Case Study #2: Group Process in the Challenger Launch Decision
Szu-Wei Yang
Master of Science in Communication, Northwestern University
MSC 540: Leading Collaboration
Professor Leslie A. DeChurch, PhD
October 8th, 2021
After reading parts A and B of the Challenger Launch case, please respond to the following
questions related to the case study.
(1) How would you characterize the broader context surrounding the January 1986
teleconference? What impact might that have on the group's decision-making process?
I think the context surrounding the January 1986 teleconference is that there were a lot of
miscommunications amongst the three teams, and even after the conference, there were no major
changes made. People from NASA, and even some of the team members from Morton Thiokol
did not take up Roger Boisjoly’s advice that launching the shuttle at such low temperature could
potentially lead to great disaster, potentially involving loss of life. The team worked as a
hierarchy and did not value people in the lower rank’s advice.
The managers relied on the data from the past and on the other hand, the experts such as
Roger Boisjoly and Arnie Thompson relied solely on their experiences. This decision making
process was very rushed and disorganized.
From the article, it seems like the engineers could care less about what happens on the
shuttle; they complained about the extra work that’s going to be placed into their calendar the
following year and that they just wanted to get things done quickly and move onto their next big
project.
All in all, the lack of coordination, poorly organized data, lack of understanding in the
teleconference, and pressure to launch in a timely manner all contributed to the challenger’s
eventual downfall and disaster.
Imagine the teleconference is scheduled for tonight. Put yourself in each person's shoes and
generate some talking points to support your views during the meeting:
(2) Put yourself in Roger Boisjoly's shoes. What approach will you take with the group to get
support for your perspective?
From case 2b, the article mentioned that Roger “have tried to get data as a member of the
O-ring Task Force since last October but haven’t been successful” (P.3). This just goes to show
the ineffective communications between the engineering expert and the data center from the very
beginning.
Roger seems like the type of guy who is extremely responsible, but doesn't know how to
strategize and leverage his network to make a difference. In this case, even though he tried with
all his might to get his voice heard and tried to stop the launch at all cost before potential disaster
occurred, no one was there to listen to him.
If I were Roger Boisjoly, I would go out of my way to find other leading experts to help
me prove my worries are valid. I would also look for more concrete data and findings instead of
saying things such as “I don’t have any more data other than what I have here” or “this is all I
can give to you”, when he knew the O-ring's seal could potentially become a major problem.
Instead of looking at the pictures of the blackened O-rings, I would go out of my way to
figure out why the soot on the O-rings was “much blacker and penetrated all the way to the
second ring” (Case 2b P.3). Just by stating that the soot was coal-like black doesn’t prove
anything, because launching the shuttle at such high temperature, it’s likely that anything could
be burnt to charcoal like color. I would try to persuade my colleagues first about the extreme
danger that can occur from the erosion in the O-ring, and then together with my colleagues,
manager. If I can successfully persuade my coworkers, it’ll be more likely for me to get the data
and information that I need, and if I can get the information along with other leading experts, to
persuade NASA would be more achievable.
(3) What issues face Bob Lund? What might he be concerned about in the teleconference
meeting?
I believe Bob Lund was on the same page as Roger Boisjoly, however, I believe that he
was rushed into making the final decision.
In the conversation, we can see that he mentioned multiple times that he recommended
the crew to launch the space shuttle at at least 53 degrees Fahrenheit and above.
He knows what is right, proper, and safe-- launching at the right temperature so that the
O-ring can be properly sealed, however, he was too afraid to speak up against NASA and too
scared to back up Roger Boisjoly’s concerns. When challenged by Larry Mulloy, he immediately
backed away from his own view and was wavered by Larry’s perspective.
I believe he was concerned that his decision may cause too big of a change and make him
look unprofessional, especially when he was challenged by Jerry Mason with the phrase, “Bob,
take off your engineer’s hat and put on your management hat” (Case 2b, pg.5), he didn’t even say
a word to rebuttal at such degrading comment.
(4) What issues face Larry Mulloy? What might he be concerned about in the teleconference
meeting?
Larry Mulloy seems like the type of manager that wanted to get things done as soon as
possible. He is a go-getter, achiever, it is not surprising to see him getting all frustrated in their
conversation. He is logical, but lacks the empathy to go out of his way to understand Roger’s
perspective.
However, I do think that his concerns were valid. On one hand, it’s perfectly reasonable
to be concerned in the validity of Roger Boisjoly’s claims, since Roger was unable to provide
concrete details and data observations in his response. He was concerned about Roger throwing
out random claims based on his own experience without really diving deep into engineering data
and facts.
On the other hand, since he was the appointed person of this project, it is likely that he
was pressured by the higher ups to push the project forward. It is likely that he was blindsided by
his image and past accomplishments, which led to his irreversible mistakes.