Immanuel Kant
Categorical and Hypothetical Imperatives
Categorical Imperative
➔ fundamental principle of our moral duties
★ It is an imperative because it is a command
addressed to agents who could follow it
but might not (e.g. , “Leave the gun. Take
the cannoli.”).
★ It is categorical in virtue of applying to us
unconditionally, or simply because we
possesses rational wills, without reference
to any ends that we might or might not
have. It does not, in other words, apply to
us on the condition that we have
antecedently adopted some goal for
ourselves.
There are “oughts” other than our moral duties,
according to Kant, but these oughts are
distinguished from the moral ought in being based
on a quite different kind of principle, one that is
the source of hypothetical imperatives.
Hypothetical Imperatives.
➔ a command that also applies to us in virtue of
our having a rational will, but not simply in
virtue of this.
➔ It requires us to exercise our wills in a certain
way given we have previously willed an end.
➔ a command in a conditional form.
◆ But not any command in this form
counts as a hypothetical imperative in
Kant’s sense. For instance, “if you’re
happy and you know it, clap your
hands!” is a conditional command. But
the antecedent conditions under which
the command “clap your hands” applies
to you do not posit any end that you
will, but consist rather of emotional and
cognitive states you may or may not be
in.
◆ “if you want pastrami, try the corner
deli” is also a command in conditional
form, but strictly it too fails to be a
hypothetical imperative since this
command does not apply to us in virtue
of our willing some end, but only in
virtue of our desiring or wanting an
end.
willing an end
➔ involves more than desiring
➔ requires actively choosing or committing to
the end rather than merely finding oneself
with a passive desire for it. Further, there is
nothing irrational in failing to will means to
what one desires.
★ An imperative that applied to us in virtue of
our desiring some end would thus not be a
hypothetical
imperative
of
practical
rationality in Kant’s sense.
Now, for the most part, the ends we will we might
not have willed, and some ends that we do not will
we might nevertheless have willed. But there is at
least conceptual room for the idea of a natural or
inclination-based end that we must will. The
distinction between ends that we might or might
not will and those, if any, we necessarily will as
the kinds of natural beings we are, is the basis for
his distinction between two kinds of hypothetical
imperatives. Kant names these “problematic” and
“assertoric”, based on how the end is willed.
Problematic Imperative
➔ the end is one that we might or might not
will
➔ it is a merely possible end
➔ For instance, “Don’t ever take side with
anyone against the Family.”
★ Almost all non-moral, rational imperatives
are problematic, since there are virtually
no ends that we necessarily will as human
beings.
Asserotic Imperative
➔ Any imperative that applied to us because
we will our own happiness
★ As it turns out, the only (non-moral) end
that we will, as a matter of natural
necessity, is our own happiness.
● Rationality, Kant thinks, can issue no
imperative if the end is indeterminate, and
happiness is an indeterminate end.
★ Although we can say for the most part that
if one is to be happy, one should save for
the future, take care of one’s health and
nourish one’s relationships, these fail to be
genuine commands in the strictest sense
and so are instead mere “counsels.” Some
people are happy without these, and
whether you could be happy without them
is, an open question.
For anything to count as human willing, it must be
based on a maxim to pursue some end through some
means. Hence, in employing a maxim, any human
willing already embodies the form of means-end
reasoning that calls for evaluation in terms of
hypothetical imperatives. To that extent at least, then,
anything dignified as human willing is subject to
rational requirements.
The Formula of the Universal Law of
Nature
● “act only in accordance with that maxim through
which you can at the same time will that it
become a universal law”
Since Kant presents moral and prudential rational
requirements as first and foremost demands on our
wills rather than on external acts, moral and
prudential evaluation is first and foremost an
evaluation of the will our actions express. Thus, it
is not an error of rationality to fail to take the
necessary means to one’s (willed) ends, nor to fail
to want to take the means; one only falls foul of
non-moral practical reason if one fails to will the
means. Likewise, while actions, feelings or desires
may be the focus of other moral views, for Kant
practical irrationality, both moral and prudential,
focuses mainly on our willing.
1. First, formulate a maxim that enshrines your
reason for acting as you propose.
2. Second, recast that maxim as a universal law
of nature governing all rational agents, and so
as holding that all must, by natural law, act as
you yourself propose to act in these
circumstances.
3. Third, consider whether your maxim is even
conceivable in a world governed by this law of
nature. If it is, then,
4. Fourth, ask yourself whether you would, or
could, rationally will to act on your maxim in
such a world. If you could, then your action is
morally permissible.
Maxims
●
●
Kant describes the will as operating on the
basis of subjective volitional principles he
calls “maxims”.
●
Hence,
morality
and
other rational
requirements are, for the most part, demands
that apply to the maxims that we act on. .
●
“I will A in C in order to realize or produce E”
where “A” is some act type, “C” is some type
of circumstance, and “E” is some type of end
to be realized or achieved by A in C.
●
●
●
If your maxim fails the third step, you have a
“perfect” duty admitting “of no exception in
favor of inclination” to refrain from acting on
that maxim.
If your maxim fails the fourth step, you have
an “imperfect” duty requiring you to pursue a
policy that can admit of such exceptions.
If your maxim passes all four steps, only then
is acting on it morally permissible.
Perfect duties
-
Since this is a principle stating only what some
agent wills, it is subjective.
come in the form “One must never (or always)
φ to the fullest extent possible in C”
imperfect duties
Practical Law
-
principle that governs any rational will is an
objective principle of volition,
-
at least require that “One must sometimes and
to some extent φ in C.”
●
So, for instance, Kant held that the maxim of
committing
suicide
to avoid future
unhappiness did not pass the third step, the
contradiction in conception test. Hence, one is
forbidden to act on the maxim of committing
suicide to avoid unhappiness. By contrast, the
maxim of refusing to assist others in pursuit of
their projects passes the contradiction in
conception test, but fails the contradiction in
the will test at the fourth step. Hence, we have
a duty to sometimes and to some extent aid
and assist others.
Four categories of duties
1. perfect duties toward ourselves
- To refrain from suicide
2. perfect duties toward others
- to refrain from making promises you
have no intention of keeping
3. imperfect duties toward ourselves
- to develop one’s talents
4. imperfect duties toward others
- to contribute to the happiness of others
●
●
●
Kant’s example of a perfect duty to others
concerns a promise you might consider
making but have no intention of keeping in
order to get needed money. Naturally, being
rational requires not contradicting oneself, but
there is no self-contradiction in the maxim “I
will make lying promises when it achieves
something I want.”
Kant’s position is that it is irrational to perform
an action if that action’s maxim contradicts
itself once made into a universal law of nature.
The maxim of lying whenever it gets you what
you want generates a contradiction once you
try to combine it with the universalized
version that all rational agents must, by a law
of nature, lie when doing so gets them what
they want.
★ mere failure to conform to something we
rationally will is not yet immorality. Failure to
conform to instrumental principles, for
instance, is irrational but not always immoral.
Humanity Formula
➔ This formulation states that we should never act
in such a way that we treat humanity, whether in
ourselves or in others, as a means only but always
as an end in itself.
➔ This is often seen as introducing the idea of
“respect” for persons, for whatever it is that is
essential to our humanity.
Kant was clearly right that this and the other
formulations bring the CI “closer to intuition” than the
Universal Law formula. Intuitively, there seems
something wrong with treating human beings as mere
instruments with no value beyond this. But this very
intuitiveness can also invite misunderstandings.
1. First, the Humanity Formula does not rule out
using people as means to our ends. Clearly this
would be an absurd demand, since we
apparently do this all the time in morally
appropriate ways. Indeed, it is hard to imagine
any life that is recognizably human without the
use of others in pursuit of our goals. What the
Humanity Formula rules out is engaging in
this pervasive use of humanity in such a way
that we treat it as a mere means to our ends.
Thus, the difference between a horse and a taxi
driver is not that we may use one but not the
other as a means of transportation. Unlike a
horse, the taxi driver’s humanity must at the
same time be treated as an end in itself.
2. Second, it is not human beings per se but the
“humanity” in human beings that we must
treat as an end in itself. Our “humanity” is that
collection of features that make us
distinctively human, and these include
capacities to engage in self-directed rational
behavior and to adopt and pursue our own
ends, and any other rational capacities
necessarily connected with these. Thus,
supposing that the taxi driver has freely
exercised his rational capacities in pursuing his
line of work, we make permissible use of these
capacities as a means only if we behave in a
way that he could, when exercising his rational
capacities, consent to — for instance, by
paying an agreed on price.
3. Third, the idea of an end has three senses for
Kant, two positive senses and a negative sense.
An end in the first positive sense is a thing we
will to produce or bring about in the world.
For instance, if losing weight is my end, then
losing weight is something I aim to bring
about. An end in this sense guides my actions
in that once I will to produce something, I then
deliberate about and aim to pursue means of
producing it if I am rational. Humanity is not
an “end” in this sense, though even in this
case, the end “lays down a law” for me. Once I
have adopted an end in this sense, it dictates
that I do something: I should act in ways that
will bring about the end or instead choose to
abandon my goal.
pianist one’s end, one pursues the development of
piano playing. And insofar as humanity is a positive
end in others, I must attempt to further their ends as
well. In so doing, I further the humanity in others, by
helping further the projects and ends that they have
willingly adopted for themselves. It is this sense of
humanity as an end-in-itself on which some of Kant’s
arguments for imperfect duties rely.
An end in the negative sense lays down a law for me as
well, and so guides action, but in a different way.
Korsgaard (1996) offers self-preservation as an
example of an end in a negative sense: We do not try to
produce our self-preservation. Rather, the end of
self-preservation prevents us from engaging in certain
kinds of activities, for instance, picking fights with
mobsters, and so on. That is, as an end, it is something
I do not act against in pursuing my positive ends,
rather than something I produce.
Finally, Kant’s Humanity Formula requires “respect”
for the humanity in persons. Proper regard for
something with absolute value or worth requires
respect for it. But this can invite misunderstandings.
One way in which we respect persons, termed
“appraisal respect” by Stephen Darwall (1977), is
clearly not the same as the kind of respect required by
the Humanity Formula: I may respect you as a
rebounder but not a scorer, or as a researcher but not as
a teacher. When I respect you in this way, I am
positively appraising you in light of some achievement
or virtue you possess relative to some standard of
success. If this were the sort of respect Kant is
counseling then clearly it may vary from person to
person and is surely not what treating something as an
end-in-itself requires. For instance, it does not seem to
prevent me from regarding rationality as an
achievement and respecting one person as a rational
agent in this sense, but not another. And Kant is not
telling us to ignore differences, to pretend that we are
blind to them on mindless egalitarian grounds.
However, a distinct way in which we respect persons,
referred to as “recognition respect” by Darwall, better
captures Kant’s position: I may respect you because
you are a student, a Dean, a doctor or a mother. In such
cases of respecting you because of who or what you
are, I am giving the proper regard to a certain fact
about you, your being a Dean for instance. This sort of
respect, unlike appraisal respect, is not a matter of
degree based on your having measured up to some
standard of assessment. Respect for the humanity in
persons is more like Darwall’s recognition respect. We
are to respect human beings simply because they are
persons and this requires a certain sort of regard. We
are not called on to respect them insofar as they have
met some standard of evaluation appropriate to
persons. And, crucially for Kant, persons cannot lose
their humanity by their misdeeds – even the most
vicious persons, Kant thought, deserve basic respect as
persons with humanity.
Humanity is in the first instance an end in this negative
sense: It is something that limits what I may do in
pursuit of my other ends, similar to the way that my
end of self-preservation limits what I may do in pursuit
of other ends. Insofar as it limits my actions, it is a
source of perfect duties. Now many of our ends are
subjective in that they are not ends that every rational
being must have. Humanity is an objective end,
because it is an end that every rational being must
have. Hence, my own humanity as well as the
humanity of others limit what I am morally permitted
to do when I pursue my other, non-mandatory, ends.
The humanity in myself and others is also a positive
end, though not in the first positive sense above, as
something to be produced by my actions. Rather, it is
something to realize, cultivate or further by my
actions. Becoming a philosopher, pianist or novelist
might be my end in this sense. When my end is
becoming a pianist, my actions do not, or at least not
simply, produce something, being a pianist, but
constitute or realize the activity of being a pianist.
Insofar as the humanity in ourselves must be treated as
an end in itself in this second positive sense, it must be
cultivated, developed or fully actualized. Hence, the
humanity in oneself is the source of a duty to develop
one’s talents or to “perfect” one’s humanity. When one
makes one’s own humanity one’s end, one pursues its
development, much as when one makes becoming a
St. Thomas
Moral Doctrine
●
Primarily eudaimonistic and virtue based.
●
Human beings always act for an end that is
conceived of as good.
●
A desired good provides the motive for initiating
and completing some act.
●
Action begins in desire and ends in satisfaction or
joy in completion— the achievement or
acquisition of the good apprehended and desired.
●
Properly human action proceeds from and is
under the control of intellect and will.
Rational Appetite
➔ informed by an intellectual apprehension of the
world and the goods within it appropriate to
human flourishing
➔ will
★ While human beings have many appetites
informed by sense cognition of the world, they
also have rational appetite.
●
Errors of apprehension are certainly possible, and
yet a human action always originates in the
apprehension of some apparent good by intellect
and the desire for it by the will informed by the
apprehension.
●
Will is rational appetite.
●
Actions are judged to be good or bad in relation
to real human goods for which they are either
conducive (good) or detrimental (bad). Given the
complexity of human life and the goods
appropriate to it, it may well happen that a
particular action may be judged to be good in
many ways, and yet also bad in others.
●
For one to have acted well simply is for one to
have done something that is good in every
respect. There is one single ultimate human good
that provides an ordering of all other human
goods as partial in relation to it, namely,
happiness or better in the Latin beatitudo.
★ When Aristotle sought to isolate the human good,
he employed the so-called function argument. If
one knows what a carpenter is or does he has the
criteria for recognizing a good carpenter. So too
with bank-tellers, golfers, brain surgeons and
locksmiths. If then man as such has a function,
we will have a basis for deciding whether
someone is a good human being. But what could
this function be? Just as we do not appraise
carpenters on the basis of their golf game or
golfers on the basis of their being able to pick
locks, we will not want to appraise the human
agent on an incidental basis. So too we do not
appraise the carpenter in terms of his weight, the
condition of his lungs, or his taste buds. No more
would we appraise a human being on the basis of
activities similar to those engaged in by
non-human animals.
★ The activity that sets the human agent apart from
all others is rational activity. The human agent
acts knowingly-willingly. If this is the human
function, the human being who performs it well
will be a good person and be happy.
●
Thomas argues that there is one single end for
all human beings, and that it is happiness.
●
Thomas distinguishes in the Summa
Theologiae between the imperfect happiness
of this life and the perfect happiness of the
next life in beatitude or union with God.
●
He describes the life in accord with reason and
virtue in this life as imperfect, he must be
suggesting that it is in some sense faulty, not
true or real happiness. Real happiness is
something other.But such an interpretation
fails on a number of counts. In the first place it
misunderstands Aquinas' use of ‘imperfect’
which does not mean faulty or false.
○
It can mean not as great by
comparison, as in the claim that
human beings are imperfect with
regard to the angels.
○
This claim is not meant to suggest that
human beings are faulty or false
angels; it simply means that their
perfection is not as great in the scale
of being as that of the angels.
○
It can also mean incomplete in the
constitution of some overall good. So
the pursuit of some limited good, say
education, is imperfect because not the
complete human good, even though it
is partially constitutive of the human
good. But it is certainly not a faulty or
false human good.
of virtues. Moral virtues are habits of appetite brought
about by the direction of reason. Temperance is to seek
pleasure rationally; courage is to react to the threat of
harm rationally. The virtues of practical intellect are art
and prudence; the virtues of theoretical intellect are
insight, science and wisdom.
★ Aquinas claims that Aristotle understood that a
complete life in accord with reason and virtue in
this life is incomplete or imperfect happiness.
Indeed, Aristotle himself says that perfect
happiness is to be associated with the divine.
Thus Aquinas does not claim for himself the
distinction between imperfect and perfect
happiness, but attributes it to Aristotle. And so his
use of it in the Summa Theologiae cannot be
taken to be a rejection of the analysis Aristotle
provides of the formal characteristics of
happiness.
Acts of Man
➔ activities truly found in human agents, but also
found in other non-human agents too
➔ might be as important as the beating of his heart
or or as trivial as the nervous tapping of his
fingers
The philosophers are capable of grasping some of the
things that are constitutive of or necessary for perfect
happiness in beatitude. Revelation concerning even
those matters they can grasp is necessary, because
what they have grasped takes a long time, is very
difficult, and may be filled with errors. God in his
mercy makes these things known in revelation in order
that perfect happiness may be attained. And yet,
Thomas never abandons the fundamental affirmation
of the human capacity to understand apart from
revelation the nature of happiness in formal terms and
what constitutes its imperfect material status in this
life, even as its perfect embodiment in the next remains
unattainable to philosophy without the resources of
faith.
Many have come to this point, pulse quickened by the
possibilities of the function-argument, only to be
gripped with doubt at this final application of it.
Rational activity seems too unmanageable a
description to permit a function-analysis of it. Of
course Aristotle agrees, having made the point himself.
Rational activity is said in many ways or, as Thomas
would put it, it is an analogous term. It covers an
ordered set of instances. There is the activity of reason
as such, there is the activity of reason in its directive or
practical capacity, and there are bodily movements and
the like which are rational insofar as rational provides
the adequate formal description of them. If the virtue
of a function is to perform it well, the analogy of
“rational activity” makes clear that there is a plurality
Human Acts
➔ proceeds from and is under the control of reason
and will.
➔ by definition is the pursuit of a known good
●
Aristotle argues for there being an ultimate end,
Thomas points out that the argument is actually a
series of reductiones ad absurdum. That is, the
denial of an ultimate end of human action reduces
to the claim that there is no end to human seeking
at all, that it is pointless.
●
Any action aims at some good. A particular good
by definition shares in and is not identical with
goodness itself. What binds together all the acts
that humans perform is the overarching goodness
they seek in this, that, and the other thing. That
over arching goodness, what Thomas calls the
ratio bonitatis, is the ultimate end. It follows that
anything a human agent does is done for the sake
of the ultimate end.
●
The fact that there are false or inadequate
identifications of goodness does not mean that
there is not a true and adequate account of what is
perfecting or fulfilling of human agents.
Everyone acts on the supposition that what he
does will contribute to his overall good; one's
overall good is the ultimate reason for doing
anything. But not everything one does under this
aegis actually contributes to one's overall good.
Thus in one sense there is one and the same
ultimate end for every human agent—the integral
human good—and there are correct and mistaken
notions of what actually constitutes this integral
good.
○
If indeed every human agent acts for the
sake of his overall good, the discussion can
turn to whether or not what he here and
now pursues, or his general theory of what
constitutes the overall good, can withstand
scrutiny. It is not necessary to persuade
anyone that he ought to pursue the ultimate
end in the sense of his overall good. What
else would he pursue? But if one is
persuaded that what he pursues does not
contribute to his overall good, he already
has reasons for changing his ways.
aspire to in this life consists in
knowing God through His effects and
the ways in which they represent Him
as cause, this beatitudo of the next life
●
Thomas describes as a participation in the life
of divinity itself as the essence of God Himself
is united by the “light of glory” to the intellect
of the human being, a union with God that
results in the experience of ultimate and final
joy or delight of the will. However, even
though this beatitudo is brought about
supernaturally by the power of God, it is not
utterly foreign to human nature.
●
The supernatural power of God elevates or
expands the powers of intellect and will to a
kind of completion beyond themselves and yet
not foreign to them. So this distinction of a
“twofold happiness” should not be thought of
as involving two fundamentally distinct goals
or ends of human life. The second supernatural
happiness is seen as a kind of surpassing
perfection of the first.
Virtue
➔ are developed habits of powers disposing agents
to good actions.
➔ a kind of mean between excess and defect in the
exercise of a power. For example, with regard to
eating a temperate person eats what is appropriate
to him or her, pursuing neither too much which
would lead to gluttony nor to little which would
lead to starvation.
Because human actions are those acts that are subject
to the rule of human reason and will, the human virtues
reside in the various powers that are subject to the rule
of reason and will. As developed dispositions they
stand as intermediate states between the powers simply
and the full blown exercises of those powers.
Thomas first distinguishes a twofold happiness for
human beings:
1. One is the sort of happiness that is achievable
by a human agent in this life through the
exercise of the powers he or she is endowed
with by nature.
● He says this is a happiness that is
“proportionate” to human nature. It
may well include the sort of
contemplation of the nature of divinity
the philosophers aspire to.
2. Thomas adds that there is “another” happiness
that cannot be achieved simply by the exercise
of the human powers without divine
supernatural assistance.
● This is a happiness not to be found
perfectly in this life, but only in the
next. It is beatitudo or blessedness
strictly speaking. It consists in the
intellectual vision of God and all
things “in” God. While the kind of
contemplation of God the philosophers
This distinction of a twofold happiness in human life
leads to a distinction between the natural virtues and
the theological virtues.
Natural virtues
➔ are virtues that pertain to the happiness of this
life that is “proportionate” to human nature.
➔ Natural virtues are divided into:
◆ Moral Virtues
● are the habits that perfect the
various powers concerned
with
human
appetites,
including rational appetite,
conferring upon them an
aptness for the right use of
those appetites.
◆ Intellectual virtues
● perfect the intellect and confer
an aptness for the good work
of the intellect which is the
apprehension of truth.
Theological virtues
➔ pertain to the beatitudo that is
proportionate
to human nature,
supernatural good of life with God.
not
the
Cardinal natural virtues
1. Prudence
➔ is an intellectual virtue since it bears
upon the goal of truth in the good
ordering of action.
2. Justice
➔ a virtue of the rational appetite or will
3. Courage
● irascible appetite
○ inclines one toward resisting
those things that attack human
bodily life. Courage is the
cardinal virtue that pertains to
it.
4. Temperance
● Concupiscent appetite
○ inclines one toward what is
suitable and away from what
is harmful to human bodily
life. Temperance is the
cardinal virtue that pertains to
it.
★ These virtues are called “cardinal” both
because of their specific importance, but also
as general headings under which the wide
array of particular virtues are classed.
★ Temperance and Courage are ordered toward
and perfect the good of the individual as such,
★ Justice is ordered toward and perfects the good
of others in relation to the individual.
Theological Virtues
1. Faith
2. Hope
3. Love.
●
they bear upon eternal beatitude and are
simply infused by God's gift of grace.
●
They cannot be acquired by human effort.
However, as noted above supernatural
happiness is not foreign to the first natural
happiness, but a kind of surpassing perfection
of it.
●
So along with the infusion of the theological
virtues, Thomas holds that natural virtues are
infused along with them. Thus there is a
distinction between “infused natural virtues”
and “acquired natural virtues.”
Infused natural virtues
➔ cannot be acquired by human effort, although
they may be strengthened by it.
Acquired natural virtues
➔ virtues that can be acquired by human effort
without the gift of divine grace.
➔ While Thomas acknowledges that these
acquired natural virtues can in principle be
developed by human effort without grace, he
thinks that their actual acquisition by human
effort is very difficult due to the influence of
sin.
In addition, the infused natural virtues spring from
Charity as its effects, and thus bear upon its object,
which is the love of God and the love of neighbor in
God. A primary example for Thomas is Misericordia
which is the virtue that pertains to suffering with others
and acting to alleviate their suffering. It looks like
Justice because it bears upon the good of another. And
yet it is different from Justice because it springs from
the natural friendship that all human beings bear to one
another, and requires that one take upon oneself the
sufferings of other human beings. And yet in the
Summa Theologiae he says that it is an effect of
Charity. In that case there is an acquired form of it and
an infused form of it. As infused, it is informed by the
love of God and the love of neighbor in God which is
beatitude.
The infused natural virtues differ in important respects
from the corresponding acquired virtues because as
infused they point toward the supernatural end, and the
mean in acquired virtue is fixed by human reason
while the mean in the infused virtue is according to
divine rule. Thomas gives as an example the difference
between acquired and infused Temperance. Acquired
temperance is a mean inclining a human being to eat
enough food to sustain his or her health and not harm
the body. Infused temperance is a mean inclining the
human being through abstinence to castigate and
subject the body.
Even one mortal or grave sin destroys both Charity and
all the infused moral virtues that proceed from it, while
leaving Hope and Faith as lifeless habits that are no
longer virtues. On the other hand, a single sin, whether
venial or mortal, does not destroy the acquired natural
virtues.
Charity, as we've seen, is the love of God and neighbor
in God. It resides in the will. Hope is the desire for the
difficult but attainable good of eternal happiness or
beatitude. It too resides in the will. Faith is intellectual
assent to revealed supernatural truths that are not
evident in themselves or through demonstration from
truths evident in themselves. So it resides in the
intellect. It is divided into believing that there is a god
and other truths pertaining to that truth, believing God,
and believing “in” God. The distinction between the
last two is subtle. It is one thing to say you believe me.
It is a different thing to say you believe in me. The
latter connotes the relation of your intellect to the will's
desire to direct yourself to me in love. Thus believing
in God goes well beyond believing that there is a god.
It suggests the other theological virtues of Charity and
Hope.
In beatitude and felicity, the fulfillment of intellect and
will respectively, the virtues of Faith and Hope fall
away, and do not exist, for one now sees with the
intellect what one believed, and has attained what one
hoped for with the will. Only Charity abides.
Natural Law
➔ the peculiarly human participation in the eternal
law, in providence.
◆ All creatures are ordered to an end, have
natures whose fulfillment is what it is
because of those natures. It is not peculiar
to man that he is fashioned so as to find his
good in the fulfillment of his nature. That is
true of anything. But other things are
ordered to ends of which they themselves
are not conscious. It is peculiar to man that
he becomes aware of the good and freely
directs himself to it. Of course man is not
free to choose the good—any choice is a
choice under the aspect of the good. And as
to what is really as opposed to only
apparently his good, he is not free to make
that what it is. He is, however, free to direct
himself or not to his true end.
➔ the first principles or starting points of practical
reasoning.
◆ To indicate what he means by this, Thomas
invokes the analogy of the starting points of
reasoning as such. We have already
mentioned
the
distinction
between
knowledge of the simple and knowledge of
the complex. The former is a concept and is
expressed in a definition or description. The
latter is an affirmation or negation of one
thing of another. There is something which
is first in each of these orders. That is,
Thomas holds that there is a conception
which is prior to and presupposed by all
other conceptions and a judgment that is
prior to and presupposed by all other
judgments. Since knowledge is expressed
by language, this seems to come down to
the assertion that there is a first word that
everyone utters and a first statement that
would appear in everyone's baby book on
the appropriate page. But surely that is
false. So what does Thomas mean?
He says that our first conception is of being, of that
which is, and our first judgment is that you cannot
affirm and deny the same thing in the same sense
simultaneously. Since few if any humans first utter
‘being’ or its equivalent and no one fashions as his first
enunciation the principle of contradiction, facts as
known to Thomas as ourselves, his meaning must be
more subtle. It is that whatever concept one first forms
and expresses verbally—Mama, hot, whatever,is a
specification or an instance of that which is, being.
Aristotle had observed that children at first call all men
father and all women mother. The terms then function
as generic for any male or female. Even more
basically, each presupposes that what is generically
grasped is an instance of being. Being is prior not
because it is grasped absolutely, without reference to
this being or that. It is some particular being that is
first of all grasped, and however it is named it will
mean minimally something that is.
So too with regard to the first judgment. Children
express their recognition of this principle when they
disagree over the location of some quite specific thing,
say a baseball mitt. One accuses the other of taking it.
You did. I didn't. You did. I didn't. A fundamental
disagreement. But what they are agreed on is that if it
were true that one did it could not simultaneously and
in the same sense be true that he did not. The principle
is latent in, implicit in, any concrete judgment just as
being is involved in any other conception.
It is on an analogy with these starting points of
thinking as such that Thomas develops what he means
by natural law. In the practical order there is a first
concept analogous to being in the theoretical order and
it is the good. The good means what is sought as
fulfilling of the seeker. The first practical judgment is:
the good should be done and pursued and evil avoided.
Any other practical judgment is a specification of this
one and thus includes it. Natural Law consists of this
first judgment and other most general ones that are
beyond contest. These will be fashioned with reference
to constituents of our complete good—existence, food,
drink, sex and family, society, desire to know. We have
natural inclinations to such goods. Natural law
precepts concerning them refer the objects of natural
inclinations to our overall or integral good, which they
specify.
Most moral judgments are true, if true, only by and
large. They express means to achieve our overall good.
But because there is not a necessary connection
between the means and end, they can hold only for the
most part. Thus there are innumerable ways in which
human beings lead their lives in keeping with the
ultimate end. Not all means are necessarily related to
the end. Moral philosophy reposes on natural law
precepts as common presuppositions, but its advice
will be true only in the main. So the lives of human
beings will show a great deal of variation in the ways
they pursue the human end in accord with these
general principles. Thus the need for the virtues
bearing upon the contingencies of life, Prudence in
particular.
It might be noted that when Thomas, following
Aristotle, says that man is by nature a social or
political animal, he does not mean that each of us has a
tendency to enter into social contracts or the like. The
natural in this sense is what is not chosen, but given,
and what is given about human life is that we are in the
first place born into the community of the family, are
dependent on it for years in order to survive, and that
we flourish as human beings within various larger
social and political communities. The moral consists in
behaving well in these given settings.
Gautama
Four Noble Truths:
1. There is suffering.
2. There is the origination of suffering.
● is the simple claim that there are causes
and conditions for the arising of suffering.
3. There is the cessation of suffering.
● if the origination of suffering depends on
causes, future suffering can be prevented
by bringing about the cessation of those
causes.
4. There is a path to the cessation of suffering.
● specifies a set of techniques that are said
to be effective in such cessation.
habits with others that are more conducive to seeing
things as they are.
●
Training in meditation is also prescribed, as a
way of enhancing one's observational abilities,
especially with respect to one's own
psychological states.
○ Insight is cultivated through the use of
these newly developed observational
powers, as informed by knowledge
acquired through the exercise of
philosophical rationality.
●
Suffering
➔ not mere pain but existential suffering, the sort of
frustration, alienation and despair that arise out of
our experience of transitoriness.
◆ Highest levels of appreciation of this truth
involve the realization that everything is of
the nature of suffering.
Much then hangs on the correct identification of the
causes of suffering.
Buddha taught an analysis of the origins of suffering
roughly along the following lines: given the existence
of a fully functioning assemblage of psychophysical
elements (the parts that make up a sentient being),
ignorance concerning the three characteristics of
sentient existence—suffering, impermanence and
non-self—will lead, in the course of normal
interactions with the environment, to appropriation
(the identification of certain elements as ‘I’ and
‘mine’). This leads in turn to the formation of
attachments, in the form of desire and aversion, and
the strengthening of ignorance concerning the true
nature of sentient existence. These ensure future
rebirth, and thus future instances of old age, disease
and death, in a potentially unending cycle.
The key to escape from this cycle is said to lie in
realization of the truth about sentient existence—that it
is characterized by suffering, impermanence and
non-self. But this realization is not easily achieved,
since acts of appropriation have already made desire,
aversion and ignorance deeply entrenched habits of
mind. Thus the measures specified in (4) include
various forms of training designed to replace such
There is a debate in the later tradition as to
whether final release can be attained through
theoretical insight alone, through meditation
alone, or only by using both techniques.
○ Ch'an
➔ based on the premise that
enlightenment can be attained
through meditation alone,
○ Theravāda
➔ advocates using both meditation
and theoretical insight, but also
holds that analysis alone may be
sufficient for some.
Middle Path
The Buddha seems to have held (2) to constitute the
core of his discovery. He calls his teachings a ‘middle
path’ between two extreme views, and it is this claim
concerning the causal origins of suffering that he
identifies as the key to avoiding those extremes.
The extremes are:
1. Eternalism
➔ the view that persons are eternal
2. Annihilationism
➔ the view that persons go utterly out of
existence (usually understood to mean at
death, though a term still shorter than one
lifetime is not ruled out).
●
It will be apparent that eternalism requires the
existence of the sort of self that the Buddha
denies. What is not immediately evident is why
the denial of such a self is not tantamount to the
claim that the person is annihilated at death. The
solution to this puzzle lies in the fact that
eternalism and annihilationism both share the
presupposition that there is an ‘I’ whose existence
might either extend beyond death or terminate at
death.
●
The idea of the ‘middle path’ is that all of life's
continuities can be explained in terms of facts
about a causal series of psychophysical elements.
There being nothing more than a succession of
these impermanent, impersonal events and states,
the question of the ultimate fate of this ‘I’, the
supposed owner of these elements, simply does
not arise.
This reductionist view of sentient beings was later
articulated in terms of the distinction between two
kinds of truth, conventional and ultimate.
Conventionally Real
➔ are those things that are accepted as real by
common sense, but that turn out on further
analysis to be wholes compounded out of
simpler entities and thus not strictly speaking
real at all.
➔ The stock example of a conventionally real
entity is the chariot, which we take to be real
only because it is more convenient, given our
interests and cognitive limitations, to have a
single name for the parts when assembled in
the right way. Since our belief that there are
chariots is thus due to our having a certain
useful concept, the chariot is said to be a mere
conceptual fiction.
◆ This does not, however, mean that all
conceptualization is falsification; only
concepts that allow of reductive
analysis lead to this artificial inflation
of our ontology, and thus to a kind of
error.
➔ A conventionally true statement is one that,
given how the ultimately real entities are
arranged, would correctly describe certain
conceptual fictions if they also existed.
Ultimately Real
➔ are those ultimate parts into which conceptual
fictions are analyzable.
➔ An ultimately true statement is one that
correctly describes how certain ultimately real
entities are arranged.
➔ The ultimate truth concerning the relevant
ultimately real entities helps explain why it
should turn out to be useful to accept
conventionally true statements (such as ‘King
Milinda rode in a chariot’) when the objects
described in those statements are mere
fictions.
Using this distinction between the two truths, the key
insight of the ‘middle path’ may be expressed as
follows.
The ultimate truth about sentient beings is just that
there is a causal series of impermanent, impersonal
psychophysical elements. Since these are all
impermanent, and lack other properties that would be
required of an essence of the person, none of them is a
self. But given the right arrangement of such entities in
a causal series, it is useful to think of them as making
up one thing, a person. It is thus conventionally true
that there are persons, things that endure for a lifetime
and possibly (if there is rebirth) longer. This is
conventionally true because generally speaking there is
more overall happiness and less overall pain and
suffering when one part of such a series identifies with
other parts of the same series. For instance, when the
present set of psychophysical elements identifies with
future elements, it is less likely to engage in behavior
(such as smoking) that results in present pleasure but
far greater future pain. The utility of this convention is,
however, limited. Past a certain point—namely the
point at which we take it too seriously, as more than
just a useful fiction—it results in existential suffering.
The cessation of suffering is attained by extirpating all
sense of an ‘I’ that serves as agent and owner.
Mencius
The Virtues and Their Cultivation
●
A genuinely benevolent ruler will notice how his
One of Mencius's most influential views was his list of
policies will affect his subjects, and will only
four innate ethical dispositions, which he treats as what
pursue policies consistent with their well being.
Western ethicists would call cardinal virtues:
1.
benevolence (rén)
2.
righteousness (yì)
3.
wisdom (zhì)
dishonorable behavior or demeaning
4.
propriety (lĭ).
treatment.
●
Righteousness
➔ a disposition to disdain or regard as shameful
Each of the four virtues is associated with a
●
characteristic emotion or motivational attitude:
addressed disrespectfully (7B31), and would
○
The feeling of compassion is benevolence.
not engage in an illicit sexual relationship
○
The feeling of disdain is righteousness.
(3B3).
○
The feeling of respect is propriety.
○
The feeling of approval and disapproval is
●
A fully righteous person would also recognize
that it is just as shameful to accept a large
wisdom
●
A righteous person would object to being
bribe as it is to accept a small bribe (6A10),
and so would refuse to accept either.
Among these four, Mencius devotes the most
discussion to benevolence and righteousness.
★ Mencius suggests that wisdom and propriety
Benevolence
are secondary in importance to benevolence
➔ manifested in the affection one has for his or her
and righteousness:
own kin, as well as compassion for the suffering
○
“The core of benevolence is serving
of other humans, and even concern for
one's parents. The core of
non–human animals.
righteousness is obeying one's elder
brother. The core of wisdom is
★ However, according to Confucians, one should
knowing these two and not
always have greater concern for, and has greater
abandoning them. The core of ritual
obligations toward, relatives, teachers, and friends
propriety is the adornment of these
than one does for strangers and animals (7A45).
two” (4A27; Van Norden 2008, 101).
●
Benevolence is not simply a matter of feeling a
certain way: it also has cognitive and behavioral
●
Wisdom
➔ involves an understanding of and commitment to
aspects.
the other virtues, especially benevolence and
A fully benevolent person will be disposed to
righteousness.
recognize the suffering of others and to act
appropriately.
●
A wise person has the ability to properly assess
individuals and has skill at means–end
deliberation .
●
●
Mencian wisdom seems to be only partially
fearless opposition to wrongdoing, but also
He notes that no sage(wise man) would kill an
humble submission when one finds oneself in the
innocent person, even if it meant obtaining
wrong.
●
Mencius holds that all humans have innate but
world.
incipient tendencies toward benevolence,
However, he also stresses that sages often act
righteousness, wisdom, and propriety. Employing
very differently from one another, but if they
an agricultural metaphor, he refers to these
“had exchanged places, each would have done as
tendencies as “sprouts”.
the other”.
●
Courage based on righteousness will lead to
constrained by rules.
control of (and being able to benefit) the whole
●
●
●
The sprouts are manifested in cognitive and
The ultimate standard for any action is
emotional reactions characteristic of the virtues.
“timeliness”, which seems to mean performing
For example, all humans feel compassion for the
the right action out of the appropriate motivation
suffering of other humans and animals, at least on
for this particular situation.
some occasions, and this is a manifestation of
benevolence.
Propriety
●
metaphor suggests, humans are not born with
➔ is manifested in respect or deference toward
●
elders and legitimate authority figures,
fully formed virtuous dispositions. Our nascent
especially as manifested in ceremonies and
virtues are sporadic and inconsistent in their
etiquette.
manifestations.
The character for the virtue of propriety is
identical with the one for ritual, reflecting the
●
Virtuous
●
Aruler who manifests genuine benevolence when
close connection between this virtue and such
he spares an ox being led to slaughter may
practices.
nonetheless ignore the suffering of his own
subjects.
Mencius thinks that matters of ritual place
legitimate ethical demands on us, but he stresses
●
Likewise, someone who would disdain to be
that they are not categorical, and can be
addressed disrespectfully may feel no
overridden by more exigent obligations. For
compunction in acting against his convictions in
example, he notes that rescuing one's
the face of a large bribe.
sister–in–law if she were drowning would justify
violation of the ritual prohibition on physical
Extention
●
contact between unmarried men and women.
wisdom.
Courage
Highest form of courage is commitment to
righteousness
In order to become genuinely virtuous, a person
must “extend” or “fill out” his or her nascent
virtuous inclinations.
★ Knowing when to violate ritual is a matter of
●
However, as Mencius's carefully chosen sprout
●
As Mencius puts it:
○
“People all have things that they will not
bear. To extend this reaction to that which
they will bear is benevolence.
○
○
○
People all have things that they will not
★ Extension is the mental process by which one
do. To extend this reaction to that which
comes to recognize the ethically relevant
they will do is righteousness.
similarity of C1 to C2, have the same emotional
If people can fill out the heart that does not
reaction to C2 as to C1, and behave the same
desire to harm others, their benevolence
toward C2 as to C1. Were the king to extend from
will be inexhaustible.
the ox to his subjects, he would notice their
If people can fill out the heart that will not
trespass, their righteousness will be
suffering, feel compassion for them, and change
his current military and civil policies.
inexhaustible” (Mengzi 7B31; Van Norden
Three Prerequisites for Extension
2008, 192).
1.
One of the most intriguing issues in Mencius's
philosophy is the proper way to understand his claim
that we must “extend” (tui, ji, da) or “fill out” (kuo,
chong) our innate but incipient virtuous reactions.
In a much–discussed example (1A7), Mencius draws a
ruler's attention to the fact that he had shown
compassion for an ox being led to slaughter by sparing
it. Mencius then encourages the king to “extend” his
compassion to his own subjects, who suffer due to the
ruler's wars of conquest and exorbitant taxation. The
basic structure of Mencian extension is clear from this
example.
There is a paradigm case, C1, in which an individual's
sprout of compassion is manifested in cognition,
emotion, and behavior. In, C1 is the ox being led to
slaughter. The king perceives that the ox is suffering,
feels compassion for its suffering, and acts to spare it.
There is also a case that is relevantly similar to the
paradigm case, C2, but in which the individual does not
currently have the same cognitive, emotional, and
behavioral reactions. In C2 is the king's subjects.
Although his subjects suffer, the king ignores their
suffering, has no compassion for it, and does not act to
alleviate it.
An environment that meets people's basic
physical needs
Only a handful of people, Mencius argues, have the
strength of character to “have a constant heart” in the
face of physical deprivation. Most people will resort to
crime in the face of hunger and fear: “When they
thereupon sink into crime, to go and punish the people
is to trap them. When there are benevolent persons in
positions of authority, how is it possible for them to
trap the people?” (1A7; Van Norden 2008, 14)
Consequently, Mencius stresses that it is the obligation
of government to ensure that the people are well–fed
and free from the fear of violence.
2. Ethical Education
the satisfaction of physical needs is insufficient to
ensure the virtue of the common people. Socialization
is also necessary: “The Way of the people is this: if
they are full of food, have warm clothes, and live in
comfort but are without instruction, then they come
close to being animals” (3A4; Van Norden 2008, 71).
This socialization includes learning the rituals (the
etiquette and ceremony of social interactions) as well
as instruction in the fundamental “human roles”:
“between father and children there is affection;
between ruler and ministers there is righteousness;
between husband and wife there is distinction; between
elder and younger there is precedence; and between
friends there is faithfulness”
which emotions are motivational states closely
3. Individual Effort.
The first two factors are necessary and sufficient to
connected to evaluations of situations (de Sousa 2014,
Section 4).
ensure that most people will not become bestial.
However, achieving the level of a “sage” or “worthy”
requires considerable individual effort.
The Goodness of Human Nature
●
Mencius is perhaps best–known for his claim that
“human nature is good” (xìng shàn).
Reflection (Si)
●
Mencius refers to the mental activity required for
●
nature of X as the characteristics that X will
full extension as “reflection (sī).”
●
commitment to doing so.
●
develop if given a healthy environment for the
Whether someone engages in reflection is
ultimately dependent upon the individual's
Mencius and his contemporaries regarded the
kind of thing X is.
●
A characteristic, C, can be part of the nature of X
even if there exists an X such that X does not
If one knows that it is not righteous, then one
have C. For example, language use is part of the
should quickly stop
nature of a human being, but there are cases of
humans who, due to neurological damage or
One aspect of reflection is particularly salient: it is
simply failure to be exposed to language prior to
insufficient for successful extension that one merely
the onset of adolescence, fail to develop a
recognize, in an abstract or theoretical manner, the
capacity for language use.
similarity between two situations. One must come to
●
It is even possible for C to be part of the nature of
be motivated and to act in relevantly similar ways.
X if most instances of X do not have C. For
Because of the preceding requirement, an intense topic
example, it is the nature of an orange tree to bear
of discussion among later Confucians influenced by
fruit, but the majority of orange seeds do not even
Mencius is the relationship between knowledge and
germinate, much less grow to maturity.
action. For example, Wang Yangming (1472–1529)
famously argued for the “unity of knowing and
★ An important aspect of Mencius's claim that
acting,” as the most plausible interpretation of
human nature is good is that humans have a
Mencius's view: “There never have been people who
tendency to become good if raised in an
know but do not act. Those who ‘know’ but do not act
environment that is healthy for them.
simply do not yet know” (Tiwald and Van Norden
2014, 267).
From a Western perspective, one of the noteworthy
aspects of Mencius's view of extension is that he
regards emotions as a crucial part of ethical perception
and evaluation. Although it would be anachronistic to
saddle him with any specific contemporary account of
the emotions, it seems clear that his underlying view is
close to what Western psychologists and philosopher
call an “appraisal theory” of emotions, according to
○
This thesis runs the danger of becoming
viciously circular: we might characterize
goodness as the result of growing up in a
healthy environment, and a healthy
environment as one that results in humans
being good.
★ However, Mencius's claims about human nature,
virtues, ethical cultivation, and political
philosophy are nodes in a complex web of beliefs
that appeals to our intuitions (e.g., it is normal for
“inherently” has a heart with the capacity for these
humans to show compassion for the suffering of
emotions. They will manifest themselves, at least
others) as well as empirical claims (e.g., humans
sporadically, in each human. If we “reflect upon” these
are less likely to manifest compassion when
manifestations, we can develop our innate capacities
subject to physical deprivation).
into fully formed virtues.
Probably the two most important passages for
●
“those who follow their greater part become great
understanding Mencius's view of human nature are
humans. Those who follow their petty part
6A6 and 6A15. In the former, Mencius's disciple
become petty humans.”
Gongsun Chou asks him to explain how his position
differs from those who say that “human nature is
Gongduzi persists, “We are the same in being humans.
neither good nor not good,” those who claim that
Why is it that some follow their greater part and some
“human nature can become good, and it can become
follow their petty part?” Mencius replies,
not good,” and those who state that “there are natures
●
It is not the function of the ears and eyes to
that are good, and there are natures that are not good.”
reflect, and they are misled by things. Things
Mencius replies,
interact with things and lead them along. But the
function of the heart is to reflect [si]. If it reflects,
As for what they are inherently [qíng], they can
then it will get it. If it does not reflect, then it will
become good.This is what I mean by calling their
not get it. This is what Heaven has given us. If
natures [xìng] good. As for their becoming not good,
one first takes one's stand on what is greater, then
this is not the fault of their potential. Humans all
what is lesser will not be able to snatch it away.
have the feeling [xīn] of compassion. Humans all have
This is how to become a great person.
the feeling of disdain. Humans all have the feeling of
respect. Humans all have the feeling of approval and
●
Mencius sketches in 6A15, our sensual desires
disapproval. The feeling of compassion is
can lead us to wrongdoing if we pursue them
benevolence. The feeling of disdain is righteousness.
without also engaging our ethical motivations.
The feeling of respect is propriety. The feeling of
This is an especially acute danger because our
approval and disapproval is wisdom. Benevolence,
sensory desires always respond automatically and
righteousness, propriety, and wisdom are not welded to
effortlessly to their appropriate objects, while our
us externally. We inherently have them. It is simply
moral motivations are more selective.
that we do not reflect upon [sī] them. (Van Norden
2008, 149).
●
Mencius suggests the mechanical responsiveness
of our sense organs by describing them as simply
Human nature is good, on this view, because
“things”: “Things interact with things and lead
becoming a good person is the result of developing
them along.” In contrast, the full development of
our innate tendencies toward benevolence,
our ethical motivations requires that our heart
righteousness, wisdom, and propriety. These
engage in “reflection”: “If it reflects, then it will
tendencies are manifested in distinctively moral
get it. If it does not reflect, then it will not get it.”
emotions, correlated with the virtues. Each human
The heart “gets it” in that it engages the
appropriate ethical motivations.
In stating that human nature is good, “Mencius was
While ingenious, this interpretation of Mencius is
saying that human beings have a constitution
unmotivated without the assumption that the Analects
comprising certain emotional predispositions that
and Mengzi must be expressing the same view.
already point in the direction of goodness and by virtue
of which people are capable of becoming good….
The term “nature” occurs in only 17 passages in the
One's becoming bad is not the fault of one's
Mengzi , and the specific phrase “[human] nature is
constitution, but a matter of one's injuring or not fully
good” only occurs in two of these. However, there is
developing the constitution in the appropriate
some plausibility to Zhu Xi's suggestion that the latter
direction”
claim is operative in many passages where it is not
mentioned explicitly, because of how intimately it is
The statement that “[human] nature is good [xìng
connected with other aspects of Mencius's view. This
shàn]” is often misquoted as “[human] nature is
will become clearer as we consider Mencius's critiques
fundamentally good [xìng bĕn shàn].” The latter phrase
of other philosophers in his era.
actually derives from a gloss on Mencius's view
popularized by the seminal commentator Zhu Xi
(1130–1200). Zhu Xi held that Mencius was simply
explicating what was implicit in the sayings of
Confucius. Confucius stated that “natures are close to
one another, but become far from one another by
practice” .
In order to explain why Confucius described human
natures as merely "close to" one another, while
Mencius referred to them as identically "good," Zhu Xi
argued that Mencius was referring to the ultimate,
underlying human nature in itself, whereas Confucius
was referring to human nature as manifested in
concrete embodiments. Zhu Xi's view became
orthodoxy, and was even written into the opening lines
of the Three Character Classic, a primer for learning
to read Chinese that was memorized by schoolchildren
for centuries:
At its beginning,
human nature is fundamentally good.
Human natures are close to one another,
but become far from one another by practice.
It is only when there is not education,
that their natures deviate.
Lao Tzu
Dao and Virtue
Dao as Wu
➔ Nothing
Dao
➔ Way
➔ Nothingness
➔ Speaking
➔ Negativity
➔ means to a higher end
➔ nonbeing
➔ an end in itself
➔ “not
having”
any
name,
form, or other
characteristics of things
➔ beginning
➔ the etymology of the Chinese graph or character
suggests a pathway, or heading in a certain
★ The term “Dao” itself is no more than a
symbol—as the Laozi makes clear, “I do not
direction along a path.
➔ right or proper course, and by extension the
know its name; I style it Dao”. This suggests a
doctrines or teachings that set forth such a course,
sense of radical transcendence, which explains
or the means and methods that would bring it
why the Laozi has been approached so often as a
about.
mystical text.
●
Laozi 53, states, “The great dao is very even (flat,
easy to travel on), but people like (to take)
★ It marks not only the mystery of Dao but also its
limitlessness or inexhaustibility.
by-ways (jing).”
○
Jing
★ Names serve to delimit, to set boundaries; in
contrast, Dao is without limits and therefore
➔ a small trail off the main road
cannot be captured fully by language. This
suggests a positive dimension to transcendence,
Dao ke dao
➔ “Dao that can be dao-ed,”
which brings into view the creative power of Dao:
➔ “The Way that can be spoken of.”
“All things under heaven are born of being (you);
being is born of wu” (ch. 40). What does this
★ The concept of dao is not unique to the Laozi.
●
Dao cannot be defined or described; it is
mean?
●
“nameless.”
●
Dao transcends sensory perception; it has neither
Elsewhere in the Laozi, Dao is said to be the
“beginning” of all things.
●
shape nor form.
Daoist
creation
involves
a
process
of
differentiation from unity to multiplicity: “Dao
gives birth to One; One gives birth to Two; Two
Dao as Xuan
gives birth to Three; Three gives birth to the ten
➔ Nameless and formless, Dao can only be
thousand things”
described as:
◆ “dark” or “mysterious”
The dominant interpretation in traditional China is that
Dao
represents
the
source
of
the
original,
undifferentiated, essential qi-energy, the “One,” which
in turn produces the yin and yang cosmic forces.
While the “lighter,” more rarefied yang energy-stuff
★ As the source of being, Dao cannot be itself a
rises to form heaven, the “heavier” yin solidifies to
being, no matter how powerful or perfect;
become earth. A further “blending” of the two
otherwise, the problem of infinite regress cannot
generates a “harmonious” qi-energy that informs
be overcome.
human beings.
Although the Laozi may not have entertained a fully
This agrees with Wang Bi's interpretation. If wu points
developed yin-yang cosmological theory, it does
to a necessary ontological foundation, the distinction
suggest at one point that natural phenomena are
between
constituted by yin and yang: the “ten thousand things”
Commenting on chapter 42 of the Laozi, Wang Bi
or myriad creatures, as it rather lyrically puts it, “carry
writes, “One can be said to be wu”; “One is the
yin on their backs and embrace yang with their arms”.
beginning of numbers and the ultimate of things”
That which gave rise to the original qi-energy,
(commentary on ch. 39; see also Wang's commentary
however, is indescribable. The Laozi calls it Dao, or
on the Yijing, trans. in Lynn 1994, 60). The concept of
perhaps more appropriately in this context, “the Dao,”
“One” and the concept of wu thus complement each
with the definite article, to signal its presence as the
other in disclosing different aspects of the logic of
source of the created order.
creation—both unity and nonbeing are necessary for
“Dao”
and
“One”
seems
redundant.
understanding the generation of beings.
Dao as “an absolute entity which is the source
of the universe”
Comparing the two interpretations, whereas the first,
Not being anything in particular, the Dao may be
“cosmological” reading has to explain the sense in
described as “nothing” (wu). However, on this reading,
which the Dao can be said to be “nothing,” the second
wu does not mean “nothingness,” “negativity” or
emphasizes the centrality of wu, “nonbeing,” for which
absence in the nihilistic sense, in view of the creative
“Dao” is but one designation. For the latter, Dao is
power of the Dao.
entirely conceptual, whereas the former envisages the
Dao as referring to a mysterious substance or energy
Alternatively, one could argue that Dao signifies a
that brings about the cosmos and continues to sustain
conceptually necessary ontological ground; it does not
and regulate it. Depending on the interpretation, wu
refer to any indescribable original substance or energy.
may be translated as “nothing” or “nonbeing”
“Beginning” is not a term of temporal reference but
accordingly. The latter may be awkward, but it serves
suggests ontological priority in the Laozi.
to alert the reader that the nothingness or emptiness of
Dao may not be understood referentially or reduced
The process of creation does proceed from unity to
simply to the fullness of qi.
multiplicity, but the Laozi is only concerned to show
that “two” would be impossible without the idea of
The metaphor of “Dao” shows that all things are
“one.” The assertion in Laozi 42, “One gives birth to
derived ultimately from an absolute “beginning,” in
Two,” affirms that duality presupposes unity; to render
either sense of the word, like the start of a pathway. It
it as “The One gave birth to the Two” is to turn what is
also suggests a direction to be followed.
essentially a logical relation into a cosmological event.
moral, and spiritual capacity. Read this way, the title
Daodejing
➔ concerned with both Dao and de.
Daodejing should be translated as the “Classic of the
Way and Its Virtue,” given that de is understood to
The Confucian understanding of de is by no means
have emanated from the Dao.
uniform. While some early Ru scholars emphasize in
the roles and
On the other hand, for Wang Bi and others who do not
responsibilities embedded in the network of kinship
subscribe to a substantive view of Dao, de represents
ties and sociopolitical relationships that constitute the
what is “genuine” or “authentic” (zhen) in human
ethical realm, others focus on the formation of
beings. Because wu does not refer to any substance or
individual moral character through self-cultivation.
cosmological power, what the Laozi means by de, the
The Laozi seems to be suggesting a “higher” de against
“virtue” that one has “obtained” from Dao, can only be
any moral achievement attained through repeated
understood as what is originally, naturally present in
effort. The different translations mentioned above aim
human beings.
their
interpretation
of
“virtue”
at bringing out the perceived uniquely Daoist
understanding of de.
In either case, the concept of de emerges as a Daoist
Admittedly, “virtue” is ambiguous, and in Latin, as
response to the question of human nature, which was
many scholars have noted, “virtus” has more to do
one of the most contested issues in early Chinese
with strength and capacity than moral virtues.
philosophy. The two readings of the Laozi, despite
Nevertheless, there are advantages to translating de as
their differences, agree that it is an inherent de that
“virtue,” as it keeps in the foreground that the Laozi is
enables a person to conform to the way in which Dao
giving new meaning to an established concept, as
operates.
opposed to introducing a new concept not found in
other schools of Chinese philosophy. From this
“Virtue” may be corrupted easily, but when realized,
perspective, both Laozi and Confucius are interpreters
it radiates the full embodiment of the Dao understood
of de-virtue.
in terms of qi on Heshanggong's view, or the
flourishing of authenticity on Wang Bi's interpretation.
●
●
The marriage of Dao and de effectively bridges
As such, Dao points not only to the “beginning” but
the gap between transcendence and immanence.
also through de to the “end” of all things.
De is what one has “obtained” from (the) Dao, a
“latent power” by “virtue” of which any being
becomes what it is (Waley 1958, 32).
●
Laozi speaks of de as that which nourishes all
beings (e.g., ch. 51).
Within these parameters, interpretations of de follow
from the understanding of Dao and wu. On the one
hand, for Heshanggong and other proponents of the
cosmological view, what one has obtained from the
Dao refers specifically to one's qi endowment, which
determines one's physical, intellectual, affective,
Confucius' Ethics
●
Lunyu or Analects
➔ collection
through the practice of forms of the Golden Rule:
of Confucius' teachings and his
conversations
and
exchanges
with
For Confucius, concern for others is demonstrated
“What you do not wish for yourself, do not do to
his
others;”
disciples.
○
★ While Confucius believes that people live their
“Since you yourself desire standing
lives within parameters firmly established by
then help others achieve it, since you
Heaven he argues that men are responsible for
yourself desire success then help
their actions and especially for their treatment of
others attain it” (Lunyu 12.2, 6.30).
others.
●
as the most basic form of promoting the interests
★ We can do little or nothing to alter our fated span
of others before one's own.
of existence but we determine what we
accomplish and what we are remembered for.
He regards devotion to parents and older siblings
●
Central to all ethical teachings found in the
★ Confucius was also careful to instruct his
Analects of Confucius is the notion that the social
followers that they should never neglect the
arena in which the tools for creating and
offerings due Heaven.
maintaining harmonious relations are fashioned
and employed is the extended family.
★ Confucius revered and respected the spirits,
thought that they should be worshiped with
●
Among the various ways in which social
utmost sincerity, and taught that serving the
divisions could have been drawn, the most
spirits was a far more difficult and complicated
important were the vertical lines that bound
matter than serving mere mortals.
multigenerational lineages.
●
The most fundamental lessons to be learned by
individuals within a lineage were what role their
REN
➔ Compasion
generational position had imposed on them and
➔ Loving Others
what obligations toward those senior or junior to
them were associated with those roles.
●
●
●
Confucius' social philosophy largely revolves
In the world of the Analects, the dynamics of
around the concept of ren, “compassion” or
social
“loving others.”
involved movement up and down along familial
Cultivating or practicing such concern for others
roles that were defined in terms of how they
involved deprecating oneself.
related to others within the same lineage.
Avoid artful speech or an ingratiating manner that
would create a false impression and lead to
self-aggrandizement.
●
●
Those who have cultivated ren are, on the
contrary, “simple in manner and slow of speech”
(Lunyu 13.27).
●
exchange
and
obligation
primarily
It was also necessary that one play roles within
other
social
constructs—neighborhood,
community, political bureaucracy, guild, school of
thought—that brought one into contact with a
larger network of acquaintances and created
ethical issues that went beyond those that
impacted one's family.
●
●
The extended family was at the center of these
★ Subjecting oneself to ritual does not, however,
other hierarchies and could be regarded as a
mean suppressing one's desires but instead
microcosm of their workings.
learning how to reconcile one's own desires with
One who behaved morally in all possible parallel
the needs of one's family and community.
structures extending outward from the family
probably approximated Confucius's conception of
ren.
Confucius' Political Philosophy
●
his belief that a ruler should learn self-discipline,
JIAN AI
should govern his subjects by his own example,
➔ “impartial love”
and should treat them with love and concern.
➔ advocated by the Mohists who as early as the
fifth
century
BCE
posed
the
greatest
●
try to escape punishment and have no sense of
The Confucian emphasis on social role rather
shame. If they are led by virtue, and uniformity
than on the self seems to involve an
sought among them through the practice of ritual
exaggerated emphasis on social status and
position
and
an
excessive
form
propriety, they will possess a sense of shame and
of
come to you of their own accord” (Lunyu 2.3; see
self-centeredness.
●
Confucius taught that the practice of altruism
also 13.6.).
●
he thought necessary for social cohesion could
Confucius' warning about the ill consequences of
promulgating law codes should not be interpreted
be mastered only by those who have learned
as an attempt to prevent their adoption but instead
self-discipline.
●
“If the people be led by laws, and uniformity
among them be sought by punishments, they will
intellectual challenge to Confucius' thought.
●
Confucius' political philosophy is also rooted in
as his lament that his ideas about the moral
Learning self-restraint involves studying and
suasion of the ruler were not proving popular.
mastering li,
ZHENGMING
Li
➔ lack of connection between actualities and
➔ the ritual forms and rules of propriety through
their names and the need to correct such
which one expresses respect for superiors and
enacts his role in society in such a way that he
himself is worthy of respect and admiration.
circumstances
●
of his day had completely broken down.
○
A concern for propriety should inform everything that
Look at nothing in defiance of ritual,
●
listen to nothing in defiance of ritual,
●
speak of nothing in defiance or ritual,
●
never stir hand or foot in defiance of ritual.
He attributed this collapse to the fact that
those who wielded power as well as those
one says and does:
●
Confucius perceives that the political institutions
who occupied subordinate positions did so
by making claims to titles for which they
were not worthy.
●
Elsewhere in the Analects, Confucius says to his
disciple Zilu that the first thing he would do in
undertaking the administration of a state is
●
zhengming. (Lunyu 13.3).
○
means of his virtue is like the pole-star: it remains
In that passage Confucius is taking aim at
in its place while all the lesser stars do homage to
the illegitimate ruler of Wei who was, in
it”
Confucius' view, improperly using the title
●
Confucius claimed that, “He who governs by
●
The way to maintain and cultivate such royal
“successor,” a title that belonged to his
‘virtue’ was through the practice and enactment
father the rightful ruler of Wei who had
of li or ‘rituals’ identified their performers as
been forced into exile.
gentlemen.
For Confucius, zhengming does not seem to refer
to the ‘rectification of names’ (this is the way the
Confucius and Education
term is most often translated by scholars of the
★ He disparages those who have faith in natural
Analects), but instead to rectifying the behavior of
understanding or intuition and argues that the
people and the social reality so that they
only real understanding of a subject comes
correspond to the language with which people
from long and careful study.
identify themselves and describe their roles in
society.
●
Study
Confucius believed that this sort of rectification
➔ for Confucius, means finding a good teacher
had to begin at the very top of the government,
and imitating his words and deeds.
because it was at the top that the discrepancy
between names and actualities had originated. If
★ A good teacher is someone older who is familiar
the ruler's behavior is rectified then the people
with the ways of the past and the practices of the
beneath him will follow suit.
ancients.
●
De
reflection and meditation, Confucius' position
➔ Virture
appears to be a middle course between learning
➔ a kind of moral power that allows one to win
and reflecting on what one has learned.
a following without recourse to physical force
●
●
●
●
“He who learns but does not think is lost. He who
thinks but does not learn is in great danger”
“If your desire is for good, the people will be
good. The moral character of the ruler is the
While he sometimes warns against excessive
●
He taught his students morality, proper speech,
wind; the moral character of those beneath him is
government, and the refined arts. While he also
the grass. When the wind blows, the grass bends”
emphasizes the “Six Arts” — ritual, music,
For Confucius, what characterized superior
archery,
rulership was the possession of de or ‘virtue.’
computation — it is clear that he regards
relying on loyal and effective deputies.
calligraphy,
and
morality as the most important subject.
De also enabled the ruler to maintain good order
in his state without troubling himself and by
chariot-riding,
●
Confucius' teaching methods are striking. He
never discourses at length on a subject. Instead he
poses questions, cites passages from the classics,
or uses apt analogies, and waits for his students to
arrive at the right answers.
●
“Only for one deeply frustrated over what he does
not know will I provide a start; only for one
struggling to form his thoughts into words will I
provide a beginning. But if I hold up one corner
and he cannot respond with the other three I will
not repeat myself”.
●
Confucius' goal is to create gentlemen who carry
themselves with grace, speak correctly, and
demonstrate integrity in all things.
●
His strong dislike of the sycophantic “petty men,”
whose clever talk and pretentious manner win
them an audience, is reflected in numerous Lunyu
passages.
●
Confucius finds himself in an age in which values
are out of joint. Actions and behavior no longer
correspond to the labels originally attached to
them. “Rulers do not rule and subjects do not
serve,” he observes. This means that words and
titles no longer mean what they once did.
●
Moral education is important to Confucius
because it is the means by which one can rectify
this situation and restore meaning to language and
values to society.
●
He believes that the most important lessons for
obtaining such a moral education are to be found
in the canonical Book of Songs, because many of
its poems are both beautiful and good.
●
The Lunyu is also an important source for
Confucius' understanding of the role poetry and
art more generally play in the moral education of
gentlemen as well as in the reformation of society.
Confucius had found in the canonical text
valuable lessons on how to cultivate moral
qualities in oneself as well as how to comport
oneself humanely and responsibly in public.
Aristotle - Happiness and Political Association
●
Aristotle’s basic teleological framework extends
to his ethical and political theories, which he
regards as complementing one another.
●
Most people wish to lead good lives; What the
best life for human beings consists in.
●
He believes that the best life for a human being is
not a matter of subjective preference
●
He also believes that people can (and, sadly, often
do) choose to lead sub-optimal lives. In order to
avoid such unhappy eventualities, Aristotle
recommends reflection on the criteria any
successful candidate for the best life must satisfy.
He proceeds to propose one kind of life as
meeting those criteria uniquely and therefore
promotes it as the superior form of human life.
This is a life lived in accordance with reason.
Criteria for the final good for human beings
1. Must be pursued for its own sake
2. Be such that we wish for other things for its
sake
3. Be such that we do not wish for it on account
of other things
4. Be complete (teleion), in the sense that it is
always choiceworthy and always chosen for
itself
5. Be self-sufficient (autarkês), in the sense that
its presence suffices to make a life lacking in
nothing
●
●
According to Aristotle, neither the life of
pleasure nor the life of honor satisfies them all.
What satisfies
eudaimonia.
them
all
is
happiness
Eudaimonia
● Achieved by
○ fully realizing our natures
○ by actualizing to the highest degree our
human capacities, and
○
Neither our nature nor our endowment of
human capacities is a matter of choice for
us.
Function (ergon) of a human being
In determining what eudaimonia consists in, Aristotle
makes a crucial appeal to the human function
(ergon), and thus to his overarching teleological
framework.
He thinks that he can identify the human function in
terms of reason, which then provides ample grounds
for characterizing the happy life as involving centrally
the exercise of reason, whether practical or theoretical.
Happiness turns out to be an activity of the rational
soul, conducted in accordance with virtue or
excellence, or, in what comes to the same thing, in
rational activity executed excellently.
When he says that happiness consists in an activity in
‘accordance with virtue’, Aristotle means that it is a
kind of excellent activity, and not merely morally
virtuous activity.
The suggestion that only excellently executed or
virtuously performed rational activity constitutes
human happiness provides the impetus for Aristotle’s
virtue ethics.
Aristotle concludes his discussion of human happiness
in his Nicomachean Ethics by introducing political
theory as a continuation and completion of ethical
theory.
Ethical Theory
➔ characterizes the best form of human life;
Political Theory
➔ characterizes the forms of social organization
best suited to the realization of the best form
of life
Polis (City-State)
➔ The basic political unit
➔ which is both a state in the sense of being an
authority-wielding monopoly and a civil
society in the sense of being a series of
organized communities with varying degrees
of converging interest.
★ He argues that humans are inherently political
animals, and the polis exists for people to live well.
★ The polis ‘comes into being for the sake of living,
but it remains in existence for the sake of living
well’.
★ A superior form of political organization enhances
human life; an inferior form hampers and hinders it.
Aristotle’s Politics is structured by the question: What
sort of political arrangement best meets the goal of
developing and augmenting human flourishing?
Kinds of Political Organization
In thinking about the possible kinds of political
organization, Aristotle relies on the structural
observations that rulers may be one, few, or many, and
that their forms of rule may be legitimate or
illegitimate, as measured against the goal of promoting
human flourishing
Six possible forms of government, three correct and
three deviant:
Correct
Deviant
One Ruler
Kingship
Tyranny
Few Rulers
Aristocracy
Oligarchy
Many Rulers
Polity
Democracy
The correct are differentiated from the deviant by their
relative abilities to realize the basic function of the
polis: living well.
Classification of better and worse governments partly
by considerations of distributive justice. He contends,
in a manner directly analogous to his attitude towards
eudaimonia, that everyone will find it easy to agree to
the proposition that we should prefer a just state to an
unjust state, and even to the formal proposal that the
distribution of justice requires treating equal claims
similarly and unequal claims dissimilarly.
Aristotle relies upon his own account of distributive
justice, as advanced in Nicomachean Ethics v 3.
● He accordingly disparages oligarchs, who
suppose that justice requires preferential
claims for the rich, but also democrats, who
contend that the state must boost liberty across
all citizens irrespective of merit.
The best polis has neither function: its goal is to
enhance human flourishing, an end to which liberty is
at best instrumental, and not something to be pursued
for its own sake.