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FORD MOTOR COMPANY: STRUGGLE IN INDIA1
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During the past three years, under Jim Hackett’s leadership, we have made meaningful progress
and opened the door to becoming a vibrant, profitably growing company.
Now it’s time to charge through that door.
James D. Farley, CEO, Ford Motor Company2
Ford Motor Company (Ford), an automobile manufacturer headquartered in Dearborn, Michigan, was one
of the top global auto manufacturers.3 However, following 2015, it was unable to gain Wall Street’s
confidence in its business operations as it laboured to execute the turnaround plan that former chief
executive officer (CEO) Jim Hackett announced in 2018.4 Hackett, who had succeeded Mark Fields as CEO
in May 2017, said that cost cuts and better product development initiatives could help the automaker exceed
its long-term 8 per cent target for profit margins.5 But the company’s shares fell 40 per cent. Ford’s
management replaced Hackett with its long-term senior executive James Farley on October 1, 2020. Farley
was Ford’s eleventh CEO in its 117-year history but the fourth in the past decade.6
Soon after taking over, Farley announced the closure of Ford’s three remaining factories in Brazil, a country
in which it had operated for more than a century.7 Another matter that engaged Farley’s attention was Ford’s
operations in India—the fifth-largest auto market globally in 2020. Ford had envisaged India to be one of
its priority markets, but, after three decades of investment in the country, it held less than 2 per cent market
share.8 In March 2021, Ford was actively evaluating its Indian operations.9 In April 2021, Ford’s senior
executive Steven Armstrong was tasked with evaluating investment plans for India in his new role as
transformation officer for South America and India.10 Farley would then decide whether to put more money
into Indian operations, to begin manufacturing only for export, or to pull out of the country entirely.
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Sudhir Naib wrote this case solely to provide material for class discussion. The author does not intend to illustrate either effective or
ineffective handling of a managerial situation. The author may have disguised certain names and other identifying information to
protect confidentiality.
THE GLOBAL AUTO INDUSTRY: AN OVERVIEW
Ford was among the top five leading global automotive manufacturers in terms of revenue in 2020 (see
Exhibit 1). Global vehicle sales had fallen to 91.4 million units in 2019 from 95.6 million units in 2018.
This meant a 4.5 per cent decline in vehicle (excluding two-wheeler and three-wheeler) sales. In 2019,
Asia/Oceania/the Middle East constituted 56 per cent of the 64.3 million passenger cars sold. Europe
accounted for 28 per cent, the United States 15 per cent, and Africa 1 per cent.11 The outbreak of the
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COVID-19 pandemic in March 2020 adversely impacted the industry globally. It was estimated that
worldwide car sales would reach 63.8 million units in 2020 and grow to roughly 66 million in 2021.12
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A rise in the global average temperature, which had been a cause of worry for leaders worldwide, drove EV
sales. The United Nations Climate Change Conference held in Paris in 2015 strengthened its resolve to limit
the global temperature rise to 1.5–2.0 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels for the 21st century.15 The
Economist suggested that the car industry, which was in short-term crisis and long-term decline, could still be
viable— with the right fixes. It recommended that companies should pare dividends, loss-making foreign
ventures and legacy investments, rather than cutting their spending on EVs. It suggested the need for
consolidation among mid-sized carmakers, as the world had more than 1,000 factories making legacy cars.16
The global auto industry was at the cusp of a structural change driven by innovation, technological advances,
and climate compulsions. It was expected that every major original equipment manufacturer (OEM) would
roll out EVs across its vehicle lineups, with many scaling and recalibrating their business models.
FORD: HISTORY AND GLOBAL PRESENCE
Ford was incorporated in Delaware in 1919. Headquartered in Dearborn, Michigan, Ford was among the
big three American automakers in 2021, trailing General Motors Company and Stellantis N.V.17 Ford
manufactured and marketed trucks, utility vehicles, and cars, with its production spread over twenty-six
countries and a commercial presence in more than 125 countries. It had approximately 186,000 employees
as of December 31, 2020.18
EARLY HISTORY
For generations of B-school graduates, the name of Henry Ford, the founder of Ford Motor Company, was
synonymous with management lexicon— assembly line, division of labour, mass production, and labour
productivity. In 1919, the company was reincorporated with Henry Ford, his wife, and his son acquiring
full ownership. They were sole stockholders until January 1956, when public sale of the common stock was
first offered.19 Eventually, the Ford family owned a minority stake but retained significant voting power on
the company’s board of directors. Since January 1999, William Clay Ford Jr., the great-grandson of Henry
Ford, has been the chair of the board.20
FORD’S JOURNEY THROUGH THE YEARS
In the 1990s, Ford undertook a series of acquisitions, including Jaguar (1989–1990), Aston Martin (1993),
Hertz Corporation (1994), Volvo’s automotive division (1999), and Land Rover (2000). Ford also
purchased a significant share of Japan’s Mazda Motor Corporation.21
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According to a report by the Paris-based International Energy Agency, global electric car sales had risen,
while conventional and overall new car registrations had declined. The number of electric cars rose to 10
million in 2020, representing a 43 per cent increase over 2019. China, with 4.5 million electric cars, had
the largest fleet.13 A July 2020 report by Deloitte on electric vehicles (EVs) reported that by 2030, China
would hold 49 per cent of the global EV market, Europe 27 per cent, and the United States 14 per cent. The
report also predicted that, beyond 2030, EV sales would slow down because some markets would not have
suitable charging infrastructure.14
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After Mulally took over as chief executive, Ford restructured its product portfolio, moving from an
overreliance on trucks and sports utility vehicles (SUVs) to smaller cars. In fact, Mulally said that by 2020,
small cars would make up about 55 per cent of Ford’s overall sales. After revamping its core North
American business and posting eight straight profitable quarters, Ford ramped up operations in Asia
(particularly China and India). New cars were made on global platforms and sold in various markets around
the world. This was a big change from how Ford operated in the past, when it made different cars and trucks
for specific geographic regions. Mulally announced that Ford would increase the company’s worldwide
sales from 5.3 million to 8.0 million vehicles per year by 2015.24
Mark Fields, a Ford insider, took over from Mulally in July 2014. In May 2017, Jim Hackett, an outsider,
replaced him. Hackett announced a restructuring plan for Ford’s global business in 2018, stating that the
company could exceed its 8 per cent margin target.25
FORD’S 2018 GLOBAL RESTRUCTURING STRATEGY
The restructuring plan involved almost US$11 billion26 in earnings before interest and tax (EBIT) charges,
with $7 billion cash-related effects over the next five years. These costs meant shutting operations in some
regions and incurring related costs. Ford envisaged strong investments in autonomous vehicles and EVs.
Under the restructuring plan, Ford would shift to five flexible vehicle architectures, facilitating 20 per cent
savings across all stages of the vehicle-making process, and helping to identify new ways to increase
component sharing. The plan involved a change in Ford’s vehicles portfolio—about 90 per cent of the
company’s North American vehicle lineup volumes—to SUVs, pickup trucks, and commercial vehicles
between 2018 and the end of 2020. Ford also announced that it was in talks with Volkswagen and Indian
company Mahindra & Mahindra (M&M) about potential collaboration opportunities.27
However, Ford’s profits dived between 2016 and 2019, and Wall Street analysts complained that Hackett
could not sufficiently explain how he would turn the company around. In an interview with The Washington
Post in May 2020, Hackett said, “I am trying not to lay off anybody. In fact, I know that this can even sound
foolish in some respects, right, but I’ve been through four of these and the biggest trust you can build is
with your employees. Who wants to send somebody out of work, you know, when there’s a virus and there’s
no employment? So, we’re trying to balance this on the head of a pin.”28
James Farley, a long-time Ford executive who joined the company in 2007 as the global head of marketing
and communications from Toyota Motor, replaced Hackett on October 1, 2020 in an effort to get Ford back
into Wall Street’s good books.29 Analysts were upbeat about Farley, the “car guy,” who, as a mark of his
confidence in the automaker’s recovery plans, had purchased company stock worth $1 million in 2020.30
Farley restructured operations and shook up executive ranks to execute a turnaround plan. In January 2021, Ford
announced the closure of its three remaining factories in Brazil. The closure would cost the company $4.1 billion
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In September 2006, Alan Mulally left Boeing to head Ford Motor Company. The company announced a
major restructuring program, The Way Forward, which included plans to shut unprofitable factories.
Mulally led the company through the global financial crisis in 2007–2008 and was able to avoid
bankruptcy, unlike General Motors Company and Chrysler.22 Ford adopted various cost-cutting measures
and focused on stronger brands. Having sold Hertz Corporation in 2005 and Aston Martin in 2007, Ford
sold Jaguar and Land Rover to India’s Tata Motors in 2008 and also started selling its Mazda Motor
Corporation shares in 2008. In 2010, the company sold Volvo to the Chinese Zhejiang Geely Holding.
In 2011, Ford announced its focus on EVs.23
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and impact 5,000 employees. Farley said, “We know these are very difficult, but necessary, actions to create a
healthy and sustainable business. We are moving to a lean, asset-light business model by ceasing production in
Brazil.”31 Research firm HIS Markit estimated that global car sales dropped about 15 per cent in 2020. In Brazil,
sales fell 26 per cent, and Ford did not expect them to recover for at least two years.32
To push Ford’s electric vehicle (EV) strategy, Farley announced in February 2021 that it would boost its
EV investment to $ 22 billion through 2025 which was almost double of what it had previously pledged.33
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Ford reported its operations in three segments. The first was automotive, and included Ford’s electrification
vehicle programs. The automotive segment was geographically distributed across five regional business units:
North America, South America, Europe, Middle East and Africa, and Asia Pacific. The second segment was
mobility. Established in 2016, this segment included development costs related to autonomous vehicles and
Ford’s investment in emerging mobility services through Ford Smart Mobility. The third and final segment was
Ford Credit, comprising the company’s credit business of vehicle-related financing and leasing activities.34
In 2020, Ford sold approximately 4,187,000 vehicles in wholesale throughout the world, and its revenue
reached $127 billion, plummeting 18 per cent from $156 billion in 2019. The net loss attributable to the
company was $1,279 million in 2020. The company-adjusted EBIT was 2.2 per cent ($2,779 million) in
2020, down from 4.1 per cent in 2019.35
Like any other automobile manufacturer, Ford’s operational results depended on economic and geopolitical
factors, protectionist trade policies, fluctuations in commodity prices, currency exchange rate volatility,
interest rates, and compliance with host countries’ regulations. The operational risks included public health
issues, such as COVID-19, and supply disruptions of critical components such as semiconductors. Vehicle
recalls were another operational risk. Ford had to recall three million vehicles in January 2021 because of
defective Takata airbags, which cost it $610 million36 (see Exhibit 2 for summary of income [loss], and
Exhibit 3 for consolidated global retail sales, industry volume, and market share in key markets until 2020).
THE INDIAN AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY
The automotive sector was a key driver of India’s economic growth and the largest contributor to the
manufacturing sector. According to Pawan Goenka, former managing director and CEO of M&M, “The
industry contributes 6.4 per cent to Gross Domestic Product (GDP), around 35 per cent to manufacturing
GDP, supports over 8 million jobs directly (OEMs, suppliers and dealers) and as many as 30 million more
in the value chain. It accounts for cumulative investments of $35 billion over the last 10 years, and generates
export revenue of $27 billion that is nearly 8 per cent of the total merchandise exports from India.”37 In
fiscal year (FY) 2021, two-wheelers constituted 81 per cent of the Indian automobile industry, while
passenger cars accounted for 13 per cent, commercial vehicles 3 per cent, and three-wheelers 3 per cent.38
India was a closed market for the automotive sector until the 1980s, with emphasis on indigenous
production and restricted entry of foreign players due to high customs duties. As a result, it was a seller’s
market, characterized by long waiting periods and outdated car models. Things began to change with the
setting up of Maruti Udyog in 1982, a joint venture (JV) of the Indian Government and Suzuki, Japan, for
manufacturing passenger cars. The government introduced a new automobile policy in 1995, allowing
foreign direct investment (FDI) up to 51 per cent through the automatic approval route. This policy was an
outcome of the government-initiated economic liberalization in 1991 that decontrolled and deregulated the
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FORD’S OPERATIONS
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industrial sector. The new policy substantially lowered entry barriers and paved the way for foreign
automobile manufacturers to set up base in India.39 FDI was further increased to 100 per cent through the
automatic approval route in the early 2000s.40 By 2007, thirteen global automakers had entered India either
through a JV or as a 100 per cent subsidiary (see Exhibit 4).
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Ford entered India in 1995 through a 50:50 JV with M&M; General Motors and Hyundai followed soon
after.42 According to World Bank estimates, India’s GDP grew at a compound annual growth rate (CAGR)
of 7.35 per cent from 2003 through 2010. Most automakers believed that the growth would continue over
the next decade, doubling the income of Indians. However, per capita income in rupee terms grew at a
CAGR of just 3.74 per cent between 2011–2012 and 2020–2021.43
India’s economy was already slowing in 2019 before the pandemic struck.44 In 2020, the aggregate demand
measured by real GDP contracted by 8 per cent. This was the first contraction experienced since 1980–
1981 and the most severe ever.45 India’s auto industry, which had grown by more than 10 per cent in the
early 2010s, was now struggling to remain in positive territory. All automobile segments were seeing lower
sales in FY 2021 compared to previous years. Passenger vehicles sales, at 2.71 million units, were down by
2.2 per cent, two-wheelers 13.2 per cent (sales of 15.12 million units), commercial vehicles 20.7 per cent
(sales of 0.57 million units), and three-wheelers 66 per cent (sales of 0.22 million units).46
While COVID-19 could be regarded as the biggest factor for this downfall, it was not the only factor. A
rise in the price of new vehicles due to higher input costs and a high tax rate increased the cost of ownership.
R.C. Bhargava, the chair of Maruti Suzuki India Ltd., said that tax rates in India were more than double
when compared to the European Union, Japan, or the United States. India’s Goods and Services Tax on
cars was fixed at 28 per cent. However, if a vehicle exceeded a certain body/engine size, an additional tax
of up to 22 per cent was charged.47
GROWTH IN THE PRE-OWNED CAR MARKET
Compared to the new car market, India’s pre-owned car market was stable and growing. The Indian preowned car market was valued at $27 billion in 2020 and was expected to reach $50 billion by 2026,
registering a CAGR of 15 per cent.48 The pandemic impacted consumer choices, with an increasing number
of consumers preferring individual mobility. Further, with more finance options infused into the used car
market, a shorter ownership cycle (from six to seven years in 2011 to four years in 2016 and expected to
fall to three and a half years by 2021), and the emergence of organized players, the market was set to grow.49
A number of online portals also emerged in the used car business. CRISIL, one of India’s leading rating
agencies, forecasted that while passenger vehicle sales would dip by 25 per cent to 2.1 million in 2020–
2021, the pre-owned car market would emerge as a silver lining for the market.50
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Domestic and international companies were interested in the sector due to rising consumer demand for
vehicles, availability of low-cost skilled labour, cost-effective steel production, and competitive research and
development centres. Major passenger car manufacturers included: Maruti Suzuki India Limited (MSIL);
Hyundai Motor India Limited (HMIL); Tata Motors Limited; Kia India; Mahindra & Mahindra Limited;
Renault India Private Limited; Toyota Kirloskar Motor Private Limited; Honda Cars India Limited (HCIL);
Ford India Private Limited; MG Motor India Private Limited; and Volkswagen Passenger Cars (a division of
Skoda Auto Volkswagen India Private Limited). Maruti Suzuki India Ltd. held about 48 per cent market share
and Hyundai Motor India Ltd. held 17 per cent, dominating the passenger car market (see Exhibit 5).41
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INDIA’S PUSH TOWARD ELECTRIC VEHICLES
In December 2015, India signed the historic United Nations climate change agreement in Paris, along with
more than 170 countries, to limit global warming to well below 2 degrees Celsius—preferably, to 1.5
degrees Celsius—compared to pre-industrial levels.53 India agreed to reduce its carbon footprint by
approximately 35 per cent by 2030, below its 2005 levels. It also pledged to increase the share of non-fossil
fuels-based electricity to 40 per cent by 2030. The Indian transportation sector accounted for one-third of
the crude oil consumed in the country, of which 80 per cent was consumed by road transportation alone. It
also accounted for about 11 per cent of total carbon emissions from fuel combustion.54
In April 2019, India launched the second phase of its plan Faster Adoption and Manufacturing of Electric
and Hybrid Vehicles in India (also known as FAME India II), designed to increase demand for EVs, provide
upfront subsidies, and create an EV charging infrastructure.55 Various state governments announced
policies and incentives for the adoption of EVs and to attract investment in EV manufacturing. The
government expected the cost of EVs to be on par with petrol-based variants within two years.56
CHANGING CONSUMER PREFERENCES
The average age of India’s automobile consumers was changing. Younger buyers preferred a pleasant
driving experience and more space and manoeuvrability, which were offered by utility vehicles and SUVs,
both demanding higher resale values than hatchbacks or entry-level sedans. A forecast by IHS Markit, a
global leader in information and analytics, predicted that utility vehicle sales would surpass those of sedans
and hatchbacks (including the mini segment) by 2023.57 Car manufacturers increased their selection of
utility vehicles, while also introducing EVs such as Hyundai’s Kona Electric, Tata Motor’s Tigor EV and
Nexon EV, and Mahindra’s eVerito. Maruti Suzuki, which led the Indian passenger car market in 2020 in
the hatchback, sedan, SUV, and multi utility vehicle segments, planned to launch the Electric Wagon R in
2024. Tesla Inc., the global leader in EVs, had not yet entered India citing high import taxes, but the
country’s vast market potential would definitely be a factor for future entry.58
FORD’S OPERATIONS IN INDIA
Ford first entered pre-independent India in 1926 as a subsidiary of Ford Canada.59 The company’s first
assembly plant was set up in Bombay in 1931, followed by similar facilities in the port cities of Calcutta
and Madras.60 However, its India operations were closed in 1953 following severe import restrictions. After
the Indian economy was liberalized in the early 1990s, Ford re-entered India in October 1995 as Mahindra
Ford India Limited, a 50:50 JV with M&M, and set up a manufacturing plant near Chennai, Tamil Nadu.
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In 2011, the Indian government issued the National Mission on Electric Mobility, which was followed in
2013 by the National Electric Mobility Mission Plan 2020 (NEMMP 2020), a national mission document
outlining the vision and roadmap for faster adoption of EVs and their manufacturing in the country. As part
of the mission plan, in 2015 the newly elected Prime Minister Narendra Modi approved the initiative Faster
Adoption and Manufacturing of Electric (& Hybrid) Vehicles in India.51 That same year, the Society of
Indian Automobile Manufacturers and the Government of India unveiled the automobile industry roadmap
for the next ten years by announcing the second automotive mission plan for 2016–2026, which effectively
extended the 2006 initiative to 2016. According to this second mission plan, India would be among the top
three automotive industries in the world by 2026. The industry would contribute over 12 per cent of India’s
GDP and generate 65 million more jobs. The mission plan aimed to make the Indian automotive industry
the engine of the government’s Make in India initiative.52
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India was a part of erstwhile Ford CEO Mulally’s strategy to achieve 8 million sales globally. Ford invested
$500 million to double the production capacity at the Chennai plant to make Ford Figo, a small sedan. “We
are entering the sweet spot of the Indian market,” Mulally said in 2009 at the launch. “It’s a game-changer
for our Indian operations.”64 Ford built a second plant at Sanand in Gujarat that became operational in
March 2015. Ford’s global CEO Mark Fields said, “With manufacturing facilities in Chennai and Sanand,
we expect to triple our exports from India in the next five years.” Ford was exporting 60,000 to 70,000 units
at that time.65 The Chennai factory produced the Ford EcoSport and Ford Endeavour, while the Sanand
factory manufactured the Ford Figo, Ford Aspire, and Ford Freestyle. With an installed manufacturing
capacity of 610,000 engines and 440,000 vehicles per year, the company had invested $2 billion in India.66
LMC Automotive, a UK-based research company, forecasted that Ford could only use 20 per cent of its
current production capacity. Underused capacity was a major drag on profits in the motor industry. In 2020,
Ford’s share in the Indian passenger car market was just 2 per cent (see Exhibit 5). Ford’s India operations
lost $23 million in 2020, down from a loss of $804 million in 2019. Also, sales declined from 93,000 units
in FY 2019 to 66,000 units in FY 2020 and 48,000 units in FY 2021.67
Starting in 2017, Ford held talks with M&M for a partnership. The two companies signed an agreement in
September 2017 to explore a strategic alliance. The definitive agreement to create a JV, with M&M owning
a 51 per cent controlling stake, was signed in October 2019.68 However, in December 2020, the two
companies decided not to proceed with the JV. The announcement attributed the decision to fundamental
changes in global economic and business conditions, driven, in part, by the global pandemic. The
announcement also stated that those changes influenced separate decisions by Ford and M&M to reassess
their respective capital allocation priorities.69
In April 2021, Ford appointed senior executive Steven Armstrong to confirm its capital allocation for India.
According to an earlier statement, Ford’s planned capital allotment would be consistent with its plan to
achieve an 8 per cent company-adjusted EBIT margin.70 The company reportedly approached many
automakers to explore new partnerships, contract manufacturing opportunities, and even the sale of one of
its facilities, as part of its quest to meet its targeted 8 per cent EBIT margin by 2023.71
Earlier, General Motors Company, the closest rival to Ford in the United States, had decided to shut down its
operations in India. In 2017, it sold one of its factories to China’s SAIC Motor Corporation Ltd., which was
now being used by MG Motors. An agreement was signed in January 2021 to sell the second factory to China’s
General Wall Motor, whose global strategy vice-president, Liu Xiangshang, stated, “The Indian market has
great potential, rapid economic growth, and a good investment environment. Entering the Indian market was
an important step for Great Wall Motor’s global strategy.”72 Finally, in 2021, Groupe PSA, which was part of
Stellantis N.V., re-entered India and launched the premium range vehicle, Citroen C5 Aircross SUV.73
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The JV launched its first vehicle, the Ford Escort, in 1996. In 1998, Ford increased its stake in the company
to 72 per cent and named it Ford India Private Ltd.61 The Ford Ikon was introduced in 1999. The JV with
M&M ended in 2005, when Ford decided to pursue business operations on its own.62 While the JV sold a
total of 120,000 cars in about a decade, Ford’s subsequent solo venture produced almost 100,000 cars in
FY 2012 alone. Ford was not the only company to come out of a JV with complete control over its Indian
business; other companies like Honda Motor Company and Renault S.A. did the same.63
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ROAD AHEAD
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Farley was facing a difficult situation in India. Ford had less than 2 per cent market share, was incurring losses,
and had huge overcapacity in its two factories. He had to consider shutting down the Indian operations,
disinvesting one factory while continuing to manufacture for exports, or forming a JV to remain invested in
the Indian market. If Ford exited India now, it could consider re-entering after the country had firmly
established an EV market. The Indian government was making concerted efforts to promote manufacturing
of EVs and Ford was already competing globally in this sector. What would be Ford’s best path forward?
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Company
Volkswagen Group
Toyota Motor Corporation
Daimler Company Limited
Ford Motors Company
General Motors Company
Honda Motors
BMW Group
SAIC Motor
Stellantis N.V.
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Hyundai Motor
Nissan Motor
Tesla Inc.
Suzuki Motor
Revenue
254.1
249.4
175.9
127.1
122.5
121.8
112.8
106.7
98.8
88.1
72.0
31.5
28.5
Parent Company
Germany
Japan
Germany
United States
United States
Japan
Germany
China
Corporation formed in January 2021 by merger between
Italian–American Fiat Chrysler and French Groupe PSA
South Korea
Japan
United States
Japan
Source: Created by case author based on “Revenue of the Leading Automotive Manufacturers Worldwide in 2020 (in Billion
US Dollars),” Statista, accessed November 1, 2021, https://www.statista.com/statistics/232958/revenue-of-the-leading-carmanufacturers-worldwide.
EXHIBIT 2: FORD MOTOR COMPANY—SUMMARY OF INCOME/(LOSS)
(IN US$ MILLION, EXCEPT PER SHARE AMOUNTS)
Details
Total revenue
Income/(loss) before income
taxes
Net income (loss)
Net income/(loss) attributed to
Ford Motor Company
Average number of shares of
Ford common and class B stock
outstanding (in millions)
Cash dividends declared
2016
151,800
6,784
2017
156,776
8,179
2018
160,338
4,345
2019
155,900
(640)
2020
127,144
(1,116)
4,600
4,589
7,757
7,731
3,695
3,677
84
47
(1,276)
(1,279)
3,973
3,975
3,974
3,972
3,973
0.85
0.65
0.73
0.60
0.15
Source: Created by case author based on United States Securities and Exchange Commission, Ford Motor Company Annual
Report on Form 10-K for the Fiscal Year Ended December 31, 2020, 31, accessed December 21, 2021,
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/37996/000003799621000012/f-20201231.htm.
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EXHIBIT 1: GLOBAL REVENUE OF LEADING AUTOMOTIVE MANUFACTURERS IN 2020
(IN US$ BILLION)
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EXHIBIT 3: FORD MOTOR COMPANY GLOBAL RETAIL SALES, INDUSTRY VOLUME, AND
MARKET SHARE IN EACH REGION AND KEY MARKETS
United States
Canada
Mexico
North America
Brazil
Argentina
South America
United Kingdom
Germany
EU 20d
Turkey
Europe
Chinae
Australia
India
ASEAN f
Russia
International Markets
Group
Total Company
Retail Sales
(in Million Units)a
Industry Volume
(in Million Units)b
Market Share
(as a Percentage)c
2018
2.5
0.3
0.1
2.9
0.2
0.1
0.4
0.4
0.3
1.4
0.1
1.5
0.8
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
2019
2.4
0.3
0.1
2.8
0.2
0.1
0.3
0.4
0.3
1.3
—
1.4
0.6
0.1
0.1
0.1
—
2020
2.0
0.2
—
2.3
0.1
—
0.2
0.2
0.2
1.0
0.1
1.1
0.6
0.1
0.1
0.1
—
2018
17.7
2.0
1.5
21.5
2.6
0.8
4.5
2.8
3.8
17.7
0.6
19.0
26.7
1.2
4.4
1.7
1.8
2019
17.5
2.0
1.4
21.1
2.8
0.5
4.3
2.7
4.0
17.9
0.5
19.2
26.1
1.1
3.8
1.8
1.8
2020
14.9
1.6
1.0
17.6
2.1
0.3
3.1
1.9
3.3
13.7
0.8
15.1
25.2
0.9
2.8
1.3
1.5
2018
14.1
14.7
4.8
13.4
9.2
12.1
8.3
13.7
7.9
7.6
10.9
7.6
2.9
6.0
2.2
6.6
2.9
2019
13.8
14.6
4.4
13.2
8.1
11.4
7.2
13.0
8.3
7.4
10.1
7.3
2.2
6.0
2.0
5.9
1.6
2020
13.7
15.1
4.0
13.2
6.8
9.7
6.2
12.9
7.4
7.1
12.4
7.2
2.4
6.5
1.7
5.3
0.9
0.5
0.4
0.3
22.5
21.2
17.5
2.2
1.9
1.7
6.0
5.5
4.5
94.2
91.9
78.5
6.3
6.0
5.8
Notes:
a. Retail Sales represents primarily sales by dealers and is based in part on estimated vehicle registrations; includes medium
and heavy trucks.
b. Industry Volume is an internal estimate based on publicly available data collected from various government, private, and
public sources around the globe; includes medium and heavy trucks.
c. Market Share represents reported retail sales of our brands as a per cent of total industry volume in the relevant market or
region.
d. EU 20 markets are United Kingdom, Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland,
Greece, Hungary, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Sweden, and Switzerland.
e. China includes Taiwan; China market share includes Ford brand and Jiangling Motors Corporation Ltd. brand vehicles
produced and sold by our unconsolidated affiliates.
f. ASEAN is the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and includes the Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam.
Source: Created by the case author based on United States Securities and Exchange Commission, Ford Motor Company
Annual Report on Form 10-K for the Fiscal Year Ended December 31, 2020, 5, accessed December 21, 2021,
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/37996/000003799621000012/f-20201231.htm.
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Country
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Company
Suzuki Motor
Mercedes-Benz Group
PAL-Peugeot
Daewoo Motors
Honda Seil
Ford Motor Company
General Motors Company
Hyundai Motor
Toyota Motor Corporation
Skoda (Volkswagen Group)
Renault Group
Nissan Motor
BMW Group
MG Motors
Kia Corporation
Groupe PSA (Stellantis N.V.)
Mode of Entry
JV with government (Maruti)
JV with Telco
JV with Premier Automobiles
JV with DCM
JV with Shriram
JV with Mahindra & Mahindra
JV with Hindustan Motors
100% subsidiary
JV with Kirloskar
100% subsidiary
JV with Mahindra & Mahindra
100% subsidiary
100% subsidiary
100% subsidiary of SAIC Motor
100% subsidiary of Kia (South Korea)
JV with CK Birla Group
Year
1983
1995
1995
1995
1995
1995
1995
1996
1997
2001
2005
2005
2007
2017
2017
2017
Note: JV = joint venture.
Source: Created by the case author based on individual company websites all accessed on January 9, 2022; and Smita
Miglani, “The Growth of the Automobile Industry: Analysis of the Roles of Government Policy and other Enabling Factors,” in
Innovation, Economic Development, and Intellectual Property in India and China, 439-463, Springer, edited by Kung-Chung
Liu
and
Uday
S.
Racherla,
Springer
Open,
accessed
December
14,
2021,
https://library.oapen.org/bitstream/handle/20.500.12657/23269/1006887.pdf.
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EXHIBIT 4: ENTRY OF MAJOR AUTO MANUFACTURERS AND THEIR MODE OF ENTRY IN THE
INDIAN MARKET
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Company
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Maruti Suzuki India Ltd.
Hyundai Motor India Ltd.
Tata Motors Ltd.
Kia India
Mahindra & Mahindra Ltd.
Toyota Kirloskar Motor Private Ltd.
Renault India Private Ltd.
Honda Cars India Ltd.
Ford India Private Ltd.
MG Motor India Private Ltd.
Volkswagen Group*
Nissan Motor
Skoda (Volkswagen Group)*
Fiat Chrysler Automobiles (FCA) India
Sales Volume
(in Thousands)
1,293.84
471.54
222.01
155.69
155.54
93.12
92.27
82.07
48.04
35.6
20.44
8.88
11.33
6.55
Share
(in Percentage)
47.8
17.42
8.2
5.75
5.75
3.44
3.41
3.03
1.77
1.32
0.76
0.7
0.42
0.24
Note: * In October 2019, Volkswagen Group India announced the merger of their three Indian subsidiaries - Volkswagen India
Pvt Ltd (VWIPL), Volkswagen Group Sales India Pvt Ltd (NSC) and Škoda Auto India Pvt Ltd (SAIPL) - into a single entity
named Škoda Auto Volkswagen India Pvt Ltd.
Source: Created by the case author based on “Passenger Car Market Share Across India in Financial Year 2021, by Vendor,”
Statista, April 2021, 2021, https://www.statista.com/statistics/316850/indian-passenger-car-market-share.
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EXHIBIT 5: PASSENGER CAR MARKET SHARE ACROSS INDIA IN FY 2021, BY VENDOR
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ENDNOTES
This case has been written on the basis of published sources. Consequently, the interpretation and perspectives presented
in this case are not necessarily those of Ford Motor Company or any of its employees.
2
Michael Wayland, “Ford’s New CEO Jim Farley Restructures Operations and Shakes up Executive Ranks as Automaker
Struggles to Execute Turnaround Plan,” CNBC, October 1, 2020, https://www.cnbc.com/2020/10/01/new-ford-ceo-jim-farleyannounces-restructuring-and-executive-shakeup.html.
3
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4
Neal L. Boudette, “Faltering for Years, Ford Is Showing Signs of a Revival,” New York Times, June 9, 2021
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/09/business/ford-jim-farley-electric-vehicles.html.
5
John D. Stroll, “Ford CEO Says Company Could Exceed 8% Margin Target,” The Wall Street Journal, March 15, 2018,
https://www.wsj.com/articles/ford-ceo-says-company-could-exceed-8-margin-target-1521136839.
6
Wayland, “Ford’s New CEO Jim Farley Restructures.”
7
Ben Klayman and Alberto Alerigi, “Ford to Close Brazil Manufacturing Operations, Take $4.1 Billion in Charges,” Reuters,
January 11, 2021, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ford-motor-brazil-idUSKBN29G2E9.
8
Claire Bushey and Benjamin Parkin, “Ford Is the Latest Global Carmaker to Struggle in India,” Financial Times, March 13,
2021, https://www.ft.com/content/807f6db6-d483-4e00-b02c-c4aef2b9d1a0.
9
Bushey and Parkin, “Ford is the Latest Global Carmaker.”
10
Aditi Shah, “Ford to Decide on India Investment Plan in Second Half of 2021,” Reuters, April 29, 2021,
https://www.reuters.com/business/autos-transportation/ford-decide-india-investment-plan-second-half-2021-2021-04-29.
11
Society of Indian Automobile Manufacturers (SIAM), Annual Report 2019–20: Re-Building the Nation Responsibly, 17,
accessed November 21, 2021, https://www.siam.in/uploads/ar/22-22ndAnnual%20Report%202019-20.pdf.
12
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13
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14
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17
Elizabeth
Blessing,
“Big
Three
Automakers,”
Investopedia,
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2,
2022,
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18
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19
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20
Ford
Media
Center:
William
Clay
Ford
Jr.,”
Ford,
accessed
November
27,
2021,
https://media.ford.com/content/fordmedia/fna/us/en/people/william-clay-ford--jr-.html.
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23
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25
Stroll, “Company Could Exceed 8% Margin.”
26
All amounts are in US$ unless otherwise specified.
27
Ford,
“Ford
Statement
on
Business
Transformation,”
press
release,
November
26,
2018,
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28
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29
Wayland, “Ford’s New CEO Jim Farley Restructures.”
30
Michael Wayland, “What to Know About Ford’s Incoming CEO Jim Farley,” CNBC, August 4, 2020,
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31
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32
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34
United States Securities and Exchange, Ford Annual Report.
35
United States Securities and Exchange, Ford Annual Report.
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S.
Racherla
(Singapore:
Springer
Open,
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FDI
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Page 15
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Gaurav Davare, “FCA-Groupe Officially Merge to Become Stellantis,” Zigwheels, January 19, 2021,
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63