Constitutional Rights of Labor
Individual Rights of Workers ................................................................................................................... 3
1.
Right of Due Process, Art. III, Sec. 1 ............................................................................................ 3
PMPWA vs. Premier Productions Inc, 92 Phil 843........................................................................... 3
Callanta vs. Carnation Phil, 145 SCRA 268 ...................................................................................... 3
Segismundo vs. NLRC, Dec. 13, 1994 .............................................................................................. 4
Reta vs. NLRC, May 27, 1994 ........................................................................................................... 5
St. Michael Academy vs. NLRC, July 13, 1998 ................................................................................. 6
Wenphil vs. NLRC ............................................................................................................................ 6
Gonzales vs. NLRC, 313 SCRA 169, Aug. 26, 1999 ........................................................................... 7
Serrano vs. NLRC, January 27, 2000 ................................................................................................ 7
Viernes vs. NLRC.............................................................................................................................. 8
Agabon vs. NLRC, Nov. 17, 2004...................................................................................................... 9
SMC vs. Aballa, January 29, 2005.................................................................................................... 9
Jaka Food Processing vs. Pacot, March 28, 2005 .......................................................................... 10
ITC vs. NLRC, March 30, 2006........................................................................................................ 11
Cadalin vs. CA, Nov. 28, 2008 ........................................................................................................ 11
Perez vs. PTTC, April 17, 2009 ....................................................................................................... 12
2.
Freedom of Expression, Art. III, Sec. 4 ...................................................................................... 12
Mortera vs. CIR, 79 Phil 345 .......................................................................................................... 12
De Leon vs. NLU, 100 Phil 789 ....................................................................................................... 13
PAFLU vs. Cloribel, 27 SCRA 465.................................................................................................... 13
TUPAS vs. Coscolluela, a40 SCRA 302............................................................................................ 14
KMCS vs. Camara Shoes, 111 SCRA 478 ........................................................................................ 14
3.
Freedom of Association, Art. III, Sec.8 ...................................................................................... 15
Victoriano vs. ERWU, 59 SCRA 54 ................................................................................................. 15
Juat vs. CIR, 185 SCRA 395 ............................................................................................................ 15
Villar vs. Inciong, 121 SCRA 444 .................................................................................................... 16
Sanyo vs. Canizares, 211 SCRA 7 ................................................................................................... 16
TDLU vs. Tanduay Distillery, 149 SCRA 470 ................................................................................... 17
Manila Cordage Co. vs. CIR, 78 SCRA 398, E.O. No. 180 ............................................................... 18
4.
Non-impairment Clause, Art. III, Sec. 10 ................................................................................... 18
Abe vs. Foster Wheeler Corp, 110 Phil 198 ................................................................................... 18
5.
Free access to courts and quasi-judicial bodies, Art. III, Sec. 11 ............................................... 19
6.
Right to Speedy Disposition of Cases, Art. III, Sec. 16 ............................................................... 19
7.
Right against Involuntary Servitude, Art. III, Sec 16(2) ............................................................. 19
De Los Reyes vs. Alojado, 16 Phil 499 ........................................................................................... 19
Kaisahan vs. Gotamco Sawmills, 80 Phil 521 ................................................................................ 20
8.
Right to participate in policy/decision making.......................................................................... 20
PAL vs. NLRC, 225 SCRA 301 .......................................................................................................... 20
Collective Rights of Labor...................................................................................................................... 21
1.
Right to Self-Organization, Art. XIII, Sec. 3 – E.O. No. 180 ........................................................ 21
2.
Right to Collective Bargaining Negotiation, Art. XIII, Sec. 3 ...................................................... 21
Republic Savings Bank vs. CIR, 21 SCRA 226 ................................................................................. 21
3.
Right to Peaceful Concerted Activities, Art. XIII, Sec. 3 ............................................................. 22
SSS Employees Assoc. vs. CA, 175 SCRA 686................................................................................. 22
Bangalisan vs. CA, 275 SCRA 619 .................................................................................................. 22
NARIC vs. Alvendia, 107 Phil 404 .................................................................................................. 23
AGW vs. Minister of Labor, 124 SCRA 1 ........................................................................................ 23
4.
Right to Security of Tenure, Art. XIII, Sec. 3 .............................................................................. 24
Palmeria vs. NLRC, 247 SCRA 57 ................................................................................................... 24
5.
Right to Humane Conditions of Work ....................................................................................... 25
ISAE vs. Quisumbing, G.R. No. 128845.......................................................................................... 25
6.
Right to a Living Wages, Art. XIII, Sec. 3 .................................................................................... 25
7.
Right to Participate in Policy and Decision-making, Art. XIII, Sec. 3; Sec. 22 of RA No. 6715 ... 25
Individual Rights of Workers
1. Right of Due Process, Art. III, Sec. 1
PMPWA vs. Premier Productions Inc, 92 Phil 843
Facts:
Respondent filed a petition with the Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) seeking the approval
to lay off 44 men on the ground of lack of work and they are suffering from financial losses. Petitioner
opposed claiming that the said financial losses has no basis and in fact it being only an act of
retaliation for the strike staged by the workers days before in an attempt to harass and intimidate
them and weaken and destroy the union to which they belong.
When the hearing was set, an ocular inspection of the studios and filming premises of
respondent was held. The CIR approved the petition after the said investigation with the condition
that, in the event that the work is available in the future, they should be reemployed.
Petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the decision but was denied by the court en
banc. Hence this petition.
Issue:
May the Court of Industrial Relations authorize the layoff of workers on the basis of an ocular
inspection without receiving full evidence to determine the cause or motive of such lay-off?
Held:
No. The Supreme Court held that the required due process has not been followed. The court
a quo merely acted on the strength of the ocular inspection it conducted in the premises of the
respondent company. The petition for lay-off was predicated on the lack of work and of the further
fact that the company was incurring financial losses. These allegations cannot be established by a
mere inspection of the place of labor specially when such inspection was conducted at the request
of the interested party.
Callanta vs. Carnation Phil, 145 SCRA 268
Facts:
Respondent filed with the Regional Office of Labor and Employment for clearance to
terminate Petitioner for serious misconduct and misappropriation of company funds worth
Php12,000. Petitioner was dismissed from work, later on he filed with the same office a complaint
for illegal dismissal with claim for reinstatement, back wages and damages. Labor Arbiter decided
that he was indeed dismissed without valid cause, so Petitioner was ordered to reinstate him and to
give all his benefits.
Respondent appealed before the NLRC where the decision was overruled and that the
Petitioner’s complaint has already prescribed. Petitioner claimed that his action falls as an “injury to
the rights of the plaintiff” under Civil Code, Art. 1146, and not as a “penal offense” or a “money
claim” under Articles 291 and 292 respectively, of the Labor Code.
Issue:
Was the ruling of the NLRC correct?
Held:
No. The Court said that it is a principle well recognized in this jurisdiction, that one's
employment, profession, trade or calling is a property right, and the wrongful interference therewith
is an actionable wrong. The right is considered to be property within the protection of the
Constitutional guarantee of due process of law.
Verily, the dismissal without just cause of an employee from his employment constitutes a
violation of the Labor Code and its implementing rules and regulations. Such violation, however,
does not amount to an "offense" as understood under Article 291 of the Labor Code. In its broad
sense, an offense is an illegal act which does not amount to a crime as defined in the penal law, but
which by statute carries with it a penalty similar to those imposed by law for the punishment of a
crime. The confusion arises over the use of the term "illegal dismissal" which creates the impression
that termination of an employment without just cause constitutes an offense.
Segismundo vs. NLRC, Dec. 13, 1994
Facts:
AFCI, an air freight forwarding business where the petitioners were a regular employee,
received complaints from clients/consignees regarding missing items in their packages. This
prompted private respondent to conduct an exhaustive investigation to determine whether its
delivery personnel were involved in the pilferages complained of. The investigation yielded the
unfortunate result that the pilferages could only have taken place while the packages were in the
custody of private respondent’s delivery personnel.
After their investigation and inspection, AFCI’s management gave the petitioners notices
placing them under preventive suspension but was later on formally terminated from service. This
prompted the petitioners to file a complaint for illegal suspension and dismissal, alleging that their
dismissal was not based on a just cause and was effected in violation of their right to due process.
The Labor Arbiter decided in favor of petitioners.
AFCI appealed before the public respondent, NLRC, and respondent reversed the decision of
the Labor Arbiter, upholding petitioners’ dismissal as valid.
Issue:
Was the dismissal valid?
Held:
Yes. The Supreme Court upheld that the finding of the public respondent that petitioners’
dismissal was for a just cause. The public respondent’s findings on this score are fully supported by
the results of the investigation conducted by private respondent regarding the pilferages, and these
results were presented before the Labor Arbiter. The conclusion that petitioners were involved in
the pilferages was solidly premised on the tabulated complaints of consignees, the records of
pilfered packages delivered by petitioner’s team and delivery receipts. No evidence was presented
to show that private respondent was motivated by any ill feeling or bad faith in dismissing
petitioners. On the contrary, it could have been more difficult for private respondent to dismiss
petitioners considering that petitioner Segismundo was hired upon the recommendation of
respondent’s General Manager himself while petitioner Montalvo was hired upon the
recommendation of a member of private respondent’s Board of Directors. In view of these
recommendations, petitioners could not have been dismissed unless there was sufficient cause
therefor. It is thus clear that private respondent’s decision to terminate petitioners’ services was
prompted by the necessity to protect its good name and interests.
Reta vs. NLRC, May 27, 1994
Facts:
Petitioner, a Second Officer on board the M.V.” Bulk Tupaz” by private respondent ARPAPHIL,
has committed eight infractions, all of which boil down to insubordination, incompetence and
inefficiency. Due to these infractions, the master of the vessel discharged petitioner on February 27
while the vessel was docked at Pireau, Greece.
Consequently, petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with the POEA. Finding
petitioner’s dismissal to be justified, the POEA dismissed his petition. On appeal to the NLRC, the
POEA decision was affirmed. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Was there due process for the dismissal?
Held:
None. Although the dismissal had a legal cause, the Supreme Court held that there was no
proper procedure for the dismissal. An employee cannot just be separated from his employment
without according him his constitutional right of due process, consisting of the proper notice and
hearing. No notice of any form, apprising of the proffered charges, was served on petitioner, much
less was a hearing conducted wherein he could have defended himself. The fact that the defense
interposed at the hearing would be outlandish or pure nonsense, is not a ground to cut short the
procedure for dismissal. As this Court ruled in Seahorse Maritime Corporation, v. National Labor
Relations Commission, 173 SCRA 390 (1989), that before a seaman can be dismissed and discharged
from the vessel, it is required that he be given a written notice regarding the charges against him
and that he be afforded a formal investigation where he could defend himself personally or through
a representative. Fear of any possible trouble that might be caused by the dismissed employee on
board the vessel upon being informed of his dismissal is not a reason to dispense with the
requirement.
St. Michael Academy vs. NLRC, July 13, 1998
Facts:
Petitioner is an educational institution where the private respondents are former teachers.
Their unverified position paper alleged new claims for wage differentials, vacation and sick leave
benefits, separation pay and “all other benefits to which complainants are entitled under the Labor
Code”. To justify their claim for separation pay, the seven teachers alleged that they were forced to
resign following their rally against petitioner school for not releasing their share in the tuition fee
increase.
Issue:
Were the teachers illegally dismissed?
Held:
No. This Court affirms the petitioned decision. Public respondent NLRC upheld the Labor
Arbiter's ruling that private respondents were illegally dismissed by simply stating that the
conclusion of the latter is substantially supported by the evidence on record. Bare allegations of
threat or force do not constitute substantial evidence to support a finding of forced resignation. In
fine, from the evidence on record, we are not convinced that private respondents Bolosiño, Oserraos
and Daclag were forced to resign. Accordingly, we hold that they are not entitled to the award of
separation pay and backwages.
Wenphil vs. NLRC
Facts:
Private respondent Mallare had an altercation with a co-employee. The following day, the
Operations Manager served them memorandum of suspension and in the afternoon of that same
day, Mallare was dismissed from work. Labor Arbiter dismissed Mallare’s petition for unfair labor
practice for lack of merit. NLRC reversed the decision and ordered the reinstatement of Mallare with
full backwages of one year without qualification and deduction.
Issue:
Can an employee dismissed for just cause but without due process be reinstated to work?
Held:
No. The basic requirement of due proves is that which hears before it condemns, proceeds
upon inquiry and renders judgment only after trial. The dismissal of an employee must be for a just
cause and after due process. Petitioner committed an infraction of the second requirement thus it
must be imposed a sanction for its failure to give a formal notice and conduct an investigation as
required by law before dismissing Mallare from employment. Petitioner must indemnify the
dismissed employee which depends on the facts of each case and the gravity of the omission
committed by the employer.
Where the private respondent appears to be of violent temper, caused trouble during office
hours and even defied his supervisors as they tried to pacify him, he should not be rewarded with
re-employment and backwages. The dismissal of the respondent should be maintained.
Gonzales vs. NLRC, 313 SCRA 169, Aug. 26, 1999
Facts:
Lorlene Gonzales has been an elementary schoolteacher for private respondent Ateneo de
Davao University since 1974, assigned to teach Grade VI class. In 1991, headmaster Fr.Oscar Millar
sent a letter to inform Gonzales of the complaints for alleged use of corporal punishment on her
students. 2years later, Ateneo began to solicit complainants to lodge written complaints against her.
On Mar. 31, 1993, she wrote a letter to the headmaster demanding that she be formally informed of
the complaint and be duly investigated. On June 9, 1993, she was informed of the composition of an
investigative committee to look into the complaints but petitioner refused to take part unless the
rules of procedure be revised, contending that they were violative oh her right to due process. She
specifically objected to the provision which forbids her counsel from directly participating in the
investigation.
Issue:
Was due process accorded in the investigation prior to petitioner’s dismissal?
Held:
NO. Upon being notified of her termination, she has the right to demand compliance with
the basic requirements of due process. Compliance entails the twin requirements of procedural and
substantial due process. Ample opportunity must be afforded the employee to defend herself either
personally and/or with assistance of a representative; to know the nature of her offense; and, to
cross examine and confront face to face the witnesses against her.
Likewise, due process requires that the decision must be based on established facts and on
a sound legal foundation. It is precisely to demand compliance with these requirements that
petitioner at the very onset of the investigation demanded the revision of the rules laid down by the
Investigative Committee. The adamant refusal of the Committee to accede to this demand resulted
in her failure to confront and cross-examine her accusers. This is a serious violation of petitioner's
statutory and constitutional right to due process that ultimately vitiated the investigation. The
dismissal of complainant is declared illegal for lack of factual basis.
Serrano vs. NLRC, January 27, 2000
Facts:
Serrano was a regular employee of Isetann Department Store as the head of Security
Checker. In 1991, as a cost-cutting measure, Isetann phased out its entire security section and
engaged the services of an independent security agency. Petitioner filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal among others. Labor arbiter ruled in his favor as Isetann failed to establish that it had
retrenched its security section to prevent or minimize losses to its business; that private respondent
failed to accord due process to petitioner; that private respondent failed to use reasonable standards
in selecting employees whose employment would be terminated. NLRC reversed the decision and
ordered petitioner to be given separation pay.
Issue:
Was there deprivation of right to due process under the Constitution?
Held:
NO. The Court held that the dismissal was due to an authorized cause but the procedural
requirement was not followed under the Labor Code but not under the Constitution. An employer’s
good faith in implementing a redundancy program is not necessarily put in doubt by the availment
of the services of an independent contractor to replace the services of the terminated employees to
promote economy and efficiency. Absent proof that management acted in a malicious or arbitrary
manner; the Court will not interfere with the exercise of judgment by an employer.
Viernes vs. NLRC
Facts:
Petitioner along with other meter readers of BENECO, filed complaints for illegal dismissal,
underpayment of wages and claim for indemnity pay against the company. They were each served
their identical notices of termination. It is the contention of the petitioners that they were not
apprentices but regular employees whose services were illegally and unjustly terminated. On the
other hand, BENECO invoked Art. 283 of the Labor Code as defense.
The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaints but directed BENECO to extend such contracts
except with Viernes that must be appointed as regular employee. NLRC modified the appealed
decision by declaring that there was an illegal dismissal, ordering their reinstatement.
Issue:
Did BENECO illegally dismissed the petitioners?
Held:
Yes. The Court sustained that they should be reinstated as meter readers, not on
probationary status, but as regular employees. Clearly therefrom, there are two separate instances
whereby it can be determined that an employment is regular: (1) The particular activity performed
by the employee is necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer; or (2) if
the employee has been performing the job for at least a year.
Herein petitioners fall under the first category. They were engaged to perform activities that
are necessary to the usual business of private respondent. We agree with the labor arbiters
pronouncement that the job of a meter reader is necessary to the business of private respondent
because unless a meter reader records the electric consumption of the subscribing public, there
could not be a valid basis for billing the customers of private respondent. The fact that the petitioners
were allowed to continue working after the expiration of their employment contract is evidence of
the necessity and desirability of their service to private respondents’ business.
Agabon vs. NLRC, Nov. 17, 2004
Facts:
Petitioners were employed by Riviera Home as gypsum board and cornice installers from
January 1992 to February 23, 1999 when they were dismissed for abandonment of work. Petitioners
filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and was decided in their favor by the Labor Arbiter. Riviera
appealed to the NLRC contending just cause for the dismissal because of petitioner’s abandonment
of work. NLRC ruled there was just cause and petitioners were not entitled to backwages and
separation pay. The CA in turn ruled that the dismissal was not illegal because they have abandoned
their work but ordered the payment of money claims.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioners were illegally dismissed.
Held:
To dismiss an employee, the law required not only the existence of a just and valid cause but
also enjoins the employer to give the employee the right to be heard and to defend himself.
Abandonment is the deliberate and unjustified refusal of an employee to resume his employment.
For a valid finding or abandonment, two factors are considered: failure to report for work without a
valid reason; and, a clear intention to sever employer-employee relationship with the second as the
more determinative factor which is manifested by overt acts from which it may be deduced that the
employees have no more intention to work.
Where the employer had a valid reason to dismiss an employee but did not follow the due
process requirement, the dismissal may be upheld but the employer will be penalized to pay an
indemnity to the employee. This became known as the Wenphil Doctrine of the Belated Due process
Rule.
Art. 279 means that the termination is illegal if it is not for any of the justifiable or authorized
by law. Where the dismissal is for a just cause, the lack of statutory due process should not nullify
the dismissal but the employer should indemnify the employee for the violation of his statutory
rights. The indemnity should be stiffer to discourage the abhorrent practice of “dismiss now, pay
later” which we sought to deter in Serrano ruling. The violation of employees’ rights warrants the
payment of nominal damages.
SMC vs. Aballa, January 29, 2005
Facts:
San Miguel Corporation and Sunflower Multi-Purpose Cooperative entered into a one-year
contract, renewable monthly. Aballa et al. provided services to SMC, but after a year, they filed a
complaint for regular employees. SMC filed a Notice of Closure due to serious business losses, which
was dismissed by the Labor Arbiter. Aballa et al. appealed to the NLRC, which dismissed the finding
that Sunflower is an independent contractor. The CA reversed the decision.
Issue:
Are the respondents, employees of the petitioner?
Held:
The test to determine independent contractorship is whether one claiming to be an
independent contractor has contracted to do work according to their own methods and without
subject to the control of the employer, except for the result of work. In labor-only contracting, the
statute creates an employer-employee relationship to prevent circumvention of labor laws. In this
case, the agreement between SMC and Sunflower disowned the existence of an employer-employee
relationship. However, the totality of the facts and circumstances of the case determines the
character of the business, whether as labor-only contractor or job contractor.
Sunflower did not have substantial capital or investment in tools, equipment, and materials
to qualify as an independent contractor. The work assigned to Aballa et al. was directly related to
SMC's aquaculture operations, and Sunflower's role was merely to recruit workers for SMC.
Therefore, Aballa et al. should be deemed regular employees and entitled to all benefits and rights
due to regular employment.
Jaka Food Processing vs. Pacot, March 28, 2005
Facts:
Respondents were hired by JAKA until their termination on August 29, 1997 because the
Corporation was “in dire financial straits”. It was not disputed that they were terminated without
complying with the requirement under Art. 283 of the Labor Code regarding the service of notice
upon the employees and DOLE at least one month before the intended date of termination.
Issue:
Whether or not full backwages and separation pay be awarded to respondents when
employers effected termination without complying with the twin notice rule.
Held:
Yes. The violation of employees’ right to statutory due process by the employer warrants the
payment of indemnity in the form of nominal damages. This form of damages would serve to deter
employers from future violations of the statutory due process rights of employees. The dismissal of
the respondents was for an authorized cause under Article 283. A dismissal for authorized cause
does not necessarily imply delinquency or culpability on the part of the employee. Instead, the
dismissal process is initiated by the employer’s exercise of his management prerogative, i.e. when
the employer opts to install labor-saving devices, when he decides to cease business operations or
when… he undertakes to implement a retrenchment program.
ITC vs. NLRC, March 30, 2006
Facts:
Industrial Timber Corporation (ITC) leased a plywood plant in Butuan City for five years,
employing 387 workers. However, the plant was shut down due to nonrenewal of the anti-pollution
permit and a lack of logs for milling. ITC laid off workers until further notice, and later, IPGC took over
the plant and issued a permit to operate. Respondents filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and
unfair labor practice, alleging the cessation was intended to bust the union. The Labor Arbiter
dismissed the complaint, while NLRC reinstated employees but dismissed the complaints. The Court
of Appeals set aside the decision.
Issue:
Was there an illegal dismissal?
Held:
No. The closure of an establishment for economic reasons is recognized as a valid exercise
of management prerogative. The burden of proving the closure is bona fide falls upon the employer.
Compliance with the requirements of serving a written notice and payment of separation pay is
necessary for a valid termination of employment due to closure. The determination of whether a
strike is legal or not depends on whether the majority vote requirement is met and if the strike is
conducted in accordance with the law.
Cadalin vs. CA, Nov. 28, 2008
Facts:
The petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court addressed a class
suit initiated by claimants against the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) for
money claims. The cases were consolidated and awarded US$824,652.44 in favor of 324 claimants.
The National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) later modified the decision, dismissing the claims
of 94 complainants, ordering AIBC and Brown & Root to pay the 149 complainants, setting aside
awards given to 19 complainants who appear to have worked elsewhere than in Bahrain, and
dismissing claims other than those indicated in Annex "B" for lack of substantial evidence or beyond
the Commission's competence. The parties elevated the consolidated cases to the Court via petitions
for certiorari under Rule 65, G.R. Nos. 104776, 104911-14, and 105029-32. The Court dismissed the
three consolidated petitions on December 5, 1994, after finding no grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the NLRC.
Issue:
Were the petitioners entitled to their claim?
Held:
Yes. The Court ruled in favor of the petitioners, partially granting it for the 149 claimants
listed in Annex "B" of the September 2, 1991 Resolution of the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC). The petitioners argued that the December 3, 2002 NLRC Decision granting their claims had
already attained finality, as no timely motion for reconsideration was filed or bond was posted by
the private respondents. The court found that the NLRC has ample authority to entertain tardy
appeals if the circumstances warrant liberality, as this is a mere motion for reconsideration. The court
agreed with the private respondents' contention that neither Article 223 of the Labor Code nor the
Rules of Procedure of the NLRC requires the posting of a bond for the Commission to entertain a
motion for reconsideration of its decision.
Perez vs. PTTC, April 17, 2009
Facts:
Felix Perez and Amante Doria were employed by Philippine Telegraph and Telephone
Company (PT&T) as shipping clerk and supervisor. There was an alleged anomalous transaction that
the freight costs for goods and shipping documents showed traces of tampering, alteration and
superimposition. The said petitioners were placed on preventive suspension for 30 days which was
extended for 15 days twice for their alleged involvement in the anomaly. Pursuant to the suspension
and filing of criminal charges, petitioners were then dismissed from the service. Petitioners filed a
complaint for illegal suspension and illegal dismissal and alleged that they were dismissed on the
same date that they received the complaint memorandum.
Issue:
Were the petitioners denied due process entailed in their dismissal?
Held:
Yes. Respondents failed to prove just cause and to observe due process. To meet the
requirements of due process in the dismissal of an employee, an employer must furnish the worker
with two written notices: (1) a written notice specifying the grounds for termination and giving to
said employee a reasonable opportunity to explain his side and (2) another written notice indicating
that, upon due consideration of all circumstances, grounds have been established to justify the
employer’s decision to dismiss the employee. In the said case, petitioners were neither apprised of
the charges against them nor given a chance to defend themselves. They were simply and arbitrarily
separated from work and served notices of termination in total disregard of their rights to due
process and security of tenure. The twin requirements of notice and hearing constitute the essential
elements of due process. Due process of law simply means giving opportunity to be heard before
judgment is rendered.
2. Freedom of Expression, Art. III, Sec. 4
Mortera vs. CIR, 79 Phil 345
Facts:
All laborers of Canlubang Sugar Estate were ordered to return to work immediately and stop
the strike with the admonition that those who will fail to report will not only lose any concession but
the company was authorized by the public respondent herein to employ new employees or laborers
to take the places or positions of those who fail to report. The public respondent ordered that
picketing under any guise or form, is entirely prohibited considering that the industry was into sugar,
a very important and essential food, lack of supply would mean destruction of sugar centrals of many
provinces.
Issue:
Was there a denial of the right to strike?
Held:
Yes. The order on prohibition to strike should be understood to cover only illegal picketing,
that is, picketing through the use of illegal means. Peaceful picketing cannot be prohibited. It is part
of the freedom of speech guaranteed by the Constitution. Petitioners have not shown reasons to
annul the order. Petition dismissed.
De Leon vs. NLU, 100 Phil 789
Facts:
The defendant-appellees had been picketing the Dalisay Theater owned by the plaintiff for
the purpose of securing reinstatement to their respective jobs in the theater when it was run and
operated by the Filipino Theatrical Enterprises (FTE), then a lessee of the parcel of land owned by
plaintiff on which the theater was erected. The defendant-appellees lost their jobs upon termination
of the lease contract between De Leon and the FTE, which turned over the rights to the theater back
to De Leon, the owner of the lot.
Issue:
Has the terminated employees the right to strike?
Held:
Yes. Although the employees have no business with the owner of the establishment, they
have nevertheless the right to peaceful picketing which applies also to cases where employeremployee relationship is absent. The picketing, a form of freedom of expression, is conducted not to
disrupt the business of the owner but to appeal for a humanitarian consideration, after having been
laid off due to the termination of the business of their previous employer.
PAFLU vs. Cloribel, 27 SCRA 465
Facts:
Petitioner labor union picketed against Metrobank, which is occupying an office space in the
Wellington building. Wellington complained that the picketers were annoyingly blocking the
common passageway of the building, the only ingress and egress being used by the occupants of the
second to the sixth floors thereof as well as by their respective employees, clients and customers, so
that the picket has caused a disruption of the business of Wellington as well as the other lessors in
the building.
Issue:
Does the court have the power to enjoin the picket, despite being peaceful?
Held:
Yes. The courts are vested with the power to limit the exercise of the right of peaceful
picketing to parties involved in the labor dispute, or having a direct interest to the context of this
issue. Wellington is a mere "innocent bystander" who is not involved in the labor dispute. Thus, they
are entitled to seek protection of their rights from the courts and the courts may, accordingly, legally
extend the same.
TUPAS vs. Coscolluela, a40 SCRA 302
Facts:
A petitioner union filed a strike against Super Garments Manufacturing Corporation, alleging
that goods were smuggled out of its premises through Rustan's warehouse. The union picketed not
only Super Garments but also Rustan, leading to Rustan filing a civil case for injunction and damages
and a petition with the National Labor Relations Commission.
Issue:
Is picketing lawful even if there is no employer-employee relationship exist between the
parties?
Held:
Yes. The Court, while allowing that a peaceful picketing is a phase of the freedom of
expression guaranteed by the Constitution and could not be curtailed even in the absence of an
employer-employee relationship, maintained that this is not an absolute right. The Court are not
without power to localize the sphere of demonstration, whose interest are foreign to the context of
the dispute. This the right may be recognized at the instance of an “innocent bystander” who is not
involved in the labor dispute if it appears that the result of the picketing is to create an impression
that a labor dispute exists between him and the picketing union.
KMCS vs. Camara Shoes, 111 SCRA 478
Facts:
Petitioner Ramos was suspended for writing the phrase "under protest" in the company
payroll to object to the P1.0 deduction made by the respondent for allegedly getting P500 worth of
lumber in 1964. The deduction started only in 1969, at the peak of union activities of the petitioner
when several complaints of unfair labor practices were filed by the union against the respondent.
Issue:
Is the action of the petitioner a lawful exercise of freedom of expression?
Held:
Yes. The freedom of expression is available to individual workers subject to legal limitation
of industrial peace to air valid grievances. It is thus too clear from the foregoing that petitioner
Ramos was justified in airing his grievances against the unauthorized and illegal deductions made by
respondent company. By writing "under protest" on the company payroll, petitioner Ramos was well
within the ambit of his constitutional freedom of expression as well as the right to petition against
what was obviously a calculated undue harassment amounting to unfair labor practice perpetuated
by respondent employer herein.
3. Freedom of Association, Art. III, Sec.8
Victoriano vs. ERWU, 59 SCRA 54
Facts:
Stepping on the provisions of RA 3350 exempting members of religious sects which prohibit
its members from joining associations, plaintiff-appellee, being of a faithful of Iglesia ni Cristo,
withdrew his membership from the appellant union. The latter, who have pact a closed-shop
provision in their collective bargaining agreement with respondent company sought the separation
of the plaintiff-appellee. The trial court enjoined the supposed dismissal, prompting the union to
assail the validity of RA 3350 particularly the provision granting exemption to members of abovementioned sects.
Issue:
Does the law infringe the right or freedom of labor to associate?
Held:
No. Freedom of association implies not only the right to join a labor union, but also the
privilege of not joining one, of selecting which union to join, and of disaffiliating from a union. It is
clear that the assailed Act, far from infringing the constitutional provision on freedom of association,
upholds and reinforces it. It does not prohibit the members of said religious sects from affiliating
with labor unions. It still leaves to said members the liberty and the power to affiliate, or not to
affiliate, with labor unions. If, notwithstanding their religious beliefs, the members of said religious
sects prefer to sign up with the labor union, they can do so. If in deference and fealty to their religious
faith, they refuse to sign up, they can do so; the law does not coerce them to join; neither does the
law prohibit them from joining; and neither may the employer or labor union compel them to join.
Juat vs. CIR, 185 SCRA 395
Facts:
Juat, a company employee, was suspended for 15 days due to his refusal to join the Union.
Despite a letter directing him to report, Juat did not. His continued service was inimical to his
employer's interests. Juat filed complaints for unfair labor practices and overtime pay, claiming the
company dismissed him without justifiable cause and that he had not found substantial employment
since.
Issue:
Was the dismissal valid?
Held:
Yes. It should be declared, therefore, as a settled doctrine, that the closed-shop proviso of a
collective bargaining agreement entered into between an employer and a duly authorized labor
union applies, and should be applied, to old employees or workers who are non-members of any
labor union at the time the collective bargaining agreement was entered into. In other words, the
old employees or workers can be obliged by his employer to join the labor union which he had
entered into a collective bargaining that provides for a closed-shop as a condition for his continuance
in his employment, otherwise his refusal to join the contracting labor union would constitute a
justifiable basis for his dismissal.
Villar vs. Inciong, 121 SCRA 444
Facts:
The petitioners, who are the disaffiliating union members insist that their disaffiliation from
PAFLU and filing a petition for certification election are not acts of disloyalty but an exercise of their
right to self-organization. The contention was that these acts were done within the 60-day freedom
period when questions of representation may freely be raised.
Issue:
Was the disaffiliation from its mother union justified, considering it was done during the
freedom period?
Held:
No, it must be supported by the majority of the union members. In the first place, had
petitioners merely disaffiliated from the. Amigo Employees Union-PAFLU, there could be no legal
objections thereto for it was their right to do so. But what petitioners did by the very clear terms of
their “Sama-Samang Kapasiyahan” was to disaffiliate the Amigo Employees Union-PAFLU from
PAFLU, an act which they could not have done with any effective consequence because they
constituted the minority in the Amigo Employees Union-PAFLU.
Extant from the records is the fact that petitioners numbering ten (10), were among the
ninety-six (96) who signed the “Sama-Samang Kapasiyahan” whereas there are two hundred thirtyfour (234) union members in the Amigo Employees Union-PAFLU. Hence, petitioners constituted a
small minority for which reason they could not have successfully disaffiliated the local union from
PAFLU. Since only 96 wanted disaffiliation, it can be inferred that the majority wanted the union to
remain an affiliate of PAFLU and this is not denied or disputed by petitioners. The action of the
majority must, therefore, prevail over that of the minority members.
Sanyo vs. Canizares, 211 SCRA 7
Facts:
The petition seeks to nullify Labor Arbiter Potenciano Cañizares' deferral of the motion to
dismiss the complaint filed by Sanyo Philippines Workers Union-PSSLU Local Chapter No. 109. The
case involves a Collective Bargaining Agreement with Sanyo Philippines Inc., which contained a union
security clause allowing the union to demand dismissal of members due to voluntary resignation,
refusal to pay Union Dues, or joining another labor organization. PSSLU wrote Sanyo that the
members of certain employees have been cancelled for anti-union activities and for joining KAMAO.
In accordance with Security clause of the CBA, Sanyo dismissed these employees.
The dismissed employees filed a complaint with the NLRC for illegal dismissal. PSSLU filed a
motion to dismiss complaints alleging that the Labor Arbiter was without jurisdiction over the case.
Nevertheless, the LA assumed jurisdiction.
Issue:
Does the Labor Arbiter have jurisdiction over the case?
Held:
Yes. The Supreme Court held the Labor Arbiter and not the Grievance Machinery provided
for in the CBA has jurisdiction to hear and decide the case. While it appears that the dismissal of the
private respondents was made upon the recommendation of PSSLU pursuant to the union security
clause provided in the CBA, these facts do not come within the phrase “grievances arising from the
interpretation or implementation of their Collective Bargaining. Only disputes involving the union
and the company shall be referred to the grievance machinery or voluntary arbitrators.
TDLU vs. Tanduay Distillery, 149 SCRA 470
Facts:
Tanduay Distillery, Inc. (TDI) and Tanduay Distillery Labor Union (TDLU) entered into a
Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) for three (3) years from July 1,1979 to June 30,1982. The CBA
contained a union security clause, which provided: "All workers who are or may during the effectivity
of this Contract, become members of the union in accordance with its Constitution and By-Laws
shall, as a condition of their continued employment, maintain membership in good standing in the
union for the duration of the agreement." In October 1980, while the CBA was still in effect, a number
of TDLU members joined another union, the Kaisahan ng Manggagawang Pilipino (KAMPIL) and
organized its local chapter in TDI. Soon thereafter, KAMPIL filed a petition for certification election
to determine union representation in TDI. TDLU required those who disaffiliated to explain why TDLU
should not be punished for "disloyalty" to the TDLU. At the same time TDLU created a committee to
investigate its erring members. All of the latter were given a chance to explain their side. Thereafter,
the TDLU, upon recommendation of the Committee, expelled the disaffiliating members from TDLU
and demanded that TDI terminate their employment since they had lost their membership with
TDLU. Acting on said request, TDI terminated the employment of the disaffiliating union members.
Issue:
Whether or not TDI was justified in terminating private respondent's employment based on
TDLU's demand to enforce the union security clause of the CBA.
Held:
The employer did nothing but to put in force their agreement when it separated the
disaffiliating union members upon the recommendation of the union. Such a stipulation is not only
necessary to maintain loyalty and preserve the integrity of the union but is allowed by the Magna
Carta of Labor when it provided mat while it is recognized that an employee shall have the right to
self-organization, it is at the same time postulated that such rights shall not injure the right of the
labor organization to prescribe its own rules with respect to the acquisition or retention of
membership therein.
This provision is an indirect restriction on the right of an employee to self-organization. It is
a solemn pronouncement of a policy that while an employee is given the right to join a labor
organization, such right should only be asserted in a manner that will not spell the destruction of the
same organization. The law requires loyalty to the union on the part of its members in order to obtain
to the full extent its cohesion and integrity. There is nothing improper in the disputed provisions of
the collective bargaining agreement entered into between the parties.
Manila Cordage Co. vs. CIR, 78 SCRA 398, E.O. No. 180
Facts:
The Tabuyan group negotiated with the company to take back 200 members, but the Bocobo
group continued their strike due to not being admitted back. The President certified the case, but
the company and Tabuyan group argued there was no labor dispute. The court ruled that a
compulsory arbitration can be certified by the President if a "labor dispute" exists in an industry
essential to national interest, regardless of whether a strike is imminent, ongoing, or terminated
without a final settlement. Despite a signed agreement, the President believed a labor dispute
required compulsory arbitration.
Issue:
Is the Presidential Certification proper even with a right-to-work agreement?
Held:
Yes. As far as this Court is concerned, there can be no argument against the validity and
efficacy of the presidential certification here in issue. This Court is not constitutionally permitted to
inquire into, in exactly the same manner that the Executive cannot refuse to accord respect and
sanction to a decision of this Court merely for the reason that in his opinion the same is without
sufficient factual or legal basis. A compulsory arbitration may be certified by the President as long
as, in his opinion, a "labor dispute," exists in an industry indispensable to the national interest,
whether a strike therein be impending, going on or already terminated without a final settlement of
the dispute.
4. Non-impairment Clause, Art. III, Sec. 10
Abe vs. Foster Wheeler Corp, 110 Phil 198
Facts:
The plaintiffs filed a complaint against Foster Wheeler Corp and Caltex, claiming they were
unjustly dismissed without notice and requesting recovery of separation pay and other benefits. The
defendants argued that Republic Act 1052, which was not applicable to existing contracts, would be
unconstitutional under the rule prohibiting contract impairment.
Issue:
Is the plaintiff’s contention meritorious?
Held:
No. The freedom of contract under our system of government is not meant to be absolute.
It is understood to be subject to reasonable legislative regulations aimed at the promotion of public,
health, moral, safety and welfare. By its very nature, Republic Act is a measure intended to provide
protection to the workingmen and its enactment is a valid exercise of the police power of the State.
5. Free access to courts and quasi-judicial bodies, Art. III, Sec. 11
6. Right to Speedy Disposition of Cases, Art. III, Sec. 16
7. Right against Involuntary Servitude, Art. III, Sec 16(2)
De Los Reyes vs. Alojado, 16 Phil 499
Facts:
Veronica Alojado received, as a loan, from Benito de los Reyes that the sum P67 .60, for the
purpose of paying a debt she owed to Olimpia Zaballa. It was agreed between Alojado and Reyes
that the debtor should remain as a servant in the house and in the service of her creditor, without
any renumeration whatever, until she should find someone who would furnish her with the said sum
where with to repeat the loan. The defendant, Veronica Alojado, afterwards left the house of the
plaintiff, on March 12, 1906, without having paid him her debt, nor did she do so at any subsequent
date, notwithstanding his demands. The plaintiff, therefore, filed suit against Veronica Alojado to
recover the said sum or, in a contrary case, to compel her to return to his service. The trial court
rendered judgment whereby he sentenced the defendant to pay to the plaintiff the sum claimed and
declared that, in case the debtor should be insolvent, she should be obliged to fulfill the agreement
between her and the plaintiff, which was reversed in favor of defendant. Hence, this appeal.
The defendant appealed from the said judgment, denying all the allegations of the complaint
and alleged that, although she had left the plaintiff's service, it was because the latter had paid her
no sum whatever for the services she had rendered in his house.
Issue:
Was there involuntary servitude?
Held:
Yes. When legal regulations prohibit even a usurious contract and all abuses prejudicial to
subordinates and servant, in connection with their salaries and wages, it will be understood at once
that the compact whereby service rendered by a domestic servant in the house of any inhabitant of
this country is to be gratuitous, is in all respects reprehensible and censurable; and consequently,
the contention of the plaintiff, that until the defendant shall have paid him her debt she must serve
him in his house gratuitously is absolutely inadmissible.
The trial record discloses no legal reason for the rejection of the findings of fact and of law
contained in the judgment appealed from, nor for an allowance of the errors attributed appealed
from, nor for an allowance of the errors attributed thereto; on the contrary, the reasons hereinabove
stated show the propriety of the said judgment.
Kaisahan vs. Gotamco Sawmills, 80 Phil 521
Facts:
During the pendency of the labor dispute between the petitioners and the respondents, the
CIR managed to forge a voluntary agreement which results into a return-to-work order, and the
respondents was prohibited to, among others, lay-off any of the petitioners. Barely 4 months the
contract, petitioners again staged a strike, violating the condition of the agreement. The latter
countered by assailing the Sec 19 of CA 103, the law upon which the voluntary agreement was based,
arguing that the same results to involuntary servitude.
Issue:
Should a voluntary agreement with a condition that workers must return to work be voided
upon a ground of involuntary servitude?
Held:
No. An employee entering into a contract of employment voluntarily accepts, among other
conditions, those prescribed in Section 19 of CA 103. The voluntariness of the employee's entering
into it or not--with such implied condition, negatives the possibility of involuntary servitude ensuing.
8. Right to participate in policy/decision making
PAL vs. NLRC, 225 SCRA 301
Facts:
On March 15, 1985, the Philippine Airlines, Inc. (PAL) completely revised its 1966 Code of
Discipline. The Code was circulated among the employees and was immediately implemented, and
some employees were forthwith subjected to disciplinary measures embodied therein.
On August 20, 1985, the Philippine Airlines Employees Association (PALEA) filed a complaint
before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) for unfair labor practice with the following
remarks: “ULP with arbitrary implementation of PAL’s Code of Discipline without notice and prior
discussion with Union by Management”. PALEA alleged that copies of the Code had been circulated
in limited numbers; that being penal in nature the Code must conform with the prejudicial with the
requirements of sufficient publication, and that the Code was arbitrary, oppressive, and prejudicial
to the rights of the employees. It prayed that implementation of the Code be held in abeyance; that
PAL should discuss the substance of the Code with PALEA; that employees dismissed under the Code
be reinstated and their cases subjected to further hearing; and that PAL be declared guilty of unfair
labor practice and be ordered to pay damages.
PAL filed a motion to dismiss the complaint asserting its prerogative as an employer to
prescribe rules and regulations regarding employees’ conduct in carrying out their duties and
functions, and alleging that by implementing the Code, it had not violated the collective bargaining
agreement (CBA) or any provision of the Labor Code.
Issue:
Whether or not the formulation of a Code of Discipline among the employees is a shared
responsibility of the employer and the employees.
Held:
So long as a company’s management prerogative s are exercise in good faith for the
advancement of the employer’s interest and not for the purpose of defeating or
circumventing the rights of the employees under special laws or under valid agreements, this
Court will uphold them. All this points to the conclusion that the exercise of managerial
prerogatives is not unlimited. It is circumscribed by limitations found in law, a collective bargaining
agreement, or the general principals of fair play and justice
Collective Rights of Labor
1. Right to Self-Organization, Art. XIII, Sec. 3 – E.O. No. 180
2. Right to Collective Bargaining Negotiation, Art. XIII, Sec. 3
Republic Savings Bank vs. CIR, 21 SCRA 226
Facts:
Petitioner bank terminated private respondents for having written and published a "patently
libelous letter tending to cause dishonor, discredit or contempt not only the officers and employees
of the bank, but also their employer" by demanding the resignation of the bank president on grounds
of immorality, nepotism and favoritism. CIR ruled that the petitioner's act constitutes an unfair labor
practice.
Issue:
Does the dismissal of employees airing their grievance against their employer constitute
unfair labor practice?
Held:
Yes. Even assuming that respondents acted in their individual capacities when they wrote
the letter, they were nonetheless protected for they were engaged in concerted activity, in the
exercise of their right to self-organization that includes concerted activity for mutual aid and
protection, interference with which constitutes unfair labor practice.
The petitioner should have allowed the respondents to air their grievances as a mechanism
in a collective bargaining agreement. Collective bargaining... normally takes the form of negotiation
when major conditions of employment to be written into an agreement are under consideration,
and of grievance committee meetings and arbitration when questions arising from the
administration of an agreement are at stake.
3. Right to Peaceful Concerted Activities, Art. XIII, Sec. 3
SSS Employees Assoc. vs. CA, 175 SCRA 686
Facts:
Petitioners went on strike after their employer SSS failed to act upon the union's demands
concerning the implementation of their CBA. SSS filed an injunction contending that the petitioners
are covered by Civil Service laws which prohibits employees of the government from staging a strike.
SSSEA on the other hand, argued that the NLRC has the jurisdiction of the case by virtue of the
provisions of the Labor Code.
Issue:
Does the court have jurisdiction? Do employees covered by the Civil Service have the right
to strike?
Held:
On question of jurisdiction, yes. The RTC, in the exercise of its general jurisdiction under BP
129, has jurisdiction over petitioner's claim for damages and for the issuance of a writ of injunction
to stop the strike, since the Labor Code do not apply to government employees.
On the right to strike of government workers, No. The Constitution provides guarantee
among workers with the right to organize and conduct peaceful concerted activities. On the other
hand, EO 180 provides that the Civil Service law and rules governing concerted activities in
government service shall be observed subject to any legislation that may be enacted by Congress.
Referring to Memo Circular No.6, s. 1987 of the CSC which states that prior to the enactment by
Congress of applicable laws concerning strike by government employees, enjoins under pain of
administrative sanctions, all government officials and employees from staging a strike,
demonstrations, mass leaves, walk-outs and other forms of mass action which will result in
temporary stoppage or disruption of public service, the court ruled that in the absence of any
legislation allowing government employees to strike, they are therefore prohibited from doing so.
Bangalisan vs. CA, 275 SCRA 619
Facts:
Petitioners were among the 800 public school teachers who staged “mass actions” on
September 17 to 19, 1990 to dramatize their grievances against the alleged failure of the government
to implement measures intended for their material benefit. The Education Secretary issued a Returnto-Work Order but the petitioners failed to comply. Hence, they were charged by the Secretary with
several administrative cases leading to their dismissal from service.
Issue:
Can government employees engage in a strike?
Held:
No. As a general rule, even in the absence of express statutory prohibition like Memo Circ.
No.6 public employees are denied the right to strike or engage in work stoppage against a public
employer. The right of the sovereign to prohibit strikes or work stoppages public employees was
clearly recognized at common law. To grant employees of the public sector the right to strike there
must be a clear and direct legislative authority therefor. In the absence of any express legislation
allowing government employees to strike, recognizing their right to do so, or regulating the exercise
of the right, employees in the public service may not engage in strike, walk-outs and temporary work
stoppage like workers in the private sector.
NARIC vs. Alvendia, 107 Phil 404
Facts:
National Rice and Corn Corporation filed a complaint for damages against herein petitioners
as a result of the alleged blocking and obstruction of the gates of the company’s offices by striking
picketers who threatened violence and bodily harm to persons crossing the union’s picket line.
Issue:
Whether the employees of National Rice and Corn Corporation, being an instrumentality of
the government, have the right to strike.
Held:
Yes. Under the proviso of Section 11 of the Industrial Peace Act, the prohibition to strike is
clearly limited to “employees employed in governmental functions and not to those employed in
proprietary functions of the governmental functions and not to those employed in proprietary
functions of the Government (Sec. 11, RA 875).
Since the work of the members of the petitioning union consist mainly in hauling goods at
the respondent0s warehouses, barges and piers, the same bears only a very remote relation to the
governmental functions of respondent corporation, and the union members are not covered by the
prohibition against strikes. Restrictions of the workers0 basic right to collective action to improve
their conditions of work or protect themselves against oppressive practices are to be strictly
construed.
AGW vs. Minister of Labor, 124 SCRA 1
Facts:
The Alliance of Government Workers (AGW) and its affiliate unions filed a motion to join the
Philippine Government Employees Association (PGEA) in 1983. The petitioners argue that P.D. No.
851 requires all employers to pay the 13th-month pay to their employees, with one exception found
in Section 2. They also claim that Section 3 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing Presidential
Decree No. 851 included other types of employers not exempted by the decree. The court initially
denied due course to the petition, but after considering the important issues and constitutional
principles, the court decided to give due course. The petition has far-reaching implications and raises
questions about whether the respondents unlawfully excluded the petitioners from the use and
enjoyment of rights to which they are entitled under the law.
Issue:
Whether the branches, agencies, subdivisions, and instrumentalities of the government
including GOCCs included among “employers” under PD 851 which are required to pay all their
employees receiving a basic salary of not more that Php 1 000 a month, a 13th month pay not later
than December 24 of every year.
Held:
No. They are not included because they are Government employees embraced by the Civil
Service. The terms and conditions of employment in the government are governed by law, and
workers cannot use the same tools as private sector workers to secure concessions. Labor unionism
in private industry argues that industrial peace cannot be secured through compulsion by law. In
government employment, the legislature and administrative heads determine employment terms
through statutes, administrative circulars, rules, and regulations. The old Industrial Peace Act
excluded government employees and workers in proprietary functions from compulsion of law. The
Court has supported labor in strikes and concerted activities in firms and agencies discharging
proprietary functions because the Constitution and laws allowed these activities. The present
Constitution includes government-owned or controlled corporations as embraced by the civil
service, but it would be unfair to allow personnel of these corporations to engage in concerted
activities to wring higher salaries or fringe benefits.
4. Right to Security of Tenure, Art. XIII, Sec. 3
Palmeria vs. NLRC, 247 SCRA 57
Facts:
Palmeria was employed by private respondent Coca-cola, which later entered into a contract
of service with Lipercon Services. It was made to appear that the petitioner was an employee of
Lipercon, before being dismissed by Coca-cola. Petitioner was able to prove his employment with
Coca-cola, hence sought for reinstatement. The labor arbiter and NLRC ruled that reinstatement
could not be availed of because of the vehement refusal of the respondent to accept back the
petitioner.
Issue:
Should the petition for reinstatement be granted despite the strained relations between
employee and employer?
Held:
Yes. The importance of the remedy of reinstatement to an unjustly dismissed employee
cannot be overstated. It is the remedy that most effectively restores the right of an employee to his
employment and all its benefits before its violation by his employer. Yet despite all its virtues,
reinstatement does not and cannot fully vindicate all of an employee’s injuries for reinstatement no
more than compensates for his financial damages. It cannot make up for his other sufferings,
intangible yet valuable xxx It is a right which cannot be allowed to be devalued by the purchasing
power of employers who are only too willing to bankroll the separation pay of their illegally
dismissed employees to get rid of them.
5. Right to Humane Conditions of Work
ISAE vs. Quisumbing, G.R. No. 128845
Facts:
The School, a private institution, hires both foreign and local teachers, classifying them into
foreign and local hires. The School uses four tests to determine classification, with foreign hires
receiving a 25% higher salary rate than local hires. The difference is based on economic
disadvantages such as the dislocation factor and limited tenure for foreign hires.
In 1995, the International School Alliance of Educators contested the salary difference,
leading to a deadlock and a strike. The Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) took
jurisdiction over the dispute, but the DOLE Acting Secretary resolved the parity and representation
issues in favor of the School. The petitioner now seeks Supreme Court relief.
Issue:
Was the Humane Conditions of Work present in the school?
Held:
No. Discrimination, particularly in terms of wages, is frowned upon by the Labor Code. The
foregoing provisions impregnably institutionalize in this jurisdiction the long honored legal truism of
“equal pay for equal work.” Persons who work with substantially equal qualifications, skill, effort and
responsibility, under similar conditions, should be paid similar salaries. This rule applies to the
School, its “international character” notwithstanding.
The School contends that petitioner has not adduced evidence that local-hires perform work
equal to that of foreign-hires. The employer in this case has failed to show evidence that foreignhires perform 25% more efficiently or effectively than the local-hires. Both groups have similar
functions and responsibilities, which they perform under similar working conditions. In this case, the
court find the point-of hire classification employed by respondent School to justify the distinction in
the salary rates of foreign-hires and local hires to be an invalid classification. There is no reasonable
distinction between the services rendered by foreign-hires and local-hires. The practice of the School
of according higher salaries to foreign-hires contravenes public policy and, certainly, does not
deserve the sympathy of the Court.
6. Right to a Living Wages, Art. XIII, Sec. 3
7. Right to Participate in Policy and Decision-making, Art. XIII, Sec. 3; Sec. 22 of RA
No. 6715