Sommario
PART 2 .................................................................................................................................................. 3
UNCERTAINTY: ................................................................................................................................. 3
Polarity ............................................................................................................................................. 6
Culture ............................................................................................................................................. 7
Cap XII: War ..................................................................................................................................... 8
Chapter XIII: Coercion ..................................................................................................................... 9
Chapter XIV: Peace and Violence .................................................................................................. 10
Chapter XV: Human Security ......................................................................................................... 11
Chapter 16, The Responsibility To Protect ................................................................................... 12
Chapter 17, Development ............................................................................................................. 13
Part 3: Institutions ............................................................................................................................. 14
Chapter XVIII: Alliances ................................................................................................................. 14
Chapter XIX: Regional Organizations ............................................................................................ 15
Chapter XX: The United Nations ................................................................................................... 16
Chapter 21: Peace Operations ...................................................................................................... 17
Chapter 22, The Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Regime ...................................... 18
Chapter 23 Private security companies ........................................................................................ 19
PART 4 ................................................................................................................................................ 20
GENOCIDE AND CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY ............................................................................ 20
ETHNIC CONFLICT .......................................................................................................................... 21
TERRORISM .................................................................................................................................... 25
COUNTERTERRORISM.................................................................................................................... 27
COUNTERINSURGENCY: ................................................................................................................ 28
INTELLIGENCE: ............................................................................................................................... 30
TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME (TOCs) .............................................................................. 31
INTERNATIONAL ARMS TRADE ..................................................................................................... 34
MIGRATION AND REFUGEEES: ...................................................................................................... 36
ENERGY SECURITY ......................................................................................................................... 39
WOMEN, PEACE AND SECURITY ................................................................................................... 41
ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE: .......................................................................................................... 43
Ch. 38: Outer space ....................................................................................................................... 44
Chapter 36 , Health........................................................................................................................ 45
Chapter XXXVII: Cybersecurity ...................................................................................................... 46
THEORETICAL APPROACHES .............................................................................................................. 47
Realism ........................................................................................................................................... 48
Liberalism ....................................................................................................................................... 50
Constructivism ............................................................................................................................... 52
Critical Theory ................................................................................................................................ 53
Feminism ........................................................................................................................................ 54
Women gender and security.......................................................................................................... 55
Post structuralism .......................................................................................................................... 55
Securitization ................................................................................................................................. 56
Post-colonialism ............................................................................................................................. 59
SECURITY STUDIES: AN INTRODUCTION
PART 2
UNCERTAINTY:
The security dilemma is a foundational concept since it engages with all existential condition of
uncertainty, that is explicit or immanent in all human relations. Hence, uncertainty is not an
occasional and passing phenomenon but rather it is an inherent and inescapable reality in the lives
of individuals and groups. It can be uneven in how it is perceived, understood and manifested in
practice. In fact, when states practice cooperation or security communities are created, some
degree of security is achieved even in the house of constant uncertainty. However, state decision
makers can never be certain about the current and future intentions of those with the capability of
harming them militarily and so unresolvable uncertainty occurs. Unresolvable uncertainty can be
caused by first and foremost the ambiguous symbolism of weapons and their development. The
ambiguous symbolism of weapons refers to the difficulty of safely distinguishing between
“offensive” and “defensive” weapons. If it is easy to distinguish offensive and defensive weapons
alone, the combination of the two might be more ambiguous. At the base of the ambiguous
symbolism there is the other minds problems, according to which there is only limited understanding
of the intentions and motives, hopes and fears and emotions and feelings on the part of the decision
makers of one state about their counterparts elsewhere. Intentions are therefore susceptible to
interpretation. The interaction of the ambiguous symbolism or weaponry and the other minds
problem helps to ensure that politics among states takes place under the shadow of unresolvable
uncertainty. Therefore, the security dilemma theorized by Herz is considered fundamental in
security studies.
Leaders must face both the dilemma of interpretation and the dilemma of response. In the
former case, leaders must decide whether military developments on the part of others are for
defensive purposes only or whatever they are for offensive purposes. Conversely, the dilemma of
response offers decision makers two broad approaches to what they perceive to be happening: act
or wait. If a dilemma is settled in favor of the view that another state is a definite threat to one’s
own national security, there is no longer a security dilemma: the dilemma has been resolved, maybe
mistakenly, and the relationship is best understood at that point as a strategic challenge. Thinking
that moving from a dilemma to a challenge would leave uncertainties behind is incorrect: while
removing certain uncertainties, it only opens another set, namely the risks that accompany arms
races and actual conflicts. The result is a spiral of security competition that makes everybody more
insecure: the so-called security paradox. According to Booth and Wheeler, a security paradox is a
situation in which two or more actors, seeking only to improve their own security, provoke through
their words or actions an increase in mutual tension, resulting in less security all round. Therefore,
we can conceive the anarchical system of international relations as a system driven by fear. On the
one hand, according to Herz, fear created a powerful structure of mistrust and conflict between
groups. Butterfield on the other hand, believed that fear derived from the general inability of
individual decision makers to understand how their own peaceful motives and defensive\reactive
intentional could be interpreted as threatening by others. The problem of mistrust is clearly
maximized when present uncertainties are set against a historical record of a conflictual relationship
between the states and nations concerned or future expectations of unpredictability. Therefore, the
idea of future uncertainty appears to construct international politics as an inescapable insecurity
trap. Those entitled to state security must never rely on best-case forecasting when assessing
potential threats to their well-being. Instead the guiding principle about future uncertainty in a selfhelp system must be mistrust.
There are three a priori logics that have framed the ways theorists have understood the security
dilemma:
-
The fatalistic logic is a set of assumptions proposing that security competition can never be
escaped in int. politics. They argue that the search for security is primordial. States cannot
trust each other in the anarchical condition of int. politics, relations between them are
essentially competitive, sometimes violent and always characterized by a degree of
insecurity.
- The mitigator logic is a set of assumptions proposing that security competition can be
ameliorated or dampened down for a time, but not finally eliminated. They accept that the
int. system is technically anarchic, but they do not believe that this must necessarily mean
that anarchy is synonymous with chaos and violent conflict. Mitigator logic introduced the
idea of “security regimes” which seek through mutual learning and institutionalization to
bring a degree of predictable order into relations between states, with the aim to promote
mutual security through a variety of cooperative and confidence-building mechanisms
rather than the modalities of fatalism (Gorbachev after 1985- security dilemma sensibility)
- The transcender logic is a set of assumptions proposing that the social, political and
economic character of human existence is self-constitutive, not determined. They believe
that history has got us where we are and that it is possible to construct radically different
world orders. The most significant theory connected to transcender logic is the security
community: according to Karl Deutsh, it is a group of people that has become integrated
within a territory and share a sense of community and of institutions and practices strong
enough to assure dependable expectations of peaceful change among its population. The
security community of Europe has become characterized by positive interactions between
states and societies at multiple levels with states no longer targeting each other in a military
sense.
The security dilemma in the 21st century:
- The prospect of a new Cold War: IR students have long been concerned with the instabilities
supposedly caused by power transitions between rising and falling great powers. Today, this
concerned is focused on the rivalry between China and the United States. The US and China
share some common interests such as stability in the Korean peninsula, but there are
potential flashpoints, notably across the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea. Both are
zones of tensions. Together they represent an active theatre of security dilemma dynamics.
The potential for military escalation is significant as well as mistrust. Chinese strategic
planners have been worried that US decision makers might consider that a BMD shield
become part of an offensive strategy of nuclear pre-emption, designed in any future crisis to
give the US escalation dominance over China. Conversely, US decision makers have longterm concerns about China’s intentions regarding their weaponizing of space. However,
China did nothing to allay US concerns, it has only claimed that it wants to limit not
accelerate the completion in outer space. With a fatalist logic, however there is not prudent
alternative for US planners but to treat all deployments in space as potentially offensive,
including peaceful ones. If both governments make fatalistic assumptions about each other’s
intentions on these various issues they will feel compelled to seek security at the expense of
each other, resulting in strategic dynamics that will lead to the construction of their
relationship as a Cold War narrative.
- The dynamics of new arms competitors: In several regional situations, security dilemma
dynamics have the potential to work in well-understood ways to provoke new arms
competitors with all their attendant dangers. This might be global, in the case of Russia
versus US, regional, India and China, they might be conventional, like South versus North
Korea, nuclear, with numerous possibilities in the Middle East, or both conventional and
nuclear, as in the case of India and Pakistan. In particular, the latter case is the regional
hotspot where fears of new arms races are most acute. Indeed, in South Asia the nuclear
armaments competition is driven by Pakistan fears of India’s conventional superiority, while
India’s position is complicated by having to also face a Chinese nuclear adversary that has
played a key role in the development of Pakistan’s nuclear program. Given the acute mistrust
on both sides, any security dilemmas look likely to be resolved conservatively and so rivalry
between the two states in both the conventional and nuclear spheres will continue.
- Towards a world of many nuclear powers? International order faces the long-term threat
of the breakdown of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, followed by the spread of nuclear
weapons technology to an increasing number of states. Across the world there continues to
be a diffusion of proliferation-sensitive civilian nuclear technologies and these development
fuel uncertainties about states developing nuclear weapons under the guise of a civilian
nuclear programme. If, as a consequence of the resolving of dilemmas of interpretation in a
mistrustful way, governments begin to hedge against the collapse of the NPT by weaponizing
their own civilian programmes, the outcome would significantly multiply dangers such as
accidental nuclear war, nuclear entrepreneurship, nuclear acquisition by terrorists etc etc.
- Terrorism and the spread of mistrust: The danger of terrorism has become globalized and
multilevel, with potential danger s ranging from individual attacks and future “spectaculars”
seeking to replicate the imagery of the bringing down of the Twin Towers in NY.
The iconic case of the globalization of the security dilemma in our new age of uncertainty occurs
in those situations in which fellow citizens may no longer be trusted to share the same values.
When one fears that a fellow citizen may be ready to use violence to further extremists causes,
the security dilemma becomes individualized as well as globalized. Uncertainty in the 21 st
century is set to be intense, multilevel and multidirectional and that many of the key issue areas
are likely to be subject to security dilemma dynamics.
Polarity
Polarity assumes that the distribution of capabilities largely determines what the behavior of actors
will be. It usually only refers to the quantity of states and tries to capture the essentials of the global
power structure.
The concept became explicit during the Cold War, where only two states were able to have effects
on the entire international scene. However, the concept of polarity had 3 problems during the Cold
War: the USSR was an incomplete superpower because they were weak in economic terms despite
their richness in material resources; the two hegemonies did not avoid the emergence of other
economic great powers such as India, Japan and West Germany. Furthermore, there was a clear
possible challenger to the bipolar hegemonial scene: China and its emergence as a regional power.
After the collapse of the USSR, the bipolar system collapsed, and 3 possible scenarios came up:
- A multipolar system which sees as main powers US, Russia, EU, Japan
- Unipolarity in the hands of the US (Waltz: only transition)
- A-polarity
Neorealists considered the first two cases obsolete. However, in the 1990s, the US became gradually
the sole hegemon thanks to the economic crisis in Asia and the Gulf War.
For neorealists, in general there are two alternatives: the US maintains its unipolar hyperpower or
another actor, mainly China, climbs up creating a new bipolar balance of power.
In the first case, the US should employ any public policy to prevent any challenger, while in the
second case, the only question is whether the arrive of bipolarity will be with a crisis or peaceful.
Another scenario may come up, where there are no superpowers but only great powers.
In general, we can say that it is very hard to predict the polarity change, also because the definition
of polarity does not include non-state actors of IR and it excludes any kind of potentially
collaborative motives of relation.
It can be attractive as a theoretical starting point, it is a useful guide, well established as both a
theoretical approach to understanding the international power structure and as a social fact in the
public debates about world politics.
Culture
Defining culture could be very hard. It is an elusive concept that can change according to a purpose.
In IR and security studies there are four definitions of culture:
- As a web of meaning  culture is understood as an historically transmitted pattern of
meanings expressed in symbolic forms by means of which men communicate
- As a social construct  scholars suggest that our view of the world is shaped by how social
knowledge organizes how we see the world, meaning that members of the same culture are
likely to share interpretations of the world
- As field, habitus and practice  discourse refers to what counts as a problem and social
relations that define practices and action
- As discourse guardare appunti
What comes up from these definitions is that culture is not fixed but it changes with time for drastic
events as well as small adaptation. Hence, since it is not fixed and not unique, meaning that there
are also sub-cultures, we should consider it a strong factor in decision making but not the sole one.
In particular, security studies are clearly becoming more open to the importance of culture, both in
terms of strategic culture and in terms of peacebuilding culture.
Strategic culture may be defined as shared beliefs and behaviors among militaries that shape
identities, influence relationships and affect the manner in which armed forces define and achieve
their security objectives. Hence, culture must not be ignored; power politics alone is not enough to
explain variation in the strategic choices of countries, and strategic culture is both constraining and
constituting.
Culture = identity = what is considered appropriate and legitimate in the use of force
For what regards peacekeeping culture, the UN became highly involved with that after the Cold
War. It embodies what is behind these decisions, and especially what is behind bad decisions such
as those taken during the Rwanda genocide in 1994. The main characteristics of peacekeeping
culture are a commitment to liberal peacekeeping; form of paternalism that derive from the belief
among peacebuilders that they know best.
Therefore, by denying the existence of culture in security studies, there is a risk to be unequipped
to understand the world or addressing problems in the best suiting way.
War
War is a social phenomenon that is present beyond the war front and time. Warfare is the art of
groups using organized violence and it has impacts in the human’s perspective of the social world.
Studies proved that war is only possible because humans are biologically predisposed for violence,
this might mean that warfare is a consequence of human psychology. Despite that there are various
limits that have been imposed on both the theory and practice of warfare. It has been analyzed that
in terms of its cultural, legal, political, and sociological dimensions.
Cultural: warfare maybe different depending on when and where; what we see as an act of war,
may be defined as differently from the others.
Legal: war is the legal condition which equally permits two or more hostile groups to carry on a
conflict by armed forces. Hence war is different from peace because it is a state of legal contestation
through military means.
Political: warfare is organized violence carried on by political units against each other. Violence is
not war unless it is carried out in the name of a political unit, which distinguished it from murder.
Sociologically: war is a social form of relations and a full spectrum social phenomenon.
There are three main philosophies of war: the first one is the “political warfare”, defined as an act
of violence intended to compel an opponent to fulfill our will. The second one is the “eschatological
philosophy” which believe in a final war leading to the unfolding of some design (wither messianica
or global). According to the “cataclysmic philosophy” war is a catastrophe that will hit some portion
of humanity or the entire human race. It affects all of us, no one is responsible or benefit from it.
Some scholar argued that globalization has created “new wars” which are new in goals, methods
and systems of finance. They can be seen as the progressive erosion of the state’s monopoly on the
use of force. They are driven by economic aspirations with political or ideological motivations
playing only a minor role. They are very difficult to bring to a decisive end.
Also, the domains are changing, from geographic ones to more technological ones, developed by
robot military as well as outer space and cyber space. The US National Intelligence Council predicts
that the risk of armed conflict will rise during the next two decades because of new technologies,
strategies and evolving geopolitical context. Hence, warfare must remain central to security studies.
Also because as mentioned before, the character of warfare is changing with the access of new
participants in the battlefields.
Chapter XIII: Coercion
Coercion is a distinctive strategy in which the intention is to use threats to pressure another actor
into doing something against their wishes. It changes in terms of objective methods and capacity to
counter coercion.
We can understand the coercion as one of the possible strategies among consensual strategy and
controlling strategy. The first one aligns choices with those of others without the threat or use of
force; the second one involves the use of force to restrict another strategic choice and finally
coercive strategy involves the deliberate use of overt threats of force to influence another’s
strategic choices. Whether a threat is effective at influencing the target’s strategic choices will
depend on the target's perception of the threat and other factors that go into its decision calculus.
In terms of objectives, coercion can be divided into “deterrence” the use of threats to dissuade an
adversary from initiating an undesirable act; and “compellence” which is the strategy to persuade
an adversary to doing or not doing something. These two concepts defer in terms of initiative, time
scale, and the nature of demands.
Indeed, deterrence involves making clear what the coercer considers undesirable and then waiting,
leaving the overt act to the adversary; it has no time limit; and threats are usually clear because the
aim is to preserve the status quo.
Conversely, compellence involves initiating an action that stops or becomes harmless by the
response of the targets. It might require the coercer to use force until the targets act. It requires a
deadline to become relevant and compelling threats tend to communicate only the general
direction of compliance.
The construction of effective military threats depends on more direct forms of communication and
on credibility. Even if a threat is well constructed, they might be only one part of the target's decision
calculus. The limits and possibilities of coercion can be assessed considering terrorism, which is by
default a coercive strategy: terrorism is difficult as a coercion strategy not only because the gap
between means and ends but of the magnified problems with communicating threats.
Coercion is usually associated with the threat of punishment but when a target can respond to the
punishment it may be willing to risk the cost of retaliation.
There are two types of costs: resistance and compliance. The first ones are those involved in defying
the coercer's demands, which can be those involved in trying to prevent the coercer from executing
the threat and the pain imposed by the coercer's action. Hence, coercion can be understood as an
attempt by A to present B with a choice between two types of costs: that of resisting A’s efforts an
incurring in the A’s subsequent plan and that of complying with A’s demands. Coercion succeeds if
B prefers cost of compliance than those of resistance.
Coercion might influence the development of power relationships between the protagonists. Acts
of coercion might have a wider impact on the management of conflict between adversaries. Even if
they do not generate a reputation for the coercer, they might convince the target that certain
actions are best avoided owing to the likely reaction of the coercer. Hence, the political context,
both domestic and international will impact the construction of coercive strategies and their
outcome.
Chapter XIV: Peace and Violence
Violence is the center of security studies. Traditional security theorists equate military power with
security. The more tools of violence a state has, the more it can be project power. Violence can be
legitimate or illegitimate, intentional and direct or structured and subtle.
Direct violence  involves an identifiable person who acts to carry out violence against another
identifiable person.
Structural violence  does not require an identifiable actor.
Everyday violence  is experienced at multiple levels and is an elusive and political term.
Scheper-Hughes Refers and defines everyday violence as the “small wars and invisible genocides”
that plague the socially vulnerable and cause them to suffer inordinately. Examples are infant
mortality, slow starvation, sexual and physical abuse is, diseases etc.
Peace can bring up a paradox namely when a state increases military force or police units, it is
becoming safer or is becoming more politically repressed and thus violent.
Non-violent actions involve engaging in conflict but without using violence or threat. It is always
defined in relation to violence. There are 3 categories of nonviolent techniques: protests,
persuasion, non-cooperation and nonviolent intervention.
It is the acting against oppression, injustice or violence without the use of violence or threat.
However, it is different from pacifism because it might be chosen because of its tactical usefulness
rather than out of the sole rejection of violence. Therefore, violence plays a dual role within security
studies as both a source of insecurity and the means to achieve it.
Chapter XV: Human Security
The concept was introduced in the UN's Development programs in 1994 Human Development
Report. It distinguishes the general security concept, associated with security of the states, and
security concerned with human life and dignity.
Human security threats are divided into 7 categories: political, such as freedom and human rights;
personal such as torture; food; health; economic and community security.
The UNDP report found 4 essential characteristics of human security: universal, interdependent,
the imperative of prevention, people-centered.
The concept of human security is a call to action to increase the capabilities of individuals to address
their own security and confirming that people are the most active participants in determining their
well-being.
Hence, human security is achieved when individuals or multiple actors have the freedom to identify
by risks and threats to their well-being and values. While individuals have a clear role in identifying
their own security, they are also limited.
Indeed, individual action is insufficient. States, on the other hand may co-opt the human security
agenda to add legitimacy to business-as-usual practices or even to help justify illiberal ends.
However, human security is still struggling to find a proper space in the literature of security studies.
Some scholars state that human security is nothing more than a tool to further state and
international agendas.
Critical approaches to human security have exposed activities and processes taking place on the
ground, where individuals are constantly creating spaces of security that are often fragile but in
constant development.
Human security perspectives are not irrelevant to so-called traditional or state security priorities
articulated by governments. In situation where states are weak, fragile or virtually non-existent, the
relevance of community needs and interests can be crucial to strengthening security at multiple
levels.
Chapter 16, The Responsibility To Protect
The principle of the responsibility to protect was introduced during the 2005 World Summit after
the horrors of the Rwandan genocide of 1994 and of the crimes against humanity in Bosnia and
Syria.
The principle was based on three pillars:
(1) the responsibility of the state to protect its population from genocide, war crimes, ethnic
cleansing and crimes against humanity;
(2) The international community’s responsibility to assist the state to fulfill its responsibility to
protect;
(3) The international community's responsibility to take timely and decisive actions through
peaceful diplomatic and humanitarian means, and in the case that it fails, other forceful means in a
manner consistent with chapters 6, 7 and 8 of the UN charter.
The political dilemma at the heart of the UN charter is: how should stay behave in cases where
maintaining faith in human rights means refusing to respect the right of non-interference?
As mentioned before, the turning point which pushed the UN states to rethink the nature of
humanitarian intervention had been the Rwanda genocide in 1994. Also the case of Kosovo was
critical: according to Dang sovereignty as responsibility implied the existence of a “higher authority
capable of holding supposed sovereigns accountable” and that dominant authority should place
collective interests ahead of the national interest of its members.
In 2001, after the 9/11, the ICISS published a report stating that states have primary responsibility
to protect their citizens from genocide and mass atrocities. If states are unwilling to do so, the
principle of non-interference yields to the responsibility to protect. Moreover, the ICISS states that
the responsibility to protect includes a responsibility to react, prevent and rebuild politics and
societies afterwards.
In 2005 the World Summit argued that the decisions about the use of force was removed and
submitted by the unique authorization of the Security Council and that crises are under international
concern only if the government manifestly fails to protect their population. In 2009 the security
general released the “implementing the responsibility to protect” document, outlining a wide range
of measures that individual states, regional organizations and the UN system might consider to
implement the three principles of the R2P. Today, at least 55 states developed national mechanisms
to support the responsibility to protect. Basically, the R2P is an attempt to reconfigure the
relationship between sovereignty and fundamental human rights in a way that strengthens the
protection of vulnerable populations while protecting international rules about non-intervention
Chapter 17, Development
The relationship between development and state has become common sense because the majority
of armed conflicts occur in developing countries. In general development is associated with a change
from one form to another and an improvement. In international relations, development is intended
as improvement of the lines of people living in poverty in poor countries. It is associated with the
GDP per capita but not univocally. indeed, economic growth does not always guarantee
improvement in all aspects of human development. Paul Collier introduce the concept of “conflict
traps” according to which poorer countries experience increased likelihood corruption and failure
of government to meet citizens expectations. According to the modernization theory, states can
have a transition from pre-modern to modern societies through economic development. The
Washington consensus was useful in this matter in supporting market-based solutions to
development challenges. It proved to be successful in the case of Latin America, but it was also
inefficient in Africa. Indeed, the “one size fits all” approach was highly criticized, because ultimately
the Washington consensus approach led to greater inequalities. The exception where the Asian
tigers. In terms of International Security, countries with a low level of development often lack
capacity to control their borders and ensure security in their territory. Indeed, poor territorial
control can provide opportunities for trafficking of arms, drugs or people. Another element leading
to conflict linked to development is the rise of horizontal inequalities. According to Steward, States
experiencing horizontal inequalities should tackle them directly through development policies
including forms of affirmative actions, even if this means sacrificing economic efficiency. Human
development is multidimensional as outlined by the UNDP, hence human development, human
security and needs are clearly correlated. For individuals to feel secure they need to be able to meet
their basic needs. Development and security are interconnected and reducing poverty and
enhancing human security are central to the achievements of peace potentially within and between
states.
Part 3: Institutions
Chapter XVIII: Alliances
International alliances are among the most significant phenomena in security studies and world
politics more generally. They are extremely valuable for advancing a state's interest and an external
effort for achieving an end, especially for smaller states with the limited material resources.
There are different definitions of alliance, starting from a security cooperation to a multilateral
agreement of terms. A few things must be taken into consideration to categorize an alliance:
(1) its formation conditions
(2) the dynamics
(3) the balance of power
(4) state behavior
There are different factors that may cause the collapse of an alliance. One is major war but generally
we could say that if there is a change in the conditions that generated the alliance, it will collapse.
The most relevant theories of alliance formation are focused on international determinants or
domestic factors. The former emphasizes the state form alliance in order to combine their military
capabilities and thereby improve their security positions. In this case states may form alliances to
balance the power of other states or to respond to a threat. For what concerns domestic
determinants, alliances may generate because of culture, background, ideologies and political
institutions. States tend to pair with similar ones. Scholars believe that alliances between
democratic states are likely to be strong and resilient because of the relative stability of public
preferences and the greater continuity of national leadership. Alliances may include or develop
intergovernmental organizations to facilitate cooperation among their members. Or they may
contain or acquire institutional capabilities that can be used for tasks beyond those for which it was
created. Another thing that can ensure longevity in the socialization of member states. These
interactions may lead to the development of more similar worldviews.
NATO  1949, 12 states, Response to the threat of the Soviet Union; it survived the fall of the USSR;
its longevity is given by the residual threat of the USSR; new threats emergence; the intra alliance
function that NATO has played in ensuring friendly relations among its members. Future difficulties
for NATO may be potential new threats and the possibility that European countries will be faced
with the choice to prioritize EU structure to NATO.
Chapter XIX: Regional Organizations
Regional organizations are formal bodies comprising a membership that is usually geographically
delimited. Security in this case may be understood as building a more secure community or
promoting human security.
The main early types of regional institutions that could be defined are multi-purpose organizations,
incorporating security, economic and political functions and security alliances.
The first wave of regional institution building took place to create a more robust set of international
institutions to prevent these social, political and economic upheavals (disaster) that had been taken
the world to war after 1939.
This worked especially in the developing world in Africa and the Middle East. They were not able to
ensure security but were able to promote regional unity, peacekeeping and decolonization.
With the Cold War of the Warsaw Pact and the NATO were born, in reaction of the superpower's
dominance: this wave improved regional self-sufficiency and cooperation in a changing world. The
last wave was associated with the creation of the European Union.
Today, regional institutions have grown in number, expanding the roles and memberships in gained
increased international recognition. However, new challenges have emerged particularly regarding
peace operations and the coordination of anti-terrorism and WMD policies.
Terrorism and WMD proliferation are not new but they have been classed as core security threats
by dominant States and thus captured the center of the contemporary security debate, demanding
appropriate institutional responses.
A major driver to regionalism in security affairs has been changes in the international system, with
States and organizations responding to shifts in the global and regional bounds of power. Also,
States and other actors evidently attain value to regional institutions which have survived and
developed new functions. Finally, regional organizations create common identity that influences
their capacity to cooperate.
However, while identity is crucial they also need to protect their power and influence and attend to
their own security concerns in a way that preserves a regional autonomy and order. In general,
regionalism and security affairs must be understood as a response to the dominant security order.
Regional institutions also provide useful normative frameworks conditioning members behavior and
signaling to outsiders.
Chapter XX: The United Nations
The UN was conceived during WW2 and born in June of 1945. Its main purpose is to maintain peace
and security. It includes almost all countries on the planet. There are three facets of the UN:
- the inter-governmental institution, so the arena for decision making and negotiation
- the administrative entity, meaning leaders and staff members
- the collection of non-state actors that routinely engage the world body.
The main organs of the UN are the Security Council, the General Assembly, and the secret area.
The Security Council  Is responsible for maintaining international order. It is composed of five
permanent members with veto power and 10 rotating members. It has coercive authority, and it
may impose diplomatic and economic situations or even authorize military force.
The General Assembly  Is formed by all member states that have equal status and one vote. All
the decisions taken there are recommendations and not binding. But the assembly can discuss
issues of international peace and security and make X actions to states and Council.
The Secretariat  Is composed by international civil servants who must be completely independent
from the government and must not be influenced by states. The Secretary General is appointed by
the assembly and is a crucial role: they are charged with carrying out Security Council decisions and
have the power to call the Security Council's attention to any matter which in their opinion may
threaten the maintenance of international peace and security.
In the new Millennium, the UN is mostly dealing with both Interstate intrastate disputes. One major
concern regards globalization, particularly because it has weakened the borders and generated
more tensions. Contemporary conflicts are therefore waged and found different from most previous
Interstate wars. More actors participate and new challenges occur such as migration and terrorism.
In addition to addressing conflicts once they erupt, the UN has attempted to focus on the phases
before and after wars: conflict resolution, peacemaking, peacekeeping, peace enforcement and
peacebuilding. It is also engaged in matters of terrorism (counter-terrorism committee) and
disarmament and nonproliferation (NPT Treaty + Chemical Weapons Convention + Biological Toxins
and Weapons Convention).
Chapter 21: Peace Operations
International peace operations serve problem-solving purposes. There are five different kinds of
categories of peace operations:
(1) conflict prevention  refers to the application of structural or diplomatic measures to keep
intrastate or Interstate tensions and disputes from escalating
(2) peacemaking  to address conflicts in progress
(3) peacekeeping  to preserve peace and to assist in implementing agreements
(4) peace enforcement  the application with authorization of the Security Council, to use
coercive measures to restore peace and security
(5) peace building  to reduce the risk of lapsing or relapsing into conflict by strengthening
national capabilities for conflict management
According to the Brahimi Report of 2000, which is the Report of the Panel on UN Peace Operations,
there is a need for strengthening the UN's capacity to undertake a wide range of missions. Several
reforms were applied along with the need for the UN to maintain 5000 troops that would be ready
to deploy in 30/90 days. These reforms were intended to give the UN the capacity to launch one
new large operation a year.
The Department of Peace Operations was created to plan, manage, deploy and support the UN
peacekeeping operations. It is in partner with the Department of Field Security which aims to bring
peace and stability to conflict zones around the world. Moreover, the High-level Independent Panel
on Peace Operations was born as a revisionist agenda to the Brahimi report.
In general, peace operations are understood to help bringing and maintaining conditions that
reduce or eliminate violent conflicts. The presence of peacekeepers reduced risk of conflict by over
50%. It was demonstrated that both traditional and coercive operations had a similar effect, they
were both key and bringing credibility of the missions. Also, mandate and stabilization criteria are
easier to achieve with domestic elite cooperation, local peace incentives and international political
will. However, the meaning of peace operations continues to be framed as a security-centered
business of strategies to meet threats to International Security.
In general, peace operations could well contribute to a more equitable dispensation of global
security.
Counterinsurgency vs Peacekeeping
The Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Regime
After their appearance in 1945, nuclear weapons became the 1st guarantors of peace during the
Cold War. The 1st of July 1968, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation treaty was signed by 5 nuclear powers,
namely US, USSR, UK, France and China. The aim was to prevent new states from acquiring nuclear
weapons.
However, it was not successful since now nuclear weapons states are nine including Israel, India and
Pakistan which have not joined the treaty.
Three challenges are now associated with nuclear weapons. The first one is related to secrecy. It is
estimated that the 90% of the world's nuclear arsenal is in hands of the USA in Russia. Some of the
NPT states have made significant cuts in their arsenals but the lack of transparency makes it difficult
to accurately assess where these reductions are complete, verifiable and irreversible.
The second challenge comes from a set of states which have not signed the NPT and the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Pakistan and Israel did not sign the treaty because of security
concerns while India wanted a prominent seat in determining world fairs. The third challenge comes
from non-state actors such as al Qaeda and ISIS. There is a serious possibility that armed
transnational non state actors seeking nuclear weapons might receive information from illicit
network of experts such as in the case of Dr. Khan.
To address these three challenges, three approaches were generated. The traditional multilateral
institutional approach, linked to treaty-based negotiation, strong method in setting norms and
principles in international law but it is weak in the enforcement. The non-treaty based multilateral
approach based on a legally binding instrument to prohibit nuclear weapons, at least putting the
concept of nuclear weapons - based on deterrence on notice. The final approach is an ad hoc, noninstrumental, non-conventional approach led by individual states to address the immediate
challenge of non-proliferation, including preventive wars or the Nuclear Security Summit. These
approaches are stronger in enforcement dimension but weaker and international law and
establishing norms and principles. Also, given the inability of the existing regimes to address the
proliferation challenges of today these ad hoc initiatives are likely to flourish.
Private security companies
In the two decades after the Cold War, the common sense and security studies that control
sanctioning and use of violence was in the hands of states was disrupted by private security activity.
PSC are companies that under contract perform services that are provided usually by military or
police forces. Some claim that the turn to PSC threatens and undermines state control and
democratic processes. While others believe that PSC can indeed offer solutions to untraceable
security problems.
Privatization effect on capabilities vary depending on the context. It sometimes leads to greater
capabilities and sometimes to lesser. Strong states are usually capable of dealing with the risk of
privatization while weak states with ineffective and corrupt forces have the least to lose from the
capabilities offered by private sectors and less capability to deal with risks. PSC usually provides
three different categories of military support: military advice and training, operational support,
logistical support.
PSC have a corporate structure and operate openly posting jobs on their websites. They also gained
some degree of international acceptance. PC market have some unique features namely they don't
provide foot soldiers but rather act as supporters, trainers and force multipliers for local forces.
Also, states do not authorize private takeover of other territories.
Among the reasons for the spread of this market is the fact that there was an increase in available
supply, an increase in demand for military skills, the ideology of capitalism that led people to see
private alternatives as obvious, the help given by PSC to reach governments at the end of Cold War
and to developing countries.
Both material and ideational changes placed private military and security options on the agendas.
The reluctance of states to take over on a variety of missions and the poor performance of
multilateral institutions have made the private alternative appear more workable due to prevailing
beliefs that private means cheaper and better.
PART 4
GENOCIDE AND CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY
According to Lemkin, genocide is something embedded in human society, indeed in the human
psyche. Genocide is defined as an empirical phenomenon. Lemkin conined the term “genocide” and
defined it as “a coordinate plan of different actions aiming at the destruction of essential
foundations of the life of national groups, with the aim of annihilating the groups themselves.
Genocide is directed against the national group as an entity and the actions involved are directed
against individuals not in their individual capacity but as members of the national group”. Article II
of the UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide states that
genocide means any acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethical,
racial or religious group. The acts are: killing members of the group, causing serious bodily or mental
harm to members of the group, deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to
bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part, imposing measures intended to prevent
births within the group, forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.
More significant that its wording was the challenge the convention posed to the essential norm of
the international system: state sovereignty and the rights to non-interference in “domestic” affairs.
Lemkin had hoped to displace that norm. Several factors contributed to a resurgence of interest in
genocide from the 1970s to the 1990s and to its growing use as a buttress for legal, activists and
military intervention. Among these factors: the continuing evolution of the HR regime,
demonstrated by the Helsinki Accords, the UN convention against apartheid and torture and the
growing influence of non-governmental organizations such as AI and Human Rights Watch. Equally
significant was the end of the Cold War. However, the break-up of the Soviet Empire produced a
wave of wars of succession, predominantly in Central Asia, some with genocidal overtones.
-
-
1991 Yugoslavia
1994 Rwanda
1999 East Timor: The Timor case suggested that the tolerance of the international
community of states, and their publics, for genocide and mass atrocity might be declining
and the nation of a “responsibility to protect” may be gaining ground.
2004 Darfur
The founding the ICC was the culmination of legal mechanisms developed over the decades to
confront genocide. The signatories sought to create a permanent body to supplement national legal
institutions and to supplant the “ad hoc tribunals” devised for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda.
However, as the legal machinery to confront mass atrocities has evolved, a clear preference has
emerged for charges of “crimes against humanity” over “genocide”.
Although the Nuremberg Charter of August 1945 focused on “crimes against peace”, the
charter established two core elements of “crimes against humanity” that have lasted to the present.
This led to the benchmark definition of “crimes against humanity” in the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court. According to the statute, such crimes must be committed as part of a
“widespread or systematic attack” and perpetrators must have the mens rea that their crimes are
committed as part of that wider attack not in isolation. It is also important to stress that only
individuals may be charged with crimes against humanity as is also the case with genocide. States
or regimes as a collectivity cannot be held to account. It is apparent that the crimes against humanity
prohibited in the Rome Statute are a great deal broader than those banned by the Genocide
Convention. However, a couple of interesting points of crossover with the UN Genocide Convention
are worth mentioning: the definition of extermination is almost identical to Art 2.c of the Genocide
Convention, which bans “acts deliberately inflicting on the group condition of life calculated to bring
about its physical destruction in whole or in part. The Rome Statue stands: the intentional infliction
of conditions of life inter alia the deprivation of access to food and medicine in which a group of
individuals who do not share any common characteristics are killed; the crime against humanity of
persecution incorporates the four group protections extended by the Genocide Convention but
supplements them with other variables that many genocide scholars and activists have longed to
see added to anti-genocide provisions.
The substantial civil society mobilization against genocide and crimes against humanity constitute
another significant and positive development. However, genocide and crimes against humanity
remain potent threats to the security of individuals and communities.
ETHNIC CONFLICT
Ethnic identities have been present since the beginning of times and they frequently conflicted with
one another. Most ethnic conflicts are peaceful but inevitable when linguistic and religious groups
mix. In the 20th century ethnic conflicts were more important than ever before. Indeed, civil wars
were more common than international conflicts. The same trend continued in the 21 st century.
Moreover, about half of the internal armed conflicts were, at least in part, ethnic conflicts. Ethnic
conflicts have been one of the major sources of insecurity in the world. Ethnic conflicts can be
bloody. In fact, on one list of the 10 deadliest civil wars of the 20 th century, half of the cases were
ethnic conflicts. Each of these conflicts is estimated to have cost upward of a quarter of a million
lives, most of them civilians. Ethnic conflicts might include massacres, mass rape, the forcible
emptying of cities and regions, torture, the creation of concentration. Ethnic conflicts became a
major source of disruption, conflict and refugees for neighboring countries as well. They became
major international issues and therefore are central issue for security studies.
Experts disagree about what could be defined as an ethnic conflict. From an anthropologist
point of view, what they all have in common is that the groups involved are primarily ascriptive.
Hence, membership in the groups is typically assigned at birth and it is difficult to change. They have
a “sticky” identity, hard to change even if they are not marked by the kind of obvious physical
differences (ex. African Americans from white Africans). According to Adam Smith, a group is an
ethnic group if its members share the following traits: common name, common descent, elements
of a shared culture, common historical memories and attachment to a particular territory.
Where does ethnicity comes from?
- Ethnicity is a primordial identity and implied that it was essentially unchangeable. This view
implies that ethnic conflicts are based on “ancient hatreds” that are impossible to eradicate
and nearly impossible to manage. However, most people have multiple identities, hence,
which identity is more important that the others? Identities do sometimes change, new ones
emerge and old ones disappear, depending on the time of crisis.
- Since people shift their identity, ethnic identity is not primordial at all but merely
“instrumental”. People follow ethnic leaders when it is in their interests to do so, and leaders
try to create ethnic solidarity when it works for them. ethnic conflicts can be blamed
primarily on selfish leaders who mislead their followers in pursuit of their own power.
- This view mixes the first two by emphasizing the degree to which people create their
identities. This view points out that ethnic identities are “socially constructed”, they are not
natural in the sense that a simple primordialist view would assume, even when racial
distinctions are just a matter of custom (African-Americans accept the label “black” but in
South Africa most of them would be classified as “coloured” rather than as darker, purely
African “blacks”). Moreover, constructivists pointed out that the source of these customs
was “invented traditions”, writers and scholars who created the “myth-symbol complex”.
The latter establishes the “accepted” history of the group and the criteria for distinguishing
who is a member, it identifies heroes and enemies and glorifies symbols of the group’s
identity.
When can we define a conflict as an ethnic conflict?
A conflict is ethnic only if the sides involved are distinguished primarily in the basis of ethnicity.
Often one or both sides in an ethnic conflict will be a coalition of ethnic groups, rather than one,
but the conflict is still ethnic because the people involved choose sides based on their ethnic
group membership.
What are violent ethnic conflicts about?
The long- term trend is that the number of violent ethnic conflicts increased steadily from the
endo of the Second World War until the mid-1990s, but then it started to drop. These conflicts
were about political power in a disputed territory. In most of the recent conflicts, including Syria,
Iraq and Afghanistan, the combatants are fighting to dominate the entire country. Other cases
may be about a regional minority who wants to separate and form their own state or at least
their own autonomous region (Ukraine 2011). Often the goals are unclear.
Only rarely these conflicts are religious ones, in the sense that one group is trying to impose its
religion on the other one. The biggest exception is Sudan, where the main grievance of the
Christian and animist southerners was the attempt by the Sudanese government to impose
Islamic law on the whole country. In general, the motives are mixed such in the case of ISIS: they
try to impose both the Sunni Arabs against adherents of other sects and the Sunni Islam. Another
misconception is that ethnic conflicts are merely economic: while economic grievances are
usually present, in ethnic conflicts they are expressed in ethnic terms.
What are the causes of violent ethnic conflicts?
Violent ethnic conflicts fell into two broad categories: riots with and armed conflicts/civil wars:
- Ethnic riots: they have occurred all over the world. They typically begin suddenly after
seemingly minor triggering incident. Once they begin they mushroom in size, yielding
widespread violence across a city or even a country. They usually involve little or no planning
and specific selection of the victims. Usually age or sex does not matter after the killing is
done there is usually no remorse on the part of the killers or their co-ethnics – “they had it
coming”. There are three major factors that lead to deadly ethnic riots: a hostile relationship
between the groups; authoritative social support, which usually extends to the security
forces; a stimulus, some specific event that provokes fear, anger or hatred in the rioting
group or even a political change
- Ethnic civil wars: explanations about them divide along similar lines: social psychology, social
mobilization and instrumentalist approaches.
Instrumentalist approaches start with what creates the opportunity for rebels to act: weak
governments, large populations and inaccessible terrain create the opening extremists need
to act. Also, extremists leaders, seeking to grab or hold onto power, and extremist media are
essential factors. These two facts work together: extremist leaders provide heroes for the
extremist media to promote, while one-sided media portrayals seem to validate the
extremist leaders claims that their group must unite against the “enemy”.
Social mobilization approaches consider both opportunity and leadership but are they also
interested in how ethnic group mobilize? According to them people use social mobilization
and networks that already exist, such as political parties and religious sects. People mobilize
as ethnic groups because people’s social networks tend to be mostly within their ethnic
group; barriers of language or religion typically separate them from members of other
groups.
Social psychological approaches focus on different puzzle: why do followers follow these
extremist leaders? Especially, why do they follow who wants violence instead of following
moderate leaders who will work for peace? Remembering that a group is defined by its
myth-symbol complex, symbolic political theory suggests that, when the group’s mythsymbol complex points to the other group as an enemy, prejudice is a likely result and group
members will for that reason be predisposed to be hostile to the other group. If the group
believe that they are in danger, they will be likely to use extreme measures which they justify
as self-defense.
Case Study I: Sudan
Sudan was one of the less sensible results of map-making by colonial powers in Africa. Northern
Sudan is characterized by Muslim in religion and led by an Arab elite while Southern Sudan is a
mixture of Christian and animist ethnic groups of which the largest are the Dinka and the Nuer. The
only contact made between north and south was when the northerners raided southern’ lands to
capture slaves. In colonial times, 1899-1955, the British ruled the two regions separately, with the
north under a form of Islamic law. Instrumentalists would note that Sudan had the preconditions
for ethnic war from every perspective: its large population, huge land area, hostile neighbors and
weak government. Symbolists point out that northerners’ myth symbol complex glorifies the
Mahdiyya as a basis for an Islamic identity in Sudan, and that provided racial prejudice for South
Sudan. Conversely, Southerners saw Islamic rule as a disaster for themselves and they feared
northerners’ efforts to spread Islam as a threat to their own identities.
Sudan gain its independence in 1955. Northern Elites attempted to impose Muslim and Arab
identities on the south, swiftly sparking violent resistance that escalated to full-scale civil war in
early 1960s. They signed a peace treaty in 1972 thanks to a military coup in 1960 by Numayri.
By late 1970s, he was losing his power, and in 1983 he revoked south’s autonomy and imposed
Islamic law throughout the country. They felt like their identities were threatened by this
Programme of forced Islamization and rebelled again. He was overthrown in 1985.
When a new military dictatorship took power in 1989 it maintained Islamic law and the coalition
with the Islamists and continued the war in the south for another 16 years. A Comprehensive Peace
Agreement was signed in 2005 leading to the independence of South Sudan in 2011. However, in
Sudan’s western region of Darfur, a new civil war began even before the Comprehensive Peace
Agreement. South Sudan, which was never united even in the war with the North, faced a civil war
between Dinka and Nuer- the deadliest war in Africa.
Case Study II: Yugoslavia
It was a multi-ethnic state with no majority group. The three largest groups all spoke the same
language, Serbo-Croatian, but differed in their religious tradition: Serbs- Orthodox Christians;
Croats- Catholics; Bosnian Muslims; Slovenes- Catholics; Albanians- Muslims. Before WWII,
Yugoslavia was ruled by the Serbians.
However, during WWII, the Germans conquered the country and placed Croatian fascists in power
in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, where they engaged in genocidal violence against the Serbs.
When the war ended, Josip Broz Tito recreated Yugoslavia as a nominal federation of six republics:
Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Slovenia, Macedonia, Montenegro. He died in 1980 leaving
a weak state that instrumentalists will associate with the civil war’s main cause. Tensions where
everywhere: Serbs began talking about the menace of the Albanians while labelling Croatian with
fascism.
The leader of Serbia’s League of Communism exploited the fear and ethnic myths and attempted to
impose Serbian control on the whole Yugoslavia, repressing also Albanians. In response, Bosnia,
Slovenia and Croatia turned to their nationalist leaders.
Slovenia declared independence in 1991. The Croats faced a war with Yugoslavia. Bosnia and
Herzegovina’s situations was even worse: Serbs wanted to remain in Yugoslavia, the Muslims feared
the Serbian domination and wanted an independent Bosnian state Croats wanted their areas to join
Croatia. In 1992 Bosnia was declared independent and the three-side war started: Serbia and
Croatia provided military assistance to their co-ethics in Bosnia and the Muslims were the principal
victims of the civil war. Serbs started the “ethnic cleansing” of their enemies justifying the action
because of the threat of their identity. In 1995, a Croatian military counteroffensive backed by NATO
air power prompted the Serbian side to agree to stop fighting.
International security dimension of ethnic conflicts:
Ethnic conflicts have important international effect. The Bosnian case illustrates a wide range of
such effects: the politics of ethnic conflicts transcends national boundaries with ethnic diasporas
often playing an important role; they produce large numbers of refugees because such wars are
often about which group will control disputed lands so massacres and evictions are frequently used
weapons; they often become a major issue for international diplomacy, resulting in diplomatic
intervention sometimes effective while sometimes tragically unsuccessful. Moreover, peacekeepers
are sometimes send to resolve ethnic conflicts when diplomacy is not enough.
Because international interest in ethnic conflicts is often intense and because peacekeepers are not
always effective, international actors often resort to violent intervention. Also, indirect intervention
is common: foreign counties frequently provide supplies, weapons and military training to the side
they favor. In many cases, international aid is also ethnically motivated with countries backing the
side more related to them. Sometimes these interventional are purely opportunistic rather than
ethnically based. When direct military intervention is not enough and interests are strong, foreign
powers sometimes send in their own troops. For example, the Syrian civil war attracted a wide range
of external attention, including military aid to the rebels from a wide array of countries as well as
direct Russian military intervention starting in 2015. Ethnic civil war are dangerous in part because
they often grow to involve other countries in this way.
Because of the danger that ethnic civil war may spread, international intervention is not always
violent, it is often aimed at stopping the fighting or at resolving the underlying disputes. Some argue
that the best way to stop an ethnic conflict is to arrange a compromise settlements while other
argue that ethnic conflicts only end when one rebel minority is repressed by military force or
granted its own separate state by partitioning the existing country. Hence, ethnic civil wars end only
when one side wins: usually the government but occasionally the rebel ethnic group. Sometimes
they may end with a power-sharing deal such as in the case of South Africa 1994 apartheid or the
case of Northern Ireland. Sometimes power-sharing can also go wrong as in the case of the 1994
Rwanda genocide. International involvement is sometimes driven by selfish motives and even when
they are trying to help, international actors’ good intentions do not guarantee that their efforts will
improve the situation.
TERRORISM
The global war on terror was elevated in the early 2000s in the principal challenge to security. Three
regimes were terminated, partly on claims of sponsoring terrorism (Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya),
the US military budget rose to the level of the peak years of the Cold War and the term war on terror
was for some years transformed into the long war against Islamo-fascism. This war was understood
as the “Fourth World War”. There are three elements that together offer some degree of
explanation for this concentration: the 9\11 attacks deeply shocked the US; the Bush Administration
in mid-2001 was beginning to pursue itrs vision of a New American Century with some success; the
inevitable focus of state-centered security. The end of the result of these factors is a situation that,
in the absence of fundamental changes in policy, is likely to remain a major future of international
security for some years to come. Yet, terrorism is still a minor issue in terms of global human
security.
According to Wardlaw, terrorism can be defined as “the use, threat of use, of violence by an
individual or a group whether acting for or in opposition to established authority, when such actions
is designed to create extreme anxiety and\or fear-inducing effects in a target group larger than the
immediate victims with the purpose of coercing that group into acceding to the political demands
of the perpetrators”. Conversely, the US government defined terrorism as “premeditated, politically
motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatants targets by subnational groups or
clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience”. Both definitions are concerned with
the intention to influence an audience that is larger than the group targeted. Hence, terrorism works
through fear: the element of inducing fear in a larger population than that targeted is a key aspect
of terrorism and is one explanation why its attacks so much attention compared with the many
other forms of violence as well as suffering due to natural disasters or poverty and
underdevelopment. The main difference between the two definitions is that the US’s definition is
concerned with sub-state actors while the other one embraces the actions of states against their
own population (Stalin’s Soviet Union purges 1930s \ Mao’s China purges in the 1950s). State
recently used a wide range of actions: from detention without trial to torture, execution and
disappearances (Latin America 1960s-1970s).
Sub-state terrorism can originate in very different societies and with highly variable motivations un
underlying drivers. Terrorism can be loosely divided into 2 orientations: terrorism that seeks
fundamental change in a state or society, such as revolutionary terrorism which can be based on a
political ideology of a radical persuasion and it aims for fundamental change, such as the Brigate
Rosse; terrorism that seeks particular change for an identifiable community, they may link with
similar groups elsewhere and often arise in response to substantial political change that has
damaged the prospects of the community from which they arise.
There are 3 broad approaches to responding sub-states terrorism:
- Traditional counterterrorism: rooted principally in policing, intelligence and security;
- Direct military action against paramilitary organizations;
- Focusing on the underlying motivations of terrorists’ groups and the environment from
which they draw support; hence it recognizes that there are conditions in which negotiations
with paramilitary leaders may become possible, often with the utilization of mediators
acceptable by both parties;
Most responses to terrorist campaigns utilize a combination of these methods, but the balance may
vary widely. Indeed, between 1968 and 1972 there was a widespread activity by several radical
Palestinian groups: Israeli security force sought to kill some of those responsible, Western states
invested in security measures in air travel to avoid aircraft hijacking.
The 9\11: The response to 9\11 atrocities was unusual in that it placed for greater emphasis on
military action compared with other forms of counterterrorism.
Al-Qa’ida movement had several aims: the eviction of Western “crudarer” military forces from Saudi
Arabia, the replacement of the House of Saud and other Middle Eastern autocracies by more pure
Islamist regimes, bitter anti-Zionism, support for radical Islamist groups in southern Thailand and
Indonesia and the creation of what would be a true Islamist caliphate, initially in the Middle East e
poi worldwide. It was notable for its “eschatological dimension” to their world view: timescales for
action stretching over many decades if not a century or more. In general, the two aims for the 9\11
attacks were both to demonstrate the capacities of Al-Qa’ida but also to trap the US in a protractive
guerrilla in Afghanistan. The US saw an apparent success in Afghanistan in early 2002 against the
“axis of evil” which were Iraq, Iran and North Korea. (…) By 2009 the US and its coalition partners
had achieved sufficient control in Iraq for the incoming Obama administration to announce a
withdrawal of combat forces, the Al-Qa’ida movement which had dispersed principally to northwest Pakistan was much diminished and Osama bin Laden was killed in a US raid early in 2011. In
2011, NATO forces helped rebels terminate the Gaddafi regime in Libya but the result was a deeply
insecure and failing state with a plethora of competing militias, including many with strong Islamist
tendencies. Moreover, following the US withdrawal from Iraq, the previous Al-Qa’ida elements in
the country reformed and linked with other groups in Syria to form the now known “Islamic State
in Iraq and Syria (ISIS)”. The latter made astonishing progress in 2012 and 2013 and by mi-2014
could claim the creation of a “caliphate” centered o the Iraqi city of Raqqa, controlling a population
of 6 million people. In August 2014, Obama’s decision was reversed to defeat ISIS by using air power.
By early 2017 coalition assault against ISIS had killed 50,000 of its supporters. Nevertheless, ISIS lost
much of its territory and appeared to be defeated but with the possibility of being reinforced by
others.
Movements such as Al-Qa’ida, ISIS and even the neo- Maoist Naxalite rebels in India might all be
signs not so much of a future “clash of civilizations” as an “age of insurgencies” rooted in revolts
from the margins.
Trends in terrorism:
- Terrorism and insurgency: The practice of employing regime termination as a major
response to terrorism produced complex reaction that effectively mixes terrorism and
insurgency.
- Internationalism: to carry attacks elsewhere (used by both Al-Qa’ida and ISIS)
- Suicide terrorism: usually combined with internationalism
- Speed of learning: most paramilitary groups in the past have been relatively conservative in
their operations, however the intensive environments in Afghanistan and Iraq forced
paramilitary groups to learn fast to survive and thrive. Combined with internationalism to
allow the far more rapid spread of tactics than in the past.
- Media developments: have increased the ability of paramilitary groups to promote their
causes
- Economic targeting: still in early stages
COUNTERTERRORISM
One basic element of counterterrorism is to reduce the motivation for individuals to join terrorist
groups or to focus on decisions by groups on whether to conduct terrorism and push for peaceful
actions of protests.
Elements of counterterrorism are:
- Incident management: It includes anything done once terrorist incidents occur and the
mitigation of its effects. The concept first arose in response to attacks in which hostages are
sized and their lives are kept in jeopardy as the terrorists’ voice demands. Management
includes communications or negotiations with the terrorists. Expertise has been developed
over the years on how to best deal with hostage-takers. The principal objectives usually are
to weaken the will of the terrorists while avoiding any move that could stimulate rash action
and harm to the hostage. The outcome of such incidents depends heavily on the policy of
the authorities involved towards making concessions under duress to terrorists. Some
governments, such as Italy, have been willing to make concessions in the interests of
securing safe release of hostages. Others, such as the US, are opposed to such concessions
on grounds that they encourage further terrorism. Another aspect of managing is the
communication with the public and the role of the press. An objective of terrorists in staging
such incidents is to gain attention for their cause. Some counterterrorist officials consider it
important to restrict the release of information on such incidents and to limit public
attention to them, others believe that it is a limit to the freedom of press. A third aspect of
managing is the possible use of force to rescue hostages. A successful rescue operation
avoids the difficult choices of whether to make concessions to terrorists as well as
constituting a dramatic blow against terrorism and immediate punishment of terrorists.
- Curb the ability of terrorists to conduct attacks: These include defensive security measures
designed to protect potential targets from attack and a variety of offensive measures to
reduce terrorist capabilities.
Defensive security measures are applied at several different levels. Most specific is the protection
of individual sites, all the facilities that could become a target of terrorist attacks. The next level of
defensive measures is security provided to entire systems. The system-level security that has played
the greatest role in counterterrorism is that surrounding civil aviation. The protection given to
commercial aviation today demonstrates two principles of systems-level security: a chink in the
armor everywhere can provide an opening for attacks; security must be multilayered. The most
general level of defensive security measures in the protection of an entire country. This includes not
only a substantial increase in expenditures but also the creation of a Department of Homeland
Security. The geographic and other circumstances of each country however make the homeland
security task different for each. For most EU countries, free cross borders movement within the EU
has made it more difficult for individual states to approach homeland security in the same way as
the US for example. The consequence has been restrictive measures for immigration: on both side
of the Atlantic, keeping terrorists out has been a major argument and the entire subject have
remained controversial, partly in view of the commission of terrorist attacks by citizens and legal
residents of those countries.
Defensive security measures work in several ways. The first one is “direct foiling” of an attempted
terrorist attack. However, they have some limitations: they are expensive; not everything can be
protected and terrorists will always have the advantage of choosing where to attack; inherent
openness of free, it will always be easy to find crowds in public places accessible to terrorists just as
they are accessible to anyone else (Nice, 2016- London 2017).
Offensive counterterrorist operations have the attraction of not surrounding the initiative to
terrorists and not trying to guess where and how they will strike next. A successful security
countermeasure saves from attack whatever target or potential target is being protected. This does
not mean that they are an alternative to defensive counterterrorism but rather they are
complementary parts of a comprehensive counterterrorist program. It involves the use of different
tools: diplomacy, financial control, intelligence.
Diplomacy is based on enlisting cooperation of other governments to countering terrorist operation
that cross international boundaries. It can also help to drive and guide cooperation more generally
between military, security and intelligence services. It provides important support to all the other
counterterrorist tools. It can be either multilateral, most useful in creating a worldwide climate that
recognizes terrorism as a shared problem and that is supportive of counterterrorist efforts; or
bilateral which is most practical since usually terrorist case involve only two or three states at a time
and the handling of secret material becomes more difficult the more states that are involved
Financial control in the form of freezing or seizing of terrorist assets. However, it is limited because
most of the money associated with terrorist flows through channels that are extremely hard to
detect and intercepts and because most terrorism is cheap.
Intelligence is hoped to uncover enough details of the next major terrorist plot to enable authorities
to roll the plot up before it can be executed. Although, terrorists’ plots are of course hard to target
for the intelligence, the latter performs other three functions that make larger contributions to
counterterrorism. The first one is to provide a more strategic sense of terrorist threats; a second
one is to provide detailed support to the other tools; and the third one is the collection and analysis
of information on terrorist organizations and infrastructures, enabling them to be disrupted. The
information is non-plot specific but regards names and biographic data of suspected terrorists, the
location and strength of terrorist cells etc etc. The information they provide enables police or
internal security services to conduct raids, arrest suspects and confiscate material.
Law enforcement and military force:
In general, some of the principal attractions of military force for the purpose of counterterrorism
are stronger version of the attractions of using criminal justice system. A military strike can be an
even more dramatic demonstration of resolve than a prosecution. It can immediately disrupt or
destroy terrorist capabilities such as training camps and possible kill key terrorists. And it can do all
this without the administrative, evidentiary and other legal complications that often impede
criminal prosecutions. The principal limitation is that most international terrorism simply does not
present vey many good military targets. Furthermore, collateral damage including the loss of
innocent lives, is inevitable. Some also argue that the use of military force as excessive, making it at
least as prone to controversy as any other counterterrorist instrument.
The expansion of counterterrorist powers and functions, even when not involving military actions,
frequently stars a public debate. The treatment of suspected terrorists has been one focus of
controversy: it comes from concerns over HR and the principle that even the guilty should be treated
humanely. Especially, torture became a prominent issue (enhanced interrogations’ techniques
under Bush administration). Beyond torture is the issue of assassinating individual terrorist leaders,
often referred to as “targeted killings”. Some argue that it should be treated as any other military
operations others emphasize the possible collateral damage including the possible mistakes.
Moreover, such assassination may constitute a stooping to the same level as terrorists, by using a
procedure that is some contexts can be considered terrorism itself.
Two values are also contested to have been limited In the fight for terrorism: liberty in the sense
that denied access to public places may occur and privacy when government agencies collect
information on individuals in the interest of identifying possible terrorists (USA).
There is no single optimum formula for resolving these conflicts. Counterterrorism is not only
objective in public policy nor it should be. It is up to each counties’ citizens to decide where they
wish to strike a balance between safety from terrorism and other interests and values.
COUNTERINSURGENCY:
Counterinsurgency is response to an insurgent threat is an old strategy that has come and gone
from the military limelight. In more recent times insurgencies against colonial rule were often met
by counterinsurgency strategies such as in the case of French operations in Algeria and Vietnam.
The most recent cycle of interest in counterinsurgency began with the United Nations’ authorization
of intervention in Afghanistan after the 9\11 attacks against the US homeland, followed in 2013 by
the US-led intervention in Iraq.
Writings about counterinsurgency differ from most of the writings in the field of security because a
much higher percentage of writers are both scholars and practitioners and therefore they have a
deep understanding of military practice. However, they primarily write for military audience and
tend to assume that what worked for their country will work for the others.
Insurgency is a form of violent opposition to rule by a stronger force. Examples of insurgency are
the American colonies in the 18th century faced by the British, the French resistance to the Nazi
during WWII and the anti-colonial insurgencies of the 1950s and 1960s in Africa and Asia. According
to David Kilcullen, which served in the counterinsurgency in East Timor, contemporary insurgencies
are different as compared to “classical” ones in the understanding of counterinsurgency. Classical
insurgencies were based on expelling foreign forces from their territories and establishing their own
sovereign states. Indeed, in Latin America, Che Guevara both practiced and wrote about guerrilla
warfare, the emphasis was on deposing local elites and replacing them with a socially just system of
government. Thus, insurgents wanted to gain control of the state, prove they were fit to rule by
providing an alternative governance structure to that of the colonists\oligarchs. Therefore, in
classical insurgencies the insurgents were the revolutionaries wanting change.
Conversely, today insurgents are often protecting the status quo from the changes brought by
outside invaders, for example in Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan. According to Kilcullen, contemporary
insurgencies do not seek to take over and establish their own states. Rather, insurgency today
follows state failure, and is not directed at raking over functioning body politic but at dismembering
or scavenging its carcass, or contesting an ungoverned space. Moreover, some religiously motivated
insurgencies may not have a political aim; the very act of insurgency may be earning God’s favor
(ISIS).
The tactics employed by insurgents are necessitated by their military weaknesses: they could not
confront the opposing power directly, hence attacked vulnerable points and the retreated among
the local population. These insurgents’ tactics were hard to counter. Attempt of mass punishment
of populations in response to insurgencies had the counterproductive effect of alienating the local
population from the authority trying to maintain its power and legitimacy.
How to best deal with these insurgent tactics?
In the classical model, the insurgents live off the population so a key aim of counterinsurgency is to
isolate the insurgents from these sources of support. If in the past it was relatively simple, today
this would need to encompass economic sanctions. Insurgents sometimes provide resources to the
local population in exchange for services such as planting roadside bombs and providing
intelligence. Nevertheless, the local population remains an important source of camouflage. The
classical counterinsurgency was primarily rural affairs but today the insurgencies of Iraq and
Afghanistan are also fought in urban areas.
Classical insurgencies were usually confined to one state or region and involved on insurgent group
and one government. By contrast, In Iraq the array of forces was complex and the relationship of
local groups to one another was fluid and shifting. Indeed, a feature of Iraq was that local groups
were just fighting against the external occupiers but also fighting among themselves. The positive
side is that there were opportunities for counterinsurgents to ally with local forces.
Today, is no longer a traditional military handling all aspects of the counterinsurgency mission.
Actors involved are several: civilian government agencies, private security companies, aid agencies,
non-governmental organizations, the media.
The success of counterinsurgency involves winning “the hearts and minds” of the local
population. It has come to be thought as achieving local popularity, rather than winning legitimacy,
which should be the aim. However, many counterinsurgencies lose valuable psychological ground
by initially focusing on the use of force and failing to listen and respond to the local population.
Many insurgent groups triumphed because counterinsurgents lack the will to carry on, having lost
the “hearts and minds” of their home constituents.
According to Robert Thompson there are 5 principles of counterinsurgency: the government
must have a clear political aim; it must function in accordance with the law; it must have an overall
plan; it must give priority to defeating the political subversion, not the guerrilla; in the guerrilla
phase of insurgency, the government must secure its base areas first. In terms of tactics, an
important part of counterinsurgency is not using force. According to David Galula, 80% must be
political and 20% must be military. Given the centrality of “the hearts and minds” a
counterinsurgency campaign should involve politics, economics, psychology and if necessary
military force. Clearly, in situations in which authorities are trying to win the support of the local
population, the heavy-handed use of military power is likely to be counterproductive.
According to Kilcullen, the nature of counterinsurgency is not fixed but shifting. Hence, it
evolves in response to changes in insurgency.
Given the centrality of “hearts and minds” of the local and the home populations, the media is an
essential sinew of a counterinsurgency campaign. The former, has become a vital arena of
competition between insurgents and counterinsurgents. Much contemporary counterinsurgency
practice is about spin control: attempting to influence how events are reported, both locally and at
home. The increasing democratization of the media led to the creation of a theatre for anyone: this
can be macabre as for the case of ISIS video, they recognized the power of the media and attempted
to ban all mobile phones from the caliphate; it can also work in the opposite way, indeed brave
citizens created the podcast “Life inside Islamic State”.
There are a number of comparisons to draw between counterinsurgency operations and
peacekeeping operations, they share similar strategies and tactics: in both situations, the ideal ratio
between force and non-violent activities is the same (20%-80%); both operations are aimed at
standing up an supporting weak governments; in both counterinsurgency and peacebuilding
operations there is a lot of knowledge at the tactical\operational level, but less at the strategic level,
leading to a tendency to apply standard models with very mixed results; in both peacebuilding and
counterinsurgency operations there are similar mixes of actors involved: NGOs, international
organizations, private firms, military and civilian authorities etc… etc.. this leads to parallel problems
of coordination and the difficulty of ensuring that all actors are pursuing the same agenda; finally,
the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration campaigns that are important parts of
peacekeeping operations face the same problem as counterinsurgency: how to drain away the
uncommitted supporters from the fanatics who will not be swayed by alternative and economic
opportunities.
INTELLIGENCE:
Recent debates over intelligence have taken two forms: what we might call an old-fashioned “value
for money” argument about intelligence failures, meaning that most observers agree that the
current benefits do not appear to be commensurate with the scale of spending; and a second debate
characterized by moral outrage.
Intelligence is not an end in itself. It is an essential aid to policymaking and military planning
and should ideally provide timely warning of events which we would wish to anticipate and the
intelligence background for policy decisions. Mark Lowenthal argues that intelligence is used in 3
different ways: it is defined as a process through which intelligence is requested by policymakers or
operational commanders, then collected, analyzed and fed to the consumers- intelligence cycle; it’s
a product distributed through multilevel secure electronic databases; it is an institution. Conversely,
Michael Herman defines intelligence as a form of power and especially a crucial part of “hyperpowerness”, allowing them to project military force on a global basis. Regional and international
organizations have also embraced intelligence. The EU has its own satellite and sees intelligence as
an essential component of its external policy.
Why do surprise attacks succeed so often, despite the existence of elaborate intelligence
communities? Richard Betts argues that weak collection or raw data was rarely the cause of failure.
Instead, the main culprits fell into 3 categories: bureaucratic dysfunction; psychological perception
issues; excessive political interference by policymakers. Arguments over the sources of strategic
intelligence failure have been intensified after the 9\11 attack and the Iraqi WMD program.
Governments now expect more of intelligence, since they spend breathtaking amounts of money in
this area.
Intelligence agencies have frequently advanced the claim that the transparency and the
ability of intelligence help removes uncertainty and improves stability. While the intelligence activity
of each country is conducted in a competitive environment, the collective results that accrues can
operate as a public good or an international good. Intelligence has made a major contribution to
stability by providing verification for arms control.
The importance of intelligence agencies for international security becomes greater once all
its activity is taken under consideration: they not only report on world affairs but also seek to
intervene covertly to shape events, this mode of activity is called “covert action”. It can take many
forms from noisy paramilitary activity to the discrete covert funding of political parties or
propaganda. Covert action allows premiers to undertake foreign policies that are unaccountable,
undemocratic and often questionable. Unsurprisingly, this issue connects with democratic peace
theory, which suggests that democracy has a dual effect: restraining effect and non-violent norms.
The global revolution in information and communications technologies has ushered in an era of
surveillance capitalism in which Tesco, Amazon and Google may hold more data on us the tour
governments. This has increased the importance of the private actor in the security world and data
from the most mundane sources is now capable of producing remarkable intelligence. Oddly, this
sort of intelligence looks less like spying and more like ambitious behavioral social science.
TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME (TOCs)
Organized crime is one of the oldest professions. After the end of the Cold War it emerged as a news
security threat. The emergence of organized crime as a growing threat to security was
acknowledged by the United Nations in 1994. Threats at the individual level to “citizens” or “public”
security are most obvious in Latin America or Mexico. Organized crime is particularly common
where the state suffers from capacity gaps and an inability to fulfil normal state functions. Weak or
fragile states are ideal environments to the TOCs because they offer high levels of impunity and
opportunities for the corruption of and even collusion with state authorities. TOCs can also be
understood as a threat to regional stability and global norms. However, because this threat differs
from traditional geopolitical threats, it has caught states remarkably unprepared. Indeed, challenges
that arise from “sovereignty-free” actors cannot easily be dealt with through the normal
instruments of power and influence. TOCs are particularly malevolent type of sovereignty-free actor
as they undermine national sovereignty, the integrity of financial and commercial institutions, the
property of public institutions and the fabric of societies.
While they pose many challenges, have real victims and cause great social and economic harm, they
are not considered pure evil: they flourish among populations that are impoverished, alienated and
marginalized. Consequently, some observers have highlighted the “social contradictions” of
organized crime, noting that it can bring benefits too, especially to the people for which it acts as a
safety net, bring employment to marginalized and alienated people and provide economic benefits.
In many countries, TOC is emerging as an alternative form of governance, offering protection,
paternalism and service provision to populations that are socially, politically and economically
excluded.
TOCs are usually pragmatic not ideological, they attempt to influence politics only to protect their
illegal activities and generally use violence in ruthless but more discriminate ways than do terrorists.
TOCs refers to criminal organizations or activities that cross national borders and therefore involve
the territories and laws of at least two states: borders can be crossed by the perpetrators, the
products or the proceeds.
Globalization has contributed to the rise of organized crime in several ways: it has been
empowering for organized crime as for legitimate business, encouraging it to go transnational; it
has also provided plenty of recruits;
Moreover, also states contributes to the rise of TOCs in three ways:
- States that are weak, autocratic or authoritarian provide fertile breeding grounds. Indeed,
they are characterized by low level of state legitimacy, weak border controls, poorly
articulated and\or ineffective norms and rules, the subordination of the collective interests
to individual interests, lack of provision for the citizenry, absence of legal regulation and
protection for business. TOCs develop in response to a combination of opportunities, fed by
weak states
- The state is important to organized crime not for what it fails to do but for what it does.
State enacts laws, outlaw or regulate certain products, impose taxation and tariffs etcetc…
thereby, providing opportunities for organized crime. The continues authority of the state
incentives organized crime to circumvent laws and regulations.
- States contribute to TOC and smuggling simply because of the differences among them.
Nikos Passas calls these differences “criminogenic asymmetries” which can be legal,
administrative, economic or financial in character. For instance, States that have high levels
of bank secrecy are a natural attraction for money launderers seeking to hide criminal
proceeds. Ironically, even if states have strong border control and effective law enforcement
system, organized crime will still seek access to markets accepting the high risk because the
higher the risk the higher the profit.
TOC in the first two decades of the 21st century is diverse in terms of their location and reach,
organizational structures, portfolios of activities, bonding mechanisms, degrees of power and
influence, use of corruption and violence and balance between cooperation and conflict in their
relationships with one another. In some cases, criminal organizations are centered on family, ethnic
networks, while others are cosmopolitan. Some operate through top-down hierarchical structures,
others can best be understood as horizontal structures, or they can be hybrid. Just as organizational
structures vary, so do portfolios of criminal activities, with some groups specializing and others
involved in a variety of different crimes.
The other area where criminal organizations differ is in terms of conflict and cooperation. TOC
operate in a competitive environment where they cannot use the legal system for redress, where
the potential for violence is ever-present, and competition to establish either monopolies or market
dominance is endemic. In general, though, criminal organizations work with one another (still, they
usually have fragile relationships).
The UN states that these activities are based on the organizing principle of the invisible hand of the
market, not the master designs of criminal organizations. Looking at the world through this broader
definition, it is often the groups that come and go, while the market remains constant.
The most important illicit goods are drugs: according to the 2016 UN World Drug Report, about a
quarter of a billion people use illicit drugs. The largest of the markets is cannabis (183 million people
worldwide); the second market in terms of prevalence of use is amphetamine-type stimulants,
which are synthetic and do not depend on cultivation; the third market, and the one that is most
violent, is cocaine, which is supplied by Colombia, Peru and Bolivia and has large markets in both US
and Europe.
One of the characteristics of drug markets is that they are typically populated by both large and
small criminal organizations. Large organizations receive most attention, but the markets also allows
smaller players. This is also true for illicit markets such as those of human trafficking and smuggling.
The migration crisis of 2015 in Europe was facilitated by the emergence of multiple criminal
organizations that ranged from small, informal travel agents and transportation companies to large
criminal networks. According to Wainwright, head of Europol, as many as 30,000 people could be
involved.
Illegal arms trafficking represents another major illicit market. The large-scale market that fueled
wars in Africa was organized largely by key brokers and transporters suck as Viktor Bout and Leonid
Minin, both of whom have since been arrested.
To the extent that the organizations are successful and the illicit markets are lucrative, It is necessary
to launder criminal proceeds. The essence is to hide criminal source of wealth and to make the
proceeds appear legitimate. This is often due through several stages: usually termed placement,
layering and integration.
Assessing a response to TOCs is very hard. Gaps in knowledge, lack of baseline and difficulty
in identifying trends make it difficult to know how well the criminals are doing and even more
difficult to determine how governments are doing in response. The problem for governments is that
organized crime operates in the borderless world, whereas law enforcement agencies still operate
under the constraints of sovereignty.
After September 2001, US failed to pay attention to TOC expect where they were believed to be
working with terrorists. In July 2011 the US issued a new strategy to combat TOC. Even though it is
a large step beyond anything done before, and it is a well-coordinated strategy, yet gaps remain.
For instance, little attention is given to the need to attack both organizations and markets. A lot
depends on the US ability to mobilize support among other countries and create an effective
multilateral response to TOC. The difficulty is that the US will not provide the necessary global
leadership. Trump’s wall between the US and Mexico to keep out illegal immigrants and drugs is a
simplistic response to a complex problem set. Indeed, the new nationalism and anti-globalism in the
US and Europe might lead to renewal emphasis on border control, but it could also undermine the
multilateralism essential to dealing with transnational challenge. In many parts of the world,
organized crime represents fundamental failures of governance and limited opportunities in the licit
economy. In the next few decades, rapid uncontrolled urbanization, severe and unpredictable
changes in climate will accentuate these failures and construct lucrative opportunities for organized
crime. The organized crimes will become central to societies and economies, providing not only illicit
good but also licit ones, especially those needed. In these circumstances, in some countries at least,
it will go from an alternative from of governance to the preferred form of governance.
INTERNATIONAL ARMS TRADE
The international arms trade is intimately linked to issues of peace and security, justice and injustice
and development and underdevelopment. Arms sales can fuel regional and local conflicts or help
create balances of power. They provide repressive regimes with the tools they need to suppress
democratic movements and commit human rights abuses. They can be used to facilitate terrorist
acts or support oppressed populations in fighting off genocide and ethnic cleansing.
The global arms trade is composed of three different elements: the trade in major systems such as
combat aircraft, tanks and warships; the trade in small arms and light weapons; the trade in “dualuse” items with both civilian and military applications, including everything from shotguns and
unarmed helicopters to equipment that can be used to manufacture nuclear, chemical and
biological weapons.
- Major arms manufacturing states such as the US, Russia, UK, France and China generally
control between two-thirds and three-quarters of all global weapons sales in a given year.
The US alone accounted for 45% of arms transfer agreement worldwide in the period from
2008 to 2015. There are clear economic incentives for pursuing these deals. Sales of major
combat systems not only generate revenues and profits for military firms; they also
contribute to the balance of trade and provide jobs in key regions and localities of the
exporting state. While economics is one drive of the trade in major conventional weapons,
politics and security often have an even more important role to play.
- The second major channel of arms transfers is the supply of dual-use items. In the 1980s,
the sale to Iraq of equipment and materials useful in the development of everything from
medium-range Scud missiles to nuclear, chemical and biological weapons was a classic case
of the “boomerang effect”; since dual-use transfers generally include arms-making
technology rather than finished weapons systems, they are generally harder to track, even
when exporting states put their minds to the job.
- The third channel of arms flows is the trade in small arms and light weapons(SALW) . The
vast majority of combat deaths in the world’s armed conflicts are inflicted with these
systems, which are loosely regulated and were largely ignored as a proliferation problem
until the late 1990s. SALW are easy to maintain and transport, cheap to purchase and hard
to track. They are the weapons of choice of terrorists, separatists’ movements, militias,
warlords and other non-state groups that are central players in the wars of the post-Cold
War period.
Arms sales take off – the 1970s and the 1980s
Arms sales and military aid have been tools of warfare in diplomacy from the outset of Cold War.
The increase in arms sales was drive by two major factors: the geopolitical side and the rise in oil
prices fostered by the formation of Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries.
The first factor was based on the Nixon Doctrine: Washington would arm regional allies to protect
its security interests rather than sending US troops to confront those threats directly, in some cases
involving transfers of weapons or training packages and the knowledge of technology. The Jimmy
Carter administration tried to change later the dynamics of the global trade by promoting a policy
of arms sales restraint. The Carter initiative built on the actions of the post-Vietnam, post-Watergate
Congress which passed the Arms Export Control Act in 1976 in response to runaway US arms sales.
The administration offered arms packages to a wide range of states in the Persian Gulf and the Horn
of Africa in exchange for access to military facilities that could be used by the newly forming Rapid
Deployment Force, designed to ensure that there would be “not more Irans” and “no more
Afghanistans” in the Persian Gulf Region. In short, Carter was seduced by the short-term believes of
arms transfers in securing political and military support, and allowed them to trump concerns about
human rights, democracy and the fueling of regional conflicts.
Ronald Reagan was a major promoter of arms sales from the outset of his administration. The most
important aspect of the Reagan arms sales policy was his support for covert arms sales to
movements in Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia and Nicaragua, all of whom he described as “freedom
fighters” regardless of their actual ideologies and practices.
Post- Cold War dynamics:
With the end of the Cold War, economic motives moved to the forefront in the Clinton
administration’s arms sales policy which explicitly cited the importance of weapons exports in
supporting the US defense industrial base. Bill Clinton showed a support for major arms deals as a
way of currying favor in key states. While the Bush administration went through the motions of
presenting strategic rationales for each of these deals, the real motives were made clear when
candidate Bush announced the deals at major rallies in front of cheering workers in St. Louis.
It came up the US and its allies were the major suppliers in the Iraqi war. (questa parte è scritta
malissimo secondo me, semmai vedetevela su internet)
Post-9\11 arms exports:
The September 11,2001 terror attacks created yet another shift in arms sales policy. In the name of
fighting the “global war on terrorism” the Bush administration lifted human rights and nonproliferation restrictions on sales to countries such as Pakistan and Yemen and increased military
aid to Georgia, Philippines and other states viewed as potential allies in fighting terrorist networks.
The number of states receiving US military aid doubled from 2001 through 2005 and nearly threequarters of US arms recipients were either undemocratic regimes or major human rights abusers.
The Obama years were then marked by a boom in global arms exports, with the US firms leading
the way. Most of the sales were in Middle East, especially in Saudi Arabia. Moreover, an important
development that began after 9\11 and accelerated during the Bush and Obama years was the
creation of dozens of new arms and training programs at the Pentagon.
The trade in small arms and light weapons:
The SALW is a major focus analysis and activity related to the global arms trade due to its centrality
in enabling current conflicts and its potential and actual role in arming terrorist groups.
The Small Arms Survey estimates that there are 875 million small arms in the world, and the 75% of
them are owned by the civilians. In addition to guns in civilian’s hands, about 25% are controlled by
traditional military forces. Some of these weapons also end up in the hands of terrorists or
insurgents through capture, theft or corruption. Another major source of SALW are black markets.
Which operates in large scale, taking advantage of state-of-the-art communication, transportation,
banking and brokering services.
The A.Q Khan Network: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2SKxLtH2lJE
MIGRATION AND REFUGEEES:
Migration has always played a crucial role in shaping our world. Recently, it has gained prominence
on the international agenda because of its increasing scale and the consequences such movements
have for international affairs, including the security concerns of the state. The International
population movement can be attributed to several factors: the universal nature of state control that
makes any international movement a matter of concern to at least two and sometimes more states;
the world’s population is still growing; globalization has brought about a revolution in
communications and transportation that has made people aware of vastly differing conditions and
opportunities in other parts of the world, as well as making travel to those areas easier; the world
is a turbulent and unstable place, and turmoil and uncertainty can encourage people to move,
escape and search for a better life. Displacement triggering migration constitutes a threat to the
human security of those people and populations affected. Migration can be economically beneficial
to both sending and receiving countries and for the migrant. Sending countries can benefit hugely
from remittances that migrants send home and from the easing of pressure on employment,
housing and other social facilities. The receiving county benefits from availability of labor at
reasonable cost, increasing national productivity and economic growth. Migrants can also
contribute to building bridges between communities at home and strengthening ties with their
countries of origin abroad.
Since the end of the Cold War and the 9\11 attacks on the US, the study of migration has
become firmly embedded in international relations. The 9\11 attacks dramatically reaffirmed the
role that international migration can play in international relations generally, and in security issues
in particular. In short, migration can pose a threat to people and governments on both sending and
receiving states and to relations between these two countries. It can turn civil wars into
international conflicts and it can cause the spread internationally of ethnic conflict and civil unrest.
Migration can also play a role in facilitating terrorism. Population movements can become a cause
of economic hardship and the increase in competition for scarce resources of various kinds from
jobs to social housing, and can even weaken existing power structures and institutions within
countries as well as threatening cultural identities and social cohesion.
All international migrations can be divided into two categories: involuntary\forced and
voluntary\free. The first one refers essentially to refugee flows while the second one can be further
subdivided into 3 main categories: legal permanent, legal temporary and voluntary migration.
Legal permanent settler migration is the one that populated US or created Asia and Afro-Caribbean
minorities in Britain. Legal temporary migration includes the most of voluntary migrations:
movement of people for education, business, tourism and employment. The last one is the illegal
or irregular migration of people from one country to another, which may be temporary or
permanent.
One aspect of the exercise of sovereignty has always been a state’s inviolable right to control who
will enter and exit its territory, usually through border controls. Regarding free or voluntary
migration, states have authority to decide which individuals to accept as entrants or immigrants.
Conversely, when it comes to refugees or involuntary migrations there are some limited constraints
on a state’s authority in the form of obligations imposed on them by the 1951 Convention on the
Status of Refugees. The latter obliges states to extend asylum and protection to those facing
prosecution on grounds of religion, race, nationality or political opinion. In practice the convention
commits states to ensure that no asylum is sent back to any country where they are likely to face
danger to life or liberty without their application for refugee status being given due considerations.
According to Art 14 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights everyone has the rights to seek
and enjoy asylum from persecution in other countries.
However, none of these agreements guarantees the right to refugee status, only the one to seek it.
This is because in practice there is total acceptance in international society of the right of every
sovereign state to decide for itself who should be allowed entry to its territory. Nevertheless, these
institutions form an important part of the international consensus on the treatment of refugees and
they lay down an important universal principle that most states have come to endorse, namely that
people with a well-founded fear of persecution have a right to exit from their own country, cannot
be returned to their country of origin and have international status.
Sometimes different streams of migration can mix and merge over time. One result of this kind of
convergence of different types of migrations is that receiving state governments and more
significantly their people are increasingly like to treat all immigrants alike once they are in the
territory of the receiving state.
The one inevitable long-term consequence of international population movement is the creation of
ethnic minority communities in the receiving countries. Once migrations take place, it invariably
results in at least some immigrants becoming citizens of the host country and creating a cultural,
linguistic, religious and possibly a racially distinct minority within the state. The existing of these
communities has a substantial impact on security as well as on the relationships of host states with
the countries from where these communities originate.
Large-scale international refugee migration usually raises serious security concerns. Since by
their nature they are the results of conflict, social and political upheaval and turmoil, they
sometimes carry the instability with them to the host country. In such circumstances, refugees are
both a consequence of some sort of conflict, violence or repression as well as themselves becoming
the cause of conflict between their country of origin and the host country. When a government
comes unwilling to be host to a large refugee population, it is likely to take steps to ensure that the
stay of the refugees is temporary and, in this case, there is potential for conflict between sending
and receiving countries. Often the receiving state get involved in the conflict in the sending state,
threatening to arm or arming the refugees and sometimes deploying their own armed forces. For
instance, in the case of the British Muslim youth and Mohammed, Hamza, who converted Finsbury
Park Mosque into a heaven for Islamists and a recruitment center for Al-Qa’ida of Quatada,
stipiritual leader in Europe, they and their associates must be responsible for the radicalization that
ultimately resulted in four young British Muslim men blowing themselves up to London’s transport
network on 7 July 2005.
The relationship between migration and terrorism is complex: a major fear is that among the
thousands of Syrians, Iraqi and Afghan refugees arriving on European shores were members of the
so called Islamic state group, coming with the express purpose of carrying out terrorist attacks on
soft civilian targets in the open societies in Europe.
Migrant communities tenst to maintain a strong connection with their home countries, and
turbulence or instability in those societies can find expression within the migrant community. When
this happens, these communities will become involved in a range of political activities targeted at
their home country. They will use all means at their disposal to influence events at home. They take
advantage of being outside their country to take those action that people living in their country
cannot, because of fear or prosecution. They are critical or their home government actions, and
becomes the voice of suppressed opposition, they try to draw attention to the problem or raise
funds. Home country governments respond to all this offshore activity by putting pressure o the
host state government to restrict them and not allow minorities voices to come up. But if the
migrant communities are activing within the laws of the host state, there may be little the host
government can easily and legally do to restrict their activities. The consequence is deterioration in
the relationship between the host and the home states.
The success of migrants to recruit their host governments and populations to their cause in their
home country depend to a large extend on the nature of the political system in the host country.
The more open the system and the more susceptible to lobbying it is, the more likely it is that
minority communities will succeed in getting their concerns on the agenda. Migrant communities
can also be used by their home countries to pursue its aims vis-à-vis the host country government.
Admitting migrants has long-term effects on receiving states: it can turn homogenous
societies into multicultural ones. Migrants raise also social concerns because they potentially
threaten to undermine the popularity and strength of the nation state. As citizens of one state,
moving to live and work in another, migrants clearly challenge notions of nationalism, citizenship
and the rights and duties of citizens towards their state and vice versa. As discussed, migrants or
minority communities can be seen as bringing violence and instability to peaceful host societies, but
they can also become a threat to social cohesion and stability if they are perceived as an economic
burden.
Sometimes they are perceived to be criminals and carriers of infectious diseases. Many European
countries have seen a resurgence of the extreme right in politics because of this public unease about
immigration and asylum. EU states have tried to harmonize their refugee and immigration policies.
The 1990 Dublin Convention provided an asylum seeker who has his application denied in a EU
country as a rejection by all EU states. In the last few years, much of the EU’s energies have often
been concentrated on trying to make agreements with states on the shores of the Mediterranean
to get them to stop inflows into Europe and with establishing systems of policing and patrolling of
the Mediterranean.
In general, migrants are perceived with hostility if they are perceived as a threat to the culture and
way of life of the people in the receiving country. This tends to happen when large numbers arrive
in a short period of time or when migrants are seen as holding themselves apart and being reluctant
to make any efforts to integrate into the host country’s way of life. Large long-term refugee
populations can bring about significant changes in the social cohesion and stability of the host
country. Further, migrants can affect political and social conditions and even in rare instances
fundamentally alter the nature of society in receiving countries, many years after the actual
movement of people has ceased. The extent and nature of integration of a migrant community and
the impact this has on “societal security” has recently come under the microscope, particularly in
European countries including Britain, France and Denmark. The substantial long-established Muslim
community in these European countries in light of the concern with Islamist terrorism, is seen as a
threat (France- head scarves in state institutions\ full face veil).
ENERGY SECURITY
The world’s three most important current sources of energy are oil, coal and natural gas, which are
all finite sources. Many analysts worry that insufficient energy will be available at critical moments
in the future to satisfy vital national needs.
Hence, energy security constitutes the “reliable and affordable supply of energy on a continuing,
uninterrupted basis”. In practice, it is understood to encompass the dual functions of ensuring the
procurement of sufficient supplies of energy to meet a society’s fundamental needs as well as
ensuring their unhindered delivery from point of production to ultimate consumer.
Energy security is also understood as related to the dilemma of states that are higly dependent on
suppliers for their energy requirements but are in a weak position with respect to theme and so
vulnerable to political pressure or blackmail. An example of this dilemma is Soviet republics that rely
on Russia. For this reason, the EU has adopted an energy security scheme aimed at reducing that
dependency, largely by promoting increased gas imports from non-Russian sources.
As concerned over climate change has increased, many policymakers have sought to ensure that
their countries will possess sufficient energy to meet future requirements while at the same time
reducing emissions of the greenhouse gases responsible for global warming. Other analyst suggest
that the concept of energy security has yet another meaning for petroleum-rich nations that rely on
oil exports for their economic well-being. For these countries, such as Algeria, Libya, Nigeria, Saudi
Arabia and Venezuela, energy security entails access to a stable international marketplace. When
global demand is insufficient to soak up the available supplies, their economy suffers and social
unrest may occur.
In most countries, the task of producing and delivering energy to industry and individual
consumers I performed by private companies, which do so in the pursuit of profit. But because
acquisition and delivery of adequate supplies of energy are considered so essential to the economic
health of industrial societies, governments also play a significant role in key aspects of the energy
procurement process (through activities of state-owned or state-controlled companies).
The intervention of institutions is usually justified in terms of “energy security”, therefore ensuring
that appropriate incentives and policy instruments are in place to impel private firms to meet the
nation’s requirements.
In its final report, National Energy Policy, concluded that the United States was becoming excessively
dependent on unreliable foreign suppliers for its energy needs, thereby exposing the country to the
threat of recurring supply interruptions; In response it called for increased emphasis on the
development of domestic sources of supply, including oil derived from protected wilderness areas,
such as the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge in Alaska.
In 2008, the government created the National Energy Administration to act as the key energy
regulator: together with the NDRC it is charged with approving new energy projects in China, setting
domestic wholesale energy prices and implementing the central government’s energy policies.
For the US and China, as for other industrialized countries that rely on imported supply of energy,
energy security thus entails as conspicuous foreign policy dimension, in that principal objective of
its overseas diplomacy is to establish and sustain friendly ties with key providers of oil, gas and other
fuels, thereby facilitating the procurement of these fuels by companies linked to the home country.
In many cases, energy has acquired a military dimension , because the senior officials have the need
to protect overseas energy supply routes and help defend key foreign suppliers against rebel forces
and hostile states that might seek to sabotage oil deliveries or impose less favourable terms over its
supply. The military dimension of energy security was first accorded high level attention in
Washington in late 1979, when Islamic insurgents overthrew the US-backed Shah of Iran and Soviet
forces intervened in Afghanistan, in both instances threatening the safety of oil deliveries from the
Persian Gulf to the United States and its allies. Indeed, for many, ensuring the safety of the global
oil flow remains security priority.
The major energy consumers will continue to rely on a combination of domestic and imported
supplies to satisfy their growing needs in the years to come. Some of them, are endowed with
substantial domestic sources of energy and so can minimize their reliance on imports, but most will
rely to a considerable extent on foreign sources of supply. This is the case of older industrial powers
but will increasingly prove a challenge for new industrializing countries such as China and India.
Climate change will also complicate the delivery of energy, in that many of these supply networks
are highly vulnerable to hurricanes, typhoons and other extreme weather events. As the worldwide
demand for energy expand and reliance on these far-flung networks grows along with it, energy
security will inevitably entail increase emphasis on the protection of global delivery systems. Also
complicating the task of procuring sufficient energy to meet future needs is the commitment most
states have made to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions in accordance with the Paris Climate
Agreement of 2015.
For now, the promotion of “energy security” will largely entail efforts to reduce dependence on
imported supplies and to expand domestic sources of supply. However, as global awareness of the
detrimental effects of climate change spreads, policymakers will come under increasing pressure to
limit the consumption of fossil fuels and to increase reliance on climate-friendly alternatives.
WOMEN, PEACE AND SECURITY
Feminist scholars have identified that the arena of international relations, politics and security are
highly gendered activities. Using gender as a lens, feminist scholars and activities have explored the
meaning and power attributed to masculinities and femminities within international relations, and
in respect to women’s lives and rights have identified how those meaning determine where women
are and what they think about being there.
Since 2000, the UN Security Council has adopted a series of resolutions focused on “women, peace
and security” (WPS). The WPS agenda aimed to garner acknowledgement of these realities and to
generate understanding and prompt responses to the gendered ways that women and men
experience insecurity, war and its aftermath.
Our societies attribute specific traits, values and meanings to male and female identities,
constructing social differences based on stereotyped ideas of masculinity and femininity. These
ideals are assumed to be the natural behaviors expected of men and women, refined by their
intersection with other identity makers such as race, ethnicity, age and class. Gender does not
determine our lives on an individual basis, but it is a way of categorizing, ordering and symbolizing
power, of hierarchically structuring relationships between different categories of people, and
different human activities symbolically associated with masculinity and femininity. Hence, it shapes
individuals as well as social, political and economic systems which in turn shape identities and
institutions. Gender will determine our access to privilege and power, and condition experiences of
disadvantage and discrimination.
The WPS agenda establishes policy responses that aim to redress the ways that the power and
privilege attached to masculinity has historically excluded women’s experiences of war and their
participation in policy processes. The WPS agenda evidences the need for gendered understanding
and response to all aspects of security and peace. For women, these include responses to the rights
violations that affect them during conflict, such as sexual violence; to the barriers that prevent
women’s participation in post-war elections; and to the ways that post-war economic opportunities
need to be tailored to both men and women’s shared. Through the lens of gender and gendered
power relations, WPS agenda responds to the historical exclusions and invisibility of women and
their interests within international peace and security policies and processes to date.
Several successive and interlinked developments, prompting the Security Council’s openness
to women’s concerns and interests, were crucial to the eventual adoption of the WPS agenda.
First, changes to international relations in the post-Cold War era freed some of the paralysis the
Security Council had experienced during that period.
Secondly, a growing recognition of the violations of women’s rights in the armed conflicts of the
mid-1990s, particularly in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda.
Thirdly, a third arena of development, the adoption of the human security agenda in the UN system.
Fourthly, the Security Council was experiencing a rapid expansion in its adoption of resolutions.
Fifthly, from 1999 the Security Council began holding thematic “open debates”, which include the
broader membership of the UN system and are now a regular feature of the council’s work as well
as “Arria Formula” meeting, which are informal, confidential meeting between the Security Council
and an invited constituency, primarily used as a vehicle to hear from civil society.
The provisions of the eight resolutions that make up the WPS agenda may be summarily
framed as addressing four critical areas:
- Prevention: ensuring that women are involved in conflict prevention and resolution process,
and that women’s micro and macro-level prevention and mediation work is recognized;
- Participation: ensuring the full participation of women in decision-making processes that
impact them, their family and their communities, including peace processes and broader
political, social and economic realms;
- Protections: ensuring that women and girls’ human rights are protected in times of conflict
and peacebuilding with specific attention to protection from gendered violence;
- Relief and recovery: ensuring that women and girls’ rights and needs are addressed within
humanitarian operations, transition, reconstruction and peacebuilding activities.
The WPS resolutions generally recognize the “continuing need to increase women’s participation
and the consideration of gender-related issues in all discussions pertinent to the prevention and
resolution of armed conflict.
Women’s participation on the basis of their right to participate and be heard remains a
challenge as women are only “allowed in” if it is seen as advantageous to the existing order.
Women’s rights are therefore in their essence compromised for the sake of gaining entry to security
institutions; with the popularity of the WPS agenda, many are skeptical that “adding women” to the
security system may serve to legitimize those institutions, rather than transform the ways that they
do business; the original intent of engagement with the Security Council for women’s organizations,
which was an end to militarism, is compromised when the argument for gendered approaches is
instrumentalized and used to further approaches to security based on militarism; there is the very
real risk of harm to women and girls when their work to promote gender equality through peace
and security-related initiatives as perceived as being co-opted by state security actors and thereby
seen to advance the approaches of the state.
Since its adoption, the WPS agenda has been characterized by glacial progress on
implementation of the provisions it sets out. For example, of 10 billion dollars invested in fragile
states, only 2% was spend on promoting gender equality as a specific objective of that work. The
reasons behind these gaps are complex: it may be argued that they stem from the resolutions
themselves. Indeed, the WPS resolutions are characterized by relatively weak compliancepromoting language where the Security Council “recommend” and “requests” rather than compels
actions. The WPS resolutions are considered to be “soft-law” as they are not adopted under the
Security Council’s Chapter VII enforcement provisions.
To address the implementation deficit, multiple accountability strategies have been proposed.
Among these measures are the requests by the Security Council for annual reports from the UN
Secretary General; the adoption of a Comprehensive Set of Indicators” that measure compliance to
the resolutions by the UN agencies and member states and are reported against in the SecretaryGeneral’s reports; and the adoption of a seven-point action plan on women’s participation in
peacebuilding, which attempts to enforce compliance of the UN system with the WPS agenda.
The range of harms that women may experience in armed conflict are usually associated
with sexual violence. The latter is evidenced to occur on a systematic and strategic basis. Wartime
rape is used as a “weapon of war” by some armed groups in some conflicts, primarily because of
the gendered meanings attached to sexual violence. It occurs in a range of different forms and ways
and by different actors. The Security Council engagement with sexual violence through the adoption
of four WPS resolutions
ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE:
The period before the Anthropocene was called Holocene and it was a stable period that facilitate
it the flourishing of humanity. However, the latter is coming to an end and we are accelerating
towards global warming.
In order to arrest this, we need a “safe operating space for humanity”. Climate change is the first
reason for this change along with the extermination of many species, the destruction of many biodiverse systems, the reduction of clean water, the rapid change in land use and the appropriation
of fresh water for human use.
The planet should be maintained as it was during the period of the Holocene in order for it to
flourish. Therefore, maintaining this condition is a priority for the global environmental society.
Since the middle of the 21st century, climate change has been an issue of International Security.
Some believe that climate change is a “threat multiplier”, meaning that in future crisis it could make
violence more likely. Some of the consequences could be international economic disruptions, food
price spikes and social unrest. Climate is thus understood as a matter of sustainable development,
and the role of military is still unclear.
Fears and concerns about the future are growing and the 2015 Paris Climate Agreement was a first
step in thinking more seriously about the long-term consequences of their actions. Climate change
was therefore integrated into the discussion of the Sustainable Development Goals. However, the
problem of the discussion on the Anthropocene concerns not only the importance of not doing harm
but also do more. That is why scholars are discussing better ways to make and the transition to more
ecologically benign modes of wing.
On the other hand, climate change policies can be threats to national security because they might
lead to a diplomatic strategies to slow international agreements to deal with climate change period
but the Anthropocene makes it clear that humans are much more interconnected with each other
and with the natural world than ever expected and security measures must not only deal with the
complications of climate change and the rapid changing of circumstances but also to the
marginalized groups that are more vulnerable and insecure to the crisis. Fragile states must be aided
to improve their capacity to deal with possible risks led by climate change such as insecurity or
migration as well as extreme weather events or food degradations.
Ch. 38: Outer space
Outer space should be considered “res communis”, hence it should be treated as province of all
mankind. The UN's outer space treaty ban any state or nation from appropriating outer space bodies
and prohibits the weaponizing of outer space, allowing for only peaceful actions there. The
exploitation of outer space shall be carried out only for the benefit and in the interests of all
countries. Indeed, there are negative duties and positive duties that benefit all mankind.
The News Space entrepreneurs proposed to reach outer space to extract resources from other
planets and create off world settlements. With regards to Security, this availability of resources and
territories may spark conflicts and the weaponizing of outer space. In the absence of an
authoritative body that can effectively govern outer space, it is unclear how questions of off earth
territorial claims of jurisdiction could be settled.
Also, since the jurisdiction of international law is designed to end at the boundaries of the planet, it
is unclear whether or not states will respect claims to sovereignty made on outer space bodies. In
2015, the USA passed the Space Act, allowing citizens to engage in the commercial exploitation of
space resources. This act undermines the idea of the UN's idea of outer space as the common
heritage of all mankind and scholars are concerned that this situation might produce armed conflict.
While international law phrase is outer space as a global common, the emerging New Space sector
is challenging these norms among with key assumptions about sovereignty and security. Even
though new space actors are instrumentalizing space exploitation as the only means to solve earth
issues, they also cause various threats on their own, both in obvious and potential.
Chapter 36, Health
Over the past decade, health issues have begun to appear on the security agenda. With the spread
of Ebola in 2014 it was proven that the security of the majority of people is at risk especially
regarding health. The current pandemic has for sure confirmed the statement.
For many years their relationship between health and national security has been limited and
unidirectional: conflicts cause health problems. However, in more recent times and especially now,
the term “health security” has been further developed. The latter refers to biosecurity relating to
any health issue that can be a threat to a community, to health threats that have become global in
nature requiring a global response, to health threats to the functioning of a state.
The end of the Cold War saw security analysts shift their focus away from military threats to more
diffuse risks . Also, the human agency highly attributed to the consideration of health and its place
on the foreign and security policy agenda. Three issues contributed to the emergence of health as
a security issue: HIV, the spread of the new and existing infectious diseases and bioterrorism. In
particular, HIV pandemic has not only led to widespread humanitarian concerns but has been
defined as a security issue by the UN Security Council because of its effects on the state stability.
Indeed, it causes severe economic problems leading to an increase of income inequalities. HIV has
also a severe impact on peacekeeping. Conversely, bioterrorism is the idea of using biological agents
to cause disease as a weapon of war. 3 problems have emerged with the risk of bioterrorism:
tensions between internationally versus domestically focused strategies; the doubt whether it is
better to try to prevent such attacks from happening or whether the priority should be on defense;
and whether the risk has been overstated.
But the major powers refer to the new spread and possible pandemic. 3 reasons why the
classification of infectious diseases as security threats: the spread could cause a direct threat to
the well-being of people; a pandemic may cause social disruption and threatened the effective
functioning of the state; a large-scale pandemic may also contribute to economic decline, and the
macroeconomic effects of a major epidemic may therefore be very significant.
Now we know that threats to people survival, likelihood and dignity brought by COVID-19 illustrate
how the pandemic is much more than a health crisis. It has also resulted in an increase of
unemployment and an economic and institutional crisis. It has exposed the weaknesses in the
delivery of social services as well as system of social protection and precarious and therefore states
it has brought additional shock. As COVID-19 accelerates globally, we must place health security at
the forefront of our efforts to stop the spread of the pandemic and build a more inclusive and
resilient future.
Cybersecurity
Cyber security has become a key issue and global security as attacks and intrusions have had a broad
impact and because cyber capabilities and weapons are now widely utilized by non-state actors.
In general, cyber security is the defense of computers and servers, mobile devices, electronic
systems, networks and data from malicious attacks.
There are three macro categories of activity namely computer network attack, computer network
defense and computer network exploitation.
It is important to note the difference between cyber-attack, which is destructive and cyber
exploitation, which is non-destructive and aims at gaining confidential information.
Since cyber operations are difficult to attribute and stop, there is considerable discussion about
deterrence as a way to be to ensure security of network and data.
In essence, deterrence theory holds that maintaining incredible disciplinary retaliatory capability
can prevent opponents from attacking, since they know that if they attack, they will be destroyed.
Even if it works for nuclear activity it is difficult to be applied on the cyber field. The actors involved
are several more and difficult to trace and hence attribution can be difficult.
In 2004 the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime entered into force as well as the Tallinn Manual
that applies general cyber norms and more specific rules of law to the international law. In
particular, the Tallinn Manual on the international law applicable to cyber operations provides an
extremely detailed legislation on the application of international law and norms to the cyber
domain. However, it is not a formal treaty but a guide. The manual is built around the premise that
cyber warfare is governed by existing international law, specifically by the laws of armed conflict
and international humanitarian law such as the Geneva Conventions.
Some important norms are:
 Prohibition of the use of force  states are responsible for cyber-attacks in their borders
 A cyber operation becomes an act of war if it causes harm to individuals or damages
 in convenience of minor disruptions are not acts of War to use of for
Estonia case Study  2007, Estonian state institutions subject to a sustained attack by a skilled
cyber adversary. These attacks were politically motivated and lasted for three weeks. Estonia
developed and implemented a national cybersecurity strategy, reflecting an emphasis on privatepublic partnerships and readiness of safeguard critical networks and critical data.
THEORETICAL APPROACHES
Realism
The realist tradition has exercised a major influence over the field of security studies. Although
realist approaches all share the same common idea that relations among states occur in repetitive
patterns. According to them, states behavior is driven by their leaders’ human nature or by the
anarchic international system, also wars and conflicts are explained by selfish human appetites for
power and accumulation. We can distinguish six variations of realism: classical realism,
neorealism, defense structural realism, offensive realism, rise and fall realism, neoclassical.
Classical realism: it can be dated back to 1939 with the publication of “The Twenty Years’ Crisis”
by Edward Carr. However, Morgenthau’s “politics Among Nations: the struggle for power and
peace” became the standard text for political realism. According to Morgenthau, because the
desire for more power is rooted in the nature of humanity, states are engaged in a struggle to
increase their capabilities. Therefore, classical realism explains conflicts with reference to human
failing: wars are the result of aggressive statemen. International politics is evil, bad things happen
because the people who make foreign policies are evil.
Is Donald Trump a realist? Trump’s foreign policy appears to be aligning with the views od
offensive structural realism. However, the administration’s actions have not aligned with his
declarations. Indeed, the US involvement in Iraq and Syria are violating the principles of
sophisticated power maximization at the base of offensive structural realism.
Neorealism: at the heart of neorealism is the “Theory of International Politics” by Waltz.
According to him, political structures are characterized by 3 elements:
- and ordering principle (anarchic or hierarchical).
- The character of the units (when could be functionally/differentiated).
- The distribution of capabilities.
For what concerns the international system, it is characterized by and anarchic ordering principle,
units of states that remain functionally alike and distributions of capabilities that could be bipolar
or multipolar. Differently from classical realist, Waltz’s theory is not based on leaders’ motivations
and state characteristics as causal variables for international actions except for the minimal
assumption that state seek to survive. Moreover, if classical realism suggests that state divisions
are taken rationally, Waltz believes that state behavior can be a product of competition or a
product of socialization. Waltz also noted that in international politics the same issues occur over
and over with the same outcomes. Systems are generative and the international pollical systems is
characterized by complex non-linear relationships and unintended consequences. Outcomes are
influenced by something more than simply the aggregation of individual states’ behavior.
Neorealists see international politic as tragic rather than as driven by the aggressive behavior of
revisionist states. According to Waltz multipolar systems are less stable than bipolar ones because
interdependence is lower in bipolarity, than in multiple already, and in any case, single hegemony
is indeed impossible. Neorealism declined in 1990s because of international events that seem to
provide strong support for alternative approaches. However, there are four contemporary streams
of political realism, which are rise and fall realism, neoclassical, defensive structural, offensive
structural, they all believe that international relations are characterized by an endless and
inescapable succession of wars, and they agree that rational calculation is the micro foundation,
that translates those preferences into behavior, they differ on the preferences.
Defensive structural realism: It shares neorealism’s minimal assumptions about state motivation,
suggesting that states seek security in an anarchic international system, and that the main threat
to their well-being comes from other states. Three main differences with neorealism:
- first one allows several multiple micro-foundations to explain state behavior, defensive
realism relies only on rational choice.
-
Defensive realism adds the offense-defense balance as a variable.
Rationality plus offense provoke defense balance = states should support the status quo
balancing is the appropriate response to threatening concentrations of powers. The balance of
threat theory by Waltz: states estimate threats posed by other states by their relative powers,
proximity and intentions and the offense-defense balance. Defensive realism has some difficulties
in relying on security dilemma dynamics.
Offensive structural realism: states take an uncertain international environment in which any
state might use its power to harm others. In these cases, security requires acquiring as much
power compared to other states as possible MEARSHEIMER theory of offensive structural realism
says that.
- the international system is anarchic
- great powers possess some offensive military capability and therefore can damage each
other
- states cannot be certain about other states intentions.
- Survival is the primary goal of great powers,
- great powers are rational act, actors
hence the great powers fear each other and can rely only on themselves for their security, the
best strategy for states is to ensure their survival by maximizing the relative power.
Safety comes only from being the most powerful state in the system, or wherever that Germany is
impossible. Therefore, the second best option is to attain regional hegemony, even in the absence
of each type of Germany states strive to maximize both their wealth and their military capabilities,
we're fighting battles in order to gain resources states resort to war against each other.
Mearsheimer, also analyze the state behavior depending on where it is located continental great
powers will seek regional hegemony, But in the case of its failure, it will maximize its relative
power insular states will balance against rising states, not try to be original hegemony, regional
head demands. On the other hand, seek to defend the current favorable distribution of
capabilities. The main causes of war are located in the architecture of the international system.
What matters is the number of great powers and how much power, each one controls grid power.
Worse, our allies are least likely in bipolar systems, while more likely in multipolar ones because
they are unbalanced.
Rise and Fall realism: war between major powers is least likely when the international system is
dominated by a single state, and when there are not rising challengers. Stability is a product of a
hegemonic order because states that are dissatisfied lack capabilities to change it, while the risk of
war increases when a rising challenger attempts to capture the top spot, and the declining
hegemon, wants to preserve it. In contrast with Neo realism, rising and falling realism believes
that growth is a internal process to state, and since the dynamics like industrialization or
technological innovation, do not occur in each state, at the same time, states tend to rise and fall
in relation to one another.
Neoclassical realism: it suggests that what states do depends on the influences located at the
domestic level of analysis. Transmission approach to foreign policysystematic pressure is filtered
through variables at the international level, to produce specific foreign policy decisions. hence,
although distribution of capabilities is a good starting point. International systems are hard to read
when talking about foreign policy dimensions and variables at the international level is the
medium point between systematic pressures and state behavior that determine the precise
nature and direction of a state's foreign economic and military policy. Sheller’s theory of “under
balancing” states that, for example, talking about UK and France before World War Two. Unified
states find it easier to recognize threats and carry out appropriate balancing strategies to assess
them.
Realism and the rise of China.
- Offensive structural realism predicts a future of intense security competition and global
insecurity. If China as power continues to grow. It is likely to assert greater control in Asia,
because given the required capabilities, states will pursue regional hegemony, to stay safe.
China may use capabilities to dictate neighbors on how to behave, or wherever the US and
its neighbors will align to create a balancing coalition to contest, China's rise. The US will
likely pursue aggressive policies in the attempt of remain the world's only regional
hegemon
- Defensive structural realism. They expect China's rise to be more devoted to resources of
military technology and capabilities, it could start a security dilemma scenario, if China
does not express them to be only devoted to security alone. They believe that the US
should accommodate China's growth and promote peaceful relations.
- Rise and fall realism. Instead, they believe that relations between the US and China will
become increasingly agonistic. The US will not give up its part. And as China's power
increases, they're likely to demand more influence in international politics. And if these
conditions are not met, they could try to dethrone the US by launching and her demonic or
for this to happen, June, China must not only rise but rise in relation to the US. Even if
Chinese growth continues, It will depend on China's ability to establish the status quo and
articulate for a new international order that inspires collaboration. A number of in inter
wearing factors could moderate security competition between China and the US and
provide for a peaceful transition. For example, nuclear weapons for both, and political
liberalization.
Liberalism
Kant's perpetual peace may be understood as the first liberal theory. However, liberal security has
been elaborated by many scholars, Moravcsik distinguished between ideational, commercial and
republican liberalism, Doyle between international commercial and ideological, Zacher and
Matthews identified four different implications for security planning.
Kantian liberalism: the only justified form of government is the republican government, where
everything is ruled by law, because also rules are subject to categorical imperatives, Republican
states are seen as peace producers because they have the habit of consultation and because of
the legal foundations. A state built on laws will be less likely to endorse in unlawful behavior in
international relations. However, that was not sufficient to ensure world peace because the
international system is lawless. And therefore, republican states at the duty to push for laws that
can regulate international relations. He criticizes the concept of balance of power and refused the
idea that the balance of power is a peacekeeper.
Kant’s peace program is constructed in two parts:
- The first one is the abolition of instruments that could create the conditions of the war of
all against all, such as standing army, or assassination as an instrument of diplomacy.
- Once the first phase is concluded by all states, liberal and non-liberal, three articles to
provide the actual foundation for peace
1. First, the civil constitution of every state should be Republican.
2. Second, the law of nations shall be founded on federation of states.
3. Third, universe so stuck out so at the base of world citizenship to create a sense of
cosmopolitan community.
According to Moravcsik, commercial liberalism focuses on uncertainties created by opportunities
for trans-border economic transactions. According to him, trade is better than war in
accumulating wealth. He genuinely believes that giving up mercantilism and allowing freedom to
trade would civilize the citizens of a nation facilitating a peaceful coexistence among fellow
citizens and guaranteeing the rule of law. International Trade would therefore incline nations to
peace. Liberal trade doctrine of “douce commerce” holds that trade amongst states, like trade
among individuals, is mutually beneficial. The market was civil society and peace; economic power
in the hands of government is conflict and war.
The Democratic peace thesis: it is the argument that liberal states do not fight wars against other
liberal states. Doyle argued that there was a difference between relations among liberal societies
and liberal societies and between liberal ones and non-liberal societies. He observed that almost
no liberal states had fought wars against other states. And if that was the case, it was because
liberalism was just established. He included free trade In the three preconditions of Kant.
There are 2 theories:
- liberal institutions: liberal state and the need to ensure that broad popular support, the
division of powers in democratic states which produces checks and balances, the electoral
cycle which makes liberal leadership cautious and prone to avoid risks, liberal institutions
tend to inhibit all wars.
- liberal culture: liberal states tend to trust other liberal states and to expect to reduce
conflict through discussion and compromise. But equally they distrust other liberal states.
Therefore, following the study of Doyle some say that the most democracies are more
peaceful than non-democracies, and they are generally more Pacific; others believe that
states are not necessarily peaceful but avoid the use of force in relation to other
democracies. And finally, others argue that democracies are generally stronger in the use
of force.
Neoliberal institutionalism: focus on the ability of institutions, to redefine state order and act as
arbitrators in state disputes. They can change the character of the international environment by
influencing state preferences and state behavior, international institutions do this by a variety of
methods that either create strong incentives for cooperation, such as favorable trade status or
powerful disincentives, such as trade sanctions. According to Axelrod theory of “shadows of the
future” cooperation was not going to be abandoned by states once institutionalized. Once agents
return good for good. This initiates a potential spiral of cooperation behavior.
Transaction cost theory: institutions are desirable because despite the constraints they impose to
state, they reduce transaction costs associated with rulemaking negotiating and enforcing
information gathering and conflict resolutions, they are also durable.
Constructivist institutionalism: conceptualizes institutions as a collection of norms, rules, and
routines, rather than a formal structure. Individuals actions are guided by social expectations,
rather than utility maximization calculations.
Neoliberal institutionalism VS realism: states create institutions to maximize shared interests VS
states create institutions to realize and maintain domination.
Constructivism
argues that the world is constituted socially through inter subjective interactions that agents and
structures are mutually constituted, and that ideational factors such as norms and identity, are
central to the constitution and dynamics of world politics. They share a belief that security is a
social construction, meaning different things in different contexts. Security is also seen as a side of
negotiation in which actors compete to define the identity and values of a particular group, in
order to provide a foundation for political action, identity and norms are central to the study of
security, because they provide the limits for feasible and legitimate political action. Constructivists
believe that their role is needed to really understandand some traditional security dynamics. They
can give us a deeper insight on how security works in world politics, and how particular ideas
about security and threat come into being in particular contexts, and in a particular timing.
Critical Theory
Critical Theory originated from the Marxist tradition, which, during the Cold War, formed the basis
of dependency and world system theory. In the years before and after the Cold War, critical
theory became part of a larger post positivist challenge to the discipline, and development of
critical security studies. At the heart of contestation within the arena of critical security is the
concept of emancipation, developed by several members of the Frankfurt School in particular
critical security analysts have addressed the question of how given the range of threats or rules
that exist in the world, some threats come to have priority, and others become the focus of
discourses of security. For what concerns critical theory and security. It all started in the political
world of the Cold War. In the post- World War Two, the proccupation, with force structures and
social science, created a distance from the politics of security in a critical debate developed with
Cox, he argued that problem solving theory takes the world as it is, and attempts to find solutions
to problems within it. While Critical Theory raises questions about the historical location of both
theories and the theory in general critical security studies is distinguished from a longer tradition
of security studies by the adoption of a critical approach.
The construction of threats: traditional security studies, asked the question about how to respond
to objective threats, while critical security analysts have begun with a different question about
how given the range of threats or risks that exist in the world. Some threats are prioritized,
respect toothers, conventional approaches to security start with an objective threat, which is
assumed to exist independently of the routines procedures discourses and knowledge brought to
bear it by security agencies. Conversely, more critical approaches emphasize that threats are a
product of a politics of representation, a potential threat is not an external phenomenon, but a
security question measurement of the scope and seriousness of threats are shaped by social,
cultural and political processes that produce some phenomena as security threats, while largely
ignoring others.
Emancipation: according to Booth, security means the absence of threats and emancipation is the
freeing of people from those physical inhuman constraints which stopped them carrying out what
they could freely choose to do. He understands security and emancipation as two sides of the
same coin.
Feminism
Since there is no best way to start international relations, and peace are different from feminism,
it is important to analyze different perspectives. Indeed, each feminist perspective, draws our
attention to different ways of thinking about gender and conceptualizing the gendered nature of
international security and different ways of responding to the problems of global politics.
Liberal feminists: privilege notions of equality and have tended to focus on questions of women's
representation within the public space. Many scholars focus on the ways in which within
governments and international institutions, we men remain highly underrepresented. They want
to remove the barriers posed a woman's participation. For the sake of permitting to those women
were interested, an equal opportunity to take on the challenges of political and public life.
Radical feminists: they focus less on notions of numerical equality and more on notions of
difference for them. Women and men are essentially quite different from one another, and
essentially quite similar to one another. Patriarchy influences the ways in which the world
operates and the ways in which we think about the world, they differ from liberal feminists, in the
fact that they view the patriarchal as existing everywhere. Patriarchy impacts every way of life, in
their opinion political representation is necessary not because of liberals’ values but rather
because they bring a new insight to politics, which could lead to peace and cooperation.
Feminist’s critical theory: focus on prevailing assumptions about both men and women. They
argued that prevailing norms associated with masculinity must be examined and may have an
enormous impact on men themselves. According to them, the concepts of masculinity, as well as
femininity are not just part of a discourse, but are indeed based on real living conditions of men
and women, and include, but it's not limited to the conditions of race, class, sexuality, ethnicity,
culture and religion.
Feminist’s postmodernist: they argue that any definition or standpoint, will necessarily be partial.
In any attempt to pose it a single or universal through needs to be deconstructed.
Post-colonial feminist theorists: argue that of the partial truth about gender, imperialism
constitutes one of the crucial movements through which modern identities, become established.
they attempt to.
Women gender and security
Gender neutral analysis of armed conflicts regularly does not focus on people at all, but rather on
states or other armed groups, and on the resources gained or lost. Men are assumed to be more
impacted by war than women who are assumed to be only indirectly impacted by it. Therefore,
although not generally contemplated in the analysis of what may be considered security or
insecurity, early feminists disrupted these assumptions. Women usually do invisible jobs
associated with supporting fighting forces, and are therefore regular, regularly impacted by the
violence of armed conflict.
During the Cold War era, it became increasingly obvious. In the new conflicts, women emerged as
targets of sexual violence, prostitution, sexual slavery, mutilation and sexual trafficking. However,
sexual violence sometimes excludes other important aspects, such as being targeted or active are
indeed women are also victims in terms of economic losses. They lack access to health care or
educational facilities. First, focusing strictly on the sexual violence perpetrated against women and
girls during armed conflicts, directs our attention away from the many others. effect so armed
conflict on their lives Also Eat directs our attention away from sex through violence towards boys
and men, usually used to attack their sense of manhood.
Feminists do not focus only on the impacts of war on women and men but also they explore the
ways in which women are actors in armed conflict. If they can be victims, they can be active
agents. Women are also extremely active and informal peace processes such as manifestation. But
rarely invited to formal peace tables and excluded from disarmament demobilization and
reintegration. Men on the other hand pressure to held power and decision making authority prior
to the emergence of conflict and to have been combatants and investigators throughout the
conflict. Therefore, they are assumed to be directly right targets even though they are not directly
involved in the conflict. Women and men can both be active in wars and armed conflicts in a
variety of ways, either as perpetrators or violence or as participants in peace processes. However,
the prevailing understandings and assumptions about women and men in conflict can significantly
shape and limit those experiences in both positive and negative ways.
Furthermore, many feminists focus on the way in which gender is constructed, through security,
and on the ways in which security is constructed through gender. Some feminist scholars have
examined the practices of national security, think tanks, nuclear strategy, foreign policy decisions
and even studying weapons of mass destruction in the way in which assumptions around gender
impact and are impacted by these processes.
Therefore, feminists made several interventions in international security: they analyzed the
differential impact of armed conflict on women and men. The impact on women and men of
naturalized assumptions about their behavior and actions and the ways in which assumptions
around masculinity and femininity figure into conflict and decision making and the continuum of
militarization. The ways in which gender’s implicated in questions of international security are
multifaced, but it all shows how international security is a gender-neutral set of practices.
Post structuralism
Post structuralism includes various scholars who are contributing to new strands of critical
research on war and security. They are interested in the discourse on knowledge and the idea of
security as a logic informing war as practice. They challenge what security itself might be, but also
questions where and how security is practiced.
Sights of post structuralism explore how security is seen when viewed through post structuralist
lenses. States are necessary to prove that when security is analyzed as a logic informing war, the
states in which a politics of security is prioritized are only limited by imagination. Insights
demonstrate that security is a logic forming war as practice.
Post structuralist critiques have challenged where and how security operates and propose a more
sociologically oriented approach to security. Post structuralism critique can demonstrate how the
discursive logic of security has real life effects.
Securitization
In the 90s, a group of scholars developed a securitization theory to try to understand the changing
dynamics of threats. After the cold war they issues considers considered as threats increased. But
some are still ignored and considered security issues only. In specific times, or parts of the world.
It is usually associated with the Copenhagen School, which argued that security threats are created
when authors actors label something a security threat and relevant audiences accept this
designation. Therefore, under the right conditions. Labeling something as a security issue makes it
a security issue, leading to particular political consequences. securitization is the process by which
issues become part of the security agenda. securitization theory responded to changes in the
international system that occurred with the end of the Cold War, developing a framework of
analysis that would satisfy both the traditionalists who believe that an expansion of the concept of
security would lead to its potential loss of meaning. And the others who wanted to expand the
concept of security beyond military political threats. Indeed, according to Buzan, security is a
particular type of politics that occurs not just in the traditional military sector, but also in other
sectors like political, economic, environmental, and say, social and in society. They opened up the
possibility that a range of issues could potentially be a concern of security, while retaining a core
focus on issues of survival and the role of powerful political actors such as national leaders in
addressing these issues. The key to this approach was to understand our issues become security
threats. The CS argued that security as a special quality and therefore security is a speech act.
Hence it is not descriptive, but performative. Moreover the Copenhagen School approach argued
that threats can be both real or perceived however according to them what matters is not if it is
real or not but rather than the fact that securitize an issue it is a political fact that has
consequences because the operation is particular and specific thus something can be defined as a
security problem when the elites say so for the Copenhagen school security is equated with
survival when an actor defines an issue as a threat and the audience accepts that is ignition
securitization occurs it is all dependent on the external context and all leads to a successful
securitization a range of factors affect the potential success of securitization internal and external
the first concerns this beach act itself and the extent to which it follows the logic and grammar of
secure security creating a narrative that designates a threat and the 2nd 1 concerns the general
circumstances of the act.
Paris School securitization is a process that happens through routine and everyday practices.
When analyzing the relationship between security and securitization we have a:
- realist approach: security is states condition that they want to achieve in an anarchic
international system
- human security approach: security seen as a condition of a state of being add individual
level security equal welfare of human beings
- constructivists approach: does not see it as a state of being but as a process or practice
(also post structuralist and securitization theories).
The important distinction between the Copenhagen school and more traditional approaches to
security is that for the Copenhagen school it does not matter if there is an actual threat only if the
issue is represented and thought of as such they recognized that threats can be the real or
perceived but argued that trying to define real security outside of the world of politics want help
political analysis much the critics are dead by theorizing security as a speech actor the
Copenhagen school neglects other kinds of acts that might bring security into being speech is not
the only way to communicate secondly they fail to theorize these eating any depth the emphasis
remains on the speech act as a moment of intervention securitization puts the spotlight on the
process by which issues are added to the security agenda and what happens afterwards.
SECURITIZATION THEORY
- 1990s
- Constructivist analysis from Copenhagen peace research institute
- Security threats are created when actors (elites) label something a security threat and
relevant audiences accept this designation
- “securitization” = process by which issues become part of the security agenda
Many examples: es during Bush presidency, he decided to insert in western minds he had to fight
a JUST war against terror, the elite decide war on terror could be in Iraq Afghanistan ecc. The
audience accepted it. But how can I make an idea accepted by audience? Propaganda, tv shows,
movies, newspapers ecc.
Another ex: If I think that there is a coupe in Uganda and I am the British gov, I (Boris Johnson)
decide that this is a security threat for the UK (starting to say it on tv ecc) but now another coup
happens in Rwanda even if they are the same thing. I decide Uganda’s coup is a threat because it
is an interest for the UK.
Barry Buzan (1998) security: a new framework for analysis
After cold war a debate originated between “wideners” (expansion of security beyond militarypolitical threats, es environmental security, human security) and “traditionalists” (only
phenomenon of war stricto sensus). After 1990, security was linked to political, economic,
environmental, social sectors. Security as survival. The Copenhagen school synthetizes between
wideners and traditionalists. The process of securitization is what in language theory is called a
speech act. By saying the words, something is done (Buzan et al. 1998:26) security as “speech act”.
Threats can be real or perceived, when states securitize an issue it is a political pact that has
consequences since this securitization will cause the actor to operate in a different mode that
would have otherwise. Thus, something is a security problem when the elites declare it to be so.
Security = survival
Securitization: process by which issues become part of security agenda
Speech act: utterance that is also an act
De-securitizing: issues removed from security agenda
Sectors of security: at least 5 (Buzan)
Facilitating conditions: conditions that affect likelihood a securitization will be successful
Audience: whichever group the securitizing move tries to convince
Main debates:
- Limits of speech act
- Logic of security/politics
- Audience vs power
- Ethics of de-securitization
- Propaganda, fake news, psychological manipulation
REALIST PATH TO SECURITY:
-re-armament
-alliances
-arms control negotiations
LIBERAL PATH TO SECURITY
-int law
-Int organizations
-Integration (political and economic)
-Democratization
Global peace index: list countries to most to least peaceful
Variables:
- Number and duration of internal conflicts
- N of deaths from external organized conflicts
- Ecc
- Societal safety
- Militarization
Post-colonialism
Post-colonialism is not only a theory but an approach or orientation. There is no postcolonial
school of security studies but tit provides important insights for students of security. Postcolonialism is concerned with the enduring legacy of colonisation across the globe. It seems to
analyze, explain and center the ways in which empire and imperialism continue to structure
interactions between the ‘east’ and the ‘west’ (or Global North and Global South).
It is particularly sensitive to the relationship between imperialism and culture especially in the
practices of representation though which the colonisers produces knowledge about the colonised.
Rather than viewing the colonisers as positive objects of knowledge, post-colonialism aims tot
elevate the experiences of those in the Global South as legitimate subjects of academic inquiry.
Postcolonial security studies: most people agree that continental approaches to security studies
are based on a problematic ontology of world views, one within privileges —> the West over the
rest. Resulting in a a field based on the experience a small proportion of the world states sand
peoples.
Pag. 123: we can see this in the vocabulary used, as it is structured around white privilege; key
historical moments in dominant IR narratives are often based on the interests and experiences of
western subjects.
Smaller states and countries in the Third World are neglected because they are seen as largely
irrelevant players in the international realm. Moreover, the security concerns of the Third World
are either completely marginalised or interpreted as extensions of a greater power concerns on a
smaller scale (Cold War: Third-World-related security issues tended to be read through the lens of
superpower rivalry). Finally, postcolonial theorists of IR agree that the way in which conventional
security studies deal with these important questions of power, agency and hierarchy makes it an
ethnocentric field of study.
Postcolonial scholars challenge what they believe to be the Eurocentric and radicalised nature of
dominant narratives in IR. Most agree that the study and practice of security continue to privilege
the Western subjects as the primary site of experimental and source of knowledge, systematically
sidelining the world views, perspectives and lived realities of those in the Global South.
While the recommendations differ, they agree thwart the colonial experience is fundamental to
the project of modernity. Postcolonial writing, given its diversity of perspectives and experimental
bases, considerably enriches and challenges conventional understandings of power, violence, and
security.