THE CONTENTS OF THIS DOCUMENT ARE PROPRIETARY AND CONFIDENTIAL.
ADNOC GROUP PROJECTS &
ENGINEERING
FIRE & GAS DETECTION AND FIRE
PROTECTION SYSTEM PHILOSOPHY
PHILOSOPHY
APPROVED BY:
Abdulmunim Saif Al Kindy
NAME: Abdulmunim Al Kindy
TITLE: Executive Director PT&CS
EFFECTIVE DATE:
AGES-PH-03-002
GROUP PROJECTS & ENGINEERING FUNCTION/ PT&CS DIRECTORATE
CUSTODIAN
Group Projects & Engineering / PT&CS
DISTRIBUTION
Specification applicable to ADNOC & ADNOC Group Companies
REVISION HISTORY
DATE
1 June 2020
REVIEWED BY
(Designation/
Initial)
ENDORSED BY
(Designation /
NO
PREPARED BY
(Designation/
Initial)
Initial)
ENDORSED BY
(Designation /
Initial)
1
Rajeevan K
Ashwani Kumar
Kataria/ A/MES,TCEng.
Abdulla Al
Shaiba/VP-GPE
Zaher Salem/
SVP-GPE
REV.
Maroli/ Eng. HSE
Rajeeva
n Maroli
Digitally signed by
Rajeevan Maroli
Date: 2020.06.24
15:34:37 +04'00'
Zaher
Salem
Digitally signed by
Ashwani Kumar Kataria
DN: cn=Ashwani Kumar
Kataria, o=ADNOC
Onshore, ou=ADNOC
Onshore,
email=akataria@adnoc.a
e, c=AE
Date: 2020.06.24
16:54:35 +04'00'
Reuben
Yagambaram/ SPMGPE
Reuben
Yagam
baram
Digitally signed by Reuben
Yagambaram
DN: cn=Reuben
Yagambaram, o=ADNOC
HQ, ou=ADNOC GPE,
email=ryagambaram@adno
c.ae, c=AE
Date: 2020.06.24 17:14:00
+04'00'
Adobe Acrobat version:
2017.008.30051
Digitally signed by
Abdulla Al Shaiba
Date: 2020.06.24
22:55:56 +04'00'
Digitally signed
by Zaher Salem
Date: 2020.06.30
10:59:56 +04'00'
The Group Projects & Engineering Function is the owner of this Specification and responsible for its custody,
maintenance and periodic update.
In addition, Group Projects & Engineering Function is responsible for communication and distribution of any
changes to this specification and its version control.
This document will be reviewed and updated in case of any changes affecting the activities described in this
document.
AGES-PH-03-002
Rev. No: 1
Page 2 of 3
INTER-RELATIONSHIPS AND STAKEHOLDERS
1.1
The following are inter-relationships for implementation of this Specification:
(a)
ADNOC Upstream and ADNOC Downstream Directorates; and
(b)
ADNOC Onshore, ADNOC Offshore, ADNOC Sour Gas, ADNOG Gas Processing. ADNOC LNG,
ADNOC Refining, ADNOC Fertilisers, Borouge, Al Dhafra Petroleum, Al Yasat
1.2
The following are stakeholders for the purpose of this Specification:
(a)
ADNOC PT&CS Directorate
1.3
This Specification has been approved by the ADNOC PT&CS is to be implemented by each ADNOC
Group company included above subject to and in accordance with their Delegation of Authority and
other governance-related processes in order to ensure compliance.
1.4
Each ADNOC Group company must establish/nominate a Technical Authority responsible for
compliance with this Specification.
Definitions:
‘ADNOC’ means Abu Dhabi National Oil Company.
‘ADNOC Group’ means ADNOC together with each company in which ADNOC, directly or indirectly, controls
fifty percent (50%) or more of the share capital.
‘Approving Authority’ means the decision-making body or employee with the required authority to approve
Policies and Procedures or any changes to it.
‘Business Line Directorates’ or ‘BLD’ means a directorate of ADNOC which is responsible for one or more
Group Companies reporting to, or operating within the same line of business as, such directorate.
‘Business Support Directorates and Functions’ or ‘Non- BLD’ means all the ADNOC functions and the
remaining directorates, which are not ADNOC Business Line Directorates.
‘CEO’ means chief executive officer.
‘Group Company’ means any company within the ADNOC Group other than ADNOC.
‘Standard’ means normative references listed in this specification.
‘COMPANY’ means ‘Abu Dhabi National Oil Company or any of its group companies. It may also include an
agent or consultant authorized to act for, and on behalf of the COMPANY’.
‘CONTRACTOR’ means the party which carries out the project management, design, engineering,
procurement, construction, commissioning for ADNOC projects.
‘SHALL’ Indicates mandatory requirements “Group Company” means any company within the ADNOC
Group other than ADNOC.
CONTROLLED INTRANET COPY
The intranet copy of this document [located in the section under Group Policies on One ADNOC] is the only
controlled document. Copies or extracts of this document, which have been downloaded from the intranet,
are uncontrolled copies and cannot be guaranteed to be the latest version.
AGES-PH-03-002
Rev. No: 1
Page 3 of 3
ADNOC GROUP PROJECTS &
ENGINEERING
FIRE & GAS DETECTION AND
FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM
PHILOSOPHY
PART 1 - GENERAL
AGES-PH-03-002
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................... 3
2
SCOPE .............................................................................................................................................. 3
3
DEFINED TERMS / ABBREVIATIONS / REFERENCES ................................................................ 4
4
ADNOC REFERENCES .................................................................................................................... 9
5
INDUSTRY REFERENCES............................................................................................................. 11
6
DOCUMENTS PRECEDENCE ....................................................................................................... 18
7
DEVIATION /CONCESSION CONTROL ........................................................................................ 18
8
HIGH-LEVEL TECHNICAL APPROACH ....................................................................................... 19
FIRE CLASSIFICATION – CORRELATION BETWEEN STANDARDS .......................... 29
AGES-PH-03-002 (Part-1)
Rev. No: 01
Page 2 of 31
1
INTRODUCTION
This Standard covers the design of Fire & Gas Detection and Fire Protection Systems involving all COMPANY
Projects and upgrade of existing facilities. It addresses the following measures:



Fire and Gas (F&G) Detection
Passive Fire Protection
Active Fire Protection
The Standard applies to both, greenfield and brownfield projects and shall be implemented taking account of
integration requirements with any existing COMPANY operational, maintenance and spares holding practices.
A prerequisite to the application of this Standard will therefore require clarity on the following elements:



Project Health, Safety and Environmental (HSE) Philosophy
Project Basis of Design
Operations & Maintenance Philosophy
These elements help define the philosophical approach to Major Accident Hazard (MAH) management in
terms of detection, control, mitigation and Emergency Response (ER) requirements. Clarity on these aspects
in terms of manual, remote manual or automatic action, will have a major bearing on the design of the ‘Fire
& Gas Detection and Fire Protection’ arrangements.
This Standard is not retrospective but can be used, so far as practicable, to reduce risk on existing plant.
2
SCOPE
2.1
Inclusions
The scope of this document covers all COMPANY Business areas (apart from the exclusions stated below).





Upstream Oil and or Gas production facilities; ONSHORE facilities, OFFSHORE installations and
Artificial Islands;
Downstream (Gas Processing, Refinery, LNG);
Petrochemical (Fertiliser and Polyolefins plants);
Distribution Terminals including outlets (Bulk Storage, Loading bays);
Industrial Gases.
This Standard applies to Brownfield Projects (Subject to feasibility of integration with existing facilities).
Brownfield is defined as new permanent facilities that are to be erected inside the boundary (or control) of an
existing operating facility. These include permanent modifications and facility expansions.
The philosophy may be used to determine the requirements for building protection against an incident
involving the process / utility areas, including if such a unit is within a building, but the requirements within a
building should be determined by Abu Dhabi Building Codes and UAE Fire code.
2.2
Exclusions


All drilling facilities
Temporary modifications at existing operating facilities
AGES-PH-03-002 (Part-1)
Rev. No: 01
Page 3 of 31


Buildings design
Dust / hazards from handling solids (to be managed as special cases).
3
DEFINED TERMS / ABBREVIATIONS / REFERENCES
3.1
General Terminology
General Terminology
BROWNFIELD
Development within the boundary (or control) of an existing
operating facility.
CAN (possibility and capability)
Conveys the ability, fitness or quality necessary to do or achieve a
specific thing.
CONSULTANT
The party that performs specific services, which may include but are
not limited to, Engineering, Technical support, preparation of
Technical reports and other advisory related services specified by
the party that engages them, i.e. COMPANY, CONTRACTOR or its
Subcontractors.
CONTRACTOR
The party which carries out the project management, design,
engineering, procurement, construction, commissioning for
COMPANY projects.
GREENFIELD
Development outside the boundary (and control) of an existing
operating facility or a new operating / processing facility
development in new or existing allotted area of the COMPANY.
LICENSOR
Provider of Licensed Technology
MANUFACTURER/VENDOR/
The party which manufactures and/or supplies equipment, technical
documents/drawings and services to perform the duties specified by
the COMPANY/CONTRACTOR.
SUPPLIER
MAY (permission)
The word indicates a permitted option. It conveys consent or liberty
to do something.
SHALL
Indicates a requirement
SHOULD (recommendation)
Indicates a recommendation.
STANDARD
Means this Fire & Gas Detection and Fire Protection System
Philosophy
SUB-VENDOR
Any supplier of equipment and support services for an
equipment/package or part thereof supplied by a VENDOR.
AGES-PH-03-002 (Part-1)
Rev. No: 01
Page 4 of 31
3.2
Facility Terminology
Facility Terminology
Building
Any structure used or intended for supporting or sheltering any use or occupancy.
Onshore: Any building that falls within the design requirements of the UAE Fire
and Life Code. Offshore: Occupied enclosures shall be designed to SOLAS
requirements.
Equipment
The individual items, e.g. heat exchangers, pressure vessels, etc. that make up a
process section.
Facility
Process and utility plants, tanks, buildings, marine structures, pipe racks and roads
located within a site boundary. For example, a refinery, chemical plant, storage
terminal, distribution centre, or corporate office.
Plant
A collection of units which normally operate together to produce specific products.
A process plant typically has roads on all sides and all of the processing
equipment within that are intended to be shut down during a maintenance
turnaround. For example, a Cat Cracker could have various units’ regeneration,
reaction, fractionation, gas plant) but this is considered to be one process plant.
Areas that transfer or store product are not process plants, however they are part
of process area.
Plot
Area of the site where units are grouped (e.g., refinery crude distillation unit,
chemical plant, or storage terminal is located).
Process Section
An area / part of a unit within a process unit containing a combination of
processing equipment that is focused on a single operation. This includes
Individual isolatable part of a unit /system (e.g. Feed Pre-treatment).
Process Unit
A process unit is a collection of Equipment within a Plant focused on a single
operation, arranged to perform a defined function. A process unit enables the
execution of a physical, chemical and/or transport process, or storage of process
material. This includes, plant area with a distinct physical process area /process
train, e.g. separation unit, crude distillation unit, crude treatment unit water
treatment unit, polyethylene unit. etc.
3.3
Technical Terminology
Technical Terminology
Building /
Enclosure
Any structure used or intended for supporting or sheltering any use or occupancy of
people.
Environment
Surroundings in which an organisation operates, including air, water, land, natural
resources, flora, fauna, humans and their interrelationships. Surroundings can extend
from within an organisation to the local, regional and global systems.
Environmental
Aspect
An element of an organisation’s activities or products or services that interacts or can
interact with the environment.
AGES-PH-03-002 (Part-1)
Rev. No: 01
Page 5 of 31
Technical Terminology
Environmental
Impact
Change to the environment, whether adverse or beneficial, wholly or partially resulting
from an organisation’s environmental aspects.
Escalation
Increase in severity of consequences due to failure of preventative barriers or
mitigation measures.
Fire Detection
Zone (FDZ,
same F&G
Zone)
A geographical area defined to identify the location of a fire or hazardous leak from
containment so that Emergency Response measures can be initiated and targeted.
Fire Zone
Fire zones are areas of the plant sub-divided based on the potential for fire &
explosion hazard to cause escalation, as assessed by the consequence and risk
modelling.
The partition into fire zones is such that the consequence of fire or an explosion
corresponding to the reasonably worst event likely to occur in the concerned fire zone
shall not impact other fire zones to an extent where their integrity could be put at risk.
The partition of the fire zone is intended to limit the consequence (escalation) of
credible events but is not intended to avoid the occurrence of the credible events.
(Ref. HSE-GA-ST07, HSE Design Philosophy)
Flash Point
The minimum temperature of a liquid at which sufficient vapor is given off to form an
ignitable mixture with the air, near the surface of the liquid or within the vessel used,
as determined by the appropriate test procedure and apparatus (NFPA 30)
Hazard
The potential to cause harm, including ill health and injury, damage to property,
products or the environment; production losses or increased liabilities
(HSE-RM-ST01, HSE Risk Management)
Hazardous Area
An area in which a flammable atmosphere is or may be expected to be present in
quantities such as to require special precautions for the control of potential ignition
sources.
Ignition Source
Source of temperature and energy sufficient to initiate combustion
[API]
Inherently Safer
A condition in which the hazards associated with the materials and operations used in
the process have been reduced or eliminated, and this reduction or elimination is
permanent and inseparable from the process.
Manned facility
Installation on which people are routinely accommodated (Ref. ISO13702)
An offshore platform on which at least one person occupies an accommodation space
i.e. living quarters. (API RP 14G [Ref.7] definition) In addition, personnel are present
for more than 2 hours a day or more than 10% of time.
Muster area
A designated place where personnel can muster and survive the initial effects of any
incident (minor / major) until normalcy or safe evacuation.
AGES-PH-03-002 (Part-1)
Rev. No: 01
Page 6 of 31
Technical Terminology
Non-Hazardous
Area
All areas not classified as hazardous under normal operations.
Offshore
Installation
A buoyant or non-buoyant construction engaged in offshore operations including
drilling, production, storage or support functions, and which is designed and intended
for use at a location for an extended period. [DNV]
Risk
Risk is the product of the measure of the likelihood of occurrence of an undesired
event and the potential adverse consequences which the event may have upon:
 Health and Safety of People – fatality, injury, irreversible health impact or chronic
ill health or harm to physical or psychological health.
 Environment - water, air, soil, animals, plants and social Reputation - employees
and third parties. This includes the liabilities arising from injuries and property
damage to third parties including the cross liabilities that may arise between the
interdependent ADNOC Group Companies.
 Financial - damage to property (assets) or loss of production
 Legal - Legal impacts due to breach of law, breach of contract etc.
Risk = Severity (Consequence) x Likelihood (Frequency)
Refer to ADNOC Corporate Risk Matrix for more information
Risk Overlap
A situation where risk is imposed from more than one separate location or scenario
Unmanned
facility
Any facility that is not classed as ‘Manned’ (see definition above)
Utility
An energy or services supplier, including electricity, instrument air, steam or heating
medium, fuels (oil, gas, etc.), refrigeration, cooling water or cooling medium, or inert
gases.
3.4
Acronyms & Abbreviations
Acronyms & Abbreviations
ADIBC
Abu Dhabi International Building Code
AFP
Active Fire Protection
API
American Petroleum Institute
CCR
Central Control Room
EI
Energy Institute
ESDV
Emergency Shutdown Valve
AGES-PH-03-002 (Part-1)
Rev. No: 01
Page 7 of 31
Acronyms & Abbreviations
F&G
Fire and Gas
FDZ
Fire & Gas Detection Zone
FPrZ
Fire Protection Zone
H2S
Hydrogen Sulphide
HSE
Health, Safety & Environment
HVAC
Heating, Ventilation & Air Conditioning
LNG
Liquefied Natural Gas
LPG
Liquefied Petroleum Gas
MEL
Master Equipment List
NA
Not Applicable
NFPA
National Fire Prevention Association
PFP
Passive Fire Protection
PP
Plot Plan
SGR
Switchgear Room
TEMPSC
Totally Enclosed Motor Propelled Survival Craft
AGES-PH-03-002 (Part-1)
Rev. No: 01
Page 8 of 31
4
ADNOC REFERENCES
4.1
ADNOC Standards
Ref
No
Document No
Title
1.
AGES-PH-03-001
Emergency Shutdown and Depressurisation System Philosophy
2.
AGES-PH-03-002
Fire & Gas Detection and Fire Protection System Philosophy
3.
AGES-SP-09-001
Piping Design Basis
4.
HSE-EN-ST01
Environmental Impact Assessment
5.
HSE-EN-ST02
Pollution Prevention and Control
6.
HSE-EN-ST03
Energy Management Systems
7.
HSE-EN-ST04
Waste Management
8.
HSE-EN-ST05
Environmental Performance Monitoring
9.
HSE-EN-ST06
Biodiversity Protection
10.
HSE-EN-ST07
Air Dispersion Modelling Techniques (TBC)
11.
HSE-GA-ST01
HSE Governance Framework
12.
HSE-GA-ST02
HSE Management System Manual
13.
HSE-GA-ST03
Critical HSE Roles & Competence
14.
HSE-GA-ST04
Incident Notification, Reporting & Investigation
15.
HSE-GA-ST05
Contractor HSE Management
16.
HSE-GA-ST06
Project HSE Plans
17.
HSE-GA-ST07
HSE Design Philosophy
18.
HSE-GA-ST08
HSE Performance Monitoring & Reporting
19.
HSE-GA-ST09
HSE Audit and Assurance
20.
HSE-GA-ST11
Life Saving Rules
21.
HSE-OS-ST21
Management of H2S
HSE-OS-ST29
HSECES Management.
22.
HSE-OS-ST30
Management of Technical Changes
23.
HSE-RM-ST01
HSE Risk Management System
24.
HSE-RM-ST02
HSE Impact Assessment (HSEIA)
AGES-PH-03-002 (Part-1)
Rev. No: 01
Page 9 of 31
Ref
No
Document No
Title
25.
HSE-RM-ST03
HAZID ENVID OHID
26.
HSE-RM-ST04
Hazard & Operability Study (HAZOP)
27.
HSE-RM-ST05
SIL Determination
28.
HSE-RM-ST06
Control of major accident Hazards (COMAH)
29.
HSE-RM-ST07
Escape, Evacuation and Rescue Assessment (EERA)
30.
HSE-RM-ST08
Emergency System Survivability Assessment (ESSA)
31.
HSE-RM-ST09
Fire and ExplosionRisk Assessment (FERA)
32.
HSE-RM-ST10
Quantified Risk Assessment (QRA)
33.
HSE-RM-ST11
Project HSE Review (PHSSER)
34.
HSE-RM-ST12
Pre-Startup Safety Review (PSSR)
35.
HSE-RM-ST13
Inherently Safer Design
36.
HSE-RM-ST14
CFD Dispersion & Explosion Modelling
37.
HSE-CE-ST01
Emergency Response and Crisis Management
38.
HSE-CE-ST02
Oil Spill Response
39.
HSE-CE-ST03
Fire and Rescue Operations
AGES-PH-03-002 (Part-1)
Rev. No: 01
Page 10 of 31
5
INDUSTRY REFERENCES
Ref
No
40.
Document No
Title
41.
ADIBC
Abu Dhabi International Building Code.
42.
API 14 C
Analysis, Design, Installation, and Testing of Safety Systems for Offshore
Production Facilities
43.
API 14 F
Recommended Practice for Design and Installation of Electrical Systems
for Offshore Production Platforms
44.
API 14 G
Recommended Practice for Fire Prevention and Control on Open Type
Offshore Production Platforms
45.
API 14 J
Recommended Practice for Design and Hazards Analysis for Offshore
Production Facilities
46.
API 2160
Design, construction, operation, maintenance, and inspection of chemical
and tank facilities
47.
API 2218
Fireproofing Practices in Petroleum and Petrochemical Processing Plants
48.
API 2510 A
Fire-Protection Considerations for the Design and Operation of
Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) Storage Facilities
49.
API 2510 and API
2510A
Design and Construction of LPG Installations
50.
API 607
Fire Test for Quarter-turn Valves and Valves Equipped with Non-metallic
Seats
51.
API 6FA
Standard for Fire Test for Valves (For Wellhead and Tree Equipment 6A
and Pipeline and Piping Valves 6D)
52.
API 6FB
Standard for Fire Test for End Connectors
53.
API B3:B4655
Recommended Practices for Oil and Gas Producing and Gas Processing
Plant Operations Involving Hydrogen Sulphide
54.
API RP 2001
Fire Protection at Refineries
55.
API RP 2021
Management of Atmospheric Storage Tank Fires
56.
API RP 2030
Application of fixed Water Spray Systems for Fire Protection in the
Petroleum and Petrochemical Industries, 4th Edition, September 2014)
57.
API RP 650
Welded Tanks for Oil Storage
58.
API RP 752
Management of Hazards Associated with Location of Process Plant
Permanent Buildings
UAE Fire & Life Safety Code
AGES-PH-03-002 (Part-1)
Rev. No: 01
Page 11 of 31
Ref
No
59.
Document No
Title
ASCE 7 -16
Appendix-E Performance Based Design Procedures for Fire Effects on
Structures” of “ASCE 7 -16 Minimum Design Loads and Associated
Criteria for Buildings and Other Structures
60.
ASME B31.3
Process Piping
61.
ASTM E 1002
Standard Test Method for Leaks
62.
ASTM E-1529
Standard Test Methods for Determining Effects of Large Hydrocarbon Pool
Fires on Structural Members and Assemblies
63.
BS 1635
Graphical Symbols and Abbreviations Standard
64.
BS 476-20
Fire tests on building materials and structures. Methods for determination
of the fire resistance of elements of construction (general principles).
65.
BS 6266
Fire protection for electronic equipment installations. Code of practice
66.
BS 7273
Code of practice for the operation of fire protection measures.
67.
BS EN 13565-1
Fixed firefighting systems. Foam systems. Part 1: Requirements and test
methods for components
68.
BS-6266
Fire protection for electronic equipment installations. Code of practice.
69.
CAAP 70
Heliports - Issue 3
70.
CAAP 71
UAE Civil aviation advisory publication CAAP 71 helidecks (off-shore)
71.
CAP 437
Standards for offshore helicopter landing areas
72.
EEMUA 147
Recommendations for refrigerated liquefied gas storage tanks, Ed. 3
73.
EH40
UK HSE EH40/2005 Workplace exposure limits
74.
EI 15
75.
EI 19
Model code of safe practice Part 15: Area classification for installations
handling flammable fluids
EI Model Code of Safe Practice, Part 19,: Fire Precautions at Petroleum
Refineries and Bulk Storage Installations
76.
EI 9
Large bulk pressure storage and refrigerated LPG,
77.
EN 1363 -1
Fire resistance tests. General requirement
78.
EN 1363 -2
Fire resistance tests. Alternative and additional procedures,
79.
EN 1992-1-2
Eurocode-2
Design of Concrete Structures General Rules – Structural Fire Design
80.
EN 1993-1-2
Eurocode-3
Design of Steel Structures General Rules – Structural Fire Design
AGES-PH-03-002 (Part-1)
Rev. No: 01
Page 12 of 31
Ref
No
81.
Document No
Title
EN 1994-1-2
Eurocode-4
Design of composite and concrete structures. General Rules-Structural
Fire Design.
82.
EN 476 - various parts Fire tests on building materials and structures.
83.
EN 50270
Electromagnetic compatibility. Electrical apparatus for the detection and
measurement of combustible gases, toxic gases or oxygen
84.
EN 54-20
Fire detection and fire alarm systems. Aspirating smoke detectors
85.
EN_ISO_13702_2015
Petroleum and natural gas industries — Control and mitigation of fires and
explosions on offshore production installations — Requirements and
guidelines
86.
EN_ISO_834
Fire Resistance Tests - Elements of Building Construction
87.
FM -7400
Liquid and Gas Safety Shutoff Valves, 2016
88.
FM -7440
Firesafe Valves, 1981
89.
FM3260
Radiant Energy-Sensing Fire Detectors for Automatic Fire Alarm Signalling
90.
HSE Offshore
Information Sheet No.
12/2007
Advice on acceptance criteria for damaged Passive Fire Protection (PFP)
Coatings, 2007
91.
HSE UK OTI 99 028
Review of Approached to Blast, Fire and Accidental Loads
92.
HSE UK OTO 2000
051
Offshore Technology Report – Review of the Response of Pressurised
Process Vessels and Equipment to Fire Attack
93.
HSE UK UKOOA
Fire and Explosion Guidance, Part 2: Avoidance and Mitigation of Fires
94.
IBC
International Building Code
95.
IEC 60079-10
Classification of areas - Explosive gas atmospheres
96.
IEC 60331
Flame resistant
97.
IEC 60331-1
Tests for electric cables under fire conditions - Circuit integrity - Part 1:
Test method for fire with shock at a temperature of at least 830 °C for
cables of rated voltage up to and including 0,6/1,0 kV and with an overall
diameter exceeding 20 mm
98.
IEC 60331-21
Tests for electric cables under fire conditions - Circuit integrity - Part 21:
Procedures and requirements - Cables of rated voltage up to and including
0,6/1,0 kV
99.
IEC 60331-23
Tests for Electric Cables under Fire Conditions - Circuit Integrity - Part 23:
Procedures and Requirements - Electric Data Cables - Edition 1
AGES-PH-03-002 (Part-1)
Rev. No: 01
Page 13 of 31
Ref Document No
No
100. IEC 60331-25
Title
101. IEC 60332
Flame retardant
102. IEC 60529
Ingress Protection Marking
103. IEC 61508
Functional Safety of Electrical/Electronic/Programmable Electronic Safetyrelated Systems (E/E/PE, or E/E/PES)
104. IEC 61511
Functional safety - Safety instrumented systems for the process industry
sector - Part 1: Framework, definitions, system, hardware and application
programming requirements
105. Interim Guidance
Notes (IGN)
Interim Guidance Notes for the Design and Protection of Topside
Structures against Explosion and Fire
106. ISBN 1859420788
Blast and Fire Engineering for Topside Structures - Phase 2: Final
Summary Report
107. ISBN 978 0 85293
564 4
Guidelines for offshore oil and gas installations that are not permanently
attended,
108. ISBN 978 0 85293
823 2
Guidance on Passive Fire Protection for Process and Storage Plant and
Equipment, 2017
109. ISO 10417
Petroleum and natural gas industries — Subsurface safety valve systems
— Design, installation, operation and redress
110. ISO 10497
Fire Testing of Valves
111. ISO 11429
Ergonomics - System of Auditory and Visual Danger and Information
Signals
112. ISO 13702
Control and Mitigation of Fires and Explosion on Offshore Installations
113. ISO 15138
Petroleum and natural gas industries – Offshore production installations –
Heating, ventilation and air-conditioning
114. ISO 17776
Petroleum and natural gas industries – Offshore production installations –
Guidelines on tools and techniques for hazard identification
115. ISO 19921
Fire resistance of metallic pipe components with resilient and elastomeric
seals
116. ISO 23936-1:
Petroleum, petrochemical and natural gas industries, Non-metallic
materials in contact with media related to oil and gas production - Part 1:
Thermoplastics
AGES-PH-03-002 (Part-1)
Tests for electric cables under fire conditions - Circuit integrity - Part 21:
Procedures and requirements -Optical fibre cables
Rev. No: 01
Page 14 of 31
Ref Document No
No
117. ISO 23936-2
Title
118. ISO 4628-2
Paints and varnishes — Evaluation of degradation of coatings —
Designation of quantity and size of defects, and of intensity of uniform
changes in appearance — Part 2: Assessment of degree of blistering
119. ISO 4628-4
Paints and varnishes — Evaluation of degradation of coatings —
Designation of quantity and size of defects, and of intensity of uniform
changes in appearance — Part 4: Assessment of degree of cracking
120. ISO 773 1
Danger Signals for Work places - Auditory Danger Signals
121. ISO 834
Fire Resistance Tests - Elements of Building Construction
122. ISO/TR 22899-1
Determination of the resistance to jet fires of passive fire protection Part 1
123. ISO/TR 22899-2
Determination of the resistance to jet fires of passive fire protection Part 2:
Guidance on classification and implementation methods
124. LASTFIRE
Hydrocarbon Storage Tanks
125.
126.
127.
128.
UAE Fire Safety Code and Life Safety Code
Fire Code
Standard for Portable Fire Extinguishers
Life Safety Code
NA
NFPA 1
NFPA 10
NFPA 101
Petroleum, petrochemical and natural gas industries, Non-metallic
materials in contact with media related to oil and gas production – Part 2:
Elastomers
129. NFPA 11
Standard for Low, Medium and High Expansion Foam
130. NFPA 13
Standard for the Installation of Sprinkler Systems
131. NFPA 14
Standard for the Installation of Standpipe and Hose Systems
132. NFPA 15
Standard for Water Spray Fixed Systems for Fire Protection
133. NFPA 16
Standard for the Installation of Foam-Water Sprinkler and Foam-Water
Spray Systems
134. NFPA 17
Standard for the Dry Chemical Extinguishing Systems
135. NFPA 17A
Standard for the Wet Chemical Extinguishing Systems
136. NFPA 1901
Standard for Automotive Apparatus
137. NFPA 20
Standard for the Installation of Stationary Pumps for Fire Protection
138. NFPA 2001
Standard on Clean Agent Fire Extinguishing Systems
139. NFPA 221
Standard for High Challenge Fire Walls, Fire Walls, and Fire Barrier Walls
AGES-PH-03-002 (Part-1)
Rev. No: 01
Page 15 of 31
Ref Document No
No
140. NFPA 24
Title
141. NFPA 25
Standard for the Inspection, Testing and Maintenances of Water-Based
Fire Protection Systems
142. NFPA 30
143. NFPA 55
Flammable and Combustible Liquids Code – 2nd Edition
Compressed gases and cryogenic fluids code
144. NFPA 58
Liquefied Petroleum Gas Code
145. NFPA 59
Standard for the Storage and handling of Liquefied Petroleum Gases at
Utility Gas Plants. Incl Appendix D: Procedure for Torch Fire
146. NFPA 59A
Standard for the Production, Storage, and Handling of Liquefied Natural
Gas (LNG)
147. NFPA 600
Standard for Facility Fire Brigades
148. NFPA 72
National Fire Alarm and Signalling Code
149. NFPA 750
Standard on Water Mist Fire Protection Systems
150. NFPA 76
Standard for the Fire Protection of Telecommunications Facilities
151. NFPA 850
Electric Generating Plants
152. NFPA 90A
Standard for the Installation of Air-Conditioning and Ventilating Systems
153. NFPA 90B
Standard for the Installation of Warm Air Heating and Air Conditioning
Systems
154. NFPA 96
Standard for Ventilation Control and Fire Protection of Commercial
Cooking Operations
155. NFPA-72
National Fire Alarm and Signalling Code
156. OTI 92 606
Passive Fire Protection: Performance Requirements and Test Methods
157. OTI 92 607
Availability and properties of Passive and Active Fire Protection Systems
158. OTI 92 610
Thermal Response of Vessels and Pipework Exposed to Fire
159. OTI 94 604
Experimental data relating to the performance of steel components at
Elevated Temperatures
160. OTI 95 634
Jet Fire Resistance Test of Passive Fire Protection Materials
161. Report 27.207.291/R1
Ver 2
Guidelines for the Protection of Pressurised Systems Exposed to Fire,
2004
AGES-PH-03-002 (Part-1)
Standard for the Installation of Private Fire Service Manis and Their
Appurtenances
Rev. No: 01
Page 16 of 31
Ref Document No
No
162. RR 1120
Title
163. RR 28/2005
Protection of Piping Systems Subject to Fires and Explosions
164. SOLAS Chapter II-2
Consolidated text of international convention for the Safety of Life at Sea
(SOLAS) and subsequent amendments
A review of the Applicability of the Jet Fire Resistance Test (JFRT) to
Severe Release Scenarios, 2017
CH. II-2 Construction - Fire Protection, Fire Detection and Fire Extinction
165. Technical Meeting
FABIG Technical Meeting, 2004
166. Technical Note 1
Fire Resistant Design of Offshore Topside Structures
167. Technical Note 11
Fire Loading and Structural Response
168. Technical Note 13
Design Guidance for Hydrocarbon Fires
169. Technical Note 3
Use of Ultimate Strength Techniques for Fire Resistant Design of Offshore
Structures
170. Technical Note 6
Design Guide for Steel at Elevated Temperatures and High Strain Rates
171. Technical Note 8
Protection of Piping Systems subject to Fires and Explosions
172. UK LPG CoP 1
Bulk LPG storage at fixed installations. Part 1: Design, installation and
operation of vessels located above ground, LP Gas Association
173. UL 1709
Standard for Rapid Rise Fire Tests of Protection Materials for Structural
Steel
174. WM-GL-ECD-SE0570
Fire Consequence Modelling
AGES-PH-03-002 (Part-1)
Rev. No: 01
Page 17 of 31
6
DOCUMENTS PRECEDENCE
The specifications and codes referred to in this document shall, unless stated otherwise, be the latest
approved issue at the time of Purchase Order placement.
It shall be the CONTRACTOR 'S responsibility to be, or to become, knowledgeable of the requirements of
the referenced Codes and Standards.
The CONTRACTOR shall notify the COMPANY of any apparent conflict between this specification, the related
data sheets, the Codes and Standards and any other specifications noted herein.
Resolution and/or interpretation precedence shall be obtained from the COMPANY in writing before
proceeding with the design/manufacture.
In case of conflict, the order of document precedence shall be:





7
UAE Statutory requirements
ADNOC HSE Standards & Codes of Practice
Project Specifications and standard drawings
Company Specifications & Standards
National / International Standards & Codes
DEVIATION /CONCESSION CONTROL
Any technical deviations to this Philosophy and its attachments including, but not limited to, the COMPANY’s
General Specifications shall be sought by the CONTRACTOR only through technical deviation request format.
Technical deviation requests require COMPANY’S review/approval, prior to the proposed technical changes
being implemented. Technical changes implemented prior to COMPANY approval are subject to rejection.
AGES-PH-03-002 (Part-1)
Rev. No: 01
Page 18 of 31
8
HIGH-LEVEL TECHNICAL APPROACH
8.1
Context & Background
The approach to F&G detection and fire protection is broken down into six key steps, as summarised in Table
8-1.
Table 8-1: F&G Detection & Fire Protection - Structure of Standard
Step
Identify:
Common
(Part 1)
1
Major Accident Hazards (MAH)
Section 8.4
2
Major Accident Events (MAE)
Section 8.5
3
Location of MAEs
Section 8.6
4
Critical Aspects for Escalation
5
Fire and Gas Detection
6
Escalation Avoidance Measures
(Passive & Active)
F&G
Detection
Fire
Protection
PFP
AFP
Part 3
Part
4
Part 2
Columns 1, and 2 identify steps of the assessment, with the first four steps noted in column 3 to apply to all
aspects of this Standard, meaning that they need to be covered before any assessment can be made about
F&G Detection, Passive Fire Protection (PFP) or Active Fire Protection (AFP).
The Standard is therefore broken down into four main parts:




8.2
Part 1:
Part 2:
Part 3:
Part 4:
General
Fire & Gas Detection
Passive Fire Protection (PFP)
Active Fire Protection (AFP).
Application & Compliance with Standard
CONTRACTOR shall follow the process described in this Standard.
It is acknowledged that all aspects of this Standard may not be practicable on all facilities. Any deviation from
this Standard shall therefore be supported by a documented justification covering the 4 important questions
presented in Table 8-2, which are intended to ensure the MAH risk remains as low as reasonably practicable.
The justification shall be reasoned arguments supported, if necessary, by quantitative analysis.
The justification shall be subject Group COMPANY review and approval.
AGES-PH-03-002 (Part-1)
Rev. No: 01
Page 19 of 31
Table 8-2: Key Questions – Justification to Deviate from Standard
Guidance
1.
Why can the Standard
not be implemented?
Address each relevant aspect of Standard
separately and clarify rationale / constraints.
2.
What is the potential
risk penalty?
Penalty due to non-conformance of the Standard.
3.
What alternative
measures are
proposed?
What alternative measures were considered and
adopted /rejected?
Is the residual risk
tolerable?
Describe:
Scenarios of concern
4.




Justification
Inherent safety measures
Passive measures
Active measures
Procedural / administrative controls
Alternative layers of protection provided (prevention
detection, mitigation)
Note:
Justification shall be reasoned arguments supported, if necessary, by quantitative analysis.
8.3
Structure of Part 1 (General)
The remaining parts of this document are structured to cover the first four steps. An overview schematic Table
of how these steps are expected to be addressed in a project is given in Table 8-3, where each step is
identified with a Star-label in the appropriate column.
AGES-PH-03-002 (Part-1)
Rev. No: 01
Page 20 of 31
ADNOC Classification: Internal
Table 8-3: Overview of Fire Detection & Protection (Steps 1 – 4)
Identification of:
2.1 Fire (/Leak) Types
3.1 . F&G 3.2. Categorise Plant Areas
Det'n
Zones
(FDZ)
Plant Area
Building
4.1. Critical
Plant
Features
x
x
x
x PS-1R-a
x
x 0
x
Process
P-1
x
x
x
x P-1-a
x
x P-1
x
Process Utilities
P-15
x
x
x
P-15-a
Process Utilities (Fired)
PF-1
x
x
x
PF-1-a
Utilities (& Machinery)
U-1
Safety Sys.
SS-1
Manned Areas
M-1
Emergency
Response
x
x
U-1-a
x
x
x
M-1-a
x
x
Evac
ER-E-1
ER-E-1-a
Escape
ER-Es-1
ER-Es-1-a
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
M-1
x 0
0
x
Sv
x
x
SS-1
x
St
x
U-1
x
S
x
x PF-1
x
x
SS-1-a
x
P-15
x
Ng
Special Risk (Air/HVAC Intakes)
Process - Storage Tanks & Export PS-1R
Ne
Special Risk
(Encl. - Gas Turb & Other
Engine)
H/C Process
(low sensitivity)
x
HVAC Inlet
x W-1
Telecoms
x
Special
x W-1-a
Toxic Leak
x
W-1
Np
Special Risk
H2
Special
No H/C
(People Protection)
No H/C
(Special Eqpt. Protection)
No H/C
(General Coverage)
H1
x
Well-head
Non-Process
H/C Process
(normal / high sensitivity)
F&G Detection Zone
(on Plot Plan)
Cooking Oils
Critical Structures & Supports
Flammable Metals
Combustion Air Inlet
K
Process
Flash / Exp.
D
F&G
Detection
Zones (FDZ)
Pool
C
4
x
Cellulosic
Sources of Leaks
Vulnerabilities (& ignition
sources)
B
Ignition
Potential
4.2. Grading of F&G Detection Zone
Jet /Spray
A
Electrical
Fire Types
3
Manned Space (or air to
HVAC)
2
Enclosed Spaces
1
Oth. Electronic
1. Hazard Identification
LER (/Switch Room)
4. Critical Aspects for 'Escalation'
Non-Process
3. Location of MAE
Process (& Wellheads)
2. Major Accident Events (MAE)
Fire Detection Zone (FDZ)
1. Major Accident Hazards (MAH)
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
Notes
Objective
To identify ALL the areas where a fire or
gas release event could occur.
Concept
- System List
- Plot Plans
FEED
- Master Equipment List
- Plot Plans
Detail
Design
Document No: AGES-PH-03-002 (Part-1)
To classify all the identified fire (&leak)
cases according to NFPA-10 (2018) to
allow selection of fire protection
measures.
- Initial Hazard Screening (Identification)
To identify specific plant areas (Fire Detection Zones - To 'Grade' each F&G Detection Zone according to its importance for Risk Management so
FDZ) where Emergency Response Measures (detection that appropriate focus can be given in design development.
& mitigation) need to be targeted.
n/a
n/a
- Hazard Identification Study
- Haz Area Classification (HAC)
- Fire Hazard Assessment (FHA)
- F&G detection performance target study
- Fire Grading Diagram
- F&G Detection Zone (FDZ) Grading Study
- Gas Dispersion Analysis
Update
Update
Update
- F&G Mapping
Rev. No: 01
Page 21 of 31
ADNOC Classification: Internal
8.4
Step 1: Hazard Identification
8.4.1
Identification of Area & Equipment
The objective of Step 1 is to identify ALL plant areas where a leak or fire can occur, as shown indicatively in
Table 8-1, columns 1, 2 and 3. At the highest level, the plant areas have been categorised as:
Sources of Release (Hydrocarbons)
 Process – Storage Tanks & Export
 Process
 Process Utilities
Vulnerabilities (& Potential Ignition Sources)
 Process Utilities (Fired)
 Utilities (& Machinery)
 Safety Systems
 Manned Areas
 Emergency Response (Evacuation & Escape)
 Temporary Site Facilities (including fabrication areas, batching plant, etc.)
These categories can be detailed using the Master Equipment List (MEL) and the Plot Plan (PP) to identify
items of equipment (or buildings) that can source a fire or the release of a hazardous material from process
systems. Column 1 highlights areas that can source a hydrocarbon leak and the main vulnerabilities in terms
of potential ignition sources or manned areas.
The geographical location of such events is important since it gives an indication of the type of detection,
mitigation and emergency response measures that are practicable.
An indicative example of this structure is shown in Table 8-4, which further identifies whether such systems
might be encountered on an onshore or offshore facility (columns 6 & 7, respectively).
It should be noted that the colour coding in Table 8-4 has been retained throughout this Standard to show
continuity of the design development process.
Table 8-4: Step 1: Example of Area Categories where Fire (/Leak) can occur
Area Type
Sources of Leaks
Well-head
Process Storage
Tanks &
Export
Roof
Shell
Bund
Document No: AGES-PH-03-002 (Part-1)
Area
Ref.
Process /Other Unit
W-1
W-2
PS1R
PS1S
PS1B
Wellheads
Well Servicing & Workover
Hydrocarbon Storage
Onshore




Offshore


Marine
Storage
(Not in
Scope)

Rev. No: 01
Page 22 of 31
ADNOC Classification: Internal
Area
Ref.
Process /Other Unit
Load /Unload
Load /Unload Marine
PS-2
PS-3
Loading/Unloading Racks
Marine Loading/Unloading Terminals


Other
PS-4
Impounding basins, Berth, Process Areas
& Storage

LNG Pipeline
PS-5
P-1
P-2
P-3
P-4
P-5
P-6
P-7
P-8
P-9
P-10
P-11
P-12
P-13
P-14
P-15
P-16
P-17
P-18
PF-1
PF-2
U-1
LNG pipelines
Manifolds
Separators (& Piping)
Other Vessels & Piping
Pumps
ESDVs
Pipeline (Risers), ESDVs & Pig Traps
Pig Traps (& laydown)
Compressors (Electric)
Compressors (Gas Turbine & enclosure)
Compression Building & HVAC
LER (Inst & Elec SGR) & HVAC
Metering
Slugcatcher
Heat Exchangers
Produced Water System
Fuel Gas System
Closed Drains / Flare KO Vessels
Cold Vent Stack
Flare (ground /elevated)
Fired Heaters
Laydown & Storage (Methanol tote
tanks, etc.)











































U-2
U-3
Power Generation (Diesel)
Power Generation (Gas Turbine &
enclosure)
Cooling Water (/Seawater) Pumps
Other Utilities (MEG injection, Air, N2,
etc.)
Crane(s)
Fire Pumps
Fire / Blast Wall
Manned Area HVAC Inlets
Accommodation


















Area Type
Process
Vulnerabilities (& potential ignition sources)
Process Utilities
Process Utilities (Fired)
Utilities (& Machinery)
U-4
U-5
Safety Systems
Manned Areas
Document No: AGES-PH-03-002 (Part-1)
U-6
SS-1
SS-2
M-1
M-2
Onshore
Offshore
Rev. No: 01
Page 23 of 31
ADNOC Classification: Internal
Area Type
Emergency
Response
Evacuation
Escape
8.4.2
Area
Ref.
Process /Other Unit
Onshore
M-3
M-4
M-5
M-6
M-7
M-8
M-9
M-10
ER-E1
ER-E2
ER-E3
ER-E4
ER-E5
EREs-1
CCR
Electrical Sub-station & Switchroom
Offices
Workshops & Laboratories
Stores & Warehouses
Helideck /Heliport
Boat Landing
Bridge (WTW)
Shelter /Muster /TR









TEMPSC
Bus (pick-up point & roads)


Offshore











Bridge


Boat


Liferaft


Project Scheduling
It is expected that this type of high-level hazard identification and categorisation could start at Concept stage,
soon after the first revision of the Systems List and plot plans are available. This will allow a rational basis to
be given for the F&G system’s contribution to the overall project cost.
However, it is expected that the full extent of the procedures discussed in this Standard will trigger during
FEED, when a more complete Master Equipment List (MEL) will be prepared, the Plot Plan (PP) will be better
defined and the main guiding philosophies (see Section 1) will have been developed.
8.5
Step 2: Identify Major Accident Events (MAE)
Step 2 in the process is geared towards classifying the type of Leak and fires that can occur in the areas
identified in Step 1. It is noted that the Classification needs to give sufficient clarity about the nature of the
event, and its characteristics to allow fire detection and protection measures to be designed and specified.
The Classification of fires for COMPANY projects shall be consistent with the following Codes, based on fluid
flash point:



NFPA 10
NFPA 30
EI 15
(Ref. 127)
(Ref. 142)
(Ref. 74)
Document No: AGES-PH-03-002 (Part-1)
Rev. No: 01
Page 24 of 31
ADNOC Classification: Internal
The correlation between these Codes is summarised in Table 8-5, which shows fire Classification as follows
(columns 1 and 2):





Class A:
Class B:
Class C:
Class D:
Class K:
Combustible materials (cellulosic)
Flammable Gases & Liquids
Electrical
Flammable Metals
Cooking Oils & Fats
A larger version of Table 8-5 is in Appendix A, of this Part of the Standard.
Document No: AGES-PH-03-002 (Part-1)
Rev. No: 01
Page 25 of 31
ADNOC Classification: Internal
Table 8-5: Classification of Fire Types (NFPA 10, NFPA 30 and EI 15)
Document No: AGES-PH-03-002 (Part-1)
Rev. No: 01
Page 26 of 31
ADNOC Classification: Internal
The second and third major columns sets (3-6, and 7-8) show a comparison of Classification using NFPA 30
(Ref. 142, Flammable and Combustible Liquids Code ) and EI 15 (ref 74), Hazardous Area Classification).
Both these Codes use fluid flash point for Classification, noting that the scope of EI 15 also includes the
Classification of gases.
This correlation between NFPA 30 and EI 15, means that work done within a project to perform Hazardous
Area Classification can be used to identify all sources of ‘Class B’ fires (as defined by NFPA 10). This will
also allow a distinction to be made between jet fire, flash fire /VCE, pool fire and spray fire by taking account
of Flash Point information assembled during Hazardous Area Classification. In this way consistency and
connection will be promoted between the various different measures taken to manage Major Accident Risk
(electrical eqpt. selection for Hazardous Areas, F&G detection requirements, exact requirements for AFP and
PFP against jet / pool / spray fires, etc.).
It should be noted that the hazards associated with dust explosions are not covered by this approach and
shall be managed as special cases when identified on a facility.
The columns (9 – 15) on the extreme right of Table 8-5 take note of the information in preceding columns to
identify the exact ‘Type of Fire’. An important distinction is made in the Class B category since the exact type
of fire will depend on the volatility of the fluid. The main sub-categories are therefore identified as:



Jet fires
Pool fires
Spray (/mist) fires
Label 3 in Table 7-5 also notes that delayed ignition of high volatility fluids also presents the potential for
flash fire (/explosion). This scenario will require other protective measures to be used like Emergency
Shutdown (ESD) and blowdown.
8.6
Steps 3 & 4: Location of MAE and Criticality for Escalation
Steps 3 and 4 in the two major columns on the right of Table 8-3.
8.6.1
Step 3: Where can Fire (/Leak) Occur (Fire & Gas Detection Zones & Areas on Facility)
The aim of Step 3 is to establish where a fire (/leak) can occur by breaking down the facility into F&G Detection
Zone (FDZ).
It should be noted that an FDZ is not the same as a ‘Fire Protection Zone’ (FPrZ), which is covered in Parts
3 (Passive Fire Protection) and Part 4 (Active Fire Protection) of this Standard. A FZ may be larger due to
process isolation, blowdown and fire protection reasons, and may be made up of multiple FDZs.
The final major column of Table 8-3 requires each FDZ to be given a distinct identifier.
The geographical extent of each FDZ shall be marked on a Plot Plan.
Step 3 also categorises each FDZ as a ‘Plant Area’ or a ‘Building’, and further sub-categories, as identified
in Table 8-6 below. This is done to facilitate the next step in the overall assessment process (Step 4).
Document No: AGES-PH-03-002 (Part-1)
Rev. No: 01
Page 27 of 31
ADNOC Classification: Internal
Table 8-6: Facility Area Categories
Plant
Area
Process (& Wellheads)
Non-Process
Special
Building
LER (/Switch Room)
Telecoms
Other Electronic
Enclosed Spaces
Manned Space (or air to HVAC)
Note: Colour coding previously used is retained (so far as possible).
8.6.2
Step 4: What can be Affected (‘Grading’ of Fire & Gas Detection Zones)
The aim of Step 4 is to ‘Grade’ each of the FDZ’s identified in Step 3 according to its sensitivity for overall
Risk Management of the facility. This is to ensure key safety and design features of each FDZ are highlighted
so that correct devices can be selected and appropriate priorities given.
The Grading of each FDZ is informed by Step 3 (see Table 8-6), and the following categories in Table 8-7
shall be used.
Table 8-7: Categories for ‘Grading’ each FDZ
Area
Process
Non-Process
Special
Grade
Description
H1
Hydrocarbon processing (normal to high sensitivity)
H2
Hydrocarbon processing with low sensitivity
Np
No Hydrocarbons (People protection)
Ne
No Hydrocarbons (Special Equipment Protection)
Ng
No Hydrocarbons (General coverage)
S
Special Risk
St
Special Risk (Enclosure - Gas Turbine & Other Engine)
Sv
Special Risk (Air Intakes (HVAC / utility, etc) / Airlocks)
Document No: AGES-PH-03-002 (Part-1)
Rev. No: 01
Page 28 of 31
ADNOC Classification: Internal
FIRE CLASSIFICATION – CORRELATION BETWEEN STANDARDS
This Appendix shows the relationship between fluid categorisation approaches of NFPA 30 and EI 15 with
the Classification of fires in NFPA 10.
The purpose of the comparison is to allow work done on Hazardous Area Classification to be carried forward
into the Classification of fires, and the identification of fire types (jet fires, spray fires, pool fires, etc.).
Table A1 shows both NFPA 30 and EI 15 use two main factors to categorise fluids:


Flash Point (columns 1 & 9)
Handling temperature
o Above / below Flash Point
o Above / below Boiling Point
In all cases, any fluid that is Categorised by these two standards is seen to have a potential to source a Class
‘B’ fire according to NFPA 10 (Note other fire types also shown, i.e. A, C, D, K).
It is noted that the Categorisation of EI 15 is more related to the flammable characteristics of the fluids. In
particular, it makes a distinction between fluids handled above their boiling point and those that are below.
The importance of this characteristic is for the relative likelihood of the various types of fires, namely:



Jet fires
Spray fires
Pool fires
Document No: AGES-PH-03-002 (Part-1)
Rev. No: 01
Page 29 of 31
ADNOC Classification: Internal
Table A1: Fluid Categorisation (NFPA30 & EI 1 5) versus Fire Classes (NFPA 10)
Document No: AGES-PH-03-002 (Part-1)
Rev. No: 01
Page 30 of 31
ADNOC Classification: Internal
Table A2 is a summary of the various fluid Categories according to EI 15 and the likelihood of them
sourcing each of the fire types.
Table A2: Likelihood of Fire Types
Handling Temperature, Fluid Category & Likelihood of Fire Type
No Mist
High Pressure
Release
Mist
Above BPt.
Mist
Below BPt.
Mist
Below FP
No Mist
Low Pressure Release
No Mist
Fire
Type
Fluid Category
Jet
Spray
Pool
C
C
B





A
G(ii)
G(i)
  

Key



Most Likely
Likely
Less likely
Not likely
It is noted that Fluid Categories G(i) and G(ii) (extreme right side of Table A2) can source a jet fire but present
no potential to spray or pool fire.
Category A fluids will expand rapidly upon release and are most likely to generate a jet fire with an element
of spray fire, depending on whether the leak contains liquid.
The type of fire from other fluid categories (B & C) depend entirely on the handling temperature. Fluids
handled above their boiling point are given Category B, which will flash rapidly giving rise to spray fire and
with a follow-on pool fire involving the liquid dropout.
Where the fluid is handled below the boiling point but above the flash point, there will be a potential for a
spray fire and a greater potential for an ongoing pool fire.
Fluids handled below the flash point are not likely to source a pool fire but could still generate a spray fire due
to atomisation and greater vaporisation of a pressurised release.
Document No: AGES-PH-03-002 (Part-1)
Rev. No: 01
Page 31 of 31
THE CONTENTS OF THIS DOCUMENT ARE PROPRIETARY AND CONFIDENTIAL.
ADNOC GROUP PROJECTS &
ENGINEERING
FIRE & GAS DETECTION AND
FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM
PHILOSOPHY
PART 2 – F&G DETECTION
AGES-PH-03-002
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................... 4
2
DEFINED TERMS / ABBREVIATIONS / REFERENCES ................................................................ 5
3
TECHNICAL APPROACH .............................................................................................................. 12
4
PLANNING & DESIGN ................................................................................................................... 14
5
LAYOUT OF F&G DEVICES .......................................................................................................... 18
6
F&G DETECTION DESIGN – HARDWARE SELECTION ............................................................. 22
7
F&G DESIGN - LOGIC.................................................................................................................... 29
8
RELIABILITY & AVAILABILITY ..................................................................................................... 36
9
SURVIVABILITY ............................................................................................................................. 37
10
DEPENDENCIES & INTERACTIONS ............................................................................................ 38
F&G DEVICES – FEATURES ........................................................................................... 39
ALARM INTERFACE: F&G SYSTEM-TO-TELECOMS (EXAMPLE) .............................. 63
EXAMPLE – REPRESENTATION OF F&G PROTECTION LOGIC ................................ 65
AGES-PH-03-002 (Part-2)
Rev. No: 01
Page 2 of 65
ADNOC Classification: Internal
LIST OF TABLES
Table 3-1: Document Structure: F&G Detection Part-1 ........................................................................................12
Table 4-1: Design Elements, Scheduling & Supporting Documents ....................................................................15
Table 5-1: Summary - F&G Detector Layout Philosophy .....................................................................................19
Table 6-1: Schematic Summary of F&G Detector Selection Approach ................................................................23
Table 6-2: List of F&G Devices Typically Used ....................................................................................................25
Table 6-3: F&G Detector Selection (based on FDZ Grading) ..............................................................................27
Table 7-1: Example - Definition of F&G Detection Levels & Detection Integrity ..................................................30
Table 7-2: Example F&G Protection Logic – Input Signals (Causes) ..................................................................32
Table 7-3: Example F&G Protection Logic – Output Signals (Effects) .................................................................34
Table 8-1: Reliability / Availability of F&G System ...............................................................................................36
Table 9-1: Survivability .........................................................................................................................................37
Table 10-1: List of Dependencies & Interactions ..................................................................................................38
AGES-PH-03-002 (Part-2)
Rev. No: 1
Page 3 of 65
1
INTRODUCTION
1.1
Background
This Part of the ‘Fire & Gas Detection and Protection’ Standard describes COMPANY expectations for the
development of Fire and Gas (F&G) Detection within a Project. The document is a follow-on to ‘Part-1’ where
the context and overall strategy for protection is set out in terms of a six-step process.
It is expected that the first four steps, covered in Part-1 will have been completed before the requirements
stipulated in this Part are implemented:
1.
2.
3.
4.
1.2
What are the Hazards
What Type of Fires (/Leaks) Can Occur?
Where Can Fires (/Leaks) Occur?
What Can Fires (/Leaks) Affect?
Objective
The objective of this Part of the Standard is to address Step-5,
‘How can F&G events be Detected?’.
A F&G safety system continuously monitors for abnormal situations such as a fire, or combustible or toxic
gas release within the plant; and provides early warning and mitigation actions to prevent escalation of the
incident and protect the People, process or environment.
Within the context of a new Project, this document describes how F&G requirements Shall be defined and
communicated in a ‘Project Specific F&G Detection Philosophy’. This document is not intended to cover
Engineering aspects (hardware), which are covered in Reference 2.
1.3
Scope
Inclusions:
This Standard covers the F&G detection devices and the logic required to interpret their signals.
Exclusions:
The Standard does not cover Engineering of other parts of the overall F&G System (signal cables, Marshalling
Cabinets, F&G Logic Solver, etc.).
AGES-PH-03-002 (Part-2)
Rev. 1
Page 4 of 65
2
DEFINED TERMS / ABBREVIATIONS / REFERENCES
2.1
General Terminology
General Terminology
BROWNFIELD
Development within the boundary (or control) of an existing operating
facility.
CAN (possibility and
Conveys the ability, fitness or quality necessary to do or achieve a
capability)
specific thing.
CONSULTANT
The party that performs specific services, which may include but are not
limited to, Engineering, Technical support, preparation of Technical
reports and other advisory related services specified by the party that
engages them, i.e. COMPANY, CONTRACTOR or its Subcontractors.
CONTRACTOR
The party which carries out the project management, design,
engineering, procurement, construction, commissioning for COMPANY
projects.
GREENFIELD
Development outside the boundary (and control) of an existing operating
facility or a new operating / processing facility development in new or
existing allotted area of the COMPANY.
LICENSOR
Provider of Licensed Technology
MANUFACTURER/VENDOR/
The party which manufactures and/or supplies equipment, technical
documents/drawings and services to perform the duties specified by the
COMPANY/CONTRACTOR.
SUPPLIER
MAY (permission)
The word indicates a permitted option. It conveys consent or liberty to do
something.
SHALL
Indicates a requirement
SHOULD (recommendation)
Indicates a recommendation.
STANDARD
Means this Layout & Separation Distances Guideline
SUB-VENDOR
Any supplier of equipment and support services for an
equipment/package or part thereof supplied by a VENDOR.
AGES-PH-03-002 (Part-2)
Rev. 1
Page 5 of 65
2.2
Technical Terminology
Technical Terminology
Building / Enclosure
Any structure used or intended for supporting or sheltering any use or occupancy
of people.
Combustible Fluid
A fluid handled below its Flash Point
Credible scenario
Incident likely to occur within a concerned area – typically, jet fire, pool fire,
vapour cloud explosions, gas dispersion, toxic gas dispersion and or/
asphyxiants dispersion scenarios that are considered for design.
Refer to [COMPANY HSE-GA-ST07 HSE Design Philosophy& FERA standard HSE-RM-ST09]
Emergency
Shutdown (ESD)
Escalation
A system of valves, piping, sensors, actuating devices, and logic solvers that
takes the process, or specific equipment in the process, to a safe state, i.e., to
shutdown, to isolate, de-energise, and depressurise plant, train, or process unit.
Increase in severity of consequences;
due to failure of preventative barriers or mitigation measures
Fire Detection Zone
(FDZ, same F&G
A geographical area defined to identify the location of a fire or hazardous leak
from containment so that Emergency Response measures can be initiated and
targeted.
Zone)
Fire Zone
Fire zones are areas of the plant sub-divided based on the potential for fire &
explosion hazard to cause escalation, as assessed by the consequence and risk
modelling.
The partition into fire zones is such that the consequence of fire or an explosion
corresponding to the reasonably worst event likely to occur in the concerned fire
zone shall not impact other fire zones to an extent where their integrity could be
put at risk.
The partition of the fire zone is intended to limit the consequence (escalation) of
credible events but is not intended to avoid the occurrence of the credible events.
(Ref. HSE-GA-ST07, HSE Design Philosophy)
Flammable
Refers to any substance, solid, liquid, gas or vapour, that is easily ignited.
A petroleum liquid is classified as flammable if it has a flashpoint up to and
including 55°C.
Hazard
AGES-PH-03-002 (Part-2)
The potential to cause harm, including ill health and injury, damage to
property, products or the environment; production losses or increased
liabilities
(HSE-RM-ST01, HSE Risk Management)
Rev. 1
Page 6 of 65
Technical Terminology
Hazardous Area
An area in which a flammable atmosphere is or may be expected to be present in
quantities such as to require special precautions for the control of potential
ignition sources.
Lower Explosive Limit Lower concentration of gas (by volume and expressed in percentage) in a gas-air
mixture that will form an ignitable mixture
[API, NFPA]
Manned facility
Installation on which people are routinely accommodated (Ref. ISO13702)
An offshore platform on which at least one person occupies an accommodation
space i.e. living quarters. (API RP 14G [Ref.7] definition) In addition, personnel
are present for more than 2 hours a day or more than 10% of time.
Plot
Area of the site where units are grouped (e.g., refinery crude distillation unit,
chemical plant, or storage terminal is located).
Process Section
An area / part of a unit within a process unit containing a combination of
processing equipment that is focused on a single operation. This includes
Individual isolatable part of a unit /system (e.g. Feed Pre-treatment).
Process Unit
A process unit is a collection of Equipment within a Plant focused on a single
operation, arranged to perform a defined function. A process unit enables the
execution of a physical, chemical and/or transport process, or storage of process
material. This includes, plant area with a distinct physical process area /process
train, e.g. separation unit, crude distillation unit, crude treatment unit water
treatment unit, polyethylene unit. etc.
Radiant heat output
(RHO)
The total amount of energy per unit time (kW) released by a fire in the form of
thermal radiation.
Risk
Risk is the product of the measure of the likelihood of occurrence of an
undesired event and the potential adverse consequences which the event may
have upon:
 Health and Safety of People – fatality, injury, irreversible health impact or
chronic ill health or harm to physical or psychological health.
 Environment - water, air, soil, animals, plants and social Reputation employees and third parties. This includes the liabilities arising from injuries
and property damage to third parties including the cross liabilities that may
arise between the interdependent ADNOC Group Companies.
 Financial - damage to property (assets) or loss of production
 Legal - Legal impacts due to breach of law, breach of contract etc.
Risk = Severity (Consequence) x Likelihood (Frequency)
Refer to ADNOC Corporate Risk Matrix for more information
Unmanned facility
AGES-PH-03-002 (Part-2)
Any facility that is not classed as ‘Manned’ (see definition above)
Rev. 1
Page 7 of 65
Technical Terminology
1ooN
One out of (1oo) the number (N) of detectors or circuits in the voting group in a
specific area that is in alarm.
1oo2
One out of two (1oo2) with diagnostics (D).
2ooN
Two out of (2oo) the number (N) of detectors or circuits in the voting group that are
in alarm.
Ex
refers to equipment that has been classified as safe for use in hazardous areas
Non-Hazardous Area
All areas not classified as hazardous under normal operations.
2.3
Acronyms & Abbreviations
Acronyms & Abbreviations
API
American Petroleum Institute
BFPSA
British Fire Protection Systems Association
CCTV
Closed Circuit Television.
CFD
Computational Fluid Dynamics
Cl2
Chlorine
CO2
Carbon Dioxide
DC
Direct Current
EI
Energy Institute
EN
Euronorm
EPC
Engineering Procurement & Construction
ESD
Emergency Shutdown
ESDV
Emergency Shutdown Valve
ESSA
Emergency Systems Survivability Analysis
F&G
Fire & Gas.
FEED
Front End Engineering Design
FERA
Fire & Explosion Risk Assessment
H2S
Hydrogen Sulphide
HAZID
Hazard Identification
HSE
Health Safety & Environment
HSECES
HSE Critical Equipment & Systems
HSSD
High Sensitivity Smoke Detector
AGES-PH-03-002 (Part-2)
Rev. 1
Page 8 of 65
Acronyms & Abbreviations
HVAC
Heating, Ventilation & Air Conditioning
ICSS
Integrated Control & Safety System
IEC
International Electrotechnical Commission
IR
Infrared
ISO
International Organisation for Standardisation
LEL
Lower Explosive Limit
LEL.m
Lower Explosive Limit * metre.
LNG
Liquefied Natural Gas
LOS
Line of Sight
LSIR
Location Specific Individual Risk
MAH
(IR at aAccident
locationHazard
if person present continuously)
Major
MACP
Manual Alarm Call point
NFPA
National Fire Protection Association
PFD
Probability of Failure on Demand
PFP
Passive Fire Protection
ppm
parts per million (by volume/moles unless otherwise stated)
QRA
Quantitative Risk Assessment
RHO
Radiant Heat Output.
ROR
Rate of Rise (Heat detector)
SIL
Safety Integrity Level.
SO2
Sulphur Dioxide
UV
Ultra-Violet
AGES-PH-03-002 (Part-2)
Rev. 1
Page 9 of 65
2.4
ADNOC Standards & Codes
Ref No
Document No
Title
1.
AGES-PH-03-001
ESD Philosophy
2.
AGES-SP-04-003
Fire & Gas System Specification
3.
AGES-SP-04-004
Emergency Shutdown System (SIS) Specification
4.
HSE-CE-ST05
Emergency Response Plan
5.
HSE-OS-ST21
H2S Management
6.
HSE-RM-ST05
SIL Determination Procedure
7.
HSE-RM-ST09
Fire Safety Assessment (FERA)
8.
HSE-OS-ST29
HSECES Integrity Management
9.
HSE-RM-ST08
Emergency System Survivability Assessment (ESSA)
2.5
Ref
International Codes & Standards
Code
Description
1.
API 14 F
Recommended Practice for Design and Installation of Electrical Systems for
Offshore Production Platforms
2.
API 14 G
Recommended Practice for Fire Prevention and Control on Open Type
Offshore Production Platforms
3.
API 14 J
Recommended Practice for Design and Hazards Analysis for Offshore
Production Facilities
4.
API 14 J
Recommended Practice for Design and Hazards Analysis for Offshore
Production Facilities
5.
API 14C
Analysis, Design, Installation, and Testing of Safety Systems for Offshore
Production Facilities
6.
ASTM E 1002
Standard Test Method for Leaks
7.
BS 7273
Code of practice for the operation of fire protection measures.
8.
EI 15
Model Code of Safe Practice, Part 15: Area Classification for installations
handling flammable fluids
9.
EN 54-20
Fire detection and fire alarm systems. Aspirating smoke detectors
10.
IEC 60331
Flame resistant
No
AGES-PH-03-002 (Part-2)
Rev. 1
Page 10 of 65
Ref
Code
Description
11.
IEC 61508
Functional Safety of Electrical/Electronic/Programmable Electronic Safetyrelated Systems (E/E/PE, or E/E/PES)
12.
IEC 61511
Functional safety - Safety instrumented systems for the process industry
sector - Part 1: Framework, definitions, system, hardware and application
programming requirements
13.
ISO 10417
Petroleum and natural gas industries — Subsurface safety valve systems —
Design, installation, operation and redress
14.
ISO 11429
Ergonomics - System of Auditory and Visual Danger and Information Signals
15.
ISO 773 1
Danger Signals for Work places - Auditory Danger Signals
16.
NFPA 76
Standard for the Fire Protection of Telecommunications Facilities
17.
NFPA-72
National Fire Alarm and Signalling Code
No
AGES-PH-03-002 (Part-2)
Rev. 1
Page 11 of 65
3
TECHNICAL APPROACH
3.1
Context
The overall strategy for Major Accident Hazard (MAH) Risk management has an important bearing on the
design of the F&G system. The strategy is typically documented in a Project HSE Philosophy based on
knowledge about the relative location of hazards to people, those affected and those who will be required to
react to an initiating event.
The HSE Philosophy will therefore shape the nature of manual intervention (local or remote), the degree of
remote monitoring, automatic protective actions, the architecture of the overall F&G system and its
interactions with the overall independent Emergency Shutdown (ESD) System.
This context is important in shaping the contents of the Project F&G Detection Philosophy, which Shall be
prepared early in design and updated, as a minimum, at the beginning of subsequent Design Stages.
The F&G Detection System is considered an ‘HSE Critical System’ requiring focus throughout the facility
lifecycle (design, procurement, installation, commissioning, operations & maintenance. This is typically done
by focus on the four key aspects (Ref.8):




3.2
Functionality
Reliability
Survivability
Dependencies & Interactions
Document Structure
This document is therefore structured to cover each of these aspects as described in Table 3-1.
Table 3-1: Document Structure: F&G Detection Part-1
HSE Critical Feature
Functionality
- Planning & Design
- Philosophy (high-level)
- Design - Hardware
- Design - Logic
Reliability & Availability
Survivability
Dependencies & Interactions
3.3
Section
4
5
6
7
0
9
10
Performance Standards
In view of the HSE Critical nature of the F&G Detection system, Performance Standards Shall be prepared
and documented to cover the full extent of the Fire & Gas System (detection, logic solver to final elements).
The Performance Standards Shall be started in FEED and updated in subsequent stages of the Project, and
Shall cover the four key aspects mentioned in Section 3.1 (Functionality, Reliability, etc.).
AGES-PH-03-002 (Part-2)
Rev. 1
Page 12 of 65
The Performance Standards Document Shall be made available for independent Assurance and Verification
by COMPANY, at each Project Stage, in sufficient time to allow observations by the Independent Reviewer
to be incorporated into the design.
AGES-PH-03-002 (Part-2)
Rev. 1
Page 13 of 65
4
PLANNING & DESIGN
4.1
Overview
The HSE Critical nature of the overall F&G detection system requires careful planning and scheduling of
design work to ensure the system development is backed up by rigorous justification.
Table 4-1 is a checklist of key design elements, when they need to be performed, and the documents
needed to support the justification.
Column 1 of Table 4-1 has broken down the F&G System design into 5 distinct aspects, namely:





Guiding principles
Fire detection
Gas detection
Response / Alarm System
Maintenance
Columns 2 and 3 contain a Description of key activities that need to be performed, and columns 4-6,
indicate (the Project Stage) when these activities should be scheduled. The columns on the extreme right
identify key Design Documents that are needed to demonstrate each of the activities identified (bottom right
corner).
AGES-PH-03-002 (Part-2)
Rev. 1
Page 14 of 65
ADNOC Classification: Internal
Table 4-1: Design Elements, Scheduling & Supporting Documents
Notes:
Demonstration (Design Documents)
1. F&G Design Basis (comprises items 2,3,4,5)
2. F&G Philosophy to ensure it complies with Regulatory Requirements
3. Chart indicates when Studies shall be started
(all shall be updated in subsequent stages in light of project developments).
4. Group Company to define based on project specific requirement.
Studies by
Project
Guiding
Principles
Fire Detection
Gas Detection
Response /
Alarm System
Maintenance
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
F&G Detection Philosophy
Regulatory requirements
Step 2: Fire Types
Step 3: FDZ Definition of Areas
Step 4: FDZ Grading
Step 4: FDZ Grading Diagrams - H/C & Utility Areas
Record of areas not requiring F&G detection, with reasons.
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
Step 5: Devices selected - fire detection
Step 5: Fire detector layouts
Step 5: Mapping diagrams (fire detection)
Step 5: Devices selected - gas detection
Step 5: Gas detector layouts
Step 5: Mapping diagrams (gas detection)
Ventilation inlet gas dispersion calculations, if required
Step 5: Toxic and Asphyxiant gas detection devices
Manual fire station functional requirements
Fire panel / F&G panel functional specifications
Cause and Effect (C&E) Logic
Notification appliance requirements
(F&G Alarms, Public Address, Telecoms, etc.)
20
Maintenance and testing access assessment
Document No: AGES-PH-03-002 (Part-2)
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
Update
Smoke & Gas Dispersion Study
F&G Mapping Study
3D Model Review
Telecoms Philosophy
Other
Performance Standards
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
*4
x
*4
x
x
x
x
x
Update
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
C&E Diagrams
1
*2
x
x
F&G Layouts
Detail
Design
Concept
FEED
Detail
Design
F&G Study
Project Stage
Concept
FEED
F&G Grading Diagrams
Description
FDZ Diagrams
Category
F&G Grading
F&G Philosophy
F&G Design Basis
(Perf. Target) (*1)
x
x
x
x
Update
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
Update
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
Rev. 01
Page 15 of 65
ADNOC Classification: Internal
4.2
Guiding Principles
Table 4-1 shows that a prerequisite to beginning the design of F&G detection facilities is to have a clear
understanding of the role F&G detection will play in the facility’s Risk Management strategy, and the
Regulatory requirements that need to be complied with.
These requirements Shall be documented as a F&G Detection Philosophy (item 1), early in design and
updated at the beginning of subsequent Stages.
4.3
Fire Detection
The Fire Detection design shall include the following key steps to cover the elements identified:
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
Step 2: Fire Types
Step 3: FDZ Definition of Areas
Step 4: FDZ Grading
Step 4: FDZ Grading Diagrams - H/C & Utility Areas
Record of areas not requiring F&G detection, with reasons.
Step 5: Devices selected - fire detection
Step 5: Fire detector layouts
Step 5: Mapping diagrams (fire detection)
Items 3 relate to the ‘Type’ of fires that can occur from each item of equipment, as described in Part-1,
Sections 7.5 (Step 2). Their impact on Grading of the FDZ is shown in columns 4 and 5, as described in Part1, Section 7.6. These aspects are intended to ensure the design takes note of the fire characteristics and
gives appropriate priority based on the COMPANY risk management goals.
The FDZ Diagrams mentioned under Item 6, may be omitted in the case of simple facilities, or where such
Grading can be marked on the FDZ Diagrams in Item 4.
Item 7 is noteworthy, since it requires that any FDZs not Graded Shall be recorded and justified.
Items 8-10 relate to Step 5, where the fire detection devices Shall be selected, shown on a plot plan and their
adequacy to detect fires in the FDZ demonstrated through a Mapping Study.
Items 3-10 in the above list Shall be started in FEED and updated as the design progresses during Detail
Design.
The Deliverables typically used to document the various aspects are identified in the bottom right corner of
Table 4-1, and are listed in Text Box 4-1. The deliverables in Test Box 4-1 can be combined wherever possible
in agreement with COMPANY, to ensure all the above elements are assessed and documented (e.g Item
2,3,4,5 can be combined).
Document No: AGES-PH-03-002 (Part-2)
Rev. 01
Page 16 of 65
ADNOC Classification: Internal
Text Box 4-1: F&G Detection: Typical List of Design Documents
F&G Detection Philosophy
1
2
F&G Design
Basis
(Perf. Target)
F&G Grading
FDZ Diagrams
F&G Grading Diagrams
F&G Study
F&G Layouts
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
C&E Diagrams
Smoke & Gas Dispersion Study
F&G Mapping Study
3D Model Review
Telecoms Philosophy
Other
Performance Standards
Item 13 is noteworthy in Text Box 4-1, since it confirms that the contents of the preceding items needs to be
consolidated into Performance Standards for the overall F&G system as required in Section 3.3.
4.4
Gas Detection
Key design elements for gas detection are similar to the ones for Fire Detection in Section 4.3, and are listed
below:
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
Step 5: Devices selected - gas detection
Step 5: Gas detector layouts
Step 5: Mapping diagrams (gas detection)
Ventilation inlet gas dispersion calculations, if required
Step 5: Toxic and Asphyxiant gas detection devices
The main additional aspect is the potential need for gas dispersion modelling (item 14) to assess the likelihood
of a gas cloud entering a ventilation air intake for an enclosure /building.
4.5
Response / Alarm System & Maintenance
The main design aspects covering Emergency Response and maintenance are listed below:
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
Manual fire station functional requirements
Fire panel / F&G panel functional specifications
Cause and Effect (C&E) diagrams
Notification appliance requirements (F&G Alarms, Public Address, Telecoms, etc.)
Maintenance and testing access assessment
Items 16 to 19 need to be developed in line with the Project HSE Philosophy mentioned in Section 3.1.
Provision Shall also be made for maintenance and functional testing of F&G system components without
requiring a shutdown of production.
Document No: AGES-PH-03-002 (Part-2)
Rev. 01
Page 17 of 65
ADNOC Classification: Internal
5
LAYOUT OF F&G DEVICES
5.1
Background
At the highest level, placement of F&G devices is driven by these main factors:


Likelihood of real fire /leak
affecting Personnel Safety and Asset Integrity
Likelihood of false detection /signal
affecting Production Loss
In both cases the main driver is risk, the risk that a real event has occurred and the potential for knock-on
escalation, versus the risk that the signal received is false and the resulting production loss.
The aim of this Section is to provide an approach that considers these factors when deciding on detector
layout for the different situations encountered on COMPANY facilities.
Simplistically, the aim of the approach is to provide detection near to the most likely sources or vulnerabilities,
so that potential safety issues can be addressed, to use a voting strategy to get a confirmed signal to avoid
undesired production consequences if the signal is false and also to ensure early detection and deployment
of effective mitigation measures to maximise asset protection .
Detection devices use technologies that monitor a particular point, line or volume in space and this limited
coverage means that they do not cover the full extent of the FDZ to be monitored. Also no device is 100%
reliable, so it is not possible to be certain that all real events will be detected, and it has to be accepted that
some events can go undetected and this forms part of the residual risk from the facility.
So, we must determine the size of event that the system should be able to identify as a minimum, termed
‘Design Accident Event’ (DAE).
The general approach in this Standard does not define a Design Accident Event, but this principle is implicit
within the detector layouts that are proposed based on historical precedent within industry.
Where the potential for escalation of the initiating event is found to be critical, the requirements for detection
and protection Shall be based on specific study and modelling (e.g. FERA - Fire & Explosion Risk Assessment,
or explosion modelling using CFD – Computational Fluid Dynamics, in accordance with Ref.7).
5.2
Detector Layout Philosophy
The observations above lead to the Philosophy summarised in Table 5-1, which uses the criticality Grading
of the FDZ in Step 4, and addresses the two main issues:


Likely Leak Sources (& Vulnerabilities)
Signal Integrity
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Table 5-1: Summary - F&G Detector Layout Philosophy
Criticality of Area
No of F&G Devices Required
1
Fire Detection Zone (FDZ) Grading
Detection Philosophy - Likely Leak Sources
No of Devices to install for Signal Integrity (1)
2
Process
Non-Process
H
1
H
2
N
p
Likelihood
Category
(EI 15)
Detector Coverage Required
Description
Fire
(/smoke)
x
x
Continuou
s
None
Flare
monitoring
x
x
Primary
Dedicated
Local to Source
x
x
Secondary
Area
FDZ Area
x
x
x
x
N
e
N
g
Special
S
S
t
S
v
Ungraded
x
Special
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
Toxic
(H2S)
None
FDZ Area
(/FERA-vol)
Fire
(/smoke)
Gas
(flammable)
Video Image
(CCTV) for
Flame / Smoke
Toxic
Study to
define
Toxic (H2S)
None
2
3
2
(note 2)
Typical Target
Cloud size
5m - 10m
(depends on
congestion)
(*8)
3
Target Cloud
size
5m - 8m
(*8)
None
Boundary
Monitoring
x
Gas
(flammable)
Boundary
Monitoring
Process
Area
(/Escape
route)
Boundary
Outside
Manned
Area HVAC
LOS at
each
boundary
1
1
LOS at
each
boundary
1
1
3
3
x
HVAC
At Inlet
At Inlet
x
Buildings
Case by
Case
Case by
Case
x
Other
Areas
Case by
Case
Case by
Case
3
Specific Notes:
1. No. of F&G devices needs to be sufficient to allow voting for confirmed detection signal
2. F&G Detection and Design Coverage: Overall Coverage to be defined (minimum, single=90%, double=85%).
Coverage required by at least 2 devices monitoring a volume where F&G events can occur (demonstrate by Mapping Study)
3. Devices to be placed to ensure covers only the Fire Zone being monitored (to avoid spurious detection and to ensure source of fire can be identified quickly).
4. No need for F&G detection for 'Continuous' Grade. Known hazard - ignition prevention by safe distances. In case of flare, general CCTV monitoring.
5. Toxic devices only apply if H2S is present. Other toxic gases to be evaluated on a case by case basis.
General Notes:
4. All F&G Signals to initiate Alarm in Control Room (to prompt investigative Action).
5. Voting groups for automatic Executive Action to be from same Fire Zone.
6. Simultaneous single detection in multiple Fire Zones (Project to develop a philosophy for Manual / Auto Executive Action).
7
Definitions: Congestion (qualitative)
More stringent cloud size should be defined based on facility type for both onshore and offshore using quantified assessment of congestion.
Flammable Gas Cloud Sizes
Zone Characteristic
Cloud Size to use (sphere (f)
Enclosed area (a) or Mostly enclosed area (b)
5m (16ft) diameter
Part-enclosed area (c) or Congested area (d)
7m (23ft) diameter
Open area (e)
10m (33ft) diameter
a) Fully welded floored area with or without forced ventilation
or vents
b) Congested area with one open side
c) Congested area with two or more open sides and grated
floor / ceiling or more than two open sides.
d) Process plant that has closely installed piping /equipment
e) Open lightly congested area without walls
f) The sphere diameter is based on a LEL concentration or
greater than diameter
8. FERA to validate assumptions as project progresses into further Engineering.
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5.2.1
Likely Leak Sources & Vulnerabilities
The first major column in Table 5-1 (label-1, columns 1-8) shows the FDZ Grades described in Step 4 of the
overall approach. This Grading reflects the criticality of detection in the various area types (Process, Nonprocess, Special).
The second major column (label-2, columns 9-13) contains the detection philosophy, which is based on the
likelihood of a leak or special vulnerability (column 9).
The assessment of ‘leak likelihood’ in this Standard has been related to the categorisation used by EI 15 for
Hazardous Area Classification (also commonly known as Grading). This is intended to ensure consistency
within the wider design and to take advantage of work already done as part of Hazardous Area Classification.
The likelihood categories (column 9), and the required detector coverage philosophy (column 10) are
therefore shown as:




Continuous
Primary
Secondary
Ungraded.
: None (known hazard)
: Dedicated close to leak source
: General area coverage
: None (low likelihood)
Implementation of this philosophy for Fire, Flammable and Toxic Gas is described in columns 11, 12 and 13,
respectively.
No detection is proposed for any source that is Graded as ‘continuous’, since this is a known hazard and
alternative strategies need to be adopted to avoid any associated risk (e.g. separation of tank vents from
potential ignition sources).
F&G detection is more relevant to sources graded as ‘Primary’ and ‘Secondary’ by the Hazardous Area
Classification approach since these identify potential sources that can be foreseen during normal operation,
with Primary being the more likely from items such as pumps and compressors. Secondary sources represent
items such as valves and flanges that will be numerous and widely spread throughout the plant. Parts of the
plant with equipment having welded connections (e.g. piping, pipelines) remain ungraded, and are generally
considered to have very low likelihood of sourcing a leak due to gradual degradation mechanisms.
The philosophy adopted Shall therefore provide ‘Dedicated’ detection close to items Graded as ‘Primary’,
which are most likely to be sources of leaks.
In view of the lower likelihood of Secondary sources, ‘general area coverage’ Shall be provided to detect F&G
events in the vicinity of Secondary sources. Their layout Shall ensure that any DAE can be detected, after
taking note of the voting requirements in Section 5.2.2.
No detection is required in the vicinity of Ungraded process equipment, unless it is required for other reasons.
Document No: AGES-PH-03-002 (Part-2)
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5.2.2
Number of Devices for Signal Integrity
The final major column in Table 5-1 (columns 14 to 16) contains an indication of the number of detection
devices needed for each case to ensure there are adequate numbers to detect the DAE after voting to reduce
the risk of a false detection.
It is noted in Section 5.1 that historical precedent, as stated in columns 14-16, can be used for the purpose
of initial detector layout since this includes an implicit DAE from past industry experience.
Where the potential for escalation of the initiating event is found to be critical, the requirements for detection
and protection Shall be based on specific study and modelling (e.g. FERA - Fire & Explosion Risk Assessment,
or explosion modelling using CFD – Computational Fluid Dynamics).
In all cases, achievement of the required coverage Shall be demonstrated through a F&G Mapping Study, as
required in Sections 4.3 and 4.4.
Document No: AGES-PH-03-002 (Part-2)
Rev. No: 01
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6
F&G DETECTION DESIGN – HARDWARE SELECTION
6.1
Overview
The aim of this Section is to describe the F&G detection hardware selection philosophy, which is broken down
into:


Type of F&G detectors, and
No. of Detectors.
The approach is shown schematically in Table 6-1. It should be noted that this is a schematic Table and is
only intended to demonstrate the logic of assessment approach, and that the entries are indicative only at a
‘Plant Area’ level.
Each project Shall perform the required assessment at an equipment-by-equipment level, and then reconcile
the overall requirements for each geographical area (Fire Detection Zone, FDZ), ensuring the most onerous
requirements are satisfied.
Document No: AGES-PH-03-002 (Part-2)
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Table 6-1: Schematic Summary of F&G Detector Selection Approach
Vulnerabilities (& ignition sources)
Sources of Leaks
Notes
Objective
Process Area
P-1
x
Process Utilities
(with HC)
P-15
x
x
x
x
Process Utilities
(Fired)
PF-1
Utilities (LER/LIR &
Machinery)
Safety Sys.
U-1
x
x
SS-1
x
x
Manned Areas /
Buildings
Emergency Evac
Response
Escape
M-1
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
- Master Equipment List
- Plot Plans
Secondary
Area
FDZ Area
x
Primary
Dedicated
x
x
Ungraded
Boundary
Ungraded
3
Typical Target
Cloud size
5m - 10m
(depends on
congestion)
(*8)
Local to
3
Source
Process Area Typical Target
(/Escape route) Cloud size
Boundary
5m - 10m
(depends on
congestion)
(*8)
3 FDZ Area
(/FERAvol)
2
Target
Cloud size
5m - 8m
(*8)
3
Target
Cloud size
5m - 8m
(*8)
None
Video
Image
(CCTV)
for Flame
/ Smoke
2
Air Inlet
3
3
Air Inlet
3
x
Air Lock
3
3
Air Lock
3
x
Case by Case
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
To identify ALL the areas To identify
To select appropriate F&G detection device based on fire and gas leak events that can occur and their characteristics.
where a fire or gas release characteristics of a fire
event could occur.
(/ leak) in each area to 'Special' not marked - to be considered on a case by case basis.
allow selection of
detection devices.
FEED
Local to
Source
x
ER-Es-1
- System List
- Plot Plans
Dedicated
x
x
x
Primary
Fire (/Smoke)
x
How much No of
area to
devices
cover?
needed?
Toxic
x
Fire Detection
Flammable
x
Deteciton
Gas Detection
Philosophy
How likely is What is
How much area No of devices
leak?
detection
to cover?
needed?
philosophy?
- Dedicated
- General Area
- None
x
3
Likelihood
Alarm Horn
x
Alarm Strobe Fire and Gas
Acoustic (Ultrasonic)
x
Alarm Strobe Toxic Gas
Manual Call Point (MCP)
Distributed Temperature Sensor
x
Low Temperature Detector
Toxic (Open Path)
x
Asphyxiant (Low Oxygen)
Toxic (H2S, Point, Electrochemical)
x
Aspirator (3-channel, smoke,
toxic & flammable)
x
Hydrogen (Catalytic Bead)
Hydrocarbon (IR Point)
Hydrocarbon (Open Path)
x
Oil Leak (*3)
x
ER-E-1
Concept
Detail Design
x
x
Open Path
x
x
Oil Mist (IR Optical)
x
x
HSSD
x
Press. Gas Alarms
Leak
Detection
x
Optical Point (photoelectric)
PS-1R
MAC
x
Frangible Bulb
Process - Storage
Tanks / Vessels and
Export.
Special
Elec / FO LHD
x
Toxic Gas
Fusible Plug
x
Flam'ble. Gas
Video Image (CCTV) for Flame /
Smoke
x
Oil
Triple IR
x
Smoke /
Video Image
UV / IR (*2)
Flammable Gas
W-1
Heat
Toxic
Heat
Smoke
Well-head
Flame / Video
Image
Acoustic
Flame
Fire
Gas
Characteristi
c
5.3. How Many Devices are Needed (& where to place them)
2
Grading as per Haz Area
Classification (EI 15)
5.2. Select Type of F&G Detection Devices
1
Comb'n (Fixed Linear / ROR) Heat
5.1. Fire & Gas
Characteristic
Rate of Rise (ROR)
1. Hazard Identification
- F&G Detection Study
- F&G Detection Study
Update
Update
To position the selected decices to ensure there is adequate coverage (locaion
& numbers) according to the:
- Likelihood of the fire (/leak)
- Importance for Risk Management
(Grading of Fire Detection Zone - plant areas that can be affected)
- F&G Detection Study
- F&G Layouts
- F&G Mapping Study
Notes:
1. This Table is indicative only, however, selection of detection devices and their layout shall be determined by project-specific study summarised in the Project F&G Design Basis.
2. Boundary monitoring between process area and utilites / manned.
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The first major column in Table 6-1 shows the linkage between Step 1 (Hazard Identification) and Step 5
(How many detectors?) of the overall approach in Part-1. This column Shall be based on the Master
Equipment List (MEL) and Shall be considered at an equipment-by-equipment level.
The second major column is broken down into three main headings (labels 1, 2, 3) to establish how a fire or
gas release event can be detected. The three main aspects are:



Fire & Gas Characteristics
Selection of F&G Detection Devices
No. of Devices Needed (& where to place them)
The approach to each of these aspects is presented in the following sub-sections.
6.2
Fire & Gas Characteristics
The second major column (label 1, columns 4-9) in Table 6-1 uses the information determined on ‘Fire Types’
in Step 2 of the overall approach (Part-1) to clarify the characteristics that can be used to detect each incident.
These characteristics are categorised as:
Fire
 Flame
 Heat
 Smoke
Gas
 Flammable gas
 Toxic
 Noise /Acoustic (pressurised release)
This is done for each item of equipment, shown on a row-by-row basis in Table 6-1.
6.3
6.3.1
Select F&G Detection Devices
Device Types
The second major column in Table 6-1 (columns 10-36) contain a list of typically used F&G devices to detect
the characteristics mentioned in Section 6.2 above. This list is clarified in Table 6-2, which also contains a
‘key features’ column with a reference to Appendix A where further details are given about its suitability for a
particular characteristic and where/how the device should be positioned.
Document No: AGES-PH-03-002 (Part-2)
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Table 6-2: List of F&G Devices Typically Used
Characteristic
Device Type
Flame
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Triple IR
UV / IR (*2)
Video Image Flame Detection
Rate of Rise (ROR)
Comb’n (Fixed Linear / ROR) Heat
Elec / FO LHD
Fusible Plug
Frangible Bulb
HSSD
Optical Point (photoelectric)
11
Open Path
Video Image Smoke Detection
Oil Mist (IR Optical)
Oil Leak (*3)
Hydrocarbon (IR Point)
Hydrocarbon (Open Path)
Hydrogen (Catalytic Bead)
Aspirator (3-channel, smoke, toxic & flammable)
Toxic (H2S, Point, Electro-chemical)
Toxic (Open Path)
Asphyxiant (Low Oxygen)
Low Temperature Detector
Distributed Temperature Sensor
Manual Call Point (MACP)
Acoustic (Ultrasonic)
Heat
Smoke
Oil
Flammable Gas
Toxic Gas
Special
MACP
Press. Gas Leak
Detection
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
Key
Features
(see
Section)
A.1.2
A.1.3
A.1.4
A.1.5
A.1.6
A.1.7
A.1.8
A.1.9
A.1.11
A.1.12
A.1.13
A.1.14
A.1.15
A.1.16
A.1.17
A.1.19
A.1.20
A.1.21
A.1.22
A.1.23
A.1.24
A.1.18
General Note:
1. New Technologies may be used. Approval shall be required for new technology from Group
Company Technical Authority.
2. Triple IR preferred in open areas. UV/IR considered for special cases (e.g. Turbine Enclosure)
3. For large atmospheric oil storage tanks, “liquid leak” devices may be considered.
4 Toxic & flammable gas detectors shall be provided for the facilities if toxic materials are present.
This requirement shall be in specific to be discussed & agreed with the ADNOC Group on case to
case basis.
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6.3.2
Selection of Detection Devices (based on ‘FDZ Grading’)
F&G detection devices Shall be selected based on their suitability for the FDZ Grading established in Step 4
(Part-1) of the overall approach.
The most appropriate device types are summarised in Table 6-3.
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Table 6-3: F&G Detector Selection (based on FDZ Grading)
Special
Location
Outdoors
Indoors
LER (& switch gear
room)
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Telecoms
Oth. Electronic
Enclosed Spaces
Manned Space (or
air to HVAC)
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Distributed Temperature Sensor
20
21
22
23
Y
24
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
18
Y
19
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Low Temperature Detector
Y
Y
17
Asphyxiant (Low Oxygen)
Y
16
Toxic (Open Path)
15
Y
Toxic (H2S, Point, Electrochemical)
14
Y
Special
Acoustic (Ultrasonic)
Y
13
Y
Aspirator (3-channel, smoke,
toxic & flammable)
12
Hydrogen (Catalytic Bead)
11
Toxic Gas
Manual Call Point (MCP)
Y
10
Hydrocarbon (Open Path)
Y
Oil Mist (IR Optical)
Y
9
Open Path
Y
8
Flam'ble. Gas
Hydrocarbon (IR Point)
Np People
Protection
Ne Special Eqpt
Protection
Ng General
Coverage
S Special Risk
St Enclosure GT & Other
Engine
Sv Air/ HVAC
Intakes /Air
Locks
7
Y
HSSD
Y
6
Y
Frangible Bulb
Y
5
Fusible Plug
Y
4
Elec / FO LHD
3
Y
Comb'n (Fixed Linear / ROR) Heat
Video Image (CCTV) for Flame /
Smoke
2
Y
Rate of Rise (ROR)
UV / IR (*2)
1
Y
Smoke / Video Oil
Image
Oil Leak (*3)
NonProcess
H1 Normal-High
Sensitivity
H2 Low
Sensitivity
Triple IR
Fire & Gas Process
Detection
Grades
Detection Devices
Flame / Video
Heat
Image
Optical Point (photoelectric)
Detection Criteria
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Y
Notes
1
2
3
All H/C fires
Extreme ambient temp. variations (e.g. turbine enclosures)
Fast fire development (or smokeless fire)
6
7
8
9 10 11 12
13
14
15
16 17 18 19 14
11 None
12 Large accumulation or gas cloud migration across plant areas
13 Mainly Battery Rooms - not needed for sealed batteries (unless required by Regulations).
4
Used with sprinkler system
14 Initial detection of hydrocarbon leak only (Not for Executive Action - unless confirmed by other
5
7
8
9
10
For electric /electronic eqpt. (people must not be present if auto fire protection)
Smouldering fires
Monitoring outside space near HVAC inlet for manned spaces.
Early warning of flammable liquid leak.
Oil Leak Detection (storage bund)
15
16
17
18
19
1
2
3
4
5
HVAC Inlets
None
e.g. Nitrogen System
LNG Leak
LNG pipeline leak
Note: FDZ Grading represents the criticality of detection to the overall management of risk.
Document No: AGES-PH-03-002 (Part-2)
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6.4
No. of Devices Needed (& where to place them)
The final major column in Table 6-1 (columns 37-43) uses the F&G detection Philosophy summarised in Table
5-1 to work out the number of devices needed and where to position them.
This done using the following steps:



Likelihood (Grading, as per EI 15)
Detection Philosophy: dedicated, general area, none
(done separately for gas & fire)
No of devices (flammable gas, toxic gas & fire)
: see Section 5.2.1
: see Section 5.2.1
: see Section 5.2.2
It is reemphasised that the contents of Table 6-1 are indicative only to show the logic of the assessment
process.
The project F&G detection requirements Shall be assessed at an equipment-by-equipment level based on
the project MEL and the assessment Shall be documented in line with requirements Section 4.1.
Document No: AGES-PH-03-002 (Part-2)
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7
F&G DESIGN - LOGIC
7.1
Context & Structure
The objective of this Section is to clarify the F&G system logic requirements.
7.1.1
Integration & Interfacing
Before this can be done, it is important to acknowledge that there is a requirement for new facilities to
interface, and in some instances integrate with existing facilities. For this reason, the approach in this
Standard is a flexible one that can be used to deal with the variety of situations that may occur on
COMPANY facilities.
The approach put forward is based on a principle of a modular design with careful management of
interfaces between the various building blocks, for example:


7.1.2
Existing parent facility to New facility
New facility to Vendor packages
Key Assumptions
This Section is premised on the assumptions that:

The F&G system will be designed to have continuous fault monitoring on all field devices, and it will
raise an alarm on the HMI and F&G Panel if a fault is registered.

All F&G Outputs are expected to be of the ‘energise to operate’ type, unless otherwise stated.

All F&G devices Shall be capable of being overridden for maintenance (degradation philosophy
shall be prepared accordingly).
Design requirements for the F&G System hardware and architecture are covered separately in Reference
2.
7.1.3
Key Design Features & Section Structure
It is noted from the high-level philosophy in Section 5.2 that there is a need to balance the requirement of
safety risk management against inadvertent shutdown of production in the event of false signals. The design
of the F&G System Shall therefore be done considering:


7.2
Detection Integrity
Logic of F&G System Response
: (Section 7.2)
: (Section 7.3).
Detection Integrity
Section 5.2.2 proposes voting to verify that a detected signal represents a real hazardous event, before
Executive action is triggered.
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Key to this approach is the principle that detection is either:


Unconfirmed
Confirmed
: (1ooN devices) or
: (2ooN devices)
‘Unconfirmed’ detection is when any one of the detection devices in a voting group identifies a signal above
a predefined setting (e.g. for flammable gas, Low-Level Gas, LLG at 20% of the Lower Explosive Limit, LEL).
Similarly, ‘Confirmed’ detection occurs when two separate devices identify an event simultaneously, meaning
the likelihood of detector fault can be ignored for all practical purposes.
These categorisations are important since they determine the nature of the response / Executive Action to be
taken (see Section 7.3, below).
An example of how these F&G Integrity Levels (Unconfirmed & Confirmed) can be defined is shown in Table
7-1.
Table 7-1: Example - Definition of F&G Detection Levels & Detection Integrity
Detection
Fire Detection
Flammable Gas
Detection
- Methane
Triple-IR Flame
Elec / FO LHD
Fusible Plug
Heat
- Rate of Rise
Smoke Photoelectric
Point
Open Path (LOS)
Toxic Gas
Detection
- H2S
Point
Toxic Gas
Detection
- H2S
Point
Gas
- Hydrogen
Point
Gas
- Oxygen
Point
Manual Alarm Call Push Button
Point
Purpose
Detection Level
Voting Groups
Outdoor Areas Buildings
(enclosed areas)
Area
Monitoring
Detected 18 mA
Devices in
Affected Fire
Zone (Field)
Area
Monitoring
Boundary
Monitoring
Area
Monitoring
Area
Monitoring
Area
Monitoring
Area
Monitoring
Alert
LLG
20% LEL
HLG
50% LEL
LLG
1.LEL.m
HLG
3.LEL.m
LTG
5ppm
HTG
15ppm
LTG
5ppm
HTG
10ppm
LTG
10% LEL
HTG
25% LEL
LO2G
19.5%
LLO2G
19%
Detected Pushed
Devices in Affected
Fire Zone
All Fire Zones Devices in Affected
- Outdoors
Fire Zone
(Field)
All Fire Zones Devices in Affected
- Outdoors
Fire Zone
(Field)
HVAC Air
Intakes
Devices in Affected
Fire Zone
Room /
enclosure
Devices in Affected
Fire Zone
Room /
enclosure
Devices in Affected
Fire Zone
Single
Voting of Devices
Detection Integrity
1st Device Any Other in UnConfirmed
Voting Group Confirmed
within Fire (*1)
Zone
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
Philosophy clarification:
1.
Two different devices identifying the same hazards in SAME Voting Group Shall be treated as a confirmed signal (e.g. Point
Gas & LOS, or Flame & Heat, etc).
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Notes:
Project to decide how to interpret (Unconfirmed or Confirmed):
1.
Simultaneous detection at different levels from separate devices in same voting group

LLG / HLG
(Low-level Gas / High-Level Gas)

LTG / HTG
(Low-Toxic Gas / High-Toxic Gas)

LH2G / HH2G
(Low-Hydrogen Gas / High-Hydrogen Gas)
2.
3.
Two different devices simultaneously identifying the same hazardous effect in DIFFERENT Voting Groups.
The principles apply to all the various detection devices identified in Section 6.3
The first two columns of Table 7-1 identify the various types of F&G detection devices. Column 3 describes
their purpose, with the applicable ‘Detection Levels’ indicated in columns 4 and 5. The selection of voting
groups is clarified in columns 6 and 7 for ‘Outdoor’ areas and for ‘Buildings (enclosed areas)’ respectively.
Columns 8 and 9 describe the combination of voted signals from each type of device, and the resultant
‘Unconfirmed’ or ‘Confirmed’ interpretation is in columns 10 and 11, respectively.
It should be noted that Table 7-1 is only an indicative example, and that any project Shall define and document,
taking note of project specific requirements, which might need to be driven by other factors like the need to
integrate with an existing parent facility’s philosophy.
The definition of Integrity Levels Shall be subject to COMPANY review, independent from the project.
7.3
Logic of F&G System Response
Signals from the various F&G devices Shall be interpreted within a logic solver (F&G System or ICSS), that
Shall be programmed to implement the protection actions required by the Project HSE Philosophy.
An example representation of the F&G Protection logic is given in Appendix C, which comprises two key
elements:


F&G System – Inputs (Causes)
F&G System – Outputs (Effects)
: (Section 7.3.1)
: (Section 7.3.2)
The benefit of this Philosophy format is that the high-level F&G philosophy can be communicated clearly
without ambiguity to the Engineering Design Disciplines tasked to implement it. This degree of definition and
clarity facilitates resolution of complex questions as the design progresses.
It is expected that the Philosophy expressed in this format can be converted into Engineering C&E charts,
relatively easily by adding additional rows and columns to insert Tag No.’s and other identifiers.
Clarification of key elements that need to be covered for each of the two aspects is given in the following subsections.
7.3.1
F&G System – INPUTS (Causes)
The Inputs that need to be defined in the Project F&G Detection Philosophy are:

Detector Types
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


Set-points,
Voting requirements, and
Relevant Areas for each Device Type
An illustrative example is given in Table 7-2 , columns 1 to 4, respectively.
The F&G system may also take inputs from:



building Fire Control Panels (FCP)
standalone packages with their own detectors and extinguishment systems
confirmation signals from field protection devices such as
o sprinkler valves
o deluge release
o fire water pumps
Table 7-2: Example F&G Protection Logic – Input Signals (Causes)
Description
Set
Point
Voting
IR flame Detectors (Triple & UV/IR)
Unconfirmed Fire
1ooN
Confirmed Fire
2ooN
Detector Fault
Heat Detectors (Rate of Rise)
Unconfirmed Fire
1ooN
Confirmed Fire
2ooN
Detector Fault
Smoke Detectors (Photoelectric)
Unconfirmed Fire
1ooN
Confirmed Fire
2ooN
Detector Fault
Combustible - Point Gas Detection
Unconfirmed Gas: Low Level Gas (LLG)
25% LEL
1ooN
Unconfirmed Gas: High Level Gas (HLG)
60% LEL
1ooN
HLG
2ooN
Unconfirmed Gas: Low Level Gas (LLG)
1 LEL.m
1ooN
Unconfirmed Gas: High Level Gas (HLG)
3 LEL.m
1ooN
HLG
2ooN
5ppm
1ooN
Confirmed Gas
Detector Fault
Combustible - Line of Sight (LOS) Gas Detection
Confirmed Gas
Detector Fault
Toxic Gas Detection - Field
Unconfirmed - Low Toxic Gas (LTG)
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Description
Set
Point
Voting
Unconfirmed - High Toxic Gas (HTG)
15ppm
1ooN
HLG
2ooN
Unconfirmed Gas: Low Level Gas (LLG)
15% LEL
1ooN
Unconfirmed Gas: High Level Gas (HLG)
40% LEL
1ooN
HLG
2ooN
Unconfirmed Gas: Low Level Gas (LLG)
10% LEL
1ooN
Unconfirmed Gas: High Level Gas (HLG)
25% LEL
1ooN
HLG
2ooN
Unconfirmed - Low Toxic Gas (LTG)
5ppm
1ooN
Unconfirmed - High Toxic Gas (HTG)
10ppm
1ooN
HTG
2ooN
Unconfirmed - Low H2 Gas (LH2G)
10% LEL
1ooN
Unconfirmed - High H2 Gas (HH2G)
25% LEL
1ooN
Confirmed H2 Gas
HHH2G
2ooN
19.5%
1ooN
19%
1ooN
LLO2LL
2ooN
Unconfirmed - Low SO2 Gas (LSO2G)
2.0%
1ooN
Unconfirmed - High SO2 Gas (HSO2G)
5%
1ooN
HHSO2
2ooN
1ppm%
1ooN
Unconfirmed - High CL2 Gas (HSO2G)
3ppm
1ooN
Confirmed High CL2
HCL2
2ooN
5,000ppm
1ooN
Confirmed Toxic Gas
Detector Fault
Combustible - Point Gas Detection (external)
Confirmed Gas
Detector Fault
Combustible - Point Gas Detection (HVAC inlet)
Confirmed Gas
Detector Fault
Toxic Gas Detection - Buildings & Enclosures
Confirmed Toxic Gas
Detector Fault
Hydrogen: Battery Room
Detector Fault
Oxygen: Enclosures
Unconfirmed - Low O2 Gas (LO2G)
Unconfirmed - Low Low O2 Gas (LLO2G)
Confirmed Low O2 Level
Sulphur Dioxide (SO2)
Confirmed High SO2
Chlorine (Cl2)
Unconfirmed - Low CL2 Gas (LSO2G)
Carbon Dioxide (CO2)
Unconfirmed - Low CO2 Gas (LCO2G)
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Description
Unconfirmed - High CO2 Gas (HCO2G)
Confirmed High CO2
Set
Point
Voting
30,000ppm
1ooN
HCO2G
2ooN
to be
advised by
COMPANY
1ooN
Ammonia (NH3)
Unconfirmed - Low NH3 Gas (NH3G)
Unconfirmed - High NH3 Gas (HNH3G)
Confirmed High NH3
1ooN
2ooN
Detector Fault
Manual Call-Point
Pushed
Activated
Activated
Detector Fault
It should be noted that Table 7-2 is an indicative example, and that Project-specific inputs Shall need to be
defined, and submitted for COMPANY review, independent of the Project.
The Voting requirements mentioned in column 3, Shall be in line with Section 5.2 of This Standard.
7.3.2
F&G System – OUTPUTS (Effects)
This Section describes the ‘Output’ logic interfaces, which are summarised in Table 7-3
Any situation requiring PA/GA should be routed from the F&G system through the Telecoms systems.
Table 7-3: Example F&G Protection Logic – Output Signals (Effects)
Ref.
Equipment
Location
Philosophy
1
PAS HMI
ICSS
All signals Shall be communicated to ICSS and Shall raise
Alarm on HMI in the CCR.
2
F&G System to
ESD (/SIS)
Intertrips
LER Building
The Philosophy for Executive Action on F&G Detection Shall
be aligned with the Project HSE Philosophy.
Telecoms
(Audible / Visual
Alarms)
Field Alarms
3
Executive Actions Shall be implemented through an
independent high-integrity ESD system.
The Alarm action on F&G Detection Shall be aligned with the
Project-specific HSE Philosophy. The definition Shall reflect
response to the following inputs:






Hazard type (fire, flammable gas, etc.)
Detection Integrity (unconfirmed/ confirmed)
Location (local /Remote)
Sound (type / frequency)
Visual (colours).
Etc.
An example of Alarm strategy is shown in 0.
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Ref.
Equipment
4
Location
Philosophy
Field Building
(/ LERs)
All field /plant area Alarms Shall be repeated in any Buildings
(/enclosure /LER) to ensure any personnel in the enclosure
are warned about any incident in the plant areas.
5
Fire Dampers
Building (&
LERs)
It Shall be possible to close local Fire Dampers directly from
the F&G system for any Building (/ enclosure) where the
signal is detected.
6
F&G System to
HVAC PLC
Intertrips
(Un)Manned
Building
F&G Signals Shall be communicated directly to HVAC
Systems to perform actions in accordance with the Project
HSE Philosophy and Vendor Package Requirements (could
vary depending on whether building /enclosure is manned or
unmanned).
7
Signal to
Package(s)
Package
Control
F&G Signals Shall be communicated directly to a Vendor
Package PLC for it to implement the Project HSE Philosophy
within the Package).
8
Maintenance
All
Provision Shall be made for on-line maintenance of F&G
components. A Project-specific philosophy Shall be
developed to clarify the impact of maintenance outage on
voting logic (e.g. resort to 1ooN for confirmed signal for the
duration of maintenance).
It should be noted that Table 7-3 is an indicative example, and that a Project-specific list may deviate from
this due to specific circumstances.
Project-specific Outputs Shall be identified and defined, and submitted for COMPANY review, independent
of the Project.
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8
RELIABILITY & AVAILABILITY
It is noted that the F&G system is prone to ‘Un-revealed’ failures, meaning that it could be in the failed (Unavailable) state when a Major Accident event occurs.
Key requirements for ensuring the Availability of the F&G system are summarised in Table 8-1.
Table 8-1: Reliability / Availability of F&G System
Ref.
Feature
Philosophy
1.
Maintenance
Provision Shall be made within the design for on-line maintenance and testing of
the overall F&G system, without interrupting production.
2.
Maintenance
Sufficient fire and gas detection redundancy Shall be provided in all areas to allow
maintenance of one device without compromising the function.
3.
F&G
Solver
Logic
Cable routing (e.g. via common junction boxes) Shall ensure multiple devices are
not taken out of service during maintenance.
The F&G logic solver Shall be selected such that its probability of failure on
demand (PFD) Shall not constrain the overall performance of the F&G system
(i.e. logic solver element Shall have a minimum of SIL 3).
In order to manage the issue of F&G System Availability, it is important to periodically test the overall system
and its components (items 1 & 2 in Table 7-1).
Item 3 requires that the F&G logic solver Shall be selected such that it will not be a constraint on the overall
Availability of the F&G system.
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9
SURVIVABILITY
In view of the F&G system being one of the HSE Critical Systems, key components Shall be designed to
continue to perform during a Major Accident event; see Reference 9.
The survivability requirements of the system are summarised in Table 9-1.
Table 9-1: Survivability
Ref.
Major
Accident
Feature
Philosophy
1.
Explosion
Detection
Devices
The Hazardous Area rating of F&G Detection Devices Shall be
suitable to continue operation during a Major Accident event,
and not present a risk of igniting a gas cloud.
All the field devices are rated for Zone 1 minimum
2.
Fire
&
Explosion
Cabling (& signal
transmission)
Cables used for the fire and gas detection system in external
areas Shall be fire resistant according to IEC 60331.
Cable routing for voted fire and gas detection input circuits from
any one area Shall be diverse where practicable, by cabling to
alternate junction boxes.
3.
Fire
&
Explosion
ICSS (F&G logic)
Document No: AGES-PH-03-002 (Part-2)
F&G system logic and signals Shall be protected against major
accident events (fire, explosion, dropped objects) to ensure any
‘energise to operate’ functions (e.g. deluge valves) are able to
fulfil their safety critical function.
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10
DEPENDENCIES & INTERACTIONS
The F&G System is reliant on the correct functioning and interfacing with a number of other HSE Critical
Systems. A list of these Dependencies and Interactions is given in Table 10-1.
Table 10-1: List of Dependencies & Interactions
Ref.
Measure
Reason for Dependency / Interaction
1.
Ignition Prevention
To ensure that detectors are not an ignition source.
2.
Emergency Shutdown
To implement executive actions (alarm and isolate process when
prompted by the F&G system).
3.
Active Fire Protection
To start fire pumps and open relevant deluge valve; or
To operate other fire suppression systems
4.
HVAC Systems
HVAC shuts down automatically on fire & gas detection.
5.
Public Address & General
Alarm
Provide signal to enunciate plant Alarm.
6.
Emergency
Communications
To allow head count of personnel and general coordination of
emergency response.
7.
Emergency
Power (UPS)
(Essential)
Document No: AGES-PH-03-002 (Part-2)
Battery backed power supply to ensure ‘energise to operate’
signals can be initiated.
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F&G DEVICES – FEATURES
See Table 6-2: List of F&G Devices Typically Used for Index
Single IR
These shall not be used.
Triple IR
Detector Type
FLAME
Sub-Type
Triple IR
Principle of Operation
The signals from both sensors are analysed for frequency, intensity and
duration. Simultaneous matching of radiant energy in triple IR sensors triggers
an alarm signal.
Main Usage
Equipment
Outdoor, unobstructed view. Optical flame detection should be the default for
hydrocarbon fire risk applications unless optics technology is not applicable.
Indoor/Outdoor
Ventilation
Chemicals
Multi-wavelength (triple band) infra-red fire detection is the recommended
detector type and Should be selected for detection of hydrocarbon gas and
liquid fires, hydrogen fires and alcohol fires in open plant areas
Restrictions/Limitations
Single or dual wavelength IR (infra-red) detectors Should not be used due to
interference / spurious alarms from metal surfaces subject to direct sunlight.
Detector layout Should be such as to ensure that the effectiveness of the flame
detectors is not impaired by the facilities. Fires in adjacent areas, UV flare
reflections or platform lighting are not to be visible to the detectors or cause
false alarms, otherwise shielding should be employed, where necessary
detectors Should be protected against mechanical damage.
Optical flame detectors Should be selected and placed such that solar
interference (sunlight), artificial lighting, or regularly modulated (vibrating)
black body radiation does not cause false alarms.
Characteristics
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Positioning
The detectors are normally corner mounted in a diagonal arrangement to
maximise coverage of the protected region in areas where a release of
Hydrocarbons may be ignited.
For less congested or open areas, two detectors should be placed at two
corners, or other locations, offering maximum un-obstructed views of
equipment. For congested areas, three or four (dependent on the level of
congestion) detectors should be placed at three or four corners, or other
locations, offering maximum un-obstructed views of equipment.
Flame detectors should be elevated to provide the greatest unobstructed view
of the equipment while still accessible for maintenance and inspection.
Detectors are installed from 3 m to 4 m above local deck, floor or grade for
fires at or below installed installations. Flame detectors Should be oriented at
an angle of pitch between 5 degrees and 40 degrees below horizontal, to
promote natural drainage of any condensed water or rain and to reduce
accumulation of dust, ice, snow or debris.
Range
Range of detection more than 10m distance and can be up to 50m but may
need to be set to a shorter distance to identify a specific hazard and allow for
dust and fog.
Field of View
Detector cone of vision Should be greater than or equal to 90 degrees.
Typically, 120° horizontal and 80° vertical field can be achieved.
Sensitivity
Normally 100Kw (Radiant Heat Output) RHO or greater.
High Sensitivity Case 50kW RHO fire.
Fire detection targets for flaming fires Should be specified in terms of viewing
distances obtained from a 1 ft2 (0,1 m2) n-heptane pool fire in accordance with
FM 3260.
Response Time
The response time Should be equal to or better than 3 seconds
Voting Pattern
Both IR and CCTV type detectors Should be treated as generic flame detection
devices i.e. both device types Should be considered the same with respect to
alarm and voting logic.
Power Supply
24 V DC operation
Output
4-20mA Analogue outputs should be used for flame detectors as well where
available due to lower un-revealed failures.
The detector alarms Should be latching type and alarms (alarms including
malfunction) Should automatically reset following the restoration of normal
conditions.
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Diagnostics
Built-in test facilities Should be provided for checking the detector on line and
to detect the build-up of contaminants. Flame detectors should be function
tested using a test source operated remotely.
Analogue devices can be HART compatibles to provide enhanced diagnostic
data to be collected by the F&G system.
Mountings
Maintenance
&
Detectors Should be provided with following for testing/maintenance of the
detectors as below.
a) Detectors installed at a height less than 3000 mm from the ground level
Should have a step platform (with protection guard / hand rail) at appropriate
height, so that the detector Should be accessed for maintenance at a height
of 1200mm from the platform level Access Should be provided to the platform
in form or step.
b) Detector installed at a height above 3000mm from ground level Should have
access platform (with protection guard / hand rail) at appropriate height so that
the detector Should be accessed at a height of 1200mm from the platform.
Access Should be provided to the platform in form of caged ladder.
References
Codes
CCTV (Video)
Detector Type
FLAME
Sub-Type
Optical-Video Image Flame Detection (VIFD)
Principle of Operation
VIFD detect hydrocarbon fires by implementing complex fire pattern
recognition algorithm
Main Usage
Equipment
Indoor/Outdoor
Ventilation
Chemicals
Restrictions/Limitations
Outdoor, unobstructed view. Used for flare area where other optical detectors
may generate false alarms. General purpose CCTV may be used to support
F&G detection across facilities or in high risk areas for the following reasons:
 Speed up diagnosis of causes of alarms.
 Eliminate sending people into potentially hazardous situations.
 Enable better decisions on follow-up actions.
Any with visible/IR flame.
Expensive and not cost effective in congested areas.
Note that video requirement should not normally be used by COMPANY.
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General purpose CCTV with control room monitors should not be considered
replacements for effective F&G detection.
Characteristics
Positioning
Range
CCTVs for VIFD should be elevated to provide the greatest unobstructed view
of the equipment while still accessible for maintenance and inspection.
Detectors are installed from 3 m to 4 m above local deck, floor or grade for
fires at or below installed installations.
Up to 40m optical viewing or up to 65m detect fires.
Field of View
65 degrees vertical to 90 degrees horizontal.
Sensitivity
0.1 m2 n-Heptane pan fire. Sensitivity-Distance by manufacturer.
Response Time
The response time Should be equal to or better than 4 seconds.
Voting Pattern
Video image flame detectors may not normally be used to initiate automatic
control actions. Both IR and CCTV type detectors Should be treated as
generic flame detection devices i.e. both device types Should be considered
the same with respect to alarm and voting logic.
Flame simulation.
Diagnostics
Mountings &
Maintenance
If CCTV systems are used, then the lenses Should either be self-cleaning, or
be easily accessed for cleaning. The swivelling mounting bracket ensures that
the device is optimally aimed towards potential sources of fire.
References
Rate of Rise
Detector Type
Rate of Rise Heat Detector
Sub-Type
Thermovelocimetric
Principle of Operation
This detector trips when a predetermined or pre-set temperature rise is
reached.
Main Usage
Equipment
Indoor/Outdoor
Ventilation
Rate compensation rate-of-rise detectors Should be used in areas where
the ambient temperature is high and where temperature variation can
occur in normal operating conditions, in order to have more reliable heat
detection while avoiding false alarms.
Thermovelocimetric heat detectors Should be used:
 Turbine hoods for the gas compression
 Transformers and diesel engine enclosure
 Machinery enclosures (Gas turbine enclosure)
 Near transformers outside the buildings where installed.
 Inside the diesel generator enclosure.
 Battery rooms.
Characteristics
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Positioning
Sensitivity
Response Time
Voting Pattern
When voting logic is applied the maximum distance between two detectors
should not exceed 1 meter.
Rate-of-rise alarm point of 7 - 9°C per minute. The criterion of rate-of-rise is
normally more than 5°C/min.
For heat detectors 5 minutes (time interval between the start of the
phenomena and the time when the response reaches a stated indication).
Rate of Rise type detectors Should be treated as generic fire detection
devices.
i.e. both device types Should be considered the same with respect to alarm
and voting logic.
Two UV Flame detectors with voting logic 2oo2 and two ROR detectors with
voting logic 2oo2 Should be installed in the emergency generator area. Cross
voting of UV/IR and ROR detectors Should prevail.
Confirmed fire detection Should:
 Raise general fire alarm locally and in the control room
 Shutdown exhaust fan of the battery room.
 Actuate the local total flooding extinguishing system in room (if provided)
 Close the fire dampers (inlet/outlet) to the battery room or diesel
generator if not started
Fire detection Should be monitored by the LCP fire and gas system. The LCP
Should initiate local alarms and Should also stop the normal ventilation and
trigger the fire fighting system (i.e. close the dampers and inert gas total
flooding). All info Should be relayed to fire zone and plant F&G system.
References
Codes
EN54-5 A1 standard
NFPA 72
Fixed Heat Detection
Detector Type
Heat Detector
Sub-Type
Point- Bi-metallic strip
Principle of Operation
A bimetallic strip is used to convert a temperature change into mechanical
displacement. The strip consists of two strips of different metals which expand
at different rates as they are heated, usually steel and copper, or in some
cases steel and brass.
Thermocouples have good characteristics such as simplicity, ease of use and
their speed of response to changes in temperature, due mainly to their small
size. Thermocouples also have the widest temperature range of all the
temperature sensors from below -200oC to well over 2000oC.
Thermocouples are thermoelectric sensors that basically consists of two
junctions of dissimilar metals, such as copper and constantan that are welded
or crimped together. One junction is kept at a constant temperature called the
reference (Cold) junction, while the other the measuring (Hot) junction. When
the two junctions are at different temperatures, a voltage is developed across
the junction which is used to measure the temperature sensor as shown
below.
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ADNOC Classification: Internal
Main Usage
Equipment
Indoor/Outdoor
Ventilation
Bimetallic strips may be used in situations (e.g., gas turbine enclosures,
ventilation ducts for gas turbines).
Restrictions/Limitations
All types of long-element bimetal strip thermostats should be recalibrated at
intervals, since the strip is subject to gradual changes (creep) that affect the
thermostat setting.
Characteristics
Diagnostics
For heat detectors 5 minutes (time interval between the start of the
phenomena and the time when the response reaches a stated indication).
Heat detectors should be function tested in situ.
Detector Type
Heat Detector
Sub-Type
Point-Thermistor
Principle of Operation
A thermistor is a special type of resistor which changes its physical resistance
when exposed to changes in temperature. Thermistors are generally made
from ceramic materials such as oxides of nickel, manganese or cobalt coated
in glass which makes them easily damaged. Their main advantage over snapaction types is their speed of response to any changes in temperature,
accuracy and repeatability.
Response Time
Main Usage
Characteristics
Positioning
Sensitivity
Response Time
Diagnostics
Heat detectors Should be rated for ceiling installation at a minimum of 21 m
centres.
Fixed temperature heat detectors Should have a low mass thermistor heat
sensor and operate at a fixed temperature. It Should continually monitor the
temperature of the air in its surroundings to minimise thermal lag to the time
required to process an alarm. Heat detectors Should have a nominal alarm
point rating of 38°C above expected ambient.
For heat detectors 5 minutes (time interval between the start of the
phenomena and the time when the response reaches a stated indication).
Heat detectors should be function tested in situ.
References
Detector Type
Heat Detector
Sub-Type
Point-Eutectic metal alloy
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Principle of Operation
eutectic metal alloy (melting/fusible plug)
Main Usage
Equipment
Indoor/Outdoor
Ventilation
Most common indoor usage type.
Heat detectors Should be used to detect fire in confined or polluted areas,
turbine enclosures, etc. where optical detectors may be difficult to use or will
have spurious alarms.
Characteristics
Positioning
Response Time
Diagnostics
Heat detectors Should be suitable for ceiling installation at a minimum of 21m
centres.
Heat detectors Should monitor approximately 50 m2, for coincident detection,
or in accordance with the manufacturer’s recommendations.
Where there is an executive action, 2 detectors Should be installed per 50 m²
(as per BS 7273). These 2 detectors Should be installed on separate loops.
When installed for alarm only, one detector per 50 m² with a maximum of 6
detectors per loop Should be provided.
For heat detectors 5 minutes (time interval between the start of the
phenomena and the time when the response reaches a stated indication).
Detector Should be provided with suitable in line and end-of-line resistors, for
monitoring open and short circuit faults
References
LHD (e.g. fire wire)
Detector Type
Heat Detector
Sub-Type
Linear Heat Detection Cables
Principle of Operation
The sensor cable Should be comprised of two steel conductors individually
insulated with a heat sensitive polymer. At a rated temperature, the heat
sensitive polymer insulation yields to the pressure upon it and permits the
conductors to move into contact with each other thereby initiating an alarm
signal. The action can take place at any point along the cable length where
the heating occurs.
Main Usage
Equipment
Indoor/Outdoor
Ventilation
Restrictions/Limitations
Electrical linear heat detection should be used only when other technologies
are not effective such as tank rim seal, heavily congested plant areas or where
flare radiation may cause false alarms using optical detectors. Applications
include floating roof tank rim seal fire detection, transformers, and cable
cellars. For floating roof tanks, inside the tank, linear heat sensors to be used.
Electrical linear heat detection should not be used, except in applications for
which other technologies are not effective, due to relative insensitivity and
susceptibility to mechanical damage.
Characteristics
Positioning
Linear heat sensing cable Should be arranged to alarm at multiple levels in,
cable galleries, etc. for effective detection.
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Range
Measuring temperature range from -55°C up to 180°C maximum
Response Time
For heat detectors 5 minutes
Voting Pattern
In the event of mechanical damage to the sensor cable, a fault signal Should
be alarmed.
Mountings &
Maintenance
The linear heat detector cable Should be terminated in a metallic Exd junction
box and provided with Exd/ Exe cable glands with shrouds.
Linear heat detectors Should be supplied complete with mounting clamps and
accessories.
References
Detector Type
Heat Detection
Sub-Type
Fibre Optic Linear Heat Detector
Principle of Operation
Linear heat detection system Should be based on FO sensing cables which
can provide a continuous temperature profile along the length of the sensing
cable.
Main Usage
Equipment
Indoor/Outdoor
Ventilation
Optical linear heat detection should not be used, except in applications for
which other technologies are not effective.
A frequent use is on LNG un/loading lines where a temperature profile can be
used to detect leaks.
Chemicals
Restrictions/Limitations
Optical linear heat detection should not be used, except in applications for
which other technologies are not effective, due to relative insensitivity and
susceptibility to mechanical damage.
Characteristics
Positioning
At least two cables positioned along the length of a pipeline. Useful where a
leak would give an abnormal temperature.
Response Time
For heat detectors 5 minutes (time interval between the start of the
phenomena and the time when the response reaches a stated indication).
The Linear Heat Detection System controller Should be self-contained,
carrying out internal diagnostics, checks, and performing calculations to arrive
at temperature profiles along the length of each fibre optic sensing cable.
Output
References
Fusible Plug
Detector Type
Heat Detector
Sub-Type
Fusible plugs (loops)
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Principle of Operation
The loop is pressurised with instrument air (or nitrogen) and the fusible plugs
melt at a pre-set temperature (38C above ambient or black body temperature).
The low loop pressure is used to initiate various actions.
Main Usage
Equipment
Indoor/Outdoor
Ventilation
Fusible plugs are good for outdoor use.
Fusible plugs Should be used in wellhead areas, around hydrocarbon pumps,
fuel/gas piping, etc. Fusible plugs Should be used as confirmed fire and can
initiate well shutdown.
Heat detectors such as fusible plug and fusible loop heat detector, Should be
provided for Detection system (in addition to Fire/ Flame detection) where
deluge water spray system is required.
triple IR detectors could be used in combination with fusible plugs especially
for gas compressors and loading pumps. The loop Should be pressurised with
instrument air, where active firewater systems (deluge valve actuation) are
installed and activate the concerned deluge system.
Characteristics
Positioning
Sensitivity
Response Time
Voting Pattern
Mountings &
Maintenance
For fusible plugs arrangement refers to Table C1 of API 14C.
The rule for fusible plug sitting is that the plugs are spaced at most 3m apart.
For horizontal vessels, the spacing Should be reduced to 1.50 m between
plugs.
(OD > 1.20 m) two parallel rows, i.e. rings
(OD < 1.20 m) a single row may be enough.
For vertical vessels, the maximum distance between detector and skirt Should
be 300 mm alongside each ring.
The rings Should be spaced at most 3 m apart along the vessel wall.
Fusible plugs Should be selected to melt at approximately 25°C higher than
the maximum ambient temperature. The set point should be 25C above black
body temperature of 85°C
For heat detectors 5 minutes (time interval between the start of the
phenomena and the time when the response reaches a stated indication).
For fusible plug loops, this Should be based on 1ooN logic as loss of pressure
initiates action.
Where transmitters are used, at least 3 PT (analogue pressure transmitters)
Should be installed on the fusible plug system to provide a 2oo3 voting logic
on the single loop where executive actions are required.
For small rooms which are not related to ESD, Electrical isolation and Total
gaseous flooding system, 1ooN logic is acceptable.
For machinery
enclosures or cases with a sensitive executive action a second loop can be
employed.
Tubing Should be of ½” OD (unless otherwise specified) and material Should
be SS316L. Tube fittings Should be of SS316L double compression fittings.
The fusible plug body material Should be SS316L with lead fuse. The fusible
plug connection Should be 1/4” NPT (M).
References
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Frangible Bulb
Detector Type
Heat Detector
Sub-Type
Pressurised plastic tubing (Linear)
Principle of Operation
Pressurised plastic tubing consists of fusible tube, made of plastic or any other
equivalent material, filled with air (or nitrogen) at 2 or 3 bars and connected to
an analogue pressure transmitter(s). They may be an alternative to networks
of fusible plugs, where general area detection is more suitable than multi-spot
detection
Main Usage
Equipment
Indoor/Outdoor
Ventilation
Heat detectors such as fusible plug and fusible loop heat detector, Should be
provided for Detection system (in addition to Fire/ Flame detection) where
deluge water spray system is required.
Restrictions/Limitations
Pressurised plastic tubing Should be certified for UV resistance when
installed in UV-exposed areas
Characteristics
Response Time
For heat detectors 5 minutes (time interval between the start of the
phenomena and the time when the response reaches a stated indication).
References
HSSD
Detector Type
Smoke Detectors
Sub-Type
High sensitivity smoke detectors
Principle of Operation
Laser-based aspirating
The system Should consist of a laser-based smoke detecting unit, an
aspirating fan / pump, a network of detector pipe work designated to monitor
the fire risk area. The alarms Should be interfaced with F&G system.
The early warning detection system aspirates ambient air in the monitored
zone into a pipe network through orifices and then pumps it to an analysis
chamber. When smoke particles are present, light is reflected to the optical
cell and alarms are activated.
The laser detection chamber Should use light scattering technology and be
capable of detecting a broad spectrum of smoke.
A particle counting method Should be employed for the purpose of monitoring
contamination (dust & dirt, etc.) to prevent nuisance alarms and to
automatically alert when maintenance is required.
Main Usage
Equipment
Indoor/Outdoor
Used for the early detection of incipient fires in control buildings, switchgear
rooms, system cabinets, Instrument rooms, Computer/Server rooms, Telecom
rooms.
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Ventilation
HSSD systems Should be used in rooms containing electrical or mechanical
equipment having no hydrocarbons providing protection for special equipment
such as control and safety system cabinets, electrical panels, emergency
power supplies, communication equipment, incident control centres, etc. by
early detection of small fires preventing escalation of fire scenario.
Chemicals
Restrictions/Limitations
Aspirating smoke detection should only be utilised where the following 4 (four)
conditions are met:
 Low voltage / sensitive electronic controls are present.
 The loss of this equipment means significant cost of repair and / or
production downtime.
 Emergency response personnel can be quickly mobilised.
 Room is not permanently manned.
Characteristics
Positioning
Response Time
Voting Pattern
Sampling points with tubing Should be provided for MCC, Switchgear
cabinets, room void, floor void and ceiling voids.
A clear distance of Should be maintained between sampling points and HVAC
supply diffusers/return louvers according to NFPA.
For projects at EPC the Supplier Should carry out dispersion modelling to
determine suitable locations / quantity of sampling points and distance from
smoke sources / potential fire hazardous to optimum system performance.
For smoke detectors 2 minutes (time interval between the start of the
phenomena and the time when the response reaches a stated indication).
HSSD detection Should not initiate Gas suppression system.
High sensitive smoke detection system Should as a minimum provides four
alarms levels (Alert, Action, Fire 1, Fire 2) for each sector pipe and the
sensitivity of each alarm level should be adjustable and set to ensure the
optimum alarm thresholds.
Power Supply
Output
HSSD panel Should be interfaced with local Fire Alarm Panel and the alarm
Should be repeated in the Control room.
HSSD Should be programmable and Should be provided with the following
outputs as a minimum:
a. Adjustable smoke threshold alarm levels.
b. Fault indications including airflow, detector monitoring, power etc.
c. Relay outputs for remote alarm indication and system fault conditions
Diagnostics
HSSD unit Should have display Should have to indicate the overall smoke
level, alarm thresholds and fault indication.
The system Should be microprocessor based with extensive self-diagnostic
features.
The system Should contain diagnostics to detect changes in air flow in excess
of ± 10 % from the commissioned value that could arise from broken or
blocked pipe work.
References
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Codes
HSSD systems Should be designed based on NFPA 76.
Further the selection of components, performance requirement and testing
Should conform to NFPA 76.
BFPSA Code of Practice for the design, commissioning, installation &
maintenance of aspirating smoke detection systems
NFPA-72.
Ionisation Point
This type shall not be used.
Optical Point (photoelectric)
Detector Type
Smoke Detectors
Sub-Type
Point Smoke Detectors
Principle of Operation
Photo-electric is the preferred technology. Photoelectric detectors Should
utilise a light scattering type photoelectric smoke sensor to sense changes in
air samples from its surroundings.
Main Usage
Equipment
Indoor/Outdoor
Ventilation
Point type optical smoke detectors should be used in areas with potential for
non-hydrocarbon fires and HVAC ducts.
Characteristics
Positioning
Smoke detection Should be installed in HVAC air intakes in areas that need
to remain manned during an emergency. Smoke detectors in ventilation
ductwork Should be installed away from duct corners and provided with all
necessary accessories to ensure proper detection of smoke inside the duct
and monitoring of detector status outside the ductworks. Air speed inside the
duct where the detector are to be located Should be critically evaluated for
proper operation of the devices.
Optical, Ionisation and Combined optical / heat smoke detectors Should
monitor approximately 100m2, for alarm only, or in accordance with the
manufacturer’s recommendations.
Smoke detector spacing Should be according to table below:
Maximum ground area
covered by a detector
Maximum distance
between detectors
Maximum
height
above the potential
hazard location
30 m2
8m
7.5 m
20 m2 in under floor
and false ceiling
A smaller area of coverage may be selected, depending to the hazard to be
protected against and the speed of alarm sought.
The detectors Should be evenly distributed about the premises, to ventilation
air inlet and outlet ducts and to temperatures near the ceiling.
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In premises where the air change rate is more than 12, a special study Should
be required.
The photoelectric smoke detector Should be rated for ceiling installation at a
minimum of 9.1 m centres
The photoelectric smoke detector Should be suitable for direct insertion into
air ducts up to 0.91 m high and 0.91 m wide with air velocities from 0 to 25.39
m/sec without requiring specific duct detector housings or supply tubes.
If executive action is not required only one loop needs to be installed with a
maximum of 6 detectors per loop if the system is not addressable.
Where there is an executive action, 2 detectors Should be installed
per 50 m² (as per BS 7273). These 2 detectors Should be installed
on separate loops. When installed for alarm only, one detector per
50 m² with a maximum of 6 detectors per loop should be provided.
Response Time
Voting Pattern
Diagnostics
Mountings &
Maintenance
For smoke detectors 2 minutes (time interval between the start of the
phenomena and the time when the response reaches a stated indication).
Maximum total addressable loop response time for detecting a changing state
Should be no longer than 2 seconds.
A separate loop Should be used for each room such as a battery room, UPS
room and control room.
Point smoke detectors should be tested using a test aerosol.
Each detector Should have a means of displaying alarm status. Each smoke
detector Should be capable of transmitting pre-alarm and alarm signals in
addition to diagnostic information. The detector Should be continually
monitored for any changes in sensitivity due to the environmental effects of
dirt, smoke, temperature, ageing and humidity.
It Should be possible to program control panel actions to each level. Each
smoke detector may be individually programmed to operate at any one of
three (minimum) sensitivity settings. Ambient thresholds Should be adjustable
automatically by the Fire Alarm panel, over suitable time periods, to cater for
gradual detector ageing and degradation.
Smoke detectors Should be suitable for ceiling mounting and Should be
supplied complete with all necessary accessories.
References
Open Path
Detector Type
Smoke Detectors
Sub-Type
Line of Sight Smoke Detectors
Principle of Operation
Open path infrared beam
Optical smoke detectors employ light scattering by smoke particles to detect
the presence of smoke. Optical smoke detectors are more sensitive to
starting and smouldering fires, they are recommended for electrical areas
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and areas containing hydrocarbon products, as these fires produce smoke
consistent with the particle size range.
Main Usage
Equipment
Indoor/Outdoor
Ventilation
Line of sight smoke detectors should be used in areas with potential for nonhydrocarbon fires where larger areas need to be covered. In large HVAC ducts
line of sight smoke detectors can be used to reduce the possibility of detector
bypass.
Characteristics
Range
Working range of 30m
Sensitivity
Set to alarm when the visibility changes by 11% over the path length.
Response Time
For smoke detectors 2 minutes (time interval between the start of the
phenomena and the time when the response reaches a stated indication).
Open path smoke detectors should be tested using optical filters.
Diagnostics
References
Codes
European Standard EN 54-20
Oil Mist
Detector Type
Oil Mist
Sub-Type
Oil Mist - infrared optical sensor
Principle of Operation
Oil mist detectors Should be based on infrared optical sensor technology.
The arrangement of Oil mist detection consists of two tubes of equal sizes. At
one end of each tube, a photo-electric cell is fixed. Photo-electric cells
generate an electric current when light falls on their surface. The amount of
electric current generated is directly proportional to the intensity of light falling
on it.
Main Usage
Equipment
Indoor/Outdoor
Ventilation
Chemicals
Restrictions/Limitations
Oil mist detection should be considered for all enclosed applications with a
potential of pressurised leakage of flammable liquid, when such leaks are
unlikely to be detected by gas detectors.
Turbine enclosures for instance have forced ventilation and both gas and oil
mist detection should be installed in the enclosures exhaust ducting. Also,
diesel or lubrication oil, machinery spaces and turbine exhaust ducts.
Due to the very low ignition temperature of oil mists, oil mist fire and explosion
can be a significant hazard in some installations.
Flammable oils
High air velocity (dependent on sensor)
Environments with steam and fog.
Obstacles to the flow of the particles
The sampling tubes that connect cylinders to the Oil mist detection should not
have any loops and also shouldn’t be of length more than 12.5 meters.
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Characteristics
Sensitivity
Mountings &
Maintenance
1 dB/m (equivalent to 22.3% obscuration/m)
The sensitivity of Oil mist detection should be checked on a regular basis. As
all the samples contain a small amount of mist, the lenses and mirrors tend to
get dirty and thus require periodic cleaning. The extractor fan and the rotating
valve should be checked to avoid chocking of a particular sampling tube.
References
Oil Leak
Seek industry guidance.
Hydrocarbon (IR Point)
Detector Type
Flammable Gas
Sub-Type
Point IR
Principle of Operation
Infrared gas detectors work based on the principle of infrared absorption. An
infrared source illuminates a volume of gas that has entered inside the
measurement chamber. The gas absorbs some of the infrared wavelengths
as the light passes through it, while others pass through it completely
unattenuated. The amount of absorption is related to the concentration of the
gas and is measured by a set of optical detectors and suitable electronic
systems.
Main Usage
Equipment
Indoor/Outdoor
Ventilation
Point type IR gas detector applications Should be used for all combustible gas
detectors except for H2 application. Point type IR detectors Should be used
where:
a. Space or congestion prohibits the use of open path gas detectors
b. For small enclosures / rooms (e.g. localised / small leaks);
c. HVAC systems.
The location and number of detectors required is a function of the particular
equipment design and layout; however they Should be located over obvious
potential leak points. Point infrared Flammable gas detectors Should be
placed in the vicinity of:
 Flanges of incoming trunk-lines
 Near ESD Valves
 All air intakes to equipment within the restricted area (including
furnaces and heaters)
 HVAC air inlet and air locks within the restricted area
 In the air intakes to gas turbine, power generation including ventilation
and combustion air.
 Inside turbine hoods
 Above the gas compressors
 At the gas compressor gas seals vent (for seal malfunction detection).
 The vicinity of electrical equipment not certified for use in a restricted
area.
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Chemicals
Restrictions/Limitations
 Hydrocarbon pumps
Infrared type gas detectors respond to a limited group of hydrocarbons
(alkanes and alkenes) and they cannot detect pure hydrogen.
IR gas detectors should not be used to detect gases that have no IR
absorption characteristics (e.g., hydrogen).
Characteristics
Positioning
Range
Gas detectors should be placed from 3 m to 4 m above local deck, floor or
grade to detect gas releases at or below installed elevations.
To detect light gases (MW <29) releases higher than 4 m above local deck,
floor or grade, one or more higher elevations of gas detectors may be required.
Not applicable. Requires gas to enter chamber.
Field of View
Not applicable.
Sensitivity
Gas concentration Should be measured and displayed with 0-100% LEL.
Response Time
Voting Pattern
Diagnostics
Alarm set limits Should follow the HSE philosophy. Sensor and transmitter
Should be integral by design.
Gas concentration Should be measured and displayed with 0-100% LEL.
Repeatability < 2% LEL
Should be calibrated for methane gas by default
With the point detectors placed initially in clean air and subjected to a
sudden increase of the gas concentration from 0% to 100% of the LEL, the
detection system Should be required to initiate its highest alarm level in less
than 10 seconds. This test Should be made on detectors equipped with their
accessories, such as active filters, collector cones.
Alarm can be at the lower level on 1ooN basis.
Gas detector initiated executive actions Should occur on the basis of a voting
logic of 2ooN, where N is the total number of detectors within a fire zone.
Executive actions Should only be initiated from danger level detection.
Standard IR gas detectors do not require field calibration and should be
function tested using optical filters.
The detector Should have a pre-warning feature that identifies the need for
maintenance whilst remaining fully functional
The flammable gas detector Should have a means to self-compensate and
automatically correct for small changes in the optical components removing
any drift.
Warning of window contamination Should be provided by an "optics require
cleaning" output and remain fully functional.
Optical Integrity test facility Should be provided in the point type gas detector.
References
Hydrocarbon (Open Path)
Detector Type
Flammable Gas
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Sub-Type
Open path/Line of Sight IR
Principle of Operation
Open path beam type gas detectors (or Line of Site detectors) Should operate
an infra-red light source that is transmitted between a transmitter and receiver.
Open path type gas detectors based on line of sight detection and Should be
microprocessor based and Infrared absorption single beam dual wave length
detector type.
Main Usage
Equipment
Indoor/Outdoor
Ventilation
Chemicals
Restrictions/Limitations
Line-of-sight detectors may be selected for monitoring potential leak points
from piping and equipment over large open areas.
The use of beam type gas detectors Should be limited to areas around the
process units, along peripheral roads of each process unit and at the plant
boundary with the flare area to detect flammable gas clouds moving to or from
the risk areas. In addition, beam gas detectors Should be located along the
length of the pipe rack where air cooler exchanger units are installed. Often
used in conjunction with point flammable gas detectors with line of site
detectors positioned at the periphery.
Infrared type gas detectors respond to a limited group of hydrocarbons
(alkanes and alkenes) and they cannot detect pure hydrogen.
Common operability issues are: misalignment from vibration or high winds,
beam block, steam traps, dirty optics.
Characteristics
Positioning
Range
Field of View
Sensitivity
Response Time
Voting Pattern
Diagnostics
Open path detection systems using separate transmitters and receivers
should be used in preference to combined transmitters and receivers using
reflector panels. Open path detectors require a clear and open (i.e.,
unobstructed) path approximately 0.3m diameter and therefore Should be
applied with caution in congested areas and Should be given assessed to
ensure that detection is effective.
The gas detectors Should be used for an optimum distance of 20-30m for
offshore facilities and 30 - 60 meters for onshore facilities.
Linear, 0.3m diameter.
Gas concentration Should be measured and displayed with 0-5 LEL-m
The detector Should have local LCD digital display of gas concentrations. Gas
concentration Should be in path average LEL meters for the specified
composition.
Response time Should be better than 2 seconds following step change in
concentration.
Alarm can be at the lower level on 1ooN basis.
Gas detector initiated executive actions Should occur on the basis of a voting
logic of 2ooN, where N is the total number of detectors within a fire zone.
Executive actions Should only be initiated from danger level detection.
The detector Should have a pre-warning feature that identifies the need for
maintenance whilst remaining fully functional
Open path type gas detectors Should have provision to eliminate nuisance
alarms in the event of short-term beam blockage (e.g. person crossing beam
path) and have automatic gain control. Blocked beam Should raise an alarm
(<4mA) after an adjustable time delay.
Solar interference (sunlight) and vibration Should not cause false alarms.
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Mountings &
Maintenance
Optical test filters Should be provided to test function and accuracy of the
detector. Optical Integrity test facility Should be provided in the open path
optical gas detector.
Open path gas detectors should be mounted on rigid structures not subject to
vibration or movement (e.g. structural steel members).
Transmitters and receivers Should allow easy horizontal and vertical
adjustment of 45 degrees.
References
Hydrogen (Catalytic Bead)
Detector Type
Hydrogen Detector
Sub-Type
Electrochemical cell
Principle of Operation
Electrochemical cell type detection is recommended as Hydrogen has no
infrared absorption characteristics.
Main Usage
Equipment
Indoor/Outdoor
Ventilation
Chemicals
Battery Rooms / Electro-chlorination Unit
Restrictions/Limitations
2-4 years usage.
Hydrogen
Characteristics
Positioning
Sensitivity
Response Time
Lighter than air gases, detectors placed at highest ceiling points. Hydrogen
detector should be installed at the highest, draft-free location in the battery
room or compartment where hydrogen gas would accumulate.
Measurement range coverage of 0.1–10.0% concentration. Set points are
10% and 25% LEL.
< 1 second
Acoustic
Detector Type
Leak detection
Sub-Type
Acoustic
Principle of Operation
Ultrasonic gas leak detectors can be used to detect leaks based on changes
in the background noise due sound generated by escaping high pressure gas
Main Usage
Equipment
Indoor/Outdoor
Ventilation


Acoustic leak detection may be used for detection of high pressure gas
releases in combination with conventional detection (open path / point).
Acoustic detection may not be used as the prime detection technology;
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


Restrictions/Limitations
Acoustic detection may not be used for detection of liquid releases and
gas accumulation hazards.
In situations where high pressure gas releases are difficult to detect with
conventional gas detection (e.g. releases from elevated sources).
Interfering ultrasonic noise from equipment in the area is masked out and
does not give spurious detection or prevent detection
For low pressure gas detection (≤4 bara) acoustic gas detector Should not be
used.
Acoustic detectors Should not be used for detection of liquid releases.
This technology cannot be used alone in facility without other type of
detectors. In particular as the response time is 20-30 seconds ultrasonic gas
detection Should not be used alone for toxic gas detection.
Caution is needed with respect to spurious trips from Acoustic detectors
during drilling campaigns due to 'new' background noise sources.
Characteristics
Positioning
Range
Sensitivity
Response Time
Diagnostics
Acoustic Leak detectors should be installed above or adjacent to potential leak
sources (typically within 3 meters). Acoustic leak detectors require a clear field
of view in an unobstructed cone around the detector.
When used, background ultrasonic levels within the detection area should be
considered to optimise alarm threshold limits, detector location, time delays,
etc.
Ultrasonic detectors can usually detect at the performance standard leak
rate of 0.1 kg/s (ref: methane) or 0.01 kg/s (ref: hydrogen) within a radius
of 9-12m in normal process areas and 5-8 m in compressor areas.
These detectors Should be based on the microphone technology sensitive
to high frequency sound (25 kHz to 70 kHz range).
When used, background ultrasonic levels within the detection area should be
considered to optimise alarm threshold limits, detector location, time delays,
etc.
Use of time delays should be minimised and Should not exceed 30 s. Whilst
these detectors theoretically have an instantaneous response, a delay
time Should be incorporated in order to reduce spurious alarms to an
acceptable level. It is noted that this delay is typically of the order of 20-30
seconds and therefore ultrasonic gas detection Should not be used alone
for toxic gas detection.
Ultrasonic gas leak detectors should be function tested using the built-in “selfverification” test. Only leak detectors with integrated acoustic self-test function
or fault-identifying diagnostics Should be used.
The unit Should be fitted with an integrated piezo-based acoustic (nonmechanical) integrity test. In intervals, an external transducer transmits an
acoustic test signal to check that the microphone is within the correct
tolerances.
References
Codes
ASTM E 1002
Aspirator (smoke, toxic & flam.)
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TBA
Toxic (H2S, Point)
Detector Type
Toxic Gas
Sub-Type
H2S detector – Semiconductor/Solid State
Principle of Operation
Semiconductor / solid state type for the desert plants. Physical reaction
principle: adsorption. The selected sensor Should be free from „sleep‟ effect
and Should not require frequent calibration (no more than once in a year).
Main Usage
Equipment
Indoor/Outdoor
Ventilation
All air intakes and air locks to buildings within restricted area
All air intakes to manned areas outside the restricted area
Near seals of gas compressors handling H2S;
Near pumps handling fluids containing H2S;
Near group of control valves handling fluids containing H2S;
Within sulphur recovery unit and amine treatment, around the flanges of
equipment used to remove H2S, (typically at valves and connecting flanges),
and along the flow path of H2S-laden effluents.
Along main access ways and along escape and evacuation routes at intervals
not exceeding 100 m.
Between Flares if flaring toxic gases.
Chemicals
See text for concentrations for which H2S detection required.
Restrictions/Limitations
Semi-conductor
No wear/aging. Not sensitive to ambient humidity (0 to 99%RH)
Not sensitive to ambient temperature (-40°C to 90°C)
Loss of speed of response / calibration to be done
Theoretical life time: 4 to 6 years. Slow end of life
Insensitive to other gases. When not regularly exposed to H2S
concentrations, semi-conductor H2S detectors may lose their speed of
response for low concentrations, whose effect is usually reversible; therefore,
they Should be exposed to H2S every 3 months.
Characteristics
Positioning
Sensitivity
Response Time
H2S detectors installed outdoors along evacuation paths Should be located
0.5 to 0.75 m from the ground.
Concentrations of H2S gas Should be measured and displayed over the
selectable range of 0-50 ppm.
Open path H2S detectors are becoming available. For open path H2S
detectors, alarm levels should be set at or below 30 ppm-m
For H2S detectors < 30 seconds
For gas detectors in HVAC < 60 seconds
Semi-conductor
The H2S detector semi-conductor Should work at a stable temperature
defined by the Manufacturer (not varying more than 1°C) which also
protects the sensitive element from surrounding humidity, and it Should
be systematically isolated from the atmosphere through a flame guard
Document No: AGES-PH-03-002 (Part-2)
Rev. 01
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ADNOC Classification: Internal
and a sintered element. Fouling in the sintered element can cause an
increase in the response time of detection system.
References
Detector Type
Toxic Gas
Sub-Type
H2S detector – electrochemical type
Principle of Operation
Electro-chemical type Should be used, especially for the installations where
the atmosphere is wet and humid. Chemical reaction principle.
Main Usage
Equipment
Indoor/Outdoor
Ventilation
Chemicals
Restrictions/Limitations
All air intakes and air locks to buildings within restricted area
All air intakes to manned areas outside the restricted area
Near seals of gas compressors handling H2S;
Near pumps handling fluids containing H2S;
Near group of control valves handling fluids containing H2S;
Within sulphur recovery unit and amine treatment, around the flanges of
equipment used to remove H2S, (typically at valves and connecting flanges),
and along the flow path of H2S-laden effluents.
Along main access ways and along escape and evacuation routes at intervals
not exceeding 100 m.
Between Flares if flaring toxic gases.
See text for concentrations for which H2S detection required.
Electro-chemical
Sensitive to wear/aging. Sensitive to humidity (20% to 80% RH)
Sensitive to temperature (maxi 40°/45°C).
Affected by other gases (false alarms)
Response time increasing with temperature
Typical T50 at 30 seconds for a full-range (20 ppm) equivalent concentration
gas
Life time: 1 to 2 years. Sudden failure of the detector (no self-monitoring).
Characteristics
Positioning
Sensitivity
H2S detectors installed outdoors along evacuation paths Should be located
0.5 to 0.75 m from the ground.
Concentrations of H2S gas Should be measured and displayed over the
selectable range of 0-50 ppm. Open path H2S detectors are becoming
available. For open path H2S detectors, alarm levels should be set at or below
30 ppm-m.
Open path hydrocarbon gas detectors Should not be used to give the actual
H2S concentration, only an indication of its presence. Indications of H2S can
be obtained for path lengths less than 7 m. This stipulation is because with
long paths lengths it would not be known whether there was a low
concentration over a long path or a dangerously high concentration over a
short path. Use of physical or chemical filters before the sensors Should only
Document No: AGES-PH-03-002 (Part-2)
Rev. 01
Page 59 of 65
ADNOC Classification: Internal
be accepted if the sensors’ sensitivity and detection speed are not altered by
same.
Response Time
For H2S detectors < 30 seconds
For gas detectors in HVAC < 60 seconds
References
Detector Type
Toxic Gas
Sub-Type
Cl2 detector
Principle of Operation
Solid state/ electrochemical cell type with electrodes
Main Usage
Equipment
Indoor/Outdoor
Ventilation
Cl2 Detectors Should be provided to chlorine packages.
Chemicals
Chlorine
Restrictions/Limitations
2-4 years usage.
Characteristics
Positioning
Heavier than air gas. Locate 0.5 to 0.75 m from the ground. Place 3 or 4
detectors around each leak source. 5m spacing.
Range
Not Applicable.
Field of View
Not Applicable.
Sensitivity
Concentration of Cl2 gas Should be measured and displayed over the
selectable range of 0-20 ppm.
For Cl2 detectors < 30 seconds
For gas detectors in HVAC < 60 seconds
Raise alarm in main control room and fire zone concerned
An individual visual alarm (red flashing light) on the concerned matrix panel.
Response Time
Voting Pattern
References
Asphyxiant (Low Oxygen)
Detector Type
Oxygen Depletion
Sub-Type
Electrochemical cell
Document No: AGES-PH-03-002 (Part-2)
Rev. 01
Page 60 of 65
ADNOC Classification: Internal
Principle of Operation
Electrochemical cell devices may be used for hydrogen and oxygen depletion
detection.
Main Usage
Equipment
Indoor/Outdoor
Ventilation
Chemicals
Restrictions/Limitations
Analyser House, Enclosed & Confined Spaces and pits where heavier than
air gases can collect. Warehouses where gas cylinders are held.
Fixed detectors specific to the asphyxiant gases or detecting oxygen depletion
should be installed in enclosed spaces where there is a threat to personnel
and personnel may be present.
Low Oxygen
Due to poor reliability and undetected failures, electrochemical cell devices
should not be solely relied upon for personnel safety.
Characteristics
Positioning
Sensitivity
Voting Pattern
Position between 0.9 – 1.2m height from floor. If risk arises specifically from
heavier than air gases position at low level where oxygen deficiency more
likely.
Set at 19% of oxygen volume
Initiate audible and visual indication inside the house, initiate visual indication
outside the house and notification at a manned location
Low Temperature Detector
Seek industry guidance
Distributed Temperature Sensor
Seek industry guidance
Manual Alarm Call Point
Detector Type
Manual Call Point
Main Usage
Equipment
Indoor/Outdoor
Ventilation
Manual fire alarm station devices Should be located at exits on designated
escape routes.
Characteristics
Positioning
MACPs Should be mounted not less than 1.1m and note more than 1.37m
above floor level. MACPs must be conspicuous, unobstructed and readily
accessible.
Spacing per COMPANY Standard - 50m for open areas and 30m in confined
spaces.
MAC locations Should have a common layout in identical process units for
familiarity.
Document No: AGES-PH-03-002 (Part-2)
Rev. 01
Page 61 of 65
ADNOC Classification: Internal
Voting Pattern
Maximum personnel travel on designated escape routes from exited area to
nearest station Should be determined by national standards but Should not
exceed 60 m
Manual alarm call points Should be positioned so that they stand out against
the background, they Should be clearly recognizable from a distance.
If the travel distance between exits exceeds the maximum limit, additional
manual fire alarm stations Should be positioned throughout the designated
escape routes
The role of manual fire alarms Should be clearly defined, and personnel
properly trained in their use. If manual stations are to be used to raise alarms
for events other than fire and gas release, uniquely identified stations should
be provided for these extra functions including ESD.
Pushbuttons with executive function (ESD) Should be physically separate
from MACs
Manual Alarm Call points inside the Fire Zone Should activate:
A general audible alarm in the building or IES associated with the concerned
plant area.
A general audible and visible (red flashing light) alarm in the concerned
process plant area.
An individual visible alarm (red flashing light) on the matrix panel.
An audible and visual alarm in the Control Room,
An audible and visual alarm in the fire station.
The Manual Alarm Call points in process area and process building Should be
identified individually.
Manual initiated alarms Should be independent of automatic detected events,
and thus Should not be voted with other manual alarms, fire or gas alarms.
Diagnostics
The MAC Should be capable of being tested using a special ‘key’ without the
need for shattering the glass.
Input circuit wiring Should be supervised for open and ground faults.
Mountings &
Maintenance
The MAC Should be suitable for mounting on wall or pipe and Should be
supplied complete with all accessories for installation.
MAC for indoor / safe area Should be weather proof type / Non- Ex certified.
For outdoor installations or Battery rooms, all devices Should be Ex d certified.
MAC enclosure material Should be anti-static UV resistant glass-reinforced
polyester and weather proof to IP 65.
MAC Should be break glass fire alarm units with membrane cover design, with
lift flap, double action and auto release type. Two nos. hermetically sealed,
changeover contacts rated for 1A at 24V DC Should be provided. MAC Should
be RED in colour and labelled “LIFT FLAP & BREAK GLASS”.
References
Codes
Document No: AGES-PH-03-002 (Part-2)
Rev. 01
Page 62 of 65
ADNOC Classification: Internal
ALARM INTERFACE: F&G SYSTEM-TO-TELECOMS (EXAMPLE)
Alarms Zoning and Specification
The F&G System shall annunciate emergency situations either through its own dedicated horns and strobes,
or through an interface with the telecommunication system. Interface with the Telecoms system is addressed
in the Telecoms Philosophy.
Table B1 is a summary of the audio and visual alarms performed by directly by the F&G system.
Table B1: Emergency Communication – Beacons & Sounders (Typical Example)
Condition
Beacon (*1)
Sounders
Style
Intermittent
X
Frequency
Constant
X
X
Flashing
Continuous
Variable
Fire
Red
Hydrocarbon Gas
Blue
X
Toxic Gas
Note:
1. Emergency action / PPE requirement (e.g. EEBA / BA for toxic hazard) shall be defined in the project specific
HSE Philosophy and ERP based on the location hazard.
Key References:
ISO 773 1: Danger Signals for Work Places - Auditory danger Signals (Ref. 15).
ISO 11429: Ergonomics - System of auditory and visual danger and information Signals (Ref. 14).
Audible Alarms
Audible alarms shall be provided with field mounted sounders suitable for conditions at the facility.
Fire: Fire detection shall generate an intermittent alarm of constant frequency.
Hydrocarbon or Toxic: Gas detection shall be continuous and of constant frequency.
Emergency Action: Emergency Response Plan (ERP) shall be developed in the project specific HSE Philosophy
based on the location hazard. .
Sounders shall be audible at the boundary fencing and inside the buildings.
Despite its ambient noise being relatively low during normal operation, flare areas shall be considered noisy
areas, as they will inevitably become extremely noisy during blowdown.
Visual Alarms
Flashing beacons shall be strategically located throughout the facility, including areas with noise levels of 85
dBA and above. Beacons shall be positioned such that they shall be visible in the area for which they are
providing warnings, but they shall also be accessible for maintenance.
Document No: AGES-PH-03-002 (Part-2)
Rev. 01
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ADNOC Classification: Internal
Flashing beacons shall be located in areas where there is a potential for a Hydrogen Sulphide (H2S) or other
Toxic release that presents a hazard to personnel.
Visible and audible alarms shall be mounted at all entrances to the buildings. Fire and Gas visual alarm lamps
shall also be located at the entrance to areas protected by water mist (Main Power Generation) or inert gas
systems (Switch rooms/LERs) or dry powder systems. These lamps shall indicate the status of the protected
area and prevent access when operating.
Alarms shall be available for manual activation through the ICSS HMI. Automatic initiation shall be available
through the F&G System.
Audio and visual alarm devices shall perform to comply with NFPA 72.
Document No: AGES-PH-03-002 (Part-2)
Rev. 01
Page 64 of 65
ADNOC Classification: Internal
EXAMPLE – REPRESENTATION OF F&G PROTECTION LOGIC
F&G Philosophy for Cause and Effect Diagrams
(Indicative Only -
Eqpt.
PAS HMI
FGS TO ESD (/SIS) Intertrips
Telecoms (Audible / Visual Alarms)
Loc'n
ICSS
LER Building
Field Alarms
Fire Protection Action
FGS TO HVAC
PLC Intertrips
REV
Signal to
Package(s)
Manual Alarm Call Push Button
Point
Single
CAUSE
(INPUT)
Notes
Detector Types
(& Areas Installed)
Description
Voting
Fire Detection - Field
Triple IR flame Detectors
99-1-001-Well Pad Area
Unconfirmed Fire
1ooN
2
99-1-002-Process Flowline Area
Confirmed Fire
2ooN
3
99-1-003-Manifold Area
Detector Fault
Fire Detection - Turbine Encl.
Heat Detectors (Rate of Rise)
99-1-001-GTG
Unconfirmed Fire
1ooN
6
Confirmed Fire
2ooN
7
1. All signals to be communicated to ICSS and
raise Alarm on HMI
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
2. Executive Action according to Project
HSE and F&G Philosophy
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
3. Alarms according to 4. Repeat Field
Project Philosophy
Alarms in Field
Buildings
(/LERs)
21
22
23
X
X
X
X
X
24
25
26
27
28
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
29
30
5. Close
6. Activate 7. According to
Fire
Fire
Project HSE
Dampers
Protection Philosophy
for affected
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
X
X
X
38
x
5
X
X
X
Smoke Detectors (Photoelectric)
99-1-007-LER
Unconfirmed Fire
1ooN
10
Confirmed Fire
2ooN
11
X
X
X
8
Fire Detection - Buildings
9
Detector Fault
X
X
X
Combustible - Point Gas Detection
99-1-001-Well Pad Area
Unconfirmed Gas: Low Level Gas (LLG)
1ooN
14
99-1-002-Process Flowline Area
Unconfirmed Gas: High Level Gas (HLG)
1ooN
15
99-1-003-Manifold Area
Confirmed Gas
2ooN
16
99-1-004-Pig Trap Area
Detector Fault
99-1-009-Flare Area
Combustible - Line of Sight (LOS) Gas Detection
99-1-010-Drains Drum Area
Unconfirmed Gas: Low Level Gas (LLG)
1ooN
19
99-1-008-Transformer Area
Unconfirmed Gas: High Level Gas (HLG)
1ooN
20
99-1-0XX--Boundary Area
Confirmed Gas
2ooN
X
X
X
X
X
X
12
Combustible Gas Detection - Field
13
X
X
X
X
X
X
17
18
21
Detector Fault
22
Toxic Gas Detection - Field
Toxic Gas Detection - Field
23
99-1-001-Well Pad Area
Unconfirmed - Low Toxic Gas (LTG)
1ooN
24
99-1-002-Process Flowline Area
Unconfirmed - High Toxic Gas (HTG)
1ooN
25
99-1-003-Manifold Area
Confirmed Toxic Gas
2ooN
26
99-1-004-Pig Trap Area
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
27
Detector Fault
Toxic Gas Detection - Buildings & Enclosures
Unconfirmed - Low Toxic Gas (LTG)
1ooN
30
99-1-007-LER
Unconfirmed - High Toxic Gas (HTG)
1ooN
31
Confirmed Toxic Gas
2ooN
32
29
Detector Fault
Hydrogen: Battery Room
99-1-006-XXX
Unconfirmed - Low H2 Gas (LH2G)
1ooN
35
Unconfirmed - High H2 Gas (HH2G)
1ooN
36
Confirmed H2 Gas
2ooN
37
Detector Fault
38
Hydrogen: Wellhead Control Panel
39
99-1-006-XXX
Unconfirmed - Low O2 Level (LO2G)
1ooN
40
Unconfirmed - Low Low O2 Level (LLO2G)
1ooN
41
Confirmed Low O2 Level
2ooN
42
Detector Fault
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
43
44
Activated
Detector Fault
Note:
This is a typical high level indication of Philosophy. Detailed C&E including input/output from fire protection systems, fire
extinguishing systems, fire pumps, HSSD, any local panel, vendor package PLC, etc. shall be established on a project
specific basis.
Document No: AGES-PH-03-002 (Part-2)
X
X
34
Oxygen Detection - Enclosures
Pushed
X
X
33
Hydrogen Detection - LER
Manual Alarm Call-Point
X
28
Toxic Gas Detection
- Enclosed Areas
99-1-006-XXX
All
39
X
4
45
46
x
X
Activate Gas (Flammable) - Confirmed
Activate Gas (Flammable) - Unconfirmed
8. According to
Package
Interface req.
1
Detector Fault
Manual Alarm Call Points
Activate Fire - Confirmed
Activate Fire - Unconfirmed
Activate HVAC - Increase Ventilation
Activate HVAC - Recirculation
(Un)Manned Building Package Control
Activate HVAC - Shutdown
Fire Prot
Action
Activate Fire Protection
Activate Fire Dampers - Outlet
Activate Fire Dampers - Inlet
Pushed
Building
(& LERs)
Activate Manual Alarm Activated
Detected
Alert
Activate Local Visual Fire / Gas Alarm - Beacon (Red)
Devices in Affected
Fire Zone
Activate Local Audible Fire / Gas Alarm
Room /
enclosure
19%
Activate Local Visual Alarm - O2 Depletion
19.5%
LLO2G
Field Building
(/ LERs)
Activate Local Audible Alarm - O2 Depletion
LO2G
Area
Monitoring
Activate Local GAS Alarm - Audible (Cont.) & Visual (Blue)
Point
Activate Local FIRE Alarm - Audible (Int.) & Visual (Red)
Gas
- Oxygen
Activate MAC Activated
Devices in Affected
Fire Zone
Area
Monitoring
Activate Gas(O2) - Confirmed
Room /
enclosure
25% LEL
Point
Activate Gas(H2) - Confirmed
10% LEL
HTG
Gas
- Hydrogen
Activate Gas(H2) - Unconfirmed
LTG
Area
Monitoring
Activate Gas(Toxic) - Confirmed
10ppm
Point
Activate Gas(Toxic) - Unconfirmed
Devices in Affected
Fire Zone
HTG
Toxic Gas
Detection
- H2S
Activate Gas(Flammable) - Confirmed
HVAC Air
Intakes
Area
Monitoring
Activate Gas(Flammable) - Unconfirmed
5ppm
Point
Activate Fire- Confirmed
LTG
Toxic Gas
Detection
- H2S
Fire and Gas Detection System
1.LEL.m
Area: MMWP - xxxxxx
HLG
3.LEL.m
Fire
Zone: FZ xx-xx
LTG
5ppm
All Fire Zones Devices in Affected
LLG
Activate Fire- Unconfirmed
15ppm
- Outdoors
(Field)
Fire Zone
HTG
Boundary
Monitoring
Activate F&G Detector Fault
50% LEL
Open Path (LOS)
Activate Manual Alarm Activated
HLG
Devices in Affected
Fire Zone
All Fire Zones Devices in Affected
- Outdoors
Fire Zone
(Field)
Activate Gas Alarm (O2) - Confirmed
20% LEL
Activate Gas Alarm (H2) - Confirmed
LLG
Activate Gas Alarm (H2) - Unconfirmed
Area
Monitoring
Activate Gas Alarm (Toxic) - Confirmed
Devices in
Affected Fire
Zone (Field)
Activate Gas Alarm (Toxic) - Unconfirmed
Detected 18 mA
Activate Gas Alarm (Flammable) - Confirmed
Area
Monitoring
Voting of Devices
Detection Integrity
1st Device Any Other in
UnConfirmed
Voting Group Confirmed
within Fire (*1)
Zone
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
Activate Gas Alarm (Flammable) - Unconfirmed
Elec / FO LHD
Fusible Plug
Heat
- Rate of Rise
Smoke Photoelectric
Point
Voting Groups
Outdoor Areas Buildings
(enclosed areas)
Description
(Function Performed)
Flammable Gas
Detection
- Methane
Triple-IR Flame
Detection Level
Action
Fire Detection
Purpose
Activate Fire Alarm - Confirmed
Definition of F&G Detection Levels & Detection Integrity
Detection
Activate Fire Alarm - Unconfirmed
This Table is indicative only - exact philosophy shall be determined by project-specific F&G
Design Basis.)
X
X
47
48
49
Rev. 01
Page 65 of 65
40
41
THE CONTENTS OF THIS DOCUMENT ARE PROPRIETARY AND CONFIDENTIAL.
ADNOC GROUP PROJECTS &
ENGINEERING
FIRE & GAS DETECTION AND
FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM
PHILOSOPHY
PART 3 – PASSIVE FIRE
PROTECTION
AGES-PH-03-002
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1
INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................ 3
2
DEFINED TERMS / ABBRIATIONS / REFERENCES ....................................................... 4
3
REFERENCES ................................................................................................................. 10
4
OVERALL APPROACH TO PFP & DOCUMENT STRUCTURE .................................... 16
5
FUNCTIONALITY (PRINCIPLES OF PFP APPLICATION) ............................................ 22
6
AVAILABILITY ................................................................................................................. 25
7
SURVIVABILITY ............................................................................................................... 26
8
PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION........................................................................................ 28
9
PFP IMPLEMENTATION - ONSHORE PLANT ............................................................... 31
10
PFP IMPLEMENTATION - ONSHORE BUILDINGS ....................................................... 34
11
PFP IMPLEMENTATION - OFFSHORE INSTALLATIONS ............................................ 36
12
PFP IMPLEMENTATION – OTHER FACILITY TYPES ................................................... 41
13
EARTH MOUNDING & EMBANKMENT PROTECTION ................................................. 44
APPENDIX A. MAXIMUM ALLOWABLE TEMPERATURE (MAT) ........................................... 45
APPENDIX B. PFP – PROTECTION TIME (COARSE ESTIMATES) ....................................... 50
APPENDIX C. PFP – HSECES PROTECTION PRINCIPLES ................................................... 52
APPENDIX D. PFP MATERIALS ............................................................................................... 57
APPENDIX E. FIRE TESTING.................................................................................................... 70
APPENDIX F. APPLICATION, IDENTIFICATION AND INSPECTION ..................................... 73
APPENDIX G. APPROVALS AND WARRANTY ....................................................................... 75
APPENDIX H. REGULAR INSPECTION AND MAINTENANCE ............................................... 76
APPENDIX I. PFP AND DIVISION CLASSIFICATION ............................................................ 77
APPENDIX J. COMPARISON OF FIRE TEST STANDARD CURVES..................................... 81
APPENDIX K. CORRELATION: POOL FIRE DIAMETER - FLAME HEIGHT .......................... 82
LIST OF TABLES
Table 4-1: Passive Fire Protection – Overall Framework ...................................................................... 18
Table 4-2: Passive Fire Protection – Document Framework ................................................................. 20
Table 5-1: Relevance of PFP to Fire Classes .......................................................................................... 22
Table 8-1: PFP – Starting Fire Proofing Zones ....................................................................................... 29
Table 9-1: List of Guidelines & Standards Applicable to PFP ............................................................ 31
Table 13-1: PFP Resistance Duration Coarse Initial Estimates .............................................................. 50
1
INTRODUCTION
1.1
Background
This Part of the ‘Fire Detection and Protection’ Standard describes the requirements for design,
specification, installation and maintenance of Passive Fire Protection (PFP) on Safety, Health &
Environment Critical Equipment (HSECES, Ref. 1) on COMPANY facilities. The document is a followon to ‘Part-1’ where the context and overall strategy for fire protection against Major Accident Hazards
(MAH) is set out in terms of a six-step process.
It is expected that the first four steps, covered in Part-1 will have already been completed before this
Standard is implemented, and documented in a Fire Hazard Assessment (FHA):
1.
2.
3.
4.
What are the Hazards
What type of fires can occur?
Where can it occur?
What can it affect?
Step 5 addresses the question ‘How can it be detected?’, which is covered in Part 2 of this Standard.
Step 6 is split into two main aspects:


1.2
Passive Fire Protection (PFP)
Active Fire Protection (AFP)
: Part 3
: Part 4
Objective
The aim of this Part is to address Step-6 (Passive Fire Protection -PFP) and relates to the question:
‘How can escalation be avoided?’.
This document describes how the requirements for PFP Shall be defined and implemented on
COMPANY facilities through the various stages of a project lifecycle (design, construct, procure,
commission, operate & maintain).
1.3
Scope
This Standard covers PFP on:





HSE Critical Equipment (HSECES)
Onshore Facilities
Onshore Buildings
Offshore Buildings including LQ
Offshore Facilities (including artificial islands)
AGES-PH-03-002 (Part 3)
Rev. No: 1
Page 3 of 82
2
DEFINED TERMS / ABBRIATIONS / REFERENCES
2.1
General Terminology
General Terminology
Brownfield
Development within the boundary (or control) of an existing
operating facility.
CAN (possibility and
Conveys the ability, fitness or quality necessary to do or achieve a
capability)
specific thing.
CONSULTANT
The party that performs specific services, which may include but
are not limited to, Engineering, Technical support, preparation of
Technical reports and other advisory related services specified by
the party that engages them, i.e. COMPANY, CONTRACTOR or its
Subcontractors.
CONTRACTOR
The party which carries out the project management, design,
engineering, procurement, construction, commissioning for
COMPANY projects.
GREENFIELD
Development outside the boundary (and control) of an existing
operating facility or a new operating / processing facility
development in new or existing allotted area of the COMPANY.
LICENSOR
Provider of Licensed Technology
MANUFACTURER/VENDOR/
The party which manufactures and/or supplies equipment, technical
documents/drawings and services to perform the duties specified
by the COMPANY/CONTRACTOR.
SUPPLIER
MAY (permission)
The word indicates a permitted option. It conveys consent or liberty
to do something.
SHALL
Indicates a requirement
SHOULD (recommendation)
Indicates a recommendation.
STANDARD
Means this Fire Detection & Protection Philosophy
SUB-VENDOR
Any supplier of equipment and support services for an
equipment/package or part thereof supplied by a VENDOR.
AGES-PH-03-002 (Part 3)
Rev. No: 1
Page 4 of 82
2.2
Technical Terminology
Technical Terminology
Assembly
Unit or structure composed of a combination of materials or products or
both
Critical Core
Temperature
Maximum temperature that the equipment, assembly or structure to be
protected may be allowed to reach.
Cellulosic Fire
Fire involving combustible material such as wood, paper, or furniture.
Critical Time
Minimum time required to reach the critical temperature.
Elastomeric Coating
A coating that has the ability to stretch to a specified length without
breaking or tearing and recover to its original length.
Cellulosic Fire
Fire involving combustible material such as wood, paper, or furniture.
Electrostatic Spray
The application of a coating using static electricity generated by the
charging of the coating particles as they are atomized and by grounding a
conductive substrate. The advantage is a minimisation of overspray as the
grounded equipment item or panel attracts the paint particles.
Elastomer (Rubber)
Unshaped material mechanically mixed with other constituents to form a
rubber compound, which is then shaped by flow into articles by means of
the manufacturing processes of moulding or extrusion, and then
(invariably) chemically cured at elevated temperature to form an elastic
insoluble material
Erosion Factor
Extra thickness of passive fire protection required when comparing the
results from a jet fire test with those from a furnace test on specimens with
a similar section factor (e.g. 100m-1) and a period of fire resistance, the
critical temperature or critical time or both.
Fire Barrier
Separating element that resists the passage of flame and/or heat and/or
effluents for a period of time under specified conditions
Fire Resistance
Ability of an item to fulfil, for a stated period of time, the required stability
and/or integrity and/or thermal insulation, and/or other expected duty
(reaching the critical temperature) specified in a standard fire-resistance
test
Fire Test
Procedure designed to measure or assess the performance of a material,
product, structure or system to one or more aspects of fire
Fire Zone
Fire zones are areas of the plant sub-divided based on the potential for fire
& explosion hazard to cause escalation, as assessed by the consequence
and risk modelling.
The partition into fire zones is such that the consequence of fire or an
explosion corresponding to the reasonably worst event likely to occur in
the concerned fire zone shall not impact other fire zones to an extent
where their integrity could be put at risk.
AGES-PH-03-002 (Part 3)
Rev. No: 1
Page 5 of 82
Technical Terminology
The partition of the fire zone is intended to limit the consequence
(escalation) of credible events but is not intended to avoid the occurrence
of the credible events.
(Ref. HSE-GA-ST07, HSE Design Philosophy)
Hazard
The potential to cause harm, including ill health and injury, damage to
property, products or the environment; production losses or increased
liabilities
(HSE-RM-ST01, HSE Risk Management)
Intumescent
A material that swells as a result of heat exposure, leading to an increase
in volume and decrease in density of the material.
Some intumescent materials are susceptible to environmental influences,
such as humidity, which can reduce or negate their ability to function
against various environmental exposures.
Jet Fire
Ignited discharge of hydrocarbon vapour, under pressure
Manned facility
Installation on which people are routinely accommodated (Ref. ISO13702)
An offshore platform on which at least one person occupies an
accommodation space i.e. living quarters. (API RP 14G [Ref.7] definition)
In addition, personnel are present for more than 2 hours a day or more
than 10% of time.
NUI
Passive
Protection
Normally Un-Manned Installation
Fire
A coating, cladding, free-standing system, wrapping, removable jacket,
inspection panel, cable transit system, penetration seal or other such
system which, in the event of fire, will provide thermal protection to restrict
the rate at which heat is transmitted to an object to a maximum allowable
temperature in a given time frame.
Although the term passive is used, it includes materials which react
chemically e.g. Intumescent materials which expand and create a char to
provide heat protection.
Penetration Seal
System used to maintain the fire resistance of a separating element at the
position where there is provision for services to pass through the
separating element
Plot
Area of the site where units are grouped (e.g., refinery crude distillation
unit, chemical plant, or storage terminal is located).
Process Section
An area / part of a unit within a process unit containing a combination of
processing equipment that is focused on a single operation. This includes
Individual isolatable part of a unit /system (e.g. Feed Pre-treatment).
Process Unit
A process unit is a collection of Equipment within a Plant focused on a
single operation, arranged to perform a defined function. A process unit
enables the execution of a physical, chemical and/or transport process, or
storage of process material. This includes, plant area with a distinct
physical process area /process train, e.g. separation unit, crude distillation
unit, crude treatment unit water treatment unit, polyethylene unit. etc.
AGES-PH-03-002 (Part 3)
Rev. No: 1
Page 6 of 82
Technical Terminology
Polymers
Natural or synthetic long molecular chains used for PFP materials.
Polymer based PFP may be classified into 2 main groups:


Thermoplastics such as intumescent/subliming type (reactive) or
phenolic type (insulating and unreactive)
Elastomers (rubber)
Pool Fire
Combustion of flammable or combustible hydrocarbon liquid spilled and
retained on a surface
Risk
Risk is the product of the measure of the likelihood of occurrence of an
undesired event and the potential adverse consequences which the
event may have upon:
 Health and Safety of People – fatality, injury, irreversible health
impact or chronic ill health or harm to physical or psychological
health.
 Environment - water, air, soil, animals, plants and social Reputation employees and third parties. This includes the liabilities arising from
injuries and property damage to third parties including the cross
liabilities that may arise between the interdependent ADNOC Group
Companies.
 Financial - damage to property (assets) or loss of production
 Legal - Legal impacts due to breach of law, breach of contract etc.
Risk = Severity (Consequence) x Likelihood (Frequency)
Refer to ADNOC Corporate Risk Matrix for more information
Sublimation
A process of change of solid into vapour state and vapour into the solid
state without becoming a liquid.
Thermoplastic
A material that is capable of being repeatedly softened by heating and
hardened by cooling through a temperature range characteristic of the
plastic, and, in the softened state, of being repeatedly shaped by flow into
products by moulding, extrusion or forming.
2.3
Acronyms & Abbreviations
Acronyms & Abbreviations
ADIBC
Abu Dhabi International Building Code
AFP
Active Fire Protection
ALARP
As Low As Reasonably Practicable
ASME
American Society of Mechanical Engineers
ASTM
American Society for Testing and Materials (International)
BD
Blowdown
AGES-PH-03-002 (Part 3)
Rev. No: 1
Page 7 of 82
Acronyms & Abbreviations
BDV
Blowdown Valve
BLEVE
Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapour Explosion
BRA
Building Risk Assessment
CCT
Critical Core Temperature
CUI
Corrosion Under Insulation
EER
Escape Evacuation and Rescue
EI
Energy Institute
ESD
Emergency Shutdown
F&G
Fire and Gas
FEED
Front End Engineering Design
FERA
Fire and Explosion Risk Analysis
FHA
Fire Hazard Assessment
FZ
Fire Zone
FPSO
Floating Production, Storage and Offloading
FPZ
Fire Proofing Zone
GA
General Alarm
HC
Hydrocarbon
HSE
Health, Safety & Environment
HSECES
HSE Critical Equipment & Systems
HVAC
Heating, Ventilation & Air Conditioning
I&M
Inspection & Maintenance
ISD
Inherently Safer Design
LNG
Liquefied Natural Gas
LPG
Liquid Petroleum Gas
MA
Major Accident
MAT
Maximum Allowable Temperature
MCE
Maximum Credible Event
MEL
Master Equipment List
NFPA
National Fire Prevention Association
NUI
Normally Unattended Installation
PA
Public Address
PFP
Passive Fire Protection
QRA
Quantitative Risk Assessment
ROV
Remote Operated Valve
AGES-PH-03-002 (Part 3)
Rev. No: 1
Page 8 of 82
Acronyms & Abbreviations
HSECES
HSE Critical Equipment
TR
Temporary Refuge
UL
Underwriters Laboratory
UV
Ultra-Violet
VCE
Vapour Cloud Explosion
AGES-PH-03-002 (Part 3)
Rev. No: 1
Page 9 of 82
3
REFERENCES
3.1
ADNOC Standards & Codes
Ref No
Document No
Title
1.
HSE-OS-ST29
HSECES Integrity Management
2.
HSE-GA-ST01
HSE Governance Framework
3.
HSE-RM-ST01
HSE Risk Management System
4.
HSE-GA-ST07
HSE Design Philosophy
5.
HSE-RM-ST04
Hazard & Operability Study (HAZOP)
6.
HSE-RM-ST07
Escape, Evacuation and Rescue Assessment (EERA)
7.
HSE-RM-ST08
Emergency System Survivability Analysis (ESSA)
8.
HSE-RM-ST09
Fire and Explosion Risk Assessment (FERA)
9.
HSE-RM-ST10
Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA)
10.
AGES-GLPHL-0001
Layout & Separation Distances Philosophy
11.
AGES-PH-00031
Emergency Shutdown Philosophy
12.
HSE-RM-ST13
Inherently Safer Design
3.2
International Codes & Standards
The following codes and standards, to the extent specified herein, form a part of this standard. When
an edition date is not indicated for a code or standard, the latest edition shall apply.
Ref
Code
Description
No
Abu Dhabi Codes
13.
UAE Fire & Life Safety Code
API American Petroleum Institute
14.
API 607
Fire Test for Quarter-turn Valves and Valves Equipped with Nonmetallic Seats
15.
API 6FA
Standard for Fire Test for Valves (For Wellhead and Tree
Equipment 6A and Pipeline and Piping Valves 6D)
16.
API 6FB
Standard for Fire Test for End Connectors
AGES-PH-03-002 (Part 3)
Rev. No: 1
Page 10 of 82
Ref
Code
Description
17.
API 14C
Recommended Practice for Analysis, Design, Installation, and
Testing of Basic Surface Safety Systems for Offshore Production
Platforms
18.
API 14G
Recommended Practice for Fire Prevention and Control on
Fixed Open-Type Offshore Production Platforms
19.
API 14J
Recommended Practice for Design and Hazards Analysis for
Offshore Production Facilities
20.
API 2001
Fire Protection in Refineries
21.
API 2021 (and interim
Fighting Fires in and Around Flammable and Combustible Liquid
Atmospheric Storage Tanks
No
study)
22.
API 2160
Design, construction, operation, maintenance, and inspection of
chemical and tank facilities
23.
API 2218
Fireproofing Practices in Petroleum and Petrochemical
Processing Plants
24.
API 2510 and API 2510A
Design and Construction of LPG Installations
25.
API B3:B4655
Recommended Practices for Oil and Gas Producing and Gas
Processing Plant Operations Involving Hydrogen Sulphide
American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE)
26.
ASCE 7 -16
Appendix-E Performance Based Design Procedures for Fire
Effects on Structures” of “ASCE 7 -16 Minimum Design Loads
and Associated Criteria for Buildings and Other Structures
American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME)
27.
ASME B31.3
Process Piping
28.
ASTM E-1529
Standard Test Methods for Determining Effects of Large
Hydrocarbon Pool Fires on Structural Members and Assemblies
Euro Norms (EN)
29.
EN 476 - various parts
Fire tests on building materials and structures.
30.
EN 1363 -1
Fire resistance tests. General requirement
31.
EN 1363 -2
Fire resistance tests. Alternative and additional procedures,
32.
EN_ISO_834
Fire Resistance Tests - Elements of Building Construction
33.
EN_ISO_13702_2015
Petroleum and natural gas industries — Control and mitigation of
fires and explosions on offshore production installations —
Requirements and guidelines
34.
EN 1992-1-2 Eurocode-2
Design of Concrete Structures General Rules – Structural Fire
Design
35.
EN 1993-1-2 Eurocode-3
Design of Steel Structures General Rules – Structural Fire
Design
AGES-PH-03-002 (Part 3)
Rev. No: 1
Page 11 of 82
Ref
Code
Description
EN 1994-1-2 Eurocode-4
Design of composite and concrete structures. General RulesStructural Fire Design.
No
36.
Engineering Equipment Users Association (EEMUA)
37.
EEMUA 147
Recommendations for refrigerated liquefied gas storage tanks,
Ed. 3
Energy Institute (formally Institute of Petroleum (IP) and Institute of Energy)
38.
ISBN 978 0 85293 823 2
Guidance on Passive Fire Protection for Process and Storage
Plant and Equipment, 2017
39.
EI Model Code of Safe
Large bulk pressure storage and refrigerated LPG,
Practice Part 9:
40.
EI Model Code of Safe
Practice Part 19:
41.
ISBN 978 0 85293 564 4
Fire precautions at petroleum refineries and bulk storage
installations,
Guidelines for offshore oil and gas installations that are not
permanently attended,
Fire and Blast Information Group (FABIG) Part of Steel Construction Institute
42.
Technical Note 1
Fire Resistant Design of Offshore Topside Structures
43.
Technical Note 3
Use of Ultimate Strength Techniques for Fire Resistant Design
of Offshore Structures
44.
Technical Note 6
Design Guide for Steel at Elevated Temperatures and High
Strain Rates
45.
Technical Note 8
Protection of Piping Systems subject to Fires and Explosions
46.
Technical Note 11
Fire Loading and Structural Response
47.
Technical Note 13
Design Guidance for Hydrocarbon Fires
48.
Interim Guidance Notes
Interim Guidance Notes for the Design and Protection of Topside
Structures against Explosion and Fire
(IGN)
49.
Technical Meeting
FABIG Technical Meeting, 2004
Factory Mutual Laboratories
50.
FM -7440
Firesafe Valves, 1981
51.
FM -7400
Liquid and Gas Safety Shutoff Valves, 2016
Health & Safety Executive, UK
52.
HSE UK OTO 2000 051
Offshore Technology Report – Review of the Response of
Pressurised Process Vessels and Equipment to Fire Attack
53.
HSE UK OTI 99 028
Review of Approached to Blast, Fire and Accidental Loads
54.
HSE Offshore Information
Advice on acceptance criteria for damaged Passive Fire
Protection (PFP) Coatings, 2007
Sheet No. 12/2007
55.
OTI 94 604
AGES-PH-03-002 (Part 3)
Experimental data relating to the performance of steel
components at Elevated Temperatures
Rev. No: 1
Page 12 of 82
Ref
Code
Description
56.
OTI 92 606
Passive Fire Protection: Performance Requirements and Test
Methods
57.
OTI 92 607
Availability and properties of Passive and Active Fire Protection
Systems
58.
OTI 92 610
Thermal Response of Vessels and Pipework Exposed to Fire
59.
OTI 95 634
Jet Fire Resistance Test of Passive Fire Protection Materials
60.
RR 28/2005
Protection of Piping Systems Subject to Fires and Explosions
61.
RR 1120
A review of the Applicability of the Jet Fire Resistance Test
(JFRT) to Severe Release Scenarios, 2017
No
International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC)
62.
IEC 60331-1
Tests for electric cables under fire conditions - Circuit integrity Part 1: Test method for fire with shock at a temperature of at
least 830 °C for cables of rated voltage up to and including
0,6/1,0 kV and with an overall diameter exceeding 20 mm
63.
IEC 60331-21
Tests for electric cables under fire conditions - Circuit integrity Part 21: Procedures and requirements - Cables of rated voltage
up to and including 0,6/1,0 kV
64.
IEC 60331-23
Tests for Electric Cables under Fire Conditions - Circuit Integrity
- Part 23: Procedures and Requirements - Electric Data Cables Edition 1
65.
IEC 60331-25
Tests for electric cables under fire conditions - Circuit integrity Part 21: Procedures and requirements -Optical fibre cables
International Codes Council
66.
IBC
International Building Code
International Standardization Organization (ISO)
67.
ISO 834
Fire Resistance Tests - Elements of Building Construction
68.
ISO 10497
Fire Testing of Valves
69.
ISO 13702
Control and Mitigation of Fires and Explosion on Offshore
Installations
70.
ISO 17776
Petroleum and natural gas industries – Offshore production
installations – Guidelines on tools and techniques for hazard
identification
71.
ISO 19921
Fire resistance of metallic pipe components with resilient and
elastomeric seals
72.
ISO 23936-1:
Petroleum, petrochemical and natural gas industries, Nonmetallic materials in contact with media related to oil and gas
production - Part 1: Thermoplastics
73.
ISO 23936-2
Petroleum, petrochemical and natural gas industries, Nonmetallic materials in contact with media related to oil and gas
production – Part 2: Elastomers
AGES-PH-03-002 (Part 3)
Rev. No: 1
Page 13 of 82
Ref
Code
Description
74.
ISO/TR 22899-1
Determination of the resistance to jet fires of passive fire
protection Part 1
75.
ISO/TR 22899-2
Determination of the resistance to jet fires of passive fire
protection Part 2: Guidance on classification and implementation
methods
76.
ISO 4628-2
Paints and varnishes — Evaluation of degradation of coatings —
Designation of quantity and size of defects, and of intensity of
uniform changes in appearance — Part 2: Assessment of
degree of blistering
77.
ISO 4628-4
Paints and varnishes — Evaluation of degradation of coatings —
Designation of quantity and size of defects, and of intensity of
uniform changes in appearance — Part 4: Assessment of
degree of cracking
No
National Fire Protection Association (United States)
78.
NFPA 55
Compressed gases and cryogenic fluids code
79.
NFPA 58
Liquefied Petroleum Gas Code
80.
NFPA 59
Standard for the Storage and handling of Liquefied Petroleum
Gases at Utility Gas Plants. Incl Appendix D: Procedure for
Torch Fire
81.
NFPA 59A
Standard for the Production, Storage, and Handling of Liquefied
Natural Gas (LNG)
82.
NFPA 101
Life Safety Code
83.
NFPA 221
Standard for High Challenge Fire Walls, Fire Walls, and Fire
Barrier Walls
84.
NFPA 10
Standard for Portable Fire Extinguishers
Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) International Maritime Organisation (IMO)
85.
SOLAS Chapter II-2
Consolidated text of international convention for the Safety of
Life at Sea (SOLAS) and subsequent amendments
CH. II-2 Construction - Fire Protection, Fire Detection and Fire
Extinction
Scandpower Risk Management
86.
Report 27.207.291/R1 Ver
2
Guidelines for the Protection of Pressurised Systems Exposed to
Fire, 2004
Steel Construction Institute (SCI)
87.
ISBN 1859420788
Blast and Fire Engineering for Topside Structures - Phase 2:
Final Summary Report
UAE Civil Aviation Advisory Publication
88.
CAAP 70
Heliports - Issue 3
89.
CAAP 71
Helidecks (Off-Shore)
AGES-PH-03-002 (Part 3)
Rev. No: 1
Page 14 of 82
Ref
Code
Description
No
UK Civil Aviation Authority
90.
CAP 437
Standards for offshore helicopter landing areas
UK LPG
91.
UK LPG CoP 1
Bulk LPG storage at fixed installations. Part 1: Design,
installation and operation of vessels located above ground, LP
Gas Association
UK Offshore Operators Association (now known as UK Oil & Gas)
92.
HSE UK UKOOA
Fire and Explosion Guidance, Part 0: Fire and Explosion Hazard
Management
93.
HSE UK UKOOA
Fire and Explosion Guidance, Part 1: Avoidance and Mitigation
of Explosions
94.
HSE UK UKOOA
Fire and Explosion Guidance, Part 2: Avoidance and Mitigation
of Fires
Underwriters Laboratories
95.
UL 1709
Standard for Rapid Rise Fire Tests of Protection Materials for
Structural Steel
British Standard
96.
BS 476-20
AGES-PH-03-002 (Part 3)
Fire tests on building materials and structures. Methods for
determination of the fire resistance of elements of construction
(general principles).
Rev. No: 1
Page 15 of 82
4
OVERALL APPROACH TO PFP & DOCUMENT STRUCTURE
4.1
General
Systems that are critical to the safety of a facility need to be identified early in a project and their
development managed to ensure their ‘safety critical’ performance is suitable and that it will remain
available when required. This is typically done by focus on the four key aspects (Ref. 1):




Functionality
Reliability
Survivability
Dependencies & Interactions
Passive Fire Protection (PFP) is a measure that addresses the ‘survivability’ of Safety (/HSE) Critical
Equipment identified on COMPANY projects in accordance with HSECES (Ref. 1) standard.
It is a COMPANY requirement that ‘survivability’ of each HSECES Shall be demonstrated as part of the
Performance Standards developed for each HSECES, during FEED (Ref.1) and updated in subsequent
stages of the Project.
The Performance Standards Shall be made available for Assurance and Verification by COMPANY, at
each Project Stage, in sufficient time to allow observations by the Independent Reviewer to be
incorporated into the design.
4.2
Key Assumption
It is expected that all COMPANY Projects Shall follow the Inherently Safer Design (ISD) approach
described in Ref.12, meaning that inherent safety will have been considered before a passive measure
like PFP is considered.
4.3
Pre-requisites
Two main pre-requisites have been identified as key inputs to the design of PFP arrangements:


4.3.1
Project HSE Philosophy
Fire Hazard Assessment
Project HSE Philosophy
Design of PFP Shall be on a clear understanding of the overall strategy for Major Accident Hazard
(MAH) Risk management. This strategy is typically documented as a ‘Project HSE Philosophy’ based
on knowledge about the relative location of hazards to people, those affected and those who will be
required to react to an initiating event.
The HSE Philosophy will therefore shape the nature of manual intervention (local or remote), the
degree of remote monitoring, automatic actions, and the overall facilities needed to be provided such
measures.
The survivability of HSECES measures Shall, as a minimum, be driven by personnel protection to
provide time for egress, muster and evacuation of the facility in an orderly manner. The philosophical
approach to EER (Egress, Evacuation & Rescue) is therefore be an important input to the
requirement for PFP, which Shall be clearly and explicitly documented in the Project HSE Philosophy.
This shall be done early in design and updated, as a minimum, at the beginning of subsequent Project
Stages.
AGES-PH-03-002 (Part 3)
Rev. No: 1
Page 16 of 82
4.3.2
Fire Hazard Assessment
It is expected that a ‘Fire Hazard Assessment’ covering the first four questions identified in Section 1.1
will have been carried out in accordance with Part 1 of this Standard.
This will ensure a clear understanding of potential fires and their location on the facility so that the
requirement for PFP can be assessed.
4.4
Overview of Framework
The overall framework to capture COMPANY requirements for PFP is illustrated schematically in Table
4-1. This is framed around the following questions intended to define the required ‘functionality’,
‘availability’ and ‘survivability’ for PFP:
Functionality
What are the hazards?
What are the ‘vulnerable’ HSECES?
How will it work
How long do they need to be protected?
Availability & Survivability
Will it be Available?
Will it Survive?
Project Implementation
How can it be implemented in a Project?
These questions are captured in each of the seven major columns in Table 4-1.
AGES-PH-03-002 (Part 3)
Rev. No: 1
Page 17 of 82
ADNOC Classification: Internal
Table 4-1: Passive Fire Protection – Overall Framework
1. What are the Hazards?
2. What are vulnerable HSECES?
(failure leads to 'Escalation')
3. How will it work?
4. How long
to protect
HSECES?
Functionality
P-1
P-15
PF-1
U-1
SS-1
M-1
ER-E-1
ER-Es1
'Fire Sources'
- Mainly in Process Areas
'Vulnerabilities'
- Near source (mainly)
- Other Areas
(possible, e.g. Offshore)
High temp (radiation)
Stress
Pool
Fire
Jet
fire
Internal
Press.
Structures
(Building / wall /
division)
Vessels
x
x
x
x
ESD /ROV /BDV
x
x
Cabling
x
x
Damage by fire impingement
from:
'Source' to 'Vulnerability'
(Same Area or Adjacent Areas if
fire is large enough)
Flash
fire
Protection
Period
7. How to implement in Project?
Availability
Survivability
Project Lifecycle
Maintenance
Maintenance
req. in Ops
phase.
x
x
Insulation damage &
electrical resistance
change
Damage to vulnerable target:
- Weakening from high temp.
(radiation exposure)
- Stress
(internal press. or load on structure)
6. Will it
Survive?
Design
Concept
FEED
Detail Design
API 2218 (Ref. 23)
- (Small) Pool Fires
Prescriptive approach
(minimum
requirement)
FERA (Ref 8) (update)
Load /
wt.
x
PFP Not Relevant
W-1
PS-1R
Vulnerabilities
(HSE Critical Equipment)
Well-head
Process - Storage Tanks
& Export
Process
Process Utilities
Process Utilities (Fired)
Utilities (& Machinery)
Safety Sys.
Manned Areas
Emergency
Evac
Response
Escape
Safety (/HSE) Critical Equipment
Sources
Hazard Identification
5. Will it be
Available?
Design to
ensure
robustness
against
potential MA
events:
- Pool fire
- Jet fire
- VCE,
etc.
Revise & refine design
areas of uncertainty
FERA (Ref 8)
- Confirm pool fire
- Evaluate Jetfires
Depends on
criterion for
safety (e.g.
time to:
- Evacuate
- ESD & BD
etc.
Document No AGES-PH-03-002 (Part 3)
Page 18 of 82
ADNOC Classification: Internal
The Major columns 1-4, in Table 4-1, capture ‘functionality’ related aspects of PFP and the major
columns 5 and 6 deal with ‘Availability’ and ‘Survivability’, respectively. The approach to addressing
PFP requirements within a Project lifecycle is shown in major column 7.
Functionality: Major column 1 shows general plant areas and is used to identify where the ‘sources’ of
fires are likely to be. Major column 2 shows the type of Safety (/HSE) Critical Equipment that is
potentially ‘vulnerable’, the failure of which can lead to escalation of the initiating fire event.
In most cases the ‘vulnerabilities’ are likely to be local to the ‘sources’ and will primarily be in areas
handling hydrocarbon fluids (process, wellheads, etc.). Other areas are noted to be potentially
vulnerable, if they are within range of a Maximum Credible Event (MCE) from the sources, as might be
the case on an offshore platform.
Protection Period: Column 4 questions the period of time for which the PFP will need function as
designed to delay escalation, which will depend largely on the project-specific HSE Philosophy,
mentioned in Section 4.1, above.
Availability: Column 5 addresses the issue of ensuring Availably through correct specification,
construction and installation, and ongoing maintenance during the Operations phase.
Survivability: Column 6 covers the requirement for the PFP to survive an initial event (e.g. exposure to
impact damage in routine operations, or a major accident like a VCE), so that it can still perform its fire
protection function.
Project Implementation: The final major column covers Implementation approach during the lifecycle
of a project.
4.5
Application & Compliance with Philosophy
CONTRACTOR shall follow the process described in this Philosophy.
It is acknowledged that not all aspects of this Philosophy may be practicable to be implemented on all
facilities. Any deviation from this Philosophy shall therefore be supported by a documented justification
covering the 4 important questions presented in Part 1, to ensure the risk remains as low as reasonably
practicable.
The justification shall be reasoned arguments supported, if necessary, by quantitative analysis.
The justification shall be subject COMPANY review, independent from the project team.
Document No AGES-PH-03-002 (Part 3)
Rev. No: 1
Page 19 of 82
4.6
Document Structure
Noting the above context, the remaining Sections of this Standard are structured as shown in Table 4-2.
Table 4-2: Passive Fire Protection – Document Framework
1. What are
the
Hazards?
2. What are
vulnerable
SCEs?
(failure
leads to
'Escalation')
3. How will it
Work?
4. How long
to protect
HSECES?
Functionality
Hazard
Identification
Safety
(/HSE)
Critical
Equipment
High
Temp
Stress
Protection
Period
5. Will it be
Available?
6. Will it
Survive?
7. How to implement in
Project?
Availability
Survivability
Project
Implementation
Maintenance
Design
Concept
FEED
Section 5.1
Section 5.2
Section 5.3
Section 5.4
Section 6
Section 7
Section 8
Document Structure (Remaining Section)
Onshore
Plant
Onshore
Buildings
Offshore
Installations
Onshore Plant
Section 9

Flare and Vent Lines
Section 9.2

Flare Towers and Ground Flares
Section 9.3

Air Fin-Fan Coolers
Section 9.4

Remote/Unmanned Wellheads and Gathering Stations
Section 9.5

Utilities
Section 9.6

Stairways, Walkways, and Access Platforms
Section 9.7
Onshore Buildings
Section 10

Buildings & Enclosures
Section 10.1

General
Section 10.2

Occupied Buildings at Process Plant
Section 10.3



Plant Buildings
Process Buildings
Industrial Warehouses
Section 10.4

External Boundaries and Walls
Section 10.5
Offshore Installations
Section 11

Wellhead Platforms/Drilling Jack-Ups / SIMOPS
Section 11.1.1

Jackets
Section 11.1.2

Cranes Cabins and Pedestals
Section 11.1.3
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Detail
Design
1. What are
the
Hazards?
Other
Facility
Types
2. What are
vulnerable
SCEs?
(failure
leads to
'Escalation')
3. How will it
Work?
4. How long
to protect
HSECES?
5. Will it be
Available?
6. Will it
Survive?
7. How to implement in
Project?

Normally Unmanned Installations
Section 11.1.4

Egress Routes and Enclosed Tunnels
Section 11.1.5

Firewalls
Section 11.1.6

Offshore Helidecks
Section 11.1.7
Other Facility Types
Section 12

Artificial Islands
Section 12.1

Refineries, Petrochemical plants; Gas Plants
Section 12.2

LPG Process Plants & Storage
Section 12.3

LNG Plants and Storage
Section 12.4

Jetty Terminals
Section 12.5

Helipads and Heliports
Section 12.6
Earth Mounding etc.
Section

LNG & LPG Tanks
Section 13.1

Critical Piping & Cables
Section 13.2
Detailed Supporting Information
Detailed
Supporting
Information
Maximum Allowable Temperatures
Appendix A.1
PFP Requirements for:
Appendix A

Structures
Appendix C.1.1

Pressurised Vessels
Appendix C.1.2

Esd, Rov and Bd Valves
Appendix C.1.3

Piping
Appendix C.1.4

Cabling
Appendix C.1.5
Hazards Not Suitable for PFP
Appendix C.2
PFP Materials
Appendix D
Fire Testing
Appendix E
Application, Identification and Inspection
Appendix F
Approvals and Warranty
Appendix G
Regular Inspection and Maintenance
Appendix H
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5
FUNCTIONALITY (PRINCIPLES OF PFP APPLICATION)
This Section is intended to outline the main principles of how PFP can be used within a project for
COMPANY facilities.
It is important to recognise at the outset that the main purpose of PFP is to protect HSE Critical
Equipment that is vulnerable to the thermal radiation effects of a fire, for a period that allows other
mitigation measures to be taken (e.g. shutdown, depressurisation, emergency evacuation, etc.).
The guidance is centred around key aspects outlined in the overview Schematic presented in Table 4-1:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.1
Hazard Identification (What are the hazards?)
Identification of HSECES (What are Vulnerable HSECES?)
Principles of Protection (How will it Work?)
Protection Period (How Long to Protect?)
Hazard Identification (What are the hazards?)
The starting point for any PFP assessment is to identify credible fire sources on the facility, so that an
assessment can be made about their potential to impair HSE Critical Equipment in the vicinity, thus
leading to an escalation of the initiating event. It is noted in Part 1, that this should have been done
before implementing this Part of the Philosophy in a Fire Hazard Assessment (see Part 1).
5.1.1
Fire Classes
Fires are to be in line with NFPA definitions as Class A, B, C, D, and K (exact meaning of each is
covered in NFPA 10 Ref. 84, and in Part 1). The relevance of the various fire Classes to the application
of PFP is summarised in Table 5-1.
Table 5-1: Relevance of PFP to Fire Classes
Relevance of PFP to Fire Classes (NFPA)
Class
A
B
C
D
K
Description
Cellulosic
Jet /Spray
Pool
Flash / Exp.
Electrical
Flammable Metals
Cooking Oils
PFP Relevant



N/A



It is apparent from Table 5-1 that PFP can be relevant to all Classes of fire and its application depends
on the sensitivity (Safety Criticality) of the items that are in the vicinity.
The only exception is in Class B, which is most likely to involve hydrocarbon inventories on COMPANY
facilities. This Class is further split into jet/spray fires, pool fires and flash fires. The first two types are
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relevant to PFP, since their duration can be quite extended and therefore expose vulnerable HSECES
to thermal radiation for prolonged periods.
However, the duration of flash fires and fireballs will be very short (<1-2sec, and < a minute,
respectively), meaning that the thermal radiation will not last long enough to cause significant heating
of any HSECES to weaken it, PFP is therefore not relevant.
5.1.2
Fire Duration
Selection of fire cases that require PFP application need to account for three main factors to determine
the Design Events that make up the basis of design.
1. Likelihood
2. Size of hazard envelope
3. Duration of hazard envelope
Likelihood: The likelihood of a process fluid fires depends on the potential for loss of containment and
its ignition. Most loss of containment incidents are generally ‘small’ to start with if they occur due to
gradual degradation mechanisms like corrosion. However, large leaks can be caused immediately in
the event of an external accident, especially where procedures are involved (e.g. damage from vehicle
accident, failure of a tanker loading operation, etc.). Fires in other plant areas will likely be of Cellulosic
Class-A, or Electrical Class-C and perhaps Class-K in the kitchen / galley areas.
Size of Hazard Envelope: In some cases the size of hazard envelope will depend on the size of the
leak, as in the case of a jet fire, and in other cases it may be determined by the degree of containment
(e.g. kerbs or bunds provided to limit the size of a pool fire).
Duration of Hazard Envelope: The assessment of duration also depends on the nature and quantity of
fuel, which may or may not depend on the functioning of other Safety Systems, like ESD, isolation and
blowdown for jet fires.
The complexity of these factors all feed into the definition of the events that constitute the basis for each
fire scenario being considered.
These factors shall be evaluated in Fires and Explosions Risk Assessment (FERA, Ref 8).
This will require a reasonable level of process definition in terms of a H&M Balances, P&IDs, Master
Equipment List (MEL) and a Plot Plan. This is typically not available until the FEED stage of a Project.
5.2
Identification of HSECES (What are Vulnerable HSECES?)
The next consideration for the application of PFP is to identify those SCEs that are vulnerable to all the
MCEs that have been identified.
This requires the relevant thermal radiation envelope to be plotted on to the facility plot plan so that
specific items that are vulnerable can be identified. These shall be categorised as:



Structural
Large material inventories (Vessels / Tanks)
Process Safety Systems
o ESD (Emergency Shutdown) Valves
o ROV (Remote Operated Valves)
o BDV (Blowdown Valves)
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

5.3
o Active Fire Protection systems, including deluge skids etc.
Cabling
Others
Principles of Protection (How will it Work?)
The principal mechanism of HSECES failure is through weakening of the material due to ‘high
temperature’ from fire exposure combined with ‘stress /load’ on the material, either due to the weight of
items it is supporting or internal pressure in the case of pressure vessels.
The objective of PFP is to prevent this failure mechanism for at least a defined time period when the
equipment finally reaches its failure point, usually defined as a Maximum Allowable Temperature (MAT).
The Maximum Allowable Temperature (MAT) is the temperature at which unprotected equipment,
piping, structures or barriers are expected to fail to maintain their design function. The term critical core
temperature (CCT) is usually used when referring to structural steel. This subject is discussed more
fully for each of the HSECES types in Appendix C
It is a COMPANY requirement that PFP shall prevent the relevant HSECES from reaching its
MAT for the duration required to protect it.
It is important to understand the actual MATs for the various vulnerable items falling within the fire
radiation envelope or fire protection zone.
An array of maximum allowable temperatures (MAT) for various safety critical elements are reproduced
from literature in Appendix A.
These values presented are not plant specific but serve to demonstrate the substantial variation in
failure temperatures for different equipment types and materials.
The actual equipment MATs shall be obtained from manufacturers (where possible), or from derived
calculations before the PFP design and specification is finalised for procurement. It is important to
clearly determine the MATs for the actual vulnerable items falling within the fire radiation envelope or
the fire protection zone.
5.4
Protection Period (How Long to Protect?)
The PFP shall be required to prevent each HSECES from reaching its MAT for a specific duration,
namely the time required for the HSECES to survive.
The time required for the HSECES to survive shall be based on:
Predicted fire durations, assuming operation of ESD/isolation/BD, bunding and drainage
provisions),,but assuming no operation of AFP protection (taken from FERA, Ref 8)
Predicted escape, muster and evacuation duration (taken from EERA, Ref. 6)
Predicted duration for firefighting team to arrive and control or fire (from Emergency Response
philosophy within HSE Philosophy)
Predicted search and rescue durations (taken from EERA, Ref. 6)
The required duration of protection shall be determined during FEED, once the FERA, Ref 8, is
available and shall be revised in Detail Design .Initial estimates of PFP protection period for early
FEED (before the FERA, Ref 8, is available) may be based on Appendix B.
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6
AVAILABILITY
The PFP material shall always be in place during plant operations, allowing for some planned and
temporary removal of small areas of PFP material for inspection and maintenance and planned
replacement if required.
The material shall be correctly reinstated immediately after inspection and hinged fire doors/panels shall
be closed and latched
PFP is an HSECES, as escalation avoidance to manage the risk from a MAH relies on the PFP being
Available if a fire event were to occur. In order to ensure the PFP has not degraded in an unrevealed
manner, Inspection and Maintenance (I&M) of the PFP is an essential part of the Integrity Management
process.
The objective of I&M regimes is to ensure that the installed PFP materials continue to be fit for purpose.
I&M procedures shall be established with input from the manufacturer/supplier to ensure the functional
requirements as described in the performance standards are maintained.
Records shall be prepared, detailing the inspection, testing, and maintenance routines and frequencies
to be followed.
Any identified failures or impairments shall be recorded and promptly corrected. Impairment, and repair
of systems shall be recorded and reported. Where PFP cannot be promptly reinstated, contingency
plans shall be implemented under the plant Management of Change processes.
Further details are provided about I&M requirements in Appendix H.
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7
7.1
SURVIVABILITY
Process Conditions
The PFP material shall not degrade under any foreseen process conditions. Process conditions may
vary during the life of the facility and shall include process conditions during commissioning, start-up,
shutdown and all foreseeable future operations. Note that epoxy intumescent and subliming materials
begin to deteriorate progressively, if exposed to operating temperatures above 60oC, depending on the
product and may not be suitable for cryogenic temperatures.
7.2
Pool Fires
The fire proofing material provided for protection against pool fires shall meet the requirement of
hydrocarbon pool fire test as defined in UL 1709 as a minimum and BS 476. If enhanced testing is
available this should be conducted, e.g. HCM and ASTM 1529 (Ref. 28) fire test curves, see Appendix
J.
7.3
Jet Fires
The fire proofing material provided for protection against jet fires shall meet the requirement of jet fire
test as defined in ISO 22899 (Ref. 74 & 75).
In a jet fire, the fire protection products will be subjected to erosive forces from jet fire impingement,
pressure fluctuations and high heat fluxes. It should be noted that the highest erosive forces are not in
the region of highest heat flux. Hence, the results of both pool fire (furnace) and jet fire tests should be
considered together when assessing the performance of a fire protection product in a range of scenarios.
7.4
Explosion Resistance
All specified passive fire materials shall withstand FERA (Ref 8), defined explosion overpressures or
drag loads prior to fire events. If explosion resistance is required, the PFP shall be expected to function
to its specified fire resistance performance after any consequent deformation due to the FERA (Ref 8),
defined explosion event.
Explosion resistance depends on the passive system as well as the supporting steelwork. Both these
elements shall be considered to ensure the overall integrity of passive protection is maintained.
7.5
Environmental Conditions
The specified passive fire material shall withstand all design basis environmental conditions such as
sandstorms, heavy rainfall, solar radiation, frost, seawater splashes, airborne pollutants (chemicals, HC,
chlorides), vibrations, earthquakes and expected minor mechanical impacts from maintenance and
inspection activities.
Damage through weather effects and general system degradation will results in the material being
“unavailable” for its purpose.
7.6
Cryogenic spills before fire
A cryogenic spill from super-chilled products such as LNG, liquid nitrogen, liquid oxygen and liquid
argon, can have a sudden and catastrophic impact on both PFP materials and its substrate (the material
of construction onto which the PFP is attached) if not designed for such low temperatures. If a cryogenic
process or utility spill onto PFP materials is identified as being credible, the survivability of the PFP
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material and its substrate shall be tested and performance under cryogenic and then fire conditions
confirmed by the PFP and steel manufacturers.
Any process fluids stored at a temperature below the low temperature design basis given in the project
basis of design, which may include materials such as liquid ammonia (-33C) needs to be identified so
that PFP and material of construction specifications are verified as suitable.
7.7
7.7.1
Interactions with other Activities
Firewater and Foam
The application of high-pressure active fire protection (water and foam) either during testing or during
a fire event shall not impair the integrity of passive fire protection (PFP) measures. PFP shall retain its
adherence to the protected substrate and retain its specified thermal insulation properties during
application of high-pressure water/foam streams.
7.7.2
Maintenance activities
Physical impacts from maintenance activities such as manual handling, scaffolding poles, trolley
impacts and swinging loads during lifting shall not impair the fire and if required blast resistance of the
PFP material
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8
PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION
8.1
ISD Perspective
The overall COMPANY approach to risk management (Ref. 12) requires Inherently Safer Design (ISD)
principles to be applied to all Projects. A typical hierarchy of ISD measures is shown in Text Box 8-1,
which shows PFP to be a ‘mitigation’ measure that is much lower in the order of priority than other types
of measures.
As previously stated (see Section 4.2), it is a COMPANY requirement that all Projects shall consider
ISD measures higher in the priority order (e.g. greater separation), before PFP is considered.
Text Box 8-1: Inherently Safer Design Approach (hierarchy)
1.1
Inherently Safer Design (E.g. greater separation, reducing inventory, etc.)
1.2
Prevention (E.g. reduction of likelihood of leaks and probability of ignition)
8.2
8.2.1
(a)
Detection (E.g. F&G and Leak Detection)
(b)
Control (E.g. ESD and Blowdown, Drainage)
(i)
Mitigation (E.g. Active and Passive Fire Protection)
(ii)
Escape and Evacuation (On foot and/or by lifeboat/raft)
Project Lifecycle (and Information Available)
Preliminary Design (FEED)
Achieving the optimum solution for PFP requires plant specific layouts, inventories and the potential fire
scenarios that can occur. As this information is limited in the early stages of a project, but design and
cost estimates are required for the various Project stage gates, an alternative approach is needed to
facilitate this.
Reference is made to API RP 2218 (Ref. 23), which has recommendations based on a selected “pool
fire” size.
API RP 2218 (Ref. 23) proposes this as an appropriate starting point, especially for onshore plant since
the potential for prolonged pool fires is more significant than offshore platforms due to the potential for
accumulating liquid spills near to the release point. If the fluid is flammable, such accumulations can
sustain a pool fire for a significant time, thus posing a risk of escalation
The main difference for jet fires is that the flammable inventory can usually be reduced by isolation and
depressurisation to control the fire within in a predetermined timeframe. This gives an opportunity for
the HSECES to survive, meaning that PFP can be avoided along with its downside of extra, cost and
maintenance burden.
The inherent assumptions (and constraints) of API RP 2218 (Ref. 23) should be understood when
applying its guidelines, which include:

Pool fires affected volume (9m x 9m)

No consideration of:
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
o
Hydrocarbon flash point,
o
Bund area,
o
Heat of combustion
o
Burning rate
o
Flame “wind tilt” effects
o
Flame luminosity
Coarse Fire categorisation (low, medium & high risk).
Despite these shortcomings, API RP 2218 (Ref. 23) guidance gives a cautious starting point to begin
the consideration of PFP in the early stages of a project.
It is a minimum COMPANY requirement (see FERA, Ref. 8) that “irrespective” of the optimum PFP
requirements based on specific FERA study, the prescriptive requirements of API RP 2218 (Ref. 23)
shall be applied. Additional requirements from the outcome of FERA study shall also be applied.
Onshore, the likelihood of pool fires is higher than jet fire scenarios and it makes sense to concentrate
on pool fire effects as a starting point or to provide default values.
The starting API 2218 (Ref. 23) fire proofing zones (FPZ) are defined for pool fire effects to base on a
predefined affected volume (approximately 9m by 9m) to avoid collapse of an affected structure.
These starting FPZs are presented in Table 8-1 for the three API2218 (Ref. 23) fire risk categories / fire
potential equipment.
Table 8-1: PFP – Starting Fire Proofing Zones
Fire Source Category
Low Medium Risk
Risk
No PFP
High Risk
Fire Proofing of Structure
(Initial Coarse Estimate)
Potential Fire Source
General
Pipe racks
8.2.2
Horizontal
6 - 12m
Rotating Eqpt.
Fin-Fan Cooler (on rack)
Process Eqpt. Structure
LPG Vessel
15m
Tanks
6m
Vertical
9m
Detail Design
It is a minimum COMPANY requirement (see FERA, Ref. 8) that “irrespective” of the optimum PFP
requirements based on specific FERA study, the prescriptive requirements of API RP 2218 (Ref. 23)
shall be applied. Additional as per the outcome of FERA study shall be applied.
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8.2.3
Specification
The PFP specification shall, as a minimum identify the duration of protection required as well as the
type of fire:



A-cellulosic
J-jet fire
H-pool fire etc.
The types of protection materials available for the various types of fires is covered in Appendix D.
The selected PFP material shall comply with the fire test requirements detailed in Appendix E.
Application, identification and inspection of the PFP shall be as detailed in Appendix F
It shall be the manufacturers’ responsibility to establish the PFP coatings, layers and thicknesses
required to meet the performance standards.
Approvals and warranty shall be in line with details in Appendix G.
Passive fire protection materials shall be specified to have a service life corresponding to the anticipated
field life. The minimum service/operational life for PFP materials for the defined environment for shall
be 25 years.
All relevant specifications, datasheets, certifications and inspection and maintenance documents and
performance standards shall specify the PFP service life for the defined environmental.
It should be noted that AFP using sea water / brackish water for firefighting may have a negative impact
on PFP and external painted surfaces. This potential shall be highlighted in the PFP Specification if
non-potable water conditions can be experienced.
8.2.4
Hazards not Suitable for PFP
Certain fire hazards which are unsuited to mitigation by PFP are listed below and alternative measures
such as active fire protection should be considered instead:
a. HC Tank Roof Fires (requires AFP)
b. HC Flash Fire (Danger to personnel, and not plant)
c.
Alcohol fire (e.g. methanol)
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9
PFP IMPLEMENTATION - ONSHORE PLANT
The following sections outline requirements by exception, for areas of plant, which may not be covered
by internationally recognised guidelines. Table 9-1 lists the key guidelines and standards for the extent
of PFP for each specific application and industry. These guidelines and standards are not mandatory
but are recommended as best industry practices.
Table 9-1:
List of Guidelines & Standards Applicable to PFP
Plant Type
Guideline / Standard
Petroleum / Gas Processing
API RP 2218 (Ref. 23), Energy Institute Guidance
on PFP
Petrochemicals
API RP 2218 (Ref. 23), Energy Institute Guidance
on PFP
Refineries
API RP 2218 (Ref. 23), Energy Institute Guidance
on PFP
Artificial Islands
API RP 2218 (Ref. 23), Energy Institute Guidance
on PFP
LNG
NFPA 59A (Ref. 80 & 81)
LPG
API 2510A (Ref. 24), EI Model Code Part 9 (Ref.
39)
Structures
SCI Protection of Topsides Structures
FABIG Technical Notes
Vessels
Scandpower, Protection of Pressurised Systems
Piping
FABIG TN8 Protection of Piping Systems
9.1
General
In onshore processing and petrochemical plants, the requirements for PFP are less onerous and have
fewer drawbacks than for offshore facilities.
Onshore personnel may escape a fire situation rapidly from any work area, in a choice of directions
once at ground level, towards either their muster area or the nearest fenceline exit. Escaping personnel
are not reliant on a steel structure buying time until they are ready to evacuate the plant.
Onshore, good layout practices and larger equipment separation distances are easier to achieve than
in offshore designs. Larger separation distances are a form of passive fire mitigation and minimise
thermal insulation requirements for adjacent equipment.
Upstream facilities often have large pressurised gaseous and 2-phase inventories which can lead to
highly damaging and erosive jet fires. Midstream/Downstream Onshore plant designs typically base
their PFP requirements on bunded pool fire scenarios according to API 2218 (Ref. 23), with jet fires
considered by FERA (Ref 8).
The potential for corrosion under insulation (CUI) is greatly decreased or at least slowed down by the
absence of seawater environmental conditions and the use of potable water for active firewater sprays.
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Finally, onshore designs can be stick-built on site or of modular construction, neither method imposes
weight restrictions which are so often a design burden offshore and lead to a restricted set of allowable
PFP material/coatings.
9.2
Flare & Vent Lines
Where flare and vent lines are vulnerable to fire impingement or fire radiation, they shall be protected
either by re-routing away from the fire source sufficiently to not be impaired or passively fire protected.
If this is not possible then this potential shall be subject to FERA (Ref 8), and appropriate measures
taken to reduce the risk to tolerable levels.
9.3
Flare Towers & Ground Flares
Flare towers and ground flares are typically adequately spaced from other plant fire risks such
wellheads, processing and storage areas such that they typically do not require PFP on the flare
structure above any requirement to cater for the thermal radiation from the flare itself.
If the FERA (Ref 8), identifies any fire scenarios which may affect the structural integrity of the flare
structure which can lead to escalation, then active and/or passive protection shall be used.
9.4
Air Fin-Fan Coolers
Fin-fan coolers typically have thin metal exteriors to improve their cooling efficiency, however the thin
metal is also more susceptible to external flame exposure when compared to thick-walled tubular water
exchangers. In addition, fin-fan coolers are typically supported by elevated pipe racks. This not only
makes them vulnerable to pool fires on the ground/deck beneath them, but it can also cause a “chimneyeffect”, sucking in the vapours and smoke form the fire underneath. Fin-fans should be located away
from low point drains and high-risk equipment such as pumps, handing flammable materials. If fin-fan
coolers are located at ground level, or at a level where liquid can accumulate, the supports should have
PFP if in a fire envelope or FPZ region. Air Fin Coolers handling flammable liquid should be fireproofed
for both vertical and horizontal support member.
9.5
Remote /Unmanned Wellheads
Application of PFP is not required by COMPANY for remotely located and unmanned wellheads. The
escalation potential may be present, for example from the fire or blowout of one wellhead impacting
adjacent ones, however the risk of fatalities at remote/unmanned sites is low. There are risks to the
environment and for business impact /asset loss, however these do not outweigh the burden of
inspection and maintenance and repair of PFP at remote sites and the potential for corrosion under
insulation.
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9.6
9.6.1
Utilities
Bottled Compressed Gases
Bottled compressed gases such as oxygen cylinders must be kept away from direct sunlight and located
outside of any potential fire envelope of FPZ.
9.6.2
Firewater Ringmain
Main firewater piping can be filled with water or stay dry until use (when an activation signal is received
to open the firewater deluge skid valves in the zone concerned and start the firewater pumps). The
firewater piping may be specified to be a variety of materials from duplex steel to carbon steel to
lightweight GRP. Although it can be argued that flowing firewater in a ring main will dissipate much of
the heat from a fire, it can take a few minutes before water is flowing, by which time any part of the ring
main above its MAT may have been impaired. FERA (Ref 8), must determine if PFP of fire water main
is required.
An onshore plant firewater ring main may be protected from potential thermal loads of pool and jet fires
by earth burial, otherwise FERA (Ref 8),must determine if PFP of fire water main is required. The same
aspects of pipe damage due to rock settlement and poor drainage as described in 8.1 for tank damage
shall be considered. The protection of firewater piping by burial or PFP does not negate the requirement
to have main isolation valves and redundancy built into the design.
9.6.3
Chemical Injection Skids and Tanks
Chemical injection fluids are a low fire risk but should be located outside of any potential fire envelope
of FPZ.
9.7
Stairways, Walkways, and Access Platforms
Open vertical stairways, horizontal walkways, access platforms, floor and deck plates and grating which
are designed mainly for personnel and the carriage of goods do not themselves require PFP. However,
if shown to be vulnerable to fire in the FERA (Ref 8), their primary and secondary supports shall be
protected to allow personnel to escape the immediate area and reach ground level and to protect rescue
and fire-fighting teams from injury.
Where fire scenarios with the capacity to render a primary escape route unpassable are predicted by
the FERA (Ref 8), partially protection of egress routes may be considered in the form of radiation
shielding mesh, which allows some ventilation whilst absorbing most radiative heat.
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10
PFP IMPLEMENTATION - ONSHORE BUILDINGS
10.1 Buildings & Enclosures
Buildings shall be designed to the UAE Fire Code, Ref 13 (substantially based on NFPA 101, Ref. 82).
A building is defined as “any structure used or intended for supporting or sheltering any use or
occupancy”.
OFFSHORE, occupied enclosures shall be designed to SOLAS (Ref. 101), which covers the same
issues as a building code.
10.2 General
The Building Code sets out the minimum requirements to safeguard public health, safety and general
welfare; safety to life and property from fire and other hazards and provides safety to firefighters and
emergency responders during emergencies.
The Building code aims to provide an environment for the occupants that is reasonably safe from fire
by protection of occupants not intimate with the initial fire development and by improvement of the
survivability of occupants aware of the initial fire development. This is done for the fire hazards within a
building and for the potential spread of a fire within the building to other parts of the same building; so
the code makes provision to split buildings up into ‘zones’ for the purposes of fire and smoke
compartmentalisation, fire detection, fire alarm annunciation, notification and evacuation signalling.
Industrial buildings shall be of the most suitable type allowed by the Fire code, which should mean that
load bearing walls (both internal and external) and other structurally critical elements will have a fire
rating to maintain their structural strength. Structural integrity needs to be maintained for the time
needed to evacuate, relocate, or defend in place, any occupants who are not aware of the initial fire
development.
Buildings are divided into one or more three-dimensional fire compartments due to fire hazards
contained within the building, or because the building has multiple uses or for other reasons given in
the code. These fire compartments shall have fire rating requirements to prevent spread of fire which
must also be met. Openings such as doors and windows shall have a required fire rating and
penetrations through walls and false floors and ceilings shall be designed so as not to compromise the
fire resistance.
External walls (and roofs) may also be required to have a fire rating because of external fire hazards,
and these ratings may need to cater for hydrocarbon jet fire and pool fire for which standards over and
above building code may be required. The specification for this shall be determined by a Building Risk
Assessment (BRA).
10.3 Occupied Buildings at Process Plant
Service buildings are defined as buildings required to service the running of the facility. This includes
administration offices, canteen, medical centre, security and fire station.
Residential buildings and the Central control room are also normally occupied, and TRs and Places of
Shelter shall be treated as normally occupied.
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Passive fire protection provision within all such occupied buildings at process plant shall comply with
building codes.
Any specific hazards within such buildings (e.g. diesel storage, computer rooms) shall have an
appropriate fire segregation provided from that fire compartment to segregate that hazard if required by
the fire safety assessment or the building code.
10.4 Plant / Process Buildings
Plant buildings are defined as buildings where the primary purpose of the building is to house equipment
rather than people. This includes electrical substations, analyser houses, low pressure steam, water
pump houses and air compressors buildings.
Process buildings are defined as buildings where the primary purpose of the building is to house
process equipment rather than people.
Passive fire protection provision within such occupied buildings at process plant shall comply with
building codes.
Any specific hazards within such buildings shall have an appropriate fire segregation provided from that
fire compartment to deal with that hazard if required by the fire safety assessment or the building code.
It is likely that installing process plant in a building will add additional requirements dependant on the
plant installed.
10.5 External Boundaries and Walls
Building code does not generally consider fire hazards that are external to the buildings themselves and
consequently do not impose many requirements on external faces (walls), except where buildings are
built within 3m of another building, the fenceline or a public road. Therefore, buildings built on process
facilities must rely on Building Risk Assessments, FERA (Ref 8), and QRA (Ref. 9), studies to determine
the requirements for fire and blast rating of external walls, as well as control of HVAC air intakes and
any additional PFP requirements above and beyond code.
10.6 Steel Pipe Racks, Equipment Supporting Structures
It is a minimum COMPANY requirement (FERA Standard, Ref. 8) that “irrespective” of the optimum
PFP requirements based on specific FERA study, the prescriptive requirements of API RP 2218 (Ref.
23) shall be applied .
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11
PFP IMPLEMENTATION - OFFSHORE INSTALLATIONS
11.1 OFFSHORE INSTALLATIONS
Specific environmental conditions, process operating conditions, means of escape, evacuation and
refuge and the types of fires are unique to offshore.
On offshore installations, the main priority in case of accidental event is to evacuate personnel in a safe
manner, and therefore, to maintain the function of escape, evacuation and rescue provision if necessary.
PFP shall also address the environmental issues and concerns related to asset protection (as per ‘asset
policy’). The goals and design objectives must be set in the HSE Philosophy and in the Statement of
Requirements to define the appropriate performance criteria to meet the design intent of the PFP.
The humid and saline environmental conditions can lead to and accelerate steel corrosion, especially
underneath PFP (known as CUI) and the type and seals of any applied PFP coatings and enclosures
must be either fully water-tight or allow self-drainage without any water entrapment and extended
contact with the substrate.
The weight of PFP coatings is also a factor which must be considered in the overall cost and load
limitations of offshore facilities versus its benefits.
The high pressures and gas content of upstream, offshore facilities lead to a higher likelihood of intense
and highly erosive jet fires than pool fires.
Subsea risers and wells and open grated decks can lead to long duration sea fires enveloping the
structure of a platform or FPSO.
To that end, the FERA (Ref 8), and EERA (Ref. 6), shall dictate the PFP extent by focusing on a riskbased PFP design which also need to conform to the prescriptive onshore guideline API 2218 (Ref. 23).
However further specialised project studies are likely to be required such as structural, piping and vessel
finite element analysis and subsea release scenario modelling to fully understand equipment failure
modes and fire conditions to achieve an optimum PFP design.
In a secondary capacity, PFP may also be used to prevent asset damage and significant environmental
impact from hydrocarbon and toxic releases into the sea and atmosphere and asset loss.
11.1.1 Wellhead Platforms/Drilling Jack-Ups / SIMOPS
Drilling rig operators are responsible for the fire protection of their rigs during any SIMOPS activities
with COMPANY platforms or subsea facilities.
However, the FERA (Ref 8), shall consider the effects of well blowouts and the potential for severe fire
radiation levels from wellhead areas to the rest of the platform and beyond during simultaneous
production and well workover, wirelining, coil tubing or well testing activities.
The wellhead valves and associated actuators and flanges, BOPs and any platform-based drilling
derricks shall be considered for PFP if they are defined as being within a credible fire envelope by the
FERA (Ref 8), results.
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11.1.2 Jackets
If FERA (Ref 8), results show that there is potential for a sea fire from either a subsea release or a large
pool fire draining overboard, then the stability and integrity of the jacket structure shall be fully assessed
by finite element analysis, before a decision to apply passive fire protection is made.
Depending on the spread of the sea fire due to wind conditions, the extent of fire engulfment shall be
estimated by consequence analysis for input to the finite element analysis. If the jacket structure can
be shown to maintain integrity of the topsides under sea fire conditions even with for example the loss
of one primary support, e.g. one leg, then PFP should be avoided to allow the vital visual inspection of
the jacket for ongoing fatigue and corrosion.
11.1.3 Cranes Cabins and Pedestals
Crane cabins, including the windows and doors shall be thermally insulated from predicted fire radiation
levels to allow the driver crane operator sufficient time to set down the load being carried and then
evacuate the crane cabin. The supporting pedestal shall be provided with passive fire protection based
on the FERA (Ref 8), results and the structure’s MAT to prevent collapse for a minimum of 30 minutes
for escape and evacuation or longer for asset protection. The bolted deck plate may not require PFP,
depending on the fire scenarios, if no pool fire is predicted. However, if bolted deck plates and pedestal
structural joints are fire insulated, they shall have adequate inspection access points, which can be
easily reinstated.
Crane booms are stored in a cradle, well away from pressurised equipment, and unless dropped object
protection is provided, shall be restricted by limit switches from lifting over live loads. A crane operator
shielded in a crane cab is expected to return the hook to a safe resting location before escaping the
crane and hence it is not recommended that booms are to passively fire protected.
11.1.4 Normally Unmanned Installations
Regulations and guidelines for offshore installations are equally valid for all types of installations, both
manned and not permanently manned. Equal attention should be paid to measures for fire hazard
management and emergency response on NUIs as for manned installations.
Personnel risks are primarily driven by the time spent on an installation and the number of visits to it.
All systems put on an installation, including fire mitigation systems such as PFP, require personnel to
visit to maintain and inspect them, which will raise the risk level to those personnel.
For a NUI, the design should, from an ISD viewpoint, not only reduce the hazardous inventories and
process conditions, but also reduce the staffing demand by simplifying safety systems, selecting PFP
systems which have a maintenance free life or minimising the testing, inspection and maintenance
demands of the safety systems. Systems which can be removed on a modular basis should be given
preference to reduce the time spent offshore dismantling and reassembling PFP enclosures. When
setting the inspection frequency of PFP coatings and enclosures, consideration should be given to the
anticipated installation visit frequency so that any periodic inspections align in time with the planned
visits to the NUI. If over time, any PFP system or coating is weathering better than expected and not
deteriorating as quickly, consideration should be given to extending the inspection intervals (but still to
coincide with a planned visit). Another example of minimising the requirement for NUI visits is to ensure
that the facility is isolated and blowdown remotely before a visit, hence eliminating the underlying
requirements for a number of safety systems (including PFP) and the subsequent need to visit to inspect
and maintain them.
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No unproven or novel PFP systems and coatings should be used on a NUI. Using proven systems and
coatings makes sourcing and maintenance easier and the reliability and deterioration and premature
failure is then more accurately estimated. PFP systems and coatings should have a sound track record
from previous use but the relevance of previous use should be critically assessed as it may be for
different applications or situations.
Most NUIs are small and simple installations and the normal segregation distances between potential
fire effects and personnel may be difficult to achieve. In these cases, segregation may be achieved by
barriers such as fire and blast walls and radiation shields to allow personnel to escape and evacuate
safely. In addition, whilst most installations adopt a policy of ensuring good ventilation by use of
open/grated decks, especially around the perimeter of platforms, on very small NUIs these open
walkways may not be appropriate when personnel are near accidental events and protected or enclosed
walkways may be required.
For NUIs when it is reasonably foreseeable that people will be required to be accommodated on them,
dedicated sleeping facilities should be provided. The accommodation does not need to be a TR and it
may be enough to demonstrate that external muster points are enough. However, any TR even on a
NUI which is provided for the purpose of protection from fire, smoke and explosion effects will have to
be fire rated accordingly and have an associated maintenance, testing and inspection regime.
As with all installation designs, manned and unmanned, the risks to personnel must still be
demonstrably ALARP. The design decisions for PFP systems, TRs and Fire and Blast walls require a
finely balanced approach to reduce the need for personnel to visit them and yet to provide protection to
personnel when they do visit.
11.1.5 Egress Routes and Enclosed Tunnels
Generally offshore, external egress routes should be open, well ventilated and routed with a minimum
of two diverse routes from all work areas to designated muster points/TR in a fire scenario.
Where fire scenarios with the capacity to render both sides of a platform or FPSO unpassable are
predicted by the FERA (Ref 8), partially protected or fully enclosed egress routes may be considered.
Partial protection of egress routes may be in the form of radiation shielding mesh, which allows some
ventilation whilst absorbing most of the radiative heat.
Fully enclosed routes should be considered as the last design resort, as they increase confinement and
require several add-on safety systems, such as forced HVAC ventilation, F&G detection system, CCTV,
cabling, ducting and access/exit door penetrations, each system adding to the maintenance and testing
and inspection man-hours and hence personnel risk. Fully enclosed routes also obscure any view of
the direction and extent of escalating events from the personnel inside the tunnel.
Any PFP system and coatings inside and outside of enclosed routes and applied to any structure or
equipment where egress routes pass through, shall not generate any toxic, acrid or otherwise harmful
fumes.
Internal staircases and lift shafts and voids within maned enclosed area shall be protected from
spreading cellulosic fire, heat and smoke. Refer to SOLAS (Ref. 101) Chapter II-2, Construction - Fire
Protection, Fire Detection and Fire Extinction for further details.
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11.1.6 Firewalls
On offshore installations there are fewer opportunities for hazard mitigation by plant separation due to
the high cost and weight of steel structures and steel decks. The weight limitations are typically
restricted by weight limits of transportation barges and lifting cranes during construction or weight
limitations of the steel jacket once installed.
Platforms are designed with minimal empty spaces and are likely to be taller (by several decks), than
they are wide, except for FPSOs. Most FPSOs designs are based on a “ship” shape, they tend to be
longer than they are wide and have few opportunities for hazard mitigation by plant separation due to
the high cost of ship steel and weight limitations. In addition to having several decks on their topsides,
FPSOs also have marine equipment which extends deep into their hull structure, such as the ship’s
machinery rooms, firewater pumps, emergency engines, stores, accommodation, all using up any
available space.
The alternative to spatial separation on platforms and FPSOs is:
a) Segregation of facilities based on a risk gradient, so that lower risk modules buffer hazards
from higher risk processes and
b) Physical barriers such as full width and height firewalls to prevent the spread of smoke,
flames and heat for enough time to allow escape and evacuation to be completed.
11.1.6.1 Segregation versus Ventilation
In the context of fire and explosion management conflicts, firewalls can prevent the spread of flames
and radiation but certainly add to the risk of explosions and consequential damage by increasing
confinement and preventing natural ventilation of gases and venting of any explosion overpressure.
The conflict between the requirement for fire barriers and natural ventilation shall be resolved based on
the results of the FERA (Ref 8),and QRA (Ref. 9), as early as possible in the design.
11.1.6.2 Firewall Types
When designing firewalls, their smoke, flame and heat resistance must be ensured as they then become
a safety critical element, mitigating fire consequences.
The following types of firewall may be considered:




Free standing profiled steel coated with intumescent epoxy PFP
Free standing profiled steel coated with mineral wool insulation systems on their “safe” side
Sheet steel with structural supports coated with intumescent epoxy PFP
Panel systems supported by a structural steel framework
Firewalls which are exposed to fires from both sides shall be appropriately fire rated on both faces. The
manufacturer shall be consulted to ensure that designs which rely on heat loss from the unexposed
face to maintain the structure below its critical temperature are not compromised with the addition of
PFP on the cold side allowing the structure to potentially overheat.
11.1.6.3 Fire Ratings
In selecting the fire rating of firewalls, the potential fire types, heat fluxes and fire durations shall first be
established by a HAZID and then a FERA (Ref 8).
Offshore, internal firewalls may be A-rated for cellulosic fires or H-rated for areas containing flammable
fluids such as lube oil in machinery spaces. A-rated walls may be designed as A-0 and have no
insulation, up to A-120 insulated for 2 hours.
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External offshore firewalls shall be either H-rated (for pool fires) or J-rated (for jet fires). The available
options are H0, H30, H60, H120, J15 and J30.
Note that A-rated firewalls, no matter the thickness of their insulation, shall not be considered of
adequate integrity against any duration of hydrocarbon fires.
11.1.6.4 Firewall Blast Ratings
Firewalls by nature will prevent the passage of natural ventilation and hence block explosion venting.
Their design shall incorporate any explosion resistance recommended by the FERA (Ref 8),. The ability
of the wall to resist an explosion is based on both the performance of the steel structure and the PFP
on the steel substrate. The design of both the structure and the PFP coatings or panels shall take
account of possible elastic and plastic deformation due to predicted explosion loads before or after a
fire based on FERA (Ref 8), results.
11.1.6.5 Firewall Penetrations
Penetrations for piping, cabling, ducting and doors through firewalls shall be eliminated or at least
minimised. If penetrations are unavoidable, the penetration seals shall be rated for the same fire and
explosion rating as the wall itself. Care shall be taken to ensure that fire and heat is not passed through
the firewall via pipework steel, cabling, HVAC ducting or any other conduits passing through the firewall.
This may be mitigated by extending PFP material along the service lines and ducting and ensuring that
HVAC duct’s damper ratings match the rating of the firewall.
11.1.7 Offshore Helidecks
In general, the construction of helidecks is of steel or other equivalent strength material. Yet, newer
installations in the offshore industry have opted for aluminium helidecks because of the substantial
weight savings. The UAE CAAP 71 (Ref. 89) code gives recommendations for offshore and shipboard
helidecks to have specific AFP and monitoring capability, but there are no PFP requirements. Refer to
UAE Civil Aviation Code for Helideck requirements
However, according to SOLAS (Ref. 101), if the helideck forms the top part of a deckhouse or
superstructure (i.e. is not cantilevered over the sea), it shall be required to be insulated to A-60 Class
as a minimum. SOLAS (Ref. 101) II-2 regulation 18 Helicopter Facilities.
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12
PFP IMPLEMENTATION – OTHER FACILITY TYPES
12.1 Artificial Islands
Artificial islands, although technically offshore, are not supported by steel structures or hulls, but by
man-made rock and cement to form a level base for the plant. Piled rock and cement will not collapse
under pool or jet fire conditions.
The plant’s steel supporting structures will however require PFP. These shall be based on specific
FERA (Ref 8), outcomes and requirements of API RP 2218 (Ref. 23).
Emergency escape from artificial islands in the event of fire is less restricted than on typical jacketed
platforms, however care is required for protection of escape routes from any equipment barges and
jetties as well as elevated access platforms and stair towers.
12.2 Refineries
In refineries, the most substantial means for reducing fire risk is the appropriate location and spacing
of plant to minimise the degree of equipment involvement in a fire, although additional protective
measures may still be necessary. The guidelines in API RP 2001 (Ref. 20), shall be followed to avoid
the need for PFP as far as possible.
Where the need for PFP is identified, refer to API 2218 (Ref. 23) for onshore plant and storage and API
2510A (Ref. 24), for LPG vessels and storage.
12.3 LPG Process Plants & Storage
Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) is pressurised liquid propane or butane for the purposes of
transportation and storage but is gaseous at atmospheric conditions if released. The expansion in
volume of LPG to gaseous form is 1:250. Due to the high coefficient of expansion of LPG thermal
protection must be provided to protect against liquid expansion leading to overpressure from internal
temperature rise.
Even small leaks of LPG to the atmosphere can form extremely large volumes of flammable mixtures,
e.g. a volume of 1m3 of LPG liquid can form 2,500m3 to 12,500m3 of a flammable/explosive mixture
when entrained with air
Typically, all above-ground LPG storage is provided with a fixed water spray applied to the whole
surface of vessels and product pipelines to ensure that all surfaces exposed to thermal fire radiation
are protected. Very large LPG cylinder storage compounds may be covered by shielding canopies and
provided with either fixed water monitors or a sprinkler system.
Passive fire protection, in the form of earth mounding, double walled and insulated walled tanks may
be used as an alternative to coatings and active fire protection. However, there will be a portion of the
storage tank that remains exposed to potential fires and temperature rise, which shall still be protected
by active fire protection.
Any LPG vessels on a process plant which cannot be buried or protected by earth embankments, shall
be passively fire protected because of the potential for a BLEVE from an impinging fire (not usually
applicable for storage tanks on tank farms), although PFP for the entire vessel may not be feasible, so
active fire protection shall be considered first and then requirement for PFP shall be assessed based
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on escalation assessment within FERA (Ref 8). In addition, any exposed supporting structures for LPG
vessels shall be adequately protected by passive fire protections for a minimum of 2 hours.
Experiments show that typical flange connections for LPG cannot resist the attack of jet fires. Their life
up to loss of tightness depends on the intensity of the jet fire and can be as short as one minute.
Standard tests (API and BS) for fire resistance of flange connections provide no real information about
loss of tightness in a real scenario of jet fire impingement. Hence application of PFP, ideally a type that
is easily removable should be applied to LPG flanges and the valves they are associated with, as
standard.
Intumescent epoxies either sprayed or moulded into removable boxes around valves and flanges may
be suitable for this application, if the material is approved for the low operating temperatures.
Cementitious coatings shall not be used because of the risk of vessel corrosion, due to water absorption
by concrete and subsequent spalling, cracking and leaks.
The permitted radiation level on unprotected adjacent LPG storage vessels, according to two references
is given in table of maximum allowable temperatures, Table 2: approximately 8kW/m2. It is also usual
to limit the capacity of each above-ground LPG storage vessel to 120 m3 within process units because
of their vulnerabilities.
In terms of the heat flux from LPG pool fires, once a leak and ignition has occurred, some LPG test data
indicates a considerably lower flame surface flux for LPG pool fires than for LNG. The difference is
attributed to obscuration of the LPG flame by black soot so that a significant fraction of the surface will
not be emitting thermal radiation at any moment. Conversely, other LPG fire tests have revealed that
for jet fires, the composition is also important as > 60% hydrocarbons with longer carbon chains than
methane, such as propane and butane produce greater heat fluxes than mainly methane gas jets.
Also refer to API 2510A (Ref. 24), and EI Code Part 9 and General Process Area requirements for
further details.
12.4 LNG Plants and Storage
LNG is liquid methane (with small proportions of other components), which is liquefied using cryogenic
cooling not pressurisation. Cryogenic substances, such as LNG, introduce the potentially catastrophic
hazard of cryogenic embrittlement of steel elements such as, structures and decks. The cryogenic
temperatures of LNG can cause steel to crack almost immediately and may also have an adverse effect
on the performance of the PFP systems and cables. In the event of an LNG fire, the temperature shock
on steel, process equipment, cabling and any PFP is much greater – firstly by being super chilled during
the spill, then rapidly heated upon ignition of the LNG being rapidly vaporised.
LNG leaks may cause either a spray fire or pool fire depending on the pressure they are released from.
A leak at atmospheric pressure will lead to an evaporating pool fire. For LNG fires the evaporation rate
and hence the burning rate, will be highly dependent on the temperature and heat capacity of the
substrate; steel deck, land or sea surface.
Upon ignition of a cryogenic liquid gas, there will be an initial pulse of fire, as the flame propagates
through the gas that has already vaporised; this can produce a larger flame and higher heat fluxes than
during the steady burning. Steady state heat fluxes in LNG pool fires are reported in the range 200-250
kW/m2 for a 35 m diameter pool (LR), which is like other HC pool fires.
In terms of a fire occurring externally near an LNG tank this will result in a temperature increase of the
tank contents and pressure increase. The boil-off from the liquid is complex and depends on many
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factors and the tank’s relief valve cannot be relied upon to provide enough protection from tank
overpressure and rupture. Roll-over due to density and temperature differentials is an event that should
also be prevented to avoid tank overpressure.
Heat protection may be accomplished in several ways, including adequate tank spacing, pre-stressed
and reinforced concrete tanks, double and insulated tank containment and earth embankment. Note
that single containment tanks with shallow bunding are no longer deemed acceptable for spillages and
fire protection. The type of and performance of passive fire protection solutions is highly dependent on
the fire scenarios, their calculated heat fluxes and resultant surface temperatures.
It has been documented in various standards that the temperature rise on the steel tank roof and shell
shall be limited to 300oC by passive and active means, which is well below the temperature of steel and
concrete failure and the typically the optimum passive solutions are tank earth mounting and adequate
tank spacing from potential fire sources such as adjacent tanks and nearby hazardous equipment.
12.5 Jetty Terminals
PFP may be considered for the main platform steel beams and the steel piles under the loading platform
of LNG and oil condensate jetties, if exposed to pool and sea fire scenario determined by the FERA
(Ref 8).
Drip trays draining to a sump should be positioned where potential leakage of flammable fluids may
occur to prevent accumulation of pool beneath the jetty.
12.6 Helipads and Heliports
There are no PFP requirement for ground level onshore helipads.
In respect of evaluated onshore heliports, the UAE Building Control Authorities require that the main
structural support beams which could be exposed to a jet fuel spill shall have an acceptable fireresistance rating. This should be based on a helicopter fire risk assessment.
The onshore heliport building(s) shall have a fire protection system designed to provide protection to
personnel in the event of a helipad fire incident and evacuation.
Refer to UAE Civil Aviation Code for further details regarding fire protection onshore helipad and heliport
requirements
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13
EARTH MOUNDING & EMBANKMENT PROTECTION
Earth mounding (e.g. buried piping and cables) and earth embankment are two methods which may be
used on onshore facilities to passively fire protect safety critical piping and cabling or vulnerable, high
hazard inventories such as LPG tanks. The benefit of earth mounding and embankments is that jet
fires in open areas tend to orientate upwards with distance (becoming buoyant jets) not towards the
earth unless they are blocked or impinge on roofs or ceilings. Pool fires either fill a designated bund or
will flow with gravity to lower levels and in both cases only burn on the very surface where vapour is
evaporating. Pool fires do not burn or heat up at substrate/earth level until the final liquid layer has
evaporated.
13.1 LNG and LPG Tanks
In the case of tank embankments, the height of the embankment will depend on the design of the tank
and the degree of protection required from external heat loads. Maximum protection is obtained when
the height of the earth embankment is the same as the maximum fill height of the inner tank
To avoid settlements and friction on tank walls, the fill shall be a mixture of hard rock and soil. Weak
rock such mudstone, shale, marl, chalk and sand are not suitable for heavy loaded embankment fill.
The settlement of the soil of the mounding or embankment shall be calculated in combination with the
settlements of the sub soil and the piping and tanks. This should be done by finite element analysis.
Good permeability and water drainage of the embankment shall be ensured, either by use of permeable
layers. If the subsoil is an impermeable material, a bottom drainage layer under the tank and
embankment may be required. As an alternative to natural layers, there are various types of geotextile
materials available and detailed information can be obtained from manufacturers.
13.2 Critical Piping and Cabling
On onshore plant, safety critical piping, power and cabling may be protected from potential thermal
loads from pool and jet fires by earth mounding or burial. The same aspects of pipe and cable damage
due to rock settlement and poor drainage as described in 13.1 for tank damage shall be considered.
The protection of piping and cabling by burial is like normal PFP in that it does not negate the
requirement to have isolation valves and redundancy built into the design.
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The Maximum Allowable Temperature (MAT) is the temperature at which unprotected equipment,
piping, structures or barriers fail to maintain their design function. The term is sometimes referred to as
critical core temperature (CCT) for steel structures.
It is vital to understand the actual MATs for vulnerable and safety critical equipment falling within a fire
radiation envelope or fire protection zone.
An array of maximum allowable temperatures (MAT) for various safety critical elements are reproduced
from literature in the table below. These values are not plant specific but serve to demonstrate the
substantial variation in failure temperatures for different equipment types and materials.
During the earliest part of design, once representative fire scenarios have analysed and the theoretical
fire loads calculated, the actual equipment MATs shall be obtained from the manufacturer (where
possible) or derived by calculation. Manufacturers’ product fire test data (if available) is the best source,
otherwise MATs may be derived by calculation to input into equipment PFP selection and specification.
For example, the temperature at which a structural steel may fail is usually cited as 400oC by many in
the industry. However, the actual MAT for structural steel will vary based on the actual alloy composition
and specific loading and the amount of restraint, which may be significantly above (better) or
significantly below (worse) than the typical 400oC.
The temperature at which a process vessel is over pressurised or the vessel wall weakens to a point
insufficient to contain the internal pressure, may be obtained through analysis UKOAA Part 2 & OTI 92
610 .
Note the values in bold are the values reproduced from the reference material, the corresponding
values have been calculated based on a simple version of the Stefan Boltzmann equation of
Incident radiation Q= σ *(T)4
Where:
Q = Incident thermal radiation W/m2
σ = Stephan- Boltzmann constant: = 5.6697 × 10-8 W/m2K4
T = Surface Temperature K
Note that 0oC = 273K
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Table A1: Typical Maximum Allowable Temperatures / Thermal Fluxes
Safety
Equipment
Critical
Maximum
Allowable
Temperature
/oC
Maximum
Allowable
Thermal
Radiation
Specific Concerns
/ kW/m2
Reinforced Concrete
<450
Mechanical resistance of reinforced concrete
structures is appreciably weakened due to
dilation of bar iron at 400degC. Complete
destruction of reinforced concrete occurs at
800oC.
Fully restrained
Structures
Steel
< 200
3
Expansion
of
a
heated
member
exert
extremely large forces at its supports. Fully
restrained steel can yield below 200oC, the
exact temperature depends on the grade of
steel.
Steel Jackets (Stainless
Steel)
400
Vessel saddles, skirts
400
Piping
and
cabling
supports and racks
400
Helideck
Aluminium
bearing)
200
(Aluminium)
Non-load
Slender Steel Structures
(Class 4)
>250
mins
for
5
<350
Slender cross-sections
whose resistance is
governed by elastic local
buckling below the yield
strength of the material.
Steel
Process
Equipment and piping
(pressure
vessels,
columns,
heat
exchangers for gaseous
and liquid inventories.)
AGES-PH-03-002 (Part 3)
<350
37.5kW/m2
rupture
at
15mins
API RP 521 is inadequate and inappropriate for
offshore installations, where fire heat fluxes
implicit in the API 521 guidance are much
lower than can be expected offshore from jet
fires and therefore depressurisation may not
guarantee vessel protection.
Rev. No: 1
Page 46 of 82
Safety
Equipment
Critical
Maximum
Allowable
Temperature
/oC
Maximum
Allowable
Thermal
Radiation
Specific Concerns
/ kW/m2
LPG Bulk Storage Tanks
(Unprotected)
<350
Exchangers
<350
Fire Pumps
< 200
Flare piping
<200 Variable
8
It is likely that the MAT of < 200degC is
because of vulnerable flanges/welds and
Export Piping
potentially empty flare lines without fluids to
absorb the thermal loads from a fire.
Risers
Low alloy Steel Piping
315
Carbon Steel Piping
370
<120kW/m2
(pool fire) for
10mins Ref 2
Stainless Steel Piping
450
<250kW/m2
(jet fire) for
5mins Ref 2
ESD /BD Actuators
80
ESD /BD Valves
200
The MAT for unprotected valves is very
dependent on materials of construction, type of
service (e.g. gas is worse than liquid at
dissipating heat.) and type of seal materials
Hence typical MAT are not appropriate.
References suggest 200oC or less, others
indicate 300oC. Manufacturers’ assistance
must be obtained for correct MAT for each
unprotected ESD valve.
Compact Flanges
Whilst compact flanges have a lower leak
frequency, they are easily damaged during
installation and have a lower thermal capacity
before failure.
Flanges Bolts
500
Potential elongation and loss of tension in
flange bolts can cause failure at lower
temperatures
Flange Welds
AGES-PH-03-002 (Part 3)
500
Rev. No: 1
Page 47 of 82
Safety
Equipment
Critical
Maximum
Allowable
Temperature
/oC
Maximum
Allowable
Thermal
Radiation
Specific Concerns
/ kW/m2
Fire-Tested
(Bodies only)
Valve
Uninsulated
cabling
Critical
Fire Resistant Cabling
750-980
For HC pool fires of 30 mins or less.
Not
tested/rated
for
gaseous
inventories or higher thermal impacts
of jet fires.
100
750 -850
30-90 minutes specified for
each test
Essential
Power
Generators (Diesel)
< 200
Buildings
Normal Accommodation
190
Rest/Portable Shelters
132
1.6
NOTES
1
The maximum allowable radiation shall include maximum solar radiation of 1.04 kW/m2 for Abu
Dhabi, LAT 24.
2.
See conversion chart Figure A2 below.
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Figure A2: Surface Temperatures as a Function of Fire Radiation
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In the early stages of a project (e.g. Concept / early FEED stages) it is likely that there will be insufficient
information to establish the PFP requirements with any degree of certainty.
Table 13-1 has guidelines that can be used as a starting point to provide a coarse estimate for budgeting
purposes. These times shall be verified before the design is finalised for procurement in Detail Design.
The most common periods of PFP resistance are 15min, 30min, 60min, 90min and 120 min and apply
to pool or jet fire, whichever hazard is present.
The period of jet fire resistance from the jet fire test, should be rounded down to the nearest 5 minutes.
Table 13-1: PFP Resistance Duration Coarse Initial Estimates
HSECES Type
PFP
Protection
(minutes)
Buildings
see
building
codes, ERA and
EERA Ref. 6).
Primary and Secondary Structures
including vessel, pump, air-cooler, fired
heaters, reactors, column supports,
piperacks, flare structure, crane pedestal
and derrick structure.
120
Reasoning
Allow 15 min escape time, 15 min
search and rescue time = 30 mins
Allow manual firefighting = 1530mins to arrive, and 90 mins fire
control = 2 hours
Subject to confirmation by FERA
(Ref 8).
Critical Equipment
120
Pressurised Vessels with BLEVE potential
e.g. LPG vessels
Equipment, piping, risers, flowlines with >
5m3 flammable inventory
Vessels with flammable
pressure > 4.5bar
inventory
Allow 15 min escape time, 15 min
search and rescue time = 30 mins
Allow manual firefighting = 1530mins to arrive plus 90 mins
firefighting = 2 hours
at
Piping, risers and flowlines with flammable
inventory > 20bar
Equipment and lines with toxic inventory
Reactors and catalytic crackers prone to
runaway exothermic reaction
REF EI 19)
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HSECES Type
PFP
Protection
(minutes)
Reasoning
Firewater Main
120
Allow manual firefighting = 1530mins to arrive plus 90 mins
firefighting = 2 hours
60
Allow 15 min escape time plus 15
min muster and incident decision
time, plus 30 mins lifeboat
embarkation and launch time =
60 mins
30
Allow 15 min escape time plus 15
min search and rescue time = 30
mins
30
Allow 15 min escape time plus 15
min search and rescue time = 30
mins
30
Allow 15 min escape time plus 15
min search and rescue time = 30
mins
30
Allow 15 min escape time plus 15
min search and rescue time = 30
mins
if potential for total failure of main ring main
EER and TR Offshore
Means of escape, muster, Temporary
Refuge and evacuation (offshore). This
may be a combination of heat shielding and
fire/blast walls.
ESDVs and BDVs
(valves, actuators and flanges), if not
isolating riser and flowline inventories
otherwise 120 minutes (see above)
Flare and Vent Lines
especially for staggered blowdown from
different zones which may take longer than
15 minutes
Critical Cabling, Pneumatic and Hydraulic
Lines
for critical instrumentation such as PA/GA,
and emergency power.
EER Onshore
Means of escape, muster and evacuation,
this may be via heat shielding (onshore)
Note: The PFP resistance time should be equal to the FERA (Ref 8) estimated fire duration (assuming
ESD operation but assuming without AFP operation) or the default values quoted above whichever
is highest.
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The extent of PFP on supporting structures within a fire envelope may be determined by FERA (Ref
8), outcomes by API 2218 (Ref. 23) FPZ volumes based on materials’ maximum allowable temperatures
(MAT). This is a coarse method and more sophisticated methods are available if approved by the project,
see below. The MATs in Table 2-1 are guidelines and shall not be used for detailed calculation purposes.
Plants use numerous types of steel and it is vital that the actual alloy composition of the steel is
determined, e.g. type of carbon steel or type of stainless-steel alloy as the MATs vary for various alloys
and manufacturing processes. The actual MAT for each supporting structure shall be obtained from the
manufacturer and then compared with fire scenario heat fluxes to determine if failure occurs and PFP
is required.
FIGURE 2-4:
Comparison of Characteristics of Carbon and Stainless Steels Under Elevated
Temperatures
By contrast, structural response analysis may be conducted for a steel member, part of a structure or a
whole module. By analysis of the entire module it is possible to assess the degree of redundancy of the
module’s structure beyond first member failure and to determine the way load shedding and load
redistribution takes place. It is the most detailed evaluation available, however can save on large
amounts of unnecessary PFP, which may have been overly conservative and eventually lead to
corrosion under the insulation and added weight.
Refer to FABIG Notes 1, 3, 6, 11 and 13 containing Eurocode Simple Design Rules for Structural Steel
Members in a Fire.
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Pressurised vessels typically have depressurisation (PSV and ESD/BDV) systems installed to:




Reduce the pressure in a process segment in the case of a fire. A reduction in process
pressure will reduce material stress and reduce the risk of vessel rupture, but not eliminate it.
Reduce the pressure and inventory of the process segment under fire conditions prior to
rupture, if rupture cannot be avoided.
Reduce the leak rate and fire extent and duration
Remove flammables gas/liquids from the fire area by disposal to the flare system
Traditionally process depressurisation systems are designed to:


Reduce operating pressure of the system to 7barg within 15minutes or
Reduce operating pressure to 50% of the design pressure within 15minutes, whichever is
lower
However, large-scale joint-industry research has proved that simply designing a blowdown system to
API RP 521 does not prevent catastrophic vessel rupture, because local fire heat loads may be larger
than the basis of API RP 521 or the wall of the vessel ruptures.
Therefore, there are 4 alternative design options:
1. Allow the vessel to rupture and demonstrate that the risk is ALARP if the vessel has a volume <
5m3, is below 4.2bar and contains no toxic materials. Refer to Figure 2-2.
2. Increase the rate of depressurisation and calculate by analysis the vessel heat-up time and
demonstrate rupture is avoided. The effectiveness of the depressurisation of the vessel is
dependent on the time to initiate blowdown, hence automatic ESD and blowdown is highly
recommended on all facilities.
3. Increase the thickness of the steel material to improve material stress, calculate vessel heat-up
time and demonstrate rupture is avoided.
4. Apply PFP specified for the appropriate fire type and the duration required until the fire has
receded and no longer threatens the vessel.
Note that PFP is the last option in the hierarchy of available design options.
Valves have many varied uses, but in terms of safety, there are two main types which are safety critical;
a) emergency shutdown (ESDVs) & Remotely Operated Valves (ROVs) and b) Blowdown valves
(BDVs).
ESD and BD valves form an integral part of any system of flammable and toxic containment. Hence
ESD and BD valves must be as robust as the rest of the system of containment they are linked to.
Valves are commonly discussed in general terms such as “fire-rated” or “fail-safe” or both, but their
varying fire integrity capabilities are often overlooked. There are several fire-test standards available for
valves and while they have similarities, they are not all the same (Refer Appendix D). In addition, valve
fire tests are not as onerous as structural fire tests, typically lasting for only 30 minutes at a temperature
much lower than those conducted for structural fire tests, lasting 2 hours. Valves undergoing a fire-test
AGES-PH-03-002 (Part 3)
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are typically filled with water, which helps to slow the heat-up and are not required to be resilient against
an impinging flame, especially a jet fire.
In addition, valves have known weakness, such as actuators, flanges, bolts and welds, which may lead
to loss of integrity even after the valve has operated successful. These aspects are also not covered by
standard valve fire-tests, which typically only test the valve body.
A valve must be viewed as several assembled parts, each having different failure mechanisms and
integrity under fire conditions, rather than one piece of equipment.
The key principles for protection of HSECES valve integrity are:





HSECES valves shall be fire-rated to an approved standard, but additionally passively fire
protected if thermal radiation is above the fire-rating of the valve or above 32 kW/m2.
Associated welds, bolts and flanges for all HSECES valves shall be passively fire protected if
thermal radiation is above 20 kW/m2
Associated actuators for HSECES valves shall be passively fire protected as they can fail at
temperatures as low as 80oC (e.g. actuator damage). Easily removable (Jacket with clips) are
recommended to aid inspections and maintenance.
Associated HSECES valve instrument lines shall be fire rated to an approved standard up to
750oC, but additionally passively fire protected if thermal radiation is above 32 kW/m2. This is of
importance if a staged blowdown is required and blowdown valves are to remain closed for a
period of several minutes time before opening, to avoid flare line overpressure. Care should be
taken to ensure cables do not overheat due to the application of PFP.
For ROVs that are required to be operated in the event of fire / emergency, actuators and cable
shall be fireproofed even if they are outside the fireproofing zones for example on notpermanently manned installations.
PFP to valve actuators to be specifically designed to allow easy and practical access to control
components of valve and actuator. The type of PFP used shall not create a hazard by trapping any
hydrocarbon emissions from valve stem leaks creating a higher hazardous area due to accumulation.
Fire loads shall be specified by the FERA (Ref 8).
13.2.1.1 PFP using MAT Values
Process pipework has a much broader spectrum of response to fires than structures. The performance
ranges from the simple sagging of a dry pipe to the possible catastrophic explosion of a hydrocarbontransporting pipe.
The resistance of pipework to fire loadings is extremely variable.
The main considerations are:


Insulation: If a process line is partially or completely insulated for process reasons, it may
perform well under fire loads, but most lagging materials are unlikely to be effective in a fire
The size and thickness of the pipework
AGES-PH-03-002 (Part 3)
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Page 54 of 82


Material of construction: The prime material types are carbon steel, lined carbon steel,
stainless steel and Copper-Nickel. These materials have different elevated temperature
characteristics and will behave differently under fire loading conditions. The material
properties will be linked to a function of the pipe itself and so evaluation should be carried out
on a system-by-system basis
Contents and Flowrate: The normal contents of the pipe will need to be considered. The
internal pipe fluid will be able to remove local heating at a rate which will be determined by the
properties of the fluid itself and the fluid flowrate. Gases will have little cooling effect, whilst
water will give considerable assistance. It should be noted that “fire-rated” valve tests are
conducted solely filled with water.
If the method of determining the extent of PFP on process pipework is determined by either FERA (Ref
8), fire envelopes or by API 2218 (Ref. 23) FPZ volumes and then compared with pipework maximum
allowable temperatures (MAT) then the actual MAT for each pipe shall be obtained from the
manufacturer, taking account of all the variables above.
13.2.1.2 Non-Linear Finite Element Analysis
Non-linear finite element analysis permits the rupture calculations of a piping system to be based on
more accurate methods which account for the reserve strength inherent in many design codes. It also
overcomes the approximations that have been identified with the use of simplified methods.
Refer to FABIG Technical Note 8 (Ref. 45): Protection of Piping Systems for further details of the
analyses.
Whilst instrument and power supply cabling for HSECES (e.g. emergency signals and alarms, plant PA,
active fire protection, fire and gas detection, ESD, emergency lighting and TRs and evacuation systems)
should be specified to be fire- resistant in accordance with IEC 60331-21 , i.e., able to withstand
temperatures of at least 750°C for the period of time necessary to complete the actions of the critical
function, up to a maximum of 90 minutes this is insufficient for HC fire impingement temperatures of
1000oC +.
Safety critical cabling which is subject to HC flame impingement or radiation levels in excess of
100degC (Table 2-1 MATs) shall be protected by PFP or re-routed or earth mounted or made redundant
through duplication.
Note that care should be taken when passively insulating cabling to avoid overheating during normal
plant operations.
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Certain fire hazards which are unsuited to mitigation by PFP are listed below and alternative measures
such as active fire protection should be considered instead:
d. HC Tank Roof Fires (requires AFP)
e. HC Flash Fire (Danger to personnel, and not plant)
f.
Alcohol fire (e.g. methanol) (Low radiation intensity, consider alcohol-resistant foam
AFP)
AGES-PH-03-002 (Part 3)
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Common PFP materials, their characteristics, performance and suitability for different industry
applications with examples are described below. Whilst there are different trade names for similar
materials it is critical to understand each material’s physical properties and characteristics that influence
its performance and suitability. The exclusion of any PFP material in this document does not mean that
it is not suitable. Newer materials may be selected but should be fully evaluated and approved to
recognised international standards (e.g. UL 1709 for pool fires, ISO 22899 (Ref. 74 & 75) for jet fires).
If this is not possible, for example there are no standard tests for wire mesh radiation shields,
manufacturers tests should be carefully assessed for suitability for each application.
When selecting PFP materials it should be ensured that the selected materials are:




Independently tested and approved for the predicted fire, explosion and cryogenic spill
scenarios
Appropriate for the type of equipment to be protected
Suitable for the environmental conditions (E.g. Solar degradation, CUI from high humidity,
pollutants etc.)
Suitable for all operating conditions, including process upsets (e.g. higher and lower surface
temperatures than normal)
The following table provides a summary of the most common types of fire protection materials, with
further detailed information in later sections.
Refer to COMPANY for approved vendor list for PFP materials; table D1 gives examples only.
Table D1: Summary of Advantages and Disadvantages of PFP Materials
PFP TYPE
KEY
KEY ADVANTAGES
APPLICATION
DISADVANTAGES
COST
Cement and Concrete
Concrete
Coatings






Highly water
absorbent
Steel/iron
reinforcement
bars/mesh
may fail early
in a fire
causing
spalling and
damage.
Poor erosion
resistance
Very heavy
Poor blast
performance
Difficulty in
identifying
the corrosion
AGES-PH-03-002 (Part 3)
Coatings can be
easily applied to
any shape
Mainly Onshore
Cheap
Rev. No: 1
Page 57 of 82
PFP TYPE
KEY
KEY ADVANTAGES
APPLICATION
DISADVANTAGES
COST
Lightweight
Cementitious
(LWC)
Coatings





of steel
surface
Highly water
absorbent
Poor erosion
resistance
Poor blast
performance
Narrow
process
operating
limits of 50oC
- 0oC .
Difficulty in
identifying
the corrosion
of steel
surface
Coatings can be
easily applied to
any shape
Mainly Onshore
Moderate
Polymer Based
Epoxy
Intumescent
Subliming
Polymer
coating
1.
Seals
are
prone to water
ingress
2. Degrade above
process/substrate
operating
temp
above 60oC
3.Degrades
below
process
operating temp of
-40oC
4. Can give off
toxic
gases
during
charring
and shall not be
used indoors.
5.
Prone
cracking
Subliming
Polymer
coating
1.Coatings can
be
applied to any shape
Onshore
Offshore
&
Expensive
2. Excellent fire and
good blast resistance
even after weathering
3. Very hard finish with
excellent
impact/mechanical
resistance
4.
Lighter
than
Cementitious products
5. Certain products
have excellent jet fire
resistance
to
1.
Seals
are
prone to water
ingress
Coatings can be applied
to any shape
Onshore
Offshore
&
2.
Degrades
above
process
AGES-PH-03-002 (Part 3)
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PFP TYPE
KEY
KEY ADVANTAGES
APPLICATION
DISADVANTAGES
COST
operating temp of
60oC
3.
Degrades
below
process
operating temp of
-40oC
Phenolic Foam
(Non-reacting)
Insulating
Polymer
coating
Seals are prone
to water ingress if
not sprayed as
one
whole
coating.
Well
known
insulating
properties
High
stability
Onshore & Offshore
thermal
Low toughness
Produces acrid,
toxic fumes and
smoke at high
temperatures
Long
curing
process involving
generation
of
water which can
remain trapped
inside
Can be coated on
any shape
May be used for
protection against
cryogenic spills
May be combined
with
epoxy
intumescent
on
top to form a
composite system
of layers
Operating
conditions claimed
are:
-75oC
to
o
+150 C
Elastomers
(Rubber)
Polymer
coating
Very resilient to
pool and jet fires
and
corrosion
resistant,
if
applied
by
manufacturer to
avoid issues.
E.g.
uncoated
risers
are
delivered to PFP
manufacturer
who
delivers
AGES-PH-03-002 (Part 3)
Can be applied to
any shape without
seals, using tight
winding and high
temperature
technique offsite.
Mainly used offshore
for rigid and flexible
risers in a splash
zone
Can be applied to
rigid, flexible risers
and flanges.
Rev. No: 1
Page 59 of 82
PFP TYPE
KEY
KEY ADVANTAGES
APPLICATION
DISADVANTAGES
COST
them
ready
coated to site
, the risers must
withstand
massive
wear.
The
dampening and
flexible nature of
Withstands plash
zone wear and
tear
Can
protect
against corrosion,
vibration,
small
collision
impact
and
explosion
overpressures to
2bar.
Firestop also
Pre-Formed PFP
Pre-formed
Panels



Seals are
prone to
water ingress
Poor impact/
mechanical
resistance
Prone to
being
misaligned or
not replaced
after removal
for inspection
and hence
poor fire/blast
performance
and further
water
ingress.
Onshore & Offshore
Low to
moderate
Mineral Wool
Mineral Wool
Blankets


Seals are
prone to
water ingress
Prone to
being
misaligned or
not replaced
after removal
for inspection
and hence
poor fire/blast
performance
and further
AGES-PH-03-002 (Part 3)
May be used within a
stainless-steel
sandwich to insulate
against pool and jet
fires
Onshore
Offshore
&
Low to
moderate
Rev. No: 1
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PFP TYPE
KEY
KEY ADVANTAGES
APPLICATION
DISADVANTAGES
COST

Wrap Jackets

water
ingress.
Seals are
prone to
water ingress
Prone to
being
misaligned or
not replaced
after removal
for inspection
and hence
poor fire/blast
performance
and further
water
ingress.
Resistant to pool and jet
fires
Onshore
Offshore
&
Earth Mounding/Embankments for LNG and LNG vessels and storage tanks
Burial
Mounding
/
Embankment
 Liable to
movement and
collapse of
entry roads
 Liable to
movement and
cause erosion
to tanks by
packed rock
 Prone to water
ingress and
retention
 Liable to
movement and
collapse of
entry roads
 Liable to
movement and
cause erosion
to tanks by
packed rock
 Prone to water
ingress and
retention
Onshore
Cheap
-
Onshore
Radiant Heat Shielding
Modular
system
of
woven
wire
mesh (single
or
double)
 Not effective in
an engulfing
flame
 Not effective at
high radiation
AGES-PH-03-002 (Part 3)
 Lightweight
 Does not induce
corrosion
 Minor/NonMaintenance
Onshore &
Offshore
Low/
Moderate
Rev. No: 1
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PFP TYPE
KEY
KEY ADVANTAGES
APPLICATION
DISADVANTAGES
COST
panels
inserted into a
custom -built
narrow
steel
frame.
levels >
37.5kW/m2
 No approved
international
test available
(reliant on
manufacturers’
tests/claims)
 Steel frame is
welded to a
surface and
increases
loading on
structure
Perforated
Steel Panels in
a steel frame
 Heavier than
wire mesh
panel
 Steel frame is
welded to a
surface and
increases
loading on
structure
 Wind loading
much greater
than wire mesh
 Less
ventilation/
venting than
mesh
 Poorer light
transmission/
visibility than
mesh
 Cold side
surface
temperature
not as cool as
mesh type
 Allows natural
venting
 Allows passage
of light and
vision
 Useful for
escape route
shielding
 Highly effective
for radiation
reduction away
from a fire up to
40-80%
reduction in
heat flux from
hot to cold side
 Less wind
loading than
perforated steel
(see below)
 Highly effective
for radiation
reduction away
from a fire (not
within a fire) up
to 80%
reduction in
heat flux
 Minor/NonMaintenance
 Useful for
escape route
shielding but
cold side may
be > 60oC and
present a hot
surface hazard
Onshore &
Offshore
Low/
Moderate
Fire and Blast Walls
Solid
fire/blast
rated
 Penetrations
seals (cabling,
ducting, piping,
AGES-PH-03-002 (Part 3)
 Can be used to
divide Fire
Zones where
Onshore &
Offshore
Expensive
Rev. No: 1
Page 62 of 82
PFP TYPE
KEY
KEY ADVANTAGES
APPLICATION
DISADVANTAGES
COST
walls,
either
standalone
with steel
supports
or
supported
by
buildings’
walls /
faces





doors) are
vulnerable to
failure
Doors left open
will impair
whole wall
performance
Extremely
heavy
Block
ventilation of
gases
Block venting
of explosion
overpressures
Passive fire
protection
(typically epoxy
intumescent
can lead to
corrosion of
steel substrate)
space is limited
e.g. platforms
 One wall can
shield a large
area
 Can be
designed to flex
and deform and
still perform
against fire after
severe blast
overpressure
 Prevents
passage of
gases and
smoke as well
as heat and
blast
overpressure
Concrete contains cement and fine to coarse aggregates. It is one of the oldest types of structural steel
PFP materials.
Concrete has historically been used to protect steel in a fire because concrete has a lower thermal
conductivity than steel and so provides thermal insulation. In addition, as concrete is porous, any water
absorbed will evaporate at 100oC which causes the temperature rise of the steel to remain steady until
water evaporation is complete.
Concrete can be applied in several ways. It can be pre-cast into specific shapes or sprayed on or
trowelled on with the aid of steel or plastic reinforcing bars and mesh, which is welded to the steel
structure to ensure the concrete stays in place and bonds, follows the structure’s contours and to
minimise (but not eliminate) cracking.
Concrete Advantages
1. High strength and good weather stability (in non-fire scenarios)
2. Inexpensive to buy but may prove expensive in the long term if CUI requires steel replacement
or CUI leads to collapse of steel under normal operations or in fire scenarios.
Concrete Disadvantages
1. Extremely heavy and not suitable for offshore or above grade onshore application
AGES-PH-03-002 (Part 3)
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2. Water absorbent and prone to holding water/moisture leading to unidentified corrosion of
structural steel underneath (CUI) the insulation
3. Prone to physical damage from knocks and high-pressure firewater impacts and undetected
cracking and spalling underneath, causing water ingress via small cracks.
4. Prone to physical damage from due to lifting or transportation and undetected cracking and
spalling, causing water ingress via small cracks.
5. Cracking/spalling may also occur due to natural shrinkage or expansion/shrinkage of the steel
substrate underneath due to thermal conditions, or expansion of supporting steel due to
corrosion or expansion of reinforcing (steel) mesh due to corrosion or simply due to conductivity
from process vessel and piping.
6. Cracking/spalling may occur when under load or subject to expansion due to localised heating
in a HC gas or 2-phase jet fire
7. Cracking may lead to “explosive” spalling that may cause damage to small-bore pipework,
instruments leading to further loss of inventory
8. Variability of performance from poor quality control of locally sourced materials and variable
drying and curing based on atmospheric conditions over long periods of time.
9. “Explosive” spalling may also endanger facility personnel and fire-fighters.
10. Passive explosion resistance (prior to a fire) is variable, depending on the material type,
installation method and condition of the material.
11. Reinforced concrete may begin to fail early in a fire situation due to fail of the steel/iron
reinforcement bars and mesh above 400oC.
Lightweight cementitious (LWC) fire protection materials are composites of cement and fibres and other
fillers. They are lighter than ordinary concrete and may be specified for a wide range of densities. Just
as concrete, these materials may be applied by being cast into specific shapes or sprayed-on or trowel
applied, with the aid of reinforcement mesh to keep the PFP in place.
The low thermal conductivity of LWC protects the supporting steel beneath. LWC PFP is also water
absorbent and any water within the PFP material will evaporate at 100oC and slow down the heating of
the steel substrate until water evaporation is complete.
Lightweight Cementitious Advantages



High strength and good weather stability (in non-fire scenarios)
Lighter than ordinary concrete and may be used at elevations on vessels, pipework, vessel
supports and well as structural steel.
Perform predictably in HC pool fire scenarios.
Lightweight Cementitious Disadvantages




Whilst most LWC materials have been tested and have jet fire resistance, the density of the
tested material varies and performance against highly erosive jet fires is variable. In low
density materials, cracking/spalling may occur when under load or subject to expansion due
to localised heating in a high temperature, erosive gas or 2-phase jet fire
Less dense, softer grades of LWC PFP are not recommended at lower elevations as they are
prone to physical damage from knocks and impacts
Low density, softer grades of LWC PFP are also prone to physical damage from high
pressure fire-fighting water hoses and monitors at all elevations
Water absorbent and prone to holding water/moisture leading to unidentified corrosion of
structural steel underneath (CUI) the insulation
AGES-PH-03-002 (Part 3)
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





Prone to physical damage from knocks and high-pressure firewater impacts and undetected
cracking and spalling underneath, causing water ingress via small cracks.
Prone to physical damage from due to lifting or transportation and undetected cracking and
spalling, causing water ingress via small cracks.
Cracking/spalling may also occur due to expansion/shrinkage of the steel substrate
underneath due to thermal conditions, or expansion of supporting steel due to corrosion or
expansion of reinforcing (steel) mesh due to corrosion or simply due to conductivity from
process vessel and piping. All LWC PFP materials are specified for an upper and lower
allowable temperature range. In general, the lower operating temperature limit is 0oC and the
upper operating limit is 50oC. This should be considered when specifying LWC PFP use on
vessels and pipework to prevent cracking/spalling if process conditions change during the
lifetime of the facility
Cracking may lead to “explosive” spalling that may cause damage to small-bore pipework,
instruments leading to further loss of inventory
“Explosive” spalling may also endanger facility personnel and fire-fighters.
Passive explosion resistance (prior to a fire) is variable, depending on the material type,
installation method and condition of the material.
Material selection shall be based on evaluation of compatibility with the operating environment,
functionality under service and the design lifetime.
The following shall be considered when selecting fire proofing material:


Long term behaviour; resistance to chemical/physical change of the material; an important
characteristic regarding sealing generally in the oil & gas sector;
Resistance against RGD events; a property of importance in high pressure gas sealing
applications.
The polymers used in service shall be sourced from the same material manufacturers as those used
for material qualification.
It is the responsibility of the asset operator to provide all necessary information about service conditions
and environment.
Polymers may be used for passive fire protective coverings. This material has 3 main sub-groups:
elastomers, thermoplastics and thermosets, but commonly divided into two main types:



Phenolic Polymer
Epoxy Polymer
Elastomers (also known as Rubber)
Phenolic resin coatings have been in extensively in industry for a hundred years as insulation materials.
Phenolic resins are made by combining phenol and formaldehyde. They are inherently fire resistant,
although they do generate acrid fumes (methane, acetone, carbon monoxide, propanol and propane)
and smoke when heated to flame temperatures, although top coat treatments and additives may be
used to prevent this. They also possess low toughness properties making them unsuitable for the high
erosional forces of jet fires. Phenolic resin has a long curing process involving generation of water which
can remain trapped inside and the steam generation in a fire can damage the structure of the material.
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Certain manufacturers produce composite systems with jet fire resistant epoxy intumescent coating
over the top of the phenolic coating for example for combined (phenolic) cryogenic insulation and
(intumescent) jet fire protection.
Phenolic Polymer Advantages





Well known insulating properties
High thermal stability
Can be coated on any shape
May be used for protection against cryogenic spills
May be combined with epoxy intumescent on top to form a composite system of layers
Phenolic Polymer Disadvantages



Low toughness
Produces acrid, toxic fumes and smoke at high temperatures
Long curing process involving generation of water which can remain trapped inside
Epoxy intumescent and subliming materials are used extensively as passive fire protection material.
Epoxy intumescent materials undergo a physical and chemical change as a result of heat exposure,
swelling to several times their applied volumes leading to a decrease in density of the material as well
as an increase in volume. In addition, these materials also form a low-thermal conductivity black char
that absorbs heat and prevents heat from being conducted into the rest of the material and substrate.
Epoxies are very versatile; they offer a variety of benefits that are advantageous for use as a basecoat
and a topcoat. They exhibit excellent adhesion, and are acid, alkali and solvent resistant.
Epoxy coatings can offer abrasion resistance as well as corrosion and chemical resistance. Many can
be used for immersion service. Epoxies are the hard coatings and can be used to paint escape route
floors and decks as well as masonry and metals.
Epoxy intumescent and subliming materials begin to degrade at high operating temperatures. Maximum
operating temperatures are typically 60-80oC. Typical minimum operating conditions for epoxy
intumescent is -40oC limiting their use on hot and cold surfaces. However, dual layer systems are
available using phenolic foam (non-intumescent) bonded directly to the hot/cold surface to provide an
insulating layer, with a second layer of intumescent material bonded to it. Note that these composite
epoxy systems shall only be used if both products are provided by the same manufacturer and test
results demonstrate that the combined system satisfies performance requirements. Composite epoxy
system designs should be specified to account for thermal expansion and contraction and avoid any
associated failure in the bonding between the two layers, particularly if the insulating layer is provided
for cold service below the intumescent epoxy glass transition point.
Epoxy (intumescent) Advantages





Excellent chemical and solvent resistance
Excellent abrasion resistance
Excellent corrosion resistance (except for joints and if material has degraded)
Potential for water immersion service
Excellent adhesion
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
Less maintenance / repair requirements
Epoxy (intumescent) Disadvantages






Epoxy intumescent materials begin to degrade at higher operating temperatures. Maximum
operating temperatures are typically 60-80oC, limiting their use on hot surfaces.
Typical minimum operating conditions for epoxy intumescent is -40oC limiting their use on
cold surfaces.
Some intumescent materials are susceptible to environmental influences, such as humidity,
which can reduce or negate their ability to function against various environmental exposures.
Clearance must be provided around intumescent PFP to enable the complete development of
their intumescence (swelling) during the protection duration time. Default minimum clearance
may be taken as 100mm, but the clearance must be confirmed by the PFP manufacturer.
Seals are vulnerable to water ingress and hence unidentified corrosion of substrate.
Toxic fumes and soot may be produced from intumescent and subliming materials and they
shall not be used indoors or in enclosed areas where personnel could be present or need to
escape through in a fire situation.
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Figure D1: Example of Cross-Section of Composite Phenolic & Intumescent Coatings
Epoxy Intumescent Polymer (charring) Coatings
Aids adherence of
coating to steel
Weather
and
UV Protection
Aids adherence of layers of
intumescent coatings
Phenolic Polymer (insulating) Coating
Elastomers are rubber compounds chemically cured at high temperatures to form insoluble elastic
materials, which can be shaped by moulding or extrusion. These materials are impervious to water
ingress and hence suited to areas within or beneath a splash zone, if applied to the substrate (e.g. riser)
in a continuous coating under controlled conditions by the PFP manufacturer before delivery and
installation. As these are flexible coatings they can be used on flexible risers, cabling and piping.
They can be designed to withstand erosion of jet fires and explosion overpressures of 2bar.
Blanket systems - The thermal insulation of structural steel can also be achieved using blanket systems
and thermal wraps constructed of various materials.
The principle feature of radiant heat shielding systems is to dissipate radiant heat flux from a
hydrocarbon pool or jet fire and shield personnel on the other side from injury for a limited time.
The wire mesh systems are typically manufactured as a modular system with individual panels made
up of a single or double layers of woven wire mesh which slot into a custom-made narrow steel frame.
The choice of single or double mesh depends on the radiative heat flux reduction required. The system
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is load bearing and requires to be welded to another steel structure, for example a walkway grating or
steel deck. The wire mesh system is useful for high wind or severe weather protection of personnel as
well as heat shielding on exposed offshore facilities to encase open stairwells and stair towers as well
as open escape routes and bridge-links. It provides good ventilation and venting, good light
transmission and visibility for personnel.
Manufactures provide their own predictive heat reduction data at various distances from the cold side
of the mesh for various incident heat fluxes based on customised tests for various panel configurations.
Panels are customised for each application based on the heat flux reduction required. There is no
current standard internationally recognised test for fire tests / radiation flux reduction for these types of
wire mesh systems as fire tests are typically conducted in an enclosed furnace.
Wire Mesh Radiation System Advantages








Fairly lightweight, some load bearing aspects (steel frame)
Does not induce corrosion on a substrate it is welded to
Requires very minor and possibly maintenance-free for facility lifecycle
Allows natural venting
Allows passage of light and vision
Useful for escape route shielding for limited period
Highly effective for radiation reduction away from a fire up to 40-80% reduction in heat flux
from hot to cold side
Less wind loading than perforated steel alternatives
Wire Mesh Radiation System Disadvantages





Not effective in an engulfing flame
Limited duration effect, possibly 30 minutes
Not effective at high radiation levels > 37.5kW/m2
No approved international test available (reliant on proprietary tests/performance claims)
Steel frame is welded to a surface and increases loading on structure
Perforated steel panels also provide radiation shielding by dissipating heat from hydrocarbon fires and
protecting personnel on the other side. As they are mainly steel structures with a system of perforated
holes, their weight, poor venting and visibility and higher cost disadvantages generally outweigh their
advantages compared to the wire mesh systems.
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There are three main internationally recognised types of fire test:
1. Cellulosic or Standard Fire Tests
2. Hydrocarbon Pool Fire Tests
a.
b.
c.
d.
Small Hydrocarbon Pool Fire Test
Large/ Modified Hydrocarbon Pool Fire Test
External Pool Fire Test
Tunnel (Enhanced) Pool Fire Test
3. Hydrocarbon Jet Fire Tests
Cellulosic or Standard Fire Tests are based on a theoretical temperature versus time profile for
burning building materials such wood and paper, reaching 1100oC within 2 hours.
Rapid hydrocarbon fire tests (Small pool) use a more rapid temperature rise compared to the
cellulosic test to simulate a thermal shock from a small pool fire, reaching 887oC within 3 minutes,
before reaching 1100oC within 40mins and maintaining that temperature for a total duration of 2 hours.
Modified Hydrocarbon (HCM) fire tests (Large Pool) also have a rapid temperature rise and reach a
minimum temperature of 1010oC within 3 minutes. The temperature is then maintained between 1010oC
and 1180oC for the remainder of the test for a total duration of 2 hours.
Enhanced hydrocarbon fire tests (large, semi-enclosed) have the most rapid temperature rise and
achieve the highest temperatures compared with other furnace tests. The enhanced (large, semienclosed) hydrocarbon fire tests reaches 1047oC within 3 minutes and 1300oC within 40 minutes and
maintains that temperature for the remainder of the test for a total duration of 2 hours.
Jet Fire Tests (JFRT) may be used in addition to a furnace test (but not as a substitute) to simulate the
forces of jet erosion combined with higher heat fluxes using an ignited sonic propane flame. The ISO
22889 [83] jet fire test does not have a reproducible time/temperature heat up regime, but flame heat
fluxes average 300 kW/m2
The terms Fire Safe and Fire Test have various definitions and are applicable to a wide range of fire
tests, plant equipment, structural elements, materials and coatings.
A standard fire test generally provides a reproducible time/temperature heating regime within which the
response of test specimens can be assessed against various criteria. Several international fire tests
exist, which are based on heat fluxes generated by cellulosic, hydrocarbon pool and HC jet fires. Except
for the jet fire test, these are mainly furnace tests which expose the sample to a pre-determined heatup regime while monitoring the thermal response on the reverse side of the sample. While furnace
tests are designed to represent a fire, they do not reproduce the actual fire conditions. The furnace
temperature and total heat flux may be like those generated within a fire but parameters such as the
following, are not reproduced.


the balance between radiative and convective heat transfer
pressure fluctuations due to turbulence
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


erosive forces from high gas velocities
extreme thermal shock
differential heating
The jet fire test is complementary to furnace testing and the results from both types of test should be
considered when assessing the reaction of materials and effectiveness of PFP under jet fire conditions.
In a jet fire test, flammable gas is released which produces a significantly higher impact on structures,
equipment and PFP than a conventional cellulosic and HC pool fire, due to the force and erosion
capabilities of a jet flame.
Full scale tests of pressurised gas jet fires in the 1990s (e.g. by British Gas Research in Spadeadam,
UK) provided the supporting evidence for the current Jet Fire Resistance Test (JFRT). The Jet Fire
Resistance Test (JFRT) is the only internationally available jet fire test and is described by ISO 22889
[83]. This jet fire test may be used in addition to a furnace test (not as a substitute) to simulate the
higher heat fluxes using a 0.3 kg/sec sonic release of ignited propane gas impinging on the test
specimen. In a jet fire, test samples of materials are subjected to additional erosive forces, pressure
fluctuations and even higher heat fluxes than furnace tests. The maximum heat flux during the test is
300kW/m2. It should be noted that the highest erosive forces of a jet flame are not in the region of
highest heat flux. Hence, the results of both jet and furnace tests should be considered together when
assessing the performance of passive fire protection materials in a range of scenarios. However, in
combining results, it is not valid to compare mean substrate temperature from a furnace test with a
mean substrate temperature from a jet fire because of the non-uniformity of the heating in the jet fire
test. The ISO 22889 [83] jet fire test does not have a reproducible time/temperature heat up regime.
More recently, concerns have been raised by parts of industry that other more severe jet fire scenarios
exist and that the JFRT is not representative of those conditions. Several PFP systems on the market
have been tested using ‘high heat flux’ jet fires, implying that they are particularly appropriate for use in
such scenarios. However, these ‘high heat flux’ methods remain unpublished and undefined [68] and
therefore unsubstantiated by the PFP manufacturers.
The figure below compares the heat-up curves of various commercially available furnace tests.
The US recommended practice API 2218 (Ref. 23) provides guidance to the use of the UL 1709 fire
test curve (red curve in the figure below). This curve was developed to simulate the “rapid” heat-up of
elements in a HC fire compared with the slower heat-up regime of the previously used standard
cellulosic fire curve. In recent years, the UL 1709 fire curve has been further embellished by other
guidelines to include much higher final temperatures simulating larger pool fires or semi-confined pool
fires, such as the modified HC curve and the enhanced HC curve, as shown below.
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ESDVs, ROVs and BDVs are typically designed to “fail-safe”. ESDVs and ROVs tend to be designed
as “fail close” and BDVs as “fail open” types. When deciding whether a HSECES valve will survive a
fire scenario care should be taken regarding how long the valve is required remain closed or open after
performing the initial “fail-safe” operation. Any liquid or gaseous inventories being held may leak as a
result of other parts of the “fail-safe” valve failing.
It is prudent to specify all safety (HSE) critical ESDVs, BDVs, ROVs to be fire-rated to an internationally
recognised standard for every facility irrespective of FERA (Ref 8) or API 2218 (Ref. 23) requirements.
However, all “fire-rated” valves are not tested to the same fire standard and valve fire test are typically
less onerous than the HC fire tests conducted for structures and materials. Hence reliance on the term
“fire-rated” for a valve may be misleading without specifying exactly which fire test the valve has passed.
Test valves are heated to an average temperature of 750-980oC, typically for a maximum of 30 minutes,
depending on the category of fire test. In contrast, fire-rated structures are tested to typical
temperatures of 1100-1300oC for 2 hours, e.g. UL 1709. Test valves are filled with water during the fire
test which helps dissipate some of the furnace heat and after 30 minutes the valves are cooled down
to 1000C before leak testing. Hence, caution is advised when relying on “fire-rated” valve bodies, which
may be vulnerable to immediate failure if exposed to hydrocarbon pool or jet fire temperatures in excess
of 980oC or for longer than 30 minutes.
Fire-rated valves are certified for valve body leaks only and do not consider heat conducted from
actuator stems and leaks from loosening of flanges and loss of tension in bolts. Unprotected valve
actuators may lose their functionality within a few minutes after the start of the fire and may conduct
heat from a fire into the valve body. A valve-actuator assembly where the valve is protected, and the
actuator is not protected normally leads to the situation where heat is conducted through the actuator
to the valve. Within 15 minutes after the start of the fire this leads to such temperature differentials that
will cause the valve to leak. PFP protection to actuators may be required to keep the temperature rise
down to that which can be tolerated by the internal cabling and instrumentation, possibly less than 80oC
Flanges and flange bolts are also vulnerable to rapid failure under fire conditions as these elements are
not included in the standard valve fire tests. (See Table for MAT of flanges and flange bolts)
Note that “fire-rated” and “fail-safe” should never be combined under the term fire-safe, which might
imply full valve assembly integrity under any fire conditions, which is not the case.
All HSECES cables shall be rated as “fire-resistant” to an internationally approved fire test standard.
HSECES cabling should be laid on cable racks routed outside any Fire Zone wherever possible. When
HSECES cabling is routed through a Fire Zone, integrity of the cabling, the cable racks and the
supporting cable rack structure shall be assessed with respect to fire risk based on either the FERA
(Ref 8) or API 2218 (Ref. 23) requirements or both.
the flame application time shall be as specified in the relevant cable standard. In the absence such a
cable specification, a 90 min flame application is recommended.
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Application
PFP should be regarded as a HSECES system in which the quality of its application/installation is as
important a factor as the physical properties and fire resistance of the materials. The preparation of the
substrate, the environmental conditions, the contractor’s skills, the integrity of joints and tightness and
integrity of seals all influence the performance and longevity of the final PFP product. Manufacturers’
documentation shall always be accurately followed to ensure the predictable performance of the PFP
and minimisation of maintenance.
Prior experience has shown that poor application (e.g. in a humid environment) has resulted in early
PFP material failure (e.g. via spalling within weeks of application) with very high PFP removal, reinstatement and shutdown and loss of production costs and their associated hazards.
PFP materials are a mitigation measure to protect items that have an identified role in maintaining
structural integrity and facility emergency response. Therefore, PFP is a safety critical element with an
associated Performance Standard.
During design and construction of facilities all fire passive fire protection (PFP) materials shall be
identified and defined in P&IDs, structural and architectural drawings and project specifications. Once
applied or installed in the field, PFP shall be regularly inspected and properly maintained
The PFP materials’ fire performance criteria shall specify survival times and fire type; hydrocarbon jet
or pool fire and cellulosic fires and shall be inspected regularly to ensure compliance with those
performance standards.
The term “passive” means materials not requiring detection or activation upon detection. “Passive” does
not imply that because the material does not require activation by instrumentation that it does not
change. Changes to PFP must be expected within the lifetime of a facility, for example as a result of:








Physical impacts leading to dents and fractures from plant activities
Ageing, e.g. continued operations after the end of the specified material design life
Expansion and spalling due to expansion of rust from CUI of the metal substrate
Weathering and damage to topcoat from UV sunlight, sand erosion, air-borne pollutants and
high-pressure water jets
Deterioration from exposure to production fluids and chemicals
Process changes and increased process temperatures outside of the specified parameters
causing spalling and fracture
Incorrect re-instatement after PFP removal for substrate inspection, leading to potential future
CUI
Incorrect application or incorrect design specification leading to future spalling and brittle
fracture
Also see Disadvantages section for each material type above.
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Passive fire protection coatings shall carry a means of indelible identification such that material and fire
and/or blast rating is evident without reference to drawings, documentation or certificates, and its
ongoing condition and performance assessed once installed in the field.
The following are examples of PFP identification methods.



Nameplates
Embossed or heat stamped surfaces
Painted colour-coding (either coloured top coat for coatings or specifying the colour code for
mineral wool wraps, jackets, pre-formed enclosures and panels).
PFP materials and systems across company should be standardised if feasible as this limits confusion
and aids maintenance.
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The PFP contractor shall be responsible for all quality assurance and quality control activities.
Quality control, quality assurance and the professional skills of the contractor personnel are essential
to this process. The application contractor shall have had specific training and prior experience with the
material to be installed and shall be approved and certified to apply the product by the
Manufacturer/Supplier of the material.
Preparation of the substrate shall be by abrasive cleaning and priming in accordance with the material
Manufacturer/Supplier approved recommendations.
The thickness of the material shall be in accordance with the Manufacturer/Supplier recommended dry
thickness, including any approved tolerances. Thicknesses that are too thick or too thin can reduce
service/ operational life.
PFP Contractor shall provide overspray protection on adjacent piping, equipment and structures and
remove the protection without damaging the coatings or any other part of the facility at the end of the
process.
All PFP contractors installing PFP materials shall guarantee the quality of their work. The warranty for
all PFP materials shall include details of the materials used and the details of the surface preparation
and top coats and the application method.
A minimum 5-year warranty period and associated conditions shall be agreed with the following
recommended conditions:
At the end of the warranty period the PFP coatings should have:
No degree of general or pin point rusting, as defined by ASTM D610
The quality of adhesion between the PFP and the steel substrate, and between PFP layers, of not less
than 70% of the values specified.
No visual cracking, flaking or blistering of the coating systems
No conspicuous discolouration or peeling of the topcoats exposed to the atmospheric conditions
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The objective of inspection and maintenance regimes is to ensure that the installed PFP materials
continue to be fit for purpose. Inspection and maintenance procedures shall be established with input
from the manufacturer/supplier to ensure the functional requirements as described in the performance
standards are maintained.
Records shall be prepared, detailing the inspection, testing, and maintenance routines and frequencies
to be followed.
Any identified failures or impairments shall be recorded and promptly corrected. Impairment, and repair
of systems shall be recorded and reported. Where PFP cannot be promptly reinstated, contingency
plans shall be implemented.
Industry regulations and guidance typically require operators to verify and maintain PFP throughout the
life of the facility, which is only possible if good records are maintained. To facilitate this, it is essential
to establish a database detailing where and why PFP is used. This would generally include the following
steps:









Establish an asset register of items requiring PFP. This could include primary and secondary
structures, process equipment, pipelines and ESD valves, temporary refuge (TR) and
command and control centres, blowdown and flare/vent system, Fire Zone divisions (walls,
decks), and fire pumps.
Define the criticality of each item. This would consider facts such as TR impairment,
escalation control, loss of production, asset protection, and environmental impact.
Establish functional requirements for item being protected. This would include aspects such
as structural resistance, hydrocarbon containment, smoke and toxic fume integrity, separation
for fire zoning, and fire water demand.
Establish hazards and conditions in the area. Blast/explosion hazards, impact, fire hazards
(jet fire, diffuse fires and pool fires) and environment hazards (UV, salt spray, heat, vibration).
Determine required fire resistance time.
Establish fire resistance rating.
Establish the maximum critical temperature the item can reach and from this the allowable
temperature rise under fire conditions.
Inspection of the PFP is undertaken based on the condition of the PFP, score the severity of
anomalies and the extent of anomalies.
Against each ‘score’ define the outcomes, ranging from removal and replacement with
upgrade, to future re-inspection.
It is essential to understand the modes of failure for each different PFP system and this requires detailed
knowledge of both the materials used, their system design/specification and the application principals,
which often involves a degree of detective work.
Typical anomalies include cracking; unbonding; water logging; mechanical damage; loss/removal of
material; exposed reinforcement; Corroded or damaged reinforcement; reinforcement not located in
correct position or missing; thermal degradations; UV damage; incorrect jointing and sealing details;
missing components; exposed top flanges; or missing coat-backs.
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Fire Type
Fire
Rating
B
-Hydrocarbon
(jet fire)
B
Hydrocarbon
(pool fire)
Stability
(minutes)
Smoke
and Gas
Integrity
(minutes)
Insulation
(minutes)
J60
Requirements
60
J30
30
J15
15
H120
120
120
120
a) Stability and
integrity against the
passage of flames,
smoke and gas for
120 minutes
b) The transmission
of heat through the
protection material
during the period of
120 minutes fire
exposure shall not
raise the average of
the steel (on nonfire side) above
139°C
and
no
single
thermocouple shall
indicate
a
temperature greater
than 180°C.
H60
120
120
60
a) Stability and
integrity against the
passage of flames,
smoke and gas for
120 minutes
b) The transmission
of heat through the
protection material
during the period of
60 minutes fire
exposure shall not
raise the average of
the steel (on nonfire side) above
139°C
and
no
single
thermocouple shall
indicate
a
Document No AGES-PH-03-002 (Part 3)
Cautionary
Notes
Ref.
Fire test for J
fires is IN
ADDITION to
the H fire
rating
ISO22899
a) Fire test for
an H fire rating
is
the
“Hydrocarbon”
Fire test, but
not
necessarily
the
“enhanced”
rapid
temperature
rise fire test,
typical of a
real HC fire.
b) The UL
1709
Hydrocarbon
fire test is not
sufficiently
conservative
to prevent all
failure
e.g.
those
items
which
fail
below 538oC,
UL 1709
(Ref. 74
& 75)
Page 77 of 82
Fire Type
Fire
Rating
Stability
(minutes)
Smoke
and Gas
Integrity
(minutes)
Insulation
(minutes)
Requirements
Cautionary
Notes
Ref.
temperature greater
than 180°C.
A - Cellulosic
fire
H0
120
120
0
A60
60
60
60
a) Stability and
integrity against the
passage of flames,
smoke and gas for
120 minutes
b)
No
heat
insulation
requirements
a)
Steel
or
equivalent material
b) Stability and
integrity against the
passage of flame,
smoke and gas for
60 minutes.
c) The transmission
of heat through the
protection material
during the period of
60 minutes fire
exposure shall not
raise the average
of the steel above
139°C
and
no
single
thermocouple shall
indicate
a
temperature greater
than 180°C.
A30
60
60
30
Fire test for
Class A rating
is
the
“standard”
furnace
fire
test
(cellulosic) not
a hydrocarbon
fire test
a)
Steel
or
equivalent material
b) Stability and
integrity against the
passage of flame,
smoke and gas for
60 minutes.
c) The transmission
of heat through the
protection material
during the period of
30 minutes fire
exposure shall not
raise the average
of the steel above
139°C
and
no
Document No AGES-PH-03-002 (Part 3)
Page 78 of 82
Fire Type
Fire
Rating
Stability
(minutes)
Smoke
and Gas
Integrity
(minutes)
Insulation
(minutes)
Requirements
Cautionary
Notes
Ref.
single
thermocouple shall
indicate
a
temperature greater
than 180°C.
A15
60
60
15
a)
Steel
or
equivalent material
b) Stability and
integrity against the
passage of flame,
smoke and gas for
60 minutes.
c)
The
transmission
of
heat through the
protection material
during the period of
15 minutes fire
exposure shall not
raise the average
of the steel above
139°C
and
no
single
thermocouple shall
indicate
a
temperature greater
than 180°C.
A0
60
60
0
a)
Steel
or
equivalent material
b) Stability and
integrity against the
passage of smoke
and gas for 60
minutes.
c)
No
heat
insulation
requirements
Other
B15
30
30
15
a) Non-combustible
material
b) Stability and
integrity against the
passage of flame,
smoke and gas for
30 minutes.
Document No AGES-PH-03-002 (Part 3)
Fire test for
Class B rating
is
the
“standard”
(cellulosic)
furnace
fire
test not a
Page 79 of 82
Fire Type
Fire
Rating
Stability
(minutes)
Smoke
and Gas
Integrity
(minutes)
Insulation
(minutes)
Requirements
c)
The
transmission
of
heat through the
protection material
during the period of
15 minutes fire
exposure shall not
raise the average
of the steel above
139°C
and
no
single
thermocouple shall
indicate
a
temperature greater
than 225°C.
Other
B0
30
30
0
Cautionary
Notes
Ref.
hydrocarbon
fire test
a) Non-combustible
material
b) Stability and
integrity against the
passage of flame,
smoke and gas for
30 minutes.
b)
No
heat
insulation
requirements
Other
C
0
0
0
a) Non-combustible
material
b) No stability or
smoke and gas
integrity
requirements
c)
No
heat
insulation
requirements
Document No AGES-PH-03-002 (Part 3)
Does not need
to meet any
specific
performance
requirements,
except for the
material to be
noncombustible.
Page 80 of 82
ADNOC Classification: Internal
Increasing
Severity
TYPE of FIRE
TEMPERATURE VS TIME FORMULA
Where: Temp is in oC and Time is in minutes.
SOURCE
Cellulosic Curve also known as Standard Fire Test Curve
General Building Materials
E.g. wood, paper and cotton fabric.
Temp = 20+(345*(LOG8*(time+1)))
ISO 834 (Ref. 32)
BS 476P20 (Ref. 96)
EN 1363-1 (Ref. 30)
Hydrocarbon Curve
Small Open Pool Fire with heat dissipated to atmosphere.
Temp = 20+(1080*((1-0.325*e-0.167*time) -(0.675*e-2.5*time)))
API 2218 (Ref. 23)
UL 1709 (Ref. 95)
EN 1363-2 (Ref. 31)
Hydrocarbon Modified Curve
Large Open Pool Fire with heat dissipated to atmosphere.
Temp = 20+(1280*((1-0.325*e-0.167*time) -(0.675*e-2.5*time)))
French
Regulations
HCM
Enhanced Hydrocarbon Curve
Large semi-enclosed Pool Fire e.g. tunnel or large offshore platform with
little or no heat dissipating into the atmosphere.
Based on co-ordinates below:
Dutch
Regulations
RWS
Document No AGES-PH-03-002 (Part 3)
Time (minutes)
Temp (oC)
0
3
5
10
30
60
90
120
180
20
890
1140
1200
1300
1350
1300
1200
1200
Page 81 of 82
ADNOC Classification: Internal
H=
H/m
2
4
5
7
9
11
12
14
16
17
(1.73+0.33D-1.43) D
D/m
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
(ZHANG 2014)
R/m
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
4.0
4.5
5.0
Flame Height H(m)
Pool Diameter D (m)
𝐻 = 42𝐷(𝑚/𝜌√gD) ^0.61 (THOMAS 1963)
H/m
3
5
6
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
D/m
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
m
kg/m2s-1
0.05
ρ
kg/m3
1.29
Pool Radius R (m)
R/m
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
4.0
4.5
5.0
g
m/s2
9.81
Document No AGES-PH-03-002 (Part 3)
Page 82 of 82
THE CONTENTS OF THIS DOCUMENT ARE PROPRIETARY AND CONFIDENTIAL.
ADNOC GROUP PROJECTS &
ENGINEERING
FIRE & GAS DETECTION AND
FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM
PHILOSOPHY
PART 4 – ACTIVE FIRE
PROTECTION
AGES-PH-03-002
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................... 3
2
DEFINED TERMS / ABBRIATIONS / REFERENCES ..................................................................... 4
3
REFERENCES ................................................................................................................................ 10
4
OVERALL APPROACH & FRAMEWORK ..................................................................................... 13
5
SELECTION OF SYSTEMS – ACTIVE FIRE PROTECTION (AFP) .............................................. 17
6
STANDARD - FIREWATER SYSTEM ............................................................................................ 23
7
STANDARD – DELUGE SYSTEM.................................................................................................. 40
8
STANDARD – FOAM APPLICATION ............................................................................................ 43
9
STANDARD – SPRINKLER............................................................................................................ 46
10
STANDARD - WATER MIST (SELF-CONTAINED) ....................................................................... 48
11
STANDARD - GASEOUS EXTINGUISHANT................................................................................. 51
12
STANDARD - WET CHEMICAL ..................................................................................................... 55
13
STANDARD - PORTABLE FIRE EXTINGUISHERS...................................................................... 59
14
JETTY & TERMINALS .................................................................................................................... 62
15
STANDARD - BUILDINGS ............................................................................................................. 64
AGES-PH-03-002 (Part 4)
Rev. No: 1
Page 2 of 75
1
INTRODUCTION
1.1
Background
This Part of the ‘Fire & Gas Detection and Protection’ Standard describes the COMPANY expectations for
design and operation of Active Fire Protection facilities. The document is a follow-on to ‘Part-1’ where the
context and overall strategy for fire protection is set out in terms of a six-step process.
It is expected that the first four steps, covered in Part-1 will have been completed beforehand and documented
in a Fire Hazard Assessment:
1.
2.
3.
4.
What are the Hazards
What Type of Fires (/Leaks) Can Occur?
Where Can Fires (/Leaks) Occur?
What Can Fires (/Leaks) Affect?
Step 5 addresses the question ‘How can it be detected?’, which is covered in Part 2 of this Standard.
Step 6 is split into two main aspects:


1.2
Passive Fire Protection
Active Fire Protection
: Part 3
: Part 4
Objective
The aim of this Part is to address Step-6 (Active Fire Protection -AFP) and relates to the question:
‘How can escalation be avoided?’.
This document therefore describes how AFP requirements shall be defined, so that its Safety Critical features
can be managed through the various stages of the facility lifecycle (design, procure, construct, commission,
operate & maintain).
1.3
Scope
This Standard covers the following main aspects of AFP:


Fixed Fire Protection Systems
Mobile Fire Protection arrangements.
AGES-PH-03-002 (Part 4)
Rev. No: 1
Page 3 of 75
2
DEFINED TERMS / ABBRIATIONS / REFERENCES
2.1
General Terminology
General Terminology
BROWNFIELD
Development within the boundary (or control) of an existing operating
facility.
CAN (possibility and
Conveys the ability, fitness or quality necessary to do or achieve a
capability)
specific thing.
CONSULTANT
The party that performs specific services, which may include but are not
limited to, Engineering, Technical support, preparation of Technical
reports and other advisory related services specified by the party that
engages them, i.e. COMPANY, CONTRACTOR or its Subcontractors.
CONTRACTOR
The party which carries out the project management, design,
engineering, procurement, construction, commissioning for COMPANY
projects.
GREENFIELD
Development outside the boundary (and control) of an existing operating
facility or a new operating / processing facility development in new or
existing allotted area of the COMPANY.
LICENSOR
Provider of Licensed Technology
MANUFACTURER/VENDOR/
The party which manufactures and/or supplies equipment, technical
documents/drawings and services to perform the duties specified by the
COMPANY/CONTRACTOR.
SUPPLIER
MAY (permission)
The word indicates a permitted option. It conveys consent or liberty to do
something.
SHALL
Indicates a requirement
SHOULD (recommendation)
Indicates a recommendation.
STANDARD
Means this Layout & Separation Distances Guideline
SUB-VENDOR
Any supplier of equipment and support services for an
equipment/package or part thereof supplied by a VENDOR.
AGES-PH-03-002 (Part 4)
Rev. No: 1
Page 4 of 75
2.2
Technical Terminology
Active Fire Protection Terminology
Active Fire
Protection System
fire protection systems designed to control or extinguish fires, to provide cooling to
heat affected plant (and prevent fire escalation), or to prevent ignition by applying
fire-fighting media such as water,
foam, dry powder (dry chemical) or gaseous agents
Application rate
the rate at which water / foam solution is applied to a fire, expressed as litres per
minute, per square metre (l/min./m2).
Building / Enclosure
Any structure used or intended for supporting or sheltering any use or occupancy
of people.
Cellulosic Fire
Fire involving combustible material such as wood, paper, or furniture.
Complex
Collection of facilities that may or may not be owned by the same company but are
located within the contiguous boundaries of a specific geographic location, such as
an industrial or chemical park. A facility within a complex may feed or take raw
materials from another facility in the complex or may be totally independent of its
industrial neighbours.
[CCPS 2nd ed.]
Containment
The enclosure of a hazard to prevent or mitigate impact beyond the enclosure
boundary.
Credible scenario
Refer to [ADNOC FERA standard]
Environment
Surroundings in which an organisation operates, including air, water, land, natural
resources, flora, fauna, humans and their interrelationships. Surroundings can
extend from within an organisation to the local, regional and global systems.
Environmental
An element of an organisation’s activities or products or services that interacts or
can interact with the environment.
Aspect
Environmental
Impact
Change to the environment, whether adverse or beneficial, wholly or partially
resulting from an organisation’s environmental aspects.
Escalation
Increase in severity of consequences due to failure of preventative barriers or
mitigation measures.
Equipment
The individual items, e.g. heat exchangers, pressure vessels, etc. that make up a
section (see Section).
Facility
Process and utility plants, tanks, buildings, marine structures, pipe racks and roads
located within a site boundary. For example, a refinery, chemical plant, storage
terminal, distribution centre, or corporate office.
AGES-PH-03-002 (Part 4)
Rev. No: 1
Page 5 of 75
Active Fire Protection Terminology
Fire Detection Zone
(FDZ, same F&G
A geographical area defined to identify the location of a fire or hazardous leak from
containment so that Emergency Response measures can be initiated and
targeted.
Zone)
Fire Hazard
Assessment
Fire Zone
Process of identifying and assessing types of fire that could result from accidental
releases of process, pipeline, riser, or well hydrocarbon / chemical inventories, as
well as combustible materials present in accommodation, offices, control rooms,
stores, and workshops. A fire hazard assessment provides a quantitative as well
as a qualitative understanding of the scale, intensity and duration of potential fires;
as well as the potential effects on personnel, asset and environment.
Fire zones are areas of the plant sub-divided based on the potential for fire &
explosion hazard to cause escalation, as assessed by the consequence and risk
modelling.
The partition into fire zones is such that the consequence of fire or an explosion
corresponding to the reasonably worst event likely to occur in the concerned fire
zone shall not impact other fire zones to an extent where their integrity could be put
at risk.
The partition of the fire zone is intended to limit the consequence (escalation) of
credible events but is not intended to avoid the occurrence of the credible events.
(Ref. HSE-GA-ST07, HSE Design Philosophy)
Fixed System
A fire protection system that is permanently installed and connected to a supply of
extinguishing agent(s). These systems may be automatically or manually
activated. A water spray system supplied directly by the plant fire water system or
a gaseous clean agent system in a control room or computer room are examples
of fixed systems
Hazard
The potential to cause harm, including ill health and injury, damage to
property, products or the environment; production losses or increased
liabilities
(HSE-RM-ST01, HSE Risk Management)
Inherently Safer
A condition in which the hazards associated with the materials and operations
used in the process have been reduced or eliminated, and this reduction or
elimination is permanent and inseparable from the process.
[CCPS 2nd ed.]
Jet Fire
Ignited discharge of hydrocarbon vapour, under pressure
Manned facility
Installation on which people are routinely accommodated (Ref. ISO13702)
An offshore platform on which at least one person occupies an accommodation
space i.e. living quarters. (API RP 14G [Ref.7] definition) In addition, personnel are
present for more than 2 hours a day or more than 10% of time.
AGES-PH-03-002 (Part 4)
Rev. No: 1
Page 6 of 75
Active Fire Protection Terminology
Module
Passive
Protection
Any assembly of equipment items and their associated piping, instrumentation,
electrical equipment, structure, and fittings combined into a transportable
subsection of a process unit or offsite facility.
Fire
A coating, cladding, free-standing system, wrapping, removable jacket, inspection
panel, cable transit system, penetration seal or other such system which, in the
event of fire, will provide thermal protection to restrict the rate at which heat is
transmitted to an object to a maximum allowable temperature in a given time frame.
Although the term passive is used, it includes materials which react chemically e.g.
Intumescent materials which expand and create a char to provide heat protection.
Plant
A collection of units which normally operate together to produce specific products.
A process plant typically has roads on all sides and all the processing equipment
within that are intended to be shut down during a maintenance turnaround. For
example, a Cat Cracker could have various units; regeneration, reaction,
fractionation, gas plant) but this is counted as one process plant. Areas that
transfer or store product are not process plants, however they are part of process
area.
Plot
Area of the site where units are grouped (e.g., refinery crude distillation unit,
chemical plant, or storage terminal is located).
Pool Fire
Combustion of flammable or combustible hydrocarbon liquid spilled and retained
on a surface
Portable Equipment
Fire suppression equipment that must be moved to the site of the fire, then
assembled or positioned before being put into service. It is generally stored until
needed at a location accessible to its intended users. Examples include fire trucks,
portable pumps, fire hose, foam monitors, foam supplies, fire
extinguishers, and most fire department equipment (ref.API-RP2001)
Process Section
An area / part of a unit within a process unit containing a combination of processing
equipment that is focused on a single operation. This includes Individual isolatable
part of a unit /system (e.g. Feed Pre-treatment).
Process Unit
A process unit is a collection of Equipment within a Plant focused on a single
operation, arranged to perform a defined function. A process unit enables the
execution of a physical, chemical and/or transport process, or storage of process
material. This includes, plant area with a distinct physical process area /process
train, e.g. separation unit, crude distillation unit, crude treatment unit water
treatment unit, polyethylene unit. etc.
Risk
Risk is the product of the measure of the likelihood of occurrence of an undesired
event and the potential adverse consequences which the event may have upon:




AGES-PH-03-002 (Part 4)
Health and Safety of People – fatality, injury, irreversible health impact or
chronic ill health or harm to physical or psychological health.
Environment - water, air, soil, animals, plants and social Reputation employees and third parties. This includes the liabilities arising from injuries
and property damage to third parties including the cross liabilities that may
arise between the interdependent ADNOC Group Companies.
Financial - damage to property (assets) or loss of production
Legal - Legal impacts due to breach of law, breach of contract etc.
Rev. No: 1
Page 7 of 75
Active Fire Protection Terminology
Risk = Severity (Consequence) x Likelihood (Frequency)
Refer to ADNOC Corporate Risk Matrix for more information
UL Listing
Means Underwriters Laboratory has tested representative samples of a product
and determined that the product meets specific, defined requirements. These
requirements are often based on UL's published and nationally recognized
Standards for Safety.
Utility
An energy or services supplier, including electricity, instrument air, steam or
heating medium, fuels (oil, gas, etc.), refrigeration, cooling water or cooling
medium, or inert gases.
[CCPS 2nd ed.]
2.3
Acronyms & Abbreviations
Acronyms & Abbreviations
ADIBC
Abu Dhabi Building Code
ADNOC
Abu Dhabi National Oil Company
AFP
Active Fire Protection
API
American Petroleum Institute
ASTM
American Society of Testing and Materials
BRA
Building Risk Assessment
BS
British Standard
CCR
Central Control Room
CO2
Carbon Dioxide
DRA
Dynamic Risk Assessment
ER
Emergency Response
F&G
Fire and Gas
FDZ
Fire Detection Zone
FEED
Front End Engineering Design
FERA
Fire and Explosion Risk Assessment
FHA
Fire Hazard Assessment
FM
Factory Mutual
FPZ
Fire Proofing Zone
FSF
Full Surface Fire
AGES-PH-03-002 (Part 4)
Rev. No: 1
Page 8 of 75
Acronyms & Abbreviations
FZ
Fire Zone
HSE
Health, Safety & Environment
HSECES
HSE Critical Equipment & Systems
HV
High Voltage
HVAC
Heating, Ventilation & Air Conditioning
ICSS
Integrated Control and Safety System
IEC
International Electrotechnical Commission
LHD
Linear Heat Detection
LNG
Liquefied Natural Gas
LPG
Liquid Petroleum Gas
N2
Nitrogen
NFPA
National Fire Prevention Association
QRA
Quantitative Risk Assessment
SOLAS
Safety of Life at Sea
UAE
United Arab Emirates
UL
Underwriters Laboratory
AGES-PH-03-002 (Part 4)
Rev. No: 1
Page 9 of 75
3
REFERENCES
3.1
ADNOC Standards
Ref No
Document No
Title
1.
HSE-OS-ST29
HSECES Management
2.
HSE-GA-ST01
HSE Governance Framework
3.
HSE-RM-ST01
HSE Risk Management System
4.
HSE-GA-ST07
HSE Design Philosophy
5.
HSE-RM-ST04
Hazard & Operability Study (HAZOP)
6.
HSE-RM-ST07
Escape, Evacuation and Rescue Assessment
(EERA)
7.
HSE-RM-ST08
Emergency System Survivability Analysis (ESSA)
8.
HSE-RM-ST09
Fire and Explosion Risk Assessment (FERA)
9.
HSE-RM-ST10
Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA)
10.
HSE-RM-ST13
Inherently Safer Design
11.
AGES-GL03--001
Facility Layout & Separation Distances Guidelines
12.
AGES-PH-03- 001
Emergency Shutdown and Depressurization
System Philosophy
3.2
Ref
International Codes & Standards
Code
Description
13.
ADIBC
Abu Dhabi International Building Code.
14.
API RP 14C
Analysis, Design, Installation, and Testing of Safety Systems for Offshore
Production Facilities
15.
API RP 650
Welded Tanks for Oil Storage
16.
API RP 752
Management of Hazards Associated with Location of Process Plant
Permanent Buildings
17.
API RP 2021
Management of Atmospheric Storage Tank Fires
18.
API RP 2030
Application of fixed Water Spray Systems for Fire Protection in the
Petroleum and Petrochemical Industries, 4th Edition, September 2014)
No
AGES-PH-03-002 (Part 4)
Rev. No: 1
Page 10 of 75
Ref
Code
Description
19.
API RP 2001
Fire Protection at Refineries
20.
API 2510 A
Fire-Protection Considerations for the Design and Operation of
Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) Storage Facilities
21.
ASTM E 1002
Standard Test Method for Leaks
22.
BS 1635
Graphical Symbols and Abbreviations Standard
23.
BS 6266
Fire protection for electronic equipment installations. Code of practice
24.
BS 7273
Code of practice for the operation of fire protection measures.
25.
BS-6266
Fire protection for electronic equipment installations. Code of practice.
26.
BS EN 13565-1
Fixed firefighting systems. Foam systems. Part 1: Requirements and test
methods for components
27.
CAP 437
Standard for Offshore Helicopter Landing Areas
28.
CAAP 71
UAE Civil aviation advisory publication CAAP 71 helidecks (off-shore)
29.
EH40
UK HSE EH40/2005 Workplace exposure limits
30.
EI 15
Model code of safe practice Part 15: Area classification for installations
handling flammable fluids
31.
EI 19
EI Model Code of Safe Practice, Part 19,: Fire Precautions at Petroleum
Refineries and Bulk Storage Installations
32.
EN 50270
Electromagnetic compatibility. Electrical apparatus for the detection and
measurement of combustible gases, toxic gases or oxygen
33.
EN 54-20
Fire detection and fire alarm systems. Aspirating smoke detectors
34.
FM3260
Radiant Energy-Sensing Fire Detectors for Automatic Fire Alarm Signalling
35.
IEC 60079-10
Classification of areas - Explosive gas atmospheres
36.
IEC 60331
Flame resistant
37.
IEC 60332
Flame retardant
38.
IEC 60529
Ingress Protection Marking
39.
ISO 15138
Petroleum and natural gas industries – Offshore production installations –
Heating, ventilation and air-conditioning
40.
LASTFIRE
Hydrocarbon Storage Tanks
41.
NFPA 1
Fire Code
42.
NFPA 10
Standard for Portable Fire Extinguishers (2017)
43.
NFPA 11
Standard for Medium- and High-Expansion Foam Systems
44.
NFPA 13
Standard for the Installation of Sprinkler Systems
No
AGES-PH-03-002 (Part 4)
Rev. No: 1
Page 11 of 75
Ref
Code
Description
45.
NFPA 14
Standard for the Installation of Standpipe and Hose Systems
46.
NFPA 15
Standard for Water Spray Fixed Systems for Fire Protection
47.
NFPA 16
Standard for the Installation of Foam-Water Sprinkler and Foam-Water
Spray Systems
48.
NFPA 17
Standard for the Dry Chemical Extinguishing Systems
49.
NFPA 17A
Standard for the Wet Chemical Extinguishing Systems
50.
NFPA 11
Standard for Low, Medium and High Expansion Foam
51.
NFPA 20
Standard for the Installation of Stationary Pumps for Fire Protection
52.
NFPA 24
Standard for the Installation of Private Fire Service Manis and Their
Appurtenances
53.
NFPA 25
Standard for the Inspection, Testing and Maintenances of Water-Based
Fire Protection Systems
54.
NFPA 30
Flammable and Combustible Liquids Code (2018)
55.
NFPA 72
National Fire Alarm and Signalling Code
56.
NFPA 90A
Standard for the Installation of Air-Conditioning and Ventilating Systems
57.
NFPA 90B
Standard for the Installation of Warm Air Heating and Air Conditioning
Systems
58.
NFPA 96
Standard for Ventilation Control and Fire Protection of Commercial
Cooking Operations
59.
NFPA 101
Life Safety Code.
60.
NFPA 221
Standard for High Challenge Fire Walls, and Fire Barrier Walls
61.
NFPA 600
Standard for Facility Fire Brigades
62.
NFPA 750
Standard on Water Mist Fire Protection Systems
63.
NFPA 850
Electric Generating Plants
64.
NFPA 1901
Standard for Automotive Apparatus
65.
NFPA 2001
Standard on Clean Agent Fire Extinguishing Systems
No
66.
AGES-PH-03-002 (Part 4)
UAE Fire and Life Safety Code
Rev. No: 1
Page 12 of 75
4
OVERALL APPROACH & FRAMEWORK
4.1
General
Systems that are critical to the safety of a facility need to be identified early in a project and their development
managed to ensure the ‘safety critical’ performance they provide will be suitable and remain available when
required. This is typically done by focus on the four key aspects, as described in HSE-OS-ST29 (Ref. 1):




Functionality
Reliability
Survivability
Dependencies & Interactions
Active Fire Protection is one of the HSE Critical (HSECES) aspects of COMPANY facilities, meaning that
systems performing this objective require specific focus during their lifecycle (design, procurement,
installation, commissioning, operations & maintenance), as required by the COMPANY Standards.
It is a COMPANY requirement that HSE Critical Systems Shall be identified and Performance Standards
started during FEED and shall be updated in subsequent stages of the Project.
The Performance Standards shall be made available for independent Assurance and Verification by
COMPANY, at each Project Stage, in sufficient time to allow observations by the Independent Reviewer to
be incorporated into the design.
4.2
Requisites
Three main requisites have been identified as key inputs to the design of AFP arrangements:



4.2.1
Project HSE Philosophy
Project Fire Protection Philosophy
Fire Hazard Assessment
Project HSE Philosophy
Design of the AFP system shall be premised on a clear understanding of the overall strategy for Major
Accident Hazard (MAH) management. This strategy is typically documented as a ‘Project HSE Philosophy’
based on knowledge about the relative location of hazards to people, those affected and those who will be
required to react to an initiating event.
The HSE Philosophy will therefore shape the nature of manual intervention (local or remote), the degree of
remote monitoring, automatic actions, and the overall facilities needed to be provided such measures.
The philosophical role of, and approach to using AFP shall be clearly and explicitly documented in the Project
HSE Philosophy and the Fire Protection Philosophy. This shall be done early in design and updated, as a
minimum, at the beginning of subsequent Project Stages.
4.2.2
Fire Hazard Assessment
It is expected that a ‘Fire Hazard Assessment’ covering the first four questions identified in Section 1.1 will
have been carried out in accordance with Part 1 of this Standard.
AGES-PH-03-002 (Part 4)
Rev. No: 1
Page 13 of 75
This will ensure there is a clear understanding of the nature of potential fires and their location on the facility
is known before decisions are made about the AFP systems most suitable to tackle them.
4.3
Approach to AFP
The Approach to AFP in this Part of the Standard addresses two main questions:


Which systems are suitable?
What is their safety critical performance?
: Section 5
: Sections 6 to 15
The contents of Section 5 therefore serve to ‘Identify HSE Critical’ measures (systems) related to AFP.
Sections 6 to 15 define ‘Key Properties’ of the relevant system, and the performance required.
The contents of this Standard have therefore been structured to ensure both these aspects are explicitly
defined and the performance of ‘Key Parameters’ can be easily tracked during the lifecycle of each AFP
system.
4.4
Framework of Standard (Sections 6 to 15)
4.4.1
Overview of Framework
The overall framework to capture COMPANY requirements for each AFP system in this Standard is illustrated
schematically in Table 4-1. This has been developed to be consistent with requirements in Ref.1.
The aim or this format is to facilitate:



Tracking of HSE Critical Properties
Management of HSE Critical Performance of Vendor packages
Demonstration of conformance at each stage of project lifecycle
Table 4-1: Schematic Summary: Application of Fire Protection Strategy
1
1
System
Components
(/Equipment)
2
Functionality
AGES-PH-03-002 (Part 4)
2
3
4
5
Verification
Operate
Design &
Assurance
FEED
Detail
Design
Commission
Description
Construct
Project Stages
Project Defined
Standard
Code Defined
Key
Properties
COMPANY
Aspect
6
Rev. No: 1
Page 14 of 75
1
3
Reliability /
Availability
4
Survivability
5
Dependencies
& Interactions
(on other HSE
Critical
Measures)
2
3
4
5
Verification
Operate
Design &
Assurance
FEED
Detail
Design
Commission
Description
Construct
Project Stages
Project Defined
Standard
Code Defined
Key
Properties
COMPANY
Aspect
6
The first major column in Table 4-1 is split into the 5 parts, comprising ‘System Description’ and the four
aspects described in Section 4.1. Column 2 identifies ‘Key properties’ that are critical to HSE risk and need
to be tracked (e.g. firewater application rate). Key Properties fall into two main categories:


COMPANY Standard
Project Defined
The list of ‘key properties’ contained in Sections 6 to 15 lie within both categories and are identified as such.
The Project defined key properties are those that depend on the strategy for Major Accident Hazard
management for the project (e.g. the requirement for remote activation will depend on project-specific
circumstances).
It should be noted that the list of ‘key properties’ and associated Standards in Sections 6 to 15 are the
minimum to be considered. Other key properties and Standards Shall be added as identified through projectspecific studies.
The Standards in Sections 6 to 15 represents the minimum requirement that shall be achieved and
demonstrated.
Columns 4, 5 and 6 identify the Assurance / Verification requirements for each ‘key property’ during the
lifecycle of the Project. The design and implementation each key property shall be progressively developed
and documented during the facility lifecycle (design to operation /maintenance).
AGES-PH-03-002 (Part 4)
Rev. No: 1
Page 15 of 75
4.4.2
Format of COMPANY AFP Standards (Sections 6 to 15)
The format of the COMPANY Standards for AFP in this Part of the Standard ( Sections 6 to 15), only uses
columns 1 2 & 3 from Table 4-1, for ease of presentation.
An ‘Audit’ column can be added to this format on the right to allow compliance to be assessed against each
key property in the Standard.
4.5
Application & Compliance with Standard
CONTRACTOR shall follow the process described in this Standard.
It is acknowledged that all aspects of this Standard may not be practicable to implement on all facilities. Any
deviation from this Standard shall therefore be supported by a documented justification as described in Part
1 of this standard.
4.6 Document Structure
Noting the above context, the remaining Sections of this Standard are structured as follows:
Selection of Systems –
: Section 5
Fixed Systems







Firewater System
Deluge
Foam
Sprinkler
Water Mist (self-contained)
Gaseous Extinguishant
Wet Chemical
: Section 6
: Section 7
: Section 8
: Section 9
: Section 10
: Section 11
: Section 12
Mobile Protection

Portable Fire Extinguishers
: Section 13
General


Jetty & Terminals
Buildings
AGES-PH-03-002 (Part 4)
: Section 14
: Section 15
Rev. No: 1
Page 16 of 75
5
SELECTION OF SYSTEMS – ACTIVE FIRE PROTECTION (AFP)
5.1
Fire Protection Overview
The aim of this Section is to identify the AFP Systems most suited for the fire hazards identified in the Fire
Hazard Assessment in line with Part 1 of this Standard.
The overall Strategy for Active Fire Protection is summarised in Table 5-1, which is broken down into four
main questions:
1.
2.
3.
4.
How to classify fires?
What type of fires can occur?
How to tackle fires using ‘Fixed Systems’?
Which ‘Portable Fire Extinguishers’ to use?
AGES-PH-03-002 (Part 4)
Rev. No: 1
Page 17 of 75
ADNOC Classification: Internal
Table 5-1: Overview of Active Fire Protection Strategy
b
B
Combustible
Materials
(cellulosic)
Flammable
Gases
P
1
G(i)
G(ii)
B
Flammable
Liquids
A
2
C
Electrical
D
Flammable
Metals
Cooking oils
& Fats
K
P
Water
Typical methane-rich natural gas.
P
Jet fire
P
Refinery hydrogen
A flammable liquid that, on release, would
vapourise rapidly & substantially. The
category includes:
a) Any LPG or ligher flammable liquid.
b) Any flammable liquid at a temperature
sufficient to produce, on release, more
than 40% vol. vapourisation with no heat
input other than from surroundings.
B
A flammable liquid, not in category A, but
at a temperature sufficient for boiling to
occur on release.
C
A flammable liquid, not in categories A or
B, but which can, on release, be at a
temperature above its flash point, or form
a flammable mist or spray.
P
Jet fire
P
P
(No water on
LNG/LPG).
2
Water on
High Risk
Items at
source for
'Control of
Burning'
(pumps,
compressors,
etc.)
P
Water for
cooling
Critical Items
for NonImpinging Jet
Fires
P
Water
(cooling of
Critical
Structures)
P
P
P
3
e
f
x
P
P
P
1
Class B fires correspond to all fires identified through Hazardous Area Classification using EN-15.
2
Fire Class B comprises Jet fires, Spray Fires and Pool Fires
3
Potential for flash-fire and explosion also identified by EN-15, but escalation avoidance measures focus on isolation of source and removal of ignition sources
(not Active Fire Protection).
4
Identifies Objectives and Approach to tackle fire using Fixed Active Fire Protection Systems.
5
Identifies the Portable Fire Extinguishing Options to tackle small scale fires manually.
P
P
P
P
P
P
P
E.g. Turbine enclosure
fires
Exposure
Protection
Exposure
Protection
P
Clean Agent
P
Special Agent
P
Wet chemical
Notes:
Document No: AGES-PH-03-002 (Part 4)
d
P
P
Foam on Pool
Fires with low
vapourisation
rates.
P
Spray
fire
Water
eg. Inert
Mist
Gas, Clean
(self
Agent
contained)
Manual
Response
x
P
Isolate gas leak
only
Sprinker
Control of Burning
(at source of jet fire)
Exposure Protection
(radiation from low momentum fires)
A
c
6
a
Wet Chemical
Ignition
Firewater System
Prevention
Foam
(/shutdown) Deluge
CO2
Exposure
Protection
Special
3
Control of
Burning
(at Soruce)
Dry Powder
Extinguish
Foam
Jetfire Pool
(/Spray) Fire
Flash Fire Electrical Metals Cooking
/Explosion
oils &
Fats
h
Water
B
5
g
Dry Chemical
Cellulosic
K
Gaseous
Ext'ant
Not Preferred (special cases only)
Fluid Class for Haz Areas
(EN 15)
D
Portable Extinguishers
Water
Wet Chemical
NFPA 10-2018
C
Fixed Fire Protection Systems
4
Control of Burning (same as Deluge)
A
Fixed Fire Protection Objective & Approach
Flammable Fluids
(Hydrocarbon)
Exposure Protection (same as Deluge)
Fire Types
Extinguish
Fire Classes
x
P
x
6. Firewater system requird by
multiple users throughout the
site (firewater ring main,
hydrants and monitors where
required).
P
7.
8. Vendor supplied self-contained
Dependencies systems.
- Fire Station
- FF Vehicles
- (trainded Fire
Team)
- Layout
(Access roads
& eqpt
Spscing)
- Drainage &
Disposal
Rev. No: 01
Page 18 of 75
P
P
How to Classify fires?: The Classification of fire types has been covered extensively in Part 1 of this
Standard and is included in Table 5-1 for context to show continuity of the overall approach and logic.
Noteworthy points are that Fires have been classified in line with NFPA 10 as Class A, B, C, D, and K. The
exact meaning of these fire types is covered in NFPA 10, and in Part 1 of this Standard.
It is also noted that all hydrocarbon fires lie within Class B. The fluid characteristics column has been included
in table 5.1 to allow the various different types of Class B fires to be distinguished (jet fires, pool fires, etc.),
as well as whether this is a hydrocarbon liquid or gas fire, since this is important in deciding the type of AFP
system to use.
What type of fires can occur?: The type of fires that can occur is covered in the second major column. This
is addressed in Section 7.6 of Part 1, along with the type of plant areas where such fires can typically occur
(Section 7.7, Part 1).
The main focus of this Part of the Standard is on how to tackle the various fire types using:


Fixed Fire Protection Systems
Portable Fire Extinguishers.
It is noted that “fixed” systems include those that fight fires at a specific location such as deluge spray system,
foam system, Gas suppression system etc. . Fixed design is based on the COMPANY and Code requirement
and based on Risk Assessment.
Manual Fire Fighting is supplementary support to fixed system in case of their failure or if no fixed facility is
provided. Portable fire extinguishers are for first intervention, if safe to do
The discretionary systems will rely Dynamic Risk Assessment (DRA) by the ER team during an incident to
determine exactly how to use such systems
How to tackle fires using ‘Fixed Systems’?
5.2
The third major column in Table 5-1 addresses how fixed AFP systems can be used:


5.2.1
Objective & Approach
Fixed Systems to Use
Objective & Approach
The objectives of AFP in each case have been aligned with those of API 2030 (Ref. 18) as:



Extinguishment
Control of Burning
Exposure Protection /prevent escalation to adjacent equipment.
The types of fires that could be tackled using these approaches are clarified in the rows below each of these
heading in table 5.1
Document No: AGES-PH-03-002 (Part 4)
Rev. No: 01
Page 19 of 75
It is noted that the scenario of ‘flash fire/ vapour cloud explosion’, is outside the scope of this Standard since
the systems required to manage it are normally not part of ‘Active Fire Protection’.
5.2.2
Fixed Systems to Use?
The second aspect of fixed AFP is to identify the Systems that would carry out the objectives identified in
Section 5.2.1. These are highlighted using the labels in the list below, and can be related to the various fire
types in the preceding columns in:
a)
b)
c)
d)
e)
f)
g)
h)
Firewater System
Deluge
Foam
Sprinkler
Water Mist (self-contained)
Gaseous Extinguishant
Wet Chemical
Manual Response
It is noted that manual response has also been identified to work in conjunction with the fixed systems to
support the same strategies stated in Section 5.2.1.
The Firewater System (item a) is noted to be a common supplier of water for all fixed fighting system such
Deluge, Foam etc. The fire water system also make provision for manual intervention in that monitors and
hoses can be manually directed at specific locations, whilst other systems are covering fixed locations.
The other systems (items e-g) are typically provided by vendors due to specialised requirements for
applying the firefighting media.
5.2.3
Project Implementation of AFP Strategies?
Table 5-2 is a schematic of a decision framework to consider fire protection strategies identified in Section
5.2.1, and how they can be implemented within a project.
Document No: AGES-PH-03-002 (Part 4)
Rev. No: 01
Page 20 of 75
Table 5-2: Schematic: Typical Decision Framework to Consider Fire Protection Strategy
6.1. What type of fires can occur?
Flammable Liquids
(Hydrocarbon)
C
D
K
6.3. Which Fixed Fire Protection Systems?
Extinguish
Water
Control of Exposure
Burning
Protection
(at Soruce)
Ignition
Prevention
(/shutdown)
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
P-15
x
x
x
x
Process Utilities (Fired)
PF-1
x
x
x
Utilities (& Machinery)
U-1
Safety Sys.
SS-1
Manned Areas
M-1
PS-1R
Process
P-1
Process Utilities
Emergency
Response
x
x
x
x
x
Dry
Powder
Special
Metals
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
Wet
Chemical
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
Escape
ER-Es-1
x
x
To select an approach for tackling fires (/ leaks) in
each area based on the type of fires that can occur.
(this becomes the objective for design of the relevant
Active Fire Protective System),
x
x
x
x
To review the Fire Classes that can occur in each
area and determine the most suitable measures to
avoid 'escalation' (passive & active, including PFP,
ESD, Blowdown, AFP, etc.).
x
x
x
x
x
x
ER-E-1
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
Concept Risk Assessment (CRA)
- Master Equipment List
- Plot Plans
- Fire Protection Study (passive & active)
- Identification of Safety Critical Design Measures
(SCDM)
- Fire & Explosion Risk Assessment (FERA /QRA if
required)
Active Fire Protection Study
(scope to coves requirement and capacity of firewater,
deluge, foam, clean agent, etc.to allow FEED level
costing)
Performance Standards for SCDMs
Detail design of selected AFP systems (e.g. detailed
modelling of FW network, vendor package
specification and procurement, etc).
x
To identify the type and number of Portable Fire
Extinguishers required for each area to deal with the
identified the Fire Class(es).
n/a
- System List
- Plot Plans
Active Fire Protection Study
(scope to cover Portable Fire Extinguishers)
Notes:
1. Requirement for AFP for any facility shall be assessed in the Fire Hazard Assessment and captured in HSE Design Philosophy.
2. Remote Unmanned Facilities: Requirement of AFP shall be assessed based on project-specific risk assessment (including business continuity perspective). If required, above Table shall apply for AFP selection.
3. Normally Remote Well heads (offshore & onshore): AFP not expected to be required for normal operation (SIMOPS requirement for well intervention to be assessed on case by case basis).
Document No: AGES-PH-03-002 (Part 4)
CO2
x
x
Evac
Notes
To identify ALL the areas where a fire or
gas release event could occur.
Wet
Dry
Water Foam
Chemical Chemical
Inert Gas, Clean Agent
x
Process - Product Storage Tanks,
Pressurised Vessels & Export
Other
protective
measures.
Water Mist (self
contained)
x
Manual Emergency
Response
Flash Fire /Explosion
x
Deluge
Pool Fire
x
Electrical
Jetfire (/Spray)
x
Cellulosic
x
W-1
6.4. Which Portable Extinguisher?
Firewater System
B
Well-head
Gaseous
Extinguisher
Sprinker
A
6.2. How to tackle using Fixed FP Systems?
Foam
1. Hazard Identification
Rev. No: 01
Page 21 of 75
Table 5-2 is intended to show the logical flow of decisions to define the various AFP systems needed. The
Table is structured to identify the main hazards related to the various equipment items in each area of the
facility in columns 1-3. The next major column is broken down into 7 smaller columns, one for each type of
fire. The third and fourth major columns allows the relevant strategies (extinguish, control of burning, etc.) to
be selected depending on the type of fires identified. The final major column allows the most appropriate
AFP systems to be selected based on the fire types and strategies determined.
It is intended that this analysis shall initially be done on an equipment-by-equipment basis, and then
consolidated into the systems required for the Project defined Fire Zones (FZ).
It should be noted that a FZ is a geographical area within which an initiating Major Accident event is to be
contained and may be defined on the basis of Process Units or by Plant Area. It is possible that this might
comprise multiple FDZs, as defined in Part 2 of this Standard.
5.3
Which ‘Portable Fire Extinguishers’ to use?
The extreme right side of table 5.2 shows the type of Portable Fire Extinguishers that are suitable for each
of the various fire categories.
5.4
Equipment Selection / Quality
All systems and hardware installed shall be UL Listed (Underwriters Laboratory) and shall have FM (Factory
Mutual) approval.
Any deviation from this requirement shall require a justification to be submitted for approval by the Group
Company Technical Authority.
Document No: AGES-PH-03-002 (Part 4)
Rev. No: 01
Page 22 of 75
6.1
Firewater Standard
Standard
(Description)
Company
Key Properties
Project Defined
STANDARD - FIREWATER SYSTEM
Code Defined
6
System Components (/Equipment)
1
Firewater Storage
2
Firewater Package Controls Interface
3
Firewater Pumps (Electrical Motor & Diesel Driven )
4
Firewater Motor & Engine Controllers
5
Firewater Jockey Pumps
6
Firewater Ring Main
7
Firewater Monitors
8
Firewater Hydrants
9
Fire Trucks
Functionality
1.
Simultaneous
Coverage
/Design Basis
Onshore and Offshore (Islands & Facilities):
P




For all applications, the sizing case for the firewater
pump shall be based on the largest Fire Zone
firewater demand (Fire Zone criteria and Fire Zone
Concept is provided in HSE Design Philosophy,
Ref. 4).
Fire water demand calculation shall be performed
by adding the fixed fire water demand for protected
individual equipment / area within a fire zone
+ (plus)
Supplementary allowance shall be provided for 2
hydrants or 1 monitor for Manual Emergency
Response (portable). Additional hose stream
allowances may be included if required.
2.
Simultaneous
Coverage
/Enhanced Design
Basis
Alternative: Enhanced Requirement (if required
for Company Specific Requirements)
P
If required for high risk complex processes
enhanced requirement can be considered (e.g.
Refinery , Petrochemical, etc.) as follows.
Document No: AGES-PH-03-002 (Part 4)
Rev. No: 01
Page 23 of 75
Project Defined
Code Defined
Standard
(Description)
Company
Key Properties
P


P


P


Firewater pump sizing case shall be based on two
separate simultaneous initiating events in two
different Fire Zones at the Refinery. The Fire Zones
selected shall be the two largest firewater demands
(Fire Zone criteria and Fire Zone Concept is
provided in HSE Design Philosophy, Ref. 4).
Fire water demand calculation shall be performed
by adding the fixed fire water demand for both
initiating events to protect individual equipment /
area within each Fire Zone
+ (plus)
Supplementary allowance shall be provided for 2
hydrants and 1 monitor for Manual Emergency
Response (portable) for each of the two Fire Zones.
3.
Design Basis:
Fixed roof storage tanks shall require:
Fixed Roof Storage
Tank
-
Adjacent Tank Surface cooling (exposure
protection)
Full
Surface
Fire
(FSF)
protection
(extinguishment)
Full Bund Fire ( Bund fire protection may be
provided if recommended by FERA or QRA
assessment).
4.
Design Basis:
Floating roof storage tanks shall require:
Floating Roof Storage
Tank
-
Rim Seal Fire (extinguishment)
Tank Surface cooling (exposure protection)
Arrangements shall be as recommended by API RP
2021 (Ref. 21), NFPA 11 (Ref. 50).
FSF Protection: The requirement to provide Full
Surface Fire (FSF) protection shall be established
based on project specific Risk Assessment. If
required, FSF protection shall be in accordance
with LASTFIRE recommendations.
5.
Contingency on
Firewater flowrate
A contingency of 30% shall be added to the total
firewater demand rate calculated for the end point
application requirements. This is to cover for losses
and hydraulic imbalances.
Hydraulic – COMPANY approved software
Document No: AGES-PH-03-002 (Part 4)
Rev. No: 01
Page 24 of 75
6.
Simultaneous
Coverage
/Design Basis
Approved Hydraulic modelling of the firewater
systems shall use surface roughness coefficients
representative of the selected piping material(s).
NFPA standards 24, 15 and 16 provide values for
these coefficients. A surge study shall be carried
out to identify unacceptable high-pressure
transients during fire main operations.
P
7.
Simultaneous
Coverage
/Design Basis
Deluge or water spray systems shall be designed to
protect and cool equipment by either dedicated or
targeted spray to individual items of equipment or
by general area protection. The final application
and choice of coverage shall consider the
equipment being protected, the layout of the
equipment and the potential for escalation including
the effects of pool fires
P
8.
Firewater Pumping
Sets
Fire Pump set , driver and controller shall be
Underwriters Laboratory (UL) Listed and Factory
Mutual (FM) Approved.
9.
Initiation - Remote
Manual
Initiation of firewater pumping system should be
possible from the HMI in the CCR.
10.
Initiation - Remote
Automatic
The firewater system shall be designed to be
pressurised normally with a Jockey pump
arrangement. The main firewater pumps shall be
started automatically if the jockey pump(s) are not
able to maintain pressure, of if commanded to do
so by a F&G signal.
11.
Initiation - Remote
Automatic
Fire
Water
Pump
Controllers.
Controllers should be equipped for automatic and
manual starting. Automatic starting should be
accomplished using pressure switches for on/off
operation or automatic start upon activation of the
ESD, fusible loop, or other fire detection system.
12.
Initiation - Remote
Automatic
Initiation of firewater pumps should be automatic on
confirmed fire detection in plant areas (any type of
detection device, F&G detectors, loss of pressure
in pneumatic loop, LHD, etc.).
13.
Initiation - Local
Manual
Starting of firewater system shall be possible local
to the pumps.
14.
Back-up Start Method
(for Diesel Pumps)
Diesel pump start capacity shall be sufficient to start
N+1 fire pumps. NFPA 20 requirement to be
complied as minimum.
Document No: AGES-PH-03-002 (Part 4)

Project Defined
Code Defined
Standard
(Description)
Company
Key Properties



P









P
P

P
P
P


P


Rev. No: 01
Page 25 of 75
15.
Application Rate Firewater
Firewater application rate shall be based on API
2030, NFPA 13 & 15, IP-19 and ISO (an indicative
summary is given for information in Table 6-1.
P
Project Defined

Code Defined
Standard
(Description)
Company
Key Properties

Any differences required by the these Standards
from the figures in Table 6-1.shall be highlighted to
COMPANY for Approval.
16.
Pump Suction and
Discharge Piping:
1. Refer to NFPA 20 (Ref. 47) for pump suction and
discharge piping including testing connection
design as a minimum.



2. Each pump discharge shall be connected to 2
Nos common discharge manifolds with individual
isolation valves.
3. The common discharge manifolds shall be
connected to the fire water distribution system (fire
ring main) with individual isolation valves.
17.
Driver
2. If only electrical firewater pumps are installed, or
if electric power is required to start and control
diesel-driven firewater pumps, electrical power
shall be from the vital supply such that the required
firewater capacity can be met.

P

18.
Normal (stand-by)
operating condition
During normal operation, the main fire water
pump(s) shall be in the stand-by mode, with either
the jockey pump(s) or other pressure source (e.g.,
static height, cooling water system) maintaining a
minimum pressure of 7 barg in the fire water
distribution system at the pump discharge. Any
alternative setting to be agreed by Group Company
Technical Authority.

P


P

a. In this condition, the pump discharge control
valve (fail open) should be at the minimal stop.
b. The dump valve (fail open) should be in the
closed position.
19.
Operating condition
(fire scenario)
1. When the main firewater pump or the “first main
fire water pump” (if more than one main fire water
pump is required) is manually started, dump valve
shall be fully open.
Document No: AGES-PH-03-002 (Part 4)
Rev. No: 01
Page 26 of 75
Project Defined
Code Defined
Standard
(Description)
Company
Key Properties
2. To prevent a pressure surge in the main fire
water system, a suitable pressure control system
shall be installed in the pump discharge piping
network which shall include but not be limited to
providing pressure control valves in each of the two
the discharge headers. Additionally, a PCV shall be
provided in the tank return (/dump) line and the
system shall be configured such that the discharge
pressure is stabilised by operating the above stated
PCVs (3 numbers). The PCV controls shall be
managed through a PLC system.
3. The pressure sensing line arrangement and
pressure transmitters to start/stop the fire
pumps as required by NFPA 20 shall be provided
in addition to the PCV arrangement stated above.
The pressure sensing arrangement through fire
pump controllers as required by NFPA 20 shall be
set at lower system pressure and shall be
independent to provide contingency to a PCV
failure scenario.
As a minimum all above three conditions shall be
complied with.
20.
Application Rate Firewater
Water application rate shall be based on
applicable Code.

P

Fire Pump Set Arrangements
21.
Pump-set Design
Fire Pump-set design and installation (Pump, Driver
and controller) shall be comply with NFPA 20 (Ref.
51).




P
Firewater pumping system shall include a recycle
line for testing such that each pump can be tested
independently to verify its performance curve
without a requirement to discharge at the intended
end users.
22.
Pump-set – Delivery
Pressure
Min flowing pressure at hydraulically furthest user
outlet shall be above 7barg and at take off point ring
main shall have minimum 10barg. Actual value will
be set by hydraulic analysis to deliver the required
flow and pressure for the largest and furthest
demand.
Document No: AGES-PH-03-002 (Part 4)

Rev. No: 01
Page 27 of 75
23.
Pump Degradation
Maximum pump degradation (minimum pump
performance) shall be defined so that the
requirement for pump maintenance can be
assessed. This shall be based on the pumping
system's capability to deliver the most onerous
area.

P

P

Project Defined

Code Defined
Standard
(Description)
Company
Key Properties
P
Hydraulic calculations shall demonstrate that the
required application rates will be achieved in each
area to be protected with the defined maximum
pump degradation.
Pumps (Diesel)
24.
Starter
Diesel engine driven fire pumps shall have as a
minimum a primary starting system starter motor
and battery system,

.

25.
Secondary Starting
System
Diesel engine driven fire pumps that are primary
pumps or the only type of pump at the installation
shall have a secondary starting system requirement
shall be reviewed based on the reliability and
availability criteria
26.
Response Time
Within 20 seconds after a demand to start, pumps
shall supply and maintain a stable discharge
pressure (±10 percent) throughout the entire range
of operation.
27.
Operating Time
Minimum fuel supply shall meet NFPA requirement
(8hrs), however additional requirements may be
required based on Fire Hazard Assessment to meet
Group Company requirements.

P

To prevent surge in the network, maximum velocity
in firewater network shall be less than 3m/sec. The
pipe sizes shall be calculated based on design flow
rates and pressure of 10barg (based on hydraulics)
at the take-off points of each section even if one of
the supply sides has been blocked or is out of
operation.

P
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
P

Firewater Ring Main
28.
Firewater - Velocity
Document No: AGES-PH-03-002 (Part 4)
Rev. No: 01
Page 28 of 75
Project Defined
Code Defined
Standard
(Description)
Company
Key Properties
29.
Firewater – Surge
Pressure
Hydraulic Surge Analysis shall be performed to
demonstrate that the firewater system integrity shall
not be compromised due to surge pressures.

P

30.
Jockey Pump(s)
For wet pressurised firewater distribution mains or
header systems, a low (flow) capacity firewater
‘jockey’ pump shall be provided to keep the system
wet and pressurised. I

P

31.
Jockey Pump Driver
Jockey pump shall be electric motor driven due to
system demand for frequent starting and stopping
to maintain nominal system pressure.

P

32.
Jockey Pump
Discharge Pressure
Minimum jockey pump design discharge pressure
(minimum firewater distribution system pressure) is
typically 7 barg (100 psig). Required nominal
working pressure can be greater depending on
minimum pressure required at high points,
hydraulic characteristics, and response time
requirements of the firewater distribution system.

P

33.
Fire Main - Isolation
requirements
The fire water main and isolation requirements shall
comply with NFPA 24.

P

34.
Fire Main –
Sectionalisation
Isolation valves should be installed to sectionalize
the water main grid so that only part of the system
will be out of service during failures or repairs.

P

35.
Fire Main - Isolation
Valves
Isolation valves shall be installed in a chamber.
Post indicator should be used and marked for easy
identification of valve position.

P

36.
Firewater Network
Arrangement
Network shall be designed in such a way that each
Fire Zone / critical item of equipment can be
reached from two parts of grid.
P


Facility fire water ring mains and distribution
systems shall supply fire water to fire-fighting
appliances to enable fire water coverage of any
process or utilities area with a fire hazard that
requires water or foam firefighting media. This shall
also cover firefighting for buildings from the outside.

P

Firewater Hydrants
37.
Fire water Hydrant
The provision for general firefighting is that fire
water is delivered to hydrants with hoses for use by
trained firefighters.
Document No: AGES-PH-03-002 (Part 4)
Rev. No: 01
Page 29 of 75
Project Defined
Code Defined
Standard
(Description)
Company
Key Properties
If a facility is extended then hydrants shall meet the
requirements in this philosophy and should match
those of the existing facility.
38.
Inlet Isolation & Outlet
Pressure Regulation
All hydrants shall be provided with an inlet isolation
valve installed in the hydrant riser. Additionally,
each hydrant outlet valve shall be fitted with a
pressure reducing/regulating valve to allow
operator to set pressure at typically 5 -7 barg for
safe operation with hand lines.

P

39.
Connections
General: Hydrants shall have 2x 2½ inch
hose connections (instantaneous coupling) PRV
type shall be required (based on system operating
pressure) to regulate the pressure at each hydrant
valve outlet.

P

Process Areas: 4 x 2-1/2” inch hose connections
(instantaneous coupling) shall be provided as
below:
1. 2 Nos of outlet (without PRV if required on case
by case basis)
2. 2 Nos with PRV type
In process area hydrant shall be provided in a
manifold arrangement with foam/water monitor at
top of the manifold and necessary access with
platform shall be provided.
40.
Onshore
Hydrants shall be provided along the whole length
of the fire water ring mains in all locations around
processing areas, loading & unloading facilities,
flammable liquids storage facilities and general
areas.
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P

41.
Onshore (LPG / LNG)
LPG/LNG jetty heads/berths: Hydrant and monitors
shall be provided.

P

42.
Onshore Spacing
ONSHORE including Islands, hydrants shall be
provided and installed in accordance with the
following maximum spacing:50 m Around process
units and LPG bottle-filling plants
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P
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
Document No: AGES-PH-03-002 (Part 4)
50 m Loading/unloading facilities and offsite pump stations
80 m Around storage facilities and Pipe
tracks
Rev. No: 01
Page 30 of 75


43.
Onshore
(Accessibility)
Project Defined
Code Defined
Standard
(Description)
Company
Key Properties
50 m Around storage and pumping facilities
for LPG
80 m Around utility areas, offices,
workshops, laboratories, jetty approaches,
and other areas.
Hydrants shall be readily accessible from roads and
be located in such a way that possible damage by
road traffic will be minimised and shall be provided
with a guard post and concrete drainage area.

P

Hydrants shall be located not less than 1.5 m from
the edge of the road shoulder, and at least 10 m
from road crossings, sharp road curves, buildings
or other structures.
44.
Onshore (Accessibility
LPG /LNG)
On LPG/LNG storage facilities and on Jetty
heads/berths, the combined hydrant-monitor will
serve the purpose of providing intake to fire truck or
cooling the area with monitor if any sprinklers are
out of order

P

45.
Hydrants (Offshore)
Offshore hydrants and nozzles shall be of materials
and coatings suitable for seawater and outdoor
weather conditions.

P

Monitors are provided to enable firefighting to be
carried out where hydrants and hoses are not of
practical use. This is typically when coverage is
better with a monitor or allowing that a monitor can
be operated unattended.
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P
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P
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Firewater Monitors
46.
General Provision
Stationary monitors shall be provided for rapid
application of firewater onto a specific fire hazard
where no fixed water spray systems are provided.
47.
Fixed Monitors
(manual)
Fixed manually operated water monitors (oscillating
if required) shall be located in hazardous storage
areas at strategic points for exposure protection
and shall be accessible during a fire. Stationary
monitors shall be either free-standing or installed on
fire hydrants.
Document No: AGES-PH-03-002 (Part 4)
Rev. No: 01
Page 31 of 75
Project Defined
Code Defined
Standard
(Description)
Company
Key Properties
48.
Facility Expansion
If a facility is extended, then monitors shall meet the
requirements in this philosophy and should match
those of the existing facility.



49.
Monitor (operating
pressure and Flow)
All monitors operating pressure shall be 7 bar
minimum and minimum 120 m3/hr. Maximum
design pressure shall be 16 bar. Monitor nozzles
shall have "jet" and "fog" settings. The flow rate and
the pressure requirement shall be increased as
required.
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P
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P
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The fire monitor with the flow rate of 80 m3/hr may
be accepted only in specific locations where the fire
water demand is less and Subject to GC Approval.
50.
Monitor (rotation &
lock)
All monitors shall have 360-degree rotation of turret
that is lockable in any position. Rotation and
elevation movement shall be by means of a lever;
setting and locking shall be easy.
Moving parts shall be fully protected/enclosed
against sand and salt spray. Flushing facilities shall
be provided for salt/brackish water and foam
service.
51.
Monitor (rotation &
lock) – manual
movement
Rotation, elevation and nozzle adjustment shall be
done manually without gears for ground level
monitors.
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P
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52.
Monitors (congested
areas)
In congested plant sections where fixed ground
level mounted water monitors may be less effective
because of obstructions, elevated fixed adjustable
water monitors operated manually from grade level
may be used.
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P
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53.
Monitors (elevated) operation
Elevated monitors may be operated:
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P
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


Document No: AGES-PH-03-002 (Part 4)
Locally at ground level,
o Locally controlled elevated monitors shall
be provided with cable, chain or gear
mechanisms to adjust elevation, rotation
and nozzle setting.
Remotely from a safe distance,
o Remotely controlled elevated monitors
shall have a rotation and elevation speed of
approximately 6 degrees/s.
From central control room.
Rev. No: 01
Page 32 of 75
Project Defined
Code Defined
Standard
(Description)
Company
Key Properties
54.
Monitors (elevated)
Elevated monitors shall have their mounting flange
installed approximately 3 m above the level where
the fire may occur.
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P

55.
Monitors (elevated) –
supports & platform
Elevated monitors require properly supported
supply piping, which may form an integral part of
the supporting structure. A platform shall be
provided for inspection and maintenance.

P

56.
Monitor (motors)
Remotely controlled monitors shall be electrically
powered from the emergency electrical supply. As
a minimum, the equipment and operating panel
shall be suitably rated to operate in a hazardous
zone 1 environment.

P

57.
Monitors (foam)
Foam monitors shall be compatible with
proportioning equipment installed at ground level.
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P
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58.
Monitors (Offshore)
Offshore monitor shall be of materials and coatings
suitable for seawater and outdoor weather
conditions.

P

59.
Monitors (LPG /LNG)
LPG/LNG storage facilities and on Jetty
heads/berths. Combined hydrant-monitor will serve
the purpose of providing intake to fire truck or
cooling the area with monitor if sprinklers are out of
order.
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P

60.
Cabinets
Firewater Hose reels & Hose cabinets (branch pipe,
fire hose)

P
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61.
Hose Box
Fire hose boxes shall be located along the fire
water network in the facility areas (at alternate
hydrant point).
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P
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62.
Equipment
They shall be equipped with a minimum of 4 Nos of
2 ½ (65 mm) x 30 m hoses with branch pipe and
with Nozzle.
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P
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Hoses
Storage Capacity
63.
Storage Design
Fire water storage design and installation shall
comply with NFPA 22.
P
64.
Storage Capacity
Firewater storage capacity shall be sufficient to
supply the most onerous duty for the following
period:
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Document No: AGES-PH-03-002 (Part 4)
Rev. No: 01
Page 33 of 75
Project Defined
Code Defined
Standard
(Description)
Company
Key Properties
P
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- Process plants minimum 6 hrs uninterrupted
(reliable) for the largest fire demand (unless more
time is required based on the Fire Hazard
Assessment).
65.
Storage Capacity
(verification)
The required firewater storage capacity shall be
verified with a Fire Hazard Assessment. Such
defined capacity shall ensure the number of tanks
shall be N+1 as a minimum according to API RP
2001 (Ref. 19).
This means, if any tank is under maintenance the
maximum required flowrate, pressure and minimum
duration of 6 hrs can still be provided
If increased storage capacity over and above 6hrs
is required based on Fire Hazard Assessment, then
alterative source of reliable replenishment such as
seawater backup or mutual aid arrangement can be
considered.
66.
Storage Capacity
(special case)
Where the facility fire risk (/ firefighting duration) is
shown to be low, the firewater capacity may be
optimised. This shall require demonstration (Fire
Hazard Assessment) and approval of the Group
Company Technical Authority.
P
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
67.
Make-up Water
P
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
68.
Duration of
Application (/storage
capacity)
It is desirable to have an adequate supply of
makeup water available in addition to storage
requirements.
- Other industry based on the Fire Risk Assessment
and duration firefighting.
Process Areas:

P

6 hrs main + 6hrs reserve Storage: Any deviation
shall require approval by Group Company
Technical Authority.
Non-Process (Accommodation, Office. Etc.):
For non-process area governed by UAE Fire and
Life Safety Code - as a minimum
69.
Firewater Delivery
Pipework
The firewater main shall be suitable for static and
transient conditions (covering start up, part-load,
sudden reduction in demand etc.) to prevent failure
due to pressure surge / water hammer.
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P

This shall be demonstrated by hydraulic analysis.
Document No: AGES-PH-03-002 (Part 4)
Rev. No: 01
Page 34 of 75
70.
Adjustment of
Application Rate
(monitors)
Fixed and oscillating firewater monitors and
hydrants shall be provided where it is reasonably
practicable (and necessary) to tackle hydrocarbon
fires manually. These should have a capability to
adjust the application rate.
71.
Secondary Firewater
Storage
Especially in onshore, offshore had abundant sea
water


Reliability / Availability
72.
Maintenance
Maintenance should be conducted in accordance
with relevant NFPA codes. (Ref. 51).
73.
Redundancy Firewater Delivery
Pipework
The firewater supply shall be configured in a ringmain arrangement to allow the most onerous duty
to be met with any one section taken out for
maintenance.
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P
P
Project Defined

Code Defined
Standard
(Description)
Company
Key Properties
P
P


The fire water distribution system design shall
provide for a maximum allowable velocity in the
firewater piping of 3 m/s to prevent surging
conditions. Even impaired condition (if one of the
supply sides has been blocked or is out of
operation) the velocity shall not exceed 3 m/s).
The above shall be demonstrated by hydraulic
analysis.
74.
Redundancy Pumping Capacity
In case of one pump being taken out of service for
maintenance, the remaining pumps must be able to
deliver 100% of the required maximum duty.
75.
Redundancy Pumping Capacity
Standby
pumps
i) When total number of Working pumps work out to
be one or two, 100% standby pumps shall be
provided.
ii) When firewater supplied by three pumps, each
able to supply 60 % of the maximum required flow
rate.
iii) Each pump maximum capacity shall not exceed
1000 m3/hr or higher capacity with the special
approval by GC Technical Authority.
76.
Redundancy Pumping Capacity
During the operational phase of the fire pump
systems, Availability should be at least 95% (this
equates for example to 19 successful starts, out of
20 attempts). This is the overall Availability of the
Document No: AGES-PH-03-002 (Part 4)
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Rev. No: 01
Page 35 of 75
Project Defined
Code Defined
Standard
(Description)
Company
Key Properties
77.
Materials
Selection of material for firewater system shall take
account of the water quality and environmental
conditions. This shall be documented and require
COMPANY approval.
P


78.
Quality of hardware /
systems
All systems and hardware installed shall be UL
Listed and shall be approved by FM.
P






complete pump system, including the individual
pump, power supplies, engines, motors, start
systems, fuel supplies, cooling, switchgear,
gearboxes and line shaft drive systems.
Survivability
79.
Fire & Explosion Storage
Firewater storage shall be located such that it
cannot be damaged by the fire and explosion
events that it is intended to give protection against.
This shall be demonstrated by FERA,
P
80.
Fire & Explosion Pumps
The firewater pumps shall be located such that they
cannot be damaged by the fire and explosion
events that they are intended to give protection
against.
This shall be demonstrated by FERA,
P
81.
Fire & Explosion Pumps
Fire
Water
Pump
Location.
(a.) The fire water pump should be located to
minimize possibility of damage in the event of a fire.
It should be isolated as far as practical from external
fuel and ignition sources. If more than one fire pump
is installed, where feasible, they should be
separated to minimize the possibility of a single fire
damaging all pumps. This is especially critical if
both pumps are located in the process or wellbay
areas.
(b.) Where practical, the lift column should be
located where it will be protected by the platform
framing to minimize damage from marine vessels.
82.
Fire & Explosion Firewater Ring Main
The firewater ring main should not be damaged by
the event it is intended to give protection against.
83.
Fire & Explosion F&G signal cable
Cable from F&G system to each Fire Pump and
Deluge valve solenoid must not be exposed to the
initiating event that the system is responding to.
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P
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P
P
Dependencies & Interactions (on other HSE Critical Measures)
Document No: AGES-PH-03-002 (Part 4)
Rev. No: 01
Page 36 of 75
84.
F&G Detection
Interaction with this system should be treated as
safety critical and the combined systems designed
and tested together to verify performance.
85.
EDG Power
Electrically driven firewater pump units shall have
power available at all times, even under emergency
conditions that does not directly affect the pump.
86.
EDG Power
All power supplies shall be located and arranged to
protect against damage by fire from within the
premises
and
exposing
hazards.
All power supplies shall have the capacity to run the
fire
pump
on
a
continuous
basis.
An alternate source of power for the primary fire
pump shall not be required where a backup enginedriven fire pump, backup steam turbine-driven fire
pump, or backup electric motor–driven fire pump
with independent power source meeting NFPA 20
(Ref. 51) is installed in accordance with this
standard.
87.
Firewater System
The firewater system shall always be available at all
times to ensure water can be supplied on demand
at any given time. The design of the system,
including the firewater pumps, the ring main and
other firewater users shall recognise this
requirement and include sufficient design measures
or redundancy of equipment to achieve this
requirement.
88.
F&G System
Interaction with F&G system should be treated as
safety critical and the combined systems designed
and tested together to verify performance.
89.
F&G System
The supply of 24volt shall be from a secure source.
Interaction with this system should be treated as
safety critical and the combined systems designed
and tested together to verify performance.
90.
Spill Containment
Contaminated firefighting media shall be contained
in line with local environmental legislation /
constraints and as required by Project HSE
Philosophy.
91.
Spill
Containment/Drainage
Drainage
System
Facilities shall be provided for cleaning drain
system mains (to prevent back-up which could
result in a hydrocarbon pool fire). For large areas
such as pump floors, sleeper ways and pipe tracks,
Document No: AGES-PH-03-002 (Part 4)
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P
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P
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Project Defined

Code Defined
Standard
(Description)
Company
Key Properties
P
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Rev. No: 01
Page 37 of 75
Project Defined
Code Defined
Standard
(Description)
Company
Key Properties
fire stops shall be provided to minimize the potential
spill area.
Document No: AGES-PH-03-002 (Part 4)
Rev. No: 01
Page 38 of 75
6.2
Firewater Application Rates
Table 6-1: Firewater Application Rates (Review of API 2030)
Review of API 2030 - Table 1 [consolidates various sources including NFPA 13 & 15]
Item
Exposure
Protection
Exposure Protection
General Exposure Protection
x
Control of Burning
Control of Burning
Extinguishment
- Combustible Solids
- Combustible Solids
- Flammable Liquids
Exposure Protection for Specific Equipment Structures
Air-fin Coolers
x
Atmospheric Storage Tanks
x
Compressors - General
x
Compressors - in Buildings
x
Cooling Towers
x
Fired Heater Supports
x
LPG Loading Racks
x
Motors
x
Pipe Racks
x
Open Cable Trays /Conduit Banks
X
Exposure Protection for Specific Scenarios
Pressurised Storage Tanks (API 2510)
- Radiant Exposure
x
- Non-pressure impingement
x
- Pressure Impingement
x
Process Buildings & Structures
- Primary
x
- Supplemental
x
Pressure Vessels, Exchangers & Towers
x
Pumps / compressors (overlap on machine
x
area 40.8 lpm /m/m2)
Transformers (oil filled )
x
Turbines
- General
x
- In Buildings
x
Wellheads
- Nozzles below overhead structure
General Objectives
Pool Fires
x
Document No: AGES-PH-03-002 (Part 4)
Control of
Burning
Extinguish
Application
Rate (lpm/m2)
4.1 - 10.2
x
20.4
x
x
x
6.1 - 12.2
12.2 - 20.4
Not desirable
10.2
4.1
10.2
12.2
6.1 - 20.4
10.2
10.2
10.2
10.2
12.5
x
x
4.1
6.1 - 10.2
20.4
x
12.2
6.1
10.2
20.4
10.2
10.2
12.2
x
20.4
x
Rev. No: 01
Page 39 of 75
Review of API 2030 - Table 1 [consolidates various sources including NFPA 13 & 15]
Item
Exposure
Protection
x
(nonimpinging)
Jet Fires
Control of
Burning
x
(high risk
sources)
Extinguish
Application
Rate (lpm/m2)
System Components (/Equipment)
1 Piping
2 Deluge Application - Valve Skid
3 Deluge Application - Pipework (dry side)
4 Deluge Application - Nozzles
Functionality
Simultaneous
Protection shall be provided against a single initiating fire on
1.
Coverage
site with sufficient capacity to meet the duty of the largest
demand area.
2.
Initiation - Remote
Manual
3.
Initiation - Remote
Automatic
Initiation - Local
Manual
4.
5.
Initiation - Local
Automatic
6.
Firewater
Application Rate
Deluge
Distribution
(pipework &
nozzles)
7.
Initiation of each Deluge Valve should be possible from the
CCR and normally involves energising the relevant deluge
valve solenoid with a 24volt signal.
All energise to operate signals shall be line monitored.
Initiation of deluge valves for an area should be automatic if
there is confirmed fire detection in that area.
Initiation of deluge shall be possible locally from the individual
Deluge Valve skids (using the pneumatic / hydraulic system
independent of the F&G system).
Deluge should release automatically on local fire detection in
the area to be protected. This may be through a pneumatic
loop or hydraulic and/or a signal via the F&G system.
Code Defined
Standard
(Description)
Company
Key Properties
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See firewater system for details.
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Application nozzles and pipework (& pressure reduction
means) shall be configured to ensure the minimum required
application rate (l/min/m2) is achieved in all parts of any area
being protected by firewater or foam.
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STANDARD – DELUGE SYSTEM
7
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Isolation valve and strainer shall be provided upstream of
deluge valve.
Document No: AGES-PH-03-002 (Part 4)
Rev. No: 01
Page 40 of 75
8.
Deluge
Distribution
(pipework &
nozzles)
Selection of material for dry deluge piping shall take account
of the water quality and environmental conditions. This shall
be documented and require COMPANY approval
9.
Dry Deluge
Pipework
The dry deluge pipework shall be suitable for static and
transient conditions (covering start up, part-load, sudden
reduction in demand etc.) to prevent failure due to pressure
surge / water hammer.
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Project Defined
Code Defined
Standard
(Description)
Company
Key Properties
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This shall be demonstrated by hydraulic analysis.
The dry pipe work shall be sized to deliver the fire water
demand with required pressure and flow at remotest nozzle. (
NFPA 15 is minimum )
10.
Response Time
Reliability / Availability
Redundancy of
11.
supply -
Dry Line shall be installed sloping with low point drain for
draining the residual water after each application.
The time to fill the dry deluge pipework should be taken into
account to ensure it is not significant to the required response
time for deluge application.
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The dry deluge pipework shall be configured in a ring-main
arrangement to allow redundant routes to the most onerous
discharge location to be met.
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This shall be demonstrated by hydraulic analysis.
Water supply to each deluge system shall be from two
separate sections of the firewater ring main to ensure supply
is available in case one section of the ring main is taken out for
maintenance.
The primary tap off shall be connected to deluge valve
assembly and an alternate tap off with manual isolation shall
be taken from an alternate isolatable section of fire water ring
main. The piping shall be connected to downstream of deluge
valve assembly to facilitate the water flow directly to the spray
system.
The manual isolation valve location shall be outside the
thermal radiation contour of 3.16 Kw/m2. (from the fire event
being tackled). If isolation is provided by a remote activated
valve, then this thermal radiation criteria may not apply.
Document No: AGES-PH-03-002 (Part 4)
Rev. No: 01
Page 41 of 75
Project Defined
Code Defined
Standard
(Description)
Company
Key Properties
The manual isolation valves and piping shall be appropriately
protected against potential mechanical impact (e.g vehicle
collision).
Pressure transmitter shall be provided in the spray network to
monitor fire water discharge / flow to the spray network.

12.
Redundancy Deluge Valve(s)
Supply to each deluge valve shall be from two separate
sections of the firewater ring main to ensure supply is
available in case one section of the ring main is taken out for
maintenance.
13.
Maintenance
Equipment to be maintained in good working order with
performance verified at a pre-determined frequency.
All systems and hardware installed shall be UL Listed and
shall be approved by FM.
Quality of
hardware /
systems
Survivability
Fire & Explosion 15.
Deluge Pipework
(dry)
14.
The dry deluge pipework should be designed so far as
practicable to avoid being damaged by a fire or explosion in
the area.
16.
Fire & Explosion Deluge Valves
The Deluge Valves shall be located such that they cannot be
damaged by the Fire they are intended to protect against.
17.
Fire & Explosion F&G signal cable
Cable from F&G system to each Fire Pump and Deluge valve
solenoid must not be exposed to the initiating event that the
system is responding to.
18.
Fire & Explosion -
Instrument and power supply cabling that is critical for fire
protection shall be special fire-resistant cables in accordance
with IEC 60331-21 [Part 20]
Dependencies & Interactions (on other HSE Critical Measures)
F&G Detection
Interaction with this system should be treated as safety
19.
critical and the combined systems designed and tested
together to verify performance.
20.
Spill Containment
Contaminated firefighting media shall be contained in line
with local environmental legislation / constraints.
Document No: AGES-PH-03-002 (Part 4)
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Rev. No: 01
Page 42 of 75
STANDARD – FOAM APPLICATION
System Components (/Equipment)
1
Foam Storage
2
Foam Trailer
3
Foam Proportioner/ pumps
4
Foam Application - Valve
5
Foam Application - Pipework (dry side)
6
Foam Application - Nozzles
Functionality
Simultaneous
The foam system design should be based on the fire scenario
1.
Coverage
giving the most onerous demand on the foam system
(application
rate,
storage
capacity,
etc.).
Foam system design should be verified with Hydraulic
Analysis.
2.
Initiation - Remote
Manual
3.
Initiation - Local
Manual
4.
Foam Application
Rate
5.
Duration of
Application
(/storage
capacity)
6.
Response Time
7.
Foam Application
Rate
Initiation of foam should be possible from the HMI in the CCR
and normally involves energising the relevant application
valve solenoid with a 24volt signal.
All energise to operate signals shall be line monitored.
Initiation of foam application should be possible local to the
application devices from a position that is not vulnerable to
the fire to be tackled.
The foam system design and application rate shall be in line
with following Codes, as applicable:
-NFPA 11 (Ref.50), NFPA 16 (for foam sprinkler).
- BS EN 13565-1
- CAAP 71
Any discrepancy in the application rates shall be reviewed
and approved by GC Technical Authority.
Volume of foam storage required should be determined
based on Fire Hazard Assessment and the Fire Protection
Philosophy ( As per NFPA 11 (Ref. 50) minimum ).
Especially for full surface protection – fixed foam system
(tank) and manual intervention from outside the bund.
The time to fill the dry foam system pipework should be taken
into account to ensure it is not significant in relation to the
required response time for foam application.
The foam system design and application rate shall be in line
with following Codes, as applicable:
- NFPA 11 (Ref. 50)
Document No: AGES-PH-03-002 (Part 4)
Project Defined
Standard
(Description)
Code Defined
Key Properties
Company
8
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Rev. No: 01
Page 43 of 75
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Project Defined
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Code Defined
Standard
(Description)
Company
Key Properties
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8.
Foam:
Concentrate
The foam concentrate shall be selected in line with
requirements of:
- NFPA 11 (Ref. 50)
- LASTFIRE (Ref. 40)
9.
Foam:
Proportioning
Foam concentrate shall be diluted by proportioning devices
to produce a solution of the required concentration depending
on the type of concentrate used.
10.
Foam: Storage
quantity.
Foam storage shall be sufficient to tackle the fire for a period
specified in NFPA 11 (Ref. 50). The volume will depend on
the on the concentrate selected and the degree of dilution
permissible.
11.
Design Basis:
Foam requirements for Fixed roof storage tanks shall be as
recommended by NFPA 11
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Foam requirements for Floating Roof Tanks shall be based
on the project HSE Philosophy for the following fire types:
 P 
Fixed Roof
Storage Tank
12.
Design Basis:
Floating Roof
Storage Tank
Reliability / Availability
Maintenance
13.
14.
Material selection
15.
Quality of
hardware /
systems
Survivability
Fire & Explosion 16.
Foam Storage (&
Pumps if
installed)
-
Fire & Explosion Foam Supply
Pipework
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Rim Seal Fire (extinguishment) - NFPA 11 (Ref. 50)
If required: FSF protection (extinguishment) LASTFIRE
guidance (Ref. 40)

Equipment to be maintained in good working order with
performance verified at a pre-determined frequency.
Selection of material for foam system shall take account
compatibility in line with foam vendor recommendations and
chemical compatibility. This shall be documented and require
COMPANY approval.
All systems and hardware installed shall be UL Listed and
shall be approved by FM.
Foam storage and pumps (if installed) shall be located such
that they cannot be damaged by the fire they are intended
to give protection against.
This shall be demonstrated by FERA,
17.

The foam supply pipework should not be damaged by the
event it is intended to give protection against.
Document No: AGES-PH-03-002 (Part 4)
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Rev. No: 01
Page 44 of 75
The foam supply valves and proportioners should not be
damaged by the event it is intended to give protection
against.
Fire & Explosion - Instrument and power supply cabling that is critical for ... fire
19.
protection... shall be special fire-resistant cables in
accordance with IEC 60331-21 [Part 20]
Dependencies & Interactions (on other HSE Critical Measures)
F&G Detection
Interaction with this system should be treated as safety
20.
critical and the combined systems designed and tested
together to verify performance.
18.
Fire & Explosion Foam Valves
21.
UPS Power
Interaction with this system should be treated as safety
critical and the combined systems designed and tested
together to verify performance.
22.
Spill Containment
Contaminated firefighting media shall be contained in line
with local environmental legislation / constraints.
Document No: AGES-PH-03-002 (Part 4)
Project Defined
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Code Defined
Standard
(Description)
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Key Properties
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Rev. No: 01
Page 45 of 75
Code Defined
Standard
(Description)
Company
Key Properties
Project Defined
STANDARD – SPRINKLER
9
System Components (/Equipment)
1
Piping
2
Sprinkler Application – Control Valve (Alarm Check Valve)
3
Air Receiver - Air Supply
4
Sprinkler Application - Pipework
5
Sprinkler Application - Nozzles
6
Sprinkler Distribution (pipework & nozzles)
7
Dry Sprinkler Pipework
Functionality
1.
Simultaneous
Coverage/Design
Sprinkler system is considered inside building where
fires are expected to involve class A
material (cellulosic).
Sprinkler system shall design according to NFPA 13.
2.
Water Supplies
Water supplies shall be capable of providing the
required flow and pressure for the remote design area
determined using the requirements and procedures as
specified in NFPA 13, including hose stream allowance
where applicable for the required duration.
3.
Firewater Application
Rate
Rate & Duration selected by storage commodity using
NFPA13
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Reliability / Availability
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4.
Maintenance
A sprinkler system installed in accordance
with this standard shall be properly inspected, tested,
and maintained by the property owner or their
authorized representative in accordance with NFPA
25 to provide at least the same level of performance
and protection as designed.
5.
Quality of hardware /
systems
All systems and hardware installed shall be UL Listed
and shall be approved by FM.
P
Sprinkler Pipework
P
Survivability
6.
Fire & Explosion
Document No: AGES-PH-03-002 (Part 4)
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Rev. No: 01
Page 46 of 75
7.
Fire & Explosion
Sprinkler Valves
P
8.
Fire & Explosion
F&G signal cable
P
9.
Fire & Explosion -
Instrument and power supply cabling that is critical for
fire protection. shall be special fire-resistant cables in
accordance with IEC 60331-21 [Part 20]
Dependencies & Interactions (on other HSE Critical Measures)
10.
F&G Detection
Required signals for alarm purposes and information
as per NFPA shall be provided.
11.
Spill Containment
/Drainage
Drainage: Within buildings, designs shall incorporate
drainage of fire water sprinkler and hose reel systems,
provisions shall also be made for routine system
testing.
Document No: AGES-PH-03-002 (Part 4)
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Project Defined
Code Defined
Standard
(Description)
Company
Key Properties
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Page 47 of 75
Standard
(Description)
Company
Key Properties
Project Defined
STANDARD - WATER MIST (SELF-CONTAINED)
Code Defined
10
System Components (/Equipment)
1
Propellant Cylinders *
2
Water Containers *
3
Distribution pipework
4
Fire Department Connection
5
Standpipe *
6
Pumps *
7
Fittings
8
Valves
9
Discharge nozzles
10
Discharge Switches (local - exit)
11
Discharge inhibit switch
12
Water Mist Control System
Functionality
Single or Twin fluid
1.
system Selection
Choice of Single fluid [water] or Two fluid [water and gas]
2.
Water supply
selection
Choice of 1 Waterworks 2 Elevated Tank 3 NFPA22 tank 4
Stored water plus NFPA 20 (Ref. 51) pump
3.
Water Quality
selection
Water mist systems [in accommodation blocks] shall be fed
with fresh water. Backup water supplies ... should be
available from the firewater main. [IOC B]
4.
Water Quality
selection
Potable water or natural seawater (with permitted
additives)
in
occupied
areas.
Demineralized water required if nozzles <51 micron
5.
System Coverage
Choice of 1 Local 2 Compartment 3 Compartment zone
6.
Gas Selection *
Refer to NFPA 2001 (Ref. 65) and NFPA 750 (Ref. 62) for
the design and installation of the water mist
systems if this system is required by the fire safety
assessment.
7.
Gas Selection *
Air is presumed supply but elsewhere in text N2 is
mentioned.
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Document No: AGES-PH-03-002 (Part 4)
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Rev. No: 01
Page 48 of 75
Gas supply selection
Plant Air and Air Compressors mentioned in text.
No explicit source requirements, other than Atomizing
media essential to the production of water mist shall be
taken from a dedicated source."
9.
Propellant/Atomising
Media Quantity
(Primary) *
The minimum quantities of water, water additives in listed
concentrations (if used), and atomizing media (if used)
shall be capable of supplying the largest single hazard or
group of hazards to be protected simultaneously.
10. Propellant/Atomising
Media Quantity
(Reserve) *
A reserve supply shall be provided where the extinguishing
agent expellant gas or atomizing media cannot other‐ wise
be replaced within 24 hours following system operation.
11. Controller
NFPA72
12. Initiation (manual local)
see above
13. Initiation (automatic local)
see above
14. Initiation (remote ICSS)
No comment
15. Monitoring (remote ICSS)
No comment
16. Time Delay
Where time delays are provided, audible and visual signals
shall be provided throughout the protected space.
17. Response Time
Calculate maximum time delay to most remote nozzle
18. Ventilation
Natural and forced ventilation shall be addressed in the
design
and
installation
of
the
system
In some cases, consideration shall be given to shut‐ ting
down the forced ventilation prior to mist system activation.
19. Pre-discharge alarm
(audio & visual)
Alarms shall be provided to indicate system waterflow and
system trouble.
20. Abort Switch (if
provided)
For systems using abort switches, the switches shall be
confirmed to be of the dead-man type that necessitates
constant manual pressure, properly installed, accessible
within the hazard area, and clearly identified.
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Reliability / Availability
21. Failure of Supervised
Device
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Alarms shall be provided to indicate system waterflow and
system trouble.
Document No: AGES-PH-03-002 (Part 4)
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8.
Code Defined
Standard
(Description)
Company
Key Properties
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Rev. No: 01
Page 49 of 75
Storage containers and accessories shall be installed so
that inspection, testing, recharging, and other maintenance
are facilitated
23. Material selection
Selection of material for specific duty. This shall be
documented and require COMPANY approval.
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24. Quality of hardware /
systems
All systems and hardware installed shall be UL Listed and
shall be approved by FM.
P
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Instrument and power supply cabling that is critical for ...
fire protection... shall be special fire-resistant cables in
accordance with IEC 60331-21 [Part 20]
P
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25. Fire & Explosion -
26. Fire & Explosion -
Power supply for the pump not on same switch as the
equipment
being
protected.
Storage containers shall not be exposed to fire or
mechanical damage in a manner that affects performance.
27. Harsh conditions
(weather, chemical,
etc.)
The storage container arrangement shall be protected
against harsh environments (weather, chemical, etc.)

Survivability
Dependencies & Interactions (on other HSE Critical Measures)
28. ICSS (F&G and ESD
Systems)
All devices for shutting down supplementary equipment or
interface with other systems, necessary for effective
operation of the water mist system, such as fuel shutoff and
ventilation shutoff, shall be considered integral parts of the
system and shall function with the system operation unless
specifically permitted by the listing.
29. Telecoms (plantwide
alarms)
No comment
30. EDG Power
Approved primary and 24-hour minimum standby sources
of energy shall be used to provide for the operation of the
detection, signalling, control, and actuation requirements of
the system.
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Document No: AGES-PH-03-002 (Part 4)
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22. Maintenance
Code Defined
Standard
(Description)
Company
Key Properties
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Rev. No: 01
Page 50 of 75
Standard
(Description)
Company
Key Properties
Project Defined
STANDARD - GASEOUS EXTINGUISHANT
Code Defined
11
System Components (/Equipment)
1
Clean Agent Cylinders
2
Local distribution pipe & joints
3
Fittings
4
Valves
5
Discharge nozzles
6
Discharge Switches (local - exit)
7
Pre-discharge alarm (audio & visual)
8
Discharge inhibit switch
9
Clean Agent Sequence Control System
Functionality

1.
Clean Agent
Selection (one type
only)
Only one type of clean agent shall be selected for a
given space to be protected.
2.
Clean Agent
Selection (based on
protection
mechanism)
Clean agent shall be selected based on fire protection
mechanism to be adopted (i.e., to 'extinguish' or to 'inert
the atmosphere') and shall be from an approved list.
3.
Clean Agent
Selection
(Environmental
Impact)
Clean Agent shall be selected to be environment friendly
taking note of potential adverse impact on Ozone
depletion, global warming and atmospheric lifetime,
etc.
4.
Clean Agent
Quantity (Primary)
Clean Agent quantity shall be sufficient to protect the
largest fire in the space to be protected.
5.
Clean Agent
Quantity (Reserve)
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Gas suppression system (Inert Gas System) shall
be supplied as 100% main & 100% standby
cylinders with agent filled fitted with all systems
and shall be connected to the piping.
The Main & standby system shall be
interchangeable with easy change over, localised
switch at each area protected.
Document No: AGES-PH-03-002 (Part 4)
Rev. No: 01
Page 51 of 75
If multiple hazards exists in same proximity, the
gas suppression system can be designed for
multiple rooms with directional valves. The agent
quantity can be designed for single largest fire
scenario.

6.
Application Rate (to
Extinguish)
Application rate for 'extinguishment' objective shall be
determined based on the fuel for the fire and shall
include the appropriate minimum Safety Factor from the
applicable Code.
7.
Application Rate (to
Inert)
Application rate if the objective is 'inerting' shall be
based on a concentration determined by testing to
ensure subsequent re-flash, or explosion are avoided.
An appropriate safety factor shall be added to this
application rate, as required by the applicable code.
8.
Controller
Clean agent release controller shall be a dedicated
device to the space it is intended to protect, and shall
comply with requirements of the applicable code.
9.
Initiation (manual local)
It shall be possible to initiate the Clean Agent release
sequence by local pushbutton at each exit from the
protected space.
10.
Initiation (automatic
- local)
The system shall be configured to initiate clean agent
release sequence automatically upon detection of
fire/smoke signal from devices placed within the space
to be protected.
11.
Initiation (remote ICSS)
The clean agent controller shall be capable of being
interfaced with the remote plant F&G /ICSS /manual
pushbutton to initiate clean agent release sequence.
P
12.
Monitoring (remote
- ICSS)
The system shall be capable of being configured to
allow remote monitoring of system condition via the
ICSS (Integrated Control & Safety System)
P
13.
Time Delay
A time delay after detection and alarm shall be included
to ensure there is sufficient time for personnel to
evacuate before discharge.
14.
Time Delay (only
for personnel
safety)
Time delay shall only be used for safety of personnel,
and not for any other purpose (e.g. investigation of
incident)
Document No: AGES-PH-03-002 (Part 4)
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Code Defined
Standard
(Description)
Company
Key Properties
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Rev. No: 01
Page 52 of 75
15.
Response Time
The response time for 'extinguishment' shall depend on
the clean agent being used (halocarbon or inert gas).
The discharge rate shall ensure the minimum discharge
concentration (with the appropriate safety factor) is
achieved within the time specified in the applicable
Code.
16.
Duration of
Protection
As per NFPA 2001.
17.
Ventilation (clean
agent escape)
System design shall ensure the degree of ventilation of
the room is taken into account when determining the
system capacity and flow. If the sizing is dependent on
shutdown of ventilation systems then such shutdown
action shall be treated as critical to the functioning of the
system and shall be performed before the clean agent
is released).
18.
Pre-discharge
alarm (audio &
visual)
Audio /Visual or both types of alarm shall be used to
separately indicate the following conditions:
- Hazard to personnel
- Clean Agent Operated
- Failure of a 'supervised' device/ component
19.
Abort Switch (if
provided)
If an 'Abort Switch' is provided, it shall meet all the
following conditions:
- Located within the space being protected
- Located near the egress point(s) for the area
- Type to require constant pressure to Abort
- Can be overridden by normal Manual Control or
Manual Emergency Control
- Distinct separate indication of system impairment
- Clearly recognisable
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Reliability / Availability

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20.
Failure of
Supervised Device
Failure of supervised devices shall be promptly
revealed with a positive indication that is distinctive
from:
- Operation Mode
- Hazardous Condition
21.
Maintenance
A high integrity facility shall be provided to prevent
'unwanted system operation' so that maintenance can
be carried out within the space protected.
22.
Material selection
Selection of material for specific duty. This shall be
documented and require COMPANY approval.
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Page 53 of 75
Survivability
23.
Fire & Explosion -
If a facility is provided to initiate Clean Agent release
remotely from the F&G / ICSS /Manual Pushbutton, then
the following key components shall not be damaged by
the initiating event that the clean agent is intended to
protect:
- 24volts signal from F&G system to control interface.
- key clean agent system components (including
cylinders, initiating mechanism, piping, nozzles, etc.).
24.
Harsh conditions
(weather, chemical,
etc.)
The storage container arrangement shall be protected
against harsh environments (weather, chemical, etc.)
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Dependencies & Interactions
(on other HSE Critical Measures)
25.
ICSS (F&G and
ESD Systems)
The Clean Agent Control System should have a facility
for interfacing with the overall site F&G /ICSS and, if
required, should be able to perform local executive
actions if triggered by remote initiation.
P
26.
Telecoms
(plantwide alarms)
The Clean Agent Controller should be capable of
interfacing with the telecoms system to initiate plantwide
alarms if required by the Project Safety Philosophy.
P
27.
UPS Power
The clean agent shall be powered from a secure power
source.
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Standard
(Description)
Company
Key Properties
Project Defined
STANDARD - WET CHEMICAL
Code Defined
12
System Components (/Equipment)
1
Fire Detectors
2
Discharge Nozzles
3
Operating Devices
4
Manual Actuators
5
Shutoff Devices
6
Pipes and Fittings, Tubing, Hose
7
Wet Chemical
8
Electrical Wiring and Equipment
9
Indicators
10
Assembly
Functionality
1.
Discharge Nozzles
All discharge nozzles shall be provided with
caps to prevent entrance of grease vapours,
etc.
2.
Safety shut off Devices
On actuation of any cooking equipment fire
extinguishing system all sources of fuel and
electric power that produce heat to all
equipment protected by system shall be shut
down.
3.
Safety shut off - Gas
appliances
Gas appliances not requiring protection but
located under the same ventilation equipment
shall also be shut off.
4.
Safety shut off Expellant gas
If an expellant gas is used to pneumatically
operate these devices, the gas connection shall
be prior to entry into the wet chemical tank.
5.
Safety shut off - Manual
reset
Shutoff devices shall require manual resetting
prior to fuel or power being restored.
6.
Safety shut off - Hood
exhaust fans
A hood exhaust fan shall continue to operate
after the extinguishing system has been
activated unless fan shutdown is required by a
listed component of the extinguishing system.
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7.
Safety shut off - Makeup air
When the fire-extinguishing system activates,
make-up air supplied internally to the hood shall
be shut off.
8.
Wet Chemical
Wet chemical used shall be listed for particular
system, and system manufacturer shall be
required to specify the chemical in the
manufacturer's
design,
installation
and
maintenance manual.
9.
Wet Chemical
Wet chemical solutions of different formulations
or different manufacturers shall not be mixed.
10.
Wet Chemical
Wet chemical systems shall be provided with an
audible or visual indicator to show that the
system is in a ready condition or is in need of
recharging.
11.
System Actuation
All systems shall have both automatic, and
manual methods of actuation (separate from
each other)
12.
Alarm
The extinguishing system shall be connected to
the fire alarm system, if provided, in accordance
with requirements of NFPA 72 so that actuation
of the extinguishing system will sound the fire
alarm.
13.
System Actuation Manual
At least one manual actuation device shall be
located in in a means of egress or location
acceptable to the authority having jurisdiction.
14.
System Actuation Manual
At least one manual actuation device shall be
located in accordance with NFPA 96 or as
directed by the authority having jurisdiction
15.
System Actuation Manual
Automatic systems protecting only common
exhaust ducts shall not require a manual
actuator.
16.
System Actuation Manual
The means of manual actuation shall be
mechanical and shall not rely on electrical
power for actuation.
17.
Supervision
Where electrical power is required to operate
the fixed automatic fire extinguishing system,
the system shall be monitored by supervisory
alarm with a reserve power supply provided.
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18.
System Location
Wet chemical containers and expellant
assemblies shall be located within
temperature
range
specified
in
manufacturer's
design,
installation
maintenance manual.
19.
Discharge Nozzles
Shall be located
misalignment.
20.
Protection of common
exhaust hoods
Protect common exhaust ducts by, either:
Simultaneous operation of all independent
hood, duct and appliance protection systems
- Any hood, duct and appliance protection
system protecting the entire common exhaust
duct.
21.
Fire Detection - Fusible
link
A fusible link or other mechanically operated
heat detection device from the common duct
fire extinguishing system shall be located at
each branch duct to common duct connection
where electrical operation of the common duct
fire extinguishing system does not meet the
requirements of Section 5.3.1 of NFPA 17A
to
avoid
damage
gas
the
the
and
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or
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Reliability / Availability
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22.
Owner's Inspection
Inspection shall be conducted in accordance
with Section 7.2.2 of NFPA 17A on a monthly
basis.
23.
Maintenance replacement parts
System components shall be selected from
manufacturer's reference list shall be used.
24.
Maintenance replacement parts
Used components shall not be permitted unless
approved by authority having jurisdiction.
25.
Recharging
As per NFPA 17A
26.
Hydrostatic Testing
As per NFPA 17A
27.
Quality of hardware /
systems
All systems and hardware installed shall be UL
Listed and shall be approved by FM.
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Survivability
28.
Location
P
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All operating devices shall be designed, located
and installed, or protected to that they are not
subject to mechanical, environmental or other
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conditions that could render them inoperative or
cause inadvertent operation of the system.
Dependencies & Interactions
(on other HSE Critical Measures)
29.
F&G System
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Rev. No: 01
Page 58 of 75
Standard
(Description)
Company
Key Properties
Project Defined
STANDARD - PORTABLE FIRE EXTINGUISHERS
Code Defined
13
System Components (/Equipment)
1
Portable extinguishers
2
Wheeled extinguishers
Functionality

1.
Extinguishers
selection
specific to
class(es) of fire
hazard
Fire extinguishers shall be selected for the class(es) of
hazards to be protected (A, B, C, D, K)
2.
Class A fire
hazard
Fires in ordinary combustible materials,
wood, cloth, paper, rubber, and many plastics.
3.
Class B fire
hazard
Fires in flammable liquids, combustible liquids, petroleum
greases, tars, oils, oil-based paints, solvents, lacquers,
alcohols, and flammable gases.
4.
Class C fire
hazard
Fires that involve energized electrical equipment.
5.
Class D fire
hazard
Fires in combustible metals, such as magnesium, titanium,
zirconium, sodium, lithium, and potassium.
6.
Class K fire
hazard
Fires in cooking appliances that involve combustible
cooking media (vegetable or animal oils and fats).
7.
Extinguisher for
specific Class D
fire hazard
Fire extinguishers for protecting Class D hazards shall be
selected from types that are specifically listed and labelled
for use on the specific combustible metal hazard.
8.
Extinguisher
function
Each fire extinguisher shall be marked with the following:
(1) Identification of the listing and labelling organization (2)
Product category indicating the type of extinguisher (3)
Extinguisher classification
(4) Performance and fire test standards that the
extinguisher meets or exceeds
9.
Extinguishers
approval
All extinguishers shall be manufactured, approved and
tested with UL or FM.
10.
Extinguishers
approval
Portable fire extinguishers used to comply with this
standard shall be listed and labelled and shall meet or
exceed all the requirements of one of the fire test standards
such
as
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Rev. No: 01
Page 59 of 75
and one of the performance standards [in NFPA10 Para
4.1.1]
11.
Portable
extinguishers
Capacity by A, B
'Unit'
Fire extinguishers classified for use on Class A or
Class B hazards shall be required to have a rating number
preceding the classification letter that indicates the relative
extinguishing effectiveness.
12.
Portable
extinguishers
Discharge time
Discharge times of carried portable extinguishers are
typically 30sec to 3mins depending on size chosen.
Reliability / Availability
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13.
Ease of finding
an extinguisher
Fire extinguishers shall be conspicuously located where
they will be readily accessible and immediately available in
the event of fire.
14.
Class A
extinguisher
proximity in
buildings
The travel distance to extinguishers located in offices and
stores, etc. Shall not exceed a distance of 30 m. Work
benches in laboratories shall each be provided with a small
extinguisher. Analyzer buildings, gas metering stations and
warehouses with chemical storage, shall have two
extinguishers positioned at each entrance together with
other extinguishers when applicable, centrally located at a
travel distance not exceeding 20 m.
P
15.
Quality of
hardware /
systems
All systems and hardware installed shall be UL Listed and
shall be approved by FM.

Survivability

16.
Maintenance
Portable fire extinguishers shall be maintained in a fully
charged and operable condition and shall be kept in their
designated places at all times when they are not being
used.
17.
Protect from
damage
Outdoor extinguishers shall be stored inside posted
reinforced fiberglass boxes. Outdoor wheeled extinguishers
shall be protected from direct weather conditions by means
of shelters or heavy-duty wrappers.
18.
Protect from
damage
Fire extinguishers installed under conditions or in locations
where they are subject to physical damage (e.g., from
impact, vibration, the environment) shall be protected
against such damage.
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Page 60 of 75
Use
Designated employees of business occupancies shall be
periodically instructed in the use of portable fire
extinguishers.
Document No: AGES-PH-03-002 (Part 4)
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19.
Code Defined
Standard
(Description)
Company
Key Properties
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Page 61 of 75
14
JETTY & TERMINALS
Jetty Terminals
The jetty shall be equipped with fixed fire protection and fire-fighting systems. The firewater network shall be
a closed loop network; this shall be provided with Hydrant cum Monitors at 50 m intervals. The hydrant cum
Monitor and spray system should be supplied with separate connection with water source from main fire water
header.
Each firewater pipeline shall be provided with a bucket-type strainer.
The separate firewater supply lines shall be interconnected near the jetty head and at main header
terminations. Interconnections shall be equipped with block valves.
a. Isolating block valves shall close without causing high surge pressures.
b. Isolation block valves shall be operable from the jetty control room, from the jetty approach on shore
and in the Dispatch Control Room.
c.
Isolation block valves shall be located at a safe distance from the jetty head.
d. Where valves are not directly accessible, or where operation is required from more than one position,
the valves shall be fitted with remote control from a safe area.
e. For LNG loading installations, all valves shall have remote control.
Fire protection facilities shall be provided for the jetty, equipment, piping and structures or a ship at berth,
consisting of the following:
a. Water Monitors

To protect the ship's manifold.

To protect the gangway of the ship to provide an escape route for the crew.

To provide a water curtain between ship and jetty.

To cool equipment and structures in the event of a fire.
b. Jetty facilities need only provide assistance to the ship at berth, when requested by the master of the
ship or his representative. Assistance shall consist of, but not be limited to:
c.

Providing the ship with water and/or foam by fire hoses from hydrants.

Coverage of the ship's deck and the surrounding water with a foam blanket.

Cooling of the ship's manifold and provision of cover for the ship's crew, e.g. when
disconnecting hoses or loading arms.

Coverage of the escape route for the ship's crew.
Hose connections shall be provided for use by fire fighting vehicles at the jetty approach. Two fourway water hydrants shall be provided for use by fire fighting vehicles to back-up the fixed jetty
systems. Hydrants shall be located at the firefighting vehicle parking space.
Document No: AGES-PH-03-002 (Part 4)
Rev. No: 01
Page 62 of 75
d.
Parking space for two fire fighting vehicles and one foam compound carrier shall be provided on
shore at the approach to the jetty.
e. All product lines running to a jetty or wharf shall be provided with isolating valves at an accessible
location to minimize the free flow of products at the outbreak of a fire. Isolating valves operated by
an emergency shutdown system shall be designed to close automatically, initiated by the fire
detection system.
Document No: AGES-PH-03-002 (Part 4)
Rev. No: 01
Page 63 of 75
15
STANDARD - BUILDINGS
15.1 General
Buildings shall be designed to the UAE Fire and Life Safety Code (substantially based on NFPA 101). A
building is defined as “any structure used or intended for supporting or sheltering any use or occupancy”.
OFFSHORE, occupied enclosures shall be designed to SOLAS, which covers the similar issues as a building
code.
Building codes aim to provide an environment for the occupants that is reasonably safe from fire by protection
of occupants not aware of initial fire development and by improvement of the survivability of occupants aware
of initial fire development. The codes address fire hazards within a building and the potential spread of a fire
within the building to other parts of the same building; therefore codes make provision to split buildings up
into ‘zones’ for the purposes of fire and smoke compartmentalisation, fire detection and protection, fire alarm
annunciation, notification and evacuation signalling.
In addition, buildings on process facilities may need to be designed based on FERA against external hazards
of fire, explosion overpressure and missile damage, and ingress of smoke or toxic or otherwise harmful
substances. The requirements for the building to be gas tight, and fire and explosion resistant shall be
determined by Building Risk Assessment (BRA) according to API 752, after layout has placed these buildings
as far away from such hazards as practicable. Any building or part of a building designated as a temporary
refuge is likely to need to meet more stringent standards.
A checklist of the most significant safety issues is included in Section 15.5, but in all cases the Fire Code and
COMPANY standards shall be higher precedence.
15.2 Passive Fire Protection
Industrial buildings shall be of the most suitable type allowed by the Fire code, which should mean that load
bearing walls (both internal and external) and other structurally critical elements will have a fire rating to
maintain their structural strength. Structural integrity needs to be maintained for the time needed to evacuate,
relocate, or defend in place, any occupants who are not aware of the initial fire development.
Buildings are divided into one or more three-dimensional fire compartments due to fire hazards contained
within the building, or because the building has multiple uses or for other reasons given in the code. These
fire compartments shall have fire rating requirements to prevent spread of fire which must also be met.
Openings such as doors and windows shall have a required fire rating and penetrations through walls and
false floors and ceilings shall be designed so as not to compromise the fire resistance. The code may also
specify smoke compartment subdivisions to prevent spread of smoke.
The code requires escape route corridors to constitute a separate fire compartment. The code also specifies
that there shall always be more than one way of exiting a building from any point except under limited allowed
parameters and specifies the maximum travel distance to an exit, which can often be longer if sprinkler
systems are fitted.
External walls (and roofs) may also be required to have a fire rating because of external fire hazards, and
these ratings may need to cater for hydrocarbon jet fire and pool fire for which standards over and above
building code may be required. The specification for this shall be determined by a Building Risk Assessment
(BRA, FERA and QRA).
Document No: AGES-PH-03-002 (Part 4)
Rev. No: 01
Page 64 of 75
External hazards may also include explosion overpressure so that the BRA may specify walls as blast walls
to a specific overpressure and pressure impulse. Offshore SOLAS requirement and Building Risk
Assessment to be applied
15.3 Active Fire Protection
All buildings require a minimum provision of portable extinguishers suitable for cellulosic (class A) fires
regardless of occupation. Depending on the presence of other hazards, other types of portable extinguisher
may be required by code.
The UAE Fire Code will also often require the provision of fire water standpipes for hoses and sprinkler
systems and in the code may specify automatic sprinkler activation. Other hazards within buildings (e.g. HV
transformers) should have an appropriate firefighting system designed to NFPA codes provided within that
fire compartment to deal with that hazard, as required by the fire safety assessment or the building code.
Generally, provision for firefighting a building from the outside should be provided by a fire water ring main
and monitors or hydrants with hoses and fire brigade vehicles. There shall also be a connection to enable a
fire brigade to provide water into any building fire water standpipes.
15.4 Fire & Gas
All buildings need to comply with the UAE Fire and Life Safety Code regarding provision of fire and smoke
detection, alarm and response. Each separate fire or smoke compartment shall have smoke detectors and
other detector types as appropriate to the hazards within the building, which shall include provision as
necessary within false floor and ceiling volumes. HVAC systems designed to NFPA 90 may be used to
pressurise certain fire compartments to mitigate fire hazards and control fire spread.
All occupied buildings shall be equipped with an addressable Fire alarm panel (FAP) in compliance with NFPA
72, along with addressable fire detectors and addressable audio / visual alarms connected to it. The Fire
alarm panels shall provide common fire alarm and system fault outputs. The FAP shall also activate
appropriate automatic spray system as applicable and other firefighting systems, as well as close appropriate
fire or smoke dampers in any HVAC system and operate ventilation openings provided to release smoke from
the building. Sprinkler fusible plug / bulb will activate based on the room temperature rise and alarm check
valve will operate accordingly to provide the required demand. F&G System will receive water flow alarm in
panel and notification alarm in the building
External smoke or gas hazards may be identified by the BRA and this may specify that the building external
walls and roofs should be gas tight, in which case all ventilation within the building is forced ventilation from
one or more HVAC systems. This will mean that HVAC air inlets shall be fitted with gas detectors appropriate
to the external hazard, so that on detection, inlet dampers can be shut and the building run on a separate air
supply. BRA shall determine the time duration required for the building to maintain a safe atmosphere. Gas
tight building access points shall be double door air locks and the building occupied volume held at a slight
positive pressure. Buildings at process facilities should be integrated with the main facility F&G system.
Document No: AGES-PH-03-002 (Part 4)
Rev. No: 01
Page 65 of 75
Code Defined
Standard
(Description)
Company
Key Properties
Project Defined
15.5 Standard (/Checklist)
System Components (/Equipment)
1
Building walls (& roof)
2
Fire Partitions (compartmentalisation)
3
Fire Walls
4
Egress Facilities (incl. Fire Exits)
5
HVAC System
6
Fire Dampers
7
Smoke, Fire & Gas Detection
8
Alarm, and Communications Systems
9
Sprinkler System
Functionality
P
1.
Fire Protection
and detection
devices
Fire protection and detection system / devices/ components
to be fitted as per UAE Fire & Life Safety Code
2.
Detection zones
Buildings shall be divided into a number of detection zones
for easy recognition and short search time.
3.
F&G detector
layouts
F&G detector layouts shall be produced and approved by
COMPANY
P
4.
HSSD
High sensitivity smoke detectors shall be used in rooms with
high density of electrical wiring
P
5.
Occupant
Notification
Occupant notification shall be provided to alert occupants
of a fire or other emergency where required by the
applicable Code.
6.
Smoke barriers
Where required by code, smoke barriers shall be provided
to subdivide building spaces for the purpose of restricting
the movement of smoke.
7.
Floors
Every
floor
that
separates
stories
building shall be constructed as a smoke barrier
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Smoke barriers
continuity
Smoke barriers required shall be continuous from an
outside wall to an outside wall, from a floor to a floor, or from
a smoke barrier to a smoke barrier, or by use of a
combination
thereof.
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8.
Code Defined
Standard
(Description)
Company
Key Properties

Smoke barriers required shall be continuous through all
concealed spaces, such as those found above a ceiling,
including interstitial spaces; [unless alternatively] the
construction assembly forming the bottom of the interstitial
space provides resistance to the passage of smoke equal
to that provided by the smoke barrier.

9.
Smoke barrier
penetrations
Penetrations for cables, cable trays, conduits, pipes, tubes,
vents, wires, and similar items to accommodate electrical,
mechanical, plumbing, and communications systems that
pass through a wall, floor, or floor/ceiling assembly
constructed as a smoke barrier, or through the ceiling
membrane of the roof/ceiling of a smoke barrier assembly,
shall be protected by a system or material capable of
restricting the transfer of smoke.
10.
Smoke dampers
Where a smoke barrier is penetrated by a duct or airtransfer opening, a smoke damper designed and tested in
accordance with the requirements of ANSI/UL 555S,
Standard for Smoke Dampers, shall be installed.
[also to comply with ANSI/UL 555, Standard for Fire
Dampers if the smoke barrier is also a fire barrier]
11.
Smoke & Fire
Detection
Smoke, Carbon Monoxide and Heat detectors shall be
provided throughout a building as in the UAE Fire Code
12.
Building air inlet
locations
Buildings shall take their air intakes from a non-zoned area.
P
13.
Gas Resistant
Buildings shall be resistant to the ingress of flammable,
toxic or otherwise harmful gases as required by QRA, FERA
and Building Risk Assessment.
P
14.
Building
entrances
Building entrances shall be resistant to ingress of
flammable, toxic or otherwise harmful gases as required by
QRA, FERA and Building Risk Assessment. Air lock
designs shall be considered for inclusion.
P
15.
Building air inlet
dampers
Buildings air intakes shall have dampers that close against
the ingress of flammable, toxic or otherwise harmful gases
as required by QRA, FERA and Building Risk Assessment.
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16.
Toxic gas
detection
Buildings shall have detectors for flammable, toxic or
otherwise harmful gases emanating from processes outside
the building as required by QRA, FERA and Building Risk
Assessment.
17.
Fire wall ratings
For Offshore facilities continuous membrane or a
membrane with discontinuities created by protected
openings with a minimum of 1-hour fire protection rating,
where such membrane is designed and constructed to limit
the spread of fire. Fire barriers are to be continuous from
floor to underside of the floor above or fire rated ceiling and
from the inside face of exterior to another exterior wall or
other fire barrier with equal or greater fire rating
18.
Internal Fire
Walls
Walls used as fire barriers shall comply with NFPA 221.
19.
Fire Walls
continuity
Fire walls shall subdivide the buildings to prevent spread of
fire and have a fire resistance rating and structural stability
20.
Fire wall
openings (doors,
windows)
The fire rating for opening protectives in fire barriers, fire
rated smoke barriers, and fire-rated smoke partitions shall
be in accordance with Applicable Code.
21.
Fire wall
openings listing
Fire protection ratings for products shall be as determined
and reported by a nationally recognized testing agency
22.
Fire wall
penetrations
Penetrations for cables, cable trays, conduits, pipes, tubes,
combustion vents and exhaust vents, wires, and similar
items to accommodate electrical, mechanical, plumbing,
and communications systems that pass through a wall,
floor, or floor/ceiling assembly constructed as
a fire barrier shall be protected by a firestop system or
device.
23.
Fire walls
external
extension
Fire walls shall extend outside the external wall to prevent
internal spread of fire in accordance with NFPA 221
24.
Building interior
finish
Building interior finish and internal furnishings shall comply
with Code requirements
25.
Battery room
Shall be well ventilated to avoid the build-up of hydrogen
gas
26.
Air conditioning
plant room
Shall be minimum 1hour fire rated
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Rev. No: 01
Page 68 of 75
Air Handling
Unit Room
Shall be minimum 1hour fire rated
28.
Boiler room
Shall be minimum 1hour fire rated with automatic fixed fire
protection system, 2 hours without automatic fixed fire
protection system
29.
Electrical room
Shall be minimum 1hour fire rated
30.
Emergency
command centre
Shall be minimum 1hour fire rated with automatic fixed fire
protection system, 2 hours without automatic fixed fire
protection system
31.
Emergency
Lighting/Battery
room/UPS room
Shall be minimum 1hour fire rated with automatic fixed fire
protection system, 2 hours without automatic fixed fire
protection system
32.
Fire pump room
Shall be minimum 2hour fire rated
33.
Laboratories
Shall be minimum 1hour fire rated with automatic fixed fire
protection system, 2 hours without automatic fixed fire
protection system
34.
Low Voltage
switch room
Shall be minimum 2hour fire rated
35.
Maintenance
workshops
Shall be minimum 1hour fire rated with automatic fixed fire
protection system, 2 hours without automatic fixed fire
protection system
36.
Oil tank room
Shall be minimum 1hour fire rated with automatic fixed fire
protection system, 2 hours without automatic fixed fire
protection system
37.
Telephone room
Shall be minimum 1hour fire rated
38.
Transformer
room / HV
switch room
Shall be minimum 2hour fire rated
39.
Fire suppression
room
Rooms with fire suppressant gas shall be housed in a
separate room with 2hour fire rating
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Code Defined
Standard
(Description)
Company
Key Properties
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Rev. No: 01
Page 69 of 75
Number of
Means of egress
Two means of egress, as a minimum, shall be provided in
every building or structure, section, and area where size,
occupancy, and arrangement endanger occupants
attempting to use a single means of egress that is blocked
by
fire
or
smoke.
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40.
Code Defined
Standard
(Description)
Company
Key Properties
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The two means of egress shall be arranged to minimize the
possibility that both might be rendered impassable by the
same emergency condition. [Code specifies where one
egress is allowed]
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41.
Maximum Travel
distances to exit
Travel distance shall not exceed the distance given in UAE
Fire Code Table 3.16
42.
High hazard
travel distance
Where the contents are classified as high hazard, exits shall
be provided and arranged to allow all occupants to escape
from the building or structure, or from the hazardous area
thereof, to the outside or to a place of safety with a travel
distance of not more than 23m
43.
Inner rooms
Exit access from rooms or spaces shall be permitted to be
through adjoining or intervening rooms or areas, provided
that such rooms or areas are accessory to the area served.
Foyers, lobbies, and reception rooms constructed as
required for corridors shall not be construed as intervening
rooms. Exit access shall be arranged so that it is not
necessary to pass through any area identified under
Protection from Hazards in [the applicable code]
44.
Common Path
of Travel
The portion of exit access that must be traversed before two
separate and distinct paths of travel to two exits are
available.
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Where a single common exit is allowed Common Path of
Travel shall not exceed the distances in UAE Fire Code
Table 3.16
45.
Safety signs
layouts
Means of egress shall be marked in accordance with [the
applicable code]
46.
Dead ends
Exit access shall be arranged such that there are no dead
ends; or dead ends are within allowable length in UAE Fire
Code Table 3.16
47.
Fire Door
Opening
The door assembly shall be readily operable from the
egress side without special knowledge or effort.
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Rev. No: 01
Page 70 of 75
48.
Access control
systems
Access control systems shall not prevent egress from a
building in an emergency
49.
Evacuation
route layouts
Floor evacuation plans/diagrams reflecting the actual floor
arrangement, exit locations and directional arrows to such
emergency exits shall be posted.
50.
Building
Occupancy
Hazards
[Building] Occupancy hazard protection shall be provided
by fire extinguishers suitable for such Class A, B, C, D, or
K fire potentials as might be present.
51.
Extinguishers
are required for
buildings alone
Required building protection shall be
by fire extinguishers suitable for Class A fires.
52.
Portable
extinguishers
required
Fire extinguishers are required for buildings regardless of
the occupancy or fixed firewater systems or any other fixed
firefighting systems
53.
Fire water
requirement
Details of the code will determine if a fire water system is
required due to the need for sprinklers or hoses in the code.
54.
Fire Department
Connection
A breeching inlet shall be provided for the building active
systems.
55.
Fire water
supply
Private fire service mains shall be installed in accordance
with NFPA 24
56.
Fire water
supply pumps
Where provided, fire pumps shall be installed in accordance
with NFPA 20 (Ref. 51).
57.
Standpipes
Where required by code, standpipe systems shall be
installed in accordance with NFPA 14
58.
Fire hose &
cabinet
A 25 mm or 40 mm diameter instantaneous water outlet with
a connected hose for trained occupants or Civil Defence fire
fighters to use during fire.
59.
Fire hose &
cabinet
Fire Hose Cabinets (Hose Stations) complying to UAE Fire
Code Chapter 9, shall be available in all buildings for Fire
Fighters.
60.
Sprinklers
Where required by code, sprinkler systems shall be
installed in accordance with NFPA 13
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Standard
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Rev. No: 01
Page 71 of 75
Fire
Suppression
systems
In any occupancy where the character of the fuel for fire is
such that extinguishment or control of fire is accomplished
by a type of automatic extinguishing system in lieu of an
automatic sprinkler system, such extinguishing system shall
be installed in accordance with the applicable NFPA
standard
62.
Safety and fire
equipment
layouts
Code drawings shall be submitted to Civil Defence for
approval
63.
Code drawings
code drawings are to be submitted to Civil Defence for
approval
64.
Self-closing
doors
Fire doors between fire compartments shall be self-closing
type
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Reliability / Availability
65.
Maintenance
All building related safety devices systems shall be
inspected and maintained in good working order.
66.
Fire alarm
control panel
power
At least two power supply sources shall be provided for any
Fire Detection and Alarm System, one primary and one
secondary, fully supervised by FACP for failure,
loss of power, trouble, short circuit conditions.
67.
Quality of
hardware /
systems
All systems and hardware installed shall be UL Listed and
shall be approved by FM.
Survivability
68.
External
hazards
Buildings which are normally occupied shall protect their
occupants against the consequences of the hazards
identified by the analysis recommended to an extent which
is reasonably practicable.
69.
External
hazards
Buildings which need to be kept operable to permit the
emergency procedures to be implemented, shall protect
their occupants to the extent that they are not incapacitated
and can safely shut down the remaining equipment.
70.
Maintenance
All fire detection and fire prevention systems shall be
maintained according to code
71.
Alarms
Alarms shall have a Sound Power Level 10dB more than
background
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Code Defined
Standard
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Company
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Rev. No: 01
Page 72 of 75
Fire alarm
control panel
Fire Alarm Control Panel shall be as per NFPA and
approved and listed by Civil Defence for those buildings that
require approval.
73.
Exterior Load
Bearing walls
fire resistance
rating
UAE Fire code requires a minimum of 1-hour fire rating [see
Table 1.7 UAE fire Code for Industrial Occupancy]
74.
Internal load
bearing walls,
Columns,
beams, girders,
trusses, arches
fire resistance
rating
UAE Fire code requires a minimum of 1-hour fire rating [see
Table 1.7 UAE fire Code for Industrial Occupancy]
75.
Floor and roof
fire resistance
rating
UAE Fire code requires a minimum of 1-hour fire rating [see
Table 1.7 UAE fire Code for Industrial Occupancy]
76.
Non-Load
Bearing walls
fire resistance
rating
no requirement unless specified
77.
Blast Resistant
Buildings shall be blast resistant as required by QRA, FERA
and Building Risk Assessment.
78.
Emergency
lighting
All exits and exit routes in a facility shall be provided with
luminaries that are backed up by emergency power such as
Battery or UPS. So that during fire emergencies and/or
upon loss of power in the facility, means of egress is
illuminated for evacuees with ‘emergency lighting’.
79.
External fire
walls
The fire-resistance test should be based on exposure to an
established fire time-temperature curve or a simulated fire
test, appropriate for the expected type of fire. The expected
fire can be a [hydrocarbon] jet fire, a pool fire, or a cellulosic
fire.
80.
Pressurisation
Identify parts of a building that require to be pressurised to
control smoke movement
81.
Pressurisation
Identify parts of a building that require to be pressurised to
stop smoke or gas ingress as required by QRA, FERA and
Building Risk Assessment.
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Code Defined
Standard
(Description)
Company
Key Properties
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Rev. No: 01
Page 73 of 75
Fire rated
cabling
Fire resistance 2 hours for safety related systems
Dependencies & Interactions
(on other HSE Critical Measures)
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83.
Safety
Performance
A life safety dossier shall be produced for each building
design.
84.
HVAC Design
philosophy
For each plant/installation a HVAC design philosophy shall
be established and included as a project document.
2. The philosophy shall include the following:
a.
process
safety
requirements;
b.
safety-critical
functions;
c. HVAC control philosophy and HVAC controls interfaces
with installation control and safety systems.
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HVAC Design
philosophy
HVAC safety-critical performance requirements shall be
clearly identified in final project design documents for
incorporation into Performance Standards or another
maintained document.
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86.
HVAC
interaction with
F&G
HVAC systems to be shut down (including closure of
fire/gas
dampers)
when
required to do so by Fire and Gas or Safety system design
requirements.
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Use as
Temporary
Refuge
For enclosed TRs the prevention of smoke and/or gas
ingress is of paramount importance in maintaining integrity.
The integrity of the TR is a function of leak tightness and
positive
pressurisation.
The maximum acceptable air change rate shall be stated as
part of the TR performance standard
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PAGA (Plant
wide)
89.
Telecoms
(plantwide
alarms)
90.
ICSS (F&G and
ESD Systems)
91.
External walls
fire rating
where buildings are built within 3m of another building, the
fenceline or a public road, external walls may need to be
fire rated according to code
92.
External walls
fire rating
external walls fire rating shall not be compromised by a
design explosion scenario.
The signals from buildings normally should be repeated to
control centre or fire brigade building.
Document No: AGES-PH-03-002 (Part 4)
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Code Defined
Standard
(Description)
Company
Key Properties
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Rev. No: 01
Page 74 of 75
Emergency
Action Plan
Emergency action plans shall be provided where required
by code or AHJ
94.
HVAC systems
HVAC controls may be integrated with Building Automation
systems, Building Fire Panel or F&G control system
95.
Fire Drills
The purpose of emergency egress and relocation drills is to
educate the participants in the fire safety features of the
building, the egress facilities available, and the procedures
to be followed.
96.
HVAC systems
F&G dampers shall override HVAC controls
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97.
HVAC systems
for TR
If the building or part of the building is to be a Temporary
Refuge, then it shall be designed according to (Ref. 39).
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93.
Code Defined
Standard
(Description)
Company
Key Properties
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Rev. No: 01
Page 75 of 75