LT GarciaCastro, JuanPablo
NS3011 Term Research Paper
17MAY23
Beijing’s Mistake — A Forceful Reunification of Taiwan
It has been almost a full century since two or more world superpowers have faced off in
direct military combat and it is a worldwide concern that the next contenders will be the United
States of America and the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The fires from this conflict will be
felt globally and will likely ignite over the island of Taiwan “often called the Heart of Asia,”1 due
to its regional trade hub, democratic society, and tumultuous history with China. Today “Taiwan
touches aspects of all the ‘core interests’ that are central to the CCP’s (Chinese Communist Party)
perception of security.”2 This paper assumes China conducts a US contested reunification of
Taiwan and will start with an examination into why Taiwan is so important to the PRC and
American interests. Following with a study of recent wargames while considering the likelihood
of military escalation between two of the world’s top nuclear powers. Lastly, it will explore the
prospective costs and fallout to both parties presuming a successful Chinese invasion. This
analysis argues a Chinese forceful reunification of Taiwan is immeasurably costly even if
successful and would achieve a Cadmean victory from which the PRC may never recover from.
Literature Review
Great power competition rising over Taiwan has been thoroughly foreshadowed and this
analysis will review recent sources focusing on three main points: the importance of Taiwan, war
games, and probable consequences from military action.
The National Review, Heritage
1
Therese Shaheen, “Why Taiwan Matters,” National Review, August 2021, 2, https://advance-lexiscom.libproxy.nps.edu/document/?pdmfid=1516831&crid=ebc301ee-9fed-473b-b7961d0de90e2873&pddocfullpath=%2Fshared%2Fdocument%2Fnews%2Furn%3AcontentItem%3A635S-JXW1-JCBF3058-00000-00&pdcontentcomponentid=211515&pdteaserkey=sr0&pditab=allpods&ecomp=znyk&earg=sr0&prid=47cf7104-9be6-412f-973f-6ccd2ddc0647.
2
Dean Cheng, “Why Taiwan Matters to Beijing,” The Heritage Foundation, no. 3725 (September 2022): 2,
https://www.heritage.org/asia/report/why-taiwan-matters-beijing.
1
Foundation, and Asian Security Studies examined the current world stage and meaningfulness of
Taiwan preluding to possible war. The studies conclude that under current conditions it is difficult
to be optimistic about improving US-China relations, as they drift into a twenty-first-century Cold
War antithesis scenario.3 Considering the threat of military conflict real, the Center for Strategic
and International Studies (CSIS) conducted a series of wargames between the People’s Liberation
Army (PLA) and US/Japanese Allied forces; which predicted a favorable Allied outcome offset
with a costly encounter comparable to the Second World War.4 The American Enterprise Institute
and International Security journal examined the risk of nuclear escalation and protraction of the
war, arguing that “no one really knows how a US-China war would unfold … yet much … suggests
that a war between Washington and Beijing wouldn’t end quickly.”5 Lastly, a second CSIS study
investigated the after-effects at the end of a war over Taiwan, concluding China could at best
achieve a pyrrhic victory with the world’s economy deeply impacted by the loss of Taiwan’s
semiconductor industry.6
Why Taiwan Matters
Before the US can prepare for any hostile eventualities, it is imperative to understand why
the Taiwan problem is profoundly important to China. Dean Cheng, senior advisor to the China
program at the US Institute of Peace, argues that the Chinese Communist Party views state
security, territory integrity, and a steadily expanding economy as vital cornerstones to their hold
3
Robert S. Ross, Øystein Tunsjø, and Dong Wang, eds., US–China Foreign Relations: Power Transition and Its
Implications for Europe and Asia (London: Routledge, 2020), chap. 2, https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003056683.
4
Mark F. Cancian, Matthew Cancian, and Eric Heginbotham, “CSIS: First Battle of the Next War - Wargaming
Chinese Invasion of Taiwan” (Washington D.C.: Center for Strategic & International Studies, January 2023),
https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fspublic/publication/230109_Cancian_FirstBattle_NextWar.pdf?VersionId=WdEUwJYWIySMPIr3ivhFolxC_gZQuSOQ.
5
Hal Brands, “Getting Ready for a Long War with China,” American Enterprise Institute, July 2022, 3,
https://www.hsdl.org/c/abstract/?docid=870291.
6
Jude Blanchette and Gerard DiPippo, “‘Reunification’ with Taiwan through Force Would Be a Pyrrhic Victory for
China” (Center for Strategic & International Studies, November 2022), https://www-jstororg.libproxy.nps.edu/stable/pdf/resrep45681.pdf?acceptTC=true&coverpage=false&addFooter=false.
2
on power, adding that “fundamentally, the CCP’s interest in Taiwan encompasses issues of party
legitimacy, historical legacy, and strategic positioning.”7 Upon closer examination one can
determine that Taipei is a vulnerability to the CCP’s hold of power, geographic power projection,
and an encumbrance to economic growth.
Maintaining legitimacy of a political party’s rule over a nation is critical for any form of
government; this is no different for the CCP to preserve its authority over China. According to
Cheng, the CCP’s chief claim over Taiwan originates in “righting the wrongs of the past – in
particular, the ‘Century of Humiliation’.”8 He explains that this humiliation spans from the First
Opium War of 1842, the loss of vast territories, the coercion into numerous unfavorable treaties,
the Japanese annexation of Taiwan in 1895, and the infamous rape of Nanjing during the Second
World War. The Chinese people bear deep scars and “Taiwan is seen as the last unresolved
element of the Chinese Civil War” while the CCP has declared “a China that does not include
Taiwan is a China that is not whole.”9 In effect, the CCP cannot truly claim hegemony and
territorial integrity over China without restoring all her original borders.
In the realm of foreign relations, the appropriation of Taiwan to China’s borders provides
a commanding geostrategic position in military power projection and economic growth. For
Beijing, Taiwan constitutes the primary piece in the first island chain, that includes the territories
from the Japanese Home Islands, through the Straits of Malacca; which constrain China politically,
economically, and physically into littoral waters along the Indo-Pacific.10 Domination over the
island of Taiwan grants China unrestricted access to the Pacific Ocean with the ability to freely
7
Cheng, “Why Taiwan Matters to Beijing,” 2.
Cheng, 3.
9
Cheng, 4.
10
Cheng, 7.
8
3
project its diplomatic and military power, erect a buffer zone from western powers, and increase
economic leverage over one of the world’s most traversed trade routes.
For the US and her allies, a Chinese controlled Taiwan significantly upsets the balance of
global power. With seven nations sharing maritime rights in the South China Sea the PRC has
illicitly laid claim to 90 percent of it and with Taiwanese control, the PLA would be able to directly
threaten Japanese interests and all other nations in the region.11 Additionally, Washington would
face unimaginable diplomatic and economic fallout should it rescind her stance on Taiwan after
the Biden administration stated “that the U.S will support Taiwan, a leading democracy and a
critical economic and security partner.”12 The US cannot afford inaction in the event of a Chinese
invasion of Taiwan; thereby, precipitating great power conflict.
Shots Fired & Escalation
In the event that diplomacy and deterrence fail, all scenarios assume that the PLA will
deliver the first strike and all parties should explore the implications of armed conflict on the
Taiwanese straight. In order to forecast possible outcomes from a contested Taiwanese invasion,
the CSIC conducted 24 in-depth wargames simulations with varying categories from optimistic,
to ragnarock (a highly pessimistic) scenarios in favor of the PRC.13 In every case the PRC
successfully landed troops in Taiwan. However, in all except the most pessimistic allied
circumstances, China was unable to secure a significant foothold in Taiwan to support ground
advance and was trending towards defeat. Yet, this successful defense of Taiwan came at a great
cost to allied forces. Depending on the scenarios the CSIC estimated allied losses of 2-4 aircraft
carriers, 20-40 surface combatants and 300-600 aircraft, with casualties nearing ten thousand. The
11
Shaheen, “Why Taiwan Matters,” 3.
Shaheen, 3.
13
Cancian, Cancian, and Heginbotham, “CSIS: First Battle of the Next War - Wargaming Chinese Invasion of
Taiwan.”
12
4
PLA saw the preponderance of her surface and amphibious fleet destroyed, along with notable
portions of her submarines and attack aircraft. Ground invasion losses varied dependent on the
campaign length and resupply lines.14
The wargames provide four key points for American forces to achieve a favorable outcome.
These focal points are:
1. “Taiwan must vigorously resist. If it does not, the rest is futile.”
2. The US must respond with her full military capacity immediately. “Delays and half
measures make the defense harder.”
3. The US must have full support and use of regional allied military bases to
effectively implement her superior airpower.
4. “The United States must possess enough air-launched, long-range ASCMs.” (Antiship cruise missiles)15
The Chinese victory condition is the capture and operational sustainability of airfields and seaports
to support their initial invasion force before Allied attacks can neutralize their amphibious fleet.
Without the ability to reinforce and resupply units in the first waves, it becomes only a matter of
time before the Chinese invasion will eventually fail.
Taiwan’s mountainous rugged island equally benefits and pains both warring camps. An
‘Ukraine defense model’ is not viable within Chinese surface and air defensive zones effectively
isolating Taiwan; requiring all defensive equipment and munitions to already be in place before
hostilities begin.16 In equal regard, contested waters and airspace around the island complicates
14
Cancian, Cancian, and Heginbotham.
Cancian, Cancian, and Heginbotham, 83.
16
Cancian, Cancian, and Heginbotham, 123.
15
5
Chinese logistical lines to the invasion force while advancing through naturally defensive
positions. Allied Commanders foremost struggle while operating within Chinese defensive zones
will be moving forward in the face of heavy casualties not seen in living memory. 17 Meaningful
US defensive action will demand American units enter the PLA’s effective weapons’ range,
causing the likelihood of losses all but certain.
It is safe to assume that all parties would prefer a quick campaign, but the amplification of
this conflict into a long-protracted war is a real possibility. The US and China have the potential
to sustain a long conflict and notably “dictators don’t fare well when they lose wars that they
started … admitting failure might lead to overthrow of [Xi Jinping’s] regime or even his murder
at the hands of his political rivals.”18 In a 2021 Senate Security Review Commission, defense
analyst Henley stated, “a failed Taiwan landing would not end the war … China would continue
the conflict by whatever means available.”19 General wisdom advises that the conflict has a
significant possibility of extending into months or even years, even if it is localized to the
immediate region. Recent events in Russia’s 2022 Ukraine invasion bears evidence to the matter.
When dealing with nuclear capable powers, nuclear escalation must never be removed from
the table. Experts are split over this topic, some arguing despite China’s ‘no use first’ posture, a
losing war could push Beijing to a use-it-or-lose-it scenario; while optimist reason that US nuclear
capabilities outstrip the Chinese, and fear of a blanket retaliatory response serves as a deterrence.20
Yet, both sides concur that the risk remains high, particularly if the conflict spreads beyond the
17
Cancian, Cancian, and Heginbotham, 122.
Brands, “Getting Ready for a Long War with China,” 6.
19
Brands, 6.
20
Caitlin Talmadge, “Would China Go Nuclear? Assessing the Risk of Chinese Nuclear Escalation in a Conventional
War with the United States,” International Security 41, no. 4 (April 2017): 55,
https://doi.org/10.1162/ISEC_a_00274.
18
6
Taiwanese Straight into military strikes of the Chinese mainland.21 Should nuclear weapons be
used, regardless of magnitude, the negative effects would be impossible to predict.
The Fallout
It is understood that an armed conflict over Taiwan will be costly to all parties, yet it may
be pricier to China even if it prevails in subjugating the island. Apart from hefty losses to military
hardware and personnel, a contested invasion would see Taiwan’s infrastructure and industry
utterly devastated in combat or by sabotage. “China would occupy a new but significantly
damaged and isolated [region], which would face a severe economic contraction and be expensive
to subdue, police, and rebuild.”22 A wounded Beijing would need to subsidize sizeable resources
to reconstitute the island while maintaining a continuous military presence to suppress civil unrest
and possible guerillas. Taiwan itself is a major Chinese partner and it is estimated a year-long war
would reduce China’s GDP by 25-35 percent, the US in contrast would lose 5-10 percent.23
Currently, Taiwan’s microchip production industry provides over 60 percent of the global market
and over 90 percent of the most advanced chips; if lost rebuilding the infrastructure could take
many years with no promise of ever fully recuperating.24 Furthermore, an “attack on Taiwan would
provoke anxiety among China’s neighbors … likely galvanizing a surge in military spending and
pronounced band-wagoning against Beijing”25 by nearly all Indo-Pacific nations. From day one
of invasion, commercial shipping near and within the island would collapse, financial markets
would likely drop below the 2008 crisis, massive selloff of Chinese assets is expected, and
economic sanctions would be placed on China.26 “China’s economy would be on a wartime
21
Talmadge, 90.
Blanchette and DiPippo, “‘Reunification’ with Taiwan through Force Would Be a Pyrrhic Victory for China,” 5.
23
Blanchette and DiPippo, 4.
24
Cheng, “Why Taiwan Matters to Beijing,” 10.
25
Blanchette and DiPippo, “‘Reunification’ with Taiwan through Force Would Be a Pyrrhic Victory for China,” 8.
26
Blanchette and DiPippo, 4.
22
7
footing … overburdened fiscal system and state-sector debts amid capital outflows – and could
face a systemic financial crisis.”27 It is unrealistic for Beijing to expect an easy campaign without
western intervention and the vigorous opposition from the Taiwanese general population.
The US and by large the entire world will also experience a crisis, albeit not as impactful
as China would. During the length of the war the global economy would be in a crisis and even
after the war’s end, depending on the length and breadth of destruction, it would take numerous
years to recover. Depending on the level of US intervention, regardless of failure, its credibility
as a security partner would remain largely intact, demonstrating to democracies and allies that
America keeps her promises, but undeniably our military reputation would be bruised.28 Primarily,
the world would suffer on an economic level not seen in many decades and the vast international
opinion would blame a dangerous China.
Conclusion
Xi Jinping and the CCP’s ultimate goal is to achieve undisputed military power over the
Indo-Pacific region, legitimize its hold to power, and become the premier global economy. With
no option for peaceful reunification of Taiwan, the only course left is an immeasurably costly war
that may threaten everything China has thus far built. Beijing will have to teeter on the edge of
calamity betting on a weak Taiwanese defense, a half measured American response, and a perfect
military campaign of an untested PLA. A likely longer than expected and bloody campaign will,
even if successful, result in a severely weakened PLA and a harsh economic crisis. China’s goal
of hegemony over the Indo-Pacific would be impossible without lengthy and costly military
rebuilding.
In fact, China would likely see further challenges over its maritime claims as
apprehensive nations respond to the threat and new defense alliances against the PRC are made.
27
28
Blanchette and DiPippo, 8.
Blanchette and DiPippo, 8.
8
Further complications would be the state of her tattered economy, Taiwan as a trading partner
would cease to exist, and Chinese standing in the world would diminish. The Chinese Yuan would
take many years to recover, if it fully recovers at all, and China’s dreams of becoming the leading
world economy within the next decade will be nearly impossible. Lastly, the CCP could face
significant civil unrest under economic turmoil deterring its hold to power.
The current Russian war on Ukraine has reminded the world how erroneous initial war
predictions can be. Superpower rivalry for domination has broadly changed in the age of
globalization, interdependence, global supply chains, and technological developments.29 Should
China forcefully annex Taiwan, it may inadvertently achieve the opposite result it set out to
accomplish by invading in the first place, and discover they’ve undone decades of goals they
sought to attain. For this very reason, the US and her Allies must shore up defenses and invest
into deterrence more than ever because this conflict has no winner, only escalating tiers of misery.
29
Ross, Tunsjø, and Wang, US–China Foreign Relations, 48.
9
Blanchette, Jude, and Gerard DiPippo. “‘Reunification’ with Taiwan through Force Would Be a
Pyrrhic Victory for China.” Center for Strategic & International Studies, November 2022.
https://www-jstororg.libproxy.nps.edu/stable/pdf/resrep45681.pdf?acceptTC=true&coverpage=false&addF
ooter=false.
Brands, Hal. “Getting Ready for a Long War with China.” American Enterprise Institute, July
2022. https://www.hsdl.org/c/abstract/?docid=870291.
Cancian, Mark F., Matthew Cancian, and Eric Heginbotham. “CSIS: First Battle of the Next War
- Wargaming Chinese Invasion of Taiwan.” Washington D.C.: Center for Strategic &
International Studies, January 2023. https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fspublic/publication/230109_Cancian_FirstBattle_NextWar.pdf?VersionId=WdEUwJYWI
ySMPIr3ivhFolxC_gZQuSOQ.
Cheng, Dean. “Why Taiwan Matters to Beijing.” The Heritage Foundation, no. 3725 (September
2022). https://www.heritage.org/asia/report/why-taiwan-matters-beijing.
Ross, Robert S., Øystein Tunsjø, and Dong Wang, eds. US–China Foreign Relations: Power
Transition and Its Implications for Europe and Asia. London: Routledge, 2020.
https://doi.org/10.4324/9781003056683.
Shaheen, Therese. “Why Taiwan Matters.” National Review, August 2021. https://advance-lexiscom.libproxy.nps.edu/document/?pdmfid=1516831&crid=ebc301ee-9fed-473b-b7961d0de90e2873&pddocfullpath=%2Fshared%2Fdocument%2Fnews%2Furn%3AcontentIt
em%3A635S-JXW1-JCBF-3058-0000000&pdcontentcomponentid=211515&pdteaserkey=sr0&pditab=allpods&ecomp=znyk&earg=sr0&prid=47cf7104-9be6-412f-973f-6ccd2ddc0647.
Talmadge, Caitlin. “Would China Go Nuclear? Assessing the Risk of Chinese Nuclear
Escalation in a Conventional War with the United States.” International Security 41, no.
4 (April 2017): 50–92. https://doi.org/10.1162/ISEC_a_00274.
10