SECOND DIVISION
[A.M. No. P-03-1718. March 11, 2004]
SEVERINO NICDAO, petitioner, vs. SILVESTRE J. ESGUERRA,
Sheriff IV, respondent.
RESOLUTION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before us is an administrative complaint against Silvestre Esguerra, Sheriff
IV, for Abuse of Authority filed by Severino Nicdao, defendant in Civil Case No.
711, entitled Antonio Marasigan, et al. vs. Severino Nicdao, an action for
Ejectment.
In his complaint, Nicdao alleges that on December 27, 2002, respondent
sheriff, taking advantage of their absence, implemented the writ of demolition
issued by the MTC, Paombong, Bulacan in Civil Case No. 711; that without a
break open order from the MTC, respondent sheriff forced himself into their
house, demolished the same and confiscated their personal properties; that
respondent sheriff was able to list only three properties belonging to them, to wit:
an aquarium, a refrigerator and a generator but failed to account for several
others including their jewelries.
In his Comment dated March 19, 2003, respondent sheriff explains as
follows: Upon receipt of a copy of the writ of execution issued by the MTC for the
implementation/execution of the decision issued in Civil Case No. 711, he served
a notice to vacate the subject premises upon complainant on March 3, 2000
giving him five days within which to vacate the subject premises but the latter
refused to do so. He submitted his Preliminary Report on April 3, 2000 informing
the trial court of the complainant’s refusal to vacate the premises. Two years
later, or on December 4, 2002, he received a copy of an alias writ of demolition
from MTC, Paombong giving him thirty days to implement the same and to make
a return. He served the writ together with a notice to vacate to the complainant
giving him again three days within which to vacate the premises. Considering
that no temporary restraining order (TRO) was issued in the case, he decided to
implement the writ of execution on December 27,2002. All personal belongings
inside the house/studio were properly inventoried in the presence of a police
officer and since defendant thru his son, refused to heed his request to secure
their personal belongings, he requested the barangay officials to secure the
same for safekeeping but said barangay official likewise refused his request for
fear that they might be involved in the problem. In view of that development, he
had no alternative but to keep/install, with the plaintiff Marasigan’s conformity, all
the inventoried personal belongings in the garage of the latter which is adjacent
to the premises subject of Civil Case No. 711. On the same date of
implementation, December 27, 2002, he submitted before the trial court a copy of
his return on alias writ of demolition dated December 7, 2002 with the attached
copy of Delivery of Possession. On January 3, 2003, he submitted a copy of his
Report dated January 2, 2003 to the Court, narrating all the proceedings
undertaken by him in connection with the implementation of the Writ of Execution
and Alias Writ of Demolition effected on December 27, 2002.
Based on the conflicting factual allegations posited by the complainant and
respondent sheriff, the OCA recommended that the case be re-docketed as a
regular administrative matter and the case referred to the Executive Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan for investigation, report and
recommendation within sixty days from receipt of the records.
Finding the recommendation of the OCA to be well-taken, the Court in a
Resolution dated July 9, 2003 ordered the case to be re-docketed as a regular
administrative matter and referred the same to Executive Judge Guillermo P.
Agloro of RTC, Malolos for investigation, report and recommendation.
Judge Agloro submitted his Final Report which was noted in the Court’s
Resolution dated November 17, 2003. In the said report, Judge Agloro narrated
the established facts of the case, to wit:
On December 27, 2002, private complainant Severino Nicdao, who was
then residing at no. 12 San Isidro I, Paombong, Bulacan, testified that he left for
Manila at around 6:00 a.m. with the rest of his family with the exception of one
son, Sherwin Nicdao, who was then residing at no. 77 Guinhawa St., Malolos,
Bulacan. Further, complainant testified that he padlocked his house and
nobody was left home; and when he returned, he saw his house already
demolished and his belongings were no longer inside his house. Consequently,
he looked for the plaintiff and the sheriff; and when he could not see them, he
went to the municipal hall and blottered the incident at the Paombong Police
Station. Thereafter, private complainant testified that he filed this formal
complaint on January 14, 2003 against respondent Esguerra with the Office of
the Chief Justice, Supreme Court (p.002, Rollo); and likewise filed a list of his
personal belongings with the same office on January 29, 2003. . . .
On the other hand, respondent Esguerra testified that upon receipt of the
alias writ of demolition on December 4, 2002, a notice to vacate was prepared
and served on December 9, 2002 together with the copy of the writ of
demolition and the writ of execution dated February 7, 2002 issued by the MTCPaombong, Bulacan, upon private complainant who received the same thru the
son, Sonny Nicdao upon private complainant’s instruction, at his residence
located at San Isidro I, Paombong, Bulacan (pp. 130-132, Rollo).
Instead of implementing the notice to vacate despite the three (3)-day
grace period, respondent Esguerra went to see private complainant Nicdao on
December 16, 2003.1[1] However, respondent Esguerra was only able to talk to
1[1]
Should be December 16, 2002.
private complainant Nicdao’s daughter-in-law. Thereafter, respondent Esguerra
informed private complainant Nicdao’s daughter-in-law if she could relay the
message to his father-in-law to vacate the property peacefully. Despite the
request, complainant Nicdao failed to vacate the property peacefully such that
on December 26, 2002, respondent Esguerra went to see the former informing
him that he will implement the alias writ of demolition the following day,
December 27, 20032[2] (pp. 13, TSN, September 11, 2003) as there is no
temporary restraining order issued preventing the implementation of the same.
Further, respondent Esguerra informed Mr. Nicdao that he is only given a
period of 30 days from receipt to implement the alias writ of demolition
reckoned from December 4, 2002 or up to January 4, 2003.
On December 27, 2002, respondent proceeded to the residence of private
complainant Nicdao to implement the writ at on or about 8:00 a.m.; however
when respondent arrived, the house was padlocked.
Consequently,
respondent went to the barangay captain as well as to the PNP-Paombong to
request formally for assistance (pp. 137-138, Rollo). Thereafter, with the
assistance of 3 barangay councilors together with a police personnel in the
person of PO3 Joseph de Guzman, respondent then proceeded to the
residence of private complainant. Upon arrival, respondent Esguerra then
inquired from the barangay and nearby houses where complainant Nicdao was,
but nobody knew where the private complainant and his family went.
Thereafter, at about 10:00 a.m., respondent removed the padlock;
however, after removal thereof, respondent saw a person taking a video
footage, who he later knew to be Sherwin or Wen-wen, the son of private
complainant Nicdao. Respondent then approached the son and told him --A.
. . . ‘nandyan ka pala, kanina ko pa kayo hinahanap ng Tatay mo upang
makapag-usap at kung puwede pakikuha nyo na ang mga gamit nyo sa
bahay.’
Q. What was his answer if any after you told him that?
A.
And he answered while he was taking the coverage on my implementation
and my other companions, he told me ‘kung gusto po nyo kausapin nyo
ang abogado namin’ (talk to my lawyer and here I am presently talking with
him over the cellphone).
... ...
A
...
The lawyer told me ‘kung ayaw mong sumakit ang katawan mo sa asunto
ay lubayan mo na ang pag-implement nyan at meron ka bang break-open
order?’ (pp. 22-23, TSN. September 11, 2003).
After his conversation with the private complainant’s lawyer, respondent
went back to the residence of Mr. Nicdao and entered the same; and there,
respondent took pictures of the actual arrangement of the interior and the
personal belongings of the private complainant (Exhibit “2”, “2-a” to “2-k”
inclusive).
2[2]
Should be December 27, 2002.
Thereafter, respondent Esguerra started actual demolition of private
complainant’s house. The personal belongings of private complainant were
then brought out of the house, inventoried, and placed inside “aparadors” which
were sealed by placing scotch tape around to secure the same (p. 8, TSN,
September 8, 2003); and brought to the adjacent garage of plaintiff Marasigan.
A listing of the personal belongings inside the house was witnessed by the
barangay officials, namely: Councilor Efnir Gonzales, Rene Ventura, Chito
Pascual, and Barangay Tanod Secretary Lamberto Lindayag and PO3 Joseph
de Guzman (Rollo, pp. 139-141) and whose signature appears on said listing.
When the request was made by respondent Esguerra to turn over the
belongings of complainant Nicdao to the barangay officials, they refused;
consequently, it was safekept in the adjacent garage of the plaintiff. Likewise,
considering that there was a money judgment, and as stated in the inventory
listing, “personal properties were levied by virtue of writ of execution dated
February 7, 2000 in Civil Case No. 711, entitled ‘Antonio Marasigan vs.
Severino Nicdao’, to wit: 1) one (1) set of aquarium with three (3) fishes; 2) one
(1) unit refrigerator; 3) one (1) unit generator with Serial No. 0687 . . .” (pp. 3435, TSN, September 11, 2003). Thereafter, a Sheriff’s Report was made on
January 2, 2003 (pp. 134-136, Rollo).3[3]
While the investigation pends, complainant filed with Judge Agloro a
“Request for the Recovery of Personal Properties/Belongings Alleged to be
Ready to be Returned to Defendant/Complainant”.4[4]
From the foregoing facts, Judge Agloro concluded that respondent Sheriff did
not abuse nor exceed his authority in the implementation of the writ of demolition
and that respondent Sheriff substantially complied with the requirements under
the Rules of Court relative to the implementation of the same. Hence, Judge
Agloro recommended that the complaint filed against respondent Sheriff be
dismissed and that the “Request for the Recovery of Personal
Properties/Belongings Alleged to be Ready to be Returned to
Defendant/Complainant” filed before his court be granted.
In a Resolution dated November 17, 2003, the Court referred to the OCA
Judge Agloro’s Final Report for evaluation, report and recommendation. The
OCA submitted its Memorandum dated December 22, 2003 adopting the
recommendation of Judge Agloro that the complaint be dismissed for lack of
merit and that the request for the “Recovery of Personal Properties/Belongings
Alleged to be Ready to be Returned to Defendant/Complainant” filed by
complainant before Executive Judge of Malolos, Bulacan be granted.
This case arose from an ejectment case docketed as Civil Case No. 711
decided against the complainant ordering him to vacate the subject premises. A
writ of execution dated February 7, 2000 was issued for the implementation and
execution of the decision in the said case. A notice to vacate was served on
complainant on March 3, 2000. A writ of demolition dated July 10, 2000 was
3[3]
Final Report submitted by Judge Agloro
4[4]
Rollo, p. 606.
issued.
Per the respondent Sheriff’s Report, these writs were returned
unimplemented. On November 20, 2002, the subject alias writ of demolition was
issued and implemented by respondent Sheriff.
The issue is: whether the respondent Sheriff implemented the writ within the
scope of his authority. Complainant contends that it was grave abuse of
authority on the part of the Sheriff of having implemented the writ without a
break-open order.
The records disclose that the alias writ of demolition dated November 20,
2002 was served on complainant on December 9, 2002 together with the writ of
execution dated February 7, 2000 ejecting him from the subject premises and a
Notice to Vacate dated December 9, 2002 giving them three days to vacate the
said premises. These were received by the complainant through his son who
signed receipt thereof.5[5] The complainant did not vacate the premises. On
December 16, 2002, respondent Sheriff went again to the complainant but was
able to talk only with complainant’s daughter-in-law.6[6] On December 26, 2002,
respondent Sheriff informed complainant that he will implement the alias writ of
demolition the following day, December 27, 2002.7[7]
It is therefore clear that complainant has been forewarned several times of
the impending implementation of the writs of execution and demolition. Despite
his claim that he and his family left for Manila as early as 6 o’clock in the morning
on the scheduled date of demolition, December 27, 2002 because of the holiday
season, it is quite obvious that they left the subject premises to evade the said
demolition. In the case of Arcadio vs. Ilagan,8[8] we held:
The name of the process commonly resorted to by the successful party in
an action of ejectment, for the purpose of being placed by the sheriff in the
actual possession of the land recovered is called a habere facias
possessionem. . . . No need for sheriffs and respondent lawyer to secure a
break open order where the character of the writ in their hands authorized
them if necessary to break open the apartment, if they could not
otherwise execute its command.9[9] . . . (Emphasis supplied)
Cases of forcible entry and detainer are summary in nature, for they involve
perturbation of social order which must be restored as promptly as possible,
and, accordingly, technicalities or details of procedure which may cause
unnecessary delays should carefully be avoided. Hence, when an officer duly
qualified to act under a writ of execution in an ejectment case should be
obstructed by a lock or a latch, he is not expected to lie in wait around the
premises until such time as the tenants arrive. He has the right to employ force
5[5]
TSN, September 5, 2003, p. 67; Rollo, p. 405.
6[6]
TSN, September 11, 2003, p. 9; Rollo, p. 530.
7[7]
TSN, September 5, 2003, p. 71; Rollo, p. 409.
8[8]
143 SCRA 168.
9[9]
Id., pp. 174-175.
necessary to enable him to enter the house and enforce the judgment. If the
rule were otherwise, and as experience has shown, the prevailing party will be
at the mercy of his adversary who will stop at nothing to thwart execution.10[10]
In the more recent case of Morta vs. Sanez,11[11] we ruled that:
It is only when there is no occupant in the premises that the sheriff may
lawfully cause a demolition without the need of securing a “break-open order.
The writ of execution and the alias writ of demolition partake of the nature of
a habere facias possessionem. It is undisputed that no one was in the subject
premises when the respondent Sheriff arrived – the kitchen door and the front
door were locked.12[12] Respondent Sheriff under the aforecited circumstances is
authorized to employ necessary force to implement the lawful orders of the court.
Moreover, respondent Sheriff sought the assistance of the police and the
barangay officials to witness the proceedings.
Anent the claim of the complainant that he lost several valuable personal
properties during the demolition, he submitted, as proof, a listing of these
properties.13[13]
A perusal of the records shows that during the demolition, an inventory was
made by the demolition team. Every item taken out was listed and witnessed by
the police and three barangay officials who accompanied respondent Sheriff in
the implementation of the writs. Their signatures appear on the side of the said
list.14[14] As between the list submitted by the complainant and the inventory made
by the demolition team, the latter has a greater probative value considering that it
was signed by disinterested persons and public officers. If ever there were
valuables that complainant had lost, he has only himself to be blamed for there
was sufficient notice for him to safekeep or get his belongings before or even
during the demolition. Instead of heeding the request of the respondent Sheriff to
get their belongings, complainant’s son who arrived at the premises, continued
instead to take video footage of the ongoings.
WHEREFORE, the complaint filed against respondent Sheriff Silvestre J.
Esguerra, Sheriff IV, MTC of Paombong, Bulacan is DISMISSED for lack of
merit. The “Request for Recovery of Personal Properties/Belongings Alleged to
be Ready to be Returned to Defendant/Complainant” filed by complainant
Severino Nicdao before the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Malolos, Bulacan may be granted by the Municipal Trial Court of Paombong,
Bulacan in Civil Case No. 711, subject to the condition that only those listed in
the inventory made by the demolition team and witnessed by the barangay
10[10]
Id., pp. 175-176.
11[11]
343 SCRA 177, 182.
12[12]
TSN, September 5, 2003, pp. 76-77; Rollo, pp. 414-415.
13[13]
Rollo, pp. 26-28.
14[14]
Rollo, pp. 139-141.
officials may be ordered returned to complainant Severino Nicdao.
SO ORDERED.
Quisumbing, (Acting Chairman), Callejo, Sr., and Tinga, JJ., concur.
Puno, (Chairman), J., on leave.
Supreme Court E-Library
FIRST DIVISION
SECURITY BANK
CORPORATION,
Complainant,
Present:
A.M. No. P-06-2139
- versus -
Panganiban, CJ,
Chairman,
Ynares-Santiago,
Austria-Martinez,
Callejo, Sr., and
Chico-Nazario, JJ
ROMEO C. GONZALBO,
ARTURO A. RAMOS and
Promulgated:
EDILBERTO C. DE CASTRO
Respondents.
March 23, 2006
x-- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --- -- -- -- -- --x
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, CJ:
T
he ministerial duty of sheriffs is to execute with reasonable
celerity and promptness all writs placed in their hands.
Unless restrained by a court order, they should see to it that the
execution of judgments is not unduly delayed.
The Case and the Facts
This administrative case originates from an AffidavitComplaint15[1] filed by Titolaido E. Payongayong, in his capacity as
the authorized representative of Security Bank Corporation. The
case was filed against Romeo C. Gonzalbo, Arturo A. Ramos and
Edilberto C. de Castro, all sheriffs of different branches of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City.
The facts of the case including the Comments16[2] of
respondents were summarized by the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) in its Report17[3] dated September 20, 2004, as
follows:
“Complainant Bank is one of the defendants in Civil
Case No. 95-724 which was filed by Jose Teofilo T. Mercado
and assigned to Branch 62 of the RTC of Makati City. A Writ
of Possession was issued by the court on 15 January 2003
(Annex ‘C’ of complainant), ordering and directing respondent
15[1]
16[2]
17[3]
Rollo, pp. 1-6.
Comments of Respondents de Castro, Ramos and Gonzalbo, all dated March
17, 2004; rollo, pp. 38-40, 44-50, and 66-70 respectively.
Rollo, pp. 117-124. Signed by Court Administrator Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr.
Gonzalbo and three (3) other sheriffs to place the bank or any
of its authorized representatives in complete, actual and
peaceful possession over subject real property covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 218413 to the absolute
exclusion of plaintiff Mercado.
Complainant Bank and
Mercado previously constituted a real estate mortgage over
this real property, which includes three (3) houses located at
No. 36 Narra Avenue, South Forbes Park, Makati City.
“On 27 January 2003, respondent Gonzalbo and Sheriff
Renato Flora went to the subject property to serve upon
Mercado the writ of execution and the Notice to Vacate but the
latter refused to receive the same. Thereafter, several
appeals were filed by Mercado with the Court of Appeals, but
no injunction was issued by said Court to forestall the
execution of the writ.
“In spite of the foregoing, respondent Gonzalbo was
able to serve the writ again on Mercado only on 14 July 2003.
On this occasion, Mercado received a copy of the writ and
notice, but he refused to sign the receiving copy. He likewise
made a comment that had it not been for his long time friend
respondent Gonzalbo, he would not have received and/or
accepted the copy. The notice gave Mercado a period of
three (3) days within which to vacate and clear the subject
property.
“On 17 July 2003, respondents Gonzalbo and Ramos
together with the complainant’s representative proceeded to
the subject property only to find all the gates of the premises
padlocked. They were denied entrance thereto by the security
personnel. Complainants allege that respondents did not
exercise extra effort to implement the writ and decided to
leave the premises notwithstanding the protestations of
complainant.
“Upon the request of respondents Gonzalbo and
Ramos, the lawyers of complainant caused the preparation of
a Motion for the Issuance of a Break Open Order. Acting on
the aforesaid motion, the Court issued an Order stating that
the power to break open is inherent upon the authority granted
to the sheriff to enforce and/or implement the writ of
possession. It was further ordered that the Southern Police
District Office would provide police assistance to the
respondents during the enforcement of the writ.
“Respondents Gonzalbo and Ramos along with the
lawyers of the complainant proceeded to the premises again
on 21 July 2003 to implement the writ. However, instead of
insisting on its full implementation, said respondents told the
lawyers to give Mercado a period of thirty (30) days or until 21
August 2003 within which to vacate and surrender the
possession of the subject premises to avoid confrontation.
“On 21 August 2003, respondent Gonzalbo went to
complainant bank to inform its representative that he had
granted Mercado an extension of ten (10) days. Complainant’s
representative insisted that complainant Bank cannot afford to
further delay the implementation of the writ. Respondent
Gonzalbo told him that they would further discuss the matter
on 25 August 2003 at respondent’s office. However, when
complainant’s representative went to the office of respondent
Gonzalbo, he was informed that the latter was in Bauan,
Batangas for a personal engagement.
Consequently,
complainant Bank’s representative requested respondent
Ramos to enforce the writ, but the latter replied that he cannot
do so because the documents pertaining to the
implementation of the writ were in the possession of
respondent Gonzalbo.
“On 1 September 2003, respondents Gonzalbo and
Ramos,
complainant’s
representative
and
lawyers
accompanied by some policemen of the Southern Police
District Office went to the subject property to enforce the writ.
However, respondents Gonzalbo and Ramos did not
immediately order the village manager of Forbes Park to
assist them to enter the village but whiled their time to let the
day end without the writ having been implemented.
“On 11 September 2003, the enforcement of the writ
finally proceeded and respondents Gonzalbo, Ramos and de
Castro were assisted by several police officers. It was already
4 o’clock in the afternoon when the respondents agreed
among themselves to allow Mercado to pull-out his personal
belongings and other properties for a period of five (5) days.
“On the agreed date of turn-over, it was discovered that
the property was in complete disarray as fixtures and
structures therein were either missing or destroyed. Per the
valuation conducted, the amount of the damage and missing
fixtures was calculated to be around P2,369,084[.]00. The
security personnel of the bank who were detailed in the
subject property for more than three (3) months have personal
knowledge on the condition of the property before
respondents allowed the pull-out of Mercado’s personal
belongings. Copies of the valuation report, Joint Affidavit of
the security personnel, and the photographs of the missing
fixtures and structures are attached as Annexes ‘F’, ‘G’, ‘H’, ‘I’,
‘J’, ‘K’, ‘L’, ‘M’, ‘N’, ‘O’ and ‘P’ of the complainant.
“Complainant contended that had the respondents
performed their duties properly, diligently and efficiently,
damage on the part of the bank would have been prevented.
It alleges that the foregoing actions of respondents Gonzalbo,
Ramos and de Castro constitute Gross Inefficiency and
Neglect of Duty in violation of the provisions of Sections 4
(b), (c) and 5 (d) of Republic Act No. 6713 otherwise knows
as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public
Officials and Employees.
“Respondents Gonzalbo, Ramos and de Castro filed
separate COMMENTS, all dated 17 March 2004.
“Respondent Gonzalbo admits the allegation that on 27
January 2003, together with respondent Flora and
complainant’s representative, went to the subject property to
serve upon Mercado the writ and notice.
After some
discussions, Mercado was given a 60-day grace period within
which to voluntarily and peacefully vacate or leave the
premises without prejudice to the cases which Mercado filed
before the Court of Appeals.
“On 14 July 2003, they went again to the premises to
serve the notice to vacate but although Mercado received it,
he refused to sign the same. Respondent denies the
statement of Mercado that they are long time friends because
if it were true, he would have inhibited himself from
implementing the writ.
“Respondent and co-respondent Ramos, accompanied
by the lawyers of the bank, some workers and several
policemen, went to the premises to execute the break-open
order on 21 July 2003 but Mercado told them that if they would
insist upon implementing the said order, there would be a
bloody confrontation. The workers were about to begin their
work by taking out a door using an acetylene torch when
Mercado fired several shots with his automatic machine pistol
causing the respondents, the lawyers of the bank and the
policemen to scamper away. Later, Atty. Agustin Aldea,
counsel of the complainant bank, and Atty. Ciriaco Macapagal,
Mercado’s lawyer entered into an agreement captioned as
‘Turn-Over of Possession’ (attached as Annex ‘5’ of the
Complaint) stating that Mercado would be given a period of 30
days within which to vacate the premises and that some
security guards of the bank would be posted thereat.
“On 20 August 2003, respondents Gonzalbo and
Ramos and a certain Atty. Biñas went to the bank but they
were not entertained. Thus, they proceeded to the premises
to inspect it. They found out that one of three houses therein
was empty, and the other two had only a few personal
belongings which were already packed in cartons and ready
for pull-out.
“Once more, on 1 September 2003, respondents
Gonzalbo and Ramos, complainant’s representatives and
some policemen went to the premises. It was already late in
the afternoon and when respondents insisted to fully
implement the writ, a certain Major Obinque warned them that
somebody might get hurt or be killed.
“Finally, on 11 September 2003, after a long negotiation
between the parties, it was agreed upon that Mercado would
pull-out his personal belongings from the premises within a
period of five (5) days, and that all the security personnel of
the bank as well as Mercado’s security guards would leave the
premises.
Police authorities would be detailed thereat
instead. The terms and conditions of the pull-out were not
formulated by the respondents but by the parties themselves.
He emphasizes that they had no knowledge whatsoever about
the missing or destroyed fixtures or structures in the premises.
“Respondent Ramos’ Comment basically contains the
same declarations as those contained in Gonzalbo’s. He
attached to his Comment a certified true copy of the Order
dated 21 July 2003 of Branch 62 of RTC-Makati City which
granted the Motion for Issuance of Break-Open Order. He
also attached as Annex ‘5’, a photocopy of the ‘Turn-over of
Possession’
dated 21 July 2003 which contains the
agreement between the bank’s lawyer, Atty. Agustin Aldea,
and Mercado’s lawyer, Atty. Ciriaco Macapagal.
“He further asserts that he and respondent Gonzalbo
did not ‘surreptitiously and clandestinely proceeded to the
subject property upon Mercado’s invitation and acceded to the
latter’s request for another ten (10)-day extension without the
knowledge, consent and conformity of the bank’ as they went
to the bank first before proceeding to the subject property and
the bank was aware that they would inspect the premises.
Since they saw that Mercado had already packed most of his
belongings, they deemed it best to grant the request of
Mercado for an extension of 10 days for the orderly turn-over
of the property.
“Respondent further asserts that during his fifteen (15)
years of service as sheriff he has always performed his duties
with diligence and dedication and the delay in the
implementation of the writ was brought about by their efforts to
peacefully turn-over the subject property to the bank
considering that Mercado showed a violent character as
manifested during the 21 July 2003 incident.
“Respondent de Castro’s Comment contains the same
averments as those of Ramos’ and Gonzalbo’s.”18[4]
18[4]
OCA Report dated September 20, 2004, pp. 1-5; id., pp. 117-121.
Findings and Recommendation of the OCA
Considering the length of time that had elapsed from the
issuance of the Writ of Possession19[5] until its implementation, as well
as the surrounding circumstances, the OCA found that Gonzalbo
had
failed
to
observe
the
highest
degree
of
excellence,
professionalism, intelligence and skill in the performance of his
function. His failure to enforce the Writ expeditiously also showed
his inefficiency, incompetence and negligence. Thus, he was deemed
to have violated RA 6713, specifically Sections 4(A)(b) and 5(d) of
the law.
The OCA faulted Gonzalbo for unilaterally granting Mercado
an extension to vacate the premises without consulting complainant
first. Respondent likewise manifested his incompetence when he told
the lawyers of complainant to file a motion for the issuance of an
order to break open, as the authority to do so had already been
19[5]
Rollo, p. 19.
included in the power to implement the Writ of Possession. Thus,
the OCA recommended the imposition of a fine of P10,000, with a
stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the
future would be dealt with more severely.
On the other hand, the OCA recommended the dismissal of
the administrative Complaint against Ramos and De Castro for lack
of merit. It held that they could not be held administratively liable,
because they had merely assisted Gonzalbo in the implementation of
the Writ. It further opined that these two respondents had used their
best judgment under the circumstances.
The Court’s Ruling
We agree with the findings and recommendation of the OCA.
Respondent’s Administrative Liability
A writ of possession is one employed to enforce a judgment
ordering the recovery of possession of a piece of property. The writ
commands the sheriff to enter the land and give its possession to the
person entitled under the judgment.20[6]
Well-settled is the doctrine that the duty of sheriffs in the
execution of a writ issued by a court is purely ministerial.21[7] Indeed,
it is their ministerial duty to proceed to execute a writ placed in their
hands, with reasonable celerity and promptness in accordance with
their mandate.22[8] Unless restrained by a court order, they should see
to it that the execution of a judgment is not unduly delayed.
Accordingly, they must comply with their mandated obligation as
speedily as possible.
Noteworthy is the following ruling of this
Court:
20[6]
21[7]
22[8]
PNB v. Sanao Marketing Corp., 465 SCRA 287, July 29, 2005; Sps. Ong v. CA,
388 Phil. 857, June 8, 2000.
Apostol v. Ipac, 464 SCRA 232, July 28, 2005; PAMANA, Inc v. CA, 460 SCRA
133, June 15, 2005.
Buenviaje v. Anatalio, 465 SCRA 20, July 29, 2005; Garcera II v. Parrone, 463
SCRA 440, July 15, 2005; De La Cruz v. Bato, 451 SCRA 330, February 15,
2005.
“[Sheriffs have] no discretion whether to execute [writs]
or not. Good faith on [their part], or lack of it, in proceeding to
properly execute [their] mandate would be of no moment, for
[they are] chargeable with the knowledge that being an officer
of the court tasked therefor, it behooves [them] to make due
compliance.”23[9]
The primary duty of sheriffs is to execute decisions and orders
of the court to which they belong. If not executed, a judgment
would be an empty victory on the part of the prevailing party. 24[10] To
be sure, execution is the fruit and end of a suit and is very aptly called
the life of the law.25[11] Also indisputable is the fact that sometimes
the most difficult phase of judicial proceedings is the execution of a
judgment.26[12]
Hence, in the absence of a restraining order, the
officers charged with this delicate task must act with considerable
dispatch. Otherwise, the administration of justice would be unduly
23[9]
24[10]
25[11]
26[12]
Zarate v. Untalan, 454 SCRA 206, 215, March 31, 2005, per Callejo, Sr., J.
Bergonia v. Gatcheco, Jr., 469 SCRA 479, September 9, 2005; Buenviaje v. Anatalio,
supra at note 8; Zarate v. Untalan, supra.
Gulang v. CA, 360 Phil. 435, December 17, 1998; Re: Danilo Cunanan, 238
SCRA 421, November 28, 1994; Miro v. Tan, 235 SCRA 405, August 17, 1994;
PAL v. CA, 181 SCRA 557, January 30, 1990.
Garcia v. Magcalas, 447 SCRA 285, December 17, 2004; Alabastro v. Moncada,
Sr., 447 SCRA 42, December 16, 2004; Caja v. Nanquil, 438 SCRA 174,
September 13, 2004; Moya v. Bassig, 138 SCRA 49, August 7, 1985.
delayed; and the decisions, orders, or other processes of the courts of
justice, rendered inutile.27[13]
By the very nature of their duties, sheriffs perform a sensitive
function in the dispensation of justice.28[14] They are thus duty-bound
to know the basic rules relative to the implementation of writs of
execution.
At all times, they should show a high degree of
professionalism in the performance of their duties.29[15] As front-line
representatives of our justice system, they should be more vigilant in
the execution of the law. Once the people’s trust is lost, the people’s
faith in the judiciary is likewise diminished.30[16]
In the present case, we agree with the OCA that Gonzalbo was
remiss in his duties when he failed to implement the Writ of
Possession for almost eight months from its issuance. True, there
27[13]
28[14]
29[15]
30[16]
Zarate v. Untalan, supra at note 9.
Alpeche v. Bato, 413 SCRA 530, October 16, 2003; Espina v. Gato, 401 SCRA 40,
April 9, 2003; Castro v. Bague, 411 Phil. 532, June 20, 2001.
Imperial v. Basilla, 435 SCRA 442, July 30, 2004; Andal v. Tonga, 414 SCRA 524,
October 28, 2003.
Bergonia v. Gatcheco, Jr., supra at note 10; Imperial v. Basilla, supra; Concerned
Citizen v. Torio, 433 Phil. 649, July 11, 2002.
were extensions granted by complainant itself. But even if these were
excluded, the delay in the implementation of the Writ was still
unconscionable.
Worse, Gonzalbo even granted extensions himself without
notifying the bank or seeking the approval of the court. Complainant
even had to follow up the matter and remind him of the expiry of the
extension granted to Mercado to vacate the premises.31[17]
The
essence of the job of Gonzalbo was to give complainant full control
and possession of the real property. This he miserably failed to do
for an unreasonable time.
And when the Writ was finally
implemented, pilferage and destruction had already been wrought on
the subject property.
Respondent himself highlighted his culpability in his admission
that he had told complainant’s lawyers to file a motion granting him
authority to break-open the premises. This admission alone shows
31[17]
Letter dated August 26, 2003, rollo, p. 20.
his interference with the legal processes. To stress, he possessed
adequate authority to enforce the Writ. He did not need the alleged
additional mandate from the court.
Emphatically ruled this Court in a similar case:
“Time and time again, this Court has reminded sheriffs
that, as court employees, they must conduct themselves with
propriety and decorum; their actions must be above suspicion
at all times. The Court cannot countenance -- it in fact
condemns -- any conduct, act or omission that violates the
norm of public accountability and diminishes, or even just
tends to diminish, the faith of the people in the judiciary.
xxx
xxx
xxx
“x x x. Sheriffs are court officers and agents of the law
primarily responsible for the speedy and effective service of all
court processes and writs. As such, they have an important
role to play in the administration of justice, because they are
called upon to serve court writs, execute all processes and
implement court orders. Thus, they should discharge their
duties and responsibilities faithfully, with due care and utmost
diligence.32[18]
As public officers, court employees -- from the presiding judge
to the lowliest clerk -- should always act with a high degree of
professionalism and responsibility. Sheriffs, specifically, are bound to
32[18]
Tagaloguin v. Hingco, Jr, 460 SCRA 360, 372-373, June 21, 2005, per
Panganiban, J. (now CJ).
use utmost skill and diligence in the performance of their official
duties, particularly when the rights of individuals may be jeopardized
by their neglect.33[19]
Verily, they play an important role in the
administration of justice.
Lest we forget, a public office is a public trust.34[20] Being in
close contact with litigants, sheriffs are in particular at the grassroots
of our judicial machinery. Hence, their conduct should be geared
towards maintaining the prestige and integrity of the courts.35[21] By
the very nature of their functions, they must conduct themselves with
propriety and decorum. They cannot afford to err in serving court
writs and processes or in implementing court orders. Otherwise, they
would undermine the integrity of their office and the efficient
administration of justice.36[22]
33[19]
34[20]
35[21]
36[22]
Dagooc v. Erlina, 453 SCRA 423, March 16, 2005.
§1 of Art. XI of the 1987 Constitution.
Tan v. Paredes, 464 SCRA 47, July 22, 2005; Adoma v. Gatcheco, 448 SCRA 299,
January 17, 2005; Sulit v. Matias, 448 SCRA 131, January 14, 2005.
Equitable PCI Bank, Inc. v. Bellones, 453 SCRA 598, March 18, 2005.
As to Ramos and De Castro, we agree with the OCA that the
Complaint against them should be dismissed. They merely assisted
Gonzalbo in enforcing the Writ of Possession. As the incumbent
sheriff of the court that had issued the Writ, he had the primary duty
to enforce the Writ fully.
WHEREFORE, Respondent Romeo C. Gonzalbo, Sheriff IV
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 62, Makati City, is found
GUILTY of neglect of duty and incompetence in the performance
of his official duties. He is hereby FINED in the amount of ten
thousand pesos (P10,000), with a stern warning that commission of
the same or similar acts in the future will be dealt with more severely.
The Complaint against Arturo A. Ramos and Edilberto C. de Castro
is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
Chairman, First Division
W E
C O N C U R:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.
NAZARIO
Associate Justice
Supreme Court E-Library
MINITA V. CHICOAssociate Justice