V. INTRINSIC AIDS OF CONSTRUCTION
➢ Appointments made by the President for the second, third and
fourth groups do not require the consent of the COA.
EXPRESS MENTION AND IMPLIED EXCLUSION
Sarmiento III v. Mison, 156 SCRA 549 (1987)
FACTS
1987 — Salvador Mison was appointed as the Commissioner of the Bureau
of Customs.
The petitioners questioned the appointment as it appears not to have been
submitted to the Commission on Appointments (COA) for approval.
Petitioner Sarmiento insists — that under the new Constitution, Heads of
Bureaus require the confirmation of the Commision on Audit.
➢ Sarmiento also sought to enjoin Carague, then Secretary of the
Department of Budget, from disbursing the salary payments of
Mison due to the unconstitutionality of the latter’s appointment.
The respondents maintain — the constitutionality of respondent Mison's
appointment without the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments
W/N Mison’s appointment as Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs
require the confirmation/approval of COA — NO
Under Sec. 16, Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution, there are 4 groups of
officers whom the President shall appoint:
1.
Heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public
ministers and consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of
colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose appointments
are vested in him in this Constitution;
2. All other officers of the Government whose appointments are not
otherwise provided for by law;
3. Those whom the President may be authorized by law to appoint;
4. Officers lower in rank 4 whose appointments the Congress may by
law vest in the President alone
By following the accepted rule in constitutional and statutory construction
that an express enumeration of subjects excludes others not enumerated, it
would follow that:
➢ Only those appointments to positions expressly stated in the first
group require the confirmation of the Commission on
Appointments.
The position of BOC Commissioner is not included in those positions
requiring prior consent of the COA by statutory construction.
➢ An express enumeration of subjects excludes others not
enumerated, it follows then that only those appointments to
positions expressly stated in the first group require the consent of
the COA.
It is the intent of the Framers of the 1987 Constitution to exclude the
second, third and fourth groups of Presidential appointments from requiring
the consent of the COA.
1935 Constitution — required the consent of COA for all Presidential
appointments, which rule has transformed the commission into a venue of
“horsetrading” and similar malpractices.
1973 Constitution — the absolute power of appointment is vested in the
President without hardly any check from the legislature.
1987 Constitution — tried to strike a balance between the two extremes by
requiring COA’s consent on appointments for the first group and dispensing
it for the appointments in the other groups.
➢ The use of the word ‘also’ in the second sentence does not mean
‘in the same manner’. The appointments for the second group need
not be done in the same manner as the first group. So, consent is
not required.
The power to appoint is fundamentally executive or presidential in
character.
➢ Limitations on or qualifications of such power should be strictly
construed against them.
➢ Such limitations or qualifications must be clearly stated in order to
be recognized.
➢ It is only in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII where it is clearly
stated that appointments by the President to the positions therein
enumerated require the consent of the COA.
➢ The effect is to exclude from the requirement of consent, other
appointments not within the scope of the first sentence.
➢ The word ‘alone’ in the third sentence is a mere redundancy which
should not defeat the evident intent of the Framers.
NPC v. City of Cabanatuan, G.R. No. 149110, 9 April 2003
FACTS
Petitioner National Power Corporation is a government-owned and
controlled corporation created under Commonwealth Act. 120.
NPC sold electric power to the residents of Cabanatuan City with a gross
income of P107.8M in 1992.
➢ Pursuant to Section 37 of Ordinance No. 165-92,8 the respondent
assessed the petitioner a franchise tax amounting to P808K
representing 75% of 1% of the latter’s gross receipts for the
preceding year.
Petitioner refused to pay the tax assessment arguing that:
➢ The respondent has no authority to impose tax on government
entities.
➢ As a non-profit organization, it is exempted from the payment of all
forms of taxes, charges, duties or fees in accordance with Sec. 13 of
Rep. Act No. 6395 [Revising the Charter of the NPC].
The respondent filed a collection suit in the RTC, demanding that:
➢ Petitioner pay the assessed tax due, plus surcharge.
➢ Petitioner’s exemption from local taxes has been repealed by
Section 193 of the LGC, which reads as follows:
○ Sec. 193. Withdrawal of Tax Exemption Privileges.- Unless
otherwise provided in this Code, tax exemptions or
incentives granted to, or presently enjoyed by all persons,
whether natural or juridical, including government owned
or controlled corporations, except local water districts,
cooperatives duly registered under R.A. No. 6938,
non-stock and non-profit hospitals and educational
institutions, are hereby withdrawn upon the effectivity of
this Code
RTC — upheld NPC’s tax exemption. It ruled that tax exemption privileges
granted to petitioner subsist despite the passage of RA 7160 because:
1. RA 6395 is a particular law and it cannot be repealed by RA 7160
which is a general law
2. LGUs has no power to tax instrumentalities of the national
government
CA — reversed the trial court’s Order on the ground that Section 193, in
relation to Sections 137 and 151 of the LGC, expressly withdrew the
exemptions granted to the petitioner.
W/N the CA erred in reversing the trial court’s order on the ground that
Sec. 193, in relation to Sec. 137 and 151 of the LGC expressly withdrew
the exemptions granted to the petitioner — NO
In the case at bar, section 151 in relation to section 137 of the LGC clearly
authorizes the respondent city government to impose on the petitioner the
franchise tax in question.
Sec. 137. Franchise Tax. - Notwithstanding any exemption granted by any
law or other special law, the province may impose a tax on businesses
enjoying a franchise, at a rate not exceeding fifty percent (50%) of one
percent (1%) of the gross annual receipts for the preceding calendar year
based on the incoming receipt, or realized, within its territorial jurisdiction.
x
x
x
Sec. 151. Scope of Taxing Powers.- Except as otherwise provided in this
Code, the city, may levy the taxes, fees, and charges which the province or
municipality may impose: Provided, however, That the taxes, fees and
charges levied and collected by highly urbanized and independent
component cities shall accrue to them and distributed in accordance with
the provisions of this Code. The rates of taxes that the city may levy may
exceed the maximum rates allowed for the province or municipality by not
more than fifty percent (50%) except the rates of professional and
amusement taxes."
Ruling in favor of the local government, the Court ruled that the franchise
tax in question is imposable despite any exemption enjoyed by MERALCO
under special laws.
➢ MERALCO's exemption from the payment of franchise taxes was
brought as an issue before this Court.
Petitioners correctly relied on provisions of Sections 137 and 193 of the LGC
to support their position that MERALCO's tax exemption has been
withdrawn.
➢ The explicit language of Section 137 which authorizes the province
to impose franchise tax 'notwithstanding any exemption granted by
any law or other special law' is all-encompassing and clear.
➢ The franchise tax is imposable despite any exemption enjoyed
under special laws.
Sec. 193. Withdrawal of Tax Exemption Privileges.- Unless otherwise
provided in this Code, tax exemptions or incentives granted to, or presently
enjoyed by all persons, whether natural or juridical, including
government-owned or controlled corporations, except local water districts,
cooperatives duly registered under R.A. No. 6938, non-stock and non-profit
hospitals and educational institutions, are hereby withdrawn upon the
effectivity of this Code."
Section 193 buttresses the withdrawal of extant tax exemption privileges. By
stating that “unless otherwise provided in this Code, tax exemptions or
incentives granted to or presently enjoyed by all persons, whether natural
or juridical, including government-owned or controlled corporations except
(1) local water districts, (2) cooperatives duly registered under R.A. 6938, (3)
non-stock and non-profit hospitals and educational institutions, are
withdrawn upon the effectivity of this code,” the obvious import is to limit
the exemptions to the three enumerated entities.
It is a basic precept of statutory construction that the express mention of
one person, thing, act, or consequence excludes all others as expressed
in the familiar maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius.
➢ In the absence of any provision of the Code to the contrary, and the
Court finds no other provision in point, any existing tax exemption
or incentive enjoyed by MERALCO under existing law was clearly
intended to be withdrawn.
Reading together Sections 137 and 193 of the LGC, the Court concluded
that under the LGC, the local government unit may now impose a local tax
at a rate not exceeding 50% of 1% of the gross annual receipts for the
preceding calendar based on the incoming receipts realized within its
territorial jurisdiction.
The legislative purpose to withdraw tax privileges enjoyed under existing
law or charter is clearly manifested by the language used on Sections 137
and 193 categorically withdrawing such exemption subject only to the
exceptions enumerated.
➢ Since it would be not only tedious and impractical to attempt to
enumerate all the existing statutes providing for special tax
exemptions or privileges, the LGC provided for an express, albeit
general, withdrawal of such exemptions or privileges.
➢ No more unequivocal language could have been used.
Thus, in enacting Section 37 of Ordinance No. 165-92 which imposes an
annual franchise tax "notwithstanding any exemption granted by law or
other special law," the Respondent City Government of Cabanatuan clearly
did not intend to exempt the petitioner from the coverage thereof.
Furthermore, the Doctrine in Basco vs. Philippine Amusement and Gaming
Corporation relied upon by the petitioner to support its claim no longer
applies.
➢ To emphasize, the Basco case was decided prior to the effectivity
of the LGC, when no law empowering the local government units to
tax instrumentalities of the National Government was in effect.
➢ However, as this Court ruled in the case of Mactan Cebu
International Airport Authority (MCIAA) vs. Marcos, nothing
prevents Congress from decreeing that even instrumentalities or
agencies of the government performing governmental functions
may be subject to tax.
➢ In enacting the LGC, Congress exercised its prerogative to tax
instrumentalities and agencies of government as it sees fit.
➢ Thus, after reviewing the specific provisions of the LGC, this Court
held that MCIAA, although an instrumentality of the national
government, was subject to real property tax.
Doubtless, the power to tax is the most effective instrument to raise needed
revenues to finance and support myriad activities of the local government
units for the delivery of basic services essential to the promotion of the
general welfare and the enhancement of peace, progress, and prosperity of
the people.
As this Court observed in the Mactan case, the original reasons for the
withdrawal of tax exemption privileges granted to government-owned or
controlled corporations and all other units of government were that such
privilege resulted in serious tax base erosion and distortions in the tax
treatment of similarly situated enterprises.
With the added burden of devolution, it is even more imperative for
government entities to share in the requirements of development, fiscal or
otherwise, by paying taxes or other charges due from them.
COA v. Cebu, G.R. No. 141386, 29 November 2001
FACTS
The Governor of the Province of Cebu, as chairman of the Local School
Board (LSB) appointed teachers to handle extension classes in public
schools.
➢ This was in pursuant to Sec. 98 of RA 7160 or the Local
Government Code
The salaries and benefits of said teachers were charged against the Special
Education Fund (SEF). Likewise, college scholarship grants were also
charged against the SEF.
In the audit of accounts of COA for the Province of Cebu for January until
June 1998, Notices of Suspension were issued stating that disbursements
for the salaries of teachers of extension classes and scholarship grants are
not chargeable to the provincial SEF.
The Governor, on behalf of the Province of Cebu, filed a petition for
declaratory relief with the RTC.
December 13, 1999 — the Court declared the questioned expenses as
authorized expenditures of the SEF and nullified the COA’s audit findings.
Hence, this petition for review was filed by the COA before the Supreme
Court.
W/N the salaries and personnel-related benefits of public school teachers
appointed by local chief executives in connection with the establishment
and maintenance of extension classes; as well as the expenses for college
scholarship grants, may be charged to the Special Education Fund (SEF)
of the local government unit concerned — YES
Undoubtedly, the legislature intended the SEF to answer for the
compensation of teachers handling extension classes.
Under the doctrine of necessary implication, the allocation of the SEF for
the establishment and maintenance of extension classes logically implies
the hiring of teachers who should, as a matter of course, be compensated
for their services.
Every statute is understood, by implication, to contain all such provisions as
may be necessary to effectuate its object and purpose, or to make effective
rights, powers, privileges or jurisdiction which it grants, including all such
collateral and subsidiary consequences as may be fairly and logically
inferred from its terms. Ex necessitate legis.
Verily, the services and the corresponding compensation of these teachers
are necessary and indispensable to the establishment and maintenance of
extension classes.
Indeed, the operation and maintenance of public schools is lodged
principally with the DECS.
The SEF may be expended only for the salaries and personnel-related
benefits of teachers appointed by the local school boards in connection
with the establishment and maintenance of extension classes.
With respect, however, to college scholarship grants, a reading of the
pertinent laws of the Local Government Code reveals that said grants are
not among the projects for which the proceeds of the SEF may be
appropriated.
➢ Collective bargaining in such a situation can become one-sided.
NECESSARY IMPLICATION
Pepsi Cola Products Phils., Inc. v. Secretary of Labor, G.R. No. 96663, 10
August 1999)
FACTS
June 1990 — Pepsi-Cola Employees Organization-UOEF (Union) filed a
petition for certification election with the Med-Arbiter seeking to be the
exclusive bargaining agent of supervisors of Pepsi-Cola Philippines, Inc.
The Med-Arbiter granted the Petition, with the explicit statement that it was
an affiliate of Union de Obreros Estivadores de Filipinas (FEDERATION)
together with 2 rank and file unions — Pepsi-Cola Labor Unity (PCLU) and
Pepsi-Cola Employees Union of the Philippines (PEUP).
As held in the case of National Association of Trade Unions (NATU):
A confidential employee is one entrusted with confidence on delicate
matters, or with the custody, handling, or care and protection of the
employer’s property.
➢ While Art. 245 of the Labor Code singles out managerial
employees as ineligible to join, assist or form any labor
organization, under the doctrine of necessary implication,
confidential employees are similarly disqualified.
➢ This doctrine states that what is implied in a statute is as much a
part thereof as that which is expressed, as elucidated in several
cases; the latest of which is Chua v. Civil Service Commission
where we said:
PEPSI filed with the Bureau of Labor Relations a petition to Set Aside,
Cancel and/or Revoke Charter Affiliation of the Union, entitled PCPPI v.
PCEU-UOEF on the grounds that:
1. The members of the Union were managers and
2. The supervisors’ union can not affiliate with a federation whose
members include the rank and file union of the same company.
No statute can be enacted that can provide all the details involved in its
application. There is always an omission that may not meet a particular
situation. What is thought, at the time of the enactment, to be an all
embracing legislation may be inadequate to provide for the unfolding
events of the future. So-called gaps in the law develop as the law is
enforced. One of the rules of statutory construction used to fill in the gap
is the doctrine of necessary implication.
W/N a supervisors' union can affiliate with the same Federation of which
two (2) rank and file unions are likewise members, without violating
Article 245 of the Labor Code (PD 442), as amended, by Republic Act
6715 — NO
Every statute is understood, by implication, to contain all such provisions as
may be necessary to effectuate its object and purpose, or to make
effective rights, powers, privileges or jurisdiction which it grants, including
all such collateral and subsidiary consequences as may be fairly and
logically inferred from its terms. Ex necessitate legis . .
In applying the doctrine of necessary implication, we took into
consideration the rationale behind the disqualification of managerial
employees expressed in Bulletin Publishing Corporation v. Sanchez, thus:
"x x x if these managerial employees would belong to or be affiliated with a
Union, the latter might not be assured of their loyalty to the Union in view of
evident conflict of interests. The Union can also become a company dominated by the presence of managerial employees in Union
membership."
Stated differently, in the collective bargaining process, managerial
employees are supposed to be on the side of the employer, to act as its
representatives, and to see to it that its interests are well protected.
➢ The employer is not assured of such protection if these employees
themselves are union members.
CASUS OMISSUS
Spouses Delfino v. St. James Hospital, G.R. No. 166735, 5 September 2006
FACTS
Dispute regarding the expansion of St. James Hospital in Mariquita Pueblo
Subdivision, Santa Rosa, Laguna.
➢ St. James Hospital was established in 1990 as a two-storey, ten-bed
capacity hospital.
➢ In 1994, St. James Hospital applied for an expansion permit to
become a four-storey, forty-bed capacity medical institution.
The Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) initially issued a
"temporary" clearance for the expansion, but this was challenged by
residents who argued that it violated the 1981 Santa Rosa Municipal Zoning
Ordinance.
Various actions, including the suspension of the building permit and a
cease and desist order, were taken in response to the challenge.
The 1991 Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance was approved by the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna, excluding hospitals from allowable
uses within the residential zone.
Despite this change, St. James Hospital received a Certificate of Zoning
Compliance and Certificate of Locational Viability for its expansion.
Petitioners filed a complaint against these actions, leading to a legal dispute
that eventually reached the Court of Appeals.
W/N this expansion is permissible under the 1991 Zoning Ordinance,
which excluded hospitals from the list of allowable uses within a
residential zone — NO
The 1991 Zoning Ordinance repealed the 1981 Zoning Ordinance and
removed the phrase "hospitals with not more than ten capacity" from
allowable uses within a residential zone, indicating the deliberate exclusion
of hospitals from residential zones.
➢ Hospitals were classified as non-conforming uses under the 1991
Zoning Ordinance, and expansion of non-conforming buildings was
prohibited.
According to the rule of casus omissus in statutory construction, a thing
omitted must be considered to have been omitted intentionally.
➢ Therefore, with the omission of the phrase "hospital with not more
than ten capacity" in the new Zoning Ordinance, and the
corresponding transfer of said allowable usage to another zone
classification, the only logical conclusion is that the legislative body
had intended that said use be removed from those allowed within a
residential zone.
➢ Thus, the construction of medical institutions, such as St. James
Hospital, within a residential zone is now prohibited under the 1991
Zoning Ordinance.
Be that as it may, even if the St. James Hospital is now considered a
non-conforming structure under the 1991 Zoning Ordinance as it is located
in a residential zone where such use is no longer allowed, said structure
cannot now be considered illegal.
➢ This is because the St. James Hospital was constructed during the
effectivity of the 1981 Zoning Ordinance, and, as earlier stated,
under the said Ordinance, the construction of a two-storey, ten-bed
capacity hospital within a residential zone is explicitly allowed.
The existing two-storey, ten-bed capacity St. James Hospital could continue
to operate within the residential zone, subject to compliance with provisions
for non-conforming buildings.
People v. Manantan, 115 Phil. 657 (1962)
FACTS
This case involves an appeal by the Solicitor General from an order issued
by the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan that dismissed an information
against the defendant, Guillermo Manantan. The defendant was charged
with violating Section 54 of the Revised Election Code.
The case began with the filing of an information by the Provincial Fiscal of
Pangasinan in the Court of First Instance of that province.
➢ The information charged Guillermo Manantan with a violation of
Section 54 of the Revised Election Code.
The trial began after the defendant, Guillermo Manantan, entered a plea of
not guilty to the charges against him.
➢ During the trial, the defense filed a motion to dismiss the
information.
➢ The basis for the motion to dismiss was the argument that, as a
justice of the peace, the defendant was one of the officers
enumerated in Section 54 of the Revised Election Code.
➢ Therefore, the defense contended that the defendant should not
be subject to prosecution under Section 54.
The lower court initially denied the motion to dismiss.
➢ It held that a justice of the peace is within the purview of Section 54
of the Revised Election Code, meaning that the prohibition in
Section 54 applied to the defendant.
In response to the denial of the first motion to dismiss, the defense filed a
second motion to dismiss.
➢ The defense cited a decision from the Court of Appeals in People
vs. Macaraeg, which held that a justice of the peace is excluded
from the prohibition of Section 54 of the Revised Election Code.
The Solicitor General, appealed the decision of the lower court.
➢ The appeal argued that the lower court had erred in dismissing the
information against the defendant and contended that a justice of
the peace should be included in the prohibition of Section 54 of the
Revised Election Code.
W/N a justice of the peace is included in the prohibition of Section 54 of
the Revised Election Code — YES
The court held that a justice of the peace is indeed included in the
prohibition of Section 54 of the Revised Election Code.
➢ The lower court's dismissal of the information against the accused
was set aside, and the case was remanded for trial on the merits.
The term "judge" in Section 54 was not modified by any word or phrase,
indicating that it was intended to encompass all kinds of judges, including
justices of the peace.
➢ A justice of the peace is sometimes addressed as "judge" in the
jurisdiction, and they hold judicial authority.
The historical development of Section 54 and its predecessors
demonstrated that justices of the peace were not omitted but were rather
called by another term, "judge."
The purpose of the statute was to enlarge the scope of officers within its
purview, including justices of the peace.
Administrative orders and executive actions have regarded justices of the
peace as being covered by the prohibition in Section 54.
The court rejected the arguments that the rule of "casus omisus" (omission
of a case) and the strict construction of penal statutes justified exempting
justices of the peace from Section 54's prohibition.
DOCTRINE
This case establishes that justices of the peace are included in the
prohibition of Section 54 of the Revised Election Code.
➢ The court's decision emphasizes that the term "judge" in Section 54
is intended to encompass all kinds of judges, and it rejects
arguments based on casus omisus and strict construction of penal
statutes.
➢ The decision highlights the legislative intent to prevent justices of
the peace from engaging in partisan political activities to ensure
the impartiality of their decisions in election cases.
EACH TO EACH
Fortich v. Corora, G.R. No. 131457, 19 August 1999
FACTS
March 29, 1996 — the Office of the President (OP) issued a decision
converting a large parcel of land from agricultural land to
agro-industrial/institutional area.
➢ Because of this, a group of farmer-beneficiaries staged a hunger
strike in front of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR)
Compound in Quezon City on October 9, 1997.
➢ The strike generated a lot of publicity and even a number of
Presidential Candidates (for the upcoming 1998 elections)
intervened on behalf of the farmers.
Because of this “blackmail”, the OP re-opened the case and through Deputy
Executive Secretary Renato C. Corona issued the so-called, "politically
motivated", "win-win" resolution on November 7, 1997, substantially
modifying its 1996 Decision after it had become final and executory.
The "Win-Win" Resolution is based on a procedural rule pertaining to the
reglementary period for appeal or motion for reconsideration.
Respondents and intervenors sought reconsideration of the Resolution
dated November 17, 1998, arguing that the required number of votes to
carry a decision (at least three) was not met when the initial motions for
reconsideration were voted two-two.
➢ The parties cited Article VIII, Section 4(3) of the Constitution, which
sets forth the rules for the disposition of cases by a division of the
Court and the referral of cases to the Court en banc when the
required number of votes is not obtained.
➢ They contended that, according to the Constitution, such cases
should be referred to and decided by the Court en banc.
W/N the Resolution dated November 17, 1998, effectively resolved the
earlier motions for reconsideration, or whether, in accordance with the
Constitution, the matter should have been referred to the Court en banc
— DID NOT NEED TO BE REFERRED TO COURT EN BANC
The Supreme Court held that the Resolution dated November 17, 1998,
effectively disposed of the earlier motions for reconsideration, and the
matter did not need to be referred to the Court en banc.
The Court distinguished between "cases" and "matters" in interpreting the
constitutional provision and explained that the provision regarding referral
to the Court en banc only applied to cases, not motions.
➢ In this case, since there was a tie in the voting on the motions for
reconsideration, the assailed decision was not reconsidered and
must be deemed affirmed.
The key point of the case is that the constitutional provision regarding
referral to the Court en banc applies only to cases, not to motions.
When a case is decided by a division, and the required number of votes is
not obtained, the case should be referred to the Court en banc.
However, if a case has already been decided by the division, and a motion
for reconsideration is filed with a tie in the voting, the motion is lost, and the
decision must be deemed affirmed.
The Court clarified that the provision's distinction between "cases" and
"matters" is crucial in interpreting the constitutional provision.
LAST ANTECEDENT
Florentino v. PNB, G.R. No. L-8782, 28 April 1956
W/N the clause “who may be willing to accept the same for settlement”
refers to all antecedents mentioned in the last sentence of section 2 of
Republic Act No. 879 — NO
FACTS
The central dispute in the case revolves around the refusal of the
respondent bank to accept the backpay certificate issued to Marcelino B.
Florentino as a payment for the debt of P6,800, which was secured by a
real estate mortgage on certain properties.
➢ The petitioners then filed a petition for mandamus to compel the
bank to accept the backpay certificate as a valid form of settlement
for the debt.
➢ The case also hinges on the interpretation of the legal provision,
specifically whether the phrase "who may be willing to accept the
same for settlement" in Republic Act No. 879 applies to all
antecedents mentioned in the law or only to the last antecedent.
➢ The court ultimately rules in favor of the petitioners and orders the
bank to accept the backpay certificate as payment for the debt.
–––
Grammatically, the qualifying clause refers only to the last antecedent; that
is, "any citizen of the Philippines or any association or corporation
organized under the laws of the Philippines."
The petitioners and appellants filed a petition for mandamus against
Philippine National Bank to compel it to accept the back pay certificate of
petitioner Marcelino B. Florentino to pay an indebtedness in the sum of
P6,800 secured by real estate mortgage plus interest.
➢ The debt incurred on January 2, 1953 was due on January 2, 1954.
It was also found out in the Congressional Record that the amendatory bill
to Sec. 2 was made which permits the use of backpay certificates as
payment for obligations and indebtedness in favor of the government.
Petitioner is a holder of Backpay Acknowledgement No. 1721 dated October
6, 1954, in the amount of P22,896.33 by virtue of Republic Act No. 897
approved on June 20, 1953.
Petitioners offered to pay their loan with the respondent bank with their
back pay certificate, but the respondent bank, on December 29, 1953,
refused to accept the latter's back pay certificate.
➢ Under Section 2 of Republic Act No. 879, respondent-appellee
contends that the qualifying clause refers to all the antecedents,
whereas the appellant's contention is that it refers only to the last
antecedent.
➢ “The question raised is whether the clause "who may be willing to
accept the same for settlement" refers to all antecedents "the
Government, any of its branches or instrumentalities, the
corporations owned or controlled by the Government, etc.," or only
the last antecedent "any citizen of the Philippines, or any
association or corporation organized under the laws of the
Philippines.”
It should be noted that there is a comma before the words "or to any citizen,
etc.," which separates said phrase from the preceding ones.
➢ But even disregarding the grammatical construction, to make the
acceptance of the backpay certificates obligatory upon any citizen,
association, or corporation, which are not government entities or
owned or controlled by the government, would render section 2 of
Republic Act No. 897 unconstitutional for it would amount to an
impairment of the obligation of contracts by compelling private
creditors to accept a sort of promissory note payable within ten
years with interest at a rate very much lower than the current or
even the legal one.
Another reason is that it is matter of general knowledge that many officials
and employees of the Philippine Government, who had served during the
Japanese Occupation, have already received their back pay certificates and
used them for the payment of the obligations to the Government and its
entities for debts incurred before the approval of Republic Act No. 304.
Florentino incurred his debt to the PNB on January 2, 1953.
➢ Hence, the obligation was subsisting when the Amendatory Act No.
897 was approved.
➢ Consequently, the present case falls squarely under the provisions
of section 2 of the Amendatory Act No. 897.
CONTEXT AND RELATED CAUSES
Paras v. Comelec, G.R. No. 123169, 4 November 1996
FACTS
Petitioner Danilo E. Paras is the incumbent Punong Barangay of Pula,
Cabanatuan City who won during the last regular barangay election in 1994.
➢ A petition for his recall as Punong Barangay was filed by the
registered voters of the barangay.
Acting on the petition for recall, public respondent Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) resolved to approve the petition, scheduled the petition signing
on October 14, 1995, and set the recall election on November 13, 1995.
➢ At least 29.30% of the registered voters signed the petition, well
above the 25% requirement provided by law.
➢ The COMELEC, however, deferred the recall election in view of the
petitioner's opposition.
December 6, 1995 — the COMELEC set anew the recall election, this time
on December 16, 1995.
➢ To prevent the holding of the recall election, petitioner filed before
the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City a petition for injunction,
with the trial court issuing a temporary restraining order.
➢ After conducting a summary hearing, the trial court lifted the
restraining order, dismissed the petition and required petitioner and
his counsel to explain why they should not be cited for contempt
for misrepresenting that the barangay recall election was without
COMELEC approval.
January 5, 1996 — the COMELEC, for the third time, re-scheduled the recall
election an January 13, 1996; hence, the instant petition for certiorari with
urgent prayer for injunction.
January 12, 1996 — the Court issued a temporary restraining order and
required the Office of the Solicitor General, in behalf of public respondent,
to comment on the petition.
Petitioner's argument is simple and to the point.
➢ Citing Section 74 (b) of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as
the Local Government Code, which states that "no recall shall take
place within one (1) year from the date of the official's assumption to
office or one (1) year immediately preceding a regular local
election.”
➢ Petitioner insists that the scheduled January 13, 1996 recall election
is now barred as the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) election was set
by Republic Act No. 7808 on the first Monday of May 1996, and
every three years thereafter.
W/N the recall election is valid — NO
The recall is not valid. It is a rule in statutory construction that every part of
the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context.
➢ Example — that every part of the statute must be considered
together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general
intent of the whole enactment.
The evident intent of Section 74 is to subject an elective local official to
recall election once during his term of office.
➢ Paragraph (b) construed together with paragraph (a) merely
designates the period when such elective local official may be
subject of a recall election, that is, during the second year of his
term of office.
➢ Thus, subscribing to petitioner's interpretation of the phrase regular
local election to include the SK election will unduly circumscribe
the novel provision of the Local Government Code on recall, a
mode of removal of public officers by initiation of the people before
the end of his term.
➢ And if the SK election which is set by R.A No. 7808 to be held every
three years from May 1996 were to be deemed within the purview
of the phrase "regular local election", as erroneously insisted by
petitioner, then no recall election can be conducted rendering
inutile the recall provision of the Local Government Code.
Petitioner's too literal interpretation of the law leads to absurdity which we
cannot countenance.
➢ Thus, in a case, the Court made the following admonition: We
admonish against a too-literal reading of the law as this is apt to
constrict rather than fulfill its purpose and defeat the intention of its
authors.
➢ That intention is usually found not in "the letter that killeth but in the
spirit that vivifieth.
➢ The spirit, rather than the letter of a law determines its construction;
hence, a statute, as in this case, must be read according to its spirit
and intent.
DOCTRINE
A statute must always be construed as a whole, and the particular meaning to be attached to
any word or phrase is usually to be ascertained from the context, the nature of the subject
treated and the purpose or intention of the body which enacted or framed the statute. Statute
must receive a reasonable construction, reference being had to their controlling purpose, to all
their provisions, force and effect being given not narrowly to isolated and disjoined clauses,
but to their spirit, broadly taking all their provisions together in one rational view.