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Domain analytical information and
knowledge organization:
investigating the externalist and
internalist conception
of information
Martin Muderspach Thellefsen
Domain
analysis and
knowledge
organization
21
Received 1 July 2021
Revised 15 March 2022
Accepted 17 March 2022
Department of Communication, Faculty of Humanities, University of Copenhagen,
Copenhagen, Denmark
Abstract
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to discuss and clarify a possible realist foundation of domain analysis
and knowledge organization, and in this vein, investigate into how the concept of information is to be
understood at a lower but necessary conceptual level in domain analysis.
Design/methodology/approach – The paper investigates into the foundation of domain analysis as
formulated by Birger Hjørland, and develops a realist framework for domain analytical information and
knowledge organization based on critical realism.
Findings – Information can meaningfully be considered as the prerequisite for domain analysis, and critical
realism may provide for a realist ontological framework for domain analysis and knowledge organization.
Originality/value – The paper includes new insights into the foundation of information and domain analysis.
Keywords Domain analysis, Information studies, Critical realism, Semiotic object, Knowledge organization,
Internal-external information
Paper type Conceptual paper
Introduction
Domain Analysis as a theoretical framework for information science (IS) was originally
formulated by Hjørland and Albrechtsen (1995) as a new approach to IS, emphasizing of the
collective ecology and content-oriented nature of knowledge and knowledge production. It
was a programmatic article that argued that “the best way to understand information in IS is
to study the knowledge-domains as thought or discurse communities” (Hjørland and
Albrechtsen, 1995, p. 400). In 2002, Hjørland suggested eleven approaches for the information
specialist (Hjørland, 2002a). Even though domain analysis and the select approaches emanate
from the scope of IS, the ambition of the theoretical foundation of domain analysis is not
isolated to the trivialities of library management, but rather a view based in epistemology and
documentation; thus, the overall ambition of domain analysis is to seek out the very
foundation of knowledge as it shows itself in social discourse. Therefore, rather than
providing for a set of explicit tools for conducting domain analysis, domain analysis is a
theory and a systematic way of thinking about knowledge domains. Domain analysis
accentuates the focus on epistemology and investigates the foundation and practices of
communities thus raising philosophical questions about knowledge and information.
Consequently, the domain-oriented view will not reduce the concept of information to
objective representations and data structures, nor to subjective, personal information needs;
rather, in terms of information, a possible viable information concept should be defined
pragmatically and collectively, and include interpretive aspects such as situation, context and
knowledge interests that is formulated within a discourse community. In this case, neither
information nor relevance judgment is considered objective.
Journal of Documentation
Vol. 79 No. 1, 2023
pp. 21-35
© Emerald Publishing Limited
0022-0418
DOI 10.1108/JD-07-2021-0126
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Hjørland distances his version of domain analysis from subjectivist and data driven
objectivist information theories and argues that theories and knowledge claims and
documentation should be the primary focus of knowledge organization rather than
information (Thellefsen et al., 2015), a view that is elaborated (Thellefsen et al., 2015). The
particular coupling of Kuhn’s paradigm theory and the focus on knowledge claims in
discourse communities seems to affiliate domain analysis with social constructivism and
relativism, and thus suggests a contradiction to the realist stance advocated in several
conceptual writings of Hjørland (2004a, 2009) and Hjørland and Albrechtsen (1995).
In this paper, philosophical realism in knowledge organization and domain analysis is
revisited, and it is argued that information may remain an important component in domain
analysis theory and knowledge organization as a precursory component to knowledge
claims.
The paper is organized by an initial overview of domain analysis and its relation to other
major schools in IS. By mapping their differences and their view on the information concept it
is suggested that the transcendental realism formulated by Roy Bhaskar could capture a new
perspective on information and suggest a more inclusive path for grounding the information
concept in IS and domain analysis.
Information Science (IS) a field with many derivatives
By Hjørland and Albrechtsen (1995) IS is the preferred term used to address the science that
study information in human conduct. Doman analysis is put forward as an answer to the
objectivist data-oriented and cognitivist views that have dominated the developments in IS.
Domain analysis is considered a new orientation and theoretical scope for IS, that is founded
on a social point of view of knowledge domains. Even though IS signals a broader meaning, it
is useful to acknowledge that the advancements in Library and Information Science (LIS) is
related to theories in IS and to the advancements in information technology.
It may also be argued that IS has converged into the even broader conceptualization of
Information Studies, that consists of several approaches to information, that would include,
among the most prevalent subareas, domain analysis and knowledge organization,
information seeking and information behavior, theories and philosophy of information,
information systems design and information systems interaction, and information history.
As such, information studies is an umbrella term, and information plays different roles within
the different specialties of information studies. Even though IS may be part of the overall
assambage of information studies, it is worth remembering that there are close connections
between LIS and IS; however, as argued by Rayward (1983), IS seems better equipped to
address the more general scientific developments within libraries that increasingly is driven
by the developments of computer technology.
The convergence from LIS to IS, thus, signals a departure from the profession of libraries
toward a more wide-ranging concept, which naturally poses new problems of delimitation.
However, it is outside the scope of this paper to go deeper into the historical convergence and
developments from librarianship towards IS. Here, I will refer to Hayes (1985) and Rayward
(1983) and more recently Smiraglia (2014); still, it is clear that the study of information within
IS, LIS and information studies has different theoretical and methodological specifications
Table 1.
The distinctions
between the real, the
actual and the
empirical as proposed
by Bhaskar (1978)
Mechanisms
Events
Experiences
Domain of the real
Domain of the actual
Domain of the empirical
U
U
U
U
U
U
that is intimately related to the developments of librarianship, to the developments in
information (IS) and to the developments in academia. At the University of Copenhagen,
Information Studies is the preferred term used to cover a broad range of studies including
library studies.
It is also important to remember that the driving force in IS and the more general term of
information studies has been and still is fueled by the technological advancements of the
internet, and its impact on information systems and information behavior, the evolution of
search engines, algorithms and big data, and how human conduct continuously adds to the
big data economy. The rise of big data and algorithmic information processing was what in
2008 led Chris Andersen, the at the time editor of Wired Magazine, to proclaim the end of
theory. The picture painted by this short comment on the developments in the information
landscape shows that IS and information studies do not have clear cut borders.
Information may be studied from many different angles and with different interests, and
as such, only accentuates the arguments of domain analysis.
Domain analysis was formulated as a critical reaction to existing understandings
of information
When Hjørland and Albrechtsen (1995) introduced domain analysis to IS, it was formulated
as a genuine attempt to formulate a new social paradigm for IS and thus, to put the social
organization of knowledge to the fore.
The domain-analytical paradigm is thus firstly a social paradigm, conceiving of IS as one of the social
sciences [. . .] secondly a functionalist approach, attempting to understand the implicit and explicit
functions of information and communication [. . .] Thirdly it is a philosophical-realistic approach,
trying to find the basis for IS in factors that are external to the individualistic-subjective perceptions
of the users . . . (Hjørland and Albrechtsen, 1995, p. 400)
From this quotation it is clear that domain analysis is considered a research paradigm that
approaches IS from a social perspective rather than a technological one. It is also a
functionalist approach, that has a particular focus on the functions and purpose of
information and communication. Information is here clearly stated as having and cultivating
important communicative functions within domains. Furthermore, philosophical realism is
promoted as a foundation for IS.
In a later paper from 2004, Hjørland argues in favor of a view he terms “pragmatic realism”
in LIS (2004), pragmatic because domain knowledge always is based in human purposeful
actions and beliefs and is realist because reality exists independent of a perceiving mind.
Pragmatism and realism are, however, both complex concepts that have many variant
definitions, see, e.g. those of (Niinilouto, 2002), and (Hack, 2004). Here, it suffices to state that
the combination of pragmatism and realism consider knowledge as tied to human experience,
to situations and to contexts; however, knowledge is also continuously corrected by external
reality, thus the claim of realism. Furthermore, it would also seem that the idea that
knowledge continuously is corrected or tested by reality, suggests falsification as part of the
domain analytical view.
Considering information, in domain analysis, information is considered a complex
phenomenon and cannot be reduced to objective representations and data structures, or to
subjective or personal information needs, but must be defined pragmatically and collectively.
What counts as information involves a variety of contingent factors such as how, when and
why the information is produced, the circumstances connected to the information, the context
surrounding the information, the knowledge interests that select and disregard certain aspects
of information etc. Information cannot be objective or neutral, and relevance judgments always
relate information to a purpose (Hjørland and Albrechtsen, 1995; Hjørland, 2004b, c).
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Domain analysis is, thus, critical towards rationalist and subjectivist epistemologies. In
the domain analytical paradigm, IS and its conception of information depart from the roots of
social structures. Therefore, Hjørland argues not for what information is but rather what
counts as information within a discourse community. And, what counts as information is
determined by the specialties and focus of a knowledge domain, including its theoretical
assumptions, collective knowledge, modes of communication within the community
(sociology of knowledge), accepted methodologies and language (language for special
purposes (LSP)).
For that reason, domain analysis also considers that the concept of knowledge claims as a
more appropriate departure for understanding documents and their role in social practice
rather than information. Documents do not simply contain information that can be extracted;
rather, documents are texts that argue or put forward knowledge claims based on
assumptions and with reference to theories and methods. Consequently, the meaning of the
semantic units of a text is determined by more than grammar. The meaning of a document
cannot just be reduced to its semantic structure. The process of interpretation presupposes an
understanding of how and under which circumstances the document was produced and the
perspective, skills and knowledge of the reader. Computers do not read texts as humans do.
Texts can be interpretated in numerous ways, even by the same reader. Though from a
certain perspective, documents are structures of symbols, and texts are composed by
grammar and semantics; however, the meaning of a document, i.e. the reading of text involves
something more. Consequently, the interpretation of documents becomes important, and
domain analysis, thus, introduces a hermeneutic view on documents.
IS and in particular, knowledge organization should, therefore, in Hjørland’s domain
analytical view, not be concerned with definitions of information (and its many
incommensurable descriptions) but with knowledge claims and documentation.
Consequently, Hjørland is in agreement with Briet (1951), that in Bucklands translation
states:
“Information science” developed out of documentation, and the documentation movement developed
a theoretically motivated concept ”document” as a basic term (. . .) for the field: A document is “any
concrete or symbolic indication, preserved or recorded, for reconstructing or for proving a
phenomenon, whether physical or mental (Briet, 1951, p. 7; here quoted from Buckland (1991::xx)).
Information and the efforts of defining information within IS, therefore, becomes of minor
interest. Domain analyses are concerned with what counts as knowledge within discourse
communities, and even though information may play a role, the focus is turned towards
theoretical assumptions, methodologies and the role of documentation in discourse
communities.
The domain-analytical paradigm, therefore, constitutes a genuine alternative to the
information processing paradigm, “where information is viewed as an objective and
universal law-determined thing that both humans and machines absorb into their minds from
nature, change by thinking, and bring into society through language” (Brier, 2008, p. 54).
Apart from formulating a new paradigmatic approach to IS, the domain analysis also
suggests a paradigmatic framework for knowledge organization. In Hjørland (2002a) 11
nonexclusive approaches for the information specialist is suggested. Domain analysis has,
furthermore, according to Smiraglia (2015), become a generally accepted paradigm within the
knowledge organization community, and domain analysis and what constitutes a domain
have since been discussed, modified and supplemented by other scholars in the knowledge
organization community, see, e.g. (Smiraglia, 2014, 2015; Guimar~aes and Tognoli, 2015;
Tennis, 2003).
Knowledge organization is a science concerned with how knowledge is ordered, and how
the ordering of knowledge can reveal itself in the division of communities and institutions in
society, in language and communication, and in specific, conceptual or semantic systems
designed for preserving and retrieving knowledge. Apart from investigating actual discourse
communities and conceptual structures, knowledge organization is, therefore, also an applied
science concerned with, e.g. the production of knowledge organization systems, and
standards for cataloguing and library management. Knowledge organization, therefore,
forms a genuine interdisciplinary research field, that investigates the organization and
structures of knowledge within discourse communities at different levels of granularity. For
the purpose of this paper, knowledge organization is viewed from the general level as socially
organized discourse comunities, that function as actualizations of ideas within the sphere of
the empirical.
This paper, therefore, is not aimed at the different applied aproaches of domain analysis,
or particular knowledge organization system, but instead directed towards the philosophical
foundation that domain analysis and successively knowledge organization rests upon.
Externalist/internalist understandings of information in IS
In IS, the debate about what information is, often follows two opposing definitions. Either
information is objective and neutral and can be determined correctly or approximately, or
information is subjective and observer-dependent, and thus, relative to interpretation.
The challenge in the field of IS from the early online years has been to establish a clear
paradigmatic view on information as something that is not influenced by a user’s selective
knowledge.
Historically, LIS has developed information concepts from three dominating views or
perspectives: the systems-oriented view, the user-oriented view and the domain-oriented
view. The first view considers information the vein of math and formal logic, the second view
is psychological/subjective and the third view is social and pragmatic. Within the literature of
IS there are many nuances and understandings of information; however, they can be traced
back to these three understandings (see, Hjørland, 2018a, b).
Several efforts have been made to establish a unified approach to information for IS (see,
for example, Belkin, 1978; Buckland, 1991; Mingers, 1997; Bates, 2006; Bawden, 2007; Brier,
2008; Thellefsen, et al., 2018). However, despite these efforts, there is no general agreement
accepted within the IS community.
The more recent effort of Bates (2006) investigates the concept of information and
develops an understanding of fundamental forms of information for information science/
studies. Bates’ definition forms a fundamental and more philosophically-based view and
formulates an approach to the information concept that take into account how information
reveals itself in nature and manifests itself through representations.
Bates argues that information in its most fundamental form exists independent of human
perception (Information 1). As such “natural” information is understood as matter, energy
and causal structures in the universe. “Natural” Information is causation, and from causation
habits of nature and the potential of the real is actualized (Information 2). Actualized
information includes the evolution of life itself. Bates argues that information in this “natural”
sense is to be understood as existing phenomena in the universe and uses the concept of
“pattern” to distinguish between pure entropy and patterns of organization of everything.
Following this “natural” definition of information, several categories of represented
information is derived. Following Bates’ conception of information, Bawden (2007)
considers the view in line with Popperian ontology with its three “worlds” (Popper, 1979,
1992). World 1 is, thus, the physical world (or Information 1), World 2 is the mental states,
including consciousness and behavior (Information 2) and World 3 is considered the objective
contents of thought or the product of human mind (the domain of knowledge). World 3, thus,
includes what we know about World 1 and World 2; however, the status of World 3, both
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being objective knowledge and the product of the human mind is what raises some
fundamental problems (Gadenne, 2016). There are some affinities between Popper’s worlds
and Bhaskar’s realism, the latter also formulates an ontology of three domains, the real, the
actual and the empirical. I will return to Bhaskar’s domains later in this paper; for now it
suffices to point out that even though Bhaskar was critical towards Popper’s empirical
attitude and falsification, they may have more in common in their overall approach to
information and knowledge.
So far the investigations of information demonstrate that a fundamental and inclusive
definition of information must be considered both in relation what exist independent
(external) of human mind, i.e. a universe of organized complexity and to life itself, and
information-dependent on human mind (internal), i.e. the relation of information to meaning.
Externalist views on information would imply that factors external to perception
determine what is information. Information is empirical facts, that may be observed but is not
influenced by observation. Internalist views on information consider information as the result
of perception and that information is constructed by rational procedures of justification. The
latter is often associated with Cartesian rationality. The distinction between internal and
external understandings of information may become less dichotomic if considered from the
perspective of transcendental realism.
Without replicating the information debate within the field of IS and the various
determinations of the information concept, see, e.g. (Thellefsen et al., 2015), I will argue that
some new light can be shed on the concept by considering information as a property that
emerges by the actualization of transitive and intransitive events. The British philosopher of
science, Bhaskar (1978), uses this distinction to separate between transitive events that are
ever changing or socially constructed and intransitive events that are events that occur
independent of human existence. Intransitive events manifest itself in nature by cause and
effect, whereas transitive events is the result of social activity. How information can lead to
true knowledge – is the problem of justification.
An externalist conception of information would suggest that information processes take
place with or without our knowledge about it. Knowledge systems based on external
information would suggest that our knowledge is fallible but continuously corrected by
external facts/information. Externalist information is causation in its most rudimentary form
that may or may not be observed by a man. An internalist conception of information suggests
that only through perception and the mechanism of justification or justified belief, can
information become knowledge. As a consequence, information is determined by experience
and perception.
The position argued by Bhaskar named transcendental realism or critical realism,
suggests a middle ground between externalism and internalism. The critical realist
philosophy of Roy Bhaskar has been introduced by scholars in IS both as a social theory for IS
(Wikgren, 2005) and as philosophical foundation for information systems (Mingers, 2004,
2005) and Nellhaus (1998) considers critical realism and semiotics as a fruitful synthesis for
analyzing the phenomenogical dimensions of social activity. So far, critical realism has not
been discussed in relation to domain analysis.
In Bhaskar’s transcendental realism, the natural and social world are considered to be
equally dependent on time, space and the existence of material objects. Consequently, the
actualization of events in nature and culture informs us about the laws of nature and culture,
even though our understanding of events is grounded in fallible theoretical assumptions.
Social structures, cultural artefacts and human conduct are equal events taking place in social
life and thus, properties of social reality. Thus, some objects are relatively stable and
enduring, e.g. stone and metals that are used to create tools. They are both products of natural
and social events. The raw materials used for creating artifacts are intransitive and provides
different affordances. However, knowledge about intransitive materials cannot be separated
from its transitive use. Similarly, knowledge of social activity depends on theoretical
assumptions about social activity, and different theories afford different solutions, theories
that themselves are products of social activity. Consequently, we are confronted with the
paradox that knowledge about nature and culture are contingent products of social activity,
that include transitive, as well as intransitive information; even so, knowledge becomes
independently real.
Bhaskar discusses the paradoxical distinction between kinds of knowledge, that about
enduring parts of external reality that exist independently of men, and that of things that is
produced by men.
Any adequate philosophy of science must find a way of grappling with this central paradox of
science: that men in their social activity produce knowledge which is a social product much like any
other, which is no more independent of its production and the men who produce it than motor cars,
armchairs or books, which has its own craftsmen, technicians, publicists, standards and skills and
which is no less subject to change than any other commodity. The other is that knowledge is “of”
things which are not produced by men at all . . . (Bhaskar, 1978, p. 11)
Furthermore
. . . it is argued that knowledge is a social product, produced by means of antecedent social products;
but that the objects of which, in the social activity of science, knowledge comes to be produced, exist
and act quite independently of men. These two aspects of the philosophy of science justify our
talking of two dimensions and two kinds of “object” of knowledge: a transitive dimension, in which
the object is the material cause or antecedently established knowledge which is used to generate the
new knowledge; and an intransitive dimension, in which the object is the real structure or mechanism
that exists and acts quite independently of men and the conditions which allow men to access it.
(Bhaskar, 1978, pp. 5-6)
In a similar fashion the pragmatic semiotic view, based on C. S. Peirce’s mature pragmatic
philosophy, suggests a division between real objects and actual objects. Peirce’s philosophy
and semiotics have been introduced to IS and knowledge organization as a metatheory by
several information scholars see, e.g. (Almeida et al., 2013; Brier, 2006, 2008; Friedman and
Thellefsen, 2011; Sørensen et al., 2022; Thellefsen et al., 2013). Peirce theory is, however,
complex and known for its, at times, archaic terminology. In this context, Peirce’s semiotics
will only be addressed in relation to the similarity to Bhaskar’s notion of transitivity and
intransitivity, that corresponds with Peirce’s division of the semiotic object into the
immediate object and the dynamical object.
Peirce’s philosophy is based on realism. Thus, reality exists independent of man; however,
our knowledge about reality is achieved through actualizations. In Peirce’s sign theory, a sign
consists of three interrelated parts, the sign (or representamen), an object and the interpretant.
Furthermore, in Peirce’s mature semiotic theory the object in a sign relation is divided into an
immediate and a dynamical object (Peirce, 1906). This distinction is important because the
division of the object expresses the phenomenological difference between real objects and
objects derived from real objects. What is real exists independent of someone’s experience.
Thus, there is a difference between reality that exists independent of experience and
experienced reality, the latter having the status of actual observations and models about
reality. The dynamical object, thus, is real and independent of perception, and the immediate
object, thus, is the actual object perceived. The object, therefore, has an ontic and a
phenomenological side, the former relates to ontological realism and the latter to how signs
become signs of meaning. The ontic can only be determined indirectly by experience. We,
therefore, understand mountains as high, beautiful, ski slopes, hiking terrain, reservoir of raw
materials, etc. In the view of Peirce, there is a tension between the dynamical object and the
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Figure 1.
IO: immediate object
and DO: dynamical
object (Thellefsen et al.,
2018, p. 376)
immediate object, which is different from correspondence. The dynamical object or reality,
contains what is possible, and the immediate object, what is possibly real. This distinction
also explains how we can be wrong. Immediate objects are like images; their meanings are
situated and motivated by perspective and past and present experiences.
Figure 1 explains the tension and distinction between the immediate object and the
dynamical object. What the model also explains is the reasoning process that connects the
immediate and the dynamical object.
Understanding information in terms of its ontological grounding as a dynamical object
enables us to consider information as independent of perception, and the immediate object as
information based on knowledge. True information is, thus, based on the justification
procedures that is accepted in a discourse community. Furthermore, the immediate object
may only tell us a minor part of the dynamical object, and we can be misled by false
interpretations. This also means that the understanding and use of information is
contingently motivated by observations. Perceived information, therefore, only in part
corresponds to objective information.
There is, however, an important difference between Bhaskar and Peirce in their epistemic
view. Critical realism allows for epistemological relativism. Occurrences actualized in nature
or culture can be perceived and described differently from different epistemic or
paradigmatic views. Peirce’s philosophy refute absolutism and his pragmatic view is
considered idealist, in the sense that the immediate object, i.e. immediate understandings of
reality would tend to converge in a certain direction given enough time. Our views of nature
and social reality are not arbitrarily selected, but correlated by time and evolution; thus,
immediate objects may gradually narrow down the semiotic gap.
Turning our attention to domain analysis, Hjørland argues that domain analyses oppose
the objectivist claim of information. Knowledge and our very ability to know is not
determined by objective information, but pragmatically, by knowledge interests, perspective,
theories and methodologies. Documents do not contain information to be extracted, nor do
documents declare how they are to be correctly read. Documents are communicative texts,
and texts are structured by language, by subject and by the intentions of the author, i.e. his/
her perception, motivations and arguments. Thus, documents do not, prima facie, contain
extractable information, but are at the surface level, semantic structures that express
concepts and arguments about certain state of affairs, opinions or scientific problems.
Besides, documents also exhibit a diversity of genres that prescribes a certain reading
attitude of the reader. How this prescription is conveyed to the reader seems a mystery if not
conveyed by information external to the reader.
Domain analysis, thus, on the one hand claim an internalist view that knowledge is
justified by belief, not by objective information, and on the other hand claim an externalist
view in relation to the materiality and structure of documents. As argued above, this view can
be considered in line with transcendental realism.
As is the case with information, documents in the semiotics sense, stand for something
else; they represent something that is different from that what is represented. Documents are,
in principal, signs that actualize a certain point of view, a certain interest and an intended
meaning. Buckland (1997) reminds us, based on Briet (1951), that documents implicate
material objects (the physical object of interest) and intentionality (the intended meaning that
the object represents), that documents are constructions (objects have to be made into
documents), and a phenomenological perspective, that an object is to be perceived as a
document. Briet clearly distinguishes between the object as a natural object, e.g. a star in the
sky and a photo of a star (Briet, 1951, pp. 7–8 – cited from Buckland, 1997, p. 806), which is
reminiscent of the semiotic distinction between immediate objects (documents) and the
dynamical object (the real). Documents represent knowledge about nature and culture and
include transitive as well as intransitive information about state of affairs.
In summary I, have discussed information as being determined by transitive and
intransitive features, a distinction that gives an understanding of information as objects or
phenomena that are partly intransitively nonconstructed, in contrast to transitive objects that
are produced by man. Also, I have addressed the distinction between externalist and
internalist account of information, that provides some insights into how information may be
determined by internal or external reference, but which can be combined in a nondichotomic
realist view as suggested by critical realism and semiotics. Furthermore, in semiotics, a sign is
divided into immediate objects and dynamical objects, where the immediate object
is considered an actualized understanding of a given object, and the dynamical object is
considered the object as it is in itself by itself. The tension between the immediate and
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dynamical object means that understandings of the dynamical object can only be approached
through immediate objects or fallible understandings. The semiotic distinction between
dynamical object and immediate object connects well with Briet (1951) and Buckland (1997)
that suggests that documents frame knowledge, and that documents could be analyzed as
semiotic objects. The arguments put forward here thus consider information better described
within the theoretical framework of critical realism and semiotic pragmatism. Furthermore,
the section argues, despite epistemic differences, the realist model of Bhaskar, and the realist
account of the semiotic object suggests a resemblance in ontological views on information
that may be useful as the starting point for domain analysis and knowledge organization.
Transcendental realism, domain analysis and information
In his seminal book “A realist theory of science”, Bhaskar argues in favor of critical or
transcendental realism (Bhaskar, 1978), where reality is determined in three distinct domains:
the real, the actual and the empirical. The real is made up of entities, properties, mechanisms,
etc. The actual is the determination of events (causation) that may or may not be observed but
are generated within the actual. The empirical is the domain of perceived actuality (Table 1).
A stone is real; its existence is independent of perception. It is actual because it exhibits
(historical) events of nature that have formed the stone in time and space; however, in terms of
the empirical, the stone is realized through observation and meaningful action. Another
important distinction in Bhaskar’s philosophy is the division between transitive and
intransitive objects. Some objects are intransitive; they are not constructed by interpretation
or socially motivated actions. The realness of an intransitive object does not rest on our ability
to observe it. Matter is real, and the laws of nature are real and independent of our ability to
observe and understand them. Contrarily, the transitive dimension of reality is defined
through experience and as a product of man. The latter holds the social organization and
division of labor.
Understanding domain analysis from the view of Bhaskar’s transcendental realism, place
domain analysis within the transitive empirical dimension, but, within the realm of a realist
ontology.
Bhaskar’s realist ontology gives rise to some interesting and provoking thoughts and
consequences. Firstly, the real is considered the most fundamental domain that may best be
understood as the domain of possibility (e.g. the possibility of being or becoming). The
domain of the actual, i.e. the events taking place, occur within the domain of the actual.
The actualization of events presupposes the domain of the real. No events can occur outside
the domain of the real. The empirical takes place within the domain of the actual. The domain
of the empirical is determined by events, and only events can be observed. Thus, reality can
only be observed in terms of events. Secondly, social structures are real. Nothing can exist
outside the domain of the real, social structures are, though contingently, real. The power
structures of society, the national border, the idea of currency and values emerge out of social
structures; nevertheless, they exercise real power over individuals, i.e. they are in Bhasker’s
terminology, transitive objects. Thirdly, the dichotomy between nature and culture is a false
dichotomy; the real includes the actual as well as the empirical. Consequently, from the
perspective of critical realism, the external/internal dichotomy is better understood in terms
of Bhaskar’s distinction between the intransitive and transitive dimensions.
Thus, information can fruitfully be understood in terms of Bhaskar’s critical realist
ontology: intransitive. Information occurs and events take place, and transitive information is
the product of the empirical. Observations are determined by the contingent nature of
systems of ideas grounded in the social division of labor. We are not dealing with different
kinds of information but rather information as causation and the selective understandings of
the meaning of causations, information as a process or act of transference rather than
information as a static object. Also, what exists and acts in reality exists independently of our
descriptions, though our descriptions surely are motivated by actual events and are brought
into existence by description (externalist information). We, now, have an understanding of
information as events taking place in the real and of information as representations of events
experienced.
In this line of thought, Bhaskar’s critical realism suggests that real events occur
independent of observation but at the same time points out that different perspectives,
representation, understandings and interpretations of phenomena are possible. A stone in the
field activates different representations and sign systems of understanding. A document can
motivate different interpretations. Consequently, the transcendental foundation of critical
realism means that the real holds what can exist and what can be observed. The empirical
holds what can be observed at a given point in time. Objectivity is not presumed. Observation
is always intentional; therefore, information and knowledge is contingent. Even though
accepting critical realism, determinism is not presumed. Social life is not determined by the
real and events of nature; it is possible because of the real and the actual. Therefore, the
constructions of our social life are real and actual but are meaningful only within the
perspective of social discourse. Thus, the concept of the unicorn is not real outside the realm
of fiction.
The production of knowledge takes place within the domain of the empirical (Figure 2).
Domains of knowledge emerge within the domain of the empirical and produce theories about
events experienced. The distinctions between the domains of reality provide us with an
ontological realist framework that also allows for epistemic pluralism. A given object of
investigation can be understood and described from different theoretical perspectives, e.g. a
document can be read and interpreted with different motivations and from different
viewpoints. This view resonates well with Hjørland’s domain analytical framework, that
information and relevance is determined from a perspective, and cannot be objective or
neutral. Theories drive our observations in a certain direction; however, the object of
investigation also provides us with some restrictions in terms of possible interpretations.
As discussed above, domain analysis formulates a genuine alternative to the information
processing paradigm in IS. Knowledge domains are socially organized and open; however,
they are also directed towards goals. Knowledge domains are driven by research activities, and
the fallible process of interpretation and understanding. If information is a useful term in
domain analysis it most certainly is information for someone. A domain analysis should depart
from asking what kind of information/events characterize and structure a community.
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Figure 2.
Bhaskar’s domains of
reality
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32
What kind of information/events motivates investigations? Which theories and methods are
relevant for investigating events? What knowledge may be accomplished by investigating
events?
Following the premises of critical realism, information is causation. Information processes
take place in the real independent of perception, say intransitive information. Information
processes that are the result of empirical investigations and interpretation are on the other
hand, transitive, and therefore, subjected to change.
Intransitive information is what it is; it has no inherent meaning but is considered merely
as causation and the regularities of the natural world. Transitive information or social
information involves interpretation and understanding. The possibilities of interpretation
and conceptualization are nondeterminate. As discussed above, a given phenomenon can be
investigated based on different knowledge interests and from different professional
perspectives. Even so, something intransitive (an event) exists that is open for
interpretation. In relation to the social world, social phenomena are genuinely transitive,
and based on agency. Social structures are in themselves contingent and based on
meaningful action. Social structures are real and actual, and they are also self-observant and
self-regulating. Knowledge domains and knowledge organizations are themselves contingent
social structures and should be approached from this perspective. Information in the social
world can be true or false; intransitive information just exists. A stone or a mountain is neither
true nor false; it just exists. Transitive information is contrarily discursive, selective and
fallible. The social world exhibits a double contingency, i.e. the social world transforms into
scientific communities that structures the very knowledge it investigates.
Concluding thoughts
So far, the discussion has been mainly focused on externalist and internalist conceptions of
information. Furthermore, I have argued that critical realism may reconcile the dispute
between externalist and internalist conceptions that is in line with philosophical realism as
suggested by Hjørland. Also, I have argued that “knowledge claims” is a poor substitute for
information because knowledge claims clearly is confined to rhetorical practices within
discourse communities that emphasize internalist justification. Furthermore, I argue that
information can be underpinned by an ontological realist framework that even though,
information is a broad concept, still seems to be of great significance for domain analysis.
From the foundation of critical realism, domain analysis is a paradigm that is based on
empirical observations and interpretation of events that takes place within the empirical, and
furthermore, with a realist claim that the empirical is a product of actualized events that occur
within the real. Knowledge and information are not merely random social constructions but
motivated by actual events that take place or are lived out and realized within the infinite
possibilities held by the real.
As suggested in the title of this paper, the theoretical investigations of the realist
foundation of domain analysis also implicate knowledge organization. Knowledge
organizations are empirical and form a discourse directed towards common goals. Domain
analysis may reveal how these common goals are tied to epistemological views that give
priority to certain kinds of information. Consequently, knowledge organization systems
reflect actualizations in the empirical; they are intentional and purposeful constructions that
strive to fulfill a certain consolidating goal for human knowledge.
The domain of the empirical is the domain of human activity. Within the domain of the
empirical, theories about the actual and the real is evolved. Bhaskar’s transcendental realism
forms an approach to the philosophy of science (and social science) that is founded on
ontological realism (the real) and epistemic relativism (the empirical). Critical realism is
considered compatible with the philosophical realist claim suggested by Hjørland.
Consequently, events actualized within the real can motivate different interpretations. The
semiotic approach considers the relation between what is real and what we know about the
real in terms of the distinction between the dynamical object and the immediate object.
Semiotics implies a semiotic distance between what is ontological and real and what is
epistemologically justified. Where Bhaskar allows for epistemic relativism, Peirce’s semiotics
considers the relation between the dynamical object and the immediate object as
teleologically connected. In knowledge organization, the document serves as
manifestations/recordings that frame knowledge; yet it is open for interpretation. Even
though these dialectic similarities that is put forward here serves to argue in favor of
ontological realism, it is important to acknowledge that critical realism, pragmatic semiotics
and documentation also differ in their accounts of the real. These fundamental differences in
philosophical views have only been briefly discussed and will be the subject for
another paper.
In summary, it is concluded that domain analysis shares a common ground with critical
realism and semiotics. Firstly, because domain analysis is considered a theoretical view that
is based on ontological realism, secondly, because it acknowledges that epistemologies are
motivated by internal as well as external events, and thirdly because documents are signs
that represent and frame knowledge claims within a community.
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Corresponding author
Martin Muderspach Thellefsen can be contacted at: martin.thellefsen@hum.ku.dk
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