FELIZA P. DE ROY and VIRGILIO RAMOS, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and LUIS BERNAL, SR., GLENIA BERNAL, LUIS BERNAL, JR.,
HEIRS OF MARISSA BERNAL, namely, GLICERIA DELA CRUZ BERNAL and LUIS
BERNAL, SR., respondents.
G.R. No. 80718
January 29, 1988
FACTS:
Petitioner Feliza De Roy was the respondent in a civil case for damages filed by Luis
Bernal.
In the civil case, the RTC found De Roy grossly negligent and awarded damages to
Bernal for the injuries he sustained and for the death of his daughter caused by the
collapse of a burned-out building’s firewall owned by De Roy. The CA affirmed the RTC’s
decision. On the last day of the 15-day period to file an appeal, petitioners filed a
motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration. The CA denied the
motion by applying the rule laid down in Habaluyas Enterprises v. Japzon that said
period cannot be extended.
Petitioners contend that the rule enunciated in the Habaluyas case should not be made
to apply to the case at bar owing to the non-publication of the decision in the Official
Gazette when the CA decision was promulgated.
ISSUE:
Is publication in the Official Gazette required before SC decisions can become binding
and effective?
HELD:
No, publication is not required.
There is no law requiring the publication of SC decisions in the Official Gazette before
they can be binding and as a condition to their becoming effective. It is the bounden
duty of counsel as lawyer in active law practice to keep abreast of decisions of the SC
particularly where issues have been clarified, consistently reiterated, and published in
the advance reports of SC decisions and in such publications as the SCRA and law
journals.
In this case, petitioner’s contention that the SC decision was not binding and effective
because it lacks publication is without merit.
Since publication is not required, the SC decision is binding and effective even without
being published in the Official Gazette.
MICHAEL C. GUY vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 163707, September 15, 2006
Facts
On October 29, 1992, Sima Wei died in Makati City leaving an estate valued 10 million
more or less. His known heirs are his spouse Shirley Guy with their children five children.
On June 13, 1997, private respondents Karen Oanes Wei and Kamille Oanes Wei
represented by their mother Remedios filed a petition for letters of administration
before the Regional Trial Court alleging that they are duly acknowledged illegitimate
children of Sima Wei. However, petitioner and co-heirs alleged that private respondent‘s
claim had been paid, waived, abandoned, or otherwise extinguished by Remedios‘ June
7, 1993 Release and Waiver of Claim stating that in exchange for the financial and
educational support received from petitioner, Remedios and her minor children
discharge the estate of Sima Wei and any and all liabilities. The petition was denied in
the lower court and the motion for reconsidered dismissed in the Court of Appeals.
Hence, this petition was made.
Issue
Whether or not the Release and Waiver of Claim bar respondents from claiming
successional rights.
Ruling
The Release and Waiver of Claim does not bar respondents from claiming successional
rights because it does not state with clarity the purpose of its execution. It merely states
that Remedios received Php 300,000 and an educational plan for her daughters. The
document does not specifically mention private respondents‘ hereditary rights, hence it
can‘t be construed as a waiver of successional rights. The Supreme Court held that
under Art. 1044 of the Civil Code any inheritance left to minors or incapacitated persons
may be accepted by their parent or guardian. Parents may repudiate the inheritance
only by judicial authorization. Not having been judicially approved, the release and
waiver claim is null and void. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of
Appeals.
Guy v. CA
G.R. No. 163707, September 15, 2006
FACTS:
Private respondents alleged that they are the duly acknowledged illegitimate children of
Sima Wei, who died intestate leaving an estate valued at P10,000,000.00 consisting of
real and personal properties. His known heirs are his surviving spouse Shirley Guy and
children, Emy, Jeanne, Cristina, George and Michael, all surnamed Guy. Private
respondents prayed for the appointment of a regular administrator for the orderly
settlement of Sima Wei’s estate. They likewise prayed that, in the meantime, petitioner
Michael C. Guy, son of the decedent, be appointed as Special Administrator of the estate.
In his Comment/Opposition, petitioner prayed for the dismissal of the petition. He
asserted that his deceased father left no debts and that his estate can be settled without
securing letters of administration pursuant to Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court. He
further argued that private respondents should have established their status as
illegitimate children during the lifetime of Sima Wei pursuant to Article 175 of the Family
Code..
ISSUE:
Whether private respondents are barred by prescription from proving their filiation.
RULING:
No. Ruling on the same would be premature considering that private respondents have
yet to present evidence. Before the Family Code took effect, the governing law on actions
for recognition of illegitimate children was Article 285 of the Civil Code. Under the Family
Code, when filiation of an illegitimate child is established by a record of birth appearing
in the civil register or a final judgment, or an admission of filiation in a public document
or a private handwritten instrument signed by the parent concerned, the action for
recognition may be brought by the child during his or her lifetime. However, if the action
is based upon open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child, or any
other means allowed by the rules or special laws, it may only be brought during the
lifetime of the alleged parent. It is clear therefore that the resolution of the issue of
prescription depends on the type of evidence to be adduced by private respondents in
proving their filiation. However, it would be impossible to determine the same in this case
as there has been no reception of evidence yet. While the original action filed by private
respondents was a petition for letters of administration, the trial court is not precluded
from receiving evidence on private respondents’ filiation. Its jurisdiction extends to
matters incidental and collateral to the exercise of its recognized powers in handling the
settlement of the estate, including the determination of the status of each heir. That the
two causes of action, one to compel recognition and the other to claim inheritance, may
be joined in one complaint.
G.R. Nos. 120865-71 December 7, 1995
LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS; HON. JUDGE HERCULANO TECH, PRESIDING JUDGE,
BRANCH 70, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF BINANGONAN RIZAL; FLEET
DEVELOPMENT, INC. and CARLITO ARROYO; THE MUNICIPALITY OF
BINANGONAN and/or MAYOR ISIDRO B. PACIS, respondents.
LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS; HON. JUDGE AURELIO C. TRAMPE, PRESIDING JUDGE,
BRANCH 163, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF PASIG; MANILA MARINE LIFE BUSINESS
RESOURCES, INC. represented by, MR. TOBIAS REYNALD M. TIANGCO;
MUNICIPALITY OF TAGUIG, METRO MANILA and/or MAYOR RICARDO D. PAPA,
JR., respondents.
LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS; HON. JUDGE ALEJANDRO A. MARQUEZ, PRESIDING JUDGE,
BRANCH 79, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MORONG, RIZAL; GREENFIELD
VENTURES INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION and R. J. ORION
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION; MUNICIPALITY OF JALA-JALA and/or MAYOR
WALFREDO M. DE LA VEGA, respondents.
LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS; HON. JUDGE MANUEL S. PADOLINA, PRESIDING JUDGE,
BRANCH 162, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF PASIG, METRO MANILA; IRMA FISHING
& TRADING CORP.; ARTM FISHING CORP.; BDR CORPORATION, MIRT
CORPORATION and TRIM CORPORATION; MUNICIPALITY OF BINANGONAN
and/or MAYOR ISIDRO B. PACIS, respondents.
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LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS; HON. JUDGE ARTURO A. MARAVE, PRESIDING JUDGE,
BRANCH 78, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MORONG, RIZAL; BLUE LAGOON
FISHING CORP. and ALCRIS CHICKEN GROWERS, INC.; MUNICIPALITY OF JALAJALA and/or MAYOR WALFREDO M. DE LA VEGA, respondents.
LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS; HON. JUDGE ARTURO A. MARAVE, PRESIDING JUDGE,
BRANCH 78, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MORONG, RIZAL; AGP FISH VENTURES,
INC., represented by its PRESIDENT ALFONSO PUYAT; MUNICIPALITY OF JALAJALA and/or MAYOR WALFREDO M. DE LA VEGA, respondents.
LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS; HON. JUDGE EUGENIO S. LABITORIA, PRESIDING JUDGE,
BRANCH 161, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF PASIG, METRO MANILA; SEA MAR
TRADING CO. INC.; EASTERN LAGOON FISHING CORP.; MINAMAR FISHING CORP.;
MUNICIPALITY OF BINANGONAN and/or MAYOR ISIDRO B. PACIS, respondents.
Facts:
The Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) was created through RA No. 4850 in
order to execute the policy towards environmental protection and sustainable
development so as to accelerate the development and balanced growth of the Laguna
Lake area and the surrounding provinces and towns.
Upon implementation of RA 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991), the municipalities
assumed exclusive jurisdiction & authority to issue fishing privileges within their
municipal waters since Sec.149 thereof provides: “Municipal corporations shall have the
authority to grant fishery privileges in the municipal waters and impose rental fees or
charges therefore…” Big fishpen operators took advantage of the occasion to establish
fishpens & fish cages to the consternation of the LLDA.
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The implementation of separate independent policies in fish cages & fish pen operation
and the indiscriminate grant of fishpen permits by the lakeshore municipalities have
saturated the lake with fishpens, thereby aggravating the current environmental
problems and ecological stress of Laguna Lake.
The LLDA then served notice to the general public that:
(1) fishpens, cages & other aqua-culture structures unregistered with the LLDA as of
March 31, 1993 are declared illegal;
(2) those declared illegal shall be subject to demolition by the Presidential Task Force for
Illegal Fishpen and Illegal Fishing; and
(3) owners of those declared illegal shall be criminally charged with violation of Sec.39A of RA 4850 as amended by PD 813.
A month later, the LLDA sent notices advising the owners of the illegally constructed
fishpens, fishcages and other aqua-culture structures advising them to dismantle their
respective structures otherwise demolition shall be effected.
Issue
Which agency of the Government — the Laguna Lake Development Authority or the
towns and municipalities comprising the region — should exercise jurisdiction over the
Laguna Lake and its environs insofar as the issuance of permits for fishery privileges is
concerned?
Held
LLDA has jurisdiction over such matters because the charter of the LLDA prevails over
the Local Government Code of 1991.
The said charter constitutes a special law, while the latter is a general law.
The Local Government Code of 1991, has not repealed the provisions of the charter of
the Laguna Lake Development Authority, Republic Act No. 4850, as amended.
Thus, the Authority has the exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits for the enjoyment of
fishery privileges in Laguna de Bay to the exclusion of municipalities situated therein
and the authority to exercise such powers as are by its charter vested on it.
In addition, the charter of the LLDA embodies a valid exercise of police power for the
purpose of protecting and developing the Laguna Lake region, as opposed to the Local
Government Code, which grants powers to municipalities to issue fishing permits for
revenue purposes.
Thus, it has to be concluded that the charter of the LLDA should prevail over the Local
Government Code of 1991 on matters affecting Laguna de Bay.
Laguna Lake Development Authority vs CA
Natural Resources and Environmental Laws; Statutory Construction
GR No. 120865-71; Dec. 7 1995
FACTS:
The Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) was created through Republic Act No.
4850. It was granted, inter alia, exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits for the use of all
surface water for any project or activity in or affecting the said region including navigation,
construction, and operation of fishpens, fish enclosures, fish corrals and the like.
Then came RA 7160, the Local Government Code of 1991. The municipalities in the Laguna
Lake region interpreted its provisions to mean that the newly passed law gave municipal
governments the exclusive jurisdiction to issue fishing privileges within their municipal
waters.
ISSUE:
Who should exercise jurisdiction over the Laguna Lake and its environs insofar as the
issuance of permits for fishing privileges is concerned, the LLDA or the towns and
municipalities comprising the region?
HELD:
LLDA has jurisdiction over such matters because the charter of the LLDA prevails over the
Local Government Code of 1991. The said charter constitutes a special law, while the latter is
a general law. It is basic in statutory construction that the enactment of a later legislation
which is a general law, cannot be construed to have repealed a special law. The special law is
to be taken as an exception to the general law in the absence of special circumstances
forcing a contrary conclusion.
In addition, the charter of the LLDA embodies a valid exercise of police power for the
purpose of protecting and developing the Laguna Lake region, as opposed to the Local
Government Code, which grants powers to municipalities to issue fishing permits for
revenue purposes.
Thus it has to be concluded that the charter of the LLDA should prevail over the Local
Government Code of 1991 on matters affecting Laguna de Bay.
MARIA CAROLINA P. ARAULLO et. alvsBENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III, et. Al
G.R. No. 209287
July 1, 2014
Facts:
On September 25, 2013, Sen. Jinggoy Ejercito Estrada delivered a privilege speech in the
Senate of the Philippines to reveal that some Senators, including himself, had been
allotted an additional 50 ₱Million each as "incentive" for voting in favor of the
impeachment of Chief Justice Renato C. Corona. Responding to Sen. Estrada’s revelation,
Secretary Florencio Abad of the DBM issued a publicstatement entitled Abad: Releases
to Senators Part of Spending Acceleration Program,1 explaining thatthe funds released
to the Senators had been part of the Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP),
aprogram designed by the DBM to ramp up spending to accelerate economic
expansion. The DBM soon came out to claim in its website that the DAP releases had
been sourced fromsavings generated by the Government, and from unprogrammed
funds; and that the savings had beenderived from (1) the pooling of unreleased
appropriations, and (2) the withdrawal of unobligatedallotments also for slowmoving programs and projects that had been earlier released to the agencies ofthe
National Government. Petitioners filed certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65.Issues: 1.
Whether or not the cases brought to challenge DAP’s constitutionality are mooted given
thatDAP as a program, no longer exists. 2. Whether or not the petitioners have the legal
standing to sue. 3. Whether or not Operative Fact Doctrine is applicable to the adoption
and implementation ofDAP. Rulings:1. No. The court did not agree that the termination
of the DAP as a program was a superveningevent that effectively mooted these
consolidated cases. A moot and academic case is one that ceases topresent a justiciable
controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would beof
no practical use or value. It is true that Sec. Abad manifested during the January 28,
2014 oralarguments that the DAP as a program had been meanwhile discontinued
because it had fully served itspurpose. The Solicitor General then quickly confirmed the
termination of the DAP as a program, andurged that its termination had already mooted
the challenges to the DAP’s constitutionality, viz: DAP as aprogram, no longer exists,
thereby mooting these present cases brought to challenge itsconstitutionality.
respondents could not have possibly committed the crime of theft because PLDT’s
business of providing telecommunication services and these services themselves are not
personal properties contemplated under Article 308 of the RPC. SW B–l and SW B–2 (for
violation of PD No. 401), the CA upheld paragraphs one to six of the enumeration of
items subject of the search. The CA held that the stock phrase “or similar equipment or
device” found in paragraphs one to six of the search warrants did not make it suffer
from generality since each paragraph’s enumeration of items was sufficiently qualified
by the citation of the specific objects to be seized and by its functions which are
inherently connected with the crime allegedly committed. With the denial of its motion
for reconsideration, PLDT went to this Court via this Rule 45 petition.
ISSUES:
1.Whether or not the decision from other case (Laurel) can be precedent and applied to
this case?
2. the RTC gravely abused its discretion in granting or denying the motion to quash
based on facts then existing.
RULINGS:
We partially grant the petition. Laurel and its reversal by the Court En Banc Before
proceeding with the case, a review of Laurel is in order as it involves substantially similar
facts as in the present case. a subsequent ruling from the Court that a similar set of facts
and circumstances does not constitute an offense, as alleged in the search warrant
application, may be used as a ground to quash a warrant. In both instances, the
underlying reason for quashing the search warrant is the absence of probable cause
which can only possibly exist when the combination of facts and circumstances points to
the possible commission of an offense that may be evidenced by the personal
properties sought to be seized. To the CA, the second instance mentioned justified the
quashal of the search warrants. Under Article 8 of the Civil Code, the decisions of this
Court form part of the country’s legal system. While these decisions are not laws
pursuant to the doctrine of separation of powers, they evidence the laws meaning,
breadth, and scope and, therefore, have the same binding force as the laws themselves.
Hence, the Court’s interpretation of a statute forms part of the law as of the date it was
originally passed because the Court’s construction merely establishes the
contemporaneous legislative intent that the interpreted law carries into effect. In the
field of adjudication, a case cannot yet acquire the status of a “decided” case that is
“deemed settled and closed to further argument” if the Court’s decision is still the
subject of a motion for reconsideration seasonably filed by the moving party. Under the
Rules of Court, a party is expressly allowed to file a motion for reconsideration of the
Court’s decision within 15 days from notice. Since the doctrine of stare decisis is
founded on the necessity of securing certainty and stability in law, then these attributes
will spring only once the Court’s ruling has lapsed to finality in accordance with law. In
Ting v. Velez–Ting, we Ruled that