing
the tenant from the bondage of the soil.[17] In Torres v. Ventura,[18] the Court
clearly held:
"xxx As such [the farmer-beneficiary] gained the rights to possess, cultivate and
enjoy the landholding for himself. Those rights over that particular property were
granted by the government to him and to no other. To insure his continued
possession and enjoyment of the property, he could not, under the law, make any
valid form of transfer except to the government or by hereditary succession, to
his successors.
"xxx [T]he then Ministry of Agrarian Reform issued the following Memorandum
Circular [No. 7, Series of 1979, April 23, 1979]:
"`Despite the above prohibition, however, there are reports that many farmerbeneficiaries of PD 27 have transferred the ownership, rights, and/or possession
of their farms/homelots to other persons or have surrendered the same to their
former landowners. All these transactions/surrenders are violative of PD 27 and
therefore, null and void.'"
Third Issue: Abandonment
Based on the invalidity of the Waiver, petitioner concludes that the PARAD, the
DARAB and the CA erroneously ruled on the basis of the said document that he
had abandoned or voluntarily surrendered his landholding. Denying that he
abandoned the land, he contends that the transaction was a simple loan to enable
him to pay the expenses incurred for his wife's hospitalization.
We agree. Abandonment[19] requires (a) a clear and absolute intention to
renounce a right or claim or to desert a right or property; and (b) an external act
by which that intention is expressed or carried into effect.[20] The intention to
abandon implies a departure, with the avowed intent of never returning,
resuming or claiming the right and the interest that have been abandoned.[21]
The CA ruled that abandonment required (a) the tenant's clear intention to sever
the agricultural tenancy relationship; and (b) his failure to work on the
landholding for no valid reason.[22] The CA also deemed the following as
formidable evidence of his intent to sever the tenancy relationship: (a) the
mortgage and (b) his express approval and conformity to the Samahang Nayon
Resolution installing the private respondents as tenants/farmers-beneficiaries of
the landholding. We disagree.
As earlier shown, the Waiver was void. Furthermore, the mortgage expired after
four years. Thus, the private respondents were obligated to return possession of
the landholding to the petitioner. At bottom, we see on the part of the petitioner
no clear, absolute or irrevocable intent to abandon. His surrender of possession
did not amount to an abandonment because there was an obligation on the part
of private respondents to return possession upon full payment of the loan.
Fourth Issue: Voluntary Surrender
Contrary to the finding of the appellate court, the petitioner also denies that he
voluntarily surrendered his landholding.
His contention is untenable. The nullity of the Waiver does not save the case for
him because there is a clear showing that he voluntarily surrendered his
landholding to the Samahang Nayon which, under the present circumstances,
may qualify as a surrender or transfer, to the government, of his rights under the
agrarian laws.
PD 27 provides that title to land acquired pursuant to the land reform program
shall not be transferable except through hereditary succession or to the
government, in accordance with the provisions of existing laws and regulations.
Section 8 of RA 3844 also provides that "[t]he agricultural leasehold relation xxx
shall be extinguished by: xxx (2) [v]oluntary surrender of the landholding by the
agricultural lessee, xxx."
In this case, petitioner's intention to surrender the landholding was clear and
unequivocal. He signed his concurrence to the Samahang Nayon Resolutions
surrendering his possession of the landholding. The Samahan then
recommended to the team leader of the DAR District that the private
respondent be designated farmer-beneficiary of said landholding.
To repeat, the land was surrendered to the government, not transferred to
another private person. It was the government, through the DAR, which
awarded the landholding to the private respondents who were declared as
qualified beneficiaries under the agrarian laws. Voluntary surrender, as a mode of
extinguishment of tenancy relations, does not require court approval as long as it
is convincingly and sufficiently proved by competent evidence.[23]
Petitioner's voluntary surrender to the Samahang Nayon qualifies as a surrender
or transfer to the government because such action forms part of the mechanism
for the disposition and the reallocation of farmholdings of tenant-farmers who
refuse to become beneficiaries of PD 27. Under Memorandum Circular No. 8-80
of the then Ministry of Agrarian Reform, the Samahan shall, upon notice from
the agrarian reform team leader, recommend other tenant-farmers who shall be
substituted to all rights and obligations of the abandoning or surrendering
tenant-farmer. Besides, these cooperatives are established to provide a strong
social and economic organization to ensure that the tenant-farmers will enjoy on
a lasting basis the benefits of agrarian reform.
The cooperatives work in close coordination with DAR officers (regional
directors, district officers, team leaders and field personnel) to attain the goals of
agrarian reform (DAR Memorandum Circular No. 10, Series of 1977). The
Department of Local Government (now the Department of Interior and Local
Government) regulates them through the Bureau of Cooperative Development
(Section 8, PD 175). They also have access to financial assistance through the
Cooperative Development Fund, which is administered by a management
committee composed of the representatives from the DILG, the Central Bank,
the Philippine National Bank, the DAR and the DENR (Section 6, PD 175).
Petitioner insists that his act of allowing another to possess and cultivate his land
did not amount to abandonment or voluntary surrender, as the rights of an OLT
beneficiary are preserved even in case of transfer of legal possession over the
subject property, as held in Coconut Cooperative Marketing Association (Cocoma) v.
Court of Appeals.[24]
We disagree. Petitioner misconstrued the Cocoma ruling because what was
prohibited was the perpetration of the tenancy or leasehold relationship between
the landlord and the farmer-beneficiary. The case did not rule out abandonment
or voluntary surrender by the agricultural tenant or lessee in favor of the
government.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision and
Resolution AFFIRMED insofar as it dismissed petitioner's appeal. Costs against
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, (Chairman), Purisima, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.
Vitug, J., abroad on official business.
[1]
Rollo, pp. 31-36.
[2]
Ibid., p. 37.
Thirteenth Division composed of JJ Romeo J. Callejo Sr. (ponente); Angelina
Sandoval Gutierrez (Division chairman) and Mariano M. Umali (member), both
concurring.
[3]
[4]
CA Decision, p. 6; rollo, p. 36.
Ibid., p. 78.
"KASUNDUAN SA PAGPAPAHIRAM NG LUPANG SAKAHAN
[5]
"PARA SA KALAALAMAN NANG LAHAT:
"Ako si GAVINO A. CORPUZ, may sapat na taong gulang, biyudo at sa
kasalukuyan ay nakatira sa Malaya, Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija ay tumanggap ng
halagang P32,500.00 (Tatlumpu't dalawang libo at limang daang piso) perang
Pilipino ngayong ika 5 ng Disyembre 1986 mula kay Gng. HELARIA F.
GROSPE. Dahil sa pagkatanggap ko ng halagang nabanggit ay binibigyan ko si
Gng. Helaria F. Grospe, may asawa at may bahay ni Ginoong GERONIMO R.
GROSPE ng lubos na karapatan para sakahin ang aking lupa na nagtutukoy ng
mga sumusunod:
Lot
Number Not available
:
Location
Salungat, Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija
:
Existing
Not available
Title :
Land
22,000 sq. m.
Area :
"Na sa kasunduang ito ay may karapatan si Gng. Helaria F. Grospe na gamitin
o sakahin ang aking lupa sa loob ng APAT NA TAON mula sa 5 Disyembre
1986 hanggang Disyembre 5, 1990 at ito ay mapapawalang bisa lamang ayon sa
bagong kasunduan namin. Pagkatapos ng apat na taon ay ibabalik ko rin ang
halagang P32,500.00 (Tatlumpo't dalawang libo at limang daang piso) na aking
nahiram kay Gng. Helaria F. Grospe.
"Na sa kasunduang ito ay isasagawa ngayon sa (illegible) 1986 sa Sto.
Domingo, Nueva Ecija.
(sgd.) GAVINO A. CORPUZ
(sgd.)HELARIA F. GROSPE
(May-ari ng lupa)
(Nagpahiram ng salapi)
SA KAPAHINTULUTAN NG MGA ANAK:
SAKSI:
(sgd.)ANACLETO CORPUZ
(signature illegible)
(sgd.)RAYMUNDO CORPUZ
(sgd.)LOVELITO C. ORA
(sgd.)JIMMY CORPUZ."
[6]
The case was docketed as DARAB Case No. 1286-NE-91.
[7]
Rollo, p. 79.
"WAIVER OF RIGHTS
"KAMI, mga nakalagda sa ibaba nito, pawang may mga sapat na gulang, Pilipino,
at sa kasalukuyan ay pawang naninirahan sa Malaya, Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija,
matapos makapanumpa nang naaayon sa batas ay nagsasalaysay ng mga
sumusunod:
"Na, kami ang mga tagapagmana ng lupang sakahin na dati ay nakatala sa
pangalan ng aming ina/ama/kapatid na si G/Gng. Gabino A. Corpuz na
makikilala (na) Lote Blg. 3017 na may sukat na 2.2830 ektarya humigit kumulang
na dating pag-aari ni Florentino Chioco na matatagpuan sa Malaya, Sto.
Domingo, NE, na napapaloob sa Titulo Blg. 126638.
"Na, bilang tagapagmana ng lupang sakahin na nabanggit sa itaas aming inililipat
ang lahat ng karapatan at pamomosisyon kay GERONIMO R. GROSPE.
"Na, ginawa namin ito upang maisaayos sa Department of Agrarian Reform
(DAR) ang paglilipat ng mga karapatan sa nasabing Lote sa pangala(n) ni
GERONIMO A. GROSPE.
"SA KATUNAYAN NG LAHAT NG ITO, kami ay lumagda sa kasulatang ito
ngayong ika 02 ng Enero 1990, dito sa bayan ng Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija.
PANGALAN AT LAGDA
(Sgd.) Raymundo S. Corpuz
(Sgd.) Jimmy S. Corpuz
(Sgd.) Anacleto S. Corpuz
SEDULA BLG. KINUHA SA
10152182
Sto. Domingo, N.E.
10152183
Sto. Domingo, N.E.
00976119
Sto. Domingo, N.E.
NOONG
11/06/89
11/06/89
03/20/89
CONFORME:
(sgd.) GABINO A. CORPUZ
Sedula Blg......---.....10113264
Kinuha sa.......---.....Sto. Domingo, N.E.
noong............---.....June 22, 1989
x x x...............x x x ...............x x x."
[8]
Rollo, p. 41.
The Board was composed of Secretary Ernesto D. Garilao, chairman; with
Undersecretaries Hector D. Soliman and Artemio A. Adasa Jr.; Assistant
Secretaries Lorenzo R. Reyes, Augusto P. Quijano, Sergio B. Serrano and
Clifford C. Burkley, members.
[9]
[10]
Rollo, p. 52.
[11]
Ibid, p. 59.
This case was deemed submitted for decision upon this Court's receipt of the
Memorandum for the Petitioner on June 14, 1999. Respondents' Memorandum
was received earlier, on May 28, 1999.
[12]
The Petitioner's Memorandum was signed by Atty. Nicolas P. Lapeña Jr. and
the Respondents' Memorandum, by Atty. Jaime P. Batalla.
[13]
Villanueva v. United Coconut Planters Bank, GR No. 138291, March 7, 2000,
p. 14.
[14]
[15]
CA Decision, pp. 3-4; rollo, pp. 33-34.
[16]
Coconut Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 164
SCRA 568, 581, August 19, 1988; Jacinto v. Court of Appeals, 87 SCRA 263, 269,
December 14, 1978; and Domingo v. Court of Agrarian Relations, 4 SCRA 1151,
1156, April 28, 1962.
See Petitioner's Memorandum, p. 12; rollo, p. 106, citing Gloria Cuhinusayan
vda. de Oliver et al. v. Sesinando Cruz et al., SP-116191-CAR, June 22, 1981.
[17]
.....Although Executive Order No. 228, issued on July 17, 1987, allowed the
transfer of ownership of lands acquired by farmer-beneficiary after full payment
of amortization, there is no allegation in this case that the petitioner has fully
amortized his payment.
[18]
187 SCRA 96, 104-105, July 2, 1990, per Gancayco, J.
Administrative Order No. 2, issued March 7, 1994, defined abandonment or
neglect as a "willful failure of the agrarian reform beneficiary, together with his
farm household, to cultivate, till or develop his land to produce any crop, or to
use the land for any specific economic purpose continuously for a period of two
calendar years."
[19]
[20]
Medrana v. Office of the President, 188 SCRA 818, 826, August 21, 1990.
[21]
Partosa-Jo v. Court of Appeals, 216 SCRA 692, 699, December 18, 1992.
[22]
CA Decision, p. 5; rollo, p. 35.
[23]
Talavera v. Court of Appeals, 182 SCRA 778, 782, February 27, 1990.
[24]
164 SCRA 568, 584-585, August 19, 1988.
Supreme Court of the Philippines
247 Phil. 532
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-46281-83, August 19, 1988
COCONUT COOPERATIVE MARKETING ASSOCIATION, INC.
(COCOMA), PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF APPEALS, PEDRO COSICO,
HERMOGENES COSICO AND LUCAS COSICO, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
PADILLA, J.:
Petition to review on certiorari the decision** of the Court of Appeals,
promulgated 19 May 1977, in CA G.R. No. SP-05096-R entitled “Pedro Cosico,
Hermogenes Cosico, and Lucas Cosico, plaintiffs-appellees versus Rosario Vda de Fule, et al.,
defendants, and Coconut Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc. defendants-appellants,”
which affirmed the decision*** of the Court of Agrarian Relations, dated 26
January 1976, in CAR CASE Nos. 2236, 2237 and 2238, finding private
respondents Pedro Cosico and Hermogenes Cosico to be share tenants of the
Coconut landholdings of the petitioner.
The facts of the case:
The owners of the coconut land in question located in Bo. Imok, Calauan,
Laguna, consisting of fifteen (15) hectares, more or less, are the spouses Pedro
Rulloda and Salud Sanchez. Prior to, and including the years 1964 up to 1971,
Rosario Paraiso Vda. de Fule (Fule, hereafter) obtained legal possession of the
land by virtue of a yearly contract of sale (Pakyaw) of all the coconut produce and
other fruits from said land. In 1972, Fule did not renew the contract but spouses
(Pedro Rulloda and Salud Sanchez) executed a similar contract with Eddie A.
Escudero, which was renewed every year until 1975.[1]
During the period to 1964, Fule had utilized the services of Pedro, Hermogenes
and Lucas Cosico as caretakers over four (4) hectares each of the land in
question, paying them for their services in cash, which was equivalent to 1/7 of
the proceeds of the sale of coconuts harvested from the land they each caretook.
As caretakers, the Cosicos would check or visit said plantation to see whether
there was stealing in the plantation, and they would report to her (Fule). They
lived in a place about 2 and 1/2 kms. away from the land in question. They had
no work animals to cultivate the land with; they used bolos to clean and clear the
land by cutting grass and burning them. Private respondents (Cosicos) alleged
that they also planted coconut trees and other permanent trees in the land, for
which they have not allegedly been paid. The tasks of harvesting, gathering,
picking and hauling coconuts were performed by the laborers hired and paid by
Fule or her coconut buyer. And when respondent Pedro Cosico was hired to
gather coconuts in the land, he was paid for his labor. The payment for his labor
was separate from his 1/7 share received as caretaker.[2]
Defendant Fule became a member of the petitioner COCOMA from 1964 to
1972, while Eddie A. Escudero became a member of the same cooperativecorporation from 1972 to 1975. During the time that the land was under contract
with these persons, petitioner COCOMA claims to have acted as their agent in
providing management and marketing services.[3]
Consequently, from 1964 up to 1975, petitioner COCOMA hired allegedly for
and on behalf of Fule and Eddie A. Escudero, the necessary laborers to harvest
and transport the coconut produce from the land. Among these workers were
respondent Pedro and Hermogenes Cosico who were recommendees of Fule,
and who were hired to clean the land of grass, shrubs, dried coconut leaves and
husks. The work done in the land and the expenses incurred therefore were
approved and paid by Fule and Eddie A. Escudero, through petitioner
COCOMA. And all the cleaning and planting expenses were covered with
receipts duly signed by the laborers.[4]
During all the time that petitioner COCOMA was rendering management and
marketing services in the land in question, all the proceeds from the sale of the
coconut produce thereof, less the necessary expenses mentioned above, were
paid and delivered, after every harvest season, to said Fule and Eddie A.
Escudero, respectively, in compliance with the terms of their marketing
agreements with petitioner COCOMA.[5]
On 9 October 1971, or after seven (7) years from 1964 that all the workers had
been receiving their wages as hired workers in said land from Fule and later from
Eddie A. Escudero, through the petitioner COCOMA, the respondents Pedro,
Hermogenes and Lucas, all surnamed Cosico, started to claim to be the tenants
in three (3) separate portions of said landholding, consisting of about four (4)
hectares each, more or less. They instituted individually CAR Cases Nos. 2236,
2237 and 2238 against defendants Rosario Paraiso Vda de Fule and Villa
Escudero Corporation (VESCO). Respondents later amended their complaint in
said cases by including, petitioner COCOMA as defendant.[6]
On 26 January 1976 the Court of Agrarian Relations (CAR) rendered a joint
decision in the three (3) cases, the dispositive part of which is as follows:
WHEREFORE, Judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Declaring plaintiffs Pedro Cosico (CAR CASE No. 2236) and Hermogenes
Cosico (CAR CASE No. 2237), as true and lawful tenants of the Coconut
Marketing Association (COCOMA), its duly authorized representatives,
successors in interest and/or assigns, over four (4) hectares each of coconut land
described in their respective complaints;
2. Declaring, furthermore, plaintiff Hermogenes Cosico as the true and lawful
tenant of defendant COCOMA, its duly authorized representatives, successors in
interest and/or assigns, over that four (4) hectares of coconut land described in
CAR CASE NO. 2238, which is contiguous to that referred to in CAR CASE
No. 2237;
3. Declaring that no tenancy relations exists between defendant COCOMA and
Lucas Cosico, plaintiff in CAR CASE No. 2238;
4. Ordering defendant COCOMA, its representatives, successors in interest
and/or assigns, to immediately reinstate plaintiffs Pedro Cosico and Hermogenes
Cosico to the landholdings mentioned in the next preceeding paragraphs and to
maintain them in peaceful possession and tenancy thereof, on a sharing
arrangement of 70-30 in favor of the defendant COCOMA on the proceeds of
the net harvest until such time as said parties shall have mutually agreed on fixed
rentals;
5. Ordering defendant COCOMA, its representatives, successors in interest
and/or assigns to deliver to plaintiffs Pedro Cosico and Hermogenes Cosico the
amount of P28,994.00 representing the 30% share of the said plaintiffs from the
coconuts harvested from the land in question for the period covering November
12, 1971 up to June 4, 1975;
6. Ordering defendant COCOMA, its representatives, successors in interest
and/or assigns to render an accounting of the harvests of the land for the period
starting June 5, 1975, up to the present and to deposit to the court, the
equivalent of the 30% share of the aforementioned plaintiffs, for delivery to said
plaintiffs;
7. Ordering defendant COCOMA, its representatives, successors in interest
and/or assigns, to pay plaintiffs Pedro Cosico and Hermogenes Cosico the
amount of Four Thousand Pesos (P4,000.00) or Two Thousand Pesos
(P2,000.00) each, as expenses of litigation and other incidental expenses; and
8. Denying the claim for damages of all three defendants;
All other claim and counterclaims are denied for lack of merit.”[7]
On 19 February 1976, petitioner COCOMA appealed the CAR decision to the
Court of Appeals. On 19 May 1977, the Court of Appeals, as earlier stated,
rendered a decision, the dispositive part of which is as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding the decision appealed from to be in accordance with law
and supported by substantial evidence, the same is hereby affirmed in toto without
pronouncement as to costs in this instance.”[8]
Hence, the instant petition of COCOMA.
The four (4) issues raised by the petitioner are: (1) whether or not the private
respondents are share tenants in the coconut land in question; (2) whether or not
private respondent Hermogenes Cosico can be adjudged a share tenant and the
COCOMA ordered the reinstate him in the land involved in CAR Case No. 2238
when Hermogenes Cosico is not even a plaintiff in said Case No. 2238, but one
Lucas Cosico; (3) whether or not COCOMA, contending to be a mere marketing
agent which provides management and marketing services to the members of the
cooperative, can be held directly liable to the private respondents-tenants for
their share in the coconuts harvested; and (4) whether or not the computation of
the alleged shares due the respondents Pedro Cosico and Hermogenes Cosico,
made by the trial court is patently erroneous because the same was based on a
wrong number of coconuts harvested and on conjectured prices.
As to the first issue, petitioner contends that private respondents were merely
caretakers, of Fule and, later, Eddie Escudero, whose task included clearing the
land by cutting grass and burning them to smudge the coconut trees to make
them bear fruits,[9] planting of coconuts, and other fruit bearing trees,[10] and
harvesting, gathering, picking and hauling coconuts,[11] and that, as caretakers,
private respondents were paid separately in cash.[12] Hence, the petitioner would
like this Court to believe that since private respondents were mere caretakers
who were paid in cash for their services, they were therefore, hired laborers, not
share tenants.
Petitioner’s contention is without merit.
In determining the nature of the relationship of the parties in the instant case, it
would be well to review the concept of a share tenant as against that of an
agricultural worker.
Share tenancy or agricultural tenancy is defined as:
“x x x the physical possession by a person of land devoted to agriculture,
belonging to or legally possessed by another for the purpose of production
through the labor of the former and of the members of his immediate farm
household in consideration of which the former agrees to share the harvest with
the latter or to pay a price certain or ascertainable, either in produce or in money
or in both (Section 3, Republic Act 1199, the Agricultural Tenancy Act, as
amended).”
“x x x share tenancy exists whenever two persons agree on a joint undertaking
for agricultural production wherein one party furnishes the land and the other his
labor, with either or both contributing any one or several of the items of
production, the tenant cultivating the land with the aid of labor available from
members of his immediate farm household, and the produce thereof to be
divided between the landholder and the tenant in proportion to their respective
contributions (Sec. 4, RA 1199; Sec. 166(25), RA 3844, Agricultural Land Reform
Code).[13]
On the other hand, the Court has defined an agricultural worker as follows:
“x x x. A ‘farm worker’ is any agricultural wage, salary or piece worker but is not
limited to farm worker of a particular farm employer unless this Code
(Agricultural Land Reform Code, supplied) explicitly states otherwise, and any
individual whose work has ceased as a consequence of, or in connection with, a
current agrarian dispute or an unfair labor practice and who has not obtained a
substantially equivalent and regular employment.’ The term includes ‘farm
laborer and/or farm employer.’ An ‘agricultural worker’ is not a whit different
from a farm worker.
“From the definition of a ‘farm worker’ thus fashioned, it is quite apparent that
there should be an employee-employer relationship between the farm employer
and the farm worker. In determining the existence of an employer-employee
relationship, the elements that are generally considered are the following: (1)
selection and engagement of the employee; (2) the payment of wages; (3) the
power of dismissal; and (4) the employer’s power to control the employee’s
conduct. It is this last element that constitutes the most important index of the
existence of relationship.”[14]
The above-mentioned characteristics of an agricultural worker or farm worker do
not exist in share tenancy.
Further, in one case, the Court compared an agricultural worker with a share
tenant, and set out the following distinctions, among others, between the two:
“x x x. The agricultural laborer works for the farm employer, and for his labor he
receives a salary or wage, regardless of whether the employer makes a profit. On
the other hand, the share tenant participates in the agricultural produce. His
share is necessarily dependent on the amount of the harvest.
“Since the relationship between farm employer and agricultural laborer is that
employer and employee, the decisive factor is the control exercised by the former
over the latter. On the other hand, the landholder has the ‘right to require the
tenant to follow those proven farm practices which have been found to
contribute towards increased agricultural production and to use fertilizer of the
kind or kinds shown by proven farm practices adopted to the requirements of
the land.” This is but the right of a partner to protect his interest, not the control
exercised by an employer. x x x”[15]
The record of this case is bare of evidence to support the conclusion that the
private respondents are mere agricultural workers. Unlike ordinary laborers,
respondents did not observe regular hours of work. They did not work in shifts.
Petitioner COCOMA could not even remember the number of days that private
respondents worked on the land for each agricultural year. While petitioner kept
a record of the full amount paid to respondents for each agricultural season, it
did not keep an accurate record of the actual number of days respondents
reported for work.[16] The petitioner did not lay down regulations under which
respondents were supposed to do their work. Neither did petitioner prescribed
the manner by which the private respondents were to perform their duties as
farmworkers. We do not find that degree of control and supervision essential to
the presence of an employee-employer relationship between petitioner and
respondents and before that, between Fule or Escudero, on the one hand and
respondents, on the other.
Petitioner, in an attempt to support its pretense that private respondents are only
hired laborers, not share tenants, claims that private respondents are mere
caretakers who paid for their services as such, and whose work consists of
clearing and cleaning the land, planting the coconut and other fruit-bearing trees,
and harvesting, gathering, picking and hauling coconuts.
We do not sustain the petitioner’s pretense.
Now well-settled is the rule that cultivation is an important factor in determining
the existence of a share tenancy relationship.[17] As to the meaning of cultivation,
this Court has already held that:
“x x x. The definition of cultivation is not limited merely to the tilling, plowing
or harrowing of the land. It includes the promotion to growth and the care of the
plants, or husbanding the ground to forward the products of the earth by general
industry. The raising of coconuts is a unique agricultural enterprise. Unlike rice,
the planting of coconut seedlings does not need harrowing and plowing. Holes
are merely dug on the ground of sufficient depth and distance, the seedlings
placed in the holes and the surface thereof covered by soil. Some coconut trees
are planted only every thirty to a hundred years. The major work in raising
coconuts begins when the coconut trees are already fruit-bearing. Then it is
cultivated by smudging or smoking the plantation, taking care of the coconut
trees, applying fertilizer, weeding and watering, thereby increasing the produce.
The fact that respondent Benitez, together with his family, handles all phases of
farmwork from clearing the landholding to the processing of copra, although at
times with the aid of hired laborers, thereby cultivating the land, shows that he is
a tenant, not a mere farm laborer.”[18]
It may thus be said that the caretaker of an agricultural land can also be
considered the cultivator of the land.[19]
In Marcelo v. De Leon, plaintiff therein argued that the defendant was not a tenant
inasmuch as the latter did not till or cultivate the land in order to grow the fruitbearing trees because they were already full-grown; that he did not to do the
actual gathering of the fruits but merely supervised the gathering; that after
deducting the expenses, he gave one-half of the fruits to the plaintiff all in
consideration of the land. Ruling in the above-mentioned case, this Court held:
“Anyone who has had fruit trees in his yard, will disagree with the above
description of the relationship. He knows the caretaker must water the trees,
even fertilize them for better production, uproot weeds and turn the soil,
sometimes fumigate to eliminate plant pests, etc. Those chores obviously mean
‘working or cultivating’ the land. Besides, it seems that defendant planted other
crops, (i.e. cultivated the lot) giving the landowner his corresponding share.[20]
Applying the foregoing precedents to the case at bar, and given the kind of work
performed by respondents on the landholding in question, the Court holds that
respondents are share tenants, not hired workers, of the petitioner.
Further supportive of the existence of a share tenancy relationship between
petitioner and respondents is their agreement to share the produce or harvest on
a 1/7 to 6/7 basis in favor of the petitioner COCOMA. Though not a decisive
indication per se of the existence of tenancy relationship, such sharing of the
harvests, taken together with the other factors characteristic of tenancy shown to
be present in the case at bar, strengthens the claim of respondents that, indeed,
they are tenants.
To prove petitioner’s claim that the private respondents are hired workers and
not its tenants, petitioner would rely mainly on the receipts signed by
respondents and other persons tending to show that they were paid by petitioner
for services rendered especially for cutting grass.[21]
This Court cannot re-examine the facts as found by the Court of Appeals, except
for unusual and urgent reasons which however do not exist in this case.
“Whether a person is a tenant or not is basically a question of fact and the
findings of the respondent court and the trial court are, generally, entitled to
respect and non-disturbance.[22]
The conclusion then, anent the first issue, as borne out by the evidence on
record, is that private respondents Pedro and Hermogenes, both surnamed
Cosico, are share tenants of the land in dispute.
On the second issue, petitioner questions the recognition by the trial court and the
Court of Appeals of respondent Hermogenes Cosico as tenant in the
landholding where his co-respondent Lucas Cosico claims to be the tenant, when
the former is not even a party to the separate case filed by the latter and he
(Hermogenes Cosico) did not allege such tenancy in his own amended
complaint. In other words, it is petitioner’s submission that even if respondent
Hermogenes Cosico were to be considered a tenant in the landholding described
in his amended complaint, the court had no legal basis, however, in declaring
him also a tenant of a landholding described and claimed by another person in
another case in which he (Hermogenes) is not a party and which he did not claim
to be a tenant of, in his own complaint.[23]
Petitioner’s contention is without merit.
It should be noted that the three (3) cases filed by the three (3) private
respondents were jointly tried and their common evidence showed that, although
Hermogenes and Lucas Cosico were supposed to have separate holdings, from
1956, of four (4) hectares each, both of them worked the two (2) holdings jointly
in their entirety, but it was only Hermogenes Cosico who received the tenant’s
share from the whole. In other words, it was Hermogenes Cosico who acted as
sole tenant of the two (2) holdings. Hence, the latter’s recognition by the Court
of Agrarian Relations and the Court of Appeals; as the tenant in the holding also
claimed by Lucas Cosico. The facts, therefore, warranted Hermogenes Cosico’s
recognition as the tenant in both landholdings.[24]
In Teodoro vs. Macaraeg, this Court ruled:
“Significantly, the Court of Agrarian Relations is not ‘restricted to the specific
relief claimed or demands made by the parties to the dispute, but may include in
the order or decision any matter or determination which may be deemed
necessary and expedient for the purpose of settling the dispute or preventing
further disputes, provided said matter for determination has been established by
competent evidence during the hearing.’”[25]
Further, R.A. 3844, Section 155, provides;
“SEC. 155. Powers of the Court; Rules of Procedure. x x x
The Courts of Agrarian Relations shall be governed by the Rules of Court:
Provided, That in the hearing, investigation and determination of any question or
controversy pending before them the Courts without impairing substantial rights,
shall not be bound strictly by the technical rules of evidence and procedure,
except in expropriation cases.”
We now move to the third issue.
It is contended by the petitioner COCOMA that it has never been a landholder
of the land in question, since it was, at no time, owner, lessee or sub-lessee of the
land, or buyer of the coconut produce thereof, or usufructuary or legal possessor
of the same, or even an assignee of any right affecting it. Thus, assuming,
without conceding, that respondents Pedro and Hermogenes Cosico are
considered tenants of the land, petitioner COCOMA submits that, being only an
agent of defendants Fule and Escudero, it can not be held liable for the acts of
its principals. Petitioner’s contention is not in accordance with applicable laws,
because-
“A landholder shall mean a person, natural or juridical. Who, either as owner,
lessee, usufructuary, or legal possessor lets or grants to another the use or
cultivation of his land for a consideration either in shares under the tenancy
system, or a price certain or ascertainable under the leasehold system.”[26]
In accordance with the above provision, petitioner COCOMA is the landholder
of the subject landholdings for (a) it is “juridical person” being a domestic
corporation established under the laws of the Philippines; (b) it is the “legal
possessor” of the land for it has the sole management and administration
thereof,[27] (c) it has authorized or retained the private respondents to cultivate
the land; and (d) it has shared the harvest with the latter, albeit unlawfully,
making it appear that they are laborers instead of tenants.[28]
Petitioner, being a landholder, as defined by law, is therefore subject to the
rights, obligations, and limitations provided for under the agrarian laws.
There is also no question that, in this case, there was a transfer of the legal
possession of the land from one landholder to another (Fule to petitioner
COCOMA). In connection therewith, Republic Act 3844, Sec. 10 states:
Sec. 10. Agricultural Leasehold Relation Not Extinguished by Expiration of
Period, etc.-The agricultural leasehold relation under this Code shall not be
extinguished by mere expiration of the term or period in a leasehold contract nor
by the sale, alienation or transfer of the legal possession of the landholding. In
case the agricultural lessor sells, alienates or transfers the legal possession of the
landholdings, the purchaser or transferee thereof shall be subrogated to the
rights and substituted to the obligations of the agricultural lessor.”
Further, in several cases, this Court sustained the preservation of the landholdertenant relationship, in cases of transfer of legal possession:
“x x x in case of transfer or in case of lease, as in the instant case, the tenancy
relationship between the landowner and his tenant should be preserved in order
to insure the well-being of the tenant or protect him from being unjustly
dispossessed by the transferee or purchaser of the land; in other words, the
purpose of the law in question is to maintain the tenants in the peaceful
possession and cultivation of the land or afford them protection against
unjustified dismissal from their holdings.” (Primero v. CAR, 101 Phil. 675);
“It is our considered judgment, since the return by the lessee of the leased
property to the lessor upon the expiration of the contract involves also a transfer
of legal possession, and taking into account the manifest intent of the lawmaking
body in amending the law, i.e., to provide the tenant with security of tenure in all
cases of transfer of legal possession, that the instant case falls within and is
governed by the provisions of Section 9 of Republic Act 1199, as amended by
Republic Act 2263.” (Joya v. Pareja, 106 Phil. 645)
“x x x that the tenant may proceed against the transferee of the land to enforce
obligation incurred by the former landholder in relation to said land, for the
reason that ‘such obligation. . . falls upon the assignee or transferee or the land’
pursuant to Sec. 9 abovementioned. Since respondents are in turn free to
proceed against the former landholder for reimbursement, it is not iniquitous to
hold them responsible to the tenant for said obligations. Moreover, it is the
purpose of Republic Act 119, particularly Sec. 9 thereof, to insure that the right
of the tenant to receive his lawful share of the produce of the land is
unhampered by the transfer of said land from one landholder to another.”
(Almarinez v. Potenciano, 120 Phil. 1154.)
Therefore, petitioner being a landholder, can be held liable t006F private
respondents for their shares in the coconuts harvested from the land in question.
As to the fourth issue, i.e., that the computation of the private respondents’ thirty
percent (30%) share in the harvest from 1971 to 1975, made by the Court of
Agrarian Relations and affirmed by the Court of Appeals, is erroneous, this
Court finds no compelling reason to depart from such computation, as it is a part
of the findings of fact and conclusions drawn therefrom by the respondent
appellate court. Such findings and conclusions should not be disturbed on
appeal, in the absence of proof that they are unfounded or were arbitrarily
arrived at or that the Court of Appeals had failed to consider important evidence
to the contrary.
In Bagsican v. Court of Appeals, it was held that:
“x x x in agrarian cases, all that is required is mere substantial evidence.
“xxx
xxx
xxx
“Under this rule, all that the appellate court has to do, insofar as the evidence is
concerned, is to find out if the decision is supported by substantial evidence. SO
much so that the findings of fact of the Court of Agrarian Relations, if supported
by such evidence, are conclusive on the appellate tribunal.”[29]
The respondent appellate court, in the case at bar, acted correctly when it ruled:
“On the whole, we are not at liberty to reverse the foregoing findings of fact of
the Agrarian Court in the absence of any proof that are unfounded or where
arbitrarily arrived at or that the court had failed to consider important evidence
to the contrary. It is well-established that so long as the findings of fact of the
Agrarian Court attain the minimum, evidentiary support demanded by law, that
is, supported by substantial evidence, such findings cannot be reversed by the
appellate tribunals. In the present case, We do not find any cogent reason to
adopt a conclusion different from that reached by the court a quo.[30]
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision appealed from is
AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, (Chairman), Paras, and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.
Penned by Justice Emilio A. Gancayco with the concurrence of Justices
Venancio Escolin and Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr.
**
***
Penned by Judge Alberto A. Reyes.
[1]
Rollo at 7-10.
[2]
Id., at 71.
[3]
Id. at 8.
[4]
Id. at 71.
[5]
Ibid.
[6]
Ibid.
[7]
Court of Agrarian Relations Decision, January 26, 1976; Rollo, pp. 23-24.
[8]
Court of Appeals Decision, May 19, 1977, p. 8; Rollo, p. 29.
[9]
Brief for Petitioner, p. 18.
[10]
Ibid.
[11]
Ibid., p. 11.
[12]
Ibid., p. 18.
Manuel Guerrero vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-44570, May 30, 1986, 142
SCRA 136.
[13]
De Los Reyes vs. Espineli, G.R. No. L-28280-81, November 28, 1969, 30
SCRA 574.
[14]
[15]
Ibid.
[16]
T.s.n., July 31, 1974, pp. 93-106.
[17]
Guerrero v. Court of Appeals, supra.
[18]
Ibid.
[19]
Latag v. Banog, G.R. No. 20098, January 31, 1966, 16 SCRA 88.
[20]
105 Phil. 1175, G.R. No. L-12902, July 29, 1959.
[21]
Exh. “9” to “9www”.
[22]
Guerrero vs. Court of Appeals, supra.
[23]
Rollo at 57.
[24]
Ibid.
[25]
27 SCRA 7, G.R. No. L-20700, February 27, 1969.
[26]
Sec. 5(b) of RA 1199.
[27]
t.s.n. of July 31, 1974, pp. 110-111, inter alia.
[28]
Court of Agrarian Relations Decision, pp. 10-12.
[29]
141 SCRA 226, G.R. No. 62255, January 30, 1986.
[30]
Court of Appeals Decision, p. 8, Rollo at 29.