Dissertation
The Development of In-space
Servicing, Assembly, and
Manufacturing Technology
Drivers, Challenges, and Policy Implications
Marissa Herron
This document was submitted as a dissertation in March 2023 in
partial fulfillment of the requirements of the doctoral degree in Public
Policy Analysis at the Pardee RAND Graduate School. The faculty
committee that supervised and approved the dissertation consisted of
Krista Langeland (Chair), Dave Baiocchi, and Laura Delgado Lopez.
PA R D E E R A N D GRADUATE SCHOOL
For more information on this publication, visit www.rand.org/t/RGSDA2693-1.
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About This Report
This study researched the renewed interest in satellite servicing, now called In-space
Servicing, Assembly, and Manufacturing (ISAM), as a technology enabler to creating an inspace economy. The U.S. is pursuing an in-space economy as a modernized means to efficiently
support and preserve the significant national dependence on the space domain. The study
examined the challenges and enablers associated with developing infrastructure to support an inspace economy. The research began with an exploration of the technology and whether the
technology was mature enough for near-term implementation. Then the study identified the
relevant drivers and urgency within the national security and civil space sectors, and the potential
national alignment. Key international actors were also evaluated for their priorities. A U.S.
perspective of the challenges and enablers to adoption of the technology was explored. Finally,
the combined framework of technology maturity, drivers, urgency, and challenges was presented
in the context of use cases. The study found that competition with China is the primary driving
force behind the creation of an in-space economy. Also concluded was that opportunities for
U.S. national alignment exist but will not occur without direct intervention. Recommendations
for policy and decision makers were provided for steps towards the creation of an in-space
economy.
Acknowledgments
Thank you to my family, friends, and colleagues for supporting and encouraging me in this
pursuit. A special thanks to the members of my committee: Krista Langeland, Dave Baiocchi,
and Laura Delgado Lopez for their mentorship, guidance, and expertise.
iii
Executive Summary
The U.S. dependence on space assets is significant and suggests an interest in both preserving
the viability of the space environment and seeking more efficient methods of utilizing space.
Defense, civil, and commercial dependencies on space assets are numerous and well-integrated
into the daily lives of citizens. The Global Positioning System supports communications,
financial markets, power grids, aircraft, search and rescue efforts, and daily navigation needs.
Communications satellites provide television broadcasting, mobile communications, and other
telecommunications services1. Weather satellites are a mainstay of daily lives that monitor
Earth’s environment and forecast related disasters2. An ever-increasing dependence on space as a
strategic domain for the U.S. is expected to continue.
Issue
A national initiative to develop an in-space economy is now underway. This interest is based
on a renewed vision for an economically driven, in-space infrastructure. This initiative is
planning to leverage In-space Servicing, Assembly, and Manufacturing (ISAM) capabilities.
These capabilities are recognized as a technology enabler to the development of an in-space
infrastructure. The vision seeks the realization of an economy but necessitates the development
of infrastructure (such as fueling depots, repair services, tug services). There exists uncertainty
about the role of ISAM within the commercial, civil, and national security space sectors. Historic
satellite servicing efforts did not result in adoption of the capabilities. Inadequate demand for
commercial capabilities may inhibit the development of the economy. Given this uncertainty,
how should policymakers guide the preparation and shape of an in-space economy? This study
results in policy recommendations to promote the development of an ISAM enabled in-space
economy.
Research Questions
The following research questions are answered by this study:
1. What is ISAM?
2. What is the technology maturity of ISAM?
1
Northrop Grumman, “Communications Satellites,” webpage, 2023. As of February 10, 2023:
https://www.northropgrumman.com/space/communications-satellites/
2
National Environmental Satellite Data and Information Service, “Home,” webpage, undated. As of February 10,
2023: https://www.nesdis.noaa.gov/
v
3. Who are the key stakeholders and what are their priorities?
4. What characteristics impact the adoption of ISAM in the space economy?
The first research question found that the Space Superhighway vision is not a new idea. This
finding inspired the examination of why the concept has yet to be realized. The first research
question also defined the Servicing, Assembly, and Manufacturing categories of ISAM.
Servicing was defined as the alteration of a spacecraft after its initial launch and orbital insertion.
Assembly was defined as the connection of components in-space to construct a system.
Manufacturing was defined as the transformation of raw or recycled materials into components.
Shown below is the organizational scheme produced, that was also used to inform the
development of use cases for the second research question.
The second research question used use cases to evaluate the technology maturity of ISAM as
integrated system-level capabilities with recent flight experience. The research found that
Servicing capabilities are the most mature and ready for near-term implementation. Space
stations were also observed to possess an inherent dependence on ISAM capabilities, whereas the
typical requirements for satellites lack ISAM dependencies.
The third research question identified the U.S. actors as the national security and civil space
sectors, with the USSF and NASA as the lead actors of interest. Examination of the USSF
identified immediate drivers for resiliency and prioritization of satellite servicing capabilities,
particularly in the areas of refueling and inspection.
vi
Examination of NASA revealed a broad interest in ISAM capabilities for human spaceflight
exploration due to ISAM dependencies for enabling sustainable exploration. Examples include
refueling, robotic, inspection, assembly, and manufacturing capabilities to support the Gateway
outpost and the lunar surface habitat. Within the civil space sector, there exists an uncertain
interest in ISAM capabilities for science. The uncertainty was associated primarily with when to
invest in ISAM capabilities and the extent of the investment. The primary inhibitor was the
budgetary competition between ISAM costs and science objectives. The lack of dependencies
and requirements for ISAM capabilities further contributed to uncertainty in investment.
The U.S. national security and civil space sectors were also evaluated for similar drivers and
urgency. This informed the evaluation of national alignment and the potential for a consistent
demand signal towards the development of an in-space economy. Drivers for servicing
capabilities, such as refueling and inspection, could align given the effort. At present, the
national security sector has a greater demand and urgency for resiliency of satellites. In contrast,
the civil space sector needs are unique, discrete opportunities associated with persistent
platforms. For this reason, the national security space sector is expected to lead in the breadth of
implementation and dependency on satellite servicing capabilities. This situation presents an
opportunity for the civil space sector’s science community to consider new benefits and
opportunities for their missions. For example, the development of refueling, repair, and
relocation capabilities for the USSF may also be applied to science missions with long-term
continuity needs.
National alignment was found with ISAM’s Assembly capabilities, specifically for the
development of persistent platforms for technology development and science research. There
also exists aligned interest in the development of large telescopes in-space. NASA is expected to
continue leading in the area of Assembly, particularly with the development of Gateway.
Manufacturing remains a slowly developing category albeit one with great potential. The ability
to manufacture parts using local resources is necessary to reduce Earth dependency and achieve a
sustainable presence on the Moon. Both sectors are interested in some level of sustained lunar
presence. However, the urgency is greater with the civil space sector’s Artemis Campaign. Thus,
the civil space sector is expected to lead manufacturing efforts for sustained lunar operations.
The third research question examined China, Russia, and Japan as the international actors.
China is pursuing competition with the U.S. in space as a means to demonstrate global
leadership, develop self-reliance, and to influence the international order. China advocates for
the peaceful use of space but is also developing counterspace capabilities. Demonstrated ISAM
capabilities include satellite inspection, refueling, repair, relocation, and assembly. Russia seeks
to strengthen its regional power and to achieve parity with the U.S. in space. Russia is
developing counterspace weapons and has a history of anti-satellite capabilities. Their
demonstrated ISAM capabilities include inspection and those associated with space stations.
Japan's national interests include maintaining sovereignty and independence, economic growth,
and the protection of universal values. They seek to deepen cooperation with the U.S. in the
vii
space domain to address growing security concerns. Japan is developing ISAM capabilities
primarily focused on debris removal.
Examination of these actors revealed that the international space community recognizes the
changing nature of the space domain. Regardless of whether or not a country is seeking
dominance in the space domain, actors recognize the increased potential and capability for
adversaries to degrade or destroy space assets. The ISAM dual-use capabilities provide an
insurance that the owner can leverage for defensive purposes (deterrence or aggression), but
otherwise employ for peaceful purposes. Competitive priorities combined with growing tensions
and mature technologies have already initiated the realization of ISAM capabilities.
The fourth research question identified the challenges and enablers to adoption of ISAM. The
challenges recognized included the lack of consistent drivers, current single-use mission
approaches, a lack of necessity, cost, uncertain business case, and international
misinterpretations. In response to the challenges, the following enabling characteristics to
support the adoption of ISAM capabilities was identified: culture change, scoped area of focus,
funded requirements, aligned interests, and minimization of bespoke requirements. Finally, the
technology maturity – drivers – urgency – challenges framework was demonstrated with use
cases and resulted in the recommendations presented below.
Approach
The research approach developed a four-part framework that consisted of the technology
maturity, drivers, urgency, and challenges as they pertain to ISAM. The study evaluated the
actors and the framework parameters individually prior to presenting a competed framework.
The framework was demonstrated through ISAM-enabled use cases that communicated the
potential to achieve an in-space economy.
The study accepted the assumption that the government would serve as the initial anchor
tenant for commercial services. Since ISAM capabilities rely on the presence of infrastructure inspace, the development of infrastructure is recognized as a national-level activity necessitating
initial government investment.
Data sources included conversations with experts and literature review. The experts were
predominantly government stakeholders and extended to policy, programmatic, and technical
experts. The literature reviewed was restricted to sources within the past five years except where
historical information was relevant. The literature was dominated by U.S. sources of information,
U.S. government documents, and recent policy studies.
viii
Key Findings
•
•
•
•
•
The continuing theme of support through both administrations suggests that ISAM is not
just a passing fad but may have a potential role to serve in the needs of the national space
sectors.
Opportunities for national alignment of U.S. space sector priorities exist but will not
occur without direct U.S. government effort.
Competition with China is the foundational theme upon which national security space
sector ISAM drivers are built.
Among the ISAM suite of capabilities, servicing capabilities (such as inspection and
refueling) are the most mature and ready for near-term implementation.
There exists a sense of uncertainty regarding where and when to invest in ISAM
capabilities for the science missions. The uncertainty is due to a lack of funding and
requirements for ISAM capabilities.
Recommendations
Recommendations for U.S. policy and decision makers are summarized below. The reader is
referred to page 102 for a full discussion of the recommendations.
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
The USSF and NASA should create a formal body through which cross-sector
coordination can occur.
In response to the present demand and urgency for the technically mature capabilities, the
USSF should lead a focused effort on the adoption of satellite servicing capabilities.
The USSF and NASA should lead a quick turnaround study that clarifies when ISAM
capabilities are appropriate and potential incentive mechanisms.
Congress should task the Government Accountability Office to annually assess the
progress of the nation towards adoption of ISAM capabilities.
The USSF and NASA leadership should communicate and encourage a cultural change
that prioritizes sustainability within organizations, to include process changes and
estimated costs.
The USSF, NASA, and the State Department, with the support of the private sector,
should coordinate the development of formal and informal communications and
transparency measures to prevent international misperceptions.
NASA should develop internal guidelines that reflect the limits of civil and defense
cooperation to prevent international misperceptions.
The USSF and NASA should create more and expand existing international partnerships
to encourage contribution and participation in the in-space economy and to develop
responsible behaviors within the space domain.
ix
Contents
About This Report ......................................................................................................................... iii
Executive Summary......................................................................................................................... v
Contents ..........................................................................................................................................xi
Figures and Tables ....................................................................................................................... xiii
Chapter 1. Introduction .................................................................................................................... 1
Methodology Overview.............................................................................................................................3
Document Overview .................................................................................................................................5
Chapter 2. What is ISAM? .............................................................................................................. 6
Methodology .............................................................................................................................................7
ISAM Category Definitions ....................................................................................................................10
The Many Names of ISAM .....................................................................................................................13
Early Visions of ISAM ............................................................................................................................17
What Capabilities Exist within ISAM? ...................................................................................................23
Findings ...................................................................................................................................................29
Chapter 3. The Technology Maturity of ISAM ............................................................................. 30
Methodology ...........................................................................................................................................30
Assessment of the Technology Maturity .................................................................................................31
Findings ...................................................................................................................................................41
Chapter 4. The U.S. Implementation of ISAM ............................................................................. 42
Methodology ...........................................................................................................................................42
What is the national interest for ISAM? ..................................................................................................44
Who are the primary U.S. ISAM actors? ................................................................................................46
What are the National Security Space Sector drivers for ISAM? ...........................................................47
When will the National Security Space Sector implement ISAM capabilities? .....................................55
What are the Civil Space Sector drivers for ISAM? ...............................................................................62
When will the Civil Space Sector implement ISAM capabilities? .........................................................70
What is the national alignment for ISAM drivers and urgency?.............................................................77
Summary of Findings for the U.S. Implementation of ISAM .................................................................79
Chapter 5. The International Implementation of ISAM ................................................................ 80
Methodology ...........................................................................................................................................80
China .......................................................................................................................................................81
Russia ......................................................................................................................................................84
Japan ........................................................................................................................................................85
Findings for the International Implementation of ISAM ........................................................................87
Summary of Key Stakeholders and their Priorities .................................................................................88
Chapter 6. Challenges to ISAM Adoption .................................................................................... 89
Methodology ...........................................................................................................................................89
xi
Challenges with Adoption .......................................................................................................................90
Enablers to Adoption ...............................................................................................................................94
Use Cases & the Feasibility of Adoption ................................................................................................95
Summary of Characteristics that Impact the Adoption of ISAM ..........................................................101
Recommendations .................................................................................................................................102
Chapter 7. Conclusion ................................................................................................................. 105
Abbreviations .............................................................................................................................. 107
References ................................................................................................................................... 110
xii
Figures and Tables
Figures
Figure 1 The Space Superhighway .................................................................................................. 1
Figure 2 Study Overview................................................................................................................. 5
Figure 3 Data Sources ..................................................................................................................... 9
Figure 4 Dr. Wernher von Braun's Early Visions of Life in Space ............................................... 17
Figure 5 DARPA RSGS Overview ............................................................................................... 22
Figure 6 ISAM Capability Areas by Data Source ......................................................................... 24
Figure 7 ISAM Categories & Capability Areas ............................................................................ 26
Figure 8 Simplified ISAM Categorizations ................................................................................... 28
Figure 9 Installation of the EMIT Science Payload on the ISS ..................................................... 39
Figure 10 National Security Space Sector Drivers for ISAM ....................................................... 51
Tables
Table 1 Servicing Definitions ........................................................................................................ 10
Table 2 Assembly Definitions ....................................................................................................... 11
Table 3 Manufacturing Definitions ............................................................................................... 12
Table 4 Initial Set of Definitions ................................................................................................... 13
Table 5 Final Set of Definitions .................................................................................................... 27
Table 6 Technology Maturity ........................................................................................................ 40
xiii
Chapter 1. Introduction
ISAM is recognized as a technology enabler to the implementation of the Space
Superhighway vision. This vision conceptualizes a future space domain that utilizes an
economically driven in-space infrastructure3. This concept includes three major components:
•
•
•
Regional Hubs
Sustainable Transportation Network
Earth-to-Orbit Logistics
The end state consists of regional hubs placed in strategic locations of interest such as Low
Earth Orbit (LEO), Geostationary Orbit (GEO), lunar orbit, and beyond. These hubs (or logistics
depots) serve as infrastructure for refueling satellites, repairing and maintaining satellites,
upgrading payloads, and other logistics or servicing needs. The hubs are also intended to host
science payloads and technology demonstrations. The sustainable transportation network is
supported by space tugs moving materials and resources between the hubs. Finally, the Earth-toorbit logistics component leverages the commercial launch industry with routine access to space.
Figure 1 The Space Superhighway
SOURCE: Tomek, et al., 2022.
3
Tomek, Deborah, et al., The Space Superhighway: Space Infrastructure for the 21st Century, NASA, August 19,
2022.
Roesler, Gordon. “Why we need a “space superhighway,” Robots in Space post, August 13, 2021. As of February
10, 2023: https://robots-in.space/why-we-need-a-space-superhighway/
1
The development of a Space Superhighway, and ISAM technology specifically, is driven by
a significant U.S. dependence on the space domain and suggests an interest in both preserving
the viability of the space environment and seeking more efficient methods of utilizing space.
Defense, civil, and commercial dependencies on space assets are numerous and well-integrated
into the daily lives of citizens. The Global Positioning System supports communications,
financial markets, power grids, aircraft, search and rescue efforts, and daily navigation needs4.
Communications satellites provide television broadcasting, mobile communications, and other
telecommunications services5. Weather satellites are a mainstay of daily lives that monitor
Earth’s environment and forecast related disasters6. An ever-increasing dependence on space as a
strategic domain for the U.S. is expected to continue.
Decreased launch costs and reduced barriers to entry are enabling increased utilization of
space by both public and private entities7. National security, civil, and commercial needs are
converging on a desire for greater resilience in space, a sustained presence, and maximizing
investments in space. The Space Superhighway reflects a vision that incorporates an alignment
of needs and interests. Furthermore, this vision states an intentional dependence on an industry
owned and operated approach. In-space Servicing, Assembly, and Manufacturing (or ISAM) is
recognized as a technology enabler to the implementation of this vision.
Present day satellite development approaches involve the use of Earth-based resources to
build a satellite on Earth and launching the satellite into space where the intended mission is
performed. They also pursue a single-use approach that launches satellites with the intention of
completing a single mission. The Space Superhighway proposes an end state that challenges the
traditional approach to satellite development. Specifically, the vision is for satellites to be
repaired for continued mission performance, repurposed for new missions, or even built and
manufactured in space.
The idea of repairing or upgrading satellites while in space is not a new concept. The Space
Shuttle Hubble Servicing Missions were designed with this in mind. However, history shows that
this non-traditional approach did not remain. This study will research the potential for the present
day, renewed interest to achieve the Space Superhighway vision.
This visionary pursuit acknowledges a dependency on national alignment to invest in the
development of infrastructure and to initiate an economy. This study researched how the U.S.
4
National Coordination Office for Space-Based Positioning, Navigation, and Timing, “GPS Applications,”
webpage, November 25, 2014. As of February 10, 2023: https://www.gps.gov/applications/
5
Northrop Grumman, “Communications Satellites,” webpage, 2023. As of February 10, 2023:
https://www.northropgrumman.com/space/communications-satellites/
6
National Environmental Satellite Data and Information Service, “Home,” webpage, undated. As of February 10,
2023: https://www.nesdis.noaa.gov/
7
Friz, Paul D., Daniel J. Tiffin, Edward W. Rosenthal, The Space Superhighway: A Cost Analysis of an In-Space
Logistics Resupply Network, NASA, August 24, 2022.
2
could produce a national effort that initiates the creation of an ISAM-enabled in-space economy.
The study also examined the international implications of adopting ISAM capabilities.
Recommendations for the feasibility of adoption are provided for policy and decision makers.
Methodology Overview
This study researches the “Who, What, When, Where, and Why?” of ISAM capabilities to
create a four-part framework through which to assess the adoption of ISAM capabilities. The
framework consists of the technology maturity, the drivers, the urgency, and the challenges
within the scope of an ISAM-enabled in-space economy.
This study explores the following research questions which are described below in the
context of the framework. Policy recommendations to promote the development of an ISAM
enabled in-space economy result from analysis of the following research questions.
• Research Question #1 What is ISAM?
• Research Question #2 What is the technology maturity of ISAM?
• Research Question #3 Who are the key stakeholders and what are their priorities?
• Research Question #4 What characteristics impact the adoption of ISAM in the space
economy?
The technology maturity parameter, of the four-part framework, was informed by the first
two research questions. The first question was, “What is ISAM?” Answering this question
involved an in-depth exploration of the term “ISAM” and creating definitions for the purposes of
this study. The history of ISAM was explored and examples were used to describe and organize
the various technologies that comprise ISAM. The intent was to achieve an understanding of the
recently developed term “ISAM.”
The second question was, “What is the technology maturity of ISAM?” This question also
informed the technology maturity parameter. Historical, present-day, and future examples were
used to describe ISAM-enabled use cases. A technology maturity framework was created that
assessed which ISAM capabilities were available in the near-term. The intent was to distinguish
what and when the ISAM capabilities are feasible.
The drivers and the urgency parameters, of the four-part framework, were informed by the
third question, “Who are the key stakeholders and what are their priorities?” This question was
first answered through a national perspective and then an international perspective. The national
perspective focused on the national security space sector and the civil space sector as the two
primary actors of interest. The assumption was made that these two actors would serve as the
initial anchor tenants towards the development of the Space Superhighway vision. Thus, the
section was scoped to assessing the drivers and urgency parameters associated with the two
anchor tenants.
3
National-level strategic documentation served to inform an assessment of the national
interest in ISAM. Then, the national security and civil space sectors were individually assessed
for ISAM-relevant drivers and urgency. The drivers represented why the actor might use ISAM
capabilities and the urgency represented when the actor could employ those capabilities. The
drivers were identified through a review of relevant strategic documentation for something that
created an interest, need, or requirement for ISAM. The urgency was assessed through a review
of budgets, contracts, and project timelines. Finally, the two actors were combined to provide an
assessment of the national alignment for ISAM capabilities in the context of the drivers and
urgency parameters.
The third research question was also answered from an international perspective. The actors
were identified from the United States national strategy documentation and funded, recent
projects. This section did not seek to directly interpret a country’s strategic documentation.
Instead, U.S. interpretations of a country’s strategic documentation informed the perceived goals
and objectives of that actor. Stated plans and observed activities served to inform the presence of
ISAM activities. As with the national perspective, the intent of the third research question was to
identify who was using (or planning to use) ISAM capabilities, why, and when.
The challenges parameter, of the four-part framework, was informed by the fourth research
question, “What characteristics impact the adoption of ISAM in the space economy?” This
question was answered by first considering the challenges most commonly identified with
adopting ISAM capabilities. The challenges were assessed for characteristics that could enable
adoption. Finally, the use cases generated as part of the second research question were used to
exercise the four-part framework and communicate recommended actions towards achieving an
ISAM-enabled Space Superhighway. The intent of the fourth research question was to
communicate the potential challenges and enablers surrounding the development of an ISAMenabled in-space economy.
The data sources for each research question included unclassified, literature review and
conversations with experts. The literature reviewed was primarily constrained to the past five
years to capture the latest technology. This constraint did not apply to historical documentation.
Another literature constraint was the inclusion of documentation written in English or the
English translations of documentation. For those situations where English translations were not
available, U.S. interpretations of the documents of interest were used. These interpretations were
multi-sourced, from U.S. government agencies, and/or recognized policy organizations.
The ISAM National Strategy participants list served as a starting point for conversations with
experts. The list of experts was expanded based on recommendations. Conversations with
experts at multiple organization and at a variety of levels within the organizations occurred. The
national security and civil space sectors were the dominant focus of conversations.
Conversations with international representatives did not occur.
4
Document Overview
The organization of this document is presented in the figure below. Chapter 2 answered the
first research question by providing a basic understanding and definitions of what constitutes
ISAM. Chapter 3 answered the second research question with an assessment of the technology
maturity of ISAM capabilities to inform when the capabilities could be used. Chapter 4 and 5
both answer the third research question with an overview of the stakeholders and their priorities
for ISAM capabilities. Chapter 4 focuses on the national perspective whereas Chapter 5
examines the international perspective. Chapter 6 answered the final research question with an
assessment of the challenges associated with adopting ISAM capabilities. This chapter also
describes the technology maturity, the drivers, the urgency, and the challenges associated with
sample ISAM-enabled use cases. Recommendations for initial steps towards the adoption of
ISAM capabilities are provided.
Figure 2 Study Overview
5
Chapter 2. What is ISAM?
Research Question #1 What is ISAM?
The term “ISAM” is an acronym for In-space Servicing, Assembly, and Manufacturing. The
recent 2022 ISAM National Strategy8 considers this term as referring to “a suite of capabilities,
which are used on-orbit, on the surface of celestial bodies, and in transit between these regimes.”
The National Strategy considers this suite of capabilities a potential enabler for “sustained
economic activity and human presence in space.” The strategy conveys the vision of a “marketfocused ecosystem” similar to the vision portrayed by the Space Superhighway.
Important is to first understand that ISAM is not a single technology9.
ISAM refers to a multitude of capabilities that together contribute to a
potential independence, or reduced dependence, on Earth-based capabilities
and resources.
The ISAM acronym itself communicates much of what the suite of capabilities is intended to
include and refers to three high-level categories that describe the set of capabilities: Servicing,
Assembly, and Manufacturing.
The term “ISAM” is a new term that succeeded multiple name changes in a short period of
time. Although the ISAM concept is not new, the growing demand for adoption of the
capabilities is renewing interest in the concept. Consequently, organizations such as the
Consortium for Execution of Rendezvous and Servicing Operations (CONFERS) focused efforts
on standardizing terminology to ensure consistency of communication.
Consistent and well-defined terminology enables accuracy of communications within and
across organizational boundaries. ISAM is expected to cross all three space sectors, multiple
organizations, and international boundaries. Developing a common definition can support the
development of the technology and simplify international communications. Similarly, a common
8
The Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) led an interagency effort for the development of a national
strategy to On-orbit Servicing, Assembly, and Manufacturing. This strategy was published in 2022 as the In-Space
Servicing, Assembly, and Manufacturing National Strategy.
9
Arney, Dale, et al., On-orbit Servicing, Assembly, and Manufacturing (OSAM) State of Play, 2021 Edition, NASA,
October 27, 2021.
Corbin, Benjamin A., et al., Global Trends in On Orbit Servicing, Assembly, and Manufacturing (OSAM), IDA,
March 2020.
Conversations with NASA experts
6
definition can facilitate the evaluation of policy implications to a developing technology and
intended vision for that technology.
Many conversations with experts revealed remaining confusion or uncertainty about what
exactly constitutes ISAM. The breadth of technologies captured by ISAM creates a natural
complexity when organizing ISAM capabilities. Most experts felt that through time and
application, the ISAM definition would mature and become better understood. For the purposes
of this study, a simplified set of definitions and organization is created to provide clarity and
consistency of communications in the development of policy recommendations.
What follows below is an analysis of the ISAM definitions. The intent of the first research
question is to understand the different community perspectives of ISAM (national security,
commercial, civil, international) and to produce definitions for the purposes of this study. In
doing so, the reader should obtain a comprehension of ISAM capabilities and be introduced to
future use cases. For readers with pre-existing knowledge of ISAM capabilities, the final set of
definitions and organizational structure is found in Table 5 Final Set of Definitions and Figure 8
Simplified ISAM Categorizations.
Methodology
Research in support of the first research question included reviewing the history of ISAM,
the identification of terms related to ISAM, and the identification of recent documents related to
ISAM. Data sources for historical information included conversation with experts, National
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) literature, and Russian spaceflight literature. The
identification of terms also came from conversations with experts, NASA documentation, United
States Space Force (USSF) documentation, and private sector documentation. Conversations
with experts and literature search based on the terms led to the identification of the primary data
sources used for the development of definitions. Additionally, these primary data sources were
restricted to the past five years to capture the most recent terminology and the latest technology
capabilities.
The approach first reviewed the categorizations of the technology with the support of
historical example implementations. Projects in development and future plans were then
evaluated in the context of the categorizations. Finally, a set of definitions and simplified
categorization was created for the purpose of this study.
The historical information and the identification of terms provided context and supporting
information to the creation of definitions. The primary data sources for the development of
definitions included the 2020 Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA) study on the “Global Trends
7
in On Orbit Servicing, Assembly and Manufacturing (OSAM)”, the 2021 National Initiative
OSAM State of Play, the 2022 CONFERS Lexicon10, and the 2022 National Strategy.
These four sources were chosen because the compilation of the data sources produced a
diversification of perspectives and stakeholders. The National Strategy included government
participation from the national security and civil space sectors. The CONFERS Lexicon was
developed by industry participants (with government as observers). The NASA-led OSAM State
of Play was authored by primarily government and Federally Funded Research and Development
Center (FFRDC) participation. The IDA study, which interviewed a significant list of
participants from the international and/or private sectors, contributed balance to those data
sources heavily represented by government.
The diagrams below described the compiled data set from a Civil – Commercial - National
Security set of perspectives and an International – Commercial - Government set of perspectives.
The combination of the four data sources reflects adequate coverage of the major space sector
communities. The diagrams suggest that these combined data sources better represent the U.S.
government perspectives with potential to improve other perspectives. Since this research
emphasizes the U.S. government participation in ISAM, the balance of perspectives is
considered adequate for the purposes of this study.
10
The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) initiated and funded Consortium for Execution of
Rendezvous and Servicing Operations (CONFERS). CONFERS is an industry forum with a published lexicon.
During the performance of this research study, CONFERS transitioned to a fully privately funded forum.
Barnhart, David A., et al., Using Historical Practices to Develop Safety Standards for Cooperative On-Orbit
Rendezvous and Proximity Operations, 2018.
CONFERS, “CONFERS Resources & Publications,” webpage, undated. As of February 10, 2023:
https://www.satelliteconfers.org/publications/
CONFERS, “CONFERS Lexicon,” webpage, April 2022. As of February 10, 2023:
https://www.satelliteconfers.org/confers-lexicon/
8
Figure 3 Data Sources
The primary data sources were reviewed for similarities and differences in the interpretation
of what defines ISAM. Since this study does not intend to redefine ISAM, common trends in
interpretations were maintained. For example, the organization of ISAM into categories and
capability areas was maintained. However, simplification and organization of terms was applied
in those areas that experts stated confusion or redundancy was observed. The resulting ISAM
definitions and organization enabled systematic evaluation in subsequent research questions.
9
ISAM Category Definitions
The definition of the Servicing category from each data source is shown in Table 1. The
definitions generally convey the use of a spacecraft to physically interact with another spacecraft.
The intent of the interaction being to repair or modify the target spacecraft.
Table 1 Servicing Definitions
Source
Definition of Servicing
2022 National Strategy
…the in-space inspection, life extension,
repair, or alteration of a spacecraft after its
initial launch
2022 CONFERS Lexicon11
Activities by a servicer spacecraft or
servicing agent on a client space object which
require rendezvous and/or proximity
operations.
2021 OSAM State of Play
…the alteration of a spacecraft after its
initial launch
2020 IDA study on OSAM Global Trends
…the on-orbit alteration of a satellite after
its initial launch, using another spacecraft to
conduct these alterations.
The 2020 IDA study on the “Global Trends in On Orbit Servicing, Assembly and
Manufacturing (OSAM)” and the State of Play both defined satellite servicing as a post-launch
alteration of the spacecraft. IDA made a slight expansion to the definition of Servicing, such that
the inherent use of another spacecraft to perform the servicing was explicitly acknowledged. The
CONFERS Lexicon definition also acknowledged a servicer spacecraft and incorporated the
terms “agent” and “client.” CONFERS is comprised of industry membership so the use of terms
such as agent and client are representative of their business perspective.
The National Strategy appeared to be based on that of the State of Play, but augmented the
definition with the recognition of example services (or use cases), such as in-space inspection
and life extension. The inclusion of “in-space inspection” recognizes that a service may be
limited to the observation of a client spacecraft without touching the client spacecraft. The lack
of physical interaction makes inspection unique and is a source of confusion. Inspection
capabilities received unusual attention due to recent national security drivers for space situational
11
Definition for “On-Orbit Servicing”
10
awareness and intelligence gathering of spacecraft. The inspection use case is discussed in
Chapter 3.
Despite the minor differences, all sources agreed upon Servicing as being a category
applicable and relevant to activities occurring post-launch.
The defining characteristics of Servicing are:
• the timing of the activities which is post-launch as opposed to the
traditional pre-launch modification of spacecraft, and
• the intent to apply the capability of an external spacecraft to the target
(or client) spacecraft.
More simply stated, the Servicing of a spacecraft means interacting with the pre-launch state
of a spacecraft in a post-launch environment. However, an observation worth noting is that over
time this simple description of Servicing will become outdated. With the increased application of
Servicing, there may eventually be multiple post-launch interactions with a spacecraft, such as
the repeated upgrade of sensors.
The definition of the Assembly category from each data source is shown in Table 2.
Table 2 Assembly Definitions
Source
Definition of Assembly
2022 National Strategy
…the construction of space systems in
space using pre-manufactured components
2022 CONFERS Lexicon12
On-orbit activities to physically attach
objects to each other.
2021 OSAM State of Play
…aggregation and connection of
components to create a spacecraft or module
2020 IDA study on OSAM Global Trends
…the on-orbit aggregation of components
to constitute a spacecraft or spacecraft
subsystem.
The CONFERS definition of Assembly was much simpler than the others and concisely
described Assembly as the action of attaching objects while on-orbit. Both the State of Play and
the IDA report use very similar definitions that produce the same intent as the CONFERS
definition. The National Strategy augments the definitions with the explicit identification of pre-
12
Definition for “On-Orbit Servicing”
11
manufactured components. Doing so separates the construction (or assembly) of a space system
from the manufacture of components for assembly.
Most of the confusion, with regards to assembly, was related to the level of precision
implemented in assembly. Experts agreed the intent of assembly is to create something greater
than was launched. However, some experts distinguished between the level of precision required
to connect two space station modules and that required to construct a large telescope13.
The State of Play and IDA reports further describes the International Space Station (ISS) as
an example of Assembly. The report explains that the ISS parts and components were designed
and built on Earth, launched into space, and then assembled on orbit14.
The defining characteristic of Assembly is the in-space (as
opposed to on Earth) creation of a structure more complex than
the individual components.
The remaining category, Manufacturing, refers to nascent capabilities. The definition of the
Manufacturing category from each data source is shown in Table 3.
Table 3 Manufacturing Definitions
Source
2022 National Strategy
Definition of Manufacturing
…the transformation of raw or recycled
materials into components, products, or
infrastructure in space
2022 CONFERS Lexicon15
none
2021 OSAM State of Play
…transformation of raw materials into
usable spacecraft components
2020 IDA study on OSAM Global Trends
…the on-orbit transformation of raw
materials into usable spacecraft components.
The CONFERS Lexicon does not include a definition for manufacturing. However, the
National Strategy, the State of Play, and IDA produced nearly identical definitions of
Manufacturing. They defined Manufacturing as “the on-orbit transformation of materials into
13
National Aeronautics and Space Administration, “Building Structures in Space,” webpage, August 1996. As of
February 10, 2023: https://www.nasa.gov/centers/langley/news/factsheets/Bldg-structures.html
14
Arney, et al., 2021
15
Definition for “On-Orbit Servicing”
12
usable spacecraft components.” Further review of the State of Play and IDA reports reveals that
both sources interpret the raw materials as potentially Earth sourced or from materials already
resident in space.
The defining characteristics of Manufacturing are:
• the use of Earth based and/or man-made or natural materials already in
space, and
• the physical transformation of the materials accomplished while in space as
opposed to on Earth.
Despite minor variances, all three sources produced very similar definitions of the Servicing,
Assembly, and Manufacturing categories. Their category definitions and the defining
characteristics described above were used to create definitions for the purposes of this study. An
initial iteration of these definitions is described in Table 4. The final set of definitions is
described in Table 5 and results from an evaluation of the sub-categories, called “capability
areas.” The addition of a Cross-Cutting category is the change to note between iterations of the
definitions.
Table 4 Initial Set of Definitions
Topic
Category
Study
Definition
In-space Servicing, Assembly, and Manufacturing
Servicing
Assembly
The alteration
of a spacecraft
after its initial
launch and orbital
insertion
The
connection of
components inspace to construct
a system
Manufacturing
The
transformation of
raw or recycled
materials into
components
The Many Names of ISAM
The suite of ISAM technologies is also commonly known throughout the literature as OnOrbit Servicing, Assembly, and Manufacturing, or OSAM, and Satellite Servicing. The defense
community also utilized a series of terms. The OSAM and ISAM terms are the more recent
names. Although the terms discussed below remain present in literature, they key point to
remember from this section is that this study uses the term “ISAM.” Earlier terms, such as
satellite servicing, OSAM, and Space Mobility and Logistics (SML) were used interchangeably
with the term ISAM.
13
The OSAM to ISAM name change occurred during the course of this study. The name
change became a popular point of discussion by experts and decision makers that suggested
confusion and uncertainty of a developing concept. Because so much attention was given to the
name changes, a section about the history that led to the creation of the most recent term,
“ISAM,” was provided. Organizational collaboration was observed to be the driver behind the
maturation of the terms.
The generalized use of the word “servicing” is found in a 1965 NASA Dictionary of
Technical Terms for Aerospace Use16. The word appears as an example for the term rendezvous
and states “A rendezvous would be involved, for example, in servicing or resupplying a space
station.” The term “satellite servicing” is found in literature dating back to 198017. NASA
authors Kessler et. al, suggested the use of the Space Shuttle to remove space debris from orbit,
to move the objects to other orbits with less traffic, and to retrieve satellites from orbit with the
assistance of a remote manipulator. They also recommended the “repair and maintenance of
orbiting spacecraft, observation of orbiting systems, and the retrieval of satellites for return to
Earth.” Their vision included the visual inspection of damaged spacecraft and potential repair,
the resupply of propellants and other consumables, the repair and replacement of components,
and general alterations to a spacecraft. Early Space Shuttle missions brought to life this vision
with the retrieval and repair of communication satellites, science satellites, and, notably, the
Hubble Space Telescope.
The early literature and Space Shuttle applications demonstrate that the satellite servicing
term maintained the same intent as today. Such intent being the resupply, repair, or other benefitof-change applied to an operational satellite. The combined efforts of the Space Shuttle and the
International Space Station created more servicing opportunities with the maintenance and repair
of the space station that continues today18.
The OSAM term was born from parallel initiatives to promote collaboration between NASA
centers and other agencies19. In 2016 Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) and Langley
Research Center (LaRC) began discussions on areas of synergy between the two NASA centers.
Ongoing during this time was the development of James Webb Space Telescope (JWST), whose
engineering complexity inspired some to ask how JWST could be repeated in the future but with
16
Allen, William H., Dictionary of Technical Terms for Aerospace Use, NASA, January 1, 1965.
17
Portree, David S. F. and Joseph P. Loftus, Jr., Orbital debris and near-Earth environmental management: A
chronology, NASA, December 1, 1993.
Kessler, D. J., et al., “Aerospace: Collision avoidance in space: Proliferating payloads and space debris prompt
action to prevent accidents,” IEEE Spectrum, vol. 17, no. 6, pp. 37-41, June 1980.
18
National Aeronautics and Space Administration, On-Orbit Satellite Servicing Study, October 2010.
19
The discussion that follows was informed through conversations with NASA and USSF agency representatives.
14
reduced residual risks particularly those associated with the origami solar shade. In other words,
is there a different approach to building future large, complex structures?
Both centers employed expertise in robotics with LaRC developing precision assembly and
GSFC developing satellite servicing. The two NASA centers agreed to partner on in-space
construction efforts with LaRC, the research center, focusing on the technology development
efforts and GSFC, the flight center, focusing on mission implementation.
NASA leadership encouraged the partnership of a third center, which led to the inclusion of
NASA’s Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC). MSFC’s in-space manufacturing efforts had
stable funding and little overlap with the other centers. Furthermore, manufacturing was
recognized as a key enabler that was separate and distinct from assembly. Thus, this trio of
NASA centers committed to LaRC providing the technology development for Assembly, GSFC
leading the relevant science missions, and MSFC providing the Manufacturing development and
leading the relevant human exploration missions.
During this time, a parallel effort began with the intent of aligning thinking on areas of
commonality between NASA and other agencies. These discussions initially identified In-Space
Assembly as a capability enabler that crossed agency boundaries and ultimately led to
recognizing Servicing, Assembly, and Manufacturing as common areas for all organizations to
collaboratively engage. However, some organizations wanted to buy services from commercial
vendors. In parallel, some strategically minded thinkers saw long-term opportunity in focusing
on the collaborative development of capability enablers and not simply a one-and-done mission.
Thus, this cross-agency collaboration created the On-Orbit Servicing, Assembly, and
Manufacturing National Initiative.
The Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) led an interagency effort to develop a
national strategy for OSAM. This strategy was published in 2022 as the In-Space Servicing,
Assembly, and Manufacturing National Strategy. A last-minute name change from “on-orbit” to
“in-space” occurred. The “in-space” wording was intended to represent a long-term vision that
extended beyond Earth orbit and into deep space or “anywhere not on Earth.20”
The space community appears to have settled on the term ISAM21. Prior to the development
of the National Strategy, there was a similar series of name changes that occurred within the
defense community. Less detail is known about the history of these name changes. The satellite
servicing term eventually matured into Space Maneuver and Servicing which represented onorbit mobility and servicing. Then came the term Space Access, Mobility, and Logistics (SAML)
which led into the Space Mobility and Logistics, or SML term. SML is documented in the 2020
20
From conversations with USSF and NASA representatives and the Corbin, et al, 2020 report: For some nonNASA representatives, the OSAM term was considered a NASA term. Thus, the name change to “ISAM” could also
be interpreted as a national alignment and common path forward starting from the National Strategy.
21
Olson, J., et al., State of the Space Industrial Base 2022, August 2022.
15
Space Capstone Publication entitled Spacepower. The 2020 inaugural doctrine for the USSF
doctrine defines SML as “enabl[ing] movement and support of military equipment and personnel
in the space domain, from the space domain back to Earth, and to the space domain.”
This study uses the term “ISAM.” However, occurrences of OSAM, SML, SAML, satellite
servicing and so on remain present in documentation. The use of these historical terms is
interchangeable with the term ISAM.
16
Early Visions of ISAM
This section provides historical insights into past and continued efforts to realize satellite
servicing visions and the challenges encountered. Variations of the Space Superhighway vision
were conceived long ago. Popularized by Disney and Collier’s magazine, the visions of Dr.
Wernher von Braun also presented a futuristic outlook that embraced life in space22. His vision
was inspired by Jules Verne and included in-space refueling, the assembly of spacecraft on-orbit,
and space stations serving as staging areas for lunar exploration23.
However, the ambitious nature of these visions has yet to be fully realized.
Finding that past visions of satellite servicing were not adopted suggested
the need to examine why.
This finding created the impetus to examine (throughout the subsequent chapters) the
potential for the U.S. to adopt ISAM capabilities as part of the modernized Space Superhighway
vision.
Figure 4 Dr. Wernher von Braun's Early Visions of Life in Space
SOURCE: National Aeronautics and Space Administration, “Von Braun’s Early Wheel Space
Station Concept,” webpage, February 19, 2016. As of February 15, 2023:
https://www.nasa.gov/centers/marshall/history/stations/images/early-wheel-station-concept
The Space Shuttle provided a transportation system for humans and payloads for decades.
22
Wright, Mike. “Article on Von Braun and Walt Disney,” webpage, August 3, 2017. As of February 11, 2023:
https://www.nasa.gov/centers/marshall/history/vonbraun/disney_article.html
23
The reader will later find that NASA’s Gateway serves a similar purpose.
Novak, Matt, “Wernher von Braun’s Martian Chronicles,” webpage, July 30, 2012. As of February 3, 2023:
https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/wernher-von-brauns-martian-chronicles-9845747/
17
The availability of the Space Shuttle created a synergy that justified the need for
the shuttle and created demand for servicing capabilities.
The aligned interests afforded the realization of new ideas such as satellite servicing.
In 1983, the shuttle retrieved the SPAS-01 satellite24. Almost a year later, the shuttle
performed the first satellite repair on the Solar Maximum Mission25. Continued flights
demonstrated satellite refueling capabilities, more satellite retrievals and repairs, and even a
privately funded servicing mission for the Intelsat VI in 199226. Although these servicing
missions were dependent on astronauts, they represented early steps towards the Space
Superhighway vision.
Landsat
An interesting historical point worth noting is that Landsat 4 and 5 were built with large fuel
tanks to accommodate anticipated servicing by a polar orbiting Space Shuttle. The fuel tanks
were necessary to lower the orbits of the satellites to that of the shuttle’s orbit for repairs. After
repairs and maintenance, the Landsat satellites were planned to return to their operational
orbits27. The polar orbiting flights of the shuttle, to be launched from Vandenberg Air Force
Base, were canceled following the Challenger accident28. The large capacity of the fuel tanks
was not wasted and enabled Landsat 5 to last 29 years. This extended operational lifetime
enabled the Landsat program to maintain data continuity during the 2003 scan line corrector
anomaly on Landsat 7 and until the 2013 launch of Landsat 829.
The Hubble Servicing Missions
The Hubble Servicing Missions are a good example of well-timed and aligned interests
among multiple actors. The mission development provides insight into the risk trades the
engineers considered and the challenges associated with finding a balance between costs spent
24
SPAS is Shuttle Pallet Satellite; Reichhardt, 2002
25
Reichhardt, 2002, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 2010
26
Engelbert and Dupuis, 1998; Reichhardt, 2002
27
Riebeek, Holli, “Historic Landsat 5 Mission Ends,” webpage, June 26, 2013. As of February 11, 2023:
https://landsat.gsfc.nasa.gov/article/historic-landsat-5-mission-ends/
Conversations with USGS
28
National Aeronautics and Space Administration, “Space Shuttle and International Space Station,” webpage,
undated. As of February 11, 2023: https://www.nasa.gov/centers/kennedy/about/information/shuttle_faq.html#11
29
Conversations with USGS
18
on the science objectives and on the serviceability of the spacecraft. The issues encountered
remain relevant today.
In 1970 Nancy Roman and Marc Aucremanne briefed to NASA plans for a two-meter
telescope to be followed by a Large Space Telescope. The timing of these briefings occurred just
two years before the Space Shuttle Program received presidential approval in 197230.
The telescope plans included a modular concept with the intention of using the Space Shuttle
and the astronauts to accomplish instrument upgrades, maintenance, and repairs. The plans
proposed upgrading instruments "every few years" to maintain state of the art technology31. An
Orbiting Astronomical Observatories/Large Space Telescope Shuttle Economics Study
concluded that multiple launches of the Space Shuttle were more cost effective than multiple
Titan III launches. The study argued that the flexibility of the Space Shuttle to repair, maintain,
and upgrade the telescope would be cheaper than building a telescope that could last the entire
life of the mission32.
The idea of telescope serviceability was discussed in the 1970s before a mature
understanding of the Space Shuttle costs existed. The early years of the Space Shuttle Program
realized the flights would be less frequent and more costly than originally anticipated33. The
debates about whether to service the telescope on-orbit, on the ground, or at all continued for
over a decade. In 1984, program management decided to commit to the on-orbit servicing
approach. Their decision was justified by the realization that returning the telescope to the
ground for servicing came with a high likelihood of the telescope becoming permanently
grounded34.
Leading up to this decision, was a 1983 Ed Weiler memo that communicated a vision for the
periodic replacement of the telescope’s scientific instruments as part of future Announcements of
Opportunity35. He recognized that servicing a functioning satellite came with risks.
The decision to repair needed to consider the risks of the repair, the science and
operations impact, and the scientific value to be gained from the repair.
30
Smith, Robert W., et al., The Space Telescope, Cambridge University Press, 1989.
31
Smith, 1989
32
The Orbiting Astronomical Observatories/Large Space Telescope Shuttle Economics Study is also known as the
Grumman shuttle study, where Grumman later became Northrop Grumman.
Gainor, Christopher, Not yet Imagined, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 2020.
Smith, 1989
33
Gainor, 2020
34
Zimmerman, Robert, The Universe in a Mirror, Princeton University Press, 2008.
35
Weiler, Edward J., “Space Telescope Scientific Instruments Maintenance and Refurbishment,” memorandum,
December 18, 1983.
19
The Weiler memo encouraged NASA to consider innovative Maintenance & Repair (M&R)
concepts, such as the modular replacement of electronic boxes on orbit.
Weiler recognized the significant funding needs to develop M&R and acknowledged that
"huge M&R budgets may preclude other space science missions." He believed that by
"minimizing Space Shuttle visits and maximizing repair work in space" the original goal of
producing "a long-lived observatory in space to serve the science community for over a decade"
could be met.
A point worth noting is that many of the satellites serviced by the shuttle were not prepared
for servicing. In contrast, the development of the Hubble Space Telescope included design
concepts to facilitate ease of planned servicing missions. These plans included training, hardware
design, procedure development, testing, verification, contingency planning, and simulations. The
investment in planning and preparation for servicing capabilities proved worthwhile when the
Hubble Space Telescope needed corrective optics to repair an optical flaw in the primary mirror.
Although the infrastructure and planning were developed for other repairs and
maintenance, the preparations also facilitated the repair of an unexpected and
critical flaw revealed at the start of the observatory’s life. (NASA, October 2010)
The Hubble Servicing Missions represented a well-timed alignment of interests between the
Space Shuttle, the Hubble Space Telescope, and the science community. The long-term focus
and the availability of the Space Shuttle enabled satellite servicing capabilities. However, the
unanticipated high costs of Space Shuttle operations limited the full realization of a continuously
updated, state of the art observatory. The programmatic decision-making challenges associated
with the Hubble Servicing Missions highlight the difficulties associated with new and uncertain
technologies. Despite a maturity of technology and national alignment of interests between the
Space Shuttle and the science community, the fiscal realities led to a short-lived, but notable step
towards the Space Superhighway vision.
Decades later, ISAM capabilities have since matured and embraced a robotic approach with
minimal astronaut dependencies. Although barriers remain high, the cost to access space has
decreased. New interests and reasons to pursue ISAM capabilities exist. What remains uncertain
is the extent to which this renewed interest in ISAM capabilities will contribute to a realization
of the Space Superhighway vision.
20
Robotic Servicing of Geosynchronous Satellites
DARPA's RSGS program is worth a brief, historical review to observe the series of iterative
changes that led to the present effort36. The RSGS program has history dating back to 2002,
when an early study about space tugs going from LEO to GEO was completed. At the time,
launches were more expensive than the present. Thus, the interest was in launching satellites to
LEO and then tugging them to GEO. The study considered a fuel pod with multiple robotic arms
capable of relocating the satellite between orbits37.
DARPA then considered how to cost effectively mature the technology. The agency
converged on an approach that leveraged a heritage spacecraft bus but changed the front end.
The agency focused efforts on a robotics capability called Front-end Robotics Enabling Nearterm Demonstration, or FREND. The vision for FREND was the creation of a tow truck in space.
Concluded in 2008, this program lasted for a few years but lacked DoD community interest to
sustain the effort38.
In 2011, the Phoenix program eventually emerged with the intent of going to a graveyard
orbit and refurbishing defunct satellites39. This program also lacked community interest so
DARPA returned to the space tug concept but modified the concept to focus on GEO. DARPA
maintained that they would not pay for the satellite bus because Orbital Express (flown in 2007)
also did not achieve community interest40.
DARPA realized that a public-private partnership was needed to facilitate a long-term
business case. The decision was made that the private sector would fund and contribute a
commercial bus. The initial RSGS private sector partner was Maxar. However, this partnership
did not solidify because Maxar was unable to provide the necessary funding. A second RSGS
solicitation resulted in an award to Northrop Grumman SpaceLogistics.
36
The discussion that follows was based on conversations with DARPA and other supporting material referenced
where appropriate.
37
See RescueSat and Spacecraft for the Universal Modification of Orbits (SUMO) studies for more information,
Source: Roesler, Gordon, Paul Jaffe, and Glen Henshaw, “Inside DARPA’s Mission to Send a Repair Robot to
Geosynchronous Orbit,” webpage, March 8, 2017. As of February 16, 2023: https://spectrum.ieee.org/inside-darpasmission-to-send-a-repair-robot-to-geosynchronous-orbit
38
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, “Program Aims to Facilitate Robotic Servicing of Geosynchronous
Satellites,” webpage, March 25, 2016. As of February 16, 2023: https://www.darpa.mil/news-events/2016-03-25
The Space Report Online, “DARPA Makes FREND(s),” webpage, undated. As of February 16, 2023:
https://www.thespacereport.org/resources/darpa-makes-frends/
Arney, et al., 2022
39
Roesler, Gordon, Paul Jaffe, and Glen Henshaaw, 2017
Leone, Dan, “DARPA Selects Contractors for Phoenix Satellite Servicing Program,” webpage, July 9, 2012. As of
February 16, 2023: https://spacenews.com/darpa-selects-contractors-phoenix-satellite-servicing-program/
40
“In 2007, Orbital Express demonstrated automated rendezvous and capture, transfer of propellant, and transfer of
a spacecraft component.” Source: Arney, et al. 2022
21
The RSGS program is nearing completion and expected to achieve orbit in 2024. Northrop
Grumman is expected to begin servicing operations within 18 months of entering the proper orbit
and then three years to complete four missions. The demonstration will include relocation, repair,
and inspection capabilities41.
The series of efforts and contributions culminating in the RSGS program demonstrate
patience and a willingness to adapt to the needs of the community. The inclusion of a
commercial service approach may also prove to be a well-timed, economic opportunity.
Figure 5 DARPA RSGS Overview
SOURCE: Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
41
Worth noting is that DARPA is not involved in the development of refueling capabilities. The agency recognizes
that the private sector is already performing this capability and intentionally avoids areas of potential competition.
22
What Capabilities Exist within ISAM?
The categories of ISAM and their definitions were introduced above. However, ISAM is also
described by another layer of detail beyond the categories. The discussion that follows reviews
this additional layer with the intent of furthering an understanding of what is ISAM and
finalizing the definitions. This level of detail was necessary to develop the use cases that are later
used to demonstrate policy implications. The final set of definitions and organization are
available in Table 5 and Figure 8, respectively.
The Servicing, Assembly, and Manufacturing categories are each described by areas of
capability. The State of Play uses capability areas to “describe the functions or activities that
would be performed in space using OSAM.” Analyzing these areas from different data sources42
establishes the extent to which a common interpretation of the categories exists.
The different data sources were found to produce generally similar capability areas identified
suggesting a common interpretation. However, the terminology varied in the level of technical
detail used to describe the area. Some capability areas required the prerequisite support of other
areas listed, while other areas did not have supporting functions listed. Conversations revealed
some frustration with this confusing mix of areas. This suggested the need for a simpler
organization, particularly for communicating with a less technical audience and to facilitate the
development of policy.
An organization of the capability areas within each category and for each data source is
presented in Figure 6 below.
42
This section continues with the same primary data sources used to develop the category level definitions. As done
previously, the CONFERS information was pulled from their lexicon rather than an explicitly categorized set of
data. The areas displayed were chosen because they expressed an end objective or a means of achieving that
objective. The areas were assigned to the Servicing category because they fell within the published CONFERS
definition for “On-Orbit Servicing” and “Servicing Operations.”
Also worth noting is that the State of Play did not explicitly map the capability areas to the categories. For this
study, the State of Play’s capability areas were assigned to the categories based on the provided description of the
capability area and the State of Play’s category definition. Conversations with NASA personnel also confirmed the
appropriate placement and the NASA Thesaurus’ definition of the term “orbital servicing” provided further
assurance.
The NASA Thesaurus defines “orbital servicing” as “The replenishing of propellants, pressurants, coolants, and the
replacement of modules and experiments, during some phase of a spacecraft flight to extend the mission and lifetime
or change the payloads.” Notice the replenishment of consumables and replacement of parts for the purposes of life
extension or payload change are identified. This is consistent with the Servicing sub-categories defined by the other
sources. Source: National Aeronautics and Space Administration, NASA Thesaurus, Washington, DC: NASA, 2012.
23
Figure 6 ISAM Capability Areas by Data Source
24
The Servicing capability areas are presented in shades of green, the Assembly capability
areas in shades of blue, and the Manufacturing capability areas in shades of pink. The shades of
color and the box outlines distinguish the different data sources43.
The 2022 National Strategy and the 2021 State of Play provide capability areas for all three
of the Servicing, Assembly, and Manufacturing
The observed focus on the
categories. Whereas the 2020 IDA report and the
Servicing category suggests
2022 CONFERS Lexicon solely focused on the
more interest in the satellite
Servicing category and did not provide any subservicing capabilities
categorization for the Assembly and Manufacturing
categories. Recall from Figure 3 that the IDA report
and CONFERS represent the perspectives of the private sector and international communities.
43
The categorization for two of the capability areas within the State of Play were initially unclear. These two areas,
Structural Manufacturing & Assembly and Surface Construction, are clarified as follows:
•
•
Structural Manufacturing & Assembly, despite the use of the word “manufacturing,” was interpreted as
belonging solely to the Assembly category. This capability area was described by the State of Play as
“…the capability to produce structures in space out of components delivered from Earth.” This
description falls well within the State of Play’s Assembly definition, which refers to the “connection of
components.”
Surface Construction was described by the State of Play as “…excavating, constructing, and outfitting
structures and infrastructure on a planetary surface. Includes horizontal (landing pads, roads, etc.) and
vertical (power, habitation, etc.) construction, using regolith to build, and assembly of erected
structures.” The references to the construction of infrastructure and the transformation of materials
means this capability description satisfies the definitions for both the Assembly and Manufacturing
categories. Surface Construction is the only area to span multiple categories.
25
Reconfiguration of the Capability Areas
Figure 7 ISAM Categories & Capability Areas
NOTE: RPODU refers to rendezvous, proximity operations, docking, and undocking
Figure 7 was formed from a reorganization of Figure 6. The changes from Figure 6 to Figure
7 include:
• Removal of the redundant capability areas
• Addition of the Cross-Cutting category
• Assessing each capability area for categorization within the Cross-Cutting category
• Organization of the Servicing capability areas
The intent of the reorganization was to simplify the comprehension of the ISAM suite of
technologies and to offer a different perspective of an otherwise confusing topic.
The single category created was called Cross-Cutting. Each area was assessed for the
identification of prerequisite or required capabilities44. A closer look at the Servicing category
revealed that several capabilities included were also prerequisite technologies for the Assembly
and Manufacturing categories. These cross-cutting capabilities included robotic manipulation
44
The Arney et al, 2021, 2022 CONFERS Lexicon, and Corbin, et al., 2020 acknowledged the presence of
prerequisite or required capabilities.
26
and the variety of activities described as rendezvous, proximity operations, docking, and
undocking. The Cross-Cutting category was added to the definitions created for this study and is
shown in Table 5.
Table 5 Final Set of Definitions
The remaining Servicing capability areas were organized into: Alteration After Launch,
Relocation, and Replenishment. The term “Alteration After Launch” leverages the National
Strategy’s use of the term and includes those capabilities that involve changing the spacecraft in
a post-launch state. Repairing, replacing parts, upgrading a satellite, etc. are all activities
representative of altering (or changing) the satellite. Relocation can include moving a satellite
through large orbital changes, moving the spacecraft to a graveyard orbit, or simply repositioning
the satellite within another slot in Geostationary orbit.
The word “replenishment” is used within the NASA Thesaurus definition for “orbital
servicing.” 45 The relevant portion within the “orbital servicing” definition includes: “The
replenishing of propellants, pressurants, coolants… to extend the mission and life-time…”
Replenishment refers to the consumables within the spacecraft, such as fuel. Thus, fluid transfer
and IDA’s recharge (or power) area suitably described the term Replenishment.
45
National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 2012
27
Figure 8 Simplified ISAM Categorizations
Figure 8 provides a simplified organization of the ISAM categories and capabilities. This
organization and the definitions in Table 5 are used throughout the remainder of this study.
These definitions facilitate the development of policy recommendations based on a common
interpretation.
Some distinct use cases emerge from the above comprehension of ISAM. These use cases
include mission extension, debris removal, inspection, build a platform (such as the ISS),
maintenance and repair, upgrade and installation, and a permanent lunar habitat. The next
chapter explored these use cases in more detail and from the perspective of technology maturity.
The use cases are again used in Chapter 6 to demonstrate the final framework and provide policy
recommendations.
28
Findings
A majority of conversations with experts and decision makers began with the statement: “It
depends on how you define ISAM…” The ISAM definitions evaluated reflect a general
alignment of what defines ISAM, but variances exist within the details and in application of the
technology. These details can cause confusion when creating policy, when communicating in
different languages, and even between domestic organizations.
The breadth of the technologies and capabilities contained within the term “ISAM” is an
additional source of confusion. The Space Superhighway vision simplifies the confusion into a
high-level concept, but the extent of the technology suite can challenge the prioritization of
budgets and projects.
A set of definitions and organizational scheme were created to simplify the communication
and comprehension of the ISAM suite of capabilities. Presented in Table 5 and Figure 8, this
information was based on the definitions and perspectives from the national security, civil, and
commercial space sectors as well as international perspectives. Figure 7 also presents the same
organizational scheme, but with an added layer of detail that assists the reader with
understanding how the capabilities may be implemented. The organizational scheme was
developed based on a consolidation of diverse perspectives and the areas of confusion identified
by experts.
Finally, the research observes that ISAM capabilities are not new, but have yet to be adopted
into the standard mission development process. They have matured into more cost-effective,
robotic technologies suggesting a readiness for implementation. However, is this enough to
become part of the standard mission cycle? The remainder of this study explored the parameters
(technology maturity, drivers, urgency, challenges) that influence the adoption of ISAM
capabilities.
Findings from the first research question are as follows:
• Although the ISAM term is new, the vision of manufacturing and building spacecraft
while in space is not a new concept. This suggests the need for an examination of
why the concept has yet to be realized.
• The frequently changing names, the variances in details, and the breadth of the
technology suite can create confusion for policy makers and challenge the
development of policy.
29
Chapter 3. The Technology Maturity of ISAM
Research Question #2 What is the technology maturity of ISAM?
The Space Superhighway vision presents an idealized state of fully implemented, mature
ISAM capabilities. The above discussion focused on understanding the categories and
capabilities that define ISAM. The following discussion provides insight into the current state of
the technology maturity to inform when the technology might be implemented.
The intent of the second research question is to understand the extent of technology maturity
and, in doing so, inform the near-term and long-term implications associated with that
technology. Whether the technology is in a conceptual state, developmental state, or is ready for
operational implementation is key to interpreting when the technology can become part of a use
case.
A simplified framework for interpreting the technology maturity associated with ISAM is
presented below. This framework will inform subsequent analysis of the drivers and urgency for
ISAM capabilities.
Methodology
The widely accepted NASA Technology Readiness Level (TRL)46 framework was first
considered to communicate the technology maturity for this study. However, the TRL framework
is more complex than is needed for this study. NASA’s framework spans from the conceptual
state of a technology through the development of that technology and to the flown, integrated
mission operations of that technology. The latter levels were the most relevant to this study
because they distinguished technology that was ready for operational implementation and
integration into a larger system47.
46
Gonzalez, Tara D, “Technology Readiness Levels and the Linear Model of Innovation at NASA and DOE,” U.S.
Department of Energy, May 31, 2018.
National Aeronautics and Space Administration, “Technology Readiness Level,” webpage, October 28, 2012. As of
February 10, 2023: https://www.nasa.gov/directorates/heo/scan/engineering/technology/technology_readiness_level
47
This study did not apply TRL designations. Instead, the TRL scale served as a general guide and inspiration in the
development of a simpler framework.
30
Further consideration of the TRL scale, determined that this research study is primarily
focused on whether a capability has flown (or will soon fly)48. Two additional details emerged
from this simplified framework: 1) distinguishing systems vs component level and 2)
consideration of time.
Technology demonstrations can be sub-system level demonstrations that require significant
modification before applying to another mission. This study is not researching the sub-system or
component level ISAM technologies. Instead, the scope includes the integrated systems that
produce a developed capability that can be applied to another mission with minimal
modification.
Missions flown decades into the past do not necessarily mean that a capability still exists.
The Space Shuttle Hubble Servicing Missions are examples of early satellite servicing
capabilities that do not exist today. Maturations of the related technologies may exist, but these
do not always denote a system that is ready for implementation on a near-term mission. For this
reason, a time span limit was applied. Capabilities that were flown in the past five years or are
planned to fly in the next five years from the present are interpreted as a near-term capability.
The data sources included historical spaceflight documentation from different countries, past
satellite servicing or ISAM studies, government websites, and company announcements.
Although past, present, and future missions are provided as examples, this assessment was not
intended to be a comprehensive survey.
For each of the ISAM categories, examples of flown capabilities (or integrated systems) are
presented and organized into use cases. The cross-cutting category is not included, because the
intent of the framework is to communicate the presence of an integrated system flown for an
operational mission. Historical examples are included in the discussion to enable understanding
of the capability area but are excluded from the framework if not within five years of the present.
Assessment of the Technology Maturity
Satellite servicing dates back to the early days of spaceflight. In 1966, Gemini 10 docked
with the Agena rocket body and moved the stacked set of satellite objects49. This controlled
maneuvering of one object by another object is an early example of relocation. The next decade
48
The iSAT study and Arney, et al., 2021 each used similar approaches in that they did not explicitly use the TRL
scale but instead focused on example missions. iSAT study source: Mukherjee, Rudranarayan, When is it Worth
Assembling Observatories in Space?, 2019.
49
Engelbert, Phillis and Diane L. Dupuis, The Handy Space Answer Book, Visible Ink Press, 1998.
National Aeronautics and Space Administration, “What Was the Gemini Program?,” webpage, March 16, 2011. As
of February 10, 2023: https://www.nasa.gov/audience/forstudents/5-8/features/nasa-knows/what-was-geminiprogram-58.html
31
introduced refueling capabilities demonstrated by Progress and Salyut50. Years later, the Space
Shuttle demonstrated multiple astronaut-assisted retrieval and repairs of satellites51. In 1986, a
Soyuz T-15 retrieved and transferred cargo from Salyut 7 to Mir52. Each of these incremental
steps were enabled by maturing technology and creative approaches to fulfilling needs.
The following discussion explores the technology maturity of ISAM capabilities. Example
capabilities are organized in the form of use cases. Use cases are provided, because they
demonstrate how a capability can be applied to fulfill an intended purpose or need. Given the
dual-use nature of ISAM, these use cases all demonstrate that the purpose can fulfill both civil
and defense needs.
Use Case: Mission Extension
Relocation often occurs in combination with refueling activities. Present day use cases
implement these capabilities to accomplish mission extension. For example, ISS reboosts can
occur using the thrusters on the Service Module and Russia’s Progress vehicle. Fuel from the
Progress vehicle is transferred to the propellant storage tanks on the ISS to enable these
maneuvers53. These reboosts are necessary because the ISS is in low Earth orbit where the station
experiences atmospheric drag resulting in orbital decay.
Relocating the station to a higher orbit extends the life of the station. This same concept was
accomplished with the Northrop Grumman Mission Extension Vehicle (MEV), but in a different
orbit. The MEV relocated an Intelsat satellite from the graveyard orbit to GEO. The mission of
the Intelsat satellite was extended as a result of the MEV’s relocation and refueling services.
The distinction between the MEV and the ISS replenishment (or refueling) capabilities is the
method of replenishment. The MEV provided a separate propulsive capability that was added to
the satellite. In contrast, the ISS leverages a fluid transfer approach to perform the replenishment
and relocation services. Both the MEV and the ISS achieve the same goal of mission extension,
but the technical means by which they perform the replenishment and relocation capabilities are
different.
50
Godwin, Robert, Rocket and Space Corporation Energia, Apogee Books, 2001.
Reichhardt, Tony, Space Shuttle the First 20 Years, Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution, 2002.
52
Godwin, 2001
53
National Aeronautics and Space Administration, “About the Russian Progress Spacecraft,” webpage, August 16,
2018. As of February 10, 2023: https://www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/station/structure/elements/progress_about.html
National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Reference Guide to the International Space Station Utilization
Edition, September 2015.
51
32
China is also known to be developing refueling capabilities. Launched in 2016, the
Tianyuan-1 system demonstrated refueling of another satellite54 Additionally, the location of
their Tiangong space station in LEO necessitates a refueling capability to reboost the space
station for mission extension.
In development is the OSAM-1 (formerly Restore-L) mission which intends to refuel (via
fluid transfer) the Landsat-7 satellite. OSAM-1 is a technology demonstration mission that will
fly no earlier than (NET) 2026. The original intent of this mission was to refuel the Landsat-7
satellite to extend the life of Landsat-7 until its replacement, Landsat-9, was operational.
Use Case: Debris Removal
Debris, in the context of this use case, refers to relocating defunct satellites. However, debris
can also include rocket bodies and pieces shedding from man-made objects. Debris can vary in
size, mass, shape, rotation, orbit, and so on. A satellite servicing mission performing a debris
removal service is typically relocating an object (defunct satellite, rocket body, or otherwise).
The relocation may result in the deorbit of the object, moving the object to a graveyard orbit, or
transporting the object to an on-orbit facility (such as a space station) for repurposing or
recycling. The reader will find that the latter example (recycling) receives less attention in the
servicing community, because the relevant manufacturing technologies are not yet mature.
Similar to ISS reboosts, the 2001 deorbit of Russia’s Mir space station implemented ISAM
capabilities to intentionally reenter the station into Earth’s atmosphere. A series of deorbit burns
was performed using the Progress M1-5 vehicle attached to Mir to gradually lower the orbit of
the space station55.
A controlled disposal is desirable for satellites that are expected to have debris that survives
to the ground. Controlling the entry and the expected debris minimizes the potential for
casualties and damage on the ground. When the ISS reaches end-of-life, the space station will
undergo a similar process to perform a controlled descent and reentry56. These Mir and ISS
deorbit examples represent the relocation of satellites to accomplish the use case of debris
removal.
54
Fingas, Jon, “China successfully refuels a satellite in orbit,” webpage, July 2, 2016. As of February 10, 2023:
https://www.engadget.com/2016-07-02-china-refuels-satellite-in-orbit.html?guccounter=1
Lin, Jeffrey and P.W. Singer, “China’s largest space launch vehicle, the Long March 7 flies, with a Technological
Triple Whammy,” webpage, July 8, 2016. As of February 10, 2023: https://www.popsci.com/chinas-largest-spacelaunch-vehicle-long-march-7-flies-with-technological-triple-whammy/
55
Uri, John, “20 Years Ago: Space Station Mir Reenters Earth’s Atmosphere,” webpage, March 23, 2021. As of
February 10, 2023: https://www.nasa.gov/feature/20-years-ago-space-station-mir-reenters-earth-s-atmosphere
56
National Aeronautics and Space Administration, “FAQ: The International Space Station 2022 Transition Plan,”
webpage, February 11, 2022. As of February 10, 2023: https://www.nasa.gov/feature/faq-the-international-spacestation-2022-transition-plan
33
Debris removal of defunct satellites was accomplished by China’s Aolong-1 satellite in
201657, by SJ-17 in 201858, and recently by SJ-2159. A similar debris removal service will be
performed by the MEV when client satellites no longer need their refueling service and are ready
to be relocated to a graveyard orbit60. China’s missions and the MEV are situated in GEO where
debris removal means relocating defunct or end-of-life satellites to a graveyard orbit
approximately 300 km above GEO.61
Japan’s Astroscale is developing a debris removal capability for satellites in all orbits. In
2021, Astroscale completed a technology demonstration of their inspection, rendezvous and
proximity operations capabilities in LEO62. The company is planning to leverage and further
mature this technology with an inspection mission of a JAXA rocket body in the next year and
another demonstration mission planned for 2024 on a client satellite63. The 2024 mission is a
partnership with the UK Space Agency, ESA, and OneWeb to perform end-of-life removal. The
company is also in partnership with multiple companies throughout the United Kingdom (UK) to
perform the Cleaning Outer Space missions through Innovative Capture (COSMIC) mission. The
COSMIC mission is expected to fly by 2026 and will remove two British satellites from orbit64.
The European Space Agency (ESA) is also investing in debris removal capabilities. ESA
purchased a debris removal service to re-enter the Vega Secondary Payload Adapter from LEO.
57
Liu and Singer, 2016; Arney, Dale, et al., In-space Servicing, Assembly, and Manufacturing (ISAM) State of
Play, 2022 Edition, NASA, 2022.
58
SJ is ShiJian; Burke, Kristin, China’s SJ-21 Framed as Demonstrating Growing On-Orbit Servicing, Assembly,
and Manufacturing (OSAM) Capabilities, December 9, 2021.
59
Hitchens, Theresa, “China’s SJ-21 ‘tugs’ dead satellite out of GEO belt: Trackers,” webpage, January 26, 2022.
As of February 10, 2023: https://breakingdefense.com/2022/01/chinas-sj-21-tugs-dead-satellite-ou
60
Cox, Vicki, “Mission Extension Vehicle: Breathing Life Back Into In-Orbit Satellites,” webpage, April 19, 2020.
As of February 10, 2023: https://news.northropgrumman.com/news/features/mission-extension-vehicle-breathinglife-back-into-in-orbit-satellites
61
The European Space Agency, “Enabling & Support,” webpage, April 10, 2008. As of February 10, 2023:
https://www.esa.int/ESA_Multimedia/Images/2008/03/Mitigation_scenarios_Graveyard_orbit_300_km_above_GE
O
National Environmental Satellite Data and Information Service, “Graveyard Orbits and the Satellite Afterlife,”
webpage, October 31, 2016. As of February 10, 2023: https://www.nesdis.noaa.gov/news/graveyard-orbits-and-thesatellite-afterlife
U.S. Government, Orbital Debris Mitigation Standard Practices November 2019 Update, 2019.
62
Astroscale, “ELSA-d-Astroscale, Securing Space,” webpage, undated. As of February 11, 2023:
https://astroscale.com/missions/elsa-d/
63
Foust, Jeff, “Rocket Lab to launch Astroscale inspection satellite,” webpage, September 23, 2021. As of February
18, 2023: https://spacenews.com/rocket-lab-to-launch-astroscale-inspection-satellite/
Astroscale, “ELSA-M-Astroscale, Securing Space,” webpage, undated. As of February 11, 2023:
https://astroscale.com/elsa-m/
64
Astroscale, “COSMIC-Astroscale, Securing Space,” webpage, undated. As of February 11, 2023:
https://astroscale.com/missions/cosmic/
34
This mission is called ClearSpace-1 and is planned to occur no earlier than 202565. Also in LEO,
is the U.S.’ Starfish Space which is planning a flight demonstration in 202366.
Use Case: Inspection
Various levels of inspection exist depending upon the type of information to be acquired.
Inspection can occur at a distance to simply determine the general shape and size of a satellite.
This type of inspection informs the type of satellite mission, such as a radar satellite vs. a
telescope. Inspection also occurs prior to physically interacting with another satellite. For
example, a servicer satellite approaching a client satellite will observe the client satellite to
identify the location of the docking port or to observe if an antenna failed to deploy. Some level
of inspection will naturally precede a servicing activity. Sometimes the inspection itself is the
service.
A well-exercised form of inspection historically occurred with the ISS inspection of the
orbiter belly for damage due to launch debris and micrometeoroid orbital debris. As part of
Return to Flight, new processes were implemented to inspect and repair the thermal tiles on the
wing leading edge and belly of the orbiters67. The inspection of the tiles occurred via robotic arm
performing a close survey of the tiles. A secondary inspection was also accomplished through
photographs taken by the astronauts on the ISS as the orbiter performed a back flip within view
of the station68. Both inspection approaches were completed upon arrival to the ISS and, again,
prior to departure from the ISS. This enabled time for ground analysis of the inspection data and
repairs to occur prior to re-entry.
The activity of inspection is done to collect information about another object. In the civilian
context, this could be to assess for damage areas and inform potential repairs. In the national
security context inspection can provide information on an adversary’s capabilities.
One of the earliest publicized occurrences of a satellite observing another satellite was
accomplished by the Centre National d’Etudes Spatiales (CNES) in 1998. The Satellites Pour
l’Observation de la Terre (SPOT) 4 encountered ideal viewing conditions while the European
Remote Sensing (ERS) 1 satellite passed beneath SPOT 4. With the aid of post-processing
65
The European Space Agency, “ESA purchases world-first debris removal mission from start-up,” webpage,
December 1, 2020. As of February 11, 2023: https://www.esa.int/Space_Safety/ESA_purchases_worldfirst_debris_removal_mission_from_start-up
66
Rainbow, Jason. “Starfish books launch for in-orbit satellite docking mission next fall,” webpage, November 11,
2022. As of February 11, 2023: https://spacenews.com/starfish-books-launch-for-in-orbit-satellite-docking-missionnext-fall/
67
National Aeronautics and Space Administration, “In-Flight Inspection and Repair,” webpage, July 2005. As of
February 11, 2023: https://www.nasa.gov/pdf/186088main_sts114_excerpt_inflight_repair.pdf
68
Chapline, Gail, et al., “Thermal Protection Systems,” in Hale, Wayne, et al., Wings in Orbit, National Aeronautics
and Space Administration, 2010.
35
software, the resulting image was able to distinguish the major features of the ERS-1 satellite69.
In 2012, CNES imaged Envisat after rotating their Pleiades satellite70. In both events, the
identification of features clearly identified the satellites as radar missions. Knowledge of the
mission type and measurements of the satellite payload inform the performance characteristics of
the data collected from that satellite. In the case of Envisat, the imaging occurred in an attempt to
characterize an ongoing anomaly investigation71.
Early surveillance activities were accomplished at a distance without maneuvering the
surveilling satellite. As capabilities matured, satellite surveillance began to include attitude
changes and eventually maneuvers (such as rendezvous) that intentionally approached other
satellites.
In 2014, the U.S. declassified the Geosynchronous Space Situational Awareness Program
(GSSAP) creating public awareness of ongoing surveillance activities and the maturity of the
inspection capability72. Public sources revealed that GSSAP satellites approached satellites from
China, Russia, Pakistan, and Nigeria73. From 2014-2020 Russia maneuvered throughout GEO
with intentional close approaches to foreign satellites74. For several years following a 2016
launch, China’s SJ-17 performed several rendezvous and proximity operations, and inspection
maneuvers of Chinese satellites75.
69
The European Space Agency, “ESA-ERS-1,” webpage, August 16, 2017. As of February 11, 2023:
https://www.esa.int/ESA_Multimedia/Images/1991/07/ERS-1
Centre National d’Etudes Spatiales, “SPOT,” webpage, undated. As of February 11, 2023:
https://spot.cnes.fr/en/SPOT/index.htm
Centre National d’Etudes Spatiales, “ERS-1 seen by SPOT4,” webpage, June 7, 2000. As of February 11, 2023:
http://spot4.cnes.fr/spot4_gb/im-ers-0.htm
70
The European Space Agency, “Pleiades image of Envisat,” webpage, April 20, 2012. As of February 11, 2023:
https://www.esa.int/ESA_Multimedia/Images/2012/04/Pleiades_image_of_Envisat
71
Amos, Jonathan, “Envisat imaged by sharp-eyed Pleiades,” webpage, April 2-, 2012. As of February 11, 2023:
https://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-17790420
The Planetary Society, “Envisat from Pleiades,” webpage, undated. As of February 11, 2023:
https://www.planetary.org/space-images/envisat-from-pleiades
72
Werner, Debra, “An In-Orbit Game of Cat and Mouse: Close approaches prompt calls for communications and
norms,” webpage, June 16, 2022. As of February 11, 2023: https://spacenews.com/an-in-orbit-game-of-cat-andmouse-close-approaches-prompt-calls-for-communications-and-norms/
Weeden, Brian and Victoria Samson., Global Counterspace Capabilities. Secure World Foundation, April 2021.
73
Weeden and Samson, 2021
74
Weeden and Samson, 2021
75
Burke, 2021
36
Use Case: Build a Platform
The assembly of the International Space Station leveraged the early assembly capabilities of
ISAM. The assembly of the ISS began with the Zarya module launched in 199876 and was
accomplished through a human-robot cooperative effort77. This continues today with the 2021
addition of Russia’s Nauka multipurpose laboratory module78.
China’s recently completed Tiangong-3 space station also depended on assembly capabilities
to build their space station79. Similarly, Russia’s historic Mir space station utilized early
assembly capabilities to connect the modules80.
Future assembly capabilities aim to achieve greater precision in assembly techniques. The
intended use case is the on-orbit assembly of a large telescope. Assembling the telescope in orbit
reduces the limitations imposed by launch vehicles and allows for larger apertures to be built81.
Note that the terminology for “platforms” often includes “space stations,” “persistent
platforms,” and “orbital outpost.” For the purposes of this study, these terms are used
interchangeably.
Use Case: Maintenance and Repair
The early days of repair in orbit occurred on Skylab, NASA’s first space station. Skylab’s
thermal shield was replaced with the help of astronauts performing an Extravehicular Mobility
Activity (EVA) in 197382. In 1981, the Solar Maximum Mission, which made unique use of a
modular design, was repaired by the crew of STS-41C83. Additional satellite repairs occurred
while the Space Shuttle was in operation. Notably, the 1992 STS-49 mission was a paid
servicing mission for the repair of Intelsat VI84.
Well known among historians, are the Hubble Space Telescope (HST) Hubble Servicing
Missions. As with the above repair missions, these servicing missions employed the use of the
76
National Aeronautics and Space Administration, “Zarya Cargo Module,” webpage, undated. As of February 11,
2023: https://www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/station/structure/elements/zarya-cargo-module
77
National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 2010
78
National Aeronautics and Space Administration, “Liftoff! Multipurpose Laboratory Module “Nauka” Launches to
Space Station,” webpage, July 21, 2021. As of February 11, 2023:
https://blogs.nasa.gov/spacestation/2021/07/21/liftoff-multipurpose-laboratory-module-nauka-launches-to-spacestation/
79
Smith, Marcia, China’s Human Spaceflight Program: Background and List of Crewed and Automated Launches,
November 20, 2022.
80
Godwin, 1971
81
Rudranarayan, 2019; JASON Science Advisory Panel, Space Assembly, March 2020.
82
National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 2010
83
STS is Space Transportation System; National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 2010
84
Engelbert and Dupuis, 1998; Reichhardt, 2002
37
Space Shuttle and the astronauts to facilitate the repairs. HST was designed with the expectation
of future satellite servicing missions. The telescope implemented orbital replacement unit and
orbit replacement instrument designs to enable maintenance and repairs. Repairs and
maintenance of the HST addressed the optics, the solar arrays, the flight computer, the
magnetometer, the gyroscope assemblies and electronic control units, and so on85.
The ISS also depends upon regular maintenance and repair activities to maintain operations.
Similar to the Space Shuttle servicing missions, the repair activities rely on a combination of
astronaut and robotic arm assistance. In contrast, present day servicing capabilities are pursuing
purely robotic means of maintenance and repair without a dependence on astronauts. In 2024, the
U.S. will launch the completed Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) Robotic
Servicing of Geosynchronous Satellites (RSGS) satellite, which was developed as a publicprivate partnership with Northrop Grumman. Using this capability, Northrop Grumman will
provide repair services to satellites in GEO86.
Use Case: Upgrade and Installation
The ISS is well known for hosting science payloads on the platform. NASA’s Science
Mission Directorate regularly leverages the Expedite the Processing of Experiments to the Space
Station racks (EXPRESS) Logistics Carrier (ELC). The ELC offers payloads standardized power
and data services. The payloads are installed using robotic arm capabilities87. The 2022
installation of NASA’s Earth Surface Mineral Dust Source Investigation (EMIT) on the ELC is
shown below.
85
National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 2010
Additional services such as relocation and inspection will also be offered.
Saplan, Ana, “Robotic Servicing of Geosynchronous Satellites,” webpage, undated. As of February 11, 2023:
https://www.darpa.mil/program/robotic-servicing-of-geosynchronous-satellites
SpaceLogistics, “Mission Robotic Vehicle,” webpage, undated. As of February 11, 2023:
https://www.northropgrumman.com/wp-content/uploads/Mission-Robotic-Vehicle-MRV-fact-sheet.pdf
Conversations with DARPA
87
National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 2015
86
38
Figure 9 Installation of the EMIT Science Payload on the ISS
SOURCE: National Aeronautics and Space Administration, “EMIT launch and post-launch video,”
video, October 20, 2022. As of February 13, 2023:
https://earth.jpl.nasa.gov/emit/resources/100/emit-launch-and-post-launch-video/
Upgrade and installation use cases are not restricted to space stations. The early visions of the
Hubble Space Telescope included the ability to change the science payloads through competitive
announcements of opportunity88.
Use Case: Permanent Lunar Habitat
The development and sustainment of a permanent settlement on the Moon depends on
multiple ISAM capabilities. Key to a sustained presence is the development of capabilities that
are not dependent on Earth resources. The construction and maintenance of a facility can involve
the excavation and processing of lunar regolith to fabricate building materials89. Similarly, the
capability to recycle or reuse materials enables greater dependence on local in-space resources.
Breaking down the materials enables the creation of new parts for use in maintaining the
habitat90.
This use case relies significantly on the ISAM capabilities within the Manufacturing
category. Most past and present manufacturing capabilities are technology demonstrations at the
sub-system or component level. The near term OSAM-1 and OSAM-2 projects are expected to
88
Weiler, 1983
Arney et al., 2021
90
Arney et al., 2021
89
39
demonstrate the manufacture of beams91. These are encouraging technology demonstrations that
may eventually contribute to a fully, integrated system.
Summary of Technology Maturity
Recall that the intent of this research question is to determine which ISAM capabilities have
the technology maturity to be near-term realities, and which do not. Table 6 reflects the results
from the perspective of ISAM categories and ISAM-enabled use cases. A near-term designation
reflects a capability within five years of the present (past or future). A long-term designation is
applied to capabilities beyond five years from the present.
Table 6 Technology Maturity
91
Arney et al., 2021
National Aeronautics and Space Administration, “NASA Funds Demonstration of Assembly and Manufacturing in
Space,” webpage, January 31, 2020. As of February 11, 2023: https://www.nasa.gov/press-release/nasa-fundsdemonstration-of-assembly-and-manufacturing-in-space
National Aeronautics and Space Administration, “On-Orbit Servicing, Assembly, and Manufacturing 2 (OSAM-2),”
webpage, undated. As of February 11, 2023: https://www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/tdm/osam-2.html
40
Findings
The Servicing and Assembly categories consist of near-term capabilities. Whereas the
Manufacturing category is described by long-term capabilities. Although use cases exist for each
of the categories, the use cases dominate the Servicing category. This is likely a reflection of the
maturity of those capabilities. In contrast, the Manufacturing category did not present any
integrated missions in the past or near future. The potential use cases and supporting
technologies remain in development and are interpreted as a long-term or low maturity
capability. Thus, the second research question finds that Servicing capabilities are the most
mature and ready for near-term implementation.
An observation that emerged from the above assessment is that many of the use cases
presented are regularly exercised on the ISS. This is because space stations possess an inherent
dependency on ISAM capabilities throughout their development and continued operations. In
contrast, satellites lack developmental dependencies on ISAM capabilities. The next section will
show that new requirements are driving an operational need for some satellites to leverage the
benefits of ISAM.
41
Chapter 4. The U.S. Implementation of ISAM
Research Question #3 Who are the key (U.S.) stakeholders and what are their priorities?
An assessment of the challenges associated with pursuing an in-space economy, such as that
portrayed by the Space Superhighway vision, requires a review of who will contribute to the
development of the economy, why (or how) they will leverage the capabilities, and when those
capabilities will be realized. This leads to the third research question which is answered by first
identifying the major actors involved and then assessing their priorities.
Understanding the priorities of stakeholders is necessary to determine the reality of whether
or not ISAM capabilities will be adopted. Evaluating the stakeholders involved informs the
potential for national alignment. Does a natural need or dependency for the capabilities exist
among all of the stakeholders? Or is the need present for individual stakeholders, but along
different timelines? Alternatively, does an opportunity exist without a driving a need? Assessing
the national alignment requires understanding the timing of the drivers necessitating the
implementation of ISAM capabilities. Recognizing gaps in the national alignment informs the
policy recommendations for achieving an in-space economy.
The intent of the third research question is to understand who will use ISAM capabilities,
when, why, and whether a national alignment of those interests exists.
Methodology
The actors were identified from a review of national strategy documents relevant to the
ISAM topic. These documents communicate the national interest and the national-level
stakeholders. Three actors emerge from the National Space Policy in the form of space sectors:
commercial, civil, and national security. Since the commercial space sector will leverage the
priorities of the national security and civil space sectors, the government space sectors remained
the focus of the priorities analysis. This chapter focuses solely on the U.S. actors. Chapter 5 will
examine the international actors.
The respective priorities of the national security and the civil space sectors were analyzed
separately since the organizations contained within the space sectors possess different goals,
objectives, and budgets. The results of the analyses informed whether the individual
organizations naturally contribute to a national alignment and areas where alignment may be
lacking (for which action is later recommended).
The priorities of the national security and civil space sector are described as drivers and
urgency. This study defines a “driver” as something creating an interest, need, or requirement for
42
ISAM. The urgency indicates a fiscal and timeline reality of that capability. Following the
individual sector assessments is a combined national perspective of the drivers and urgency for
ISAM capabilities. Drivers were identified through conversations with government leadership
and documentation pertaining to the guidance, direction, and concerns relevant to ISAM92. An
urgency for the driver was interpreted from budgets, contracts, and timelines93.
The data sources for the assessment of drivers were restricted to the last five years (unless a
directly relevant exception was present). The five-year time span was chosen because this
included the Biden and Trump administrations. Reviewing the present and former
administrations provided insight into the susceptibility of ISAM to changing administrations.
The time span also enabled present day drivers to be connected to present day technology
capabilities.
The identification of national security space sector drivers’ data sources were primarily the
most recent strategies for national security, defense, and Department of Defense (DoD) space.
Conversations with experts and secondary documents (at the suggestion of experts) were also
used to support the identification of drivers. The civil space sector drivers’ data sources were
primarily Space Policy Directive -1 and NASA specific agency and organization level
documentation within the past five years. The documentation included the agency’s strategic
plan recently released by the current administrator (thereby reflecting the Biden administration’s
guidance and priorities). The organizational level documentation focused on the two major areas
of focus within NASA: human spaceflight exploration and science exploration.
For both the national security and civil space sectors, the urgency was interpreted from
budgets, contracts, and timelines. The budgetary data sources primarily included the Fiscal Year
(FY)23 budget requests since that was the latest data available at the time of analysis. Although,
the FY23 appropriations were published after the analysis was completed, the new values were
reviewed for consistency. The budgetary values informed whether or not the drivers were
financially supported. An evaluation of whether or not the quantitative value of the budget is
adequate was beyond the scope of this study. Instead, the budget request was assumed to specify
the necessary funds. Budgetary line items were sometimes limited in availability. Discussions
with experts provided clarification.
The identification of contracts and timelines was accomplished through conversations with
experts and literature review. The contracts served as indicators for how the money was being
spent on the drivers. The project timelines provided (estimated) insight regarding when a mission
or capability might fly.
92
The scope of this study is restricted to unclassified information. Consequently, the Intelligence Community was
not explored in depth.
93
The data gathered for contracts was used to identify trends and not intended to be comprehensive.
43
Experts were identified by those participating in the OSTP-led ISAM National Strategy and
National Implementation Plan activities. Experts were also identified through the
recommendation of other experts and literature review.
This chapter closes with a summary of the national alignment. Chapter 5 revisits the same
research question from an international perspective. Chapter 6 communicates the challenges and
feasibility associated with a national implementation of ISAM capabilities. The combined set of
research parameters (technology maturity, drivers, urgency, challenges) inform the development
of recommendations.
What is the national interest for ISAM?
ISAM-relevant policy, strategy, and other high-level, cross-sector documents were reviewed
to understand the U.S. government interest in ISAM capabilities. These documents are not
agency-level strategies and associated budgets should not be assumed. Instead, the documents
provide insight into the prioritizations of government.
The national level documents reviewed spanned the current and the previous presidential
administrations94. Each of these documents recognized ISAM. Their continued recognition
demonstrates a trend in the national interest of ISAM and bipartisan support. The national
interest was further recognized by the completion of the 2022 ISAM National Strategy.
Within the U.S., space activities are divided at a national level across three “distinct but
interdependent sectors: commercial, civil, and national security.95” Each of these sectors are
interpreted as actors for which the 2020 National Space Policy provides guidelines.
The guidelines call for the use of “inventive, nontraditional arrangements for acquiring
commercial space goods and services to meet United States Government requirements, including
measures such as hosting Government capabilities on commercial spacecraft, … leveraging
satellite servicing or on-orbit manufacturing, and public-private partnerships…96"
Both the National Space Policy produced during the Trump administration and the U.S.
Space Priorities Framework produced during the Biden administration, prioritize a competitive
commercial space sector with explicit identification of ISAM activities. This suggests a
continued, national prioritization of the role of the commercial space sector as providing a
“global space marketplace.97”
94
The following documents were identified: the 2020 National Space Policy, the 2021 U.S. Space Priorities
Framework, and the 2022 ISAM National Strategy.
95
Executive Office of the President, 2020
96
Executive Office of the President, 2020
97
Executive Office of the President, 2020
44
The national priorities of the civil space sector are consistently recognized as leadership in
exploration and science with a focus on reaching the Moon and beyond. The use of commercial
space services and international partnerships are also a continuing theme of the civil space
sector98. Both administrations also prioritized the development of commercial space platforms as
a potential opportunity for maintaining a continued presence in LEO beyond the lifetime of the
ISS99.
The 2020 and 2021 policies provide consistent recognition of the national security space
threats. Both policies call for a national security space posture that accelerates the transition to
resilient space capabilities, such as “the ability to field or to rapidly reconstitute space
capabilities.100” They also specify the need to deter aggression and “to detect and attribute hostile
acts in space.101”
The 2022 ISAM National Strategy builds on the national space sector priorities and begins
developing a path forward for the U.S.’ development and application of ISAM. The 2022
strategy acknowledges an “increased reliance on space-based services” and the national intent to
maintain leadership by adopting new capabilities. ISAM capabilities are recognized as a means
"to accelerate a new, diverse, and market-focused ecosystem …”
The 2022 strategy states the ISAM benefits to the national space priorities include the
promotion of a sustainable space environment, improved scientific output, the creation of
sustainable in-space infrastructure, and the resilience of space systems and logistics.
Findings
The national-level documents convey both an interest and multiple opportunities through
which ISAM capabilities can support national priorities. The continuing theme of support
through both administrations suggests that ISAM is not just a passing fad but may have a
potential role to serve in the needs of the national space sectors.
98
Executive Office of the President, “Reinvigorating America’s Human Space Exploration Program,”
memorandum, December 11, 2017.
Executive Office of the President, “The National Space Policy,” memorandum, December 9, 2020.
The White House, United States Space Priorities Framework, December 2021.
99
Executive Office of the President, 2020
The White House, 2021
100
Executive Office of the President, 2020
101
The White House, 2021
45
Who are the primary U.S. ISAM actors?
What follows next is an assessment of why and when these sectors might pursue ISAM
capabilities. An understanding of "why" is accomplished through an assessment of the drivers for
each sector. An estimate of “when” the drivers may occur is assessed by considering the urgency
of the driver.
As mentioned previously, the 2020 National Space Policy recognizes three space sectors:
commercial, civil, and national security. This research study accepts the assumption that
commercial ISAM capabilities are expected to develop with government initially “as an anchor
tenant, but not the only tenant102”.
An example worth noting is the prior arrangement of the DARPA RSGS public-private
partnership103. DARPA was originally partnered with Maxar. However, RSGS required the
inclusion of private funding with the partnership. Due to the challenges of private funding in a
developing market, Maxar opted to instead partner with NASA’s OSAM-1 project. Previously
called Restore-L, NASA’s OSAM-1 project is fully funded by public funds. The distinct
difference in the funding profiles of two similar projects suggests a need for the continuation of
government support. Ultimately, DARPA was able to partner with Northrop Grumman’s
SpaceLogistics104.
The evaluation of whether or not a business case exists for ISAM capabilities is beyond the
scope of this study. Instead, this study assumes that the development of an ISAM enabled inspace economy will initially require the support of the government. Thus, the focus of this
research effort is scoped to the civil and national security space sectors.
For the purposes of this study, the sub-sector actors considered as part of the civil space
sector include NASA, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), and U.S.
Geological Survey (USGS). Similarly, the actors considered as part of the national security space
sector include anyone performing ISAM relevant efforts within the national security space
sector, such as the U.S. Space Force, the U.S. Air Force, DARPA, Defense Innovation Unit
(DIU), and the Intelligence Community105. The identification of the sub-sector actors was
accomplished through conversations with experts and the member list of the ISAM National
Strategy.
102
This assumption was obtained from and reinforced by: Olson, J., 2022; Corbin, 2020;
National Aeronautics and Space Administration, “In-space Servicing, Assembly, and Manufacturing Workshop,”
October 17-18, 2022.
CONFERS, “2022 Global Satellite Servicing Forum,” October 19-20, 2022.
Conversations with experts
103
Saplan, undated
104
Conversations with DARPA, NASA, and OMB experts
105
The scope of this study is restricted to unclassified information. Consequently, the Intelligence Community was
not explored in depth.
46
The sections that follow evaluate, by space sector, the drivers and urgency for ISAM
capabilities. This study defines a “driver” as something creating an interest, need, or requirement
for ISAM. Drivers were identified through conversations with government leadership and
documentation pertaining to the guidance, direction, and concerns relevant to ISAM. An urgency
for the driver was interpreted from budgets, contracts, and timelines106.
What are the National Security Space Sector drivers for ISAM?
This section evaluates whether drivers for ISAM capabilities exist in the national security
space sector. The presence of drivers is necessary to pursue the implementation of ISAM.
Inadequate or unclear drivers will inhibit the implementation. An example exists with NASA’s
Restore-L/OSAM-1 project. NASA’s 2016 Appropriations Act directed the agency to pursue this
effort despite the agency’s lack of interest in the capability. Although visionary in nature, this
project was ahead of its time and premised on the hope of future adoption. Consequently, the
project suffered from inadequate resources and low prioritization. This resulted in schedule
slippage and notoriety within the NASA organizations107.
The Space Superhighway vision denotes a long-term perspective with a consistent demand
signal. Thus, the drivers must be adequately justified to support a sustained implementation and
adoption of ISAM.
If drivers do not exist, then the development of infrastructure to support an
in-space economy will not occur.
An assessment of the National Security drivers began with a review of strategy documents.
These documents included the 2022 National Security Strategy (NSS)108, the 2022 National
Defense Strategy (NDS)109, and the 2020 DoD Space Strategy (DSS)110. In the context of ISAM,
the priorities communicated in these documents supported the implementation of ISAM
capabilities as a mechanism to achieve objectives. Although the DSS was produced under a
different administration, consistency was observed in the priorities communicated.
The 2022 NSS and the 2022 NDS both identify the U.S. national interests as the following
three objectives:
106
The data gathered for contracts was used to identify trends and not intended to be comprehensive.
Conversations with NASA and OMB; Government Accountability Office, NASA Assessments of Major Projects,
May 2021.
108
The White House, National Security Strategy, October 2022.
109
U.S. Department of Defense, National Defense Strategy of the United States of America, 2022.
110
U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Space Strategy Summary, June 2020.
107
47
• "Protect the security of the American people;”
• "Expand economic prosperity and opportunity; and"
• "[R]ealize and defend the democratic values at the heart of the American way of life."
The NSS states that the fulfillment of these objectives will involve domestic investment,
coalition building, and modernization of military forces. The strategy further calls for strategic
competition with China and recognizes China as “the only competitor with both the intent and,
increasingly, the capability to reshape the international order.” Russia is acknowledged in the
strategy as a dangerous force needing to be constrained but is not recognized as competitor.
Finally, the NSS emphasizes the need for the United States’ enduring leadership.
The NDS is implemented by the DoD in accordance with the ten-year window presented by
the NSS111. The NDS follows with the spirit of the NSS and builds a strategy to prevent China’s
dominance and "to dissuade the PRC from considering aggression as a viable means of
advancing goals that threaten vital U.S. national interest." The NDS identifies defense priorities
as:
• “Defending the homeland, paced to the growing muti-domain threat posed by the PRC;”
• “Deterring strategic attacks”
• “Deterring aggression, while being prepared to prevail in conflict when necessary”
• “Building a resilient Joint Force and defense ecosystem.”
The National Defense Strategy conveys a message of defense through
deterrence first, but preparation for potential conflict and the resilience to
survive conflict.
Of interest to this ISAM study, is the NDS’ integrated deterrence, campaigning, and force
planning approaches.
The NDS approach to integrated deterrence identifies the space domain as an area of
prioritization for resilience by "increasing options for reconstitution." Integrated deterrence
includes deterrence by denial, by resilience, and by collective cost imposition. Deterrence by
denial refers to deterring aggression, particularly with regards to seizing territory112. This
approach includes “innovative operational concepts.” Deterrence by resilience includes "the
ability to withstand, fight through, and recover quickly from disruption." Deterrence by
collective cost imposition (in the context of space) refers to “U.S. leadership in shaping norms
for appropriate conduct … will reinforce deterrence by increasing international consensus on
what constitutes malign and aggressive behavior, thereby increasing the prospect of collective
attribution and response…”
111
112
U.S. Department of Defense, 2022
U.S. Department of Defense, 2022
48
The NDS describes “campaigning” as “the conduct and sequencing of logically linked
military activities to achieve strategy-aligned objectives over time.” This can also be described as
“aligning our activities over time to maintain our competitive advantage and support our defense
priorities.113” Campaigning focuses on presence, including “the relationships and access to
operate in the region.114” Military exercises are an example of campaigning115.
Campaigning accomplishes two objectives: 1) practice and learned from the operational
implementation of a capability and 2) “to shape perceptions, including by sowing doubt in our
competitors that they can achieve their objectives116” The NDS explicitly identifies logistics as a
supporting element that will be built and exercised.
The NDS force planning approach focuses on the “ability to integrate, defend, and
reconstitute … particularly in the space domain.” Relevant priorities of the force planning
approach include the creation of a force that is sustainable, resilient, agile, and responsive.
Logistics and sustainment are recognized as an element that supports these priorities through
rapid mobilization and deployment while sustaining attack and disruption117.
Finally, the NDS recognizes the need to change the current acquisition system to one that
will “reward rapid experimentation, acquisition, and fielding… incorporating emerging
technologies in the commercial and military sectors…” As part of this change, the NDS
identifies the need for “increase[d] collaboration with the private sector in priority areas,
especially with the commercial space industry, leveraging its technological advancements and
entrepreneurial spirit to enable new capabilities.”
The 2020 DoD Space Strategy was developed in accordance with the 2018 National Strategy
for Space and the 2018 National Defense Strategy for a decade long outlook. Although
developed during different administrations, the 2020 DSS is similar to the 2022 NSS and 2022
NDS. The 2020 and 2022 strategies convey continuity in messaging. All three strategies
recognize both China and Russia as having counterspace capabilities and a willingness to use
them on the U.S. homeland. They specifically highlight China as the competitor and the need to
both deter aggression and to prepare for conflict in space.
The primary difference between the 2020 and 2022 strategies is that both 2022 strategies
emphasize a distinction between the competitive capabilities of China and Russia. The 2022
NDS recognizes Russia as an “acute threat” with unprovoked, irresponsible behavior. This small
113
VanHerck, Glen D., “Campaigning at the Top of the World: Arctic Security and Homeland Defense,” webpage,
October 3, 2022. As of February 11, 2023:
https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/JIPA/Display/Article/3173407/campaigning-at-the-top-of-the-world-arcticsecurity-and-homeland-defense/
114
VanHerck, 2022
115
VanHerck, 2022 /
116
U.S. Department of Defense, 2022
117
U.S. Department of Defense, 2022
49
difference between the strategies represents a maturity in understanding the capabilities and
limitations of U.S. adversaries.
The strategic focus on China as the sole competitor and “pacing challenge” also prevents
distractions during the development of defense and deterrence capabilities. Thus, constraining
the focus on Russia to that which is necessary to address the acute threat.
Figure 10 summarizes the national security needs based on the security environment and
priorities that surround the national interests. The graphic presents the U.S. national interests
recognized by both the NSS and the NDS in the center of the image. The security environment
and priorities as conveyed by both documents are reflected in the innermost blue ring with white
notes. The national security needs are presented in the blue ring with yellow notes. The drivers
and needs were identified from the strategic documents discussed above and other relevant
documentation presented in the discussion that follows. The ISAM relevant applications capable
of fulfilling the needs are presented in the outermost blue ring with purple notes.
50
Figure 10 National Security Space Sector Drivers for ISAM
NOTE: White text is from the National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy. Yellow text
is from the National Defense Strategy. Purple text represent ISAM-relevant capabilities.
The top-level national security strategies reflect drivers enabled by ISAM capabilities. This
finding is supported by the 2019 USSF Space Futures II workshop, the 2022 State of the Space
Industrial Base (SSIB), and the inclusion of OSAM on the 2022 Critical and Emerging
Technologies List118.
118
The 2022 Critical and Emerging Technologies List was created in support of national security related needs. This
document lists OSAM in the Space Technologies and Systems subfield. A technology’s inclusion on this list means
51
Additionally, the 2020 inaugural doctrine for the USSF states that “military spacepower
leverages space capabilities to accomplish military objectives in support of national policy and
strategy.119” This doctrine recognizes Space Mobility and Logistics as a core competency for
enabling “How military spacepower is employed” and explicitly identifies ISAM Servicing
capabilities.
Supporting documentation and conversations with experts that communicated a deeper level
of detail was needed to confirm how and why national security drivers are connected to ISAM
capabilities. The discussion that follows will present sample ISAM enabled use cases that fulfill
the drivers identified above and shown in Figure 10.
National Security Space Sector Drivers and Use Cases
In order to understand how the national security space sector could implement ISAM
capabilities to fulfill drivers, use cases were considered. The use cases presented below
demonstrate connections between drivers and ISAM capabilities. Relevant connections were
presented for each ISAM category, but the servicing capabilities present the most drivers.
Satellite refueling technologies and propellant depots on orbit could extend the life of a
satellite and enable the satellite to maneuver without the concern of a limited fuel supply120.
Increased maneuverability enables new operational concepts such as responding to another
satellite maneuvering too closely or the need to chase a satellite121.
ISAM refueling capabilities fulfill a variety of national security needs,
including resilience, new operational concepts, maneuver without regret,
sustainment, agility, and responsiveness.
Today’s satellites are generally considered robust, but infant mortality can occur shortly after
achieving orbit. An ISAM capability to repair a satellite that was launched with defective
components or to repair a satellite that was damaged by an adversary’s attack fulfills resilient
needs122. Possessing a maintenance and repair capability also reduces the risk of loss of the asset.
the technology is recognized as “potentially significant to U.S. national security.” The document clarifies that the list
should not be interpreted as a prioritization or funding mechanism. The inclusion of OSAM, or ISAM, in the
document raises awareness of the potential technology application and relevance to fulfilling national security needs.
Source: Executive Office of the President, Critical and Emerging Technologies List Update, February 2022.
119
U.S. Space Force, Spacepower Doctrine for Space Forces, June 2020.
120
Air Force Space Command, The Future of Space 2060 & Implications For U.S. Strategy: Report on the Space
Futures Workshop, September 5, 2019.U.S. Space Force, 2020
121
Werner, 2022
122
Air Force Space Command, 2019; U.S. Space Force, 2020
52
An ISAM capability to repurpose a satellite may involve adapting the satellite to a new
mission. The SSIB report states that the “rate of obsolescence in legacy space systems is
accelerating.” ISAM technologies include the capability to upgrade satellites with new payloads
and sensor technologies123. Upgrading satellites leverages the durability of a satellite bus and
enables the satellite’s mission to adapt to changes in technologies and changing needs. An ISAM
upgrade capability thereby enables adaptable missions and sustainability of a system.
The ISAM capability to relocate a satellite is a technology of growing interest internationally.
China already demonstrated the ability to move a defunct satellite from one orbit to another124.
The U.S.’ Northrop Grumman MEV similarly demonstrated the ability to move satellites to and
from operational and disposal orbits125. Japan completed demonstrated missions for future debris
removal efforts126. Europe also is investing in future debris removal technology127. The
capability to relocate an object in space presents a proactive means of sustaining the operational
environment (through debris removal)128 and adapting, or repurposing, a satellite’s mission.
However, inherent to debris removal is the capability to physically touch another satellite and
move that satellite with or without consent of the satellite’s owner. The dual-use nature of this
capability also creates national security concerns. Worth noting is the absence of the explicit
identification of debris removal in the U.S. NSS, NDS, and DSS. This suggests the U.S. need for
sustainability prioritizes the (reactive) maintenance of the satellite over the (proactive) reduction
of debris in space (and potential collisions).
123
Saplan, undated; Arney, et al., 2021; U.S. Space Force, 2020
Northrop Grumman, “Mission Robotic Vehicle,” webpage, undated. As of February 13, 2023:
https://www.northropgrumman.com/wp-content/uploads/Mission-Robotic-Vehicle-MRV-fact-sheet.pdf
Davis, Joshua P., John P. Mayberry, and Jay P. Penn., On-orbit servicing: inspection, repair, refuel, upgrade and
assembly of satellites in space, Aerospace Corporation, April 2019.
124
Burke, 2021; Hitchens, 2022
125
Intelsat, “MEV-1: A look back at Intelsat’s groundbreaking journey,” webpage, April 17, 2020. As of February
11, 2023: https://www.intelsat.com/resources/blog/mev-1-a-look-back-at-intelsats-groundbreaking-journey
126
Astroscale, “Astroscale Statement on Our ELSA-d Demonstration,” webpage, April 6, 2022. As of February 11,
2023: https://astroscale.com/astroscale-statement-on-our-elsa-d-demonstration-april-22/
127
The European Space Agency, “ESA commissions world’s first space debris removal,” webpage, December 9,
2019. As of February 11, 2023:
https://www.esa.int/Space_Safety/Clean_Space/ESA_commissions_world_s_first_space_debris_removal
The European Space Agency, “ESA invites ideas to open up in-orbit servicing market,” webpage, April 1, 2021. As
of February 11, 2023: https://www.esa.int/Space_Safety/Clean_Space/ESA_invites_ideas_to_open_up_inorbit_servicing_market
128
“Sustainability” can be interpreted as either asset sustainability (i.e., satellite maintenance) or environmental
sustainability (i.e., the removal of satellite debris and defunct satellites). The IDA 2022 Assessment of Global
Norms of Behavior and Legal Regimes Related to On-Orbit Activities discusses the different international values.
The report shows that some countries distinctly prioritize (environmental) sustainability while other countries (such
as the U.S.) prioritize stability and security. Source: Lindbergh, Rachel, et al., Assessment of Global Norms of
Behavior and Legal Regimes Related to On-Orbit Activities, IDA, April 2022.
53
Consistent with the strategies, the U.S. posture assumes the potential for a
damaged satellite (whether by attack or debris) and responds with the creation
of a resilient architecture.
The ISAM capabilities described above (refueling, repair, upgrade, maintenance, relocating,
inspection) fit within ISAM’s servicing category. Each of these capabilities will rely on ISAM
cross-cutting capabilities. These include robotic manipulation, modularity, interoperability,
common interfaces, automation, etc.129. Robotic manipulation and automation reduce the
historical need for human interaction in the local environment enabling a cost-effective means of
operating in space.
The ISAM assembly category can support national security needs with the creation of large
structures in space. The large structures can provide persistent platforms thereby enabling the
development of emerging technologies in the space environment130. For the intelligence
community, the ISAM assembly capabilities are of particular interest for the development of
large, complex imaging aperture structures in space131.
The ISAM manufacturing category was also recognized by both the SSIB and the Space
Futures workshop for the potential to sustain an extended presence beyond GEO. The nation’s
civil space program is expected to pursue Moon and Mars exploration efforts132. The workshop
and SSIB reports both recognize a “military trend is to extend the reach of military operations
within the cislunar environment.” The reports also recognize the military role as expanding to
include “the protection of military, civil, commercial, and human space assets.133”
Sustainment is the hallmark of ISAM capabilities. Possessing the
capability to extract lunar resources or to recycle old spacecraft reduces the
dependency on Earth based manufacturing.
Instead, parts and goods manufactured in space for the repair and maintenance of satellites or
surface construction enable sustainability and presence. Whether a part of the commercial, civil,
or national security space sectors, a U.S. presence in extended environments, such as cislunar
129
Olson, J., et al., 2022; Air Force Space Command, 2019; Arney, et al., 2021
Olson, J., et al., 2022; Corbin, et al., 2020
131
Jason Science Advisory Panel, 2020
132
Olson, J., et al., 2022; Air Force Space Command, 2019; Executive Office of the President, 2017
133
Air Force Space Command, 2019
Space Policy Directive-3 also recognizes "the contested nature of space is increasing the demand for DoD focus on
protecting and defending U.S. space assets and interests.” Source: Executive Office of the President, “National
Space Traffic Management Policy,” memorandum, June 18, 2018.
130
54
space, fulfills the national priorities of U.S. leadership and competition with China134. The
advancement of resource extraction technologies for application on the Moon and asteroids is
also viewed as an economic expansion opportunity, which contributes to national interests and
needs135.
Findings
The top-level national security strategies reflect drivers enabled by ISAM capabilities.
Competition with China is the foundational theme upon which national security space ISAM
drivers are built. Consideration of potential use cases found that drivers exist for each of the
ISAM categories. Most distinct are the Servicing (and supporting Cross-Cutting) capabilities in
their ability to fulfill the needs and drivers identified.
When will the National Security Space Sector implement ISAM
capabilities?
The combination of strategies and supporting reports and workshops recognize a consistent
set of national security needs and the ability for ISAM capabilities to fulfill those needs. The
next step was to consider the urgency surrounding the realization of these needs. Recall that an
urgency for the driver was interpreted from budgets, contracts, and timelines. The assessed
urgency for the driver was considered near-term if estimated to occur within five years.
A distinct difference in the levels of urgency were observed for the national security space
sector. The servicing capabilities were observed as immediately needed. The assembly
capabilities were less clear on their urgency, but noticeably less urgent than the servicing
capabilities. The manufacturing capabilities did not appear urgent.
An appropriate starting point for the assessment of urgency is the budget. The presence of a
budget or lack thereof is an indicator of the actual support or prioritization of the capability. Note
that the timing of this study was such that the President’s Budget Request (PBR) was the latest
available budgetary documentation. The PBR is interpreted as representing the Administration’s
priorities whereas the appropriated funding reflects the support from Congress.
The Defense budget results from the ongoing execution of the Planning, Programming,
Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) process. The Congressional Research Service (CRS) produced
a defense primer on the PPBE process136. The portions of the CRS defense primer relevant to this
134
"The U.S. should establish space settlement and human presence as a primary driver of the nation’s civil space
program to determine the path for large-scale human space settlement and ensure America is the foremost power in
achieving that end." Air Force Space Command, 2019
135
Air Force Space Command, 2019
136
Williams, Lynn M. and Brendan W. McGarry, Defense Primer: Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and
55
study are summarized here. The planning phase of the PPBE process produces the Defense
Planning Guidance (DPG). The DPG is a classified document that reflects the National Security
Strategy, the National Defense Strategy, and the National Military Strategy. The DPG provides
guidance on investments and divestments and informs the Program Objective Memorandum
(POM). The programming phase of the PPBE process produces the POM, which is a five-year
funding plan that prioritizes programs137. The budgeting phase of the PPBE process produces the
Budget Estimate Submission (BES), which covers the first year of the POM. The BES uses
guidance from the Office of Management and Budget, considers the feasibility of execution
within the budget year, and informs the President’s budget request to Congress.
Public statements by USSF officials reiterate a pivot to focusing on China and an
“operational imperative” for a “resilient space order of battle.138” These statements also indicated
the pivot was reflected as small changes in the FY 2023 POM but will include large changes in
the FY24 POM. They identified 2026 as the date by which the USSF "needs to have capabilities
on line to support the new space order of battle, including both systems in space to support other
domains and those required to "protect and defend" US satellites.139"
The Defense Budget implements the National Defense Strategy140. At the time of this
research, the FY2023 President’s Budget Request was the latest available documentation. The
Defense Budget Request for FY23 was based on the 2022 NDS and continued the theme of
focusing on China as a “strategic competitor and pacing challenge” and Russia as “an acute
threat.” Funding was requested to support resilient architectures in space and to enable a “pivot
to resilient capabilities for today’s contested space domain.” Most relevant to this study, is the
Research, Development, Test and Evaluation budget request of $130.1 billion, of which Science
& Technology comprise $16.5 billion. A portion of this funding will support the creation of a
new Space Mobility and Logistics office141.
The FY23 defense budget request reveals a budget increase in the Research and
Development portfolio, suggesting a prioritization of technology development efforts.
Execution (PPBE) Process, Congressional Research Service, December 15, 2022.
The POM is not a publicly available document. Source: AcqNotes, “Program Objective Memorandum (POM),”
webpage, January 2, 2023. As of February 11, 2023: https://acqnotes.com/acqnote/acquisitions/program-objectivememorandum-pom
138
Hitchens, Theresa, “2024 Space Force budget to show ‘large pivot’ to ‘China fight’,” webpage, February 24,
2022. As of February 11, 2023: https://breakingdefense.com/2022/02/2024-space-force-budget-to-showPope, Charles, “Kendall Outlines ‘Operational Imperatives,’ Choices During Think Tank Appearance,” webpage,
January 19, 2022. As of February 11, 2023: https://www.spaceforce.mil/News/Article/2904727/kendall-outlinesoperational-imperatives-choices-during-think-tank-appearance
139
Hitchens, 2022
140
U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Budget Overview Fiscal Year 2023 Budget Request, March 2022.
141
Albon, Courtney, “Why the Space Force is getting serious about on-orbit servicing,” webpage, November 10,
2022. As of February 11, 2023: https://www.c4isrnet.com/battlefield-tech/space/2022/11/10/why-the-space-forceis-getting-serious-about-on-orbit-servicing/
137
56
Conversations with USSF personnel confirmed an increase in funding directly for SML142 (or
ISAM) development, which resides within the R&D portfolio. The supporting budget and the
identification of the 2026 date by which the USSF needs to have capabilities online to support a
“resilient space order of battle” reflects a near-term urgency for the technology. This information
suggests that technology development that fulfills resilient needs is a high priority and immediate
urgency. More detailed indicators regarding the urgency of ISAM needs for national security
were found through a review of funded projects and contracts.
Defense-Funded ISAM Servicing and Cross-Cutting Projects
The Department of the Air Force funded the SpaceWERX Orbital Prime solicitation for
proposals to the Small Business Technology Transfer Program. Orbital Prime is focused on the
commercial development of ISAM capabilities, specifically those associated with active debris
removal. The intent of the effort is to build an industrial base and to leverage the dual-use nature
of the technology. The technologies of interest include many of the servicing and cross-cutting
categories of ISAM, such as relocation, inspection, RPODU, refueling, repair, etc. The
solicitation emphasizes that proposals “should demonstrate a high probability of identifying a
product-mission fit between a Space Force end user and the proposed solution through a nonDefense commercial solution’s adaptation.” Orbital Prime recognizes the timeframe for the
technology demonstrations is near term stating that “[o]n-orbit capability will be demonstrated
on an accelerated timeline in two to four years143”
The Orbital Prime solicitation consists of three phases. The first phase is a feasibility study
lasting five months with a not-to-exceed (NTE) value of $250,000 per contract. During this time,
proposers are expected to prove “the proposed effort’s scientific and technical feasibility and
commercialization potential.” The second phase requires Phase I success and includes the
prototype development of validated concepts. Phase II lasts 15-months and is valued at NTE
$1.5M per contract. The third and final phase requires funding “from the private sector, nonSBIR/STTR Governmental sources, or both” and is “oriented toward technology
commercialization.144” Orbital Prime awarded 124 Phase I contracts from June to September
142
Recall that SML stands for Space Mobility and Logistics and is defined in the 2020 inaugural doctrine for the
USSF as “enabl[ing] movement and support of military equipment and personnel in the space domain, from the
space domain back to Earth, and to the space domain.”
143
SpaceWERX, “Space Prime,” webpage, undated. As of February 11, 2023: https://spacewerx.us/space-prime/
144
SpaceWERX, undated
57
2022145. Considering the five-month duration of the Phase I awards, the Phase II proposals are
expected to be received in the early part of 2023146.
DARPA’s RSGS program will “enable cooperative inspection and servicing in GEO147”
RSGS is a public-private partnership with Northrop Grumman’s SpaceLogistics subsidiary.
Northrop Grumman is providing the spacecraft and DARPA is providing the robotic toolkit.
With this combined product, Northrop Grumman will provide a commercially owned and
operated servicing vehicle within 18 months of entering the proper orbit. The vehicle will be
ready for launch in 2024 and Northrop Grumman is expected to complete all missions within
three years148.
In July 2022, the Space Systems Command announced a $44.5 million award to Orion Space
Solutions for the Tetra-5 program. The program consists of a small “constellation of up to three
prototype spacecraft to demonstrate key inspection and docking capabilities of on-orbit refueling
and next-generation autonomous collaboration techniques to provide comprehensive local area
awareness.149” This program intends to leverage refueling capabilities and automation to enable
maneuver without regret needs. The development and mission timeframe is five years150.
DIU has multiple solicitations relevant to ISAM servicing capabilities. Their Robust Access
to Propellant In Diverse orbitS, or RAPIDS, solicitation called for proposals in April 2022. The
first part of the solicitation is seeking on-orbit fuel transfer capabilities that can demonstrate
145
Holt, Brian, “SpaceWERX Awards 124 Orbital Prime Contracts,” webpage, November 4, 2022. As of February
11, 2023: https://afresearchlab.com/news/spacewerx-awards-124-orbital-prime-contracts/
146
Holt, 2022
147
Saplan undated
148
Conversations with DARPA; Saplan, undated
Cage, Paul, “NRL Engineers Ready Innovative Robotic Servicing of Geosynchronous Satellites (RSGS) Payload for
Launch,” webpage, November 9, 2022. As of February 11, 2023: https://www.navy.mil/Press-Office/NewsStories/Article/3214605/nrl-engineers-ready-innovative-robotic-servicing-of-geosynchronous-satellites-r/
Erwin, Sandra, “DARPA’s robot could start servicing satellites in 2025,” webpage, November 8, 2022. As of
February 11, 2023: https://spacenews.com/darpas-robot-could-start-servicing-satellites-in-2025/
149
Space Systems Command, “Space Systems Command selects Orion Space Solutions for Tetra-5 Other
Transaction Agreement,” webpage, July 26, 2022. As of February 11, 2023:
https://www.ssc.spaceforce.mil/Portals/3/Documents/PRESS%20RELEASES/Tetra5.pdf?ver=otxbrmw6mqtW5c3d4v084w%3D%3D
Jewett, Rachel, “Orion Space Solutions to Develop 3 Satellites for US Space Force Tetra-5 Mission,” webpage,
August 17, 2022. As of February 11, 2023: https://www.satellitetoday.com/government-military/2022/08/17/orionspace-solutions-to-develop-3-satellites-for-us-space-force-tetra-5-mission/
Orion Space Solutions, “Orion Space Solutions Team Selected to Lead U.S. Space Force Tetra-5 Mission,”
webpage, August 16, 2022. As of February 11, 2023: https://www.orionspace.com/post/orion-space-solutions-teamselected-to-lead-u-s-space-force-tetra-5-mission
SCOUT Space, “SCOUT Wins SSC Tetra-5 OTA,” webpage, August 17, 2022. As of February 11, 2023:
https://scout.space/news/scout-wins-ssc-tetra-5-ota
Olson, J., et al., 2022
150
Orion Space Solutions, 2022
58
capability within 18 to 24 months after a contract award. The second part of the solicitation
focuses on fuel depots and seeks proposed concepts of operations for “how government client
vehicles can receive fuel from the depot.” This latter half has the goal of on-orbit demonstration
24 to 30 months after a contract is awarded151.
The AFWERX AFVentures Strategic Funding Increase (STRATFI) program exists to bridge
capability gaps. STRATFI awards small businesses with government funding that is combined
with private funding for a four-year period of performance152. In 2022, Orbit Fab was awarded
$12 million in funding through the STRATFI program “to integrate their RAFTI [fueling port]
onto DoD assets and provide refueling services.153”
The 2022 DIU Modularity for Space Systems, or M4SS, solicitation is focused on the
development of low-cost robotic arms, that “could be commercialized rather than follow military
specs154”. The three companies awarded contracts include Motiv Space Systems, Maxar
Technologies, and Tethers Unlimited155. The companies are expected to deliver prototypes in
2024156.
CONFERS was initiated and originally funded by DARPA in 2017157. The intent of this
industry-led organization is “to develop technical and safety standards that servicing providers
and clients for on-orbit servicing operations would adopt” and to define responsible behavior in
space. The organization transitioned to full private sector funding in November 2022158.
Although not a flight project, the prior funding and initiative from DARPA demonstrated a
151
Hitchens, Theresa, “Space gas stations: DIU to prototype commercial on-orbit satellite refueling,” webpage,
April 13, 2022. As of February 11, 2023: https://breakingdefense.com/2022/04/space-gas-stations-diu-to-prototypecommercial-on-orbit-satellite-refueling
152
Air Force Research Laboratory Public Affairs, “AFVentures opens opportunity window for STRATFI/TACFI
program,” webpage, April 14, 2022. As of February 11, 2023:
https://www.afrl.af.mil/News/Article/3000038/afventures-opens-opportunity-window-for-stratfitacfi-program/
153
RAFTI refers to Orbit Fab’s Rapidly Attachable Fluid Transfer Interface, Source: Orbit Fab, “Orbit Fab
Announces $12 million AFWERX STRATFI Program,” webpage, March 14, 2022. As of February 11, 2023:
https://www.orbitfab.com/stratfi
154
Conversations with DIU
Erwin, Sandra, “DoD signaling demand for satellite support services in geostationary orbit,” webpage, July 25,
2022. As of February 11, 2023: https://spacenews.com/dod-signaling-demand-for-satellite-support-services-ingeostationary-orbit//
155
Defense Innovation Unit, “Department of Defense to Prototype Robotic Arms for Modular Space Systems,”
webpage, March 7, 2022. As of February 11, 2023: https://www.diu.mil/latest/modularity-for-space-systems-m4sspress-release
156
Erwin, 2022
157
Mayfield, Mandy, “Industry Offering On-Orbit Satellite Servicing,” webpage, January 29, 2021. As of February
11, 2023: https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2021/1/29/industry-offering-on-orbit-satellite-servicing
158
Weeden, Brian, “Update on the Consortium for Execution of Rendezvous and Servicing Operations,” briefing
slides, Secure World Foundation, February 2022.
CONFERS, “CONFERS,” webpage, undated. As of February 11, 2023: satelliteconfers.org
59
recognition of the anticipated need for standardization to enable a successful satellite servicing
industry.
Each of the above projects or contracts represent ISAM servicing and cross-cutting initiatives
that are expected to perform within five years. This near-term timeframe suggests an urgent need
for the capabilities. Refueling contracts appear to be in greatest demand.
Refueling technology is still maturing but has achieved a sufficiently high
TRL that the combination of the “maneuver without regret” driver and the
immediate urgency are enabling the capability to achieve operational
implementation.
The contracts also demonstrate a focus on repair and cross-cutting capabilities. The ISAM
repair capabilities fulfill drivers such as sustainment, adaptability, and resiliency. Both the repair
and refueling capabilities are dependent upon cross-cutting capabilities such as rendezvous,
proximity operations, docking, and undocking and robotic manipulation. A recognition of the
importance of these dependencies and their urgent need is reflected in the above contracts.
Defense-Funded ISAM Assembly Projects
The Defense Innovation Unit’s Orbital Outpost solicitation was released in June 2019 to
“explore the military utility of exclusive DoD access to an unmanned orbital platform in order to
perform experiments with no risk to human crew or other non-DOD payloads.159” The
solicitation recognized the variety of potential ISAM enabled benefits from an orbital platform,
but stated that the immediate need for the platforms was to “facilitate the flight qualification of
new hardware” and advanced the TRL160.
The Orbital Outpost solicitation was for study contracts, but DIU stated “[s]olutions must be
capable of being established in low Earth orbit within 24 months of contract award following the
study.161” DIU issued three Phase I awards from late 2019 to July 2020. The companies awarded
include Nanoracks at $389,900, Arkisys at $366,000, and Sierra Nevada Corporation at
$439,100162. The Nanoracks study is focused on repurposing hardware already in space. The
Arkisys website provides limited information but suggests an orbital hosted platform concept is
159
Strout, Nathan, “Defense Innovation Unit issues contract for unmanned orbital outpost,” webpage, July 16, 2020.
As of February 11, 2023: https://www.c4isrnet.com/battlefield-tech/space/2020/07/16/defense-innovation-unitissues-contract-for-unmanned-orbital-outpost/
160
Foust, Jeff, “Three companies studying “Orbital Outpost” space station concepts for Defense Department,”
webpage, July 19, 2020. As of February 11, 2023: https://spacenews.com/three-companies-studying-orbital-outpostspace-station-concepts-for-defense-department/
161
Foust, 2020; Strout, 2020
162
Foust, 2020
60
envisioned163. The Sierra Nevada Corporation (SNC) concept leverages the company’s preexisting Shooting Star transport vehicle developed for “NASA Commercial Resupply Services 2
(CRS-2) missions to provide extra storage for payloads and to facilitate cargo disposal upon reentry into Earth’s atmosphere.164” The SNC press release further suggests that the concept is
mature and “…already designed with significant capabilities for an orbital outpost and by adding
only a few components we are able to meet Department of Defense needs.” Additionally, the
Nanoracks website indicates 2024 as the targeted timeframe for outpost mission165.
The number of solicitations for ISAM Assembly capabilities contrasts with the Servicingrelated solicitations and suggests less urgency. Some company websites suggest near-term
launch dates while others remain unclear. Thus far, awards appear to be for studies only and not
flight demonstrations.
Orbital platforms serve well to demonstrate emerging technology, but the
ongoing operations of the ISS likely reduce the urgency associated with
developing another platform.
Defense-Funded ISAM Manufacturing Projects
DARPA’s Novel Orbital and Moon Manufacturing, Materials, and Mass-efficient Design
(NOM4D) program was initiated in 2021166. Eight industry and research teams were awarded
contracts to produce proof of concepts focused on materials science and manufacturing
capabilities that enable the production of structures in space, such as communications antennas
and solar power arrays167. The project vision is to use raw materials from Earth and the Moon for
163
Arkisys, “The Port,” webpage, undated. As of February 11, 2023: https://www.arkisys.com/the-port
Sierra Nevada Corporation, “Ozmens’ SNC Selected by the Department of Defense to Design, Develop
Unmanned Orbital Outpost Prototype,” webpage, July 14, 2020. As of February 11, 2023:
https://www.sncorp.com/press-releases/dod-selects-snc-to-design-develop-unmanned-orbital-outpost-prototype/
Trevithick, Joseph, “The Pentagon Moves To Launch Its Own Experimental Mini Space Station,” webpage, July 15,
2020. As of February 11, 2023: https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/34840/the-pentagon-moves-to-launch-itsown-experimental-mini-space-station
165
Nanoracks, “Outpost,” webpage, undated. As of February 11, 2023: https://nanoracks.com/outpost/
166
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, “Novel Orbital and Moon Manufacturing, Materials, and Massefficient Design (NOM4D) Proposers Day (Archived),” webpage, February 26, 2021. As of February 11, 2023:
https://www.darpa.mil/news-events/nom4d-proposers-day
167
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, “DARPA Kicks Off Program to Explore Space-Based
Manufacturing,” webpage, March 23, 2022. As of February 11, 2023: https://www.darpa.mil/news-events/2022-0323
Hitchens, Theresa, “DARPA Space Manufacturing Project Sparks Controversy,” webpage, February 12, 2021. As of
February 11, 2023: https://breakingdefense.com/2021/02/darpa-space-manufacturing-project-sparks-controversy
164
61
on-orbit manufacturing168. Phase 1 of the program focuses on structural efficiency for a
megawatt class solar array. Phase 2 focuses on precision manufacturing for radio frequency
reflectors and Phase 3 includes a demonstration of precision for infrared reflectors. Given the
low TRL nature of manufacturing, this program is limited to ground studies and the results are
anticipated for use in 10-20 years169. Although this technology could eventually support future
needs for large, complex structures in space, the technology immaturity prevents immediate
application of the capability. The existence of this project now suggests such future drivers are
considered plausible.
Findings
The compilation of budgetary information, projects, and contracts suggests the national
security space sector has a near-term urgency for Servicing capabilities. This aligns with the
budgetary assessment that capabilities fulfilling resilient needs reflect a high priority and
immediate urgency. The Assembly and Manufacturing capabilities suggest less urgency.
What are the Civil Space Sector drivers for ISAM?
An assessment of the civil space drivers began with a review of strategy documents. These
documents included the NASA FY2010 Authorization, Space Policy Directive-1 (SPD-1), the
NASA Strategic Plan, NASA SMD’s Science Plan, the Decadal Surveys, and NASA’s Moon to
Mars Objectives.
Civil space sector drivers were predominantly identified in the human
spaceflight exploration initiatives.
The civil space sector includes other agencies such as NOAA and USGS170. These agencies
are discussed as appropriate, but the efforts of NASA are the primary focus of this study. Thus,
the review of relevant documentation was scoped to NASA.
Although not the most recent authorization, NASA’s FY2010 Authorization Act is worth
examination, because this bill authorized NASA to invest in ISAM capabilities. Since provisions
in authorizing language remain in effect until directly amended or rescinded, the language also
remains relevant to present day programs and projects.
168
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, 2022
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, 2022; Hitchens, 2021
170
The NASA relationship with NOAA exists within NASA’s Science Mission Directorate Joint Agency Satellite
Division (JASD). The NASA relationship with USGS exists within NASA’s Science Mission Directorate Earth
Science Division (ESD).
169
62
NASA’s FY2010 Authorization Act presents a vision of in-space servicing capabilities with
striking similarities to the Space Superhighway. The authorization contains frequent mentions of
the need for “in-space servicing of existing and future assets.” Development of servicing
capabilities is authorized particularly in the areas of refueling, repair, and reuse. The use of the
ISS as a testbed for developing these capabilities is also authorized. The driving need for these
capabilities is the ability to support and extend human spaceflight presence to the Moon and
Mars. The authorization also recognizes that the development of in-space servicing capabilities
can enable international, commercial, and military users of space.
Section 804 of NASA’s FY2010 Authorization states:
“The Administrator shall continue to take all necessary steps to ensure that
provisions are made for in-space or human servicing and repair of all future
observatory-class scientific spacecraft intended to be deployed in Earth-orbit or
at a Lagrangian point to the extent practicable and appropriate. The
Administrator should ensure that agency investments and future capabilities for
space technology, robotics, and human space flight take the ability to service and
repair these spacecraft into account, where appropriate, and incorporate such
capabilities into design and operational plans."
This language specifies the inclusion of servicing and repair capabilities for future
observatories. However, the 2021 launch of the JWST demonstrates the limits of an
authorization bill171. JWST was not built to be serviceable since the telescope operates at the
second Lagrange point and, at the time of development, was assumed to be unreachable by
servicing capabilities for the lifetime of the observatory172.
The 2017 SPD-1 modified the 2010 Presidential Policy Directive-4 to provide an explicit
goal for the United States to “lead the return of humans to the Moon for long-term exploration
and utilization, followed by human missions to Mars and other destinations173’’. SPD-1 calls for
the “human expansion across the solar system” to include both commercial and international
partners.
Three years later, the National Space Policy reiterated the goal of returning to the Moon “by
2024, followed by a sustained presence on the Moon by 2028.” The dates provided served as
deadlines for the development of the capabilities need to return to the Moon, but also to remain
on the Moon. This statement suggests the need for new capabilities that do not rely on
traditional, single-use, Earth based developments.
171
National Aeronautics and Space Administration, “The Launch-Webb,” webpage, undated. As of February 11,
2023: https://jwst.nasa.gov/content/about/launch.html
172
Ramirez, Rebecca, “Why the most powerful space telescope ever needs to be kept really, really cold,” webpage,
December 21, 2021. As of February 11, 2023: https://www.npr.org/2021/12/21/1064183308/james-webb-spacetelesco
National Aeronautics and Space Administration, “Orbit-Webb,” webpage, undated. As of February 11, 2023:
https://jwst.nasa.gov/content/about/orbit.html
173
Executive Office of the President, 2017
63
Sustainable capabilities that can leverage resources already in-space and
reduce the dependence on Earth are necessary to create a feasible and costeffective approach.
The 2022 NASA Strategic Plan reflects the priorities of the current administration and
presents three goals that support SPD-1 with relevance to this study. These goals are:
1. “Expand human knowledge through new scientific discoveries”
2. “Extend human presence to the Moon and on towards Mars for sustainable long-term
exploration, development, and utilization”
3. “Catalyze economic growth and drive innovation to address national challenges”
The second goal reiterates the core of SPD-1, which is to extend and sustain human presence
beyond present capabilities. The first goal recognizes that the expanded exploration should also
include scientific contributions. The third goal addresses the commercial role and economic
opportunity brought forth by the first and second goals.
The first goal is the responsibility of NASA’s Science Mission Directorate (SMD). This goal
is focused on the understanding and discovery of science within SMD’s respective science areas.
The decadal survey priorities and recommendations are recognized as the primary source of
implementation direction for SMD, in addition to the Executive Branch and Congress174. The
first goal of NASA’s Strategic Plan contains no mention of drivers with a clear connection to
ISAM or needs requiring ISAM capabilities.
The second goal of NASA’s Strategic Plan is led by the Exploration Systems Development
Mission Directorate (ESDMD) and the Space Operations Mission Directorate (SOMD). Both
directorates are focused on human spaceflight and were formerly combined within the Human
Exploration and Operations Mission Directorate175. The second goal presents opportunities for
ISAM capabilities.
In response to the extension of human presence to the Moon, NASA’s
second goal recognizes the need for infrastructure on the Moon and the
establishment of a platform to support lunar expeditions.
174
National Aeronautics and Space Administration, NASA Strategic Plan 2022, 2022.
National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Explore Science 2020-2024, 2020.
175
“In September 2021, NASA Administrator Bill Nelson announced the agency was creating two new mission
directorates that would best position the agency for the next 20 years. The move separated the Human Exploration
and Operations Mission Directorate (HEOMD) into the new Exploration Systems Development Mission Directorate
(ESDMD) and Space Operations Mission Directorate (SOMD).” Source: National Aeronautics and Space
Administration, “About the Human Exploration and Operations Mission Directorate (Archive),” webpage, March
10, 2022. As of February 11, 2023: https://www.nasa.gov/directorates/heo/about.html
64
This goal also includes the use of the ISS to enable new commercial platforms and
capabilities.
The third goal (as is relevant to this study) is the responsibility of the Space Technology
Mission Directorate (STMD)176. This goal includes a focus on advancing “transformational space
technologies” and “catalyz[ing] economic growth” to “ensure American leadership in the space
economy.177”
The NASA Strategic Plan presents a set of strategic goals that are aligned with SPD-1 and
the National Space Policy. Worth noting is the consistency of messaging between the two
administrations suggesting bipartisan support for NASA’s efforts. A deeper review of the
potential mission drivers for the first strategic goal was obtained from the SMD Science Plan and
the Decadal Surveys. A similar review was accomplished for NASA’s second strategic goal
using NASA’s recently produced Moon to Mars Objectives document.
NASA’s First Strategic Goal: Scientific Discoveries
Recall that the first goal of NASA’s Strategic Plan is to “Expand human knowledge through
new scientific discoveries.” The Science Mission Directorate is the responsible organization for
completion of this goal.
The SMD Science Plan
The SMD Science Plan contains a few strategies with potential relevance to ISAM
capabilities. Most relevant to this study are the following:
• “Strategy 1.1: Execute a balanced science program based on discipline-specific guidance
from the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, Administration priorities,
and direction from Congress”
• Strategy 1.2: “Participate as a key partner and enabler in the agency’s exploration
initiative, focusing on scientific research of, on, and from the Moon, lunar orbit, Mars, and
beyond.”
• Strategy 2.1: “Foster a culture that encourages innovation and entrepreneurship across all
elements of the SMD portfolio.”
• Strategy 2.4: “Drive innovation in focused technology areas to capitalize on the rapid
evolution of commercial capabilities.”
176
Note: NASA’s Aeronautics Research Mission Directorate (ARMD) is responsible for one of the objectives
associated with this goal. ARMD is outside the scope of this study.
177
National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 2022
65
• Strategy 3.5: “Pursue public-private partnerships in support of shared interests with
industry.”
Strategy 1.1 refers to the three primary sources of guidance and direction for SMD. These
sources include the Decadal Surveys, the Administration priorities, and congressional direction.
The Decadal Survey is a periodic study tasked by SMD178 to the National Research Council
(NRC)179 to prioritize research areas. With the help of the NRC, SMD is informed on the science
community user needs and uses the Decadal Survey to guide the SMD Divisions on which
science observables to pursue within the funding guidelines and timeframe allocated by
Congress.
The science community serves a specialized, but dominant interest and
alignment with the organization’s goals.
The Decadal Surveys are explored in further detail below.
Strategy 1.2 presents SMD’s contribution to SPD-1. The strategy states that SMD will
contribute “ongoing investments in fundamental research and science and technology
payloads…” SMD states that the organization will collaborate with NASA organizations and
partners to accomplish SPD-1’s national objectives. SMD identifies mutual organizational
interest in the robotic and platform technologies.
The strategy explicitly states that SMD will “leverage investments in human exploration
towards performing high-priority science.”
This suggests that SMD may use new technologies, such as ISAM
capabilities developed for SPD-1, for science missions of sufficient prioritized
need.
Strategies 2.1, 2.4, and 3.5 indicate an interest in new technologies that can benefit science.
Strategy 2.1 acknowledges the necessity of risk taking and the willingness to allow for failure.
This strategy is intended to enable SMD to have a mission portfolio of varied risk postures in the
future180. Strategy 2.4 is of particular interest to this study. This strategy focuses on capabilities
that enable new science or “more science per dollar.” Strategy 3.5 reflects an opportunity for
178
Because NASA frequently partners with other agencies, such as NOAA and USGS these partners are often
included in the tasking of the Decadal Survey.
179
The NRC is the “operating arm of the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine”, Source:
National Academies, “About Us,” webpage, undated. As of February 11, 2023:
https://www.nationalacademies.org/about
180
Chang, Kenneth, “At NASA, Dr. Z Was OK With Some Missions Failing,” webpage, January 13, 2023. As of
January 18, 2023: https://www.nytimes.com/2023/01/12/science/thomas-zurbuchen-nasa-science.html
66
public private partnerships to leverage the intended economic development associated with
ISAM capabilities181.
The strategies identified in the SMD Science Plan identify no direct connection between
science needs and drivers for ISAM capabilities. The strategies primarily suggest an interest in
robotic technologies and platforms as science enablers. Of further note, is the observation that
SMD will leverage human exploration technology investments but will not independently pursue
or lead the development of these efforts182.
Decadal Surveys
Conversations with multiple NASA officials and a review of the Decadal Surveys183 revealed
a few indirect mentions of ISAM capabilities in the survey results, but no recommendations to
use ISAM capabilities. According to NASA, formal recommendations are needed from the
Decadal Surveys to serve as a driver to pursue ISAM capabilities. Despite the lack of formal
recommendations, the decadal survey suggestions serve as potential future drivers, and are
summarized below.
The 2017 Earth Science Decadal recognizes the accomplishments of the A-Train
constellation for integrated and tightly aligned observations184. The survey also mentions
synergies in observational measurements as well as novel approaches and technology innovation.
However, the 2017 survey does not explicitly identify any drivers for ISAM capabilities.
The recently completed 2022 Planetary Decadal Survey mentions the use of in-orbit
assembly to overcome launch vehicle constraints particularly for planetary missions to the outer
solar system. There are also suggestions that the technology being developed for human
exploration to the Moon and Mars could produce infrastructure for future planetary missions to
leverage. Robotic assembly and additive manufacturing were cited as emerging technologies
with potential applications for planetary missions. The decadal survey recommended that NASA
“maintain cognizance of emerging new technologies and encourage the science and engineering
communities to explore new ways that these technologies can enable greater science while
181
The supporting words provided with this strategy (3.5) do not mention ISAM. Conversations with NASA experts
revealed that ISAM was not considered when writing this documentation. However, SMD is now exploring the
possibility of ISAM related partnerships with industry.
182
This interpretation was also confirmed through conversations with NASA officials.
183
As discussed above, recall that the decadal survey priorities and recommendations are recognized as the primary
source of implementation direction for SMD, in addition to the Executive Branch and Congress.
184
National Aeronautics and Space Administration, “Decadal Survey,” webpage, undated. As of February 11, 2023:
https://science.nasa.gov/earth-science/decadal-surveys
National Academies, Thriving On Our Changing Planet: A Decadal Strategy for Earth Observation from Space
(2018), 2018.
67
reducing development and operations costs.185” This recommendation aligns well with SMD’s
strategies 1.2 and 2.4 which state the organization will leverage the secondary benefits of human
exploration capabilities and consider new ways to maximize science return.
The 2020 Astrophysics Decadal Survey contains explicit suggestions (but not
recommendations) for the potential use of ISAM capabilities. The survey states:
“…because the Astrophysics budget may not increase as rapidly as telescope
costs. If very large aperture telescopes are required in the future, different design
approaches could be considered, including assembly in space, and servicing and
modularity that would allow telescopes to evolve, including adding aperture,
upgrading capabilities, and extending the life of the telescope.”
This suggestion for ISAM capabilities is driven for the purpose of enabling reduced cost
approaches and creating an evolvable, yet sustainable capability. The suggestion to enable
capability upgrade and maintenance is reminiscent of the vision for the Hubble Space Telescope
and the servicing missions.
The survey also mentions the potential use of refueling capabilities to reposition starshades
and cites recent refueling successes in GEO as opportunities to leverage for future telescopes. In
support of anticipated servicing capabilities, the survey panel further suggested the addition of
grappling fixtures and simple interfaces for consideration on future missions.
Precision assembly was also suggested for the assembly of large telescopes in space beyond
the constraints of launch vehicles. However, the survey recognized that precision assembly
capabilities need more technical maturation and encouraged investment in the area.
The remaining decadal surveys (Heliophysics, and Biological and Physical Sciences) make
references to robotics capabilities that may have overlap with ISAM technologies. Although not
an intentional pursuit of ISAM capabilities, there may result secondary benefits from technology
overlap. However, no clear drivers for ISAM capabilities were present in these surveys.
As with the SMD Science Plan discussed above, the Decadal Surveys indicate no direct
drivers or requirements for ISAM capabilities.
The surveys present and encourage the consideration of servicing and
precision assembly capabilities for future large observatories but stop short of
formal recommendation.
The combined set of NASA Authorization language, SMD Science Plan, and the Decadal
Surveys present an interest in the use of ISAM capabilities, but also convey a sense of
uncertainty regarding where and when to invest in ISAM capabilities186.
185
National Academies, Origins, Worlds, and Life: A Decadal Strategy for Planetary Science and Astrobiology
2023-2032 (2022), 2022.
186
Conversations with NASA officials also conveyed a sense of uncertainty about the appropriate application of
ISAM capabilities within SMD.
68
NASA’s Second Strategic Goal: Human Spaceflight Exploration
NASA’s second strategic goal is a direct result of SPD-1 and states the intent to “[e]xtend
human presence to the Moon and on towards Mars for sustainable long-term exploration,
development, and utilization.” This goal was recently recognized as a priority of NASA’s
leadership at the 2022 NASA ISAM Workshop. A month before the workshop, NASA released
“an objectives-based blueprint for the sustained human exploration of deep space” framework
titled “Moon to Mars Objectives187”. The items of relevance to ISAM capabilities and this study
are summarized.
The Moon to Mars Objectives framework identified science objectives that include robotic
systems aiding human exploration. Robotic capabilities have a variety of applications and can
include remote support of exploration activities, surface sample retrieval and measurements, and
general preparation of a site prior to the arrival of astronauts. Robotic capabilities are
advantageous because they “optimize astronaut time on the lunar and Martian surface and
maximize science return.188” Finally, the application of science objectives is expected to
“[c]oordinate on-going and future science measurements from orbital and surface platforms…”
These robotic capabilities demonstrate potential overlap with the cross-cutting category of
ISAM189.
The infrastructure objectives state the goal of creating an “interoperable global lunar
utilization infrastructure where U.S. industry and international partners can maintain continuous
robotic and human presence on the lunar surface for a robust lunar economy…” The goal of
creating “essential infrastructure” for human Mars exploration is also stated. The infrastructure
objectives focus on the near-term lunar efforts and recognize the need for evolvable and scalable
systems. The objectives also emphasize the need for “advanced manufacturing and autonomous
construction capabilities”, In-Situ Resource Utilization (ISRU) capabilities, and technologies that
support “cislunar orbital/surface depots, construction and manufacturing maximizing the use of
in-situ resources.” The infrastructure goals and objectives repeatedly stated the need for the
above technology capabilities to support a continued presence and a robust in-space economy.
The infrastructure objective embraces the Space Superhighway vision and leverages the full suite
of ISAM capabilities.
187
National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Moon to Mars Objectives, September 2022.
National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 2022
189
Worth noting is that ISAM does not generically consider all robotic capabilities to be ISAM. Instead, the State of
Play specifies “robotic manipulation” as pertaining to ISAM. For example, the NASA Commercial Lunar Payload
Services (CLPS) effort is a public-private partnership for private services that deliver science payloads on the Moon.
These missions were not recognized at the 2022 ISAM Workshop, in the original (2021) State of Play, or the
recently updated 2022 version. Conversations with NASA experts confirmed that the CLPS missions were not
considered ISAM. However, attention was brought to the Maxar robotic arm called SAMPLR. The NASA experts
will revisit the CLPS projects for future updates. This situation demonstrates that not all robotic capabilities should
be assumed ISAM.
188
69
The Moon to Mars Objectives framework identifies operational needs as including common
interfaces, the "capability to find, service, upgrade, or utilize instruments and equipment from
robotic landers or previous human missions", integrated robotic systems, the capability to
autonomously or remotely operate robotic systems, the capability to "use commodities produced
from planetary surface or in-space resources to reduce the mass required to be transported from
Earth", and reuse/recycling capabilities. These operational objectives emphasize the ISAM
servicing, cross-cutting, and manufacturing capabilities. They recognize the need to leverage
resources already in-space, whether that be the repair, upgrade, reuse of a resource, or the
creation of a new commodity from planetary resources. Their operational categorization implies
a new way of doing business and deviation from the traditional approach of developing a single
use resource on Earth.
Findings
The Moon to Mars Objectives framework reveals that NASA’s second strategic goal is
dependent upon ISAM capabilities. The architecture for this framework is the responsibility of
NASA’s Exploration Systems Development Mission Directorate190. In contrast, NASA’s first
strategic goal, which is the responsibility of the Science Mission Directorate, contains no
dependencies on ISAM capabilities. The lack of ISAM drivers in SMD means the organization is
not incentivized to independently develop the capabilities. Instead, the organization will consider
leveraging ISAM benefits developed as part of a larger agency wide initiative. Thus, the research
finds that NASA’s drivers for ISAM capabilities reside primarily with human spaceflight
exploration efforts.
When will the Civil Space Sector implement ISAM capabilities?
As was done with the national security space sector, the urgency, or potential realization, of
the ISAM drivers identified for the civil space sector was analyzed. The assessment was
accomplished by considering the implementation of NASA’s strategic goals identified above and
the responsible organization. Recall that an urgency for the driver was interpreted from budgets,
contracts, and timelines. The assessed urgency for the driver was considered near-term if
estimated to occur within five years.
190
National Aeronautics and Space Administration, “NASA’s Stakeholder Collaborations Help Inform Moon to
Mars Planning,” webpage, September 20, 2022. As of February 12, 2023: https://www.nasa.gov/press-release/nasas-stakeholder-collaborations-help-inform-moon-to-mars-planning
70
The research revealed that the civil space sector human spaceflight exploration efforts
possessed urgency for ISAM capabilities. Whereas the science efforts appeared interested in
leveraging ISAM capabilities but needed more time to determine the appropriate applications.
NASA’s First Strategic Goal: Scientific Discoveries
The NASA Science Mission Directorate is a FY22 $7.6 billion191 portfolio that builds and
operates satellites. As shown above, SMD has no driving needs for ISAM capabilities but is
exploring potential future benefits with several studies.
NASA’s FY22 Appropriations Act provided encouragement for NASA to utilize a
commercially provided, robotically assembled earth science platform. In anticipation of the
FY23 appropriations directing NASA to study the feasibility and funding of such a platform, the
Earth Science Division (ESD) within SMD proactively pursued a study.
A Fall 2022 Committee on Earth Science and Applications (CESAS) meeting initiated a
study regarding the feasibility of an earth science platform for the completion of the remaining
2017 Earth Science Decadal Survey observables. The ESD representative elaborated that one
study will focus on the impact to science while another study will focus on the business case.
Both ESD and NOAA192 recognize that high priority Earth science missions needing
continuity may serve as appropriate servicing and platform candidates. NOAA recently
completed satellite servicing studies in response to GOES-16 and GOES-17 instrument and
thruster issues193. The agency determined that the capability to service these individual missions
would occur too late to benefit the satellites, however, NOAA recognized the benefits of
servicing capabilities194.
NOAA also determined that a persistent platform concept was a potentially beneficial use
case. However, NOAA’s concerns for both the servicing and platform ISAM capabilities were
with the longevity of the business case.
The agency was unwilling to invest significantly in a dependency on a
commercial service that may not exist decades into the future.
In the hopes that future ISAM services will exist, NOAA is planning to install grappling
fixtures and fiducials on future missions. This is a low impact approach that prepares for future
191
National Aeronautics and Space Administration, NASA Budget Request FY 2023, 2022.
NOAA contracts (provides funding and requirements to) SMD’s Joint Agency Satellite Division (JASD) to build
NOAA’s satellites. Source: National Aeronautics and Space Administration, “Joint Agency Satellite Division,”
webpage, undated. As of February 12, 2023: https://science.nasa.gov/about-us/smd-programs/joint-agency-satellitedivision
193
GOES is Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellites
194
Conversations with NOAA
192
71
ISAM capabilities should they become a reality. Beyond these efforts, NOAA lacks the urgency
to fully embrace ISAM capabilities.
Conversations with NASA experts revealed additional ISAM related studies for the
Astrophysics Division and in partnership with STMD. A decreasing Astrophysics budget was
also cited as a disincentive to ISAM pursuits beyond studies. The limited budget and focus on
studies suggest a low urgency for ISAM capabilities within SMD.
NASA’s Second Strategic Goal: Human Spaceflight Exploration
The combined human exploration budget (ESDMD and SOMD) is over $10 billion. The
projects of relevance to this study include the Commercial LEO Destinations (CLD) and the
Artemis Campaign.
NASA’s FY23 budget request included $1.3 million to support the ongoing ISS operations
and $224 million for the Commercial LEO Development effort. The ISS continues to
demonstrate the suite of ISAM capabilities. This includes servicing for refueling and repair
purposes, (structural) assembly and robotic manipulation for changing science experiments,
manufacturing experiments, and so on. The ISS also continues to serve as a technology
demonstration of the benefits of ISAM capabilities towards enabling a sustained presence in
space.
Despite the enduring presence of the ISS, the U.S. seeks to enable a LEO economy195. The
NASA Transition Authorization Act of 2017 directed NASA to plan for a capability that
transitions from the ISS to a commercial platform capability “where NASA could be one of
many customers of a low-Earth orbit non-governmental human space flight enterprise.196” NASA
recognizes that the success of this transition is contingent upon “whether there will be sufficient
demand for those capabilities and services beyond NASA’s needs.197”
NASA’s Commercial LEO Destinations project responds to the NASA Transition
Authorization Act of 2017 with a two-step approach that seeks to prevent a gap between the
planned 2030 end of ISS and the beginning of commercial services198. This two-step approach
195
National Aeronautics and Space Administration, “NASA’s Long-Term Needs in Low-Earth Orbit Economy,”
webpage, June 7, 2019. As of February 12, 2023: https://www.nasa.gov/leo-economy/long-term-needs
National Aeronautics and Space Administration, “NASA Seeks Industry Input on Future Commercial Destinations
in Low-Earth Orbit,” webpage, March 23, 2021. As of February 12, 2023: https://www.nasa.gov/leoeconomy/strategy-for-commercial-leo-destinations/
196
U.S. 115th Congress, National Aeronautics and Space Administration Transition Authorization Act of 2017,
March 21, 2017.
197
National Aeronautics and Space Administration 2019
198
National Aeronautics and Space Administration, “Commercial Destinations Development in LEO,” webpage,
March 25, 2021. As of February 12, 2023: https://www.nasa.gov/leo-economy/commercial-destinations
National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 2022
72
begins with “multiple funded Space Act Agreements for early concept development” and follows
with the purchase of services199. Thus far, NASA awarded Axiom $140 million for the
Commercial Destination ISS contract to initially attach a module to the ISS and later detach.
NASA also awarded three additional contracts, totaling $415.6 million, for the Commercial
Destination Free Flyers200. Phase one of the CLD two step approach is expected to continue
through 2025201. Worth noting, is that CLD has a history of underfunding suggesting a lack of
support from Congress202, but was funded at the requested levels in the recent FY23
appropriations. The urgency associated with CLD (and the anticipated dependency on ISAM
capabilities) is defined by the need to maintain a continuous presence in space. Thus, the 2030
end date of the ISS represents a modest urgency particularly considering the history of regular
ISS extensions.
Recall that the 2017 SPD-1 and the 2020 National Space Policy directed NASA to
accomplish a human landing on the Moon by 2024 with sustained presence developed by 2028.
NASA’s 2022 Strategic Plan and 2022 Moon to Mars Objectives reiterate these goals, but do not
explicitly reference the dates203. NASA’s FY23 budget request reflects a scheduled crewed flight
test, Artemis II, to orbit the Moon NET 2024 and a mission to the lunar surface, Artemis III,
NET 2025204. These dates suggest a near-term urgency to landing on the Moon, a necessary
precursor to creating a sustainable presence on the Moon. The latter of which is dependent upon
ISAM capabilities.
As part of the Artemis Campaign development, Gateway is planned to be a human-capable
outpost orbiting the Moon205. The platform is intended to enable sustainable lunar surface
operations and to serve as a staging point for deep space exploration206. Gateway will be
significantly smaller than the ISS with fewer resources, such as power, logistics delivery, and
199
National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 2021
Smith, Marcia, “Three Winners for Commercial LEO Destinations Awards,” webpage, December 2, 2021. As of
February 12, 2023: https://spacepolicyonline.com/news/three-winners-for-commercial-leo-destinations-awards/
201
Smith, 2021
202
Smith, 2021
203
The Moon to Mars Objectives document was intentionally written without schedule and cost constraints to focus
on the architecture objectives and enable a trade space of implementation approaches.
204
National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 2022
National Aeronautics and Space Administration, “NASA’s Stakeholder Collaborations Help Inform Moon to Mars
Planning,” webpage, September 20, 2022. As of February 12, 2023: https://www.nasa.gov/press-release/nasa-sstakeholder-collaborations-help-inform-moon-to-mars-planning
205
National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 2022
206
National Aeronautics and Space Administration, “Gateway,” webpage, January 31, 2023. As of February 12,
2023: https://www.nasa.gov/gateway/
Fuller, Sean, et al., Gateway Program Status and Overview, NASA, September 1, 2022.
200
73
crew time, available. Although human capable, the outpost will be uncrewed most of the time
thereby requiring ISAM capabilities.
NASA’s FY23 budget request for Gateway included $779 million207. The first elements of
Gateway include the Power and Propulsion Element and the Habitation and Logistics Outpost.
These elements will launch no earlier than November 2024208. In 2026, Canada will contribute a
Canadarm3, which is a robotic arm capability evolved from the Space Shuttle and ISS209. The
Canadarm3 will support exterior maintenance and inspection as well as support assembly efforts
with the transfer and install of external hardware and science payloads210.
As with the ISS, the Gateway outpost will rely on refueling capabilities to maintain its lunar
orbit. ESA agreed to contribute this ISAM capability by 2027211. The new refueling challenge
presented with Gateway will be the inclusion of remote operations212. Japan Aerospace
Exploration Agency (JAXA) is also planning to provide logistics resupply to Gateway using an
evolution of their H-II Transfer Vehicle, or HTV213. Gateway operations, in general, are
anticipated to be a combination of ground supervised remote operations and automated
operations. The Gateway outpost NET 2024 launch and follow-on milestones present a near-term
urgency for ISAM capabilities.
NASA FY23 budget request for Artemis Campaign development also included $60 million
for Advanced Cislunar and Surface Capabilities. This area focuses on lunar sustainability
technologies and is a likely funding source for the ISAM technology dependencies. The urgency
associated with lunar sustainment is less clear than Gateway. The Artemis III NET 2025 date
207
National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 2022
National Aeronautics and Space Administration, “NASA, Northrop Grumman Finalize Moon Outpost Living
Quarters Contract,” webpage, July 9, 2021. As of February 12, 2023: https://www.nasa.gov/press-release/nasanorthrop-grumman-finalize-moon-outpost-living-quarters-contract
National Aeronautics and Space Administration, “Gateway,” webpage, November 17, 2022. As of February 12,
2023: https://www.nasa.gov/gateway/overview
National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 2022
209
Foust, Jeff, “Canadian astronaut to fly on first crewed Artemis mission,” webpage, December 16, 2020. As of
February 12, 2023: https://spacenews.com/canadian-astronaut-to-fly-on-first-crewed-artemis-mission/
National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 2022
210
National Aeronautics and Space Administration, October 2022; Fuller, Sean, et al., 2022
211
Foust, Jeff, “ESA awards contracts for moon and Mars exploration,” webpage, October 15, 2020. As of February
12, 2023: https://spacenews.com/esa-awards-contracts-for-moon-and-mars-exploration /
212
National Aeronautics and Space Administration, October 2022; Fuller, Sean, et al., 2022
213
Fuller, Sean, et al., 2022; Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency, “New unmanned cargo transfer spacecraft
(HTV-X),” webpage, undated. As of February 12, 2023: https://humans-in-space.jaxa.jp/en/htv-x/mission/
208
74
reflects a delay from the original 2024 goal. NASA acknowledged this delay but has yet to
discuss impacts to the 2028 goal214.
Worth noting is that Gateway is expected to contribute to the initial phase of sustained lunar
presence. The surface habitat and logistics will contribute another phase of lunar
sustainability215. NASA’s FY23 budget request reflected a 2031 milestone for the surface habitat
and logistics. Given the present delays, this phase of lunar sustainability is likely to occur later.
Although Congressional support remains for NASA’s lunar exploration plans, delays and
impacts suggest less urgency for the surface habitat and logistics phase of lunar sustainment.
Also recognized in NASA’s FY23 budget request is the Mars Campaign development. This
development effort included $8 million for Advanced Exploration Systems Foundational
Systems, a piece of which includes in-space refueling capabilities. The urgency associated with
the Mars Campaign is not urgent.
NASA’s human spaceflight exploration efforts appear to have a diversity of urgency levels.
The near-term urgency is associated primarily with Gateway. The urgency associated with a
CLD replacement to the ISS and the next phase of lunar sustainment is less.
NASA’s Third Strategic Goal: Transformational Technologies
NASA’s Space Technology Mission Directorate has a FY22 $1.1 billion budget with a FY23
budget request for $1.4 billion216. This organization is responsible for transformative technology
demonstrations, such as the suite of ISAM capabilities217. Unique to this organization, is their
focus on technology demonstrations. Thus, this organization is less about the continued use of a
particular technology and more about enabling the development of the technology for other
organizations to implement.
The STMD organization pursues ideas that will benefit both science and human spaceflight
exploration missions. Their project portfolio covers the entire range of technology readiness
levels with a focus on technology transfer. At least 20 percent of the STMD budget is spent on
ISAM efforts218. The On-orbit Servicing, Assembly, and Manufacturing, or OSAM-1 and
OSAM-2, projects are funded by STMD. The OSAM-1219 project is a technology demonstration
214
Bender, Bryan, “There’s no on in charge of NASA’s mega-moon program. And the countdown clock is ticking,”
webpage, August 17, 2022. As of February 12, 2023: https://www.politico.com/news/2022/08/17/wanted-someoneto-oversee-nasas-return-to-the-moon-00052251
215
National Aeronautics and Space Administration, FY 2023 President’s Budget Request Summary, 2022.
National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 2022
216
National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 2022
217
National Aeronautics and Space Administration, October 2022
218
CONFERS, 2022; National Aeronautics and Space Administration, October 2022
219
Formerly called Restore-L
75
of satellite refueling (fluid transfer), specifically targeting the Landsat-7 satellite220. The
demonstration will include a robotic arm to grapple Landsat-7. Upon completion of the refueling
objective, OSAM-1 will also demonstrate in-space assembly of an antenna and in-space
manufacturing of a spacecraft beam221.
Surviving a series of budget and personnel shortages, as well as Coronavirus impacts,
OSAM-1 will launch no earlier than 2026222. OSAM-1 is a high TRL project that aims to
overcome the TRL “valley of death.” STMD’s support of this high TRL effort suggests the
technology is ready for further implementation but does not guarantee future adoption.
OSAM-2 is another STMD funded technology demonstration project valued at $73.7 million
and awarded in 2019223. This demonstration includes additive manufacturing and robotic
manipulation of structures in space. The OSAM-2 launch date is NET 2024224.
During the 2022 ISAM workshop, STMD highlighted ongoing contributions to the
development of infrastructure. They specifically highlighted a few of the lunar and Mars
infrastructure objectives identified in the Moon to Mars Objectives framework. These objectives
included advanced manufacturing, autonomous construction, and ISRU capabilities to support a
sustained presence. STMD’s Lunar Surface Technology Research solicitation recently awarded
university grants on these topics225.
Within STMD, NASA’s FY23 budget request included $5 million to establish the
Consortium for Space Mobility and ISAM Capabilities (CoSMIC)226. This consortium will
address civil and national security space and is intended to initiate a nationwide alliance.
CoSMIC is not intended to be handed over to industry and will coordinate with the existing
CONFERS to avoid duplication. Pre-coordination efforts for the CoSMIC consortium are
220
National Aeronautics and Space Administration, “NASA’s Robotic OSAM-1 Mission Completes its Critical
Design Review,” webpage, March 3, 2022. As of February 12, 2023:
https://www.nasa.gov/feature/goddard/2022/nasa-s-robotic-osam-1-mission-completes-its-critical-design-review
221
National Aeronautics and Space Administration, March 2022
222
Universe Today, “NASA is Building a Mission That Will Refuel and Repair Satellites in Orbit,” webpage,
undated, As of February 12, 2023: https://www.universetoday.com/155863/nasa-is-building-a-mission-that-willrefuel-and-repair-satellites-in-orbit/
Government Accountability Office, 2021; National Aeronautics and Space Administration, October 2022;
Conversations with NASA and OMB
223
National Aeronautics and Space Administration, “On-Orbit Servicing, Assembly, and Manufacturing 2 (OSAM2),” webpage, June 23, 2022. As of February 12, 2023: https://www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/tdm/osam-2.html
224
National Aeronautics and Space Administration, June 2022
225
National Aeronautics and Space Administration, “NASA Selects Three US Universities to Develop Lunar
Infrastructure Tech,” webpage, February 18, 2022. As of February 12, 2023:
https://www.nasa.gov/directorates/spacetech/strg/lustr/NASA_Selects_Three_US_Universities_to_Develop_Lunar_
Infrastructure_Tech
226
CONFERS, 2022; National Aeronautics and Space Administration, October 2022
76
expected to continue through June 2023. The FY23 budget request for this initiative suggests a
near-term urgency for the ISAM-focused consortium.
Since STMD is not a traditional mission development organization, an urgency assessment is
less relevant. The organization’s pursuit of ISAM technology development primarily suggests
that STMD views ISAM as a technology that applies to both science and human exploration
efforts. The creation of the CoSMIC consortium further supports STMD’s perspective that ISAM
is a transformative technology that is ready for and in need of coordinated implementation.
Findings
The civil space sector was found to primarily possess urgency for ISAM capabilities within
the human spaceflight exploration efforts. The science efforts appeared interested in leveraging
ISAM capabilities but require more time to determine the appropriate applications.
What is the national alignment for ISAM drivers and urgency?
The civil space sector’s drivers and urgency for ISAM capabilities exist with NASA’s human
spaceflight exploration pursuits. This includes the near-term development of the Gateway lunar
outpost followed by the (less urgent) effort to achieve a sustainable presence on the Moon. Also
less urgent is the Commercial LEO Destinations with a current target date of 2030. There exists
opportunity for science exploration to also leverage the benefits of ISAM, but limited incentives.
Within the national security space sector, the ISAM Servicing capabilities are distinctly
recognized as immediate needs. The pivot to resilient space systems is well served by refueling
and repair capabilities. Furthermore, ongoing investment with expected near-term realization of
flight-demonstrated and proven capabilities exist. Additional interest exists in platforms and a
lunar presence, but with much less urgency.
Both sectors need Servicing capabilities in the near-term. However, the national security
space sector has a greater need and urgency for these capabilities. Specifically, the national
security space sector needs mature capabilities ready for operational implementation. This sector
also possesses a large number of satellites in need of resiliency, whereas the civil space sector
needs discrete and unique opportunities associated with persistent platforms (such as Gateway or
CLD).
The national security space sector is expected to lead in the breadth of implementation and
dependency on satellite servicing capabilities. This situation presents an opportunity for the civil
space sector, particularly the science community, to consider new benefits and opportunities for
their missions.
ISAM’s Assembly category reflects some alignment between the two sectors. Both sectors
have an interest in ISS-like platforms to enable technology development and science research.
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Similarly, both sectors have an interest in large telescopes built in-space beyond the limits of
launch vehicles227. The civil space sector is expected to continue leading in the area of
Assembly, particularly with the development of Gateway. Aligned interests exist with the two
sectors, but the urgency is greater with the civil space sector.
Manufacturing remains a slowly developing category albeit one with great potential. The
ability to manufacture parts using local resources is necessary to reduce Earth dependency and
achieve a sustainable presence on the Moon. Both sectors are interested in a sustained lunar
presence228. However, the urgency is greater with the civil space sector’s Artemis Campaign.
Thus, the civil space sector will lead in the category of Manufacturing with the national security
space sector following.
The development and implementation of ISAM capabilities has historically occurred in
discrete situations. Transitioning the space sectors to an ISAM-enabled, commercial service
approach is recognized as a national effort. Opportunities for national alignment exist, but the
extent of drivers and level of urgency vary. The question remaining is how feasible is the
adoption of ISAM?
Update: The above analysis was completed using the FY23 budget request. After the analysis
was completed, the FY23 appropriations were released. The appropriated funding was reviewed
and found to be generally consistent with the above assessment. The national security space
sector’s defense funding was well supported and received more than requested (in the areas of
space)229. The civil space sector, specifically NASA, was also supported with an increase from
the FY22 enacted appropriations, but not the full request in all areas. The Artemis Campaign did
well, and OSAM-1 was fully funded230. Whether the CoSMIC consortium was fully funded is yet
to be known.
227
A thorough assessment of the national security space sector’s drivers and urgency for large telescopes was
beyond the scope of this study (due to classification limitations).
228
On the surface of the Moon for the civil space sector and near the Moon for the national security space sector.
229
Smith, Marcia, “Appropriators Boost FY2023 Space Force Funding,” webpage, December 20, 2022. As of
February 12, 2023: https://spacepolicyonline.com/news/appropriators-boost-fy2023-space-force-funding/
230
Smith, Marcia, “FY2023 Funding For NASA Takes Another Step Forward, NEO Surveyor Gets a Boost,”
webpage, June 28, 2022. As of February 12, 2023: https://spacepolicyonline.com/news/fy2023-funding-for-nasatakes-another-step-forward-neo-surveyor-gets-a-boost/
Space Policy Online, “Civil,” webpage, January 4, 2023. As of February 12, 2023:
https://spacepolicyonline.com/topics/civil/
U.S. 117th Congress, Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies Appropriations Bill, 2023, 2022.
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Summary of Findings for the U.S. Implementation of ISAM
Findings from the third research question, in the context of U.S. implementation, are
summarized from the preceding sections below:
• The continuing theme of support through both administrations suggests that ISAM is not
just a passing fad but may have a potential role to serve in the needs of the national space
sectors.
• Competition with China is the foundational theme upon which national security space
sector ISAM drivers are built.
• The national security space sector has a near-term demand and urgency for Servicing
capabilities, particularly those that fulfill resilient needs.
• NASA’s drivers for ISAM capabilities reside primarily with human spaceflight
exploration efforts.
• Despite acknowledgement of the benefits of ISAM, there presently exists no direct
connection between drivers and ISAM capabilities for science missions.
• There exists a sense of uncertainty regarding where and when to invest in ISAM
capabilities for the science missions.
• Opportunities for national alignment exist but will not occur without direct effort.
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Chapter 5. The International Implementation of ISAM
Research Question #3 Who are the key (international) stakeholders and what are their
priorities?
As demonstrated in Chapter 4, the U.S. national security space strategic documentation
clearly communicates that China is the predominant driver for the development of resilient space
capabilities. China also remains a driver for the continued presence of the ISS.
Although China is the dominant focus for this chapter, Russia and Japan are also explored.
The U.S. recognizes Russia as an “acute threat.” Their long history of space capabilities and
recent challenge to international order (with their war on Ukraine) makes Russia an actor worth
further evaluation in the context of ISAM in an international environment. Finally, Japan is
evaluated for the country’s unique interest in environmental sustainability. Contrary to the
competitive nature that accompanies the U.S., China, and Russia, Japan does not appear to seek
international dominance.
The previous chapter focused on the U.S. drivers and urgency for the implementation of
ISAM capabilities. The discussion that follows will revisit the third research question, but from
an international perspective. The intent of this research question, in the international context, is
to understand what ISAM capabilities other countries are developing (and/or accomplished), as
well as when and why they might use them.
Given the growing international use of the space domain and the dual-use nature of ISAM
capabilities, understanding an actor’s intent can become increasingly challenging. The
complexity of the space domain is exacerbated by the diversity of international actors, the new
and developing dual-use capabilities, and the increased usage of the space domain. Different
actors have different values, priorities, and interests with respect to the space domain.
Understanding the capabilities and potential intent of an actor is key to supporting the interests
and objectives of the U.S.
Methodology
A direct interpretation of a country’s strategic documentation is beyond the scope of this
study. Instead, a high-level analysis that leverages the U.S. interpretation of the country’s
government strategic documentation is referenced to understand the country’s goals and
objectives. This information is supported by U.S. interpretations of the country’s news reports.
Data sources are primarily limited to the past five years. Discussions with country
representatives and translations of foreign documents were beyond the scope of this study.
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The U.S. drivers and urgency chapters contained a programmatic assessment of whether
needs and budget existed to support the implementation of ISAM capabilities. A slight
modification is applied to the international review of drivers and urgency. Rather than assessing
the presence of needs, this chapter focuses on the stated plans, interpreted values, and observed
activities of the country (relevant to ISAM). Near-term (within five years of the present)
activities suggest the country has the capability or will soon have the capability.
The countries were identified from the U.S. national strategy documentation presented in
Chapter 4. Chapter 3’s discussion of demonstrated and/or funded developments of integrated
capabilities within five years (of the present) also informed the selection of countries.
China
The U.S. perception is that China’s space sector pursuits are driven by a desire for global
leadership and influence and competition with the United States. According to a recently
published U.S. Department of Defense annual report to Congress, China’s national strategy aims
to “revise the international order in support of Beijing’s system of governance and national
interest.231” Their strategy is justified by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) leadership belief
that “an increasingly confrontational United States are the root causes of intensifying strategic
competition.232”
China “aspires to demonstrate the superiority of its civilization based on self-reliance and
indigenous innovation, especially in high technology sectors like space.233” This observation is
reiterated by U.S. government interpretations that the “PRC’s long-term goal is to create an
entirely self-reliant defense-industrial sector-fused with a strong civilian industrial and
technology sector-that can meet the PLA’s needs for modern military capabilities.234”
China is developing counterspace capabilities “for use against satellites in orbit to degrade
and deny adversary space capabilities.235” The ability to control and deny access to “space-based
information gathering and communication” is recognized by China as a critical capability236.
231
U.S. Department of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China,
2022.
232
U.S. Department of Defense, 2022
233
Goswami, Namrata, “Why Is China Going to the Moon?” webpage, December 18, 2020. As of February 12,
2023: https://thediplomat.com/2020/12/why-is-china-going-to-the-moon/
234
U.S. Department of Defense, 2022
235
U.S. Department of Defense, 2022
Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community,
February 2022.
236
U.S. Department of Defense, 2022
Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2022.
81
Although the PRC advocates against the weaponization of space, China is developing advanced
capabilities while also recognizing that “destroying or capturing satellites” are a possibility237.
The dual-use nature of space technology means the same technology can be applied to both
military and civilian purposes. Thus, China is advocating for the peaceful uses of outer space
while also removing defunct satellites from orbit238. These same capabilities can “be used in a
future system for grappling and disabling other satellites.239” The integration of their military and
civilian technology development and industrial bases suggests a more efficient and coordinated
means of developing dual-use capabilities240.
China is already observed to be “employing more sophisticated space operations.241” Their
application of ISAM capabilities, such as satellite inspection, refueling, repair, and relocation are
well observed242. Launched in 2016, the Tianyuan-1 system demonstrated refueling of another
satellite243 and the Aolong-1 satellite, equipped with a robotic arm, demonstrated debris removal
capabilities (by relocating a defunct satellite to a graveyard orbit)244. Additionally, their SJ-17
demonstrated RPO's and inspections of Chinese satellites for several years, including the
relocation of ChinaSat-5A to a graveyard orbit in 2018245. Launched in 2021, SJ-21 continued to
demonstrate ISAM capabilities with the relocation of the defunct CompassG2 satellite from
GEO246.
The China Aerospace Studies Institute (CASI) previously identified that a science and
technology goal for China was the achievement of “on-orbit service and “transport” by 2030.247”
CASI also noted that Chinese academic studies reflect an interest in robotic arm and refueling
237
U.S. Department of Defense, 2022
Erwin, Sandra, “Pentagon report: China’s space strategy shaped by technological change,” webpage, November 29,
2022. As of February 12, 2023: https://spacenews.com/pentagon-report-chinas-space-strategy-shaped-bytechnological-change/
238
Gong, Zizheng, “China Practices on Satellites Post Mission Disposals Toward Space Long Term Sustainability,”
briefing slides, China Academy of Space Technology, February 2016.
239
Werner, Debra, 2022
240
U.S. Department of Defense, 2022
241
U.S. Department of Defense, 2022
242
Burke, 2021; Hitchens, 2022; Lin, 2016; U.S. Department of Defense, 2022
Fingas, Jon, “China successfully refuels a satellite in orbit,” webpage, July 2, 2017. As of February 13, 2023:
https://www.engadget.com/2016-07-02-china-refuels-satellite-in-orbit.html
243
Fingas, 2017; Lin, 2016
244
Lin, 2016; Arney, Dale, et al., 2022
245
Burke, 2021
246
Hitchens, 2022
247
Burke, 2021
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capabilities on satellites. Similar reports cite the publicly released China’s Space Program: A
2021 Perspective as prioritizing satellite servicing efforts248.
China recognizes that the space sector is a valuable mechanism for demonstrating global
leadership and to influence other countries. They recently completed the assembly of their third
space station, called Tiangong-3249. Through the Tiangong space station, China demonstrates the
capability to assemble, refuel, and maintain a space station. Tiangong possesses a robotic arm250
capability and is supported with regular crewed and cargo flights251. China is also considering
the addition of a Hubble-like telescope252.
In alignment with the above goal of self-reliance, the Tiangong space station was built
independently253. Whereas the International Space Station, which was built with a prioritization
of international partnerships and relations, is truly reliant on those partnerships. For example, the
ISS dependence on Russia for propulsion (reboosts) was written into the ISS agreement and
intentionally designed into the ISS architecture254. This dependency contrasts with China’s
approach to partnerships on Tiangong. China is open to partnerships on the Tiangong255, but
those partnerships will not include a dependence on anyone.
China’s past achievements of landing rovers on the Moon and Mars serve as a symbol of
pride to the country256. In parallel to the U.S., China is also pursuing a lunar program with the
intent of landing humans on the Moon and developing a sustained, lunar presence257. Chang’e-7
248
Jones, Andrew, “China presents space plans and priorities in new white paper,” webpage, January 28, 2022. As
of February 13, 2023: https://spacenews.com/china-presents-space-plans-and-priorities-in-new-white-paper/
249
U.S. Department of Defense, 2022, Smith, November 2022
250
Woodall, Tatyana, “How Tiangong station will make China a force in the space race,” webpage, September 8,
2022. As of February 13, 2023: https://www.popsci.com/science/tiangong-chinese-space-station/
251
United Nations General Assembly, “Note verbale dated 3 December 2021 from the Permanent Mission of China
to the United Nations (Vienna) addressed to the Secretary-General,” memorandum, December 6, 2021.
Lin, 2016
252
Jones, Andrew, “China’s Tiangong space station,” webpage, August 24, 2021. As of February 13, 2023:
https://www.space.com/tiangong-space-station
Kluger, Jeffrey, “China’s New Space Station Has a Big Role to Play-Scientifically and Diplomatically,” webpage,
September 12, 2022. As of February 13, 2023: https://time.com/6212281/china-tiangong-space-station-role/
Smith, November 2022; Woodall, 2022
253
Woodall, 2022
254
National Aeronautics and Space Administration, “NASA-RSA Agreement,” webpage, undated. As of February
13, 2023: https://www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/station/structure/elements/nasa_rsa.html
255
Woodall, 2022
256
Goswami, 2020 quoting the Global Times
257
Goswami, 2020; Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2022
Jones, Andrew, “China Aims for a Permanent Moon Base in the 2030s,” webpage, September 22, 2021. As of
February 13, 2023: https://spectrum.ieee.org/china-aims-for-a-permanent-moon-base-in-the-2030s
83
and 8 are expected to contribute to the development of lunar resource capabilities that may
contribute to a lunar settlement258. Although speculative in nature, various news sources suggest
the International Lunar Research Station will be ready to support crewed missions in the mid2030’s259.
The U.S. DoD assesses that “Beijing has devoted significant economic and political
resources to growing all aspects of its space program, from military space applications to civil
applications such as profit-generating launches, scientific endeavors, and space exploration.260”
For over 20 years, their military budget has experienced annual increases in defense spending261.
Thus, China’s well-funded and integrated military and civilian space sector projects support the
goal of global influence and competition262. Their past and continuing accomplishments for both
space debris and space station capabilities suggest an ongoing commitment to the further
development and exploitation of these ISAM capabilities.
Russia
The U.S. perception is that Russia seeks to strengthen its regional power and to constrain the
influence of the U.S. on Russia263. Russia is not seeking a direct conflict with the U.S,264 but is
pursuing “parity with the United States in space.265”
Russia values information dominance or the ability to influence the adversary’s decisionmaking by denying or corrupting the information (that is enabled by space capabilities)
received266. They are integrating space services to improve their capability to “identify, track,
and target U.S. satellites during a conflict.267”
Normile, Dennis, “Chinese spacecraft successfully lands on moon’s far side and sends pictures back home,”
webpage, January 3, 2019. As of February 13, 2023: https://www.science.org/content/article/chinese-spacraftsuccessfully-lands-moons-far-side-and-sends-pictures-back-home
258
Jones, Andrew, “China’s Moon Missions Shadow NASA Artemis’s Pace,” webpage, September 7, 2022. As of
February 13, 2023: https://spectrum.ieee.org/china-moon-mission-artemis; Jones, September 2021
259
Jones, September 2022; Jones, September 2021; Goswami, 2020; Normile, 2019; The Space Futures Workshop
report recognizes “China’s long-term plan to put humans on the Moon by the year 2036” with the intent of securing
dominance by 2040. Source: Air Force Space Command, 2019
260
U.S. Department of Defense, 2022
261
U.S. Department of Defense, 2022
262
Burke, 2021; Goswami, 2020
263
Weeden, Brian and Victoria Samson., Global Counterspace Capabilities. Secure World Foundation, April 2022.
264
Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2022
265
Weeden and Samson, 2021; Weeden and Samson, 2022
266
Weeden and Samson, 2021; Weeden and Samson, 2022
267
Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2022
84
Russia has a history of anti-satellite capabilities and is continuing to develop those
capabilities268. The country is developing destructive and nondestructive counterspace weapons
to disrupt and degrade adversary assets269. From 2014-2020 Russia demonstrated inspection (or
surveillance) capabilities by maneuvering throughout GEO with intentional close approaches to
foreign satellites270. Although their actions might be described as necessary maneuvers, their
non-standard operational activities suggested surveillance operations, and were interpreted as
such by multiple satellite operators271.
Russia has a long history of recognized spaceflight accomplishments for both military and
civil purposes. They contribute a significant role in the ISS partnership. Partnered with China,
Russia is jointly pursuing the International Lunar Research Station and other lunar exploration
missions272. However, Russia’s war on Ukraine creates an uncertain future for their space
exploration activities. Annual budget cuts for Russia’s space activities are expected for 2022 to
2024273.
Japan
An English translation of Japan’s recent national security strategy states that Japan’s national
interests include maintaining sovereignty and independence, economic growth, and the
protection of universal values through “a free and open international order. 274” Japan’s national
security strategy cites peace and security concerns due to China’s military activities and stated
potential to use force against Taiwan. Russia’s war on Ukraine, growing military activities near
Japan, and increased strategic coordination with China are also cited as security concerns for
Japan. North Korea’s significantly increased and unprecedented frequency of ballistic missile
launches is also recognized as a security concern.
Deepening cooperation with the United States in areas such as the space domain is
recognized as a strategic approach to address the growing security concerns275. The strategy
specifies the promotion of “measures to address the issue of space debris,” enhanced cooperation
268
Weeden and Samson, 2021; Weeden and Samson, 2022
Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2022; Weeden and Samson, 2021; Weeden and Samson, 2022
270
Weeden and Samson, 2021; Weeden and Samson, 2022; Harisson, Todd, et al., Space Threat Assessment 2022,
Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2022.
271
Weeden and Samson, 2021; Weeden and Samson, 2022
272
Jones, September 2021
273
Weeden and Samson, 2022
274
Government of Japan, National Security Strategy of Japan, December 2022.
275
Government of Japan, 2022
269
85
with allies, and “the formulation of international codes of conduct.” Japan’s 2008 Basic Space
law is interpreted to permit national security space activities for defensive purposes276.
Japan is pursuing a significant defense budget increase, that includes space activities277. The
increased funding for space activities is expected to include civilian activities with overlapping
national security interests278. Japan’s ISAM related activities are primarily debris removal.
Astroscale, a Japanese company, completed a technology demonstration in 2021 of capabilities
for use in future debris removal missions279. The company plans to continue maturation of their
technology with missions in 2023 and 2024280. Astroscale is also partnered with companies
throughout the UK for a 2026 mission to remove two satellites from orbit281. The company is
also planning to launch a GEO life extension service in 2025.
The recent signing of the U.S.-Japan space cooperation framework demonstrates an intent to
build on their partnerships with the United States282. The framework reinforces existing
relationships, explicitly cites lunar efforts, and suggests further discussions to follow. Japan is
already an ISS partner, a signatory to the Artemis Accords, and a Gateway partner. Japan’s
partnership contributions continue with an upcoming robotic arm addition to the ISS and a
pressurized lunar rover by the end of the decade283.
276
Weeden and Samson, 2021; Weeden and Samson, 2022; Harisson, Todd, et al., 2022
Johnstone, Christopher B., “Japan’s Transformational National Security Strategy,” webpage, December 8, 2022.
As of February 13, 2023: https://www.csis.org/analysis/japans-transformational-national-security-strategy;
Government of Japan, 2022
278
Schwartz, H. Andrew and Johnstone, Christopher B., “Japan’s New Defense Strategy,” webpage, December 16,
2022. As of February 13, 2023: https://www.csis.org/analysis/japans-new-defense-strategy
279
Astroscale, “ELSA-d-Astroscale, Securing Space,” webpage, undated. As of February 11, 2023:
https://astroscale.com/missions/elsa-d/
280
Astroscale, “ELSA-M-Astroscale, Securing Space,” webpage, undated. As of February 11, 2023:
https://astroscale.com/elsa-m/
281
Astroscale, “COSMIC-Astroscale, Securing Space,” webpage, undated. As of February 11, 2023:
https://astroscale.com/missions/cosmic/
282
Blinken, Antony J., “The United States and Japan Sign Framework Agreement on Space Cooperation,” webpage,
January 13, 2023. As of February 13, 2023: https://www.state.gov/the-united-states-and-japan-sign-frameworkagreement-on-space-cooperation/
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “The Signing Ceremony of the Framework Agreement between Japan and the
United States of America for Cooperation in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space,” webpage, January 13, 2023.
As of February 13, 2023: https://www.mofa.go.jp/fp/msp/page1e_000559.html
283
Rainbow, Jason, “Japanese startup to demo robotic arm onboard ISS in 2023,” webpage, July 11, 2022. As of
February 13, 2023: https://spacenews.com/japanese-startup-to-demo-robotic-arm-onboard-iss-in-2023/
Foust, Jeff, “NASA signs agreement with Japan on lunar exploration,” webpage, July 13, 2020. As of February 13,
2023: https://spacenews.com/nasa-signs-agreement-with-japan-on-lunar-exploration/
277
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Findings for the International Implementation of ISAM
Regardless of whether or not a country is seeking dominance in the space domain, the
international space community appears to recognize the changing nature of the domain. This
includes a recognition of the increased potential and capability for adversaries to degrade or
destroy space assets. Reactions include the development of dual-use capabilities and
international alliances284. The ISAM dual-use capabilities provide an insurance that the owner
can leverage for defensive purposes (deterrence or aggression), but otherwise employ for
peaceful purposes.
Competitive priorities combined with growing tensions and mature technologies have already
initiated the realization of ISAM capabilities. Although competitive attitudes can encourage new
ideas and capabilities, they can also risk damage to the environment and to relationships.
Recognizing risks and identifying mechanisms to minimize the risks is key to achieving an
internationally beneficial Space Superhighway vision.
Findings from the third research question, in the context of international implementation, are
as follows:
• Surveillance and debris removal are the ISAM capabilities currently being employed
or developed by international space actors. The presence of dual-use capabilities
among adversaries creates a potential for misinterpretation. However, the similar
presence among partner nations creates opportunity for the development of
responsible behaviors.
• The international space exploration community appears to be divided among the
U.S.-led and China-led coalitions.
284
Although not discussed in this chapter, Europe is also recognized throughout this report as pursuing debris
removal capabilities and contributing to Gateway lunar exploration efforts. Various news articles also suggest that
Europe is attempting to bridge the divide between the U.S. exploration efforts and that of China. However,
budgetary and political uncertainty is challenging the interest in China-led efforts. Source: Jones, Andrew, “ESA is
no longer planning to send astronauts to China’s Tiangong space station,” webpage, January 25, 2023. As of January
27, 2023: https://spacenews.com/esa-is-no-longer-planning-to-send-astronauts-to-chinas-tiangong-space-station/
(Weeden and Samson, 2022) also indicate that France is pursuing increased surveillance capabilities in response to
Russia’s close approaches in GEO. The same source stated that the defense space strategies from France and from
the UK each cite a need to protect and defend their space assets.
87
Summary of Key Stakeholders and their Priorities
The third research question was: Who are the key stakeholders and what are their priorities?
Chapters 4 and 5 answered the third research question from a U.S. perspective and from an
international perspective.
The key stakeholders in the context presented are the United States, China, Russia, and Japan.
Their priorities and interests are as follows:
•
The United States: The U.S. seeks to protect democratic values, the security of its
people, and economic expansion. These national interests are pursued through the
prioritization of U.S. leadership in space, competition with China, and constraining
Russia. Although the U.S. does not seek conflict, the ability to deter in conflict and to
prevail is prioritized. The U.S. is demonstrating significant interest in inspection,
refueling, repair, and relocation ISAM capabilities.
•
China: China seeks global leadership and to influence the international order in
support of China's governance system and national interests. These goals are pursued
through competition with the U.S., demonstrations of technological superiority in
space, and the development of self-reliant defense and civilian industrial and
technology sectors. China advocates for the peaceful use of space but is also
developing counterspace capabilities to degrade and deny adversary space
capabilities. China's demonstrated ISAM capabilities include satellite inspection,
refueling, repair, relocation, and assembly.
•
Russia: Russia seeks to strengthen its regional power and to achieve parity with the
U.S. in space. Russia values information dominance and is improving their capability
to identify, track, and target U.S. satellites during conflict. Russia is developing
destructive and nondestructive counterspace weapons and has a history of antisatellite capabilities. Russia's space expertise has decades of global recognition. Their
demonstrated ISAM capabilities include inspection and those associated with space
stations.
•
Japan: Japan's national interests include maintaining sovereignty and independence,
economic growth, and the protection of universal values through a free and open
international order. Japan is pursuing a significant defense budget increase that
includes space activities. Japan is developing ISAM capabilities primarily focused on
debris removal. Japan seeks to deepen cooperation with the U.S. in the space domain
to address growing security concerns.
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Chapter 6. Challenges to ISAM Adoption
Research Question #4 What characteristics impact the adoption of ISAM in the space
economy?
The Chapter 4 analysis revealed that the U.S.’ national security and civil space sectors
possess some drivers and near-term urgency for ISAM capabilities. However, possessing an
urgent need for a new capability is only an initial step. The feasibility of implementing a new
capability can determine the success or failure of adoption. In other words, how realistic is the
proposed change? Can the challenges be overcome with the provided funding and timeframe?
Will the present enthusiasm for ISAM remain in the long-term or is this a short-term interest
similar to historical efforts?
Chapter 5 presented an evaluation of key actors within the international space community as
they pertain to ISAM. The dominant actors (China, Russia) were found to have competitive
interests similar to those of the U.S. They are also developing and/or leveraging limited ISAM
capabilities, with China possessing the most advanced capabilities. The added dynamic of the
international space community is included in the discussion below.
The intent of the fourth research question is to communicate the potential challenges and
enablers surrounding the development of an ISAM enabled in-space economy. Historic satellite
servicing implementations were shown to occur over finite time spans and in discrete situations.
A true adoption of satellite servicing has yet to occur. Before the Space Superhighway vision can
be pursued, policy makers need to recognize why past attempts did not result in adoption and
what challenges will inhibit future adoption. An understanding of the challenges informs the
enablers. Identifying enablers is key to creating feasible solutions that inform the development of
effective policy. Otherwise, policy makers risk designing policy solutions that are not realistic or
feasible.
Methodology
This section will assess the potential for ISAM adoption through the identification of
challenges and enablers. The challenges are defined as barriers, obstacles, or other inhibitors to
change. The ability to overcome these challenges informs the feasibility of implementation and
the identification of enablers. The data sources include conversations with U.S. experts and
literature review.
Challenges were identified from commonly cited issues associated with adopting ISAM
capabilities. Examples were provided to analyze and understand the challenges presented. The
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challenges discussed are scoped to the initial adoption of ISAM capabilities. An economic
outlook of market demand is beyond the scope of this study.
Each challenge was reviewed for leverage points that could enable adoption. The combined
set of technology maturity, drivers, urgency, and challenges were presented in the form of use
cases. Recommendations were provided throughout the use cases and at the end of the section.
Challenges with Adoption
The challenges commonly associated with the adoption of ISAM capabilities are summarized
below.
1. A lack of consistent drivers that require ISAM capabilities has historically slowed the
adoption of ISAM.
The above analysis reveals that the national security space sector has the most drivers and
urgency for the development of ISAM servicing capabilities. Their urgent need is directly
connected to concerns over China’s developing and competing capabilities. Thus, national
security space will likely lead the adoption and operational implementation of servicing
capabilities. Unless the national security space sector identifies alternative methods for achieving
resilience in space, the drivers for ISAM capabilities are likely to persist.
The civil space sector’s contribution to ISAM adoption will likely occur with NASA’s
human exploration efforts.
While the civil space sector possesses drivers and urgency for ISAM
capabilities their urgency is less competitive and more cooperative in nature.
Cooperative efforts tend to be more forgiving to development delays as was
well demonstrated by the assembly of the International Space Station.
Consequently, NASA’s urgency for ISAM capabilities may experience delays.
Also worth noting, is the change in direction that NASA human spaceflight efforts
historically experience from one Administration to the next. If NASA’s requirement for a
sustainable approach is removed (or down scoped) then the drivers for ISAM will decrease. This
creates the possibility for delays and major program changes. However, the presence of
international partnerships can ensure the continuation of international relations through the
agreed upon project. For this reason, and the ongoing bi-partisan support for NASA, a major
redirection is not likely, but remains a valid concern285.
285
Also worth noting, if China remains on a steady pace towards the Moon, then NASA’s course is unlikely to
change.
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The distinction between the national security space sector and the civil space sector is that
the drivers associated with national security space have a greater sense of urgency and are
focused on satellite servicing capabilities.
2. Current development and acquisition approaches are designed for single-use missions.
Typically, if a satellite with more maneuverability is needed, then a satellite with a larger fuel
tank is built. The increased size and weight of the fuel tank has a cascading effect that also
increases the satellite size, weight, and launch vehicle capability. The result is that the overall
cost of developing and launching the larger satellite increases with the estimated need for
maneuverability.
The single-use build of the satellite relies on modeling and estimates of the consumables
needed or the extent of redundancy. Inaccuracies in the models or unpredictable failures can
produce mission ending events. Within the first six months of JWST’s flight, a micrometeorid
strike that was larger than predicted by modeling hit the observatory and raised concerns about
the lifetime of the observatory286. Alternative ISAM enabled approaches may have invested in a
repair capability287.
Smaller, cheaper satellites have less individual risk but smaller fuel tanks. Adding a refueling
capability and spreading the refueling cost among multiple small, cheaper satellites meets
resiliency needs and constrains the cost of the individual satellites.
3. The benefits of ISAM are nice to have, but not a necessity.
The resiliency needs of the national security space sector, and the sustainability needs of
human spaceflight exploration possess an inherent need for ISAM capabilities. The national
security space sector’s resilience needs are dependent on refueling and repair capabilities.
Human spaceflight needs are dependent on refueling capabilities for Gateway, assembly
capabilities for platforms and lunar structures, and manufacturing capabilities for a sustained,
lunar presence.
These needs are also recognized as dependencies because no (or few) viable alternative
approaches exist. As discussed above, the national security sector could just build and launch
bigger satellites. However, this alternative approach exists at the cost of time and money. The
Artemis Campaign could regularly cycle through the expensive routine of build and launch from
286
Howell, Elizabeth, “James Webb Space Telescope picture shows noticeable damage from micrometeoroid
strike,” webpage, July 18, 2022. As of February 13, 2023: https://www.space.com/james-webb-space-telescopemicrometeoroid-damage
287
Worth noting, is that JWST was designed, developed, and flown before the availability of satellite servicing
capabilities. This is simply a representative example of how future ISAM infrastructure could repair a valuable
investment.
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Earth, but this is not a realistically sustainable approach. For both of these examples, mission
constraints are met through the implementation of ISAM capabilities.
In contrast, science exploration experiences a benefit from ISAM capabilities. The current
demands of the science community dictate unique platforms with specific orbit and stability
requirements. The science objectives and mission success are met through current approaches,
without ISAM capabilities. Thus, ISAM capabilities for science have yet to present an obvious
need and are currently recognized as a beneficial, but optional service.
4. The cost to make a satellite serviceable is in competition with the cost to maximize
mission capability.
Budget spent to add modularity, a door, or a grapple fixture, etc. does not enhance the
science. The development of the JWST included challenging risk trades. The single launch of a
$10 billion telescope risked the loss of decades of investment at a single time288. This risk could
have been mitigated with multiple launches and assembly of the telescope in space. However,
with present capabilities and the cost of launch vehicles such a mitigation was not cost effective.
JWST also accepted a significant number of risks with the sunshield deployment289. The project
chose to mitigate some risks with ground testing prior to launch and to accept other risks (due to
risk of damage to hardware and launch delay)290. An alternative (or additional) approach was to
use ISAM capabilities to repair a failed deployment in space. However, the infrastructure to
support a repair is not yet in orbit and the development of this capability would have required
additional budget and/or reduced the budget spent on science capabilities.
Unless a program prioritizes the ability to repair or upgrade a mission, the
incentive to prioritize and maximize expenditure on science objectives will
remain.
288
USA Facts, “How much did NASA’s James Webb Space Telescope cost?” webpage, July 21, 2022. As of
February 13, 2023: https://usafacts.org/articles/how-much-did-nasas-james-webb-space-telescope-cost/
Government Accountability Office, James Webb Space Telescope Technical Challenges Have Caused Schedule
Strain and May Increase Costs, January 2020.
289
Foust, Jeff, “JWST launch marks only the start of a risky deployment process,” webpage, December 23, 2021. As
of February 13, 2023: https://spacenews.com/jwst-launch-marks-only-the-start-of-a-risky-deployment-process/
290
Leitner, Jesse and Tupper Hyde, “How NASA decided Webb was ready: Inside the risk assessment,” webpage,
February 2022. As of February 13, 2023: https://aerospaceamerica.aiaa.org/departments/how-nasa-decided-webb
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5. Uncertainty associated with the viability and longevity of a business case.
Are there enough customers to share the costs? A commercially owned and operated
persistent platform in LEO implies a pay-for-service approach rather than a traditional
government contract. The CESAS meeting focused on an Earth observing platform for the Earth
Science Division within SMD. The primary risk with this approach is a customer base that is too
small. If the platform is solely dependent on ESD, then this approach risks the entire ESD
budget.
Similar concerns exist for the Commercial LEO Destinations effort. Although CLD was fully
funded in the FY23 appropriations, prior levels of funding were appropriated at lower levels than
requested and associated with concern for the viability of the business case.
Will the ISAM capability be available when needed? ISAM is uniquely characterized by the
continued presence of infrastructure in-space. NOAA acknowledged potential benefits from
servicing capabilities. However, NOAA emphasized the need for assurance that servicing
capabilities would be available decades in the future before significant investment in making
their satellites servicing capable.
Given adequate drivers and funding, government customers are willing to invest in a
commercial service. However, the civil space sector, particularly the science missions, do not
possess adequate drivers and funding for investment in ISAM capabilities. Thus, their adoption
is reliant on the investment of others. Coordinated efforts among the national security and civil
space sector users may enable consistency and clarity in demand signals. Doing so can
encourage the maturation of the business case while distributing the cost of infrastructure
investment across sectors.
6. The dual-use nature of ISAM can result in international misinterpretations of in-space
operations.
Dual-use technologies are generally recognized as having both military and civilian
applications. The space domain is well known for producing dual-use capabilities. In the context
of ISAM, the Servicing category is notably recognized for the ability to relocate or repair a
satellite with the use of robotic manipulators. These capabilities can extend, upgrade, or alter a
satellite’s mission, but they can also intentionally damage a satellite.
The 2014 declassification of GSSAP revealed that the inspection capability was being used
to surveil adversary satellites and collect intelligence on their capabilities and activities.
Operational maneuvers were no longer restricted to orbit maintenance, but now included
approaching other satellites to inspect. Russia and China have demonstrated similar inspection
capabilities and maneuvers.
Similarly, China has repeatedly demonstrated dual-use capabilities in the context of debris
removal, but the U.S. does not interpret their efforts as solely focused on environmental
sustainability.
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Within the U.S., national alignment is an enabling characteristic that creates demand and
encourages a business case. However, such alignment also encourages international
misperceptions for all three space sectors. A commercial service with a (cooperative) nondefense client might perform a capability too close to another country’s satellite and
(unintentionally) create cause for concern. Commercial services are expected to have clients
from all three space sectors. A civilian use can become difficult to distinguish from a military
use.
Proactively communicating intent prior to, during, and after an operational event can
minimize international misinterpretations. Similarly, engaging in the discussion of norms and
behaviors can raise awareness of potential misinterpretations. As the operational implementation
of these capabilities matures, standard operational practices can be defined and also distributed
internationally.
Involving international opinions in these discussions can be beneficial but can also challenge
the ability to reach consensus. Efforts to include international perspectives should be made
regardless but should not inhibit progress. If a lack of international consensus exists, then the
U.S. can consider whether or not to simply develop a domestic norm or to wait until consensus is
achieved.
The implementation of new capabilities, particularly among adversaries, will always be
characterized by uncertainty and the potential for misunderstandings. Those misperceptions may
be innocent or intentional in nature. Even if proactive communication and widely distributed
messaging occurs, unfavorable propaganda will still occur. These actions are expected but should
not dissuade proactive methods of communication and transparency. The extent to which such
proactive measures are pursued is a topic for discussion with all three space sectors. Historical
events, tabletop exercises, and other gaming exercises are potential methods to simulate the
implementation of what, how, when, and to whom information is shared.
Enablers to Adoption
The list below presents potential leverage points that can overcome the challenges discussed.
The leverage points are recognized as enablers and include the following:
• Culture change - A willingness to think differently and consider alternative, nontraditional approaches. Guidance and consistent messaging from leadership and
management is needed to ensure buy-in at all levels. Actionable steps include leadership
prioritization of sustainability practices and influence during the architecture and design
phase.
• Scoped area of focus - Targeted investment
• Funded requirements - The use of ISAM represents a change from the traditional way of
doing business. Transitioning from one approach to another will not occur
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•
•
•
instantaneously. Realistic and consistent funding can reduce the uncertainty associated
with change.
Aligned interests and/or coordinated efforts - This can occur through natural alignment,
incentivized alignment, or mandates. Coordinate efforts throughout all the space sectors
to ensure a sufficient quantity of demand as well as a consistent demand signal.
Variances in drivers and urgency between sectors can result in displaced timelines that
challenge the demand signal.
Minimize bespoke requirements - Pursue requirements that are supported across multiple
space sectors and not just a single project.
Communication and transparency - Pro-active communication techniques that state intent
prior to, during, and after the operational activity.
Use Cases & the Feasibility of Adoption
Recall from Chapter 3, the use cases identified include: Mission Extension, Debris Removal,
Inspection, Build a Platform, Maintenance & Repair, Upgrade & Installation, and Permanent
Lunar Habitat. This section will discuss four use cases where the first use case is mission
extension, the second use case is building a platform, the third use case is a permanent lunar
habitat, and the fourth use case is debris removal.
The first use case was chosen, because the refueling capability is a top priority within the
national security space sector. The seconds use case was chosen because platforms represent an
area of national alignment, but with an uncertain business case. The third use case represents
another area of potential national alignment, but international misperceptions challenges exist.
Finally, the fourth use case represents an area that also has international misperceptions
challenges as a result of exploiting the dual-use nature of the capability.
The use cases presented include a description of the technology maturity, drivers, urgency,
and the challenges. Recall that Chapter 3 discussed the technology maturity, Chapter 4 examined
the drivers and urgency for the national security and civil space sectors, and this chapter
reviewed the challenges. Each of these parameters (technology maturity, drivers, urgency, and
challenges) influence the feasibility of adoption. Enablers are provided as potential leverage
points to overcome the obstacles. For example, a use case may be characterized by mature
technology that is needed immediately but could be considered threatening to other actors. In this
case, the policy recommendation may be to promote targeted investment of the near-term
capability with a focus on communications and transparency efforts.
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Individual Satellite Servicing: Mission Extension
The first use case refers to the refueling capability area within ISAM’s Servicing category. In
this context, refueling a satellite refers to replenishing the fuel reserves of an individual satellite.
Where the word “individual” is added to distinguish a satellite bus from a space station (such as
the ISS). Recent examples include DARPA’s RSGS partnership with Northrop Grumman
SpaceLogistics services and Astroscale’s life extension services291.
The national security space sector distinctly identified the refueling capability as a need with
immediate urgency. The intent is for this sector to increase the maneuverability of their satellites
with less prioritization given to the finite fuel capacity of an individual satellite. In other words,
the vehicle can stop at a gas station or have a gas tank added to the vehicle and continue its
mission objectives.
The civil space sector science community expressed an interest in refueling capabilities, but
no drivers or urgency. Recall that the developing OSAM-1 project is a technology demonstration
that suggests interest and opportunity for the capability but does not represent buy-in for future
satellite missions. The original intent for OSAM-1 was to refuel and extend the life of the
Landsat-7 mission until Landsat-9 was operational. SMD, NOAA, and USGS indicated potential
support of refueling capabilities for science missions with an emphasis on continuity of
measurements.
A point worth noting is that the national security sector’s needs are primarily in GEO,
whereas the civil space sector’s candidate science satellites are in LEO. The significantly
different locations of the orbits can impact the availability of the services and the cost of the
services. Thus, a business case in LEO will need to exist if the civil space sector is to leverage
the benefits of these capabilities292.
As discussed in Chapter 3, the mission extension use case is a mature capability with recent
flight demonstrations and is considered available for near-term implementation. In the context of
enabling characteristics, the refueling capability represents a scoped area of focus with increased
funding. The national security sector’s efforts should emphasize the minimization of bespoke
requirements to enable wider usability. Incentives should be considered to encourage national
alignment. Although national alignment remains uncertain, the national security sector’s present
demand and urgency has never been stronger. Since satellite servicing represents a nontraditional approach, organizational leadership should promote cultural change to prioritize
291
Astroscale is launching their GEO Life Extension In-orbit Servicer, called LEXI, in 2025. Source: Staples, Rob,
“Key Capabilities of our Life Extension In-orbit (LEXITM) Servicer,” webpage, October 5, 2021. As of February
18, 2023: https://astroscale-us.com/lexi-life-extension-capabilities/
292
LEO experiences atmospheric drag which creates a fuel impact to simply maintain the servicing satellite’s orbit.
The orbit maintenance fuel use for the servicer comes at the cost of the potential benefits to the client satellite.
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sustainability. The combination of drivers, urgency, maturity, funding, and scoped efforts enable
the implementation and adoption of the mission extension use case.
Build a Platform
The second use case refers to ISAM’s Assembly category for the creation of a commercially
provided, persistent platform. Recent examples include the International Space Station, the
Commercial LEO Destinations concept studies, the developing Gateway, the platform study for
NASA’s ESD, and the Orbital Outpost solicitation.
The national security space sector has drivers for platforms to enable emerging technology
development, but low urgency. The civil space sector possesses the most drivers and urgency for
this use case. However, the near-term urgency for a platform is associated with Gateway, which
has bespoke requirements. The potential for this platform to contribute to an in-space economy is
in the presence of lunar orbit infrastructure, but not as a commercial service.
The assembly of a platform is considered a mature capability. Both sectors possess an
aligned interest, but the uncertainty of the business case is the primary inhibitor for this use case.
The commercial platform use case needs more time to mature the business case. If the ongoing
(CLD, ESD, Orbital Outpost) studies transition to flight demonstrations, then an aligned effort
may impact the feasibility of implementation. Requirements such as orbit, stability, human
rating, research, and operations should be assessed for the potential to create a platform with
multiple customers.
However, if national security and civil space efforts are combined, then international
perceptions should also be considered. For many years, NASA has hosted DoD experiments and
scientific payloads on the ISS293. If a new platform (independent of the ISS) and cross-sector
effort is pursued, then the activities and operations for which that platform is leveraged should be
assessed for potential international misperceptions. The Orbital Outpost solicitation is for simple,
unpressurized platform concepts achievable in a couple of years. If these concepts remain scoped
and minimize bespoke requirements, then a defense -led platform is likely feasible.
Permanent Lunar Habitat
The third use case leverages ISAM’s Manufacturing category for the development of a
permanent lunar habitat. The only recent examples of this use case are the ongoing concept
developments for the U.S.’ Artemis Campaign and China.
293
Bridenstine, James F. and John W. Raymond, Memorandum of Understanding Between the National Aeronautics
and Space Administration and the United States Space Force, September 2020.
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Within the U.S., the national security space sector drivers relevant to the establishment of a
lunar presence are competition with China, first mover’s advantage, and the development of
norms of behavior. The civil space sector also possesses drivers for the establishment of a
sustained lunar presence. Both sectors possess aligned interests, but the national urgency with
respect to a lunar habitat (or lunar surface activities) is entirely dependent upon NASA. NASA’s
FY23 budget request indicated plans for a surface habitat in 2031. The U.S. currently expects
China to establish a lunar station in the mid-2030’s. This expectation encourages urgency, but a
competitive perception is primarily observed with the national security space sector and not
within the NASA bureaucracy.
The primary inhibitor for the permanent lunar habitat is the immaturity of the capability. This
use case needs more time to develop and mature the relevant technology. An aligned effort
benefits the potential adoption of this use case from a national perspective. In other words,
aligned funding and developments towards a common goal can enable implementation.
However, from an international perspective, the presence of the national security space sector
on the surface of the Moon could create international concerns. Although DARPA’s NOM4D
program is not pursuing a presence on the surface of the Moon, the program was recognized for
potential concerns about future military operations on the Moon and compliance with the 1967
Outer Space Treaty294. In the current environment, limiting the presence of the national security
sector to on-orbit, cislunar activities is likely adequate to fulfill drivers.
For now, the U.S.-led and China-led efforts are planning to settle on the Moon for research
and exploration purposes. This denotes a civil space sector led activity with the support of the
commercial space sector. If national security drivers eventually extend to the surface of the
Moon, such as the need to protect the commercial and civil space sector activities, then the U.S.
will have to carefully consider the balance between national alignment and international
interpretations. Communications and transparency mechanisms can support messaging efforts to
the international community. The Artemis Accords also offers a coalition of the international
space community through which potential challenges and actions can be agreed upon.
Debris Removal
The fourth use case is debris removal, which leverages the capabilities of ISAM’s Servicing
category. The removal of objects inherently uses the relocation capability to move a defunct
satellite to a GEO disposal orbit or to lower the perigee of a satellite in LEO. Recent examples
include Northrop Grumman’s SpaceLogistics services and China’s accomplishments in GEO. In
LEO, developing examples include Japan’s Astroscale services, Europe’s ClearSpace-1 mission,
and the U.S.’ Starfish Space.
294
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, 2021; Hitchens, 2021
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The national security space sector possesses drivers for adapting or repurposing a satellite’s
mission, which can include relocating the satellite to another orbital slot. This sector’s focus on
sustainability appears to prioritize satellite sustainability in the context of maintenance and
repair, whereas Japan and Europe appear to prioritize environmental sustainability295.
The national security space sector is funding the Orbital Prime effort, which is pursuing nearterm active debris removal capabilities, such as relocation. This is likely in response to China’s
multiple demonstrations of their relocation capabilities to remove defunct satellites from GEO.
China’s debris removal activities in GEO raised attention in the U.S. because this use case is
recognized as a dual-use capability. China’s capability to move their own satellites could also be
used to move (or damage) adversary satellites. The national security sector’s prioritized
competition with China is a sufficient driver and urgency in itself for the U.S. to develop a
comparable capability to that of China.
The civil space sector uses the relocation capability whenever a controlled disposal from
LEO occurs, or the ISS is reboosted. The execution of the relocation capability typically uses the
onboard capabilities of the satellite. The controlled disposal relies on the remaining availability
of fuel and still-functional components. Despite good intentions, these dependencies are not
always available296.
In response to the growing lack of compliance to government guidelines, a 2021 NASA IG
report cited a need to prioritize the active debris removal use case297. NASA’s FY22
appropriations included funding for debris removal technology development and prizes. Use of
this funding, in parallel with the Orbital Prime effort, presents an opportunity to coordinate
efforts and create national alignment.
However, NASA has an internal policy that restricts the agency’s involvement to that of low
technology maturity efforts298. Furthermore, the civil space sector drivers for debris removal
reside solely with the 25-year rule. Beyond this rule, no other drivers exist. An alignment of
interests with the science community or a mandate could strengthen the drivers. Until then,
NASA’s drivers for debris removal will remain unchanged.
295
Lindbergh, Rachel, et al., 2022
See Herron, Marissa, “Obstacles to ODMSP Compliance,” webpage, October 4, 2022. As of: February 13, 2023:
https://technarrativelab.org/obstacles-to-odmsp-compliance for an explanatory study of the decision making process,
the decisions made, and the effect of those decisions with regards to satellite disposal.
The Orbital Debris Mitigation Standard Practices (ODMSP) guidelines apply to government satellites and call for
the removal of satellites from LEO within 25-years of ending operations. The FCC regulations impose similar (but
shorter timeline) requirements on commercial satellites. Despite the presence of these guidelines and requirements,
compliance is not guaranteed, and enforcement (across all three space sectors) is not clear.
297
National Aeronautics and Space Administration Office of Inspector General, NASA’s Efforts to Mitigate the
Risks Posed by Orbital Debris, January 27, 2021.
298
Werner, Debra, “NASA’s Interest in Removal of Orbital Debris Limited to Tech Demos,” webpage, June 22,
2015. As of February 13, 2023: https://spacenews.com/nasas-interest-in-removal-of-orbital-debris-limited-to-techdemos/
296
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The maturity of this capability is near-term. Commercial services were recently demonstrated
in GEO and are in development in LEO. Given proper incentives, an alignment of interests can
occur across all three space sectors (and the international community). The alignment could
create sufficient demand to support multiple commercial debris removal service. If the incentives
only apply to the government, then the business case is challenged.
This use case is unique because the capability is mature, cross-sector enforcement could
create demand, but the primary inhibitor is the lack of value placed on environmental
sustainability. Thus, a cultural change needs to occur, but such change will not happen unless
sufficient drivers are created.
Bespoke requirements and complexity can inhibit debris removal. Debris is not restricted to
defunct satellites but can also include rocket bodies and pieces shedding from man-made objects.
Debris can vary in size, mass, shape, rotation, orbit, and so on. A variety of technical solutions
and ideas exist for removing these objects, but the feasibility of creating a commercial service to
remove every type of debris via a commercial service is challenged. For this reason,
implementations of this use case as a commercial service are enabled if scoped appropriately.
The unique, bespoke variations of this use case are well served by government development.
Implementation of this use case, particularly in GEO, is enabled by communications and
transparency to prevent (or minimize) international misperceptions and concerns. Examples
include communicating intended actions prior to, during, and after an event. These
communications should be proactively shared by owner/operators and their space situational
awareness providers to government organizations and neighboring operators. Other
organizations, such as the Federal Aviation Administration, could also contribute through
demonstrated mechanisms, such as NOTAMs299. Developing different levels of communications
(to whom, how frequently, type of data communicated, type of activity) could encourage
standardized practices and ease concerns.
299
Notice to Air Missions
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Summary of Characteristics that Impact the Adoption of ISAM
The fourth research question was: What characteristics impact the adoption of ISAM in the
space economy? The adoption of ISAM will encounter the challenges discussed and others yet to
be recognized. The key takeaway is the use of the enabling characteristics when shaping paths to
adoption. These characteristics include:
Enablers to Adoption
•
•
•
•
•
•
Culture change: A willingness to think differently and consider alternative, nontraditional approaches. Guidance and consistent messaging from leadership
and management is needed to ensure buy-in at all levels. Actionable steps
include leadership prioritization of sustainability practices and influence during
the architecture and design phase.
Scoped area of focus: Targeted investment
Funded requirements: The use of ISAM represents a change from the
traditional way of doing business. Transitioning from one approach to another
will not occur instantaneously. Realistic and consistent funding can reduce the
uncertainty associated with change.
Aligned interests and/or coordinated efforts: This can occur through natural
alignment, incentivized alignment, or mandates. Coordinate efforts throughout
all the space sectors to ensure a sufficient quantity of demand as well as a
consistent demand signal. Variances in drivers and urgency between sectors
can result in displaced timelines that challenge the demand signal.
Minimize bespoke requirements: Pursue requirements that are supported
across multiple space sectors and not just a single project.
Communication and transparency: Pro-active communication techniques that
state intent prior to, during, and after the operational activity.
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Recommendations
The use cases presented above demonstrated application of the overall technology maturity –
drivers – urgency - challenges framework. Although recommendations and guidance were
provided within the presented use cases, some general recommendations for policy and decision
makers are provided below.
Recommendation: The USSF and NASA should create a formal body through which crosssector coordination can occur.
The USSF and NASA should create a formal body (such as the NASA-proposed consortium,
called CoSMIC) through which cross-sector coordination can occur with the intent of identifying
consistent and aligned demand signals. The attendees should represent the perspectives of the
owners, developers, operators, and customers of the satellite systems. Each of the
recommendations that follows can occur with the support of the coordinating body.
Recommendation: The USSF should lead a focused effort on the adoption of satellite
servicing capabilities.
The combination of present drivers and near-term urgency, particularly, for a concentrated
set of technically mature ISAM capabilities enables the adoption. Capabilities within ISAM’s
Servicing category (inspection, refueling, relocation, repair) should be prioritized with stable and
consistent funding. The USSF present demand and urgency for satellite servicing has never been
stronger and should leverage the existing support from the commercial space sector.
Recommendation: The USSF and NASA should lead a quick turnaround study that clarifies
when ISAM capabilities are appropriate and potential incentive mechanisms.
The study should consider various levels of implementation300, the impacts to the mission
objectives, the added cost, and cross-sector alignment. Potential incentive mechanisms should
also be explored. These could vary from separate funding for ISAM capabilities (as opposed to
the science mission costs) to mandates.
Recommendation: Congress should task the Government Accountability Office to annually
assess the progress of the nation towards adoption of ISAM capabilities.
The assessed progress will enable Congress to be effective in articulating budgetary
priorities. The results of the quick turnaround study could inform appropriate actions to guide
progress.
300
For example, grapple fixtures and fiducials represent low-cost approaches whereas refueling ports and modularity
have greater impacts to the mission cost.
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Recommendation: The USSF and NASA leadership should communicate and encourage a
cultural change that promotes sustainability within organizations, to include process changes and
estimated costs.
The USSF and NASA should communicate and encourage sustainability efforts within
organizations, both horizontally and vertically, to deliver consistent messaging and to encourage
a culture change. Obtaining workforce buy-in at all levels is imperative to implement a
successful and sustained transition. For example, within NASA the leadership should provide
clear guidance and goals to the mission directorates. The mission directorates should work with
the centers to develop mission requirements and estimated costs and provide that feedback to
leadership. Processes should be updated to reflect the consideration of ISAM capabilities. Across
the agency, the mission directorates should coordinate with each other for potential synergy and
efficiency. Leadership and management should consistently demonstrate an attitude that is open
minded to change and willing to embrace new ideas.
Recommendation: The USSF, NASA, and the State Department, with the support of the
private sector, should coordinate the development of communications and transparency measures
to prevent international misperceptions.
These mechanisms can be developed and implemented generally within the U.S. and/or
include the more formal development of Transparency and Confidence Building Measures
within the United Nations.
Recommendation: NASA should create, review, and update internal guidelines that reflect
the limits of civil and defense cooperation with regards to international perception concerns.
The need for national alignment and sharing of infrastructure reduces the ability to
distinguish between defense and non-defense activities. Communications and transparency
measures are useful mechanisms for mitigating the risks associated with blurred lines. However,
NASA should also carefully consider the limits of their roles and exercise those limits.
Developing guidelines within the agency can enable consistency in decision making and guide
the perspectives from which a partnership should be assessed. Considering the potential
international perceptions, particularly of adversarial actors, can improve a delineation of the roles
and identification of limits. These perceptions should be periodically updated to reflect the
current international environment. Although the Space Superhighway has a non-aggressive
connotation, there is no doubt that the most immediate drivers and urgency originate with the
national security space sector and result from competition with China.
Recommendation: The USSF and NASA should create more and expand existing
international partnerships to encourage contribution and participation in the in-space economy
and to develop responsible behaviors within the space domain.
103
The full realization of the Space Superhighway vision will ultimately include international
participants. The USSF and NASA should engage the international community and identify new
opportunities for partnerships that drive ISAM-enabled pursuits. The Artemis Accords has
attracted many signatories and creates an opportunity for cooperative and collaborative
participation with international influence. Further utilization of Gateway and increased
international presence on the lunar surface are goals that can be met with varied levels of
contribution and capabilities. Inspection capabilities, the development of responsible behaviors,
and debris removal are additional starting points that can meet immediate needs closer to Earth,
but eventually transition to the Moon and beyond.
104
Chapter 7. Conclusion
The Space Superhighway vision is calling for a future that includes participation from all
three national space sectors and the international community. This study focused on the role of
the U.S. government with the assumption that the national security and civil space sectors will be
the initial anchor tenants for commercial services.
A vision alone, no matter how great, must be feasible if ever to be realized. The challenges
presented above emphasize the difficulties that come with the adoption of ISAM capabilities.
These challenges convey the value of adequate drivers, funding, and a culture change to enable
steps towards the ambitious Space Superhighway vision. If policymakers are committed to
developing an in-space economy, then initial commitments must focus on the feasibility of
adoption.
Although the pursuit of an in-space economy vision is intended to include all three space
sectors, the research reveals a dominant role within the national security space sector at present.
Furthermore, the inherent international nature of the space domain presents opportunity for
international perception concerns. These concerns were observed in most of the use cases. The
research also reveals that an in-space economy is not going to be developed by a single space
sector alone.
The role of the civil space sector is particularly important for dampening the perception of
the militarization of space and presenting peaceful intent. Maintaining a peaceful use of space is
important for continued operations of communications, navigation, weather, and scientific
satellites. As such, decision makers should focus on incentivizing lagging participation from the
civil sector. Doing so will intentionally leverage the dual-use nature of ISAM capabilities so as
to meet immediate national security needs and also preserve the peaceful applications that impact
the daily lives of Americans.
Future research could include the following:
• Identify areas of potential cooperation and areas of competition with China.
Competition with China serves well to progress technology, but eventually a bridge
needs to form between the U.S.-led and China-led efforts. Consider potential science
activities, types of partnerships, and common alignments between the two nations.
Also consider whether non-government actors (i.e., private sector and academia) can
serve a role that is not bound by U.S. – China limitations, such as the Wolf
Amendment.
• Manufacturing experiments began as early as a 1969 welding of metal experiment on
Soyuz, then continued with Skylab, Salyut, Mir, the Space Shuttle, and ISS301. Yet
301
Curtis, Anthony R., Space Almanac Second Edition, Gulf Publishing Company, 1992.
105
manufacturing remains largely undeveloped. Research the current state of the
technology maturity and the potential use cases, to include potential commercial
space sector interest. Consider the challenges present and identify enablers that may
close gaps to applying the use cases.
Defense Technical Innovation Center, “Spacecraft Soyuz 6 and the Welding Process,” webpage, undated. As of
February 20, 2023: https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/citations/AD0749745
Uri, John, “The Real Story of the Skylab 4 “Strike” in Space,” webpage, November 16, 2020. As of February 20,
2023: https://www.nasa.gov/feature/the-real-story-of-the-skylab-4-strike-in-space
Uri, John, “50 Years Ago: Launch of Salyut, the World’s First Space Station,” webpage, April 19, 2021. As of
February 20, 2023: https://www.nasa.gov/feature/50-years-ago-launch-of-salyut-the-world-s-first-space-station
Godwin, 2001; Engelbert and Dupuis, 1998; Reichhardt, 2002; National Aeronautics and Space Administration,
2010
106
Abbreviations
AFRL
BES
CASI
CESAS
CLD
CLPS
CNES
CONFERS
COSMIC
CoSMIC
COVID
CRS
DARPA
DIU
DOD
DPG
DSS
ELC
EMIT
ERS
ESA
ESD
ESDMD
EVA
EXPRESS
FFRDC
FREND
FY
GEO
GOES
GSFC
GSSAP
HEOMD
HST
HTV
Air Force Research Laboratory
Budget Estimate Submission
China Aerospace Studies Institute
Committee On Earth Science and Applications
Commercial LEO Destinations
Commercial Lunar Payload Services
Centre National d'Etudes Spatiales
Consortium for Execution of Rendezvous and Servicing Operations
Cleaning Outer Space Missions Through Innovative Capture
Consortium for Space Mobility and ISAM capabilities
Coronavirus Disease
Congressional Research Service
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
Defense Innovation Unit
Department of Defense
Defense Planning Guidance
DoD Space Strategy
EXPRESS Logistics Carrier
Earth Surface Mineral Dust Source Investigation
European Remote Sensing
European Space Agency
Earth Science Division
Exploration Systems Development Mission Directorate
Extravehicular Mobility Activity
Expedite the Processing of Experiments to the Space Station
Federally Funded Research and Development Center
Front-end Robotics Enabling Near-term Demonstration
Fiscal Year
Geostationary Orbit
Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellites
Goddard Space Flight Center
Geosynchronous Space Situational Awareness Program
Human Exploration and Operations Mission Directorate
Hubble Space Telescope
H-II Transfer Vehicle
107
IDA
IG
ISAM
ISRU
ISS
JASD
JAXA
JWST
LaRC
LEO
LEXI
M&R
M4SS
MEV
MMOD
MSFC
NASA
NDS
NET
NG
NOAA
NOM4D
NOTAMS
NRC
NSS
NTE
ODMSP
OMB
OSAM
OSTP
PBR
PLA
POM
PPBE
PRC
RAFTI
RAPIDS
RPODU
Institute for Defense Analysis
Inspector General
In-space Servicing, Assembly, and Manufacturing
In-Situ Resource Utilization
International Space Station
Joint Agency Satellite Division
Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency
James Webb Space Telescope
Langley Research Center
Low Earth Orbit
Life Extension In-orbit Servicer
Maintenance and Repair
Modularity For Space Systems
Mission Extension Vehicle
Micrometeoroid Orbital Debris
Marshall Space Flight Center
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
National Defense Strategy
No Earlier Than
Northrop Grumman
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
Novel Orbital and Moon Manufacturing, Materials, and Mass-Efficient
Design
Notice to Air Missions
National Research Council
National Security Strategy
Not-to-Exceed
Orbital Debris Mitigation Standard Practices
Office of Management and Budget
On-orbit Servicing, Assembly, and Manufacturing
Office of Science and Technology Policy
President's Budget Request
People's Liberation Army
Program Objective Memorandum
Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution
People's Republic of China
Rapidly Attachable Fluid Transfer Interface
Robust Access To Propellant In Diverse OrbitS
Rendezvous, Proximity Operations, Docking, and Undocking
108
RSGS
SAML
SBIR
SJ
SMD
SML
SNC
SOMD
SPAS
SPD
SPOT
SSIB
STMD
STRATFI
STS
STTR
SUMO
TRL
U.S.
UK
USG
USGS
USSF
Robotic Servicing of Geosynchronous Satellites
Space Access, Mobility, and Logistics
Small Business Innovative Research
ShiJian
Science Mission Directorate
Space Mobility and Logistics
Sierra Nevada Corporation
Space Operations Mission Directorate
Shuttle Pallet Satellite
Space Policy Directive
Satellites Pour l’Observation de la Terre
State of the Space Industrial Base
Space Technology Mission Directorate
Strategic Funding Increase
Space Transportation System
Small Business Technology Transfer
Spacecraft for the Universal Modification of Orbits
Technology Readiness Level
United States
United Kingdom
United States Government
United States Geological Survey
United States Space Force
109
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