Security Studies and the ‘Security State’: Security
Provision in Historical Context
Bryan Mabee, Oxford Brookes University, UK
Abstract
The role of historical change in international relations has been an important issue,
especially regarding the ‘ahistoricism’ of mainstream theories. In this context, security
studies has suffered from a lack of analysis of the state and its relation to historical
change. When this attitude is challenged, it can be seen that the particular ‘state’ of
security studies fits into a particular historical logic that structured states which is
susceptible to change. A historical sociological analysis of the development of the state–
society complexes surrounding security can provide a historical analysis of the state, in
order to better articulate its continuing relevance to political life and security, its
relationship with individuals and society, and the complexities of contemporary
citizenship. The 20th century saw the development of the ‘security state’, where the
western state became the centre of security provision, the protector against external
threat and provider of domestic well-being.
Keywords: historical sociology, security state, security studies, state theory, state
transformation
One of the most important concerns of international relations has been the issue of
change. The long-standing debate concerning the role of historical study in the
development of theories of international relations has progressed steadily throughout the 1980s and 1990s.1 However, this growth has not had much of an impact on
the debates in security studies. The end of the Cold War sensitized theorists and
practitioners of security to the existence of a diversity of threats, and much
attention has been paid to the expansion of the issue areas of security studies and
the deepening of the conception of referents of security.2 The major changes that
have impacted the international system as a result of the end of the superpower
conflict, and the increasing recognition of the importance of globalization in
international politics, provide an opportunity for a re-examination of the basis of
post-Second World War security, especially in terms of the major security actor:
the sovereign state.
Though much notice has been recently paid to notions concerning a changing
environment of security, little of this has been connected explicitly to globalization, and even less to changes in contemporary western states.3 This lack can be
explained by the relative inattention those studying security (and international
relations more generally) have spent dealing with theories of the state and its
historicization.4 The state is given an implicit definition that is used transhistorically. The problem with the avoidance of state theorization manifests itself
International Relations Copyright © 2003 SAGE Publications
(London, Thousand Oaks, CA and New Delhi), Vol 17(2): 135–151
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in the inability to incorporate change, and the state takes on an isomorphic
character. When the state is seen as a static, transhistorical institution, change is
either ignored or only postulated in terms of a radical break from normal practices.
This can be seen, for example, in the often-polarized debates concerning the
impacts of globalization on the state, between those who deny change, and those
who claim radical transformation.5 The possibility of a change in the state and its
functions becomes difficult to hypothesize, and the only possibility for states
faced with change is the ‘end of the state’.6
As Hobson has noted, the mainstream of international relations theorizing,
especially that of neo-realism and neo-liberalism, has been susceptible to an
ahistorical attitude: that history only exists in so much as it reflects present
conditions, and as such denies novelty and change.7 When this attitude is
challenged, it can be seen that the particular ‘state’ of international relations – i.e.
the Westphalian state, with its discrete separation of inside and outside – fits into a
particular historical logic that structured states which is susceptible to change.
This is not to deny the reality of the Westphalian paradigm, but to highlight its
origins and suggest that it is not the case that it has been existent since the birth of
the ‘Westphalian’ system,8 and that it may lead to somewhere else, by conditions
of its own making.9
Security studies has suffered from similar problems with regard to the state and
historical change. In the traditional realist approach to security studies, the state
has been unquestioned in its historical structure.10 Symptomatic of this, security
studies has mainly focused on changes in issue areas caused by globalization and
the end of the Cold War, ignoring possible changes to the state and security
provision itself.11 While critical scholars have done much to interrogate the
assumptions of traditional approaches to security, their views on the state have
mainly questioned its role as the object of security (i.e. a criticism of the national
focus of security studies) and the state as a security provider (i.e. against the
assumption that states act in their citizens’ best interests).12 This questioning has
been valuable in denaturalizing the state as the provider of security, but has
ignored to some extent the formation and historical role of states in the security
process.13
The debates that the critical agenda have developed, such as where security
resides, and who the ‘subject’ of security is, are important. However, there remains
a crucial question concerning how the provision of security has historically
changed with the development of the state. A historical sociological analysis of
the development of the state–society complexes surrounding security will assist in
this process, by supplying a historical analysis of the state, in order to better
articulate its continuing relevance to political life and security, its relationship
with individuals and society, and the complexities of contemporary citizenship.14
During the period of total war at the beginning of the 20th century, a particular
configuration of state–society security relationships developed in western states
where the state increased its power over society, but also in return gave a bundle
of social goods to its citizens as a means of providing security. This model is here
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referred to as the ‘security state’.15 Though this is often divorced from discussions
of security, as ‘domestic’ concerns have been relegated to the margins of security
studies, this development indicated a particular change in state–society relations.
The increase in domestic security provision was a compromise for a greater
internationalization of the state, and provided a distinctive separation of external
and internal security. Security was very much linked to the idea of ‘external’
threat, and the divide between discrete internal and external realms became very
much reified in thinking about international relations.
A move towards examining state–society security complexes requires an
attempt to historically situate the role of contemporary states as security providers.
This is particularly important in investigating the rather undeveloped impacts of
globalization on security studies.16 While in other areas, particularly the
economic, globalization has been linked explicitly to changes in the state, it is in
the realm of security that these impacts have been most neglected. A focus on the
changing nature of security provision will help to analyse where the security state
has come from, and its prospects for the future.
This will be accomplished by demonstrating the historical development of the
European model of state and society security compacts, and show the specific
development of the security state. However, there is a problem in generalizing
about the security state, as there is a tension between its use as a theoretical
concept and the geographical scope of its existence. In this regard, the discussion
will focus on the development of the western model of the security state.17 This
geographical neglect is necessary in order to focus clearly on the main theoretical
problem: the historical analysis of security provision.
In order to accomplish this analysis, three steps will be taken. First, an
introduction to the possible contribution of neo-Weberian historical sociology to
security studies will be given, in order to show how security provision is
embedded in the state–society complex, through the concept of citizenship.
Second, an overview of the development of a security relationship between state
and society in the European state-building process will be given, demonstrating
the increasing intensity of state–society bonds that were partly maintained by the
granting of protective rights to citizens. Third, an analysis of the development of
the security state in the 20th century will provide the background for a historically
constituted state–society security complex, with the possibility to incorporate
change.
Security and the neo-Weberian state
The problem that is most apparent in the way the state is utilized in international
relations (and, by extension, security studies) is that of transhistoricism, where the
contemporary state is seen as unchanged from its ‘emergence’ in 1648 (or,
perhaps better put, the modern state is seen as the same as the contemporary
state).18 This tendency both overestimates the coherence and capacity of early
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European states, as well as ignoring the tendency for the state to evolve.19 This is
a symptom of the general reluctance of scholars of international relations to
devote much effort in analysing the state itself. The state has generally been
viewed as a national-territorial totality, where, as Halliday notes, ‘the state
provides in conceptual form what is denoted visually on a map’.20 The state in
international relations is, due to this, often under-theorized, and often conceptualized in a static manner.
In security studies, the state has primarily been discussed, if at all, in terms of
its relevance as an actor in the security process.21 Though these debates are
important, the terms of the debate encompass the security provision by western
states in the latter half of the 20th century. There is little sense that states have
developed particular security relationships with their constituent societies, other
than those that embrace notions of the state and a liberal social contract. The result
of this is a situation where the arguments have mainly hinged around the
promotion or dismissal of states as security actors.22 Though this is not a problem
in the sense that the questions that these debates have raised are indeed important,
it does seem to limit the possibilities of examining the future of both the state and
security provision.
The international context of security must presume some kind of relationship
with states and their domestic societies, as states have a domestic (societal) role in
addition to their international commitments.23 This could, theoretically, go along a
continuum from the idea that states themselves act completely in their own
interests, without regard to their domestic constituencies, to the idea that national
security is primarily determined by domestic constituencies, at least in the abstract
sense that the ‘national interest’ embodies the collective interests of domestic
society. As McSweeney points out: ‘It is implicit in most studies of national and
international security . . . that the ultimate reference is people. . . . It is from the
human need to protect human values that the term “security” derives its
meaning.’24
Contemporary state theory has relevance in this context, for it has struggled
with the problems of examining the state historically, the relevance of state–
society relations and developing a model of how changes in state structures and
state–society relations occur. Sociologists, and especially those working within
neo-Weberian historical sociology, have done much to help clarify the state as an
institution.25 These approaches separate the state (as a socio-political institution)
and society (as social relations in general), for the purpose of examining the
context of relationships between the two.26 The merits of this approach are that it
helps to clarify state–society relations, and importantly, allows for and substantively examines the state as a historically constituted and dynamic institution,
providing for the possibility of change in the institutional framework of the state
itself.27
The crucial idea that derives from such an approach is the concept of state
autonomy. Though in realist international relations thought autonomy has
generally been placed in the context of the international realm, in that states are
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autonomous from one another, in this context it also refers to the way the state
relates to society. The state should be seen, as Poggi notes, ‘as itself constituting a
distinctive social force, vested with interests of its own, which affect autonomously, and sometimes decisively, the state’s own arrangements and policy’.28
This is important because it describes a relationship between states and societies
that goes beyond the fiction of the state as a mere outgrowth of individual
desires.29 However, the autonomy of the state from society is never total, as states
often rely on their constituent societies for certain types of social action,
exemplified by the role played by extraction.
These ideas concerning autonomy come out clearly in Mann’s important
distinction between the despotic and infrastructural power of the state.30 The
former refers to the ability of the state to act freely, without regard to society,
while the latter refers to the ability of the state to penetrate society and organize
social relations.31 Despotic power thus concerns the state elite, and its ability to
take action without regard to civil society. As Mann puts it, despotic power refers
to ‘the range of actions the elite is empowered to undertake without routine,
institutionalised negotiation with civil society groups’.32
The autonomous powers of the state do not amount to much, however, as Hall
and Ikenberry have pointed out, if the ‘orders do not translate into reality’.33
Infrastructural power is a crucial part of state power, as it concerns the ability to
structure and organize civil society through the institutions of the state. As Mann
describes it, infrastructural power refers to ‘the capacity of the state to penetrate
civil society, and to implement logistically political decisions throughout the
realm’.34 Infrastructural power, however, should not be seen just as power in the
sense of ‘power over’ – referring to the state’s domination of civil society. It is a
form of what Mann describes as ‘collective power’, which is a type of ‘enabling’
power that is not a zero-sum game.35
An increase in infrastructural power means that civil society is subject to more
control by the state, but also has the reciprocal affect of enabling civil society to
affect the state itself. As Hall and Ikenberry suggest: ‘The state can be too distant
from society as well as too constrained by it: gaining, exercising and maintaining
state capacity is an extremely complicated matter, in which there is a perpetual
dialectic between the state seizing and being granted authority.’36 This is an
important feature of Mann’s theory, as the rise of infrastructural power is one of
the key features of the contemporary state, and helps to develop a security
relationship between state and society.
In the contemporary state, the concept of citizenship should be seen as
specifying a type of compact between state and society, as a part of increasing
infrastructural power. Citizenship is both relational and reciprocal, and it therefore
is not simply the case of a beneficent state giving rights to citizens. It also outlines
the obligations of the individual within civil society to the state, and individuals’
legitimate claims and expectations of the state. As the state increases infrastructural power, the possibilities and potentiality of civil society rise, and this is
expressed through the duties and benefits of citizenship.37
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Citizenship is the key to examining security relationships between state and
society, in that citizenship rights and duties describe the necessary functions of the
state in order for it to legitimate itself. Much security studies literature has taken
the western security state for granted as the model of security provision, with its
rigid demarcations of internal and external security, and ignores the way such
provision developed over time. This is not only because citizenship rights were
rather looser than they are in the contemporary state (i.e. they mainly related to the
maintenance of internal order, perhaps a very basic or minimal form of security),
but also because societies were not as bounded by the state as they became in the
19th and 20th centuries.
The problem with taking the ‘security state’ for granted is that it creates
difficulty in analysing the possibility of change in the state, both because the state
is taken as a static institution, and because the array of contemporary security
functions and relationships are taken for granted. The slow development of
citizenship rights and duties is an important part of the growth of security
compacts between state and society, demonstrating the dynamic nature of the state
itself, and also pointing to the possible further evolution of the state. The benefit
of a historical sociological approach to the state is found in the recognition of the
functional autonomy of the state itself, manifested both in despotic and infrastructural power. The development of infrastructural power goes along with the
development of citizenship, and therefore provides a crucial corrective to the
analysis of the state in both security studies and international relations.
The evolution of western security provision
The history of the development of the European state is one that has been told a
number of times from various angles, but primarily in the context of how elite war
making eventually necessitated the development of states, both for the advancement of order and the need for the formation of an infrastructure for extraction to
finance the ever more costly means of warfare.38 The development of European
states, therefore, was as a means to power – it was not an end in itself.39 In the
context of citizenship and infrastructural power, there had to be the arrival of
the state as an end in itself, something that was not properly seen until after the
French Revolution, in order for the kind of security provision associated with
the contemporary state to develop. Around this time, citizenship and the state
became intimately connected, and the infrastructural power of the state increased
enormously, through a slow process of development of material infrastructure.
Along with the eventual development of the rights of citizenship, we see a
gradual change in what those rights and duties consist of, that moves from the
relative disinterest that early states and rulers saw in their subjects to the relatively
compassionate governance seen in contemporary western states. An accompanying change in the scope of state security provision is also apparent: from the
early state emphasis on social order and lack of violence (at least against the state)
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to the contemporary welfare/warfare state. Although this story can be told in
developmental terms – i.e. a switch from mere state despotism to enlightened
democratic forms of governance – it is essential to examine this through the
context of infrastructural power, where benefits were trade-offs in some sense for
the further penetration of state into society.
Tilly provides an example of an early variant on the development of security
relations between states and at least one class actor in civil society, the new
bourgeoisie, and the role it played in the development of the state in western
Europe. Tilly describes the growth of the state as a consequence of the development of a ‘protection racket’, where the pursuit of power and control caused elites
to monopolize the control over violence within their territories, while,
furthermore, the pursuit of war caused rulers to set up systems of extraction in
order to raise capital for these endeavours. The extraction process, though not
excluding outright pillage, importantly included taxation, through the making of
promises of protection (of a particular social class). This led to the entrenchment
of substantial bureaucracies to regulate taxation, police forces, courts, and account
keepers, therefore solidifying the existence of exclusive territorial states.40
Therefore, one of the factors in the consolidation of states was the unintended
consequence of the rulers’ search for power – that the need for capital to invest in
war making inadvertently led to the elimination of rivals within a given territory,
in order to have a greater capacity to extract resources.41
The development of such a relationship is borne out by the two major
watersheds in the state: its increase in size in the 18th century, and the increasing
extent of its civil functions in the 19th century.42 This can be seen in a number of
areas, but one of the most important was the increasing level of bureaucratic
management of the state, which came to be seen more and more as the actual
location of rule in the state. As van Creveld points out: ‘By the beginning of the
nineteenth century the point had been reached where the bureaucracy itself
became the state, elevating itself high above civil society and turning itself into
the latter’s master.’43 This was also accompanied by the development of infrastructures, both material and symbolic, exemplified by the development of roads,
railways, postal services, telegraphy and mass education; civilian functions that
increased the prosperity of society but further politicized society in the sense that
it could not ignore the state’s influence its members.44
In terms of civilian expenditures, the average over the course of the 19th
century was about a 50 percent increase. At the beginning of the 20th century
about 75 percent of state expenditure was channelled towards civilian purposes.45
In the 19th century, the state’s commitment to educating its subjects became an
important aspect of its increased civil role. This, of course, was connected to the
economic needs of the states, and also to the rise of nationalism, and receiving the
‘correct’ education; education was a product of further democratization, but also
contained a strong element of ‘parading, flag-saluting, anthem-singing, and heroworshipping’.46 Over the course of the 19th century, states also started to focus on
the conditions of the poor, the sick, and on the conditions of workers. In Britain,
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this can be seen through a number of developments, such as the Factory Acts and
the eventual establishment of the Ministry of Health in 1919.47
The development of a state monopoly of organized violence also proceeded
over this time period. The state gained increasing control over organized violence
within its territory, which was accompanied by a shift in the status of the military,
from a situation where the military was essentially ‘embedded’ within society, to
where the military itself became separate to the state and civil society.48 It was in
the 18th century where the distinction between civilians and soldiers became
commonplace.49 Along with this came a switch in the purpose of armed force,
where it became more an instrument of an abstract state, and less an instrument of
the rulers. This, however, also went along with the increased presence of force
internally, though eventually through the establishment of police forces as distinct
from the military, as the needs of the internal maintenance of order (e.g. controlling mobs) required different techniques than external conflicts.50
These watersheds of the state were accompanied by the increased politicization
of society in the late-18th and 19th centuries. As Mann notes: ‘As states
transformed into national states, then into nation-states, classes became caged,
unintentionally “naturalized” and politicized’.51 The word ‘caging’ is of importance, as it describes how the development of nation-states in the period was part
of a process of the state bounding social relations within its political territory. The
rise of infrastructural power developed the boundedness of the state so taken for
granted in traditional accounts of international relations; as Hobden points out:
‘Traditional international relations theory has portrayed borders as hard shells. A
socio-historical construct has become reified into a physical attribute of social
relations’.52
This boundedness also contributed to the expansion of citizenship, as the
combination of nationalism (the result of the process of ‘caging’) and sovereignty
led to the demand for greater national rights for the subjects of the state.53 As
societies were clamped ever tighter within states, the state politicized societies
through nationalism and sovereignty. Modern societies therefore reinvented
democracy because the state could not be escaped; as Mann puts it: ‘In the early
modern period people became trapped within national cages and so sought to
change the conditions within those cages’.54
This tendency can also be seen in conjunction with the changing nature of
armed force. The shift from armed force as principally an instrument of the ruling
elite to being an instrument of the abstract state was noted above, but with the rise
of nationalism, this connection became even stronger. As Howard notes: ‘War was
no longer considered a matter for a feudal ruling class or a small group of
professionals, but one for the people as a whole. The armed forces were regarded,
not as a part of the royal household, but as the embodiment of the Nation.’55
The overall increase in civilian expenditure and the changing nature of armed
force, combined with the increased politicization of society through the development of citizenship rights, point to the development of more advanced forms of
security provision. The combination of nationalism and warfare meant that, to a
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large extent, war was becoming more about the national interest of the population,
and therefore could be expressed as providing a form of security. Regarding
civilian expenditure, the development of mass infrastructures was all part of
increased living standards as part and parcel of citizenship, which should be seen
as another aspect of security provision. These two dimensions provide the basis
for putting the state at the centre of an internal and external divide that has
pervaded the literature on security ever since.
Though this is obviously a generalized model of the process, it still provides
important insights. The rise of European states was thus founded not only on the
development of a powerful state elite and governing apparatus, but also through the
development of infrastructural power. This was put in the context of protection,
which can be seen as a precursor to the more advanced kind of security provision
seen through the increased involvement of the state in civil activities. As Hobden
points out: ‘States did not emerge in terms of contractual arrangement with society,
but because of their effectiveness in extracting resources from society, to protect
the state as an institution and the population under its jurisdiction. State survival
was very closely linked to the protection of a local population.’56 The end of the
19th and beginning of the 20th centuries heralded a more intensive relationship
between state and society regarding security provision.
The security state
The state–society relationship in the 20th century has been one of a dramatic rise
in the infrastructural power of the state, unprecedented in previous eras. The
‘security state’ represents a situation where the increased penetration of the state
into civil society has provided the basis for not only more co-ordination of society
by the state, but the reciprocal effect of increased rights and expectations of the
citizens of states. Though this is often ignored by security analysts, as it is seen as
a ‘domestic’ development associated with the rise of the welfare state, it is in fact
an important change in the structure of states, and also requires a transformation in
the conceptualization of security. The security state is, basically, a relationship
between state and society where the state provides insurance against the impact of
‘external’ contingencies.57
The increase in infrastructural power and rights in 20th-century states had
much to do with the rise of industrialized total wars. The need for massive
penetration into civil society in order to organize the total wars of the 20th century
had a major impact on the structure of the state, which continued after the end of
the Second World War. The First World War, of course, provides the precedent for
this, where the state managed to organize a vast array of market forces in the
domestic economy for its own purposes. As McNeill states: ‘Innumerable bureaucratic structures that had previously acted more or less independently of one
another in a context of market relationships coalesced into what amounted to a
single national firm for waging war’.58
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During the Second World War, all of the industrialized nations involved had to
organize their economies around mobilization for the war effort.59 This was
usually done through the use of specialized state bureaucracies which organized
their economies. In Nazi Germany, economic planning had been divided among
the three branches of the armed services and the SS, but under Armaments
Minister Albert Speer was centralized to a large degree.60 In Britain, a greatly
successful war economy was achieved under the auspices of Sir John Anderson,
the head of the Lord President’s Group, responsible for co-ordination of the wartime economic effort. The planning introduced many compromises in terms of
civil liberties, and introduced measures to deal with wartime manpower shortages:
by the middle of 1944, one-third of Britain’s labour force was involved in civilian
work in the war effort.61 In the USA, though in many ways a special case due to
its relative isolation from the conflict, wartime production was co-ordinated
through a number of organizations, including the War Production Board, the
Manpower Commission, and the Office of War Mobilization. These organizations
proved an outstanding success, and by the end of 1942, the USA was outproducing all of the enemy powers combined.62
The extensive mobilization of society in the war effort led to a post-war
situation where society demanded more from the state, and there was an
opportunity for states to meet such demand.63 As Mazower states: ‘It seems as
though the war had created – or intensified – a demand for social solidarity, while
the economic upswing created the resources to support this change.’64 However,
not only did the total wars affect the structure of the post-war states, they also
affected the relationship between state and society in terms of citizenship. As
Giddens points out, in the example of the United Kingdom: ‘The wartime
experience quite early on stimulated programmes for widespread social reform
following the cessation of hostilities. The need for a thorough-going set of
economic citizenship rights was accepted by groups from both major parties.’65
The rights that came out of the Second World War – rights of full employment,
unemployment insurance, housing benefits and the like – developed out of the war
effort itself, and the increased pressures put on societies by the war, as well as a
number of compromises made by political parties after the war.66 The development of the security state hinges on this elaboration of citizenship and rights
which were seen as part of the trade-off in the increased penetration of the state
into civil society. The rise of infrastructural power over the last two centuries not
only increased the state’s involvement in civil society, but increased the
expectations of civil society through its politicization, and the recognition of such
expectations can be seen in the expansion of citizenship rights.67 The ‘security’
that states provide has changed dramatically in the 20th century, through extended
ideas of citizenship in the beginning of the century, to the post-Second World
World War development of the welfare state and social (or economic) citizenship
rights.
The domestic compacts, however, were not made in isolation from the
international. Just as the war effort had shaped domestic society through
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increasing infrastructural power and through compromises in welfare provision,
the war had also fundamentally changed international relations as well. Though
the effects of the new nuclear technology have been much commented upon,68 the
internationalized nature of wartime planning had a profound effect on the
organization of the international system. The internationalism in the war was most
strongly seen in the case of the joint US and British mobilization for the war
effort.69 As McNeill notes: ‘Thanks to the increasing complexity of arms
production, a single nation had become too small to conduct an efficient war. This
was, perhaps, the main innovation of World War II.’70 The legacy of such organization can be seen in the promotion of economic and political internationalism and
integration in the post-war period, often seen as the beginnings of an intense
period of globalization.71
The extension of social rights and provision was in part a recognition that the
state would have to extend its benefits to citizens in order to participate more
intensely in a new international and global environment. The development of
more extensive forms of security after the Second World War was part of the postwar consensus of embedded liberalism, the compact giving citizens more security
for the trade-off of the state being more integrated into the world economy and
military security system.72 When this account is put in the context of the end of a
period of total war, which involved the mobilization of society on an unprecedented level, the importance of post-war bargaining as a state strategy becomes
clearer. The security state was a result of the war and the need to participate more
intensely at the global and international scale, both by the provision for domestic
intervention and the protection from external threat.
This is emphasized in the way that the term ‘national security’ came to
prominence in the period following the Second World War. As Dalby states: ‘It
was only in the middle of this century that security became the architectonic
impulse of the American security polity, and, subsequently, of its allies.’73 The
state had become the prime focus of security, with the USA taking the lead in this
development. As McSweeney puts it: ‘The concept of “national security” serves to
focus on the autarky of the state.’74 Though the stress in these accounts concerns
the peculiarity of the state being at the centre of security,75 at that historical
moment, the state did become the centre of security: the expansion of infrastructural power and its reciprocal effects had seen both the caging of civil society
into the bounded territory of the state, as well as the development of the state as
the main security provider, an insurance policy against contingency.
The ‘security state’ should be seen as a specific arrangement between state and
society, where the state acts as a form of insurance against contingency. The
combination of the strongly militarist state as a form of external protection, and
the extension of rights through further enfranchisement and the development of
social rights led to the situation where the state was at the centre of security.
Protector against external threat and provider of domestic well-being, the state
became the prime guarantor and provider of security.
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Conclusion
An engagement with state theory, particularly that provided by proponents of neoWeberian historical sociology proved useful in elaborating the state as an
institution, and a historically constituted actor. The incorporation of a more
complex idea of state–society relations demonstrated that the security relationships between state and society have developed over the course of several
centuries as the result of a rise in the infrastructural power of the state. In the 20th
century, a further rise in infrastructural power was obtained by the involvement of
western states in two total wars, which led to the development of the ‘security
state’. This represented a situation where the trade-off for further penetration into
civil society was compensated for through increased citizenship rights, which
encompassed a large gamut of the provision of social goods, in which should be
included not only basic welfare provision, but the whole range of security
provision, both ‘internal’ and ‘external’.
The development of the state as the mediator between these two realms, as a
protector from external military threats, and as insurer against domestic malaise
came at a cost. This was the other transformation that was a development of the
total war era: the need to amalgamate more fully into the international realm. In a
sense, this is the development of a more integrated international system, where
western industrialized states begin to have an increasingly interdependent
relationship. This is not only the result of the European allies’ position at the end
of the Second World War, where they were in need of American financial
assistance to overcome the hardships incurred in conflict, but also the recognition
of the importance of the international economy. This is the essence of the post-war
compromise: aspects of the dual development of the security state, social welfare
itself provided the ground for the increased internationalization of the state.
This reappraisal of the western state in security studies serves a number of
purposes. First, it challenges the complacency concerning the impact of change on
the state, enabling the state to both be resilient to change, and to incorporate
change and come out transformed. This is an increasingly salient point, especially
in relation to the often sterile debates on the supposed ‘end of the state’ in the face
of forces of globalization. The increasing need for interdependence and internationalism among western states in the post-war period supplied the grounding
for globalization and state restructuring itself. The creation of a rigid internal–
external division was therefore problematic from the start. The recognition that
this divide is historically contingent shows that challenges to the state’s domestic
role do not necessitate its demise.
Second, it places the development of western security states into a historical
dynamic, which challenges a second complacency towards history, the transhistorical attitude that equates contemporary states with those of the 17th
century.76 Crucial here is the gradual adding of security competences to the state,
in terms of the areas that the state is responsible for, and an increasing
responsibility towards its citizenry.
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Finally, it challenges the idea prevalent in security studies which presumes that
the state is either the ultimate security actor, or an insufficient actor. There is in
fact a middle ground, when the state is both examined historically as a security
provider, and security is seen as encompassing more than just the ‘external’
military dimension. The recognition of the historical contingency of the internal–
external divide in security studies helps to connect security more robustly with the
rights of people as citizens. The contingency of this divide also adds to the critique
of traditional security studies, by showing a more ambivalent view of the state’s
role in the security process, also contributing to the agenda of a more humanized
security studies by linking security squarely with the needs of people.
These three purposes all contribute to an agenda for security studies that is
more historically attuned, in order to better consider changes to both the security
agenda of states and challenges to the competence of the state itself as a security
provider under conditions of globalization. Although the scope of the enquiry
has been geographically limited, and in some ways complicit with ignoring the
global–regional variations in state formation,77 it is intended as a first foray into a
historical sociology of international security studies, and a challenge to common
assumptions about state security.
Acknowledgements
The author would like to thank Ian Clark, Paul Williams and the two anonymous reviewers for
comments on the various drafts of this article.
Notes
1
2
3
4
5
6
See especially the debates in Robert Keohane (ed.) (1986) Neorealism and its Critics. New York:
Columbia University Press.
For a good overview, see Stuart Croft and Terry Terriff (eds) (2000) Critical Reflections on
Security and Change. London: Frank Cass.
There have been a few attempts to deal with the issue of security in the context of globalization,
though primarily from a military standpoint. See Victor D. Cha (2000) ‘Globalization and the
Study of Security’, Journal of Peace Research 37 (3): 391–403; Ian Clark (1999) Globalization
and International Relations Theory, chap. 6. Oxford: Oxford University Press; Jean-Marie
Guéhenno (1998–9) ‘The Impact of Globalization on Strategy’, Survival 40 (4): 5–19; David
Held et al. (1999) Global Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture, chap. 2. Cambridge:
Polity; and Martin Shaw (2000) Theory of the Global State: Globality as an Unfinished
Revolution. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
This was noted over a decade ago by Halliday, and has continued to be an important point of
contention, especially seen in the current interest in the historical sociology of international
relations. Fred Halliday (1987) ‘State and Society in International Relations: A Second Agenda’,
Millennium 16 (2): 215–29; and Stephen Hobden and John M. Hobson (eds.) (2002) The
Historical Sociology of International Relations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
See Held et al., Global Transformations, Introduction (see note 3). Thanks to Paul Williams for
reminding me of this point.
Mathew Horsman and Andrew Marshall (1994) After the Nation State. New York: Harper
Collins; Kenichi Ohame (1990) The Borderless World. London: Fontana.
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7
8
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10
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John M. Hobson, ‘What’s at Stake in “Bringing Historical Sociological back into International
Relations”? Transcending “Chronofetishism” and “Tempocentrism” in International Relations’,
in Hobden and Hobson, pp.3–41 (see note 4).
There is an irony here, that contemporary sovereign states are seen as being the products of the
new Westphalian order, but most theorists of the state, and many with a more historically
nuanced approach to international relations, argue that the modern nation-state is of more recent
origin. For a good overview of the myths of Westphalia, see Stephen Krasner, ‘Westphalia and
All That’, in Judith Goldstein and Robert Keohane, (eds) (1993) Ideas and Foreign Policy,
pp.235–64. London: Cornell University Press; and Andreas Osiander (2001) ‘Sovereignty,
International Relations and the Westphalian Myth’, International Organization 55 (2): 251–87.
This is to suggest that it is a ‘structurated’ process.
Representative examples of traditional realist and neo-realist approaches can be found in Barry
Buzan (1991) People, States and Fear, 2nd edn. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner; Hans J.
Morgenthau (1978) Politics Among Nations, 5th edn. New York: Knopf; Stephen Walt (1991)
‘The Renaissance of Security Studies’, International Studies Quarterly 35: 211–39; Kenneth
Waltz (1979) Theory of International Politics. Boston: Addison-Wesley; Kenneth Waltz (1959)
Man the State and War. New York: Columbia University Press; and Arnold Wolfers (1962)
Discord and Collaboration. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Charlotte Bretherton (1996) ‘Security After the Cold War: Towards a Global Paradigm?’ in
Charlotte Bretherton and Geoffrey Ponton (eds) Global Politics: An Introduction, pp.126–51.
Oxford: Blackwell; Roger Carey and Trevor C. Salmon (eds) (1996) International Security in the
Modern World, rev. edn. London: Macmillan.
See especially Ken Booth (1991) ‘Security and Emancipation’, Review of International Studies
17 (4): 313–27; Keith Krause and Michael Williams, ‘From Strategy to Security: Foundations of
Critical Security Studies’, in Keith Krause and Michael C. Williams (eds) (1997) Critical
Security Studies: Concepts and Cases, pp.33–59. London: UCL Press; Steve Smith (1991)
‘Mature Anarchy, Strong States, and Security’, Arms Control 12 (2): 325–339; and Richard Wyn
Jones (1999) Security, Strategy, and Critical Theory. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
This is perhaps less true of recent constructivist work on security, which has examined the
constructed and contingent nature of the development of various facets of security. For a good
overview, see Theo Farrell, ‘Constructivist Security Studies: Portrait of a Research Program’,
International Studies Review 4 (1): 49–72.
Such approaches are gaining prominence in international relations. For examples, see, Stephen
Hobden (1998) International Relations and Historical Sociology. London: Routledge; Hobden
and Hobson, Historical Sociology (see note 4); Special Section (1998) ‘Debate: The “Second
Wave” of Weberian Historical Sociology’, Review of International Political Economy 5 (2): 284–
361; John M. Hobson (1997) The Wealth of States: A Comparative Sociology of International
Economic and Political Change. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
There is some overlap here with the idea of the ‘national security state’, as conceptualized in the
literature on the history of US security policy, with particular reference to the early Cold War
years, and the founding of the National Security Act in 1947. This is of importance because of
the way this ‘militarized’ the concept of security and merged domestic concerns with those of
foreign policy, the connotations of which are still being felt both in the context of academic IR,
and policymaking. For more on the ‘national security state’ in the context of security studies, see
Bill McSweeney (1999) Security, Identity and Interests, Chaps. 1 and 2. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press. For the historical literature, see, for example, Michael J. Hogan (2000) A Cross
of Iron: Harry S. Truman and the Origins of the National Security State, 1945–1954. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press; and Daniel Yergin (1977) Shattered Peace: The Origins of the Cold
War and the National Security State. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. For the policymaking impacts,
see Michael McGwire (2001) ‘The Paradigm that Lost its Way’, International Affairs 77 (4): 777–
803; and Michael McGwire (2002) ‘Shifting the Paradigm’, International Affairs 78 (1): 1–28.
On this point, see Clark, Globalization and International Relations Theory, chap. 6 (see note 3).
There is also some justification, as the western state has remained a model for state-building
worldwide, for a legacy of the domination (and imperialism) of European states. See Mohammed
Ayoob (1995) The Third World Security Predicament: State Making, Regional Conflict, and the
International System. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.
This problem is especially seen in neo-realist and neo-liberal approaches to IR, where states are
not generally seen in their own historical context. For a good overview, see Hobson, ‘What’s at
Stake’ (see note 7).
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Michael Mann (1993) ‘Nation-States in Europe and Other Continents: Diversifying, Developing,
Not Dying’, Daedalus 122: 115–40.
Halliday, ‘State and Society’, p.217 (see note 4).
This is especially clear in the work of Buzan and Waever, who have devoted a great deal of
analysis to the role of the state in the security process. See Buzan, People, States and Fear (see
note 10); and Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, and Jaap de Wilde (1998) Security: A New Framework
for Analysis. London: Lynne Rienner.
This is mainly a debate between traditional or realist scholars and critical security studies
scholars. The former prioritize national security, or the security of the state, while the latter (in
the main) focus on the relevance of individuals and other social groupings. For an overview, see
Krause and Williams, ‘From Strategy to Security’ (see note 12).
An exception in security studies can be found in the work of Deudney, who has examined
domestic forces as being important for security. Daniel Deudney, ‘Political Fission: State
Structure, Civil Society, and Nuclear Security Politics in the United States’, in Ronnie D.
Lipschutz (ed.) (1995) On Security, pp.87–123. New York: Columbia University Press.
McSweeney, Security, Identity and Interests, p.33 (see note 15).
Representative examples of this literature can be found in the following works: Anthony Giddens
(1987) The Nation-State and Violence. Berkeley: University of California Press; John A. Hall and
G. John Ikenberry (1989) The State. Milton Keynes: Open University Press; Michael Mann
(1993) The Sources of Social Power, Vol. II. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Gianfranco
Poggi (1990) The State: Its Nature, Development, and Prospects. Cambridge: Polity; Charles
Tilly, ‘War Making and State Making as Organized Crime’, in P.B. Evans, D. Rueschemeyer, and
T. Skocpol (eds) (1985) Bringing the State Back In, pp.169–91. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press; and Charles Tilly (1990) Coercion, Capital, and European States: ad
990–1990. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. For a succinct statement of Weber’s position on the state,
see Max Weber, ‘The Profession and Vocation of Politics’, in Peter Lassman and Ronald Speirs
(eds) (1994) Weber: Political Writings, pp.309–69. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
This essay is more commonly known as ‘Politics as a Vocation’.
The approach followed most closely here is that of Mann. See Mann, Sources of Social Power,
Vol. II, Ch. 3 (see note 25).
There are of course other theoretical approaches to the state. For overviews of competing
approaches to the state, see Colin Hay (1996) Re-Stating Social and Political Change.
Buckingham: Open University Press; and John M. Hobson (2000) The State and International
Relations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. The neo-Weberian approach associated with
historical sociology is preferred here, primarily because it both well integrates an historical
approach into its overall framework of analysis, and incorporates an international dimension into
its theorizing from the outset. The role of the international in historical sociology has, however,
been criticized by some international relations scholars for being crudely realist. On this point,
see Stephen Hobden (1999) ‘Theorising the International System’, Review of International
Studies 25 (2): 257–71.
Poggi, The State, p.98 (see note 25).
This is common in pluralist theories of the state, in which the state is actually seen as a fiction, a
bureaucratic manifestation of collective political decisions, and not an institution in its own right.
For overviews, see Hall and Ikenberry, The State, pp.3–6 (see note 25); and Mann, Sources of
Social Power, Vol. II, pp.46–7 and Ch. 3 passim (see note 25).
Michael Mann (1988) ‘The Autonomous Power of the State: its Origins, Mechanisms and
Results’, in States, War and Capitalism, pp.1–32. Oxford: Basil Blackwell; Mann, Sources of
Social Power, Vol. II, pp.59–61 (see note 25).
Hall and Ikenberry, The State, p.13 (see note 25).
Mann, ‘The Autonomous Power of the State’, p.5 (see note 30).
Hall and Ikenberry, The State, p.13 (see note 25).
Mann, ‘The Autonomous Power of the State’, p.5 (see note 30).
Giddens has also importantly added the role of more invasive forms of surveillance that have
developed in the modern state, and these should be seen as part of the infrastructural power.
Giddens, Nation-State and Violence, Chap. 7 (see note 25). Giddens’ notion of surveillance overlaps suggestively with the one developed by Foucault, although Giddens is keen to disentangle
them. See Giddens, Nation-State and Violence, pp.185–6 (see note 25); and Michel Foucault
(1979) Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, trans. Alan Sheridan. New York: Vintage.
Hall and Ikenberry, The State, p.14 (see note 25).
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Hay, Re-Stating Social and Political Change, p.67 (see note 27).
A good sampling of these perspectives can be found, though sometimes tangentially, in the
following works: Martin van Creveld (1999) The Rise and Decline of the State. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press; Paul Kennedy (1989) The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers.
London: Fontana; Michael Howard (1977) War and European History. Oxford: Oxford
University Press; Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States (see note 25); William H.
McNeill (1982) The Pursuit of Power: Technology, Armed Force and Society since A.D. 1000.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press; Michael Mann (1986) The Sources of Social Power, Vol. I.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Mann, Sources of Social Power, Vol. II (see note 25).
This is pointed out by van Creveld, Rise and Decline of the State, Ch. 3 (see note 38). There is
some contention in this matter over the role of ideational factors in historical sociological
analysis, which has primarily (though not exclusively) looked at material motivations for the
development of states and the states system. See the critique from a sympathetic theorist in
Christian Reus-Smit, ‘The Idea of History and History of Ideas’, in Hobden and Hobson,
Historical Sociology of International Relations, pp.120–40 (see note 4).
Tilly outlines an ‘ideal sequence’ of the classic European state-building experience: Tilly, ‘War
Making’ p.183 (see note 25).
Ibid., p.181; Howard, War and European History, p.49 (see note 38).
Mann, Sources of Social Power, Vol. II, p.370 and p.375 (see note 25).
van Creveld, Rise and Decline of the State, pp.142–3 (see note 38).
Mann, Sources of Social Power, Vol. II, p.479 (see note 25).
Ibid., p.375.
van Creveld, Rise and Decline of the State, p.217 (see note 38).
Ibid., pp.218–19.
Ibid., p.155.
Howard, War and European History, Chap. 4 (see note 38).
Mann, Sources of Social Power, Vol. II, p.410 (see note 25).
Ibid., p20.
Stephen Hobden (1999) ‘Can Historical Sociology be Critical?’, Alternatives 24 (3): 406.
See Giddens for an account of the connection between these three dimensions of the state.
Giddens, Nation-State and Violence, pp.212–21 (see note 25).
Mann, Sources of Social Power, Vol. II, p.251 (see note 25).
Howard, War and European History, p.110 (see note 38).
Hobden, ‘Can Historical Sociology be Critical?’, p.403 (see note 52).
This description has been borrowed from Giddens, though with a slightly different purpose in
mind. As Giddens states: ‘The welfare state originated as a “security state” and was actually
called such in some countries. It was the socialised, public counterpart to private insurance’.
Anthony Giddens, ‘Affluence, Poverty and the Idea of a Post-Scarcity Society’, in Ken Booth
(ed.) (1998) Statecraft and Security: The Cold War and Beyond, p.314. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
McNeill, Pursuit of Power, p.317 (see note 38). Also see Mark Roseman, ‘War and the People:
The Social Impact of Total War’, in Charles Townshend (ed.) (2000) The Oxford History of
Modern War, pp.284–5. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Eric Hobsbawm (1995) Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century, 1914–1991, pp.44–9.
London: Abacus; Roseman, ‘War and the People’, pp.283–5 (see note 58).
Brian Bond (1998) War and Society in Europe, 1870–1970, 2nd edn, p.174. Stroud, Gloucestershire: Sutton Publishing.
Ibid., p.175–6.
Ibid., p.178.
Roseman, ‘War and the People’, pp.285–287 (see note 58).
Mark Mazower (1999) Dark Continent: Europe’s Twentieth Century, p.304. London: Penguin
Books. In the case of Britain, the Beveridge report, outlining Britain’s post-war social welfare
provision, was received with a great enthusiasm, and became the best selling bureaucratic
document in British history, selling over 500,000 copies. Hay, Re-Stating Social and Political
Change, p.29 (see note 27).
Giddens, Nation-State and Violence, p.242 (see note 25).
For more on the latter, particularly in terms of the decreased demands of both left and right, see
Charles S. Maier (1981) ‘The Two Postwar Eras and Conditions for Stability in Twentieth
Century Western Europe’, American Historical Review 86 (2): 328–333.
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Also see Mann’s account of the different kinds of state strategies pursued to this end, which
demonstrates well that the ‘trade-off’ played differently in different types of state regimes, but
was important in all of them. Michael Mann (1988) ‘Ruling Class Strategies and Citizenship’, in
States, War and Capitalism, pp.188–210. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
See, for example, Bernard Brodie (1965) Strategy in the Missile Age. Princeton: Princeton
University Press; Robert Jervis (1989) The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution. Ithaca: Cornell
University Press; and Michael Mandelbaum (1981) The Nuclear Revolution: International
Politics Before and After Hiroshima. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
This is given brief outline in McNeill, Pursuit of Power, pp.354–6 (see note 38).
Ibid., p.356.
Giddens, Nation-State and Violence, p.240 (see note 25); and Ian Clark (1997) Globalization and
Fragmentation: International Relations in the Twentieth Century, p.115. Oxford: Oxford
University Press. This is not to say that nationalism and the nation-state were principles that were
abandoned in the post-war period, for it is more accurate to say that the war promoted both
nationalism and internationalism, creating some of the main problems of the latter half of the
20th century. See Ibid., p.117.
John Gerrard Ruggie (1982) ‘International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded
Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order’, International Organization 36 (2): 195–231.
Simon Dalby, ‘Contesting an Essential Concept: Reading the Dilemmas in Contemporary
Security Discourse’, in Krause and Williams, Critical Security Studies, p.21 (see note 12). Yergin
notes that the term ‘national security’ had only become utilized in policymaking circles during
the 1940s. Yergin, Shattered Peace, pp.194–5 (see note 15).
McSweeney, Security, Identity and Interests, p.28 (see note 15).
In a sense it was peculiar, after the relative failure of the nation-state in the inter-war period.
And indeed with the ‘states’ of any other historical period which happens to resemble the present;
e.g. Renaissance Italy, Ancient Greece, etc. On this point, see Hobson, ‘What’s at Stake’, pp.9–11
(see note 4); and Justin Rosenberg (1994) The Empire of Civil Society, Ch. 3. London: Verso.
There is some recognition of the different accounts of state-building and state power structures in
other regions of the world, despite the continued reliance on western models of statehood as the
basis of international society. See, for example, Jeffrey Herbst’s work on state-building in Africa:
Jeffrey Herbst (2000) State and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control.
Princeton: Princeton University Press.
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