PDS DATA HANDBOOK – 2021 EDITION
PDS 数据手册 - 2021 版
Reliability Data for Safety Equipment
安全设备可靠性数据
1
SINTEF Digita
SINTEF 数码
Maria Ottermo, Stein Hauge and Solfrid Håbrekke
玛丽亚-奥特莫、斯坦因-豪格和索尔弗里德-哈布雷克
Reliability Data for Safety Equipment
安全设备可靠性数据
PDS Data Handbook – 2021 Edition
PDS 数据手册 - 2021 版
www.www.sintef.no
2
Maria Ottermo, Stein Hauge and Solfrid Håbrekke
玛丽亚-奥特莫、斯坦因-豪格和索尔弗里德-哈布雷克
Reliability Data for Safety Equipment
安全设备可靠性数据
PDS Data Handbook – 2021 Edition
PDS 数据手册 - 2021 版
Keywords:
关键词:
Safety, Reliability Data, Safety Instrumented Systems (SIS), SIL calculations
安全、可靠性数据、安全仪表系统（SIS）
、SIL 计算
ISBN 978-82-14-06468-1
国际标准书号 978-82-14-06468-1
SINTEF Report no. 2021:00370
SINTEF 报告编号：2021:00370
printed by 07 Media AS
由 07 Media AS 印刷
Content: 115 g G-print
内容 115 克 G 版
Cover: 250 g Galerie Art Silk
封面：250 克 Galerie 艺术丝绸
3
© Copyright SINTEF 2021
©版权所有：SINTEF 2021
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SINTEF Digital
SINTEF 数字
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软件工程、安全和安保
Address:
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NO-7465 特隆赫姆
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挪威
Telephone: +47 40 00 51 00
4
电话：+47 40 00 51 00
www.sintef.no
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5
SINTEF Digital
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Report
Address:
报告
地址:
Postboks
4760
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Torgarden
Trondheim
NORWAY
Postboks
Reliability Data for Safety Equipment
报告安全设备的可靠性数据
PDS Data Handbook – 2021 Edition
4760
Torgarden
PDS 数据手册 - 2021 年版
NO-7465 挪威特隆赫姆
VERSION
Switchboard: +47 40005100
DATE
版本日期
info@sintef.no
总 机 ： +47
FINAL
2021-05-30
40005100
最终版本
2021-05-30
info@sintef.no
Enterprise /VAT No: NO 919
AUTHORS
303 808 MVA
作者
企业/增值税号：NO 919
Maria Ottermo, Stein Hauge and Solfrid Håbrekke
303 808 MVA
玛丽亚-奥特莫、斯坦因-豪格和索尔弗里德-哈布雷克
KEYWORDS:
CLIENT(S)
关键字:
客户的参考资料
Reliability data Failure
Multiclient – PDS Forum
rates Safety systems SIL
多客户 - PDS 论坛 Mathilde Cot
calculations
可靠性数据 故障率 安全
系统 SIL 计算
CLIENT’S REF.
Mathilde Cot
PROJECT NO.
NUMBER OF PAGES:
项目编号
页数
60S051
216
6
ABSTRACT
摘要
This handbook provides reliability data based on field feedback for components of safety
instrumented systems, subsea and drilling equipment, and selected non-instrumented safety critical
equipment. Considerable effort has been made to ensure that the data are credible, traceable,
documented and justified, in line with requirements in the IEC 61508 and IEC 61511 standards.
Compared to the 2013 edition of the handbook, the main changes are:
本手册提供基于现场反馈的可靠性数据，适用于安全仪表系统、海底和钻井设备以及选定的非
仪表安全关键设备的组件。为确保数据可信、可追溯、有据可查、有理有据，本手册在 IEC 61508
和 IEC 61511 标准的要求方面做了大量工作。与 2013 版手册相比，主要变化如下：
 Greatly expanded data basis, including comprehensive and more recent operational experience.
大大扩展了数据基础，包括更全面、更近期的运行经验。
 New equipment groups are added.
 增加了新的设备组。
 For several sensors and final elements, the failure rates differentiate between relevant attributes such
as dimension, measuring principle, process service, etc.
 对于一些传感器和最终元件，故障率区分了相关属性，如尺寸、测量原理、工艺服务等。
 Updated values for the common cause factor (𝛽 factor), diagnostic coverage (DC) and random
hardware fraction (RHF).
 更新了常见原因因子（¼）
、诊断覆盖率（DC）和随机硬件分数（RHF）的值。
 Improved data traceability and a more detailed assessment of data uncertainty.
提高了数据的可追溯性，并对数据的不确定性进行了更详细的评估。
In addition, failure rates, equipment boundaries, failure definitions and other relevant information have
been updated or included.
此外，还更新或纳入了故障率、设备边界、故障定义和其他相关信息。
7
PREPARED BY
编写人
Maria Ottermo, Stein Hauge and Solfrid Håbrekk
CHECKED BY
检查人
Tor Onshus
APPROVED BY
批准人
Lars Bodsberg, Project Director
项目主任 Lars Bodsberg
REPORT NO.
ISBN
CLASSIFICATION
报告编号
ISBN
分类
2021:00370
978-82-14-06468-1
Unrestricted
不受限制
CLASSIFICATION THIS PAGE
本页分类
Unrestricted
无限制
8
Table of contents
目录
PREFACE............................................................................................................................................. 10
前言
1 INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................................ 13
1 引言
1.1 Objective and Scope .................................................................................................................... 13
1.1 目标和范围
1.2 The IEC 61508 and 61511 Standards .......................................................................................... 14
1.2 IEC 61508 和 61511 标准
1.3
Data Sources .............................................................................................................................. 16
1.3
数据来源
1.4 Organisation of the Data Handbook ............................................................................................ 19
1.4 《数据手册》的组织结构
2 RELIABILITY CONCEPTS – THE PDS METHOD.................................................................30
2
可靠性概念--PDS 方法
2.1 The PDS Method ......................................................................................................................... 30
2.1
计划数据发布系统方法
2.2 Notation and Definitions ...............................................................................................................31
2.2 术语和定义
4 DATA DOSSIERS ......................................................................................................................... 33
4
数据档案
4.4 Topside Final Elements ................................................................................................................ 40
4.4
顶层最终构件
4.4.1 Topside ESV and XV ................................................................................................................ 40
9
4.4.1
顶层 ESV 和 XV
References ............................................................................................................................................ 45
参考资料
10
PREFACE
前言
SINTEF is proud to present this new 2021 edition of the PDS1 data handbook. As compared to the
2013 edition of the PDS data handbook [1], the historical data basis has been greatly expanded and
the detailing and assessment of the data have been significantly improved. The data have been
subject to extensive quality assurance, where equipment experts and operational personnel have
gone through and classified some thirty thousand maintenance notifications and work orders
manually. As to our knowledge, this represents one of the broadest and best documented data bases
for safety equipment, worldwide.
SINTEF 隆重推出新版 PDS1 数据手册（2021 年版）。与 2013 年版 PDS 数据手册[1]相
比，历史数据基础得到了极大的扩展，数据的细化和评估也得到了显著的改进。这些数据经
过了广泛的质量保证，设备专家和操作人员通过人工方式对大约三万份维护通知和工单进行
了检查和分类。据我们所知，这是全球范围内最广泛、记录最完整的安全设备数据库之一。
The work has been carried out as part of the research project “Automized process for follow-up of
safety instrumented systems” (APOS) and has been funded by SINTEF, the Research Council of
Norway, the APOS project members and the PDS forum participants. We would like to thank
everyone who has provided us with quality assured reliability data, comments, and valuable input
to this PDS data handbook.
这项工作是作为研究项目 "安全仪表系统跟踪自动化流程"（APOS）的一部分而开展的，
并得到了挪威科学与技术研究所（SINTEF）、挪威研究理事会、APOS 项目成员和 PDS 论
坛参与者的资助。我们衷心感谢为本 PDS 数据手册提供质量保证可靠性数据、意见和宝贵
建议的所有人。
11
Trondheim, May 2021
特隆赫姆，2021 年 5 月
PDS Forum Participants as per 2021
截至 2021 年的 PDS 论坛参与者
Petroleum Companies / Operators:
Engineering Companies and Consultants:
石油公司/运营商：
工程公司和顾问：
 AkerBP
 Aibel
 Altera Infrastructure
 艾贝尔
 Altera 基础设施
 Aker Solutions
 ConocoPhillips Norge
 阿克尔解决方案公司
康菲石油挪威公司
 DNV Norge
 Equinor
挪威船级社
 Gassco
 ORS Consulting
 加斯科
 ORS 咨询公司
 Lundin Energy
 Proactima
隆丁能源
 隆丁能源
 Neptune Energy
 Rosenberg WorleyParsons
海王星能源公司
 Safetec Nordic
 Norske Shell
北欧安全技术公司
挪威壳牌石油公司
 TechnipFMC
 OKEA
 Repsol Norge
 Vysus Group
雷普索尔挪威公司
Governmental Bodies (Observers):
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 Vår Energi
政府机构（观察员）
：
Control and Safety System Vendors:
 Norwegian Maritime Directorate
控制和安全系统供应商：
 挪威海事局
 ABB
 Petroleum Safety Authority Norway
 Emerson
 挪威石油安全局
艾默生
 Honeywell
霍尼韦尔
 Kongsberg Maritime
康斯伯格海事
 Optronics Technology
光电技术公司
 Origo Solutions
 Siemens Energy
西门子能
13
1
INTRODUCTION
1
引言
1.1
Objective and Scope
1.1
目标和范围
The use of realistic failure data is an essential part of any quantitative reliability analysis. It is also
one of the most challenging parts and raises several questions concerning the suitability of the data,
the assumptions underlying the data and the uncertainties related to the data.
使用真实的故障数据是任何定量可靠性分析的重要组成部分。它也是最具挑战性的部分
之一，会引发有关数据的适用性、数据的基本假设以及与数据相关的不确定性等若干问题。
This handbook provides reliability data for safety equipment, including components of safety
instrumented systems, subsea and drilling equipment and selected non-instrumented safety critical
equipment such as valves, fire-fighting equipment, fire and gas dampers, fire doors, etc. Efforts have
been made to document the presented data thoroughly, both in terms of applied data sources,
underlying assumptions, and uncertainties in terms of confidence limits.
本手册提供了安全设备的可靠性数据，包括安全仪表系统、水下和钻井设备的部件，以
及选定的非仪表安全关键设备，如阀门、消防设备、防火阀和燃气阀、防火门等。我们已努
力详尽记录所提供的数据，包括应用数据来源、基本假设和置信区间的不确定性。
Compared to the 2013 version, the main changes and improvements are:
与 2013 版相比，主要变化和改进有
 Greatly expanded data basis, including comprehensive and more recent operational experience.
极大地扩展了数据基础，包括更全面、更近期的运行经验。
 New equipment groups have been added, and more detailed failure rates, differentiating on
attributes such as dimension, measuring principle, medium, etc., are given for selected sensors
and final elements.
增加了新的设备组，并针对选定的传感器和最终元件，根据尺寸、测量原理、介质等属
性提供了更详细的故障率。
14
 Updated common cause factors (β values) based on an extensive field study of some 12.000
maintenance notifications, as described in [3].
更新了常见原因系数（β 值）
，该系数基于对约 12000 份维护通知的广泛实地研究，详
见文献 [3]。
 Updated values for diagnostic coverage (DC) and random hardware fraction (RHF) based on
operational experience, vendor certificates and discussions with equipment experts.
根据运行经验、供应商证明以及与设备专家的讨论，更新了诊断覆盖率 (DC) 和随机硬
件分数 (RHF) 值
 Improved data traceability and a more detailed assessment of failure rate uncertainty.
改进了数据的可追溯性，并对故障率的不确定性进行了更详细的评估。
In addition, failure rates, equipment boundaries including a definition of dangerous (or safety critical)
failure, and other relevant information and parameters have been reviewed and updated for all
components.
此外，还对所有组件的故障率、设备界限（包括危险（或安全关键）故障的定义）以及
其他相关信息和参数进行了审查和更新。
This data handbook may also be used in conjunction with the PDS method handbook [2]2, which
describes a practical approach for calculating the reliability of safety systems.
本数据手册也可与 PDS 方法手册 2]2 一起使用，后者介绍了计算安全系统可靠性的实
用方法。
1.2
The IEC 61508 and 61511 Standards
1.2
IEC 61508 和 61511 标准
The IEC 61508 and IEC 61511 standards, [4] and [5], present requirements to SIS for all relevant
lifecycle phases, and have become leading standards for SIS specification, design, implementation,
and operation. IEC 61508 is a generic standard common to several industries, whereas IEC 61511
has been developed especially for the process industry. The Norwegian Oil and Gas Association
15
(NOROG) has also developed a guideline to support the use of IEC 61508 / 61511 in the Norwegian
Petroleum Industry [6].
IEC 61508 和 IEC 61511 标准[4]和[5]提出了 SIS 在所有相关生命周期阶段的要求，并
已成为 SIS 规范、设计、实施和运行的主要标准。IEC 61508 是一个通用标准，适用于多个
行业，而 IEC 61511 则是专门为流程工业制定的。挪威石油天然气协会（NOROG）也制定
了一份指南，以支持在挪威石油工业中使用 IEC 61508 / 61511 [6]。
A fundamental concept in both IEC 61508 and IEC 61511 is the notion of risk reduction; the higher
the risk reduction is required, the higher the SIL. It is therefore important to apply realistic failure
data in the design calculations, since too optimistic failure rates may suggest a higher risk reduction
than what is obtainable in operation. In other words, the predicted risk reduction, calculated for a
safety function in the design phase, should to the degree possible reflect the actual risk reduction
that is experienced in the operational phase, see also [6].
IEC 61508 和 IEC 61511 的一个基本概念是降低风险；要求降低的风险越高，SIL 就越
高。因此，在设计计算中采用现实的故障数据非常重要，因为过于乐观的故障率可能会导致
风险降低程度高于运行中的实际情况。换句话说，在设计阶段为安全功能计算的预测风险降
低率应尽可能反映运行阶段的实际风险降低率，另见 [6]。
This is also emphasized in the second edition of IEC 61511-1 (sub clause 11.9.3) [4] which states
that the applied reliability data shall be credible, traceable, documented and justified and shall be
based on field feedback from similar devices used in a similar operating environment. It is therefore
recommended [6] to use data based on actual historic field experience when performing reliability
calculations.
IEC 61511-1 第二版（11.9.3 子条款）[4] 也强调了这一点，规定应用的可靠性数据应
可信、可追溯、有记录和有理 由，并应基于在类似运行环境中使用的类似设备的现场反
馈。因此，建议 [6] 在进行可靠性计算时使用基于实际历史现场经验的数据。
The reliability data in this PDS handbook represent collected experience from operation of safety
equipment, mainly in the Norwegian oil and gas industry. As such, the PDS data and associated
16
method are in line with the main principles advocated in the IEC standards, and the data presented
in this handbook are on a format suitable for performing reliability calculations in line with the
IEC standards.
本 PDS 手册中的可靠性数据是主要在挪威石油和天然气行业安全设备运行中收集的
经验。因此，PDS 数据和相关方法符合 IEC 标准所倡导的主要原则，本手册中提供的数
据格式适合于按照 IEC 标准进行可靠性计算。
1.3
Data Sources
1.3
数据来源
The most important data source for this handbook is extensive operational experience gathered from
Norwegian offshore (and some onshore) oil and gas facilities during the last 10–15 years. Data from
54 different facilities and seven different operators, are represented. In fact, the total accumulated
experience sums up to more than 3 billion operational hours for topside equipment and more than
750 million operational hours for subsea and well completion equipment. Note that these data have
been subject to extensive quality assurance through the fact that equipment experts and operational
personnel have gone through and classified thousands of maintenance notifications and work orders
manually. As to our knowledge, this represents one of the broadest and best documented data bases
for safety equipment, worldwide.
本手册最重要的数据来源是过去 10-15 年间从挪威近海（及部分陆上）石油和天然气设
施收集到的大量运营经验。这些数据来自 54 个不同的设施和 7 个不同的运营商。事实上，
上部设备的累计总运行时间超过 30 亿小时，海底和完井设备的总运行时间超过 7.5 亿小
时。需要注意的是，这些数据都经过了广泛的质量保证，设备专家和操作人员对数千份维护
通知和工单进行了人工审核和分类。据我们所知，这是全球范围内最广泛、记录最完整的安
全设备数据库之一。
Other data sources applied include: OREDA reliability data handbooks, subsea BOP data from
Exprosoft, RNNP, manufacturer data and certificates, in addition to various data studies and expert
judgements. Each of the data sources applied in this handbook are briefly discussed in Table 1.1.
17
应用的其他数据来源包括 OREDA 可靠性数据手册、Exprosoft 提供的海底 BOP 数据、
RNNP、制造商数据和证书，以及各种数据研究和专家判断。表 1.1 简要介绍了本手册中使
用的每种数据源。
Table 1.1: Discussion of applied data sources
表 1.1： 应用数据源讨论
18
19
1.4
Organisation of the Data Handbook
1.4 《数据手册》的组织结构
In chapter 2, important reliability concepts are discussed and defined. Failure classification for
safety equipment is presented together with the main reliability performance measures used in the
IEC standards and in PDS.
第 2 章讨论并定义了重要的可靠性概念。介绍了安全设备的故障分类以及 IEC 标准和
PDS 中使用的主要可靠性能衡量标准。
The reliability data are summarised in chapter 3. A split has been made between topside equipment,
subsea and downhole well completion equipment, and drilling equipment. Chapter 3 also includes
main considerations and assumptions behind the given parameter values.
第 3 章对可靠性数据进行了总结。可靠性数据分为上部设备、水下和井下完井设备以及
钻井设备。第 3 章还包括给定参数值背后的主要考虑因素和假设。
In chapter 4 all the detailed data dossiers with data sources and failure rate assessments are presented,
including an explanation of the various data dossier fields.
第 4 章介绍了所有详细的数据档案、数据来源和故障率评估，包括对各种数据档案字段
的解释。
Finally, a list of references, i.e., reports, standards, guidelines, and other relevant data sources and
documents, is included.
最后，还包括一份参考文献清单，即报告、标准、指南及其他相关数据来源和文件。
1.5
List of abbreviations
1.5
缩写表
General terms
通用条款
CCF - Common cause failure
CCF - 常见故障
CSU - Critical safety unavailability
20
CSU - 关键安全故障
D - Dangerous
D - 危险
DC - Diagnostic coverage
DC - 诊断范围
DD - Dangerous detected
DD - 检测到危险
DU - Dangerous undetected
DU - 未检测到的危险
ESD - Emergency shutdown
ESD - 紧急停机
FMECA - Failure modes, effects, and criticality analysis
FMECA - 故障模式、影响和临界分析
FMEDA - Failure modes, effects, and diagnostic analysis
FMEDA - 故障模式、影响和诊断分析
F&G - Fire and gas
F&G - 火与气体
FTA - Fault tree analysis
FTA - 故障树分析
HC - Hydrocarbon
HC - 碳氢化合物
HMI - Human machine interface
HMI - 人机界面
IEC - International electro-technical commission
IEC - 国际电工委员会 IR - Infrared
21
ISO - International organization for standardization
ISO - 国际标准化组织
mA - Milliampere
mA - 毫安
MoC - Management of change
MoC - 变更管理
MooN - 𝑀-out-of-𝑁
MooN - 𝑀-out-𝑁
MTTF - Mean time to failure
MTTF - 平均故障时间
MTTR - Mean time to restoration
MTTR - 平均恢复时间
MUX - Multiplex
MUX - 多路复用
NA - Not applicable
NA - 不适用
NDE - Normally de-energised
NDE - 正常断电
NE - Normally energised
NE--正常通电
NOG/NOROG - Norwegian oil and gas association
NOG/NOROG--挪威石油天然气协会
OREDA - Offshore reliability data
OREDA - 近海可靠性数据
PA - Public address
22
PA - 公共广播
PDS - Norwegian acronym for “reliability of computer-based safety systems”
PDS - 挪威语 "计算机安全系统可靠性 "的缩写
PFD - Probability of failure on demand
PFD - 按要求发生故障的概率
PFH - Probability of failure per hour (or average frequency of failure per hour)
PFH - 每小时故障概率（或每小时平均故障频率）
PSD - Process shutdown
PSD - 过程停机
PST - Partial stroke test
PST - 部分冲程测试
PTC - Proof test coverage
PTC - 证明测试范围
RBD - Reliability block diagram
RBD - 可靠性框图
RH - Random hardware
RH - 随机硬件
RHF - Random hardware fraction
RHF - 随机硬件分数
RNNP - Project on risk level in the Norwegian petroleum production
RNNP - 挪威石油生产风险水平项目
S - Safe
S - 安全
SFF - Safe failure fraction
SFF - 安全故障率
23
SIF - Safety instrumented function
SIF - 安全仪表功能
SIL - Safety integrity level
SIL - 安全完整性等级
SIS - Safety instrumented system
SIS - 安全仪表系统
SOLAS - Safety of life at sea
SOLAS - 海上人命安全
TIF - Test independent failure
TIF - 独立测试故障
UV - Ultraviolet
UV - 紫外线
Technical (equipment related) terms
技术（设备相关）术语
AI - Analogue input
AI - 模拟输入
AMV - Annulus master valve
AMV - 环形主阀
ASV - Annulus safety valve
ASV - 环形安全阀
BPCS - Basic process control system
BPCS - 基本过程控制系统
BOP - Blowout preventer
BOP - 防喷器
CAP - Critical action panel
24
CAP - 关键行动面板
CCR - Central control room
CCR - 中央控制室
CIESDV - Chemical injection emergency shutdown valve
CIESDV - 化学物质注入紧急关闭阀
CIV - Chemical injection valve
CIV - 化学品注入阀
CLU - Control logic unit
CLU - 控制逻辑单元
CPU - Central processing unit
CPU - 中央处理器
DCP - Driller's control panel
DCP - 钻井控制面板
DHSV - Downhole safety valve
DHSV - 井下安全阀
DO - Digital output
DO - 数字输出
ESV - Emergency shutdown valve
ESV - 紧急关闭阀
FOV - Fast opening valve
FOV - 快速开启阀
GLESDV - Gas lift emergency shutdown valve
GLESDV - 气举紧急关闭阀
GLV - Gas lift valve
GLV - 气举阀
25
HART - Highway addressable remote transducer (protocol)
HART - 高速公路可寻址远程传感器（协议）
HASCV - Hydraulically actuated safety check valve
HASCV - 液压驱动安全单向阀
HIPPS - High integrity pressure protection system
HIPPS - 高完整性压力保护系统
HXT - Horizontal X-mas tree
HXT - 水平 X-Mas 树
LMRP - Lower marine riser package
LMRP - 下部海洋立管组件
MCS - Master control station
MCS - 主控站
MIV - Methanol injection valve
MIV - 甲醇注入阀
PLC - Programmable logic controller
PLC - 可编程逻辑控制器
PMV - Production master valve
PMV - 生产主阀
PPS - Pressure protection system
PPS - 压力保护系统
PSS - Programmable safety system
PSS - 可编程安全系统
PSV - Pressure relief valve
PSV - 泄压阀
PWV - Production wing valve
26
PWV - 生产翼阀
QSV - Quick closing shut-off valve
QSV - 快速关闭截止阀
SAS - Safety and automation system
SAS - 安全和自动化系统
SCM - Subsea control module
SCM - 水下控制模块
SEM - Subsea electronic module
SEM - 水下电子模块
SPM - Side-pocket mandrel
SPM - 侧袋心轴
SSIV - Subsea isolation valve
SSIV - 水下隔离阀
TCP - Tool pusher’s control panel
TCP - 工具推动器控制面板
TRCIV - Tubing retrievable chemical injection valve
TRCIV - 管道可回收化学品注入阀
TRSCSSV - Tubing retrievable surface-controlled subsurface valve
TRSCSSV - 管道可回收表面控制水下阀
TRSCASSV - Tubing retrievable surface-controlled annulus subsurface valve (also abbr. ASV)
TRSCASSV - 管道可回收表面控制环形次表面阀（也称 ASV）
UPS - Uninterruptable power supply
UPS - 不间断电源
WRCIV - Wire retrievable chemical injection valve
WRCIV - 导线可回收化学注入阀
27
WRSCSSV - Wireline retrievable surface-controlled subsurface valve
WRSCSSV - 导线可回收表面控制地下阀
XT - X-mas tree
XT - X-圣诞树
XOV - Crossover valve
XOV - 交叉阀
XV - Production shutdown valve
XV - 生产关闭阀
Failure mode abbreviations
故障模式缩写
AIR - Abnormal instrument reading
AIR - 仪表读数异常
BRD – Breakdown
BRD - 故障
DOP - Delayed operation
DOP - 运行延迟
ELP - External leakage process medium
ELP - 外部泄漏工艺介质
ELU - External leakage utility medium
ELU - 外部泄漏实用介质
ERO - Erratic output
ERO - 输出异常
FTC - Fail to close on demand
FTC - 无法按要求关闭
FTF - Fail to function on demand
28
FTF - 无法按要求运行
FTO - Fail to open on demand
FTO - 无法按要求打开
FTR - Fail to regulate
FTR - 无法调节
FTS - Fail to start on demand
FTS - 无法按需启动
HIO - High output
HIO - 高输出
INL - Internal leakage utility medium
INL - 介质内部泄漏
LAP - Leakage across packer
LAP - 跨封隔器泄漏
LCP - Leakage in closed position
LCP - 关闭位置泄漏
LOO - Low output
LOO - 低输出
NONC - Non-critical
NONC - 非关键
NOO - No output
NOO - 无输出
PLU - Plugged/choked
PLU - 堵塞/窒息
PRD - Premature disconnect
PRD - 过早断开
29
SPO - Spurious operation
SPO - 误动作
STP - Fail to stop on demand
STP - 未按要求停止
UST - Spurious stop (unexpected stop)
UST - 误停机（意外停机）
30
2
RELIABILITY CONCEPTS – THE PDS METHOD
2
可靠性概念--PDS 方法
The PDS method has been developed to enable safety and reliability engineers to perform reliability
calculations in various phases of a project. This chapter presents some main characteristics of the PDS
method, the failure classification scheme, and reliability performance measures. Please note that the
objective is not to give a full and detailed presentation of the method, but to introduce the model
taxonomy and some basic ideas. For a more comprehensive description of the PDS method and the
detailed formulas, see the PDS method handbook, [2].
开发 PDS 方法的目的是使安全和可靠性工程师能够在项目的各个阶段进行可靠性计算。
本章介绍了 PDS 方法的一些主要特点、失效分类方案和可靠性性能指标。请注意，本章的目
的不是全面详细地介绍该方法，而是介绍模型分类法和一些基本思想。有关 PDS 方法的更全
面描述和详细公式，请参阅 PDS 方法手册 [2]。
2.1
The PDS Method
2.1
计划数据发布系统方法
For estimating SIS reliability, different calculation approaches can be applied, including analytical
formulas, Boolean approaches like reliability block diagrams (RBD) and fault tree analysis (FTA),
Markov modelling and Petri Nets (see IEC 61508-6, Annex B). The IEC standards do not mandate
one specific approach or a set of formulas but leave it to the user to choose the most appropriate
approach for quantifying the reliability of a given system or function.
在估算 SIS 可靠性时，可采用不同的计算方法，包括分析公式、布尔方法（如可靠性框图
(RBD) 和故障树分析 (FTA)）
、马尔可夫模型和 Petri 网（见 IEC 61508-6，附件 B）
。IEC 标
准并不强制规定一种特定的方法或一套公式，而是让用户选择最合适的方法来量化特定系统
或功能的可靠性。
The PDS method includes a set of analytical formulas and concepts to quantify loss of safety [2], and
together with the PDS data, it offers an effective and practical approach towards implementing the
quantitative aspects of the IEC standards. In the following sections some main characteristics of the
31
PDS method are briefly introduced, including important notation and classification schemes.
PDS 方法包括一套量化安全损失的分析公式和概念[2]，它与 PDS 数据一起，为实施 IEC
标准的量化方面提供了一种有效而实用的方法。下文将简要介绍 PDS 方法的一些主要特点，
包括重要的符号和分类方案。
2.2
Notation and Definitions
2.2 术语和定义
Table 2.1 presents some main parameters and performance measures used in the PDS method and in
this data handbook.
表 2.1 列出了 PDS 方法和本数据手册中使用的一些主要参数和性能指标。
Table 2.1 Performance measures and reliability parameters
表 2.1 性能指标和可靠性参数
32
Apart from the following five example pages in Chapter 4 Data
Dossier, the remaining part of the handbook is not included in this
free copy.
除第 4 章 "数据档案 "中的以下 5 个示例页外，手册的其余部分
未包含在本免费版本中
33
4
DATA DOSSIERS
4
数据档案
This chapter presents the detailed data dossiers for the various safety related components. The
dossiers are input to the tables in chapter 3 that summarise the PDS data.
本章介绍了各种安全相关组件的详细数据档案。第 3 章中的表格汇总了 PDS 数据，
这些档案资料就是这些表格的输入内容。
The data provide SINTEF's best estimates of equipment failure rates based on the data sources
discussed in section 1.3 and specified in the data dossiers. Also, uncertainty estimates (confidence
intervals) have been provided whenever feasible. An explanation of the content of each data dossier
field is given in section 4.1. Sections 4.2–4.4 contain data dossiers for topside input devices, logic,
and final elements, respectively. Data dossiers for subsea and downhole well completion equipment
are included in section 4.5 and 4.6 respectively, whereas section 4.7 includes data dossiers for subsea
drilling BOPs.
这些数据提供了 SINTEF 根据第 1.3 节中讨论的数据来源和数据档案中规定的数据
对设备故障率的最佳估计。此外，在可行的情况下，还提供了不确定性估计值（置信区
间）
。第 4.1 节解释了每个数据卷宗字段的内容。第 4.2-4.4 节分别包含上部输入设备、
逻辑和最终元件的数据档案。第 4.5 节和第 4.6 节分别包含水下和井下完井设备的数据档
案，第 4.7 节包含水下钻井 BOP 的数据档案。
4.1 Explanation of data dossier fields
4.1 数据档案字段说明
The main fields of the data dossiers are described in the following.
数据档案的主要内容如下。
Module
模块
The module indicates whether the device is (cf. IEC 61508/IEC 61511, [4] and [5]):
34
模块指示设备是否（参见 IEC 61508/IEC 61511，[4] 和 [5]）
：
 an input element (e.g., a sensor that monitors a process parameter or a push button).
输入元件（例如，监测过程参数的传感器或按钮）
。
 a control logic unit (logic solver that decides it if is necessary to act upon monitored
signal).
一个控制逻辑单元（逻辑解算器，用于决定是否需要对监控信号采取行动）
。
 a final element (actuating element).
最终元件（执行元件）
。
Equipment group and component
设备组和组件
In the report “Standardised failure reporting and classification of SIS failures in the petroleum
industry" [11], a three-level hierarchy of equipment has been suggested:
在 "石油工业 SIS 故障的标准化故障报告和分类 "报告[11]中，提出了设备的三级层次
结构：
 The main level, L1 (main equipment groups), includes equipment that shares a common
main functionality. Examples of such functionality are e.g., to detect a process upset, to detect
hydrocarbons or a fire, to stop the process flow or to facilitate evacuation.
主设备层 L1（主设备组）包括具有共同主要功能的设备。此类功能的例子包括检测
工艺中断、检测碳氢化合物或火灾、停止工艺流程或促进疏散。
 The second level, L2 (safety critical elements), represents the most important characteristics
of the L1 equipment groups. As compared to the L1 group, these elements will often have a
further specified (sub)functionality, e.g., to detect H2S gas, to detect smoke or to shut in and
isolate the riser, and some additional design characteristics, e.g., a diesel engine or an electric
engine.
35
第二级 L2（安全关键要素）代表了 L1 设备组最重要的特征。与 L1 设备组相比，
这些设备通常具有更多的特定（子）功能，如检测 H2S 气体、检测烟雾或关闭和隔
离立管，以及一些额外的设计特性，如柴油发动机或电动发动机。
 The third level, L3 (equipment attributes), is represented by a common set of attributes with
a foreseen potential to impact the performance and reliability of the equipment within an L2
group. For example, among topside ESV/XVs, there can be ball valves, globe valves, and
gate valves handling fluids of different types, and there are gas detectors located in air intakes
versus gas detectors located in open process areas.
第三级 L3（设备属性）由一组共同属性组成，这些属性可能会影响 L2 组内设备的
性能和可靠性。例如，在上部 ESV/XV 中，可能有球阀、截止阀和闸阀处理不同类型
的流体，也可能有位于进气口的气体探测器和位于开放工艺区的气体探测器。
Each equipment group in the second row of the data dossier corresponds to a L1 equipment group
while component corresponds to a safety critical element on the L2 level described above, e.g., a
line HC gas detector or a PSD valve. In addition, the component, may in some cases be further
detailed in terms of relevant L3 attributes.
数据档案第二行中的每个设备组都对应一个 L1 设备组，而组件则对应上述 L2 级别的
安全关键元件，如管线 HC 气体探测器或 PSD 阀门。此外，在某些情况下，组件还可以进
一步详细说明相关的 L3 属性。
Component boundaries / Failure definition
组件边界/故障定义
This field provides additional information about the boundaries of the specified component, e.g.,
whether the actuator of the main valve is included or if local electronics and process connections
are part of a transmitter. A reference to the comparable equipment class in ISO 14224 [12] is also
given.
36
该字段可提供有关指定组件边界的附加信息，例如是否包括主阀的执行机构，或者本地
电子设备和过程连接是否是变送器的一部分。此外，还提供了 ISO 14224 [12] 中可比设备
类别的参考信息。
When relevant, additional assumptions concerning safe state, fail safe design, self-test ability, loop
monitoring, NE/NDE design, etc. are also given. Hence, when using the data for reliability
calculations, it is important to consider the relevance of these assumptions for each specific
application.
在相关情况下，还给出了有关安全状态、故障安全设计、自检能力、环路监控、NE/NDE
设计等方面的附加假设。因此，在使用数据进行可靠性计算时，必须考虑这些假设与每个具
体应用的相关性。
Also (except for drilling equipment), a definition of dangerous (or safety critical) failure for the
component under consideration is given. This definition will in some cases depend on the specific
application and must therefore be considered as typical rather than unique.
此外（钻井设备除外）
，还给出了所考虑部件的危险（或安全关键）故障定义。该定义在
某些情况下取决于具体应用，因此必须被视为典型而非唯一的定义。
SINTEF's Best Estimates – Failure rates (per 106 hours)
SINTEF 最佳估计 - 故障率（每 106 小时）
Provides SINTEF's best estimates for 𝜆𝐷𝑢 , 𝜆𝐷 , 𝜆𝑠 and 𝜆𝐶𝛾𝑖𝑡 (see section 2.2) for the specified
component under consideration.
提供 SINTEF 对所考虑的特定成分的 𝜆𝐷𝑢 , 𝜆𝐷 , 𝜆𝑠 和𝜆𝐶𝛾𝑖𝑡 （见第 2.2 节）的最佳估计
值。
SINTEF's Best Estimates – Coverage/Others
SINTEF 的最佳估计 - 保险/其他
37
Provides SINTEF's best estimates for the diagnostic coverage DC for dangerous failures, as well as
suggested 𝛽 factor for the specified component under consideration. For a further discussion 𝛽 and
DC values, reference is made to section 3.4 and 3.5, respectively.
提供 SINTEF 对危险故障诊断范围 DC 的最佳估计，以及对所考虑的特定组件的建议
⻆系数。如需进一步讨论 𝛽 和 DC 值，请分别参见第 3.4 和 3.5 节。
SINTEF's Best Estimates – Failure mode distribution
SINTEF 最佳估计 - 故障模式分布
Provides SINTEF's best estimate for the failure mode distribution wherever this has been available
for the specified component.
提供 SINTEF 对指定部件故障模式分布的最佳估计。
𝝀𝑫𝒖 (Per 10⁶ h) Uncertainty and Population Details
𝝀𝑫𝒖 (Per 10⁶ h) 不确定性和人口详情
Provides further details for the specified part of the component population (e.g., all IR gas detectors
from operational reviews, or a further extract of the population such as "all valve sizes > 3""). The
details include:
提供组件群指定部分的更多详细信息（例如，运行审查中的所有红外气体探测器，或组
件群的进一步提取，如 "所有阀门尺寸 > 3"）。详情包括
𝜆𝐷𝑢 The average rate of dangerous undetected failures for the specified population
𝜆𝐷𝑢 指定人群中未检测到的危险故障的平均比率
𝜆𝐷𝑢 70% The upper 70% confidence limit of the dangerous undetected failure rate
𝜆𝐷𝑢 70% 未检测到的危险故障率的 70% 置信上限
𝜆𝐷𝑢 5-95% The 90% confidence interval for the dangerous undetected failure rate
𝜆𝐷𝑢 5-95% 未检测到的危险故障率的 90% 置信区间
𝐷𝑢0 𝑏𝑠 The observed number of dangerous undetected failures for the specified component
population.
𝐷𝑢0 𝑏𝑠 指定组件群的未检测到的危险故障观测次数。
38
𝐷𝑢𝐶𝑎𝑙𝐶 The number of DU failures used in the estimation of the average 𝜆𝐷𝑢 failure rate (when
lower than 𝐷𝑢0 𝑏𝑠 T this is typically due to some facilities being given a reduced weight due to
uncertainties related to number of actual DU failures). The reasoning will normally be further
explained in the failure rate assessment and/or the failure rate references fields
𝐷𝑢𝐶𝑎𝑙𝐶 用于估算平均 𝜆𝐷𝑢 故障率的 DU 故障数量（当低于 𝐷𝑢0 𝑏𝑠 T 时，通常是由于与实际
DU 故障数量相关的不确定性而降低了某些设施的权重）
。通常会在故障率评估和/或故障率
参考字段中进一步说明理由
T The accumulated observation period (operational time) for the specified component population,
i.e., the operating time multiplied with the number of components in the population.
T 指定组件群的累计观察期（运行时间）
，即运行时间乘以组件群中组件的数量。
Observation period
The period (years) during which the failure history for the specified
population has been registered.
观察期 指登记指定群体故障历史记录的时间（年）
。
Population size
The number of components (tags / functional locations) in the specified
population.
群体规模 指定群体中组件（标签/功能位置）的数量。
Number of facilities
The number of facilities (and number of operators) represented in the
specified population.
设施数量 指定群体中的设施数量（和操作员数量）
。
Failure rate assessment
故障率评估
Provides a discussion and elaboration of the suggested failure rates, such as comparison with
previous editions of the handbook, weight of different data sources, whether the equipment is new
to this edition of the handbook, basis for data differentiation, explanation of equipment details, as
well as other relevant assumptions underlying the failure rates.
39
对建议的故障率进行讨论和阐述，例如与以前版本手册的比较、不同数据来源的权重、
设备是否是本版手册的新内容、数据区分的依据、设备细节的解释以及故障率所依据的其他
相关假设。
Failure rate references
故障率参考
Provides a more detailed specification of the different data sources. For each source this includes
the (dangerous undetected) failure rate, the associated source or facility (anonymized), the number
of DU failures from that source (𝐷𝑢0 𝑏𝑠 ), as well as T, the observation period, and the population
size (see above) for that specific source/facility.
提供了不同数据源的更详细说明。对于每个数据源，其中包括（未检测到的危险）故障
率、相关数据源或设施（匿名）
、该数据源的 DU 故障数(𝐷𝑢0 𝑏𝑠 ），以及特定数据源/设施的
T、观察期和人口数量（见上文）
。
40
4.4
Topside Final Elements
4.4
顶层最终构件
4.4.1
Topside ESV and XV
4.4.1
顶层 ESV 和 XV
41
Failure Rate Assessment
故障率评估
Data given for ESD and PSD valves (i.e., ESVs and XVs respectively). The population size and the
number of observed DU failures have increased significantly as compared to the 2013 edition of the
data handbook [1]. As a result, the overall suggested 𝜆𝐷𝑢 has also slightly increased (i.e., from 1.9
to 2.4 per 106 hours). Note that in the previous edition of the handbook, the dangerous failure rate
was based on operational review data from two facilities in addition to OREDA [19], whereas in
this edition, operational review data from several additional facilities are included. This being the
direct explanation for the increased failure rate.
给出了 ESD 和 PSD 阀门（即分别为 ESV 和 XV）的数据。与 2013 年版数据手册[1]相
比，观察到的 DU 故障的群体规模和数量显著增加。因此，建议的总体𝜆𝐷𝑢 也略有增加（即
从每 106 小时 1.9 增加到 2.4）
。请注意，在上一版手册中，危险故障率是基于 OREDA [19]
42
以外的两个设施的运行审查数据，而在这一版手册中，则包含了另外几个设施的运行审查数
据。这就是故障率增加的直接原因。
𝐷𝑢0 𝑏𝑠 specifies the number of observed DU failures. Some facilities (one onshore plant and
one floating installation) have a disproportional number of observed DU failures (and these facilities
are identified as "outliers"), typically due to a specific repeating systematic cause and / or other
uncertainties related to the failure classification (i.e., generally less confidence in the data). These
facilities (and associated DU failures) have therefore been weighted down (here to 25%) in order to
reduce their contribution to the suggested𝜆𝐷𝑢 (number of DU failures resulting from the weighting
denoted as 𝐷𝑢𝐶𝑎𝑙𝐶 .
𝐷𝑢0 𝑏𝑠 表示观测到的 DU 故障次数。有些设施（一个陆上工厂和一个浮动装置）观测到
的 DU 故障数量不成比例（这些设施被确定为 "异常值"），通常是由于特定的重复系统原
因和/或与故障分类有关的其他不确定性（即对数据的置信度普遍较低）。因此，这些设施（以
及相关的贫铀故障）已被降低权重（此处为 25%），以减少其对建议的𝜆𝐷𝑢 （加权后的贫铀
故障数，用 𝐷𝑢𝐶𝑎𝑙𝐶 表示）的贡献。
43
44
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References
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