David Hume (1711-1776)
1. background and career
2. problem of induction
If we would satisfy ourselves, therefore, concerning the nature of that evidence,
which assures us of matters of fact, we must inquire how we arrive at the
knowledge of cause and effect. I shall venture to affirm, as a general proposition,
which admits of no exception, that the knowledge of this relation is not, in any
instance, attained by reasonings a priori; but arises entirely from experience, when
we find that any particular objects are constantly conjoined with each other. Let
an object be presented to a man of ever so strong natural reason and abilities; if
that object be entirely new to him, he will not be able, by the most accurate
examination of its sensible qualities, to discover any of its causes or effects.
Adam, though his rational faculties be supposed, at the very first, entirely perfect,
could not have inferred from the fluidity and transparency of water that it would
suffocate him. No object ever discovers, by the qualities which appear to the
senses, either the causes which produced it, or the effects which will arise from it;
nor can our reason, unassisted by experience, ever draw any inferrence
concerning real existence and matter of fact. (Enquiry Concerning Human
Understanding, Section IV, Part 1)
3. problem of personal identity
For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always
stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade,
love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch myself at any time without a
perception, and never can observe anything but the perception. When my
perceptions are removed at any time, as by sound sleep; so long am I insensible to
myself, and my be truly said not to exist. And were all my perceptions removed by
death, and cou’d I neither think, nor feel, nor see, nor love, nor hate after the
dissolution of my body, I shou’d be be entirely annihilated, nor do I conceive
what is farther requisite to make me a perfect non-entity. If any person on serious
and unprejudic’d reflection, thinks he has a different notion of himself, I must
confess I can reason no longer with him. All I can allow him is, that he may be in
the right as well as I, and that we are essentially different in this particular. He
may, perhaps, perceive something simple and continu’d, which he calls himself;
tho’ I am certain there is no such principle in me. (Treatise of Human Nature, Part
IV, Section 6)
... nor is there a any single power of the soul, which remains unalterably the same,
perhaps for one moment. The mind is a kind of theatre, where several perceptions
successively make their appearance; pass, re-pass, glide away, and mingle in an
infinite variety of postures and situations. There is properly no simplicity in it at
one time, nor identity in different. (ibid.)