University of Santo Tomas
Faculty of Civil Law
CRIMINAL
LAW
Questions Asked More
Than Once
(QuAMTO 2018)
*QUAMTO is a compilation of past bar questions with answers as
suggested by UPLC and other distinct luminaries in the academe, and
updated by the UST Academics Committee to fit for the 2017 Bar Exams.
*Bar questions are arranged per topic in accordance with the bar syllabus
released by the Supreme Court and were selected based on their
occurrence on past bar examinations from 1987 to 2016.
ACADEMICS COMMITTEE
EDREA JEAN V. RAMIREZ
SECRETARY GENERAL
ARIANNA LAINE T. SARMIENTO
MARIA ANGELICA J. HADLOC
GENA MYRTLE P. TERRE
MAICA A. PRUDENTE
MARIELLA A. MARASIGAN
EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
LAURISSE MARIE T. PERIANES
JED NATHANIEL M. GONZALEZ
LAYOUT AND DESIGN
QUAMTO COMMITTEE MEMBERS
MARHEN CASTRO
MARIA ANGELICA HADLOC
EDREA JEAN RAMIREZ
ARIANNA LAINE SARMIENTO
ATTY. AL CONRAD B. ESPALDON
ADVISER
QUAMTO (1987-2017)
Q: What is the fundamental principle in
applying and interpreting criminal laws
xxx? (2012 Bar)
CRIMINAL LAW QUAMTO
A: The fundamental principle in interpreting
and applying penal laws is the principle of pro
reo. The phrase “in dubio pro reo” means
“when in doubt, for the accused” (Intestate
Estate of Gonzales v. People, GR No. 181409,
February 11, 2010). This is in consonance with
the constitutional guarantee that the accused
ought to be presumed innocent until and
unless his guilt is established beyond
reasonable doubt (See People v. Temporary, GR
No. 173473)
PART I. REVISED PENAL CODE BOOK I
A. FUNDAMENTAL AND GENERAL
PRINCIPLES IN CRIMINAL LAW
Power of Congress to Enact Penal Laws
Q: What are the limitations upon the power
of Congress to enact penal laws? (1988,
2012 Bar)
Mala in Se and Mala Prohibita (1997, 1999,
2001, 2003, 2005, 2017 Bar)
A: The limitations upon the power of congress
to enact penal laws are as follows:
1.
2.
3.
Q: Distinguish between crimes mala in se
and mala prohibita. (1997, 1999, 2001,
2003, 2005, 2017 Bar)
Congress cannot enact an ex post facto
law.
Congress cannot enact a bill of attainder.
Congress cannot provide for a cruel
punishment.
A: In concept, crimes mala in se are those
where the acts or omissions penalized are
intently bad, evil, or wrong that they are
almost universally condemned. Crimes mala
prohibita are those where the acts penalized
are not inherently bad, evil, or wrong but
prohibited by law for public good, public
welfare, or interest and whoever violate the
prohibition are penalized.
However, other limitations may be considered
like:
1.
2.
Congress cannot enact a law which shall
punish for a condition. Congress shall
punish an act and not the condition or
status. (Robinson v. California)
Congress should consider Article 21 of the
Revised Penal Code which provides that
“penalties that may be imposed. No felony
shall be punishable by any penalty not
prescribed by law prior to its commission.”
In legal implications, in crimes mala in se, good
faith or lack of criminal intent or negligence is
a defense, while in crimes mala prohibita, good
faith or lack of criminal intent or malice is not a
defense; it is enough that the prohibition was
voluntarily violated. Also, criminal liability is
generally incurred in crimes mala in se even
when the crime is only attempted or
frustrated, while in crimes mala prohibita,
criminal liability is generally incurred only
when the crime is consummated.
Doctrine of Pro Reo (2010, 2012 Bar)
Q: What is the Doctrine ofPro Reo? How
does it relate to Article 48 of the Revised
Penal Code? (2010 Bar)
A: The Doctrine of Pro Reo provides that
whenever a penal law is to be construed or
applied and the law admits of two
interpretations, one lenient to the offender and
one strict to the offender, that interpretation
which is lenient or favorable to the offender
will be adopted.
Also in crimes mala in se, mitigating and
aggravating circumstances are appreciated in
imposing the penalties, while in crimes mala
prohibita, such circumstances are not
appreciated unless the special law has adopted
the scheme or scale of penalties under the
Revised Penal Code.
Following this doctrine, crimes under Art. 48
of the RPC are complexed and punished with a
single penalty (that prescribed for the most
serious crime and to be imposed in its
maximum period). The rationale being, that
the accused who commits two crimes with a
single criminal impulse demonstrates lesser
perversity than when the crimes are
committed by different acts and several
criminal resolutions (People v. Comadre, G.R.
No. 153559, June 8, 2004). However, Art. 48
shall be applied only when it would bring
about the imposition of a penalty lesser than
the penalties imposable for all the component
crimes if prosecuted separately.
Lack of criminal intent is a valid defense in
mala in se except when the crime results from
criminal negligence. Such defense is not
available in cases of mala prohibita.
Q: May an act be malum in se and be, at the
same time, malum prohibitum? (1997 Bar)
A: Yes, an act may be malum in se and malum
prohibitum at the same time. In People v.
Sunico, et. al. (CA, 50 OG 5880) it was held that
the omission or failure of election inspection
and poll clerks to include a voter’s name in the
registry list of voters is wrong per se because it
disenfranchises a voter of his right to vote. In
1
CRIMINAL LAW
A: Yes. The motion to quash the information
should be granted. The Philippine court has no
jurisdiction over the crime committed since it
was committed on the high seas or outside of
Philippine territory and on board a vessel not
registered or licensed in the Philippines (US v.
Fowler, 1 Phil 614)
this regard, it is considered as malum in se.
Since it is punished under a special law (Sec.
101 and 103, Revised Election Code), it is
considered malum prohibitum.
Applicability and Effectivity of the Penal
Code (1988, 1994, 1998, 2000, 2015, 2016
Bar)
It is the registration of the vessel in accordance
with the laws of the Philippines, not the
citizenship of her owner, which makes it a
Philippine ship. The vessel being registered in
Panama, the laws of Panama govern while it is
in the high seas.
Q: State the characteristics of criminal law
and explain each. (1988, 1998 Bar)
A: The characteristics of criminal law are as
follows:
1.
2.
3.
Q: Ando, an Indonesian national who just
visited the Philippines, purchased a ticket
for a passenger vessel bound for Hong
Kong. While on board the vessel, he saw his
mortal enemy Iason, also an Indonesian
national, seated at the back portion of the
cabin and who was busy reading a
newspaper. Ando stealthily approached
Iason and when he was near him, Ando
stabbed and killed Iason. The vessel is
registered in Malaysia. The killing
happened just a few moments after the
vessel left the port of Manila. Operatives
from the PNP Maritime Command arrested
Ando. Presented for the killing of Iason,
Ando contended that he did not incur
criminal liability because both he and the
victim were Indonesians. He likewise
argued that he could not be prosecuted in
Manila because the vessel is a Malaysianregistered ship. Discuss the merits of
Ando's contentions. (2015 Bar)
Generality – that the law is binding upon
all persons who reside to sojourn in the
Philippines, irrespective of age, sex, color,
creed, or personal circumstances.
Territoriality – that the law is applicable to
all crimes committed within the limits of
Philippine territory, which includes its
atmosphere interior water and maritime
zone. (Art. 2)
Prospectivity – that the law does not have
any retroactive effect, except if it favors
the offender unless he is a habitual
delinquent (Art. 22) or the law otherwise
provides.
Q: Abe, married to Liza, contracted another
marriage with Connie in Singapore.
Thereafter, Abe and Connie returned to the
Philippines and lived as husband and wife
in the hometown of Abe in Calamba,
Laguna. Can Abe be prosecuted for bigamy?
(1994 Bar)
A: Both contentions of Ando lack merit. The
argument of Ando that he did not incur
criminal liability because both he and the
victim were Indonesians is not tenable. Under
the generality principle, penal laws shall be
obligatory upon all who live or sojourn in the
Philippine territory (Article 14 of the Civil
Code). The foreign characteristic of an offender
and offended party does not exclude him from
operation of penal laws (People v. Galacgac,
C.A., 54 O.G. 1027). Under the Revised Penal
Code, except as provided in treaties and laws
of preferential application, penal laws of the
Philippines shall have force and effect within
its territory. Here, since the killing took place
within the Philippine territory, our penal laws
applies and Ando may be held criminally
responsible despite his being and Indonesian
citizen
A: No. Abe may not be prosecuted for bigamy
since the bigamous marriage was contracted
or solemnized in Singapore, hence, such
violation is not one of those where the Revised
Penal Code, under Art. 2 thereof, may be
applied extraterritoriality. The general rule on
territoriality of criminal law governs the
situation.
Q: After drinking one (1) case of San Miguel
Beer and taking two plates of “pulutan”,
Binoy, a Filipino seaman, stabbed to death
Sio My, a Singaporean seaman, aboard M/V
“Princess of the Pacific”, an overseas vessel
which was sailing in the South China Sea.
The
vessel,
although
Panamanian
registered, is owned by Lucio Sy, a rich
Filipino businessman. When M/V “Princess
of the Pacific” reached a Philippine Port at
Cebu City, the Captain of the vessel turned
over the assailant Binoy to the Philippine
authorities. An Information for homicide
was filed against Binoy in the Regional Trial
Court of Cebu City. He moved to quash the
Information for lack of jurisdiction. If you
were the judge, will you grant the motion?
Why? (2000 Bar)
Corpus delicti
Q:
(a) Define “Corpus delicti”.
(b) What are the elements of “Corpus
delicti”? (2000 Bar)
A:
UST BAR OPERATIONS
B. FELONIES
2
QUAMTO (1987-2017)
Motive and Intent
(a) Corpus Delicti literally means “the body or
substance of the crime” or the fact that a
crime has been committed, but does not
include the identity of the person who
committed it. (People v. Pascal, 44 OG
2789)
Q: May a crime be committed without
criminal intent? (1988 Bar)
A: A crime may be committed without criminal
intent in two cases:
1. In offense punishable as mala
prohibita; and
2. Felonies committed by means of culpa.
(b) Elements of corpus delicti: The actual
commission by someone of the particular
crime charged. It is a compound fact made
up of two things:
Q: Distinguish intent from motive in
Criminal Law. (1996, 2004 Bar)
(1) The existence of a certain act or result
forming the basis of the criminal
charge; and
(2) The existence of a criminal agency as
the cause of the act or result.
A: Motive is the moving power which impels
one to action for a definite result; whereas
intent is the purpose to use a particular means
to effect such results. Motive is not an essential
element of a felony and need not be proved for
purpose of conviction, while intent is an
essential element of felonies by dolo.
The identity of the offender is not a
necessary element of corpus delicti.
Q: At a birthday party in Cebu, A got
intoxicated and started quarreling with B
and C. At the height of their arguments, A
left and took a bolo from his house, after
which he returned to the party and
threatened to stab everybody. B got scared
and ran towards the seashore, with A
chasing him. B ran up a steep incline along
the shore and was cornered on top of a cliff.
Out of fear, B jumped from the cliff into the
sea. A returned to the scene of their
confrontation and seeing that nobody was
there, went home to sleep. The next day, B’s
wife reported to the police station that her
husband had not yet come home. A search
was conducted by the residents of the
barangay but after almost two days, B or his
body could not be located and his
disappearance continued for the next few
days. Based on the testimony of C and other
guests, who had seen A and B on top of the
cliff, A was arrested and charged with
Murder. In his defense, he claimed that
since B’s body has not been found, there
was no evidence of corpus delicti and
therefore, he should be acquitted.
Q: When is motive relevant to prove a case?
When is it not necessary to be established?
Explain. (1999, 2006 Bar)
A: Motive is relevant to prove a case when
there is doubt as to the identity of the offender
or when the act committed gives rise to variant
crimes and there is the need to determine the
proper crime to be imputed to the offender.
It is not necessary to prove motive when the
offender is positively identified or the criminal
act did not give rise to variant crimes.
IMPOSSIBLE CRIME (1994, 1998, 2000,
2004, 2009, 2014)
Q: JP, Aries and Randal planned to kill Elsa,
a resident of Barangay Pula, Laurel,
Batangas. They asked the assistance of Ella,
who is familiar with the place.
On April 3, 1992, at about 10:00 in the
evening, JP, Aries and Randal, all armed
with automatic weapons, went to Barangay
Pula. Ella, being the guide, directed her
companions to the room in the house of
Elsa. Whereupon, JP, Aries and Randal fired
their guns at her room. Fortunately, Elsa
was not around as she attended a prayer
meeting that evening in another barangay
in Laurel.
Is the defense of A tenable or not? State the
reason(s) for your answer? (2001 Bar)
A: The defense of A is not tenable. “Corpus
delicti” does not refer to the body of the
purported victim which had not been found.
Even without the body of the purported victim
being found, the offender can be convicted
when the facts and circumstances of a crime,
the body of the crime or “corpus delicti” is
established.
JP, et. al., were charged and convicted of
attempted murder by the Regional Trial
Court at Tanauan, Batangas. On appeal to
the Court of Appeals, all the accused
ascribed to the trial court the sole error of
finding them guilty of attempted murder.
In other words, the non-recovery of the body
of the victim is not a bar to the prosecution of
A for Murder, but the fact of death and identity
of the victim must be established beyond
reasonable doubt.
If you were the ponente, how will you
decide the appeal? (1994 Bar)
A: If I were the ponente, I will set aside the
judgment convicting the accused of attempted
murder and instead find them guilty of
3
CRIMINAL LAW
investigating prosecutor merely filed a
case of “Impossible Crime to Commit
Kidnapping” against Enrique. Is the
prosecutor correct? (2000 Bar)
impossible crime under Art. 4, par. 2, RPC, in
relation to Art. 59, RPC. Liability for impossible
crime arises not only when the impossibility is
legal, but likewise when it is factual or physical
impossibility, as in the case at bar.
A:
Elsa’s absence from the house is a physical
impossibility which renders the crime
intended
inherently
incapable
of
accomplishment. To convict the accused of
attempted murder would make Art. 4, par. 2,
practically useless as all circumstances which
prevented the consummation of the offense
will be treated as an incident independent of
the actor’s will which is an element of
attempted or frustrated felony. (Intod v. CA,
215 SCRA 52)
a.
b.
Q: Puti detested Pula, his roommate,
because Pula was courting Ganda, whom
Puti fancied. One day, Puti decided to teach
Pula a lesson and went to a veterinarian to
ask for poison on the pretext that he was
going to kill a sick pet, when actually Puti
was intending to poison Pula, the Vet
instantly gave Puti a non-toxic solution
which, when mixed with Pula’s food, did not
kill Pula. What crime, if any, did Puti
commit? (1994, 1998, 2004, 2009, 2014
Bar)
c.
A: Puti committed an impossible crime of
murder. Puti, with intent to kill Pula,
unknowingly employed ineffectual means to
accomplish the intended felony, that is, using a
non-toxic solution.
Q:
d.
a. What is an impossible crime?
b. Is an impossible crime really a crime?
c. A, B, C and D, all armed with armalites,
proceeded to the house of X, Y, a
neighbor of X, who happened to be
passing by, pointed to the four culprits
the room that X occupied. The four
culprits peppered the room with
bullets. Not satisfied, A even threw a
hand grenade that totally destroyed X’s
room. However, unknown to the four
culprits, X was not inside the room and
nobody was hit or injured during the
incident. Are A, B, C and D liable for any
crime? Explain.
d. Carla, 4 years old, was kidnapped by
Enrique, the tricycle driver paid by her
parents to bring and fetch her to and
from school. Enrique wrote a ransom
note demanding P500,000 from Carla’s
parents in exchange for Carla’s
freedom. Enrique sent the ransom note
by mail. However, before the ransom
note was received by Carla’s parents,
Enrique’s hideout was discovered by
the police. Carla was rescued while
Enrique was arrested and incarcerated.
Considering that the ransom note was
not received by Carla’s parents, the
UST BAR OPERATIONS
Impossible crime is an act which would be
an offense against person or property,
were if not for the inherent impossibility
of its accomplishment or on account of the
employment of inadequate or ineffectual
means (Art. 4, par. 2, RPC).
No, an impossible crime is not really a
crime. It is only so-called because the act
gives rise to criminal liability. But actually,
no felony is committed. The accused is to
be punished for his criminal tendency or
propensity although no crime was
committed.
Yes, A, B, C and D are liable for destructive
arson because of the destruction of the
room of X with the use of an explosive, the
hand grenade.
Liability for an impossible crime is to be
imposed only if the act committed would
not constitute any other crime under the
Revised Penal Code. Although the facts
involved are parallel to the case of Intod v.
CA (215 SCRA 52), where it was ruled that
the liability of the offender was for an
impossible crime, no hand grenade was
used in the said case, which constitutes a
more serious crime though different from
what was intended.
No, the prosecutor is not correct in filing a
case for “impossible crime to commit
kidnapping” against Enrique.
Impossible crimes are limited only to acts
which when performed would be a crime
against persons or property. As
kidnapping is a crime against personal
security and not against persons or
property, Enrique could not have incurred
an “impossible crime” to commit
kidnapping. There is thus no impossible
crime of kidnapping.
STAGES OF EXECUTION (1996, 2000, 2005,
2015)
Q: Edgardo induced his friend Vicente, in
consideration of money, to kidnap a girl he
is courting so that he may succeed in raping
her and eventually making her accede to
marry him. Vicente asked for more money
which Edgardo failed to put up. Angered
because Edgardo did not put up the money
he required, he reported Edgardo to the
police. May Edgardo be charged with
attempted kidnapping? (1996 Bar)
A: No. Edgardo may not be charged with
attempted kidnapping inasmuch as no overt
act to kidnap or restrain the liberty of the girl
4
QUAMTO (1987-2017)
had been commenced. At most, what Edgardo
has done in the premises was a proposal to
Vicente to kidnap the girl, which is only a
preparatory act and not an overt act. The
attempt to commit a felony commences with
the commission of overt act, not preparatory
act. Proposal to commit kidnapping is not a
crime.
only to felonies which are punished in the
Revised Penal Code.
Q: Rodolfo, a policeman, was cleaning his
service pistol inside his house when it fell
from his hand and fired. The bullet hit a
neighbor on the stomach and a second
neighbor on the leg. The injuries sustained
by the two neighbors required thirty-five
(35) days and nine (9) days of medical
attendance, respectively. The investigating
fiscal later filed an information for
frustrated homicide and slight physical
injuries through reckless imprudence
against Rodolfo. Is the charge correct?
Explain. (1989 Bar)
Q: Taking into account the nature and
elements of the felonies of coup d’etat and
rape, may one be criminally liable for
frustrated coup d’etat or frustrated rape?
Explain. (2005 Bar)
A: No. A person may not be held liable for
frustrated coup d’etat or for frustrated rape
because in a frustrated felony, it is required
that all acts of execution that could produce
the felony as a consequence must have been
performed by the offender but the felony was
not produced by reason of causes independent
of the will of the offender. In the said felonies,
one cannot perform all the acts of execution
without consummating the felony. The said
felonies, therefore, do not admit of the
frustrated stage.
A: The charge is not correct. One single act of
accidental shooting cannot give rise to two
felonies. One of which is intentional and the
other
negligent.
Frustrated
homicide
presupposes intent to kill. The facts do not
show any intent to kill on the part of Rodolfo.
At most, he was careless, and therefore only
negligent.
Alternative Answer: Two separate crimes of
serious physical injuries (against the first
neighbor whose injuries requires 35 days of
medical attendance), and slight physical
injuries (against the second neighbor), both
through reckless imprudence, were committed
by Rodolfo. Although both of these offenses
were the result of one single act, a complex
crime is not committed. It is only when a single
act constitutes two or more grave or less grave
felonies that a complex crime may be
committed under Article 48 of the RPC. Slight
physical injuries is not a grave or less grave
felony.
COMPLEX AND COMPOSITE CRIMES
Complex crime (1987, 1989, 1991, 1994,
1995, 1996, 1999, 2000, 2003, 2007)
Q: Jose purchased roofing materials worth
P20,000 from PY & Sons Construction
Company owned by Pedro and paid the
latter a check in the said amount. The
following day, Pedro deposited the check
but it was returned dishonored because it
was drawn against a closed account. Jose
failed to make good the said check despite
written demands. Atty. Saavedra, counsel
for Pedro, filed two complaints against Jose
with the Office of the Provincial Fiscal, one
for estafa under Article 315 of the Revised
Penal Code and another for violation of BP
Blg. 22. Atty. San Pascual, counsel for Jose,
claimed that if his client was at all liable, he
could only be liable for violation of BP 22
and not for estafa under Art. 315 of the RPC
because one precludes the other and
because BP 22 is more favorable to the
accused as it carries a lighter penalty.
The information filed should be reckless
imprudence resulting to serious physical
injuries and slight physical injuries.
Q: Harry, an overseas contract worker,
arrived
from
Saudi
Arabia
with
considerable savings. Knowing him to be
“loaded”, his friends Jason, Manuel and
Dave invited him to poker session at a
rented beach cottage. When he was losing
almost all his money which to him was his
savings of a lifetime, he discovered that he
was being cheated by his friends. Angered
by the betrayal, he decided to take revenge
on the three cheats.
The investigating fiscal, on his resolution,
stated that only one crime was committed,
namely, the complex crime of estafa under
Art. 315 of the RPC and another under BP
22.
Harry ordered several bottles of Tanduay
Rhum and gave them to his companions to
drink, as they did, until they all fell asleep.
When Harry saw his companions already
sound asleep, he hacked them all to death.
Then he remembered his losses, he rifled
through the pockets of his victims and got
back all the money he lost. He then ran
away but not before burning the cottage to
hide his misdeed. The following day, police
investigators found among the debris the
Is the investigating fiscal correct? (Question
reframed) (1987 Bar)
A: The resolution of the investigating fiscal is
erroneous. There is no complex crime of estafa
under Art. 315 of the Revised Penal Code and
the violation of BP 22. A complex crime refers
5
CRIMINAL LAW
charred bodies of Jason, Manuel, Dave and
the caretaker of the resort.
The Provincial Prosecutor
with the complex crime
quadruple homicide and
Harry properly charged?
Bar)
complex crime? What is the penalty
therefor? (1999 Bar)
charged Harry
of arson with
robbery. Was
Discuss. (1995
A:
(A) The decision of the trial judge is not
correct. When the offender made use of an
automatic firearm, the acts committed are
determined by the number of bullets
discharged inasmuch as the firearm being
automatic, the offender need only press
the trigger once and it would fire
continually. For each death caused by a
distinct and separate bullet, the accused
incurs distinct criminal liability. Hence, it
is not the act of pressing the trigger which
should be considered as producing the
several felonies, but the number of bullets
which actually produced them.
(B) A complex crime is constituted when a
single act caused two or more grave or less
grave felonies or when an offense is
committed as a necessary means to
commit another offense. (Art 48, RPC)
A: No. Harry was not properly charged. Harry
should have been charged with three (3)
separate crimes, namely: murder, theft, and
arson.
Harry killed Jason, Manuel and Dave with
evident premeditation, as there was
considerable lapse of time before he decided to
commit the crime and the actual commission of
the crime. In addition, Harry employed means
which weakened the defense of Jason, Manuel,
and Dave. Harry gave them the liquor to drink
until they were drunk and fell asleep.
The taking of the money was a mere
afterthought of the killings. Hence, Harry
committed the separate crime of theft and not
the complex crime of robbery with homicide.
Although theft was committed against dead
persons, it is still legally possible as the
offended party are the estates of the victims.
At least two crimes are involved in a complex
crime; either two or more grave or less grave
felonies resulted from a single act, or an
offense is committed as a necessary means for
committing another.
In burning the cottage, it is another separate
crime of arson. The act of burning was not
necessary for the consummation of the two
previous offenses he committed. The fact that
the caretaker died from the blaze did not
qualify Harry’s crime into a complex crime of
arson with homicide for there is no such crime.
The penalty for the more serious crime shall be
imposed and in its maximum period. (Art. 48,
RPC)
Q: Distinguish betweeen compound and
complex crime as concepts. (2004 Bar)
A: Compound crimes result when the offender
committed only a single felonious act from
which two or more crimes resulted. This is
provided for in modified form in the first part
of Article 48, RPC, limiting the resulting crimes
to only grave and/or less grave felonies. Hence,
light felonies are excluded even though
resulting from the same single act.
Hence, Harry was improperly charged with the
complex crime of arson with quadruple
homicide and robbery. Harry should have been
charged with three separate crimes, murder,
theft and arson.
Q: A, actuated by malice and with the use of
a fully automatic M-14 sub-machine gun,
shot a group of persons who were seated in
a cockpit with one burst of successive,
continuous, automatic fire. Four (4)
persons were killed thereby, each having
hit by different bullets coming from the
sub-machine gun of A. Four (4) cases of
murder were filed against A.
Complex crime result when the offender has to
commit an offense as a necessary means for
committing another offense. Only one
Information shall be filed and if proven, the
penalty for the more serious crime shall be
imposed.
Special Complex Crime (1989, 1995, 1997,
2003, 2005, 2006, 2016)
The trial court ruled that there was only
one crime committed by A for the reason
that, since A performed only one act, he
having pressed the trigger of his gun only
once, the crime committed was murder.
Consequently, the trial judge sentenced A to
just one penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Q: After raping the complainant in her
house, the accused struck a match to smoke
a cigarette before departing from the scene.
The brief light from the match allowed him
to notice a watch in her wrist. He demanded
that she hand over the watch. When she
refused, he forcibly grabbed it from her.
The accused was charged with and
convicted of the special complex crime of
robbery with rape. Was the court correct?
(1997 Bar)
(A) Was the decision of the trial judge
correct? Explain.
(B) What constitutes a complex crime? How
many crimes may be involved in a
UST BAR OPERATIONS
6
QUAMTO (1987-2017)
A: No. The accused should instead be held
liable for two separate crimes of robbery and
rape, since the primary intent or objective of
the accused was only to rape the complainant,
and his commission of the robbery was merely
an afterthought. The robbery must precede the
rape, in order to give rise to the special
complex crime for which the court convicted
the accused.
A:
(a) Julio is liable for special complex crime of
robbery with rape since he had carnal
knowledge of Antonio’s daughter on occasion
or by reason of robbery. Even if the place of
robbery is different from that of rape, what is
important is the direct connection between the
crimes (People v. Canastre, G.R. No. L-2055,
December 24, 1948).
Q: Distinguish between an ordinary
complex crime and a special complex crime
as to their concepts and as to the
imposition of penalties. (2003 Bar)
Pedro, Pablito, and Juan are liable for robbery
by a band since more than three armed
malefactors took part in the commission of
robbery. There were four of them. Under Art.
296 of RPC, any member of a band, who is
present at the commission of a robbery by a
band, shall be punished as principal of any of
the assaults committed, unless it be shown that
he attempted to prevent the same.
A: In concept – An ordinary complex crime is
made up of two or more crimes being punished
in distinct provisions of the Revised Penal
Code but alleged in one information either
because they were brought about by a single
felonious act or because one offense is a
necessary means for committing the other
offense or offenses. They are alleged in one
information so that only one penalty shall be
imposed.
However, Pedro, Pablito, and Juan are not
liable for rape since they were not present
when the victim was raped and thus, they had
no opportunity to prevent the sa,e. They are
only liable for robbery by band (People v.
Anticamaray, G.R. No. 178771, June 8, 2011).
A special complex crime, on the other hand, is
made up of two or more crimes which are
considered only as components of a single
indivisible offense being punished in one
provision of the Revised Penal Code.
(b) They are liable for special complex crime of
robbery with homicide. It is immaterial that
several persons are killed and the number of
rapes committed by reason or on occasion of
the crime. Since homicides are committed by
or on occasion of the robbery, the multiple
rapes committed shall be integrated into one
and indivisible felony of robbery with
homicide (People v. Diu, G.R. No. 201449, April
3, 2013)
As to penalties – In ordinary complex crime,
the penalty for the most serious crime shall be
imposed and in its maximum period.
In special complex crime, only one penalty is
specifically prescribed for all the component
crimes which are regarded as one indivisible
offense. The component crimes are not
regarded as distinct crimes and so the penalty
to be imposed for the most serious crime is not
the penalty to be imposed nor in its maximum
period. It is the penalty specifically provided
for the special complex crime that shall be
applied according to the rules on imposition of
the penalty.
Composite crime (1998, 1999, 2004)
Q: A, B, C and D all armed, robbed a bank
and when they were about to get out of the
bank, policemen came and ordered them to
surrender but they fired on the police
officers who fired back and shot it out with
them. Suppose a bank employee was killed
and the bullet which killed him came from
the firearm of the police officers, with what
crime shall you charge A, B, C and D? (1998,
2004 Bar)
Q; Pedro, Pablito, Juan and Julio, all armed
with bolos, robbed the house where
Antonio, his wife, and three (3) daughters
were residing. While the four were
ransacking Antonio's house, Julio noticed
that one of Antonio's daughters was trying
to escape. He chased and caught up with
her at a thicket somewhat distant from the
house, but before bringing her back, raped
her.
[a] What crime or crimes, if any, did Pedro,
Pablito, Juan and Julio commit? Explain.
[b] Suppose, after the robbery, the four
took turns in raping the three daughters
inside the house, and, to prevent
identification, killed the whole family just
before they left. What crime or crimes, if
any, did the four malefactors commit?
(2016 Bar)
A: A, B, C and D should be charged with the
crime of robbery with homicide because the
death of the bank employee was brought about
by the acts of said offenders on the occasion of
robbery. They shot it out with the policeman,
thereby causing such death by reason or on the
occasion of robbery; Hence, the composite
crime of robbery with homicide.
Q: Samuel, a tricycle driver, plied his usual
route using a Honda motorcycle with a
sidecar. One evening, Raul rode on the
sidecar, poked a knife at Samuel and
instructed him to go near a bridge. Upon
reaching the bridge, Raul alighted from the
7
CRIMINAL LAW
motorcycle and suddenly stabbed Samuel
several times until he was dead. Raul fled
from the scene taking the motorcycle with
him. What crime(s) did Raul commit?
(1998, 2004 Bar)
Q: BB and CC, both armed with knives,
attacked FT. The victim's son, ST, upon
seeing the attack, drew his gun but was
prevented from shooting the attackers by
AA, who grappled with him for possession
of the gun. FT died from knife wounds. AA,
BB and CC were charged with murder. In his
defense, AA invoked the justifying
circumstance of avoidance of greater evil or
injury, contending that by preventing ST
from shooting BB and CC, he merely
avoided a greater evil. Will AA's defense
prosper? Reason briefly. (2004 Bar)
A: Raul committed the composite crime of
Carnapping with homicide under Sec. 14 of RA
6539, as amended, considering that the killing
“in the course of” or “on the occasion of” a
carnapping. (People v. De la Cruz, 183 SCRA
763). A motorcycle is included in the definition
of a “motor vehicle” in said Republic Act. There
is no apparent motive for the killing of the
tricycle driver but for Raul to be able to take
the motorcycle. The fact that the tricycle driver
was killed brings about the penalty of
reclusion perpetua to death.
A: No, AA's defense will not prosper. The act of
the victim's son, ST, appears to be a legitimate
defense of relatives; hence, justified as a
defense of his father against the unlawful
aggression by BB and CC. ST’s act to defend his
father's life and to stop BB and CC achieve their
criminal objective cannot be regarded as an
evil inasmuch as it is, in the eyes of the law, a
lawful act. What AA did was a lawful defense,
not greater evil. Likewise, AA’s defense will not
prosper because in this case there was a
conspiracy among the three of them, hence, the
act of one is the act of all.
Q: Two young men, A and B, conspired to
rob a residential house of things of value.
They succeeded in the commission of their
original plan to simply rob. A, however, was
sexually aroused when he saw the lady
owner of the house, and so raped her.
The lady victim testified that B did not in
any way participate in the rape but he
watched the happening from a window and
did nothing to stop the rape. Is B as
criminally liable as A for robbery with
rape? Explain. (1999 Bar)
Q: Pat. Negre saw Filemon, an inmate,
escaping from jail and ordered the latter to
surrender. Instead of doing so, Filemon
attacked Pat. Negre with a bamboo spear.
Filemon missed in his first attempt to hit
Pat. Negre, and before he could strike again,
Pat. Negre shot and killed him.
A: Yes. B is as criminally liable for the
composite crime of robbery with rape under
Art. 294 (1). Although the conspiracy of A and
B was only to rob, B was present when the
rape was being committed which gave rise to a
composite crime, a single indivisible offense of
robbery with rape. B would not have been
liable had he endeavored to prevent the
commission of the rape. But since he did not
when he could have done so, he in effect
acquiesced with the rape as a component of
the robbery and so he is also liable for robbery
with rape.
(a) Can Pat. Negre claim self defense?
Explain.
(b) Suppose Pat Negre missed in his shot,
and Filemon ran away without parting
with his weapon. Pat Negre pursued
Filemon but the latter was running so
fast that Pat Negre fired warning shots
into the air shouting for Filemon to
stop. In as much as Filemon continued
running Pat. Negre fired at him hitting
and killing him. Is the plea of selfdefense sustainable? Why would you
then hold Pat. Negre criminally liable?
Discuss.(1993 Bar)
CIRCUMSTANCES AFFECTING CRIMINAL
LIABILITY
JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES(1993, 1998,
2000, 2002, 2003, 2004, 1996, 2008, 2016
BAR)
A:
Q: Distinguish clearly but briefly: Between
justifying and exempting circumstances in
criminal law. (2004, 1998 Bar)
(a) Yes. Self-defense can be claimed as there is
an imminent and great peril on the life of
Negre.
(b) No. Self-defense is no longer sustainable as
there is no more peril on his life.
A: Justifying circumstance affects the act, not
the actor; while exempting circumstance
affects the actor, not the act. In justifying
circumstance, no criminal and, generally, no
civil liability is incurred; while in exempting
circumstance, civil liability is generally
incurred although there is no criminal liability
Q: Osang, a married woman in her early
twenties, was sleeping on a banig on the
floor of their nipa hut beside the seashore
when she was awakened by the act of a man
mounting her. Thinking that it was her
husband, Gardo, who had returned from
fishing in the sea, Osang continued her
sleep but allowed the man, who was
Self-Defense (Defense of Person, Rights,
Property and Honor)
UST BAR OPERATIONS
8
QUAMTO (1987-2017)
actually their neighbor, Julio, to have sexual
intercourse with her. After Julio satisfied
himself, he said “Salamat Osang" as he
turned to leave. Only then did Osang realize
that the man was not her husband. Enraged,
Osang grabbed a balisong from the wall and
stabbed Julio to death. When tried for
homicide, Osang claimed defense of honor.
Should the claim be sustained? Why? (2000,
1998 Bar)
A: No. The relatives of the accused for purpose
of defense of relative under Art. 11(20 of the
Revised Penal Code are his spouse, ascendants,
descendants, or legitimate, natural or adopted
brothers or sisters or of his relatives by affinity
in the same degrees, and those by
consanguinity within the fourth civil degree.
Relative by affinity within the same degree
includes ascendant, descendant, brother or
sister of the spouse of the accused. In this case,
Juan is not the ascendant, descendant, brother
or sister of Tessie, the spouse of Pedro.
Relative by consanguinity within the fourth
civil degree includes first cousin. But in this
case, Juan is the cousin of Pedro by affinity but
not by consanguinity. Juan, therefore, is not a
relative of Pedro for purpose of applying the
provision on defense of relative.
A: No. Osang's claim of defense of honor
should not be sustained because the
aggression on her honor had ceased when she
stabbed the aggressor.
In defense of rights under Art. 11(1) of the
RPC, it is required inter alia that there be (1)
unlawful aggression, and (2) reasonable
necessity of the means employed to prevent or
repel it. The unlawful aggression must be
continuing when the aggressor was injured or
disabled by the person making a defense.
Otherwise, the attack made is a retaliation and
not a defense. Hence, Osang's act of stabbing
Julio to death after the sexual intercourse was
finished, is not defense of honor but an
immediate vindication of a grave offense
committed against her, which is only
mitigating.
Pedro, however, can invoke defense of a
stranger. Under the Revised Penal Code, a
person who defends a person who is not his
relative may invoke the defense of a stranger
provided that all its elements exist, to wit: (a)
unlawful aggression; (b) reasonable necessity
of the means employed to prevent or repel the
attack; and (c) the person defending be not
induced by revenge, resentment, or other evil
motive.
Defense of Relatives
Defense of Stranger
Q: When A arrived home, he found B raping
his daughter. Upon seeing A, B ran away. A
took his gun and shot B, killing him.
Charged with homicide, A claimed he acted
in defense of his daughter's honor. Is A
correct? If not, can A claim the benefit of
any
mitigating
circumstance
or
circumstances? (2002, 2000, 1998 Bar)
Q: A chanced upon three men who were
attacking B with fist blows. C, one of the
men, was about to stab B with a knife. Not
knowing that B was actually the aggressor
because he had earlier challenged the three
men to a fight, A shot C as the latter was
about to stab B. May A invoke the defense of
a stranger as a justifying circumstance in
his favor? Why? (Bar 2002)
A: No. A cannot validly invoke defense of his
daughter's honor in having killed B since the
rape was already consummated; moreover, B
already ran away, hence, there was no
aggression to defend against and no defense to
speak of. Defense of honor as included in selfdefense, must have been done to prevent or
repel an unlawful aggression. There is no
defense to speak of where the unlawful
aggression no longer exists.
A: Yes. A may invoke the justifying
circumstance of defense of stranger since he
was not involved in the fight and he shot C
when the latter was about to stab B. There
being no indication that A was induced by
revenge, resentment or any other evil motive
in shooting C, his act is justified under par. 3,
Art. 11 of the RPC.
EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCES (1998, 2000,
2010 BAR)
A may, however, invoke the benefit of the
mitigating circumstance of having acted in
immediate vindication of a grave offense to a
descendant, his daughter, under par. 5, Art. 13
of the RPC.
Insanity
Q: While his wife was on a 2-year
scholarship abroad, Romeo was having an
affair with his maid Dulcinea. Realizing that
the affair was going nowhere, Dulcinea told
Romeo that she was going back to the
province
to
marry
her
childhood
sweetheart. Clouded by anger and jealousy,
Romeo strangled Dulcinea to death while
she was sleeping in the maid’s quarters.
Q: Pedro is married to Tessie. Juan is the
first cousin of Tessie. While in the market,
Pedro saw a man stabbing Juan. Seeing the
attack on Juan, Pedro picked up a spade
nearby and hit the attacker on his head
which caused the latter’s death. Can Pedro
be absolved of the killing on the ground
that it is in defense of a relative? Explain.
(2016 Bar)
9
CRIMINAL LAW
The following day, Romeo was found
catatonic inside the maid’s quarters. He
was brought to the National Center for
Mental Health (NCMH) where he was
diagnosed to be mentally unstable. Charged
with murder, Romeo pleaded insanity as a
defense.
1.
2.
(a) Will Romeo’s defense prosper? Explain.
(b) What is the effect of the diagnosis of the
NCMH on the case? (2010 Bar)
A:
(a) No. Romeo’s defense of insanity will not
prosper. Insanity as a defense to the
commission of a crime must have existed
and proven to have been existing at the
precise moment when the crime was being
committed. The facts of the case indicate
that Romeo committed the crime with
discernment and was only diagnosed to be
mentally unstable after the crime was
committed.
(b) The effect of the diagnosis made by NCMH
is possibly a suspension of the proceeding
against Romeo and his commitment to
appropriate institution for treatment until
he could already understand the
proceedings.
3.
4.
Q: Lito, a minor, was bullied by Brutus, his
classmate. Having had enough, Lito got the
key to the safe where his father kept his
licensed pistol and took the weapon.
Knowing that Brutus usually hung out at a
nearby abandoned building after class, Lito
went ahead and hid while waiting for
Brutus. When Lito was convinced that
Brutus was alone, he shot Brutus, who died
on the spot. Lito then hid the gun in one of
the empty containers. At the time of the
shooting, Lito was fifteen years and one
month old. What is Lito's criminal liability?
Explain. (2015 Bar)
Minority
Q: While they were standing in line
awaiting their vaccination at the school
clinic, Pomping repeatedly pulled the
ponytail of Katreena, his 11 years, 2 months
and 13 days old classmate in Grade 5 at the
Sampaloc Elementary School. Irritated,
Katreena turned around and swung at
Pomping with a ball pen. The top of the ball
pen hit the right eye of Pomping which bled
profusely. Realizing what she had caused,
Katreena immediately helped Pomping.
When investigated, she freely admitted to
the school principal that she was
responsible for the injury to Pomping's eye.
After the incident, she executed a statement
admitting her culpability. Due to the injury,
Pomping lost his right eye. (2000, 1998
Bar)
A: Lito is criminally liable for murder qualified
by the circumstance of treachery, or evident
premeditation, as well as illegal possession of
firearms. Minority is not an exempting under
Section 7 of RA No. 9644 since his age is above
fifteen years but below eighteen years and he
acted with discernment. Circumstance will
show that he discerned the consequences of
his criminal acts as shown from the fact he
employed means to make a surprise attack and
he even hid the murder weapon in an empty
container. It was also clear that he planned the
killing. However, minority will be considered
as a privileged mitigating circumstance, which
will require the graduation of the penalty
prescribed by law to one degree lower (Article
68).
(a) Is Katreena criminally liable? Why?
(b) Discuss the attendant circumstances
and effects thereof.
A:
(a) No.Katreena is not criminally liable due to
her minority. She is exempted from
criminal liability for being a minor less
than fifteen (15) years old although over
nine (9) years of age. Nonetheless is she
civilly liable.
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES (1988, 1992,
1996, 1997, 1999, 2012, 2016 BAR)
Q: What is a privileged mitigating
circumstance? Distinguish a privileged
mitigating circumstance from an ordinary
mitigating circumstance as to reduction of
(b) The attendant circumstances which may
be considered are:
UST BAR OPERATIONS
Minority of the accused as an exempting
circumstance under Art. 12(3) of RPC,
where she shall be exempt from criminal
liability, unless it was proved that she
acted with discernment. She is however
civilly liable;
If found criminally liable, the minority of
the accused is a privileged mitigating
circumstance. A discretionary penalty
lower by at least two (2) degrees than that
prescribed for the crime committed shall
be imposed in accordance with Art. 68(1)
of RPC. The sentence however, should
automatically be suspended in accordance
with Sec. 5(a) of R.A. No. 8369 (Family
Courts Act of 1997);
Likewise if found criminally liable, the
ordinary mitigating circumstance of not
intending to commit so grave a wrong as
that committed under Art. 13(3) of the
RPC may apply;
The ordinary mitigating circumstance of
sufficient provocation on the part of the
offended party immediately preceded the
act.
10
QUAMTO (1987-2017)
penalty and offsetting against aggravating
circumstance/s. (2012 Bar)
A: A surrender by an offender is considered
voluntary when it is spontaneous, indicative of
an intent to submit unconditionally to the
authorities. To be mitigating, the surrender
must be:
A: Privileged mitigating circumstances are
those that mitigate the criminal liability of the
accused by graduating the imposable penalty
for the crime being modified to one or two
degrees lower. These circumstances cannot be
offset by aggravating circumstance. The
circumstance of incomplete justification or
exemption (when majority of the conditions
are present), and the circumstance of minority
(if the child above 15 years of age acted with
discernment) are privileged mitigating
circumstance.
a.
b.
c.
Q: In order that the plea of guilty may be
mitigating, what requisites must be
complied with? (1999 Bar)
The distinctions between ordinary and
privileged mitigating circumstances are as
follows:
a.
b.
Spontaneous,
i.e.,
indicative
of
acknowledgment of guilt and not for
convenience nor conditional;
Made before the government incurs
expenses, time and effort in tracking down
the offender's whereabouts; and
Made to a person in authority or the
letter's agents.
A: For plea of guilty to be mitigating, the
requisites are:
Under the rules for application of divisible
penalties (RPC, Art. 64), the presence of a
mitigating circumstance, if not off-set by
aggravating circumstance, has the effect of
applying the divisible penalty in its
minimum period. Under the rules on
graduation of penalty (RPC, Art. 68, 69),
the presence of privileged mitigating
circumstance has the effect of reducing the
penalty one to two degrees lower;
Ordinary mitigating circumstances can be
off-set by aggravating circumstances.
Privileged mitigating circumstances are
not subject to the off-set rule.
1.
2.
3.
That the accused spontaneously pleaded
guilty to the crime charged;
That such plea was made before the court
competent to try the case and render
judgment; and
That such plea was made prior to the
presentation of evidence for the
prosecution.
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES (1988,
1991, 1993, 1994, 1996, 1997, 2000, 2003,
2005, 2009 BAR)
Surrender and Confession of Guilt
Q: The robbers killed a mother and her
baby, then threw the body of the baby
outside the window. Can the aggravating
circumstance of cruelty be considered in
this case? Reason. (1988 Bar)
Q: After killing the victim, the accused
absconded. He succeeded in eluding the
police until he surfaced and surrendered to
the authorities about two years later.
Charged with murder, he pleaded not guilty
but, after the prosecution had presented
two witnesses implicating him to the crime,
he changed his plea to that of guilty. Should
the mitigating circumstances of voluntary
surrender and plea of guilty be considered
in favor of the accused? (1997 Bar)
A: Cruelty cannot be considered in this case
because the aggravating circumstance of
cruelty requires deliberate prolongation of the
suffering of the victim. In this case, the baby
was dead already so that there is no more
prolongation to speak of.
Q: At about 9:30 in the evening, while Dino
and Raffy were walking along Padre Faura
Street, Manila, Johnny hit them with a rock
injuring Dino at the back. Raffy approached
Dino, but suddenly, Bobby, Steve, Danny
and Nonoy surrounded the duo. Then
Bobby stabbed Dino. Steve, Danny, Nonoy
and Johnny kept on hitting Dino and Raffy
with rocks. As a result, Dino died.
A: Voluntary surrender may not be
appreciated in favor of the accused. Two years
is too long a time to consider the surrender as
spontaneous (People v. Ablao, G.R. No. 69184,
March 26, 1990).
For sure the government had already incurred
considerable efforts and expenses in looking
for the accused. Plea of guilty can no longer be
appreciated as a mitigating circumstance
because the prosecution had already started
with the presentation of its evidence (Art.
13[7], RPC).
Bobby, Steve, Danny, Nonoy and Johnny
were charged with homicide. Can the court
appreciate the aggravating circumstances
of nighttime and band? (1994 Bar)
A: No. Nighttime cannot be appreciated as an
aggravating circumstance because there is no
indication that the offenders deliberately
sought the cover of darkness to facilitate the
commission of the crime or that they took
Q: When is surrender by an accused
considered voluntary, and constitutive of
the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender? (1999 Bar)
11
CRIMINAL LAW
advantage of nighttime (People v. De los Reyes,
203 SCRA 707) Besides, judicial notice can be
taken of the fact that Padre Faura Street is
well-lighted.
homicide. During the trial, the prosecution
was able to prove that the killing was
committed by means of poison in
consideration of a promise or reward and
with cruelty. If you were the Judge, will you
consider the aggravating circumstances of
using poison, in consideration of a promise
or reward and cruelty?(2000 Bar)
However, band should be considered as the
crime was committed by more than three
armed malefactors; in a recent Supreme Court
decision, stones or rocks are considered deadly
weapons.
Q: Name the four (4) kinds of aggravating
circumstances and state their effect on the
penalty of crimes and nature thereof.
Distinguish
generic
aggravating
circumstance from qualifying aggravating
circumstance. (1999 Bar)
A: The four (4)
circumstances are:
1.
2.
3.
4.
kinds
of
A: The circumstances of using poison, in
consideration of a promise or reward and
cruelty which attended the killing of Rico could
only be appreciated as generic aggravating
circumstances since none of them have been
alleged in the Information to qualify the killing
to murder. A qualifying circumstance must be
alleged in the Information and proven beyond
reasonable doubt during the trial to be
appreciated as such.
aggravating
Q: When would qualifying circumstances be
deemed, if at all, elements of a crime? (2003
Bar)
Generic aggravating or those that can
generally apply to all crimes, and can be
offset by mitigating circumstances, but if
not offset, would affect only the maximum
of the penalty prescribed by law;
Specific aggravating or those that apply
only to particular crimes and cannot be
offset by mitigating circumstances;
Qualifying circumstances or those that
change the nature of the crime to a graver
one, or brings about a penalty next higher
in degree, and cannot be offset by
mitigating circumstances;
Inherent aggravating or those that
essentially accompany the commission of
the crime and do not affect the penalty
whatsoever.
A: A qualifying circumstance would be deemed
an element of a crime when:
1.
2.
3.
Q: Candido stabbed an innocent bystander
who accidentally bumped him. The
innocent bystander died as a result of the
stabbing. Candido was arrested and was
tested to be positive for the use of “shabu”
at the time he committed the stabbing.
What should be the proper charge against
Candido? Explain. (2005 Bar)
The distinctions between generic aggravating
circumstances and qualifying aggravating
circumstances are as follows:
Generic aggravating circumstances:
a.
It changes the nature of the crime,
bringing about a more serious crime and
heavier penalty;
It is essential to the crime involved,
otherwise some other crime is committed;
and
It is specifically alleged in the information
and proven during trial.
affects the nature of the crime or brings
about a penalty higher in degree than that
ordinarily prescribed;
can be offset by ordinary mitigating
circumstances;
need not be alleged in the Information as
long as proven during the trial;
the same shall be considered in imposing
the sentence.
Qualifying circumstances:
A: Candido should be charged with murder
qualified by treachery because the suddenness
of the stabbing caught the victim by surprise
and was totally defenseless. Being under the
influence of dangerous drugs is a qualifying
aggravating circumstance in the commission of
a crime (Sec. 25, RA 9165, Comprehensive
Dangerous Drug Act of 2002); Hence, the
penalty for murder shall be imposed in the
maximum.
b.
Article 332: Persons exempt from criminal
liability for theft, swindling and malicious
mischief
b.
c.
d.
a.
c.
ABSOLUTORY CAUSE (2004, 2008, 2012
BAR)
affects the nature of the crime or brings
about a penalty higher in degree than that
ordinarily prescribed;
cannot
be
offset
by
mitigating
circumstances;
must be alleged in the Information and
proven during trial.
Q: The wife of AAA predeceased his motherin-law. AAA was accused of defrauding his
mother-in-law
under
a
criminal
information for estafa, but the actual recital
of facts of the offense charged therein, if
Q: Rico, a member of the Alpha Rho
Fraternity, was killed by Pocholo, a
member of the rival group, Sigma Phi
Omega. Pocholo was prosecuted for
UST BAR OPERATIONS
12
QUAMTO (1987-2017)
proven, would constitute not only the crime
of estafa, but also falsification of public
document as a necessary means for
committing estafa. AAA invokes the
absolutory cause of relationship by affinity.
Which statement is most accurate? (2012
Bar)
companions, A and B, drinking beer at one
of the tables, Marco fired two (2) shots at
Raul, who was hit on his forehead with one
of the bullets; the other hit A, injuring him
on his stomach. As a consequence of the
gunshot wound, Raul died instantaneously.
Due to the timely medical attention given to
A, he survived. He was, however,
hospitalized for 45 days. Marco was
prosecuted for Murder for the death of Raul
and for frustrated murder in the case of A.
You are Marco’s lawyer, what will be your
defense? (1991 Bar)
A: There are two views on whether the
extinguishment of the marriage by death of the
spouse dissolves the relationship by affinity for
purpose of absolutory clause.
The first holds that the relationship by affinity
terminates with the dissolution of the
marriage, while the second maintains that
relationship continues even after the death of
the deceased spouse. The principle of pro reo
calls for the adoption of the continuing affinity
view because it is more favorable to the
accused. However, the absolutory cause
applies to theft, swindling and malicious
mischief. It does not apply to theft through
falsification orestafa through falsification
(Intestate estate of Gonzales v. People, G.R. No.
181409, February 11, 2010).
A: The defense with respect to the death of
Raul is death under exceptional circumstances
(Art. 247, People v. Abarca, 153 SCRA 735).
Although the killing happened one hour after
having surprised the spouse, that would still be
within the context of “immediately thereafter”.
The term “immediately thereafter” means that
from discovery to the escape and the killing,
there must be no interruption or interval of
time. The pursuit and the killing must form
part of one continuous act. However, it is not
necessary that the victim is to be killed
instantly by the accused after surprising his
spouse in the act of intercourse with another
person. What is required is that the death
caused must be the proximate result of the
outrage overwhelming the accused after
chancing upon his spouse in the act of
infidelity
Article 20: Accessories exempt from
criminal liability by reason of relationship
Q: DCB, the daughter of MCB, stole the
earrings of XYZ, a stranger. MCB pawned
the earrings with TBI Pawnshop as a pledge
for P500 loan. During the trial, MCB raised
the defense that being the mother of DCB,
she cannot be held liable as an accessory.
Will MCB's defense prosper? Reason briefly.
(2004 Bar)
With respect to the wounding of the stranger,
the defense of lawful exercise of a right is a
justifying circumstance. Under Art. 11, par. 5
could be invoked. At the time the accused shot
Raul, he was not committing a felonious act
and therefore could not have been criminally
liable under Art. 4, RPC.
A: No. MCB's defense will not prosper because
the exemption from criminal liability of an
accessory by virtue of relationship with the
principal does not cover accessories who
themselves profited from or assisted the
offender to profit by the effects or proceeds of
the crime.
Q: Procopio, a call center agent assigned at
a graveyard shift, went home earlier than
usual. He proceeded immediately to their
bedroom to change his clothes. To his
surprise, he found his wife Bionci in bed
making love to another woman Magna.
Enraged, Procopio grabbed a knife nearby
and stabbed Bionci, who died.
a) What crime did Procopio commit, and
what circumstance attended the case?
Explain.
b) Assuming that Procopio and Bionci were
common-law spouses, will your answer be
the same? Explain. (2015 Bar)
This non-exemption of an accessory, though
related to the principal of the crime, is
expressly provided in Art. 20 of the RPC.
EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCE (1988, 1991,
2001, 2007, 2015, 2016 BAR)
Q: At 10:00 in the evening, upon his arrival,
Marco surprised his wife, Rosette and her
former boyfriend, Raul, both naked and in
the act of illicit copulation. Raul got his
revolver and upon seeing the revolver,
Marco ran toward the street, took a pedicab
and proceeded to the house of his brother,
a policeman from whom he borrowed a
revolver. With the weapon, he returned to
his residence. Unable to find Raul and
Rosette, Marco proceeded to a disco jointly
owned and operated by Raul. It was already
11:00 that evening when he arrived at the
joint. Upon seeing Raul with two (2) male
A:
a) The crime committed by Procopio is
parricide qualified by the circumstance of
relationship. Killing a spouse after having been
surprised in the act of committing sexual
intercourse with another woman is death
under exceptional circumstance under Article
247 of the Revised Penal Code. However, in
this case this is not death under exceptional
circumstance because Bionci was having
13
CRIMINAL LAW
homosexual intercourse with another woman
and not sexual intercourse with a man.
“Homosexual intercourse “is not within the
contemplation of the term “sexual intercourse”
in Article 247. However, the crime of parricide
is attended by the circumstance of passion
arising from a lawful sentiment as a result of
having caught his wife in the act of infidelity
with another woman (People v. Belarmino, G.R.
No. L-4429, April 18, 1952).
Killing a spouse after having been surprised in
the act of committing sexual intercourse with
another woman is death under exceptional
circumstance under Article 247 of the Revised
Penal Code.
However, in this case this is not death under
exceptional circumstance because Felipa was
having homosexual intercourse with another
woman and not sexual intercourse with a man.
“Homosexual intercourse “is not within the
contemplation of the term “sexual intercourse”
in Article 247. However, the crime of parricide
is attended by the circumstance of passion
arising from a lawful sentiment as a result of
having caught his wife in the act of infidelity
with another woman (People v. Belarmino, G.R.
No. L-4429, April 18, 1952, En Banc).
b) No, the answer is not the same. The crime
committed is Homicide if Procopio and Bionci
were common law spouses. Parricide
contemplates killing by spouse who are legally
married.
Q: Macky, a security guard, arrived home
late one night after rendering overtime. He
was shocked to see Joy, his wife and Ken,
his best friend, in the act of having sexual
intercourse. Macky pulled out his service
gun and shot and killed Ken. Macky was
charged with murder for the death of Ken.
PERSONS LIABLE AND DEGREE OF
PARTICIPATION
(a) PRINCIPALS, ACCOMPLICES, AND
ACCESSORIES (1987, 1989, 2013 BAR)
Principal (1994, 2000, 2002, 1994, 2014,
2015 Bar)
The court found that Ken died under
exceptional circumstances and exonerated
Macky of murder but sentenced him to
destierro. The court also ordered Macky to
pay indemnity to the heirs of the victim in
the amount of P50,000.00. Did the court
correctly order Macky to pay indemnity?
(2007 Bar)
Q: Tata owns a three-storey building. She
wanted to construct a new building but had
no money to finance the construction. So,
she insured the building for P3,000,000.00.
She then urged Yoboy and Yongsi, for
monetary consideration, to burn her
building so she could collect the insurance
proceeds. Yoboy and Yongsi burned the
said building resulting to its total loss. What
is their respective criminal liability? (1994
Bar)
A: No. Since the killing of Ken was committed
under the exceptional circumstances in Article
247, RPC, it is the consensus that no crime was
committed in the light of the pronouncement
in People v. Cosicor (79 Phil 672) that
banishment (destierro) is intended more for
the protection of the offender rather than as a
penalty. Since the civil liability under the RPC
is the consequence of the criminal liability,
there would be no legal basis for the award of
indemnity when there is no criminal liability.
A: Tata is a principal by inducement for the
crime of destructive arson because she directly
induced Yoboy and Yongsi for a price or
monetary consideration, to commit arson
which the latter would not have committed
were it not for such reason. Yoboy and Yongsi
are principals by direct participation (Art. 17,
pars. 21 and 3, RPC).
Q: Jojo and Felipa are husband and wife.
Believing that his work as a lawyer is
sufficient to provide for the needs of their
family, Jojo convinced Felipa to be a stay-athome mom and care for their children. One
day, Jojo arrived home earlier than usual
and caught Felipa in the act of having sexual
intercourse with their female nanny, Alma,
in their matrimonial bed. In a fit of rage,
Jojo retrieved his revolver from inside the
bedroom
cabinet
and
shot
Alma,
immediately killing her.
Q: Jonas convinced Jaja to lend him his .45
caliber pistol so that he could use it to
knock down Jepoy and end his arrogance.
When Jepoy came out, Jonas immediately
shot him with Jaja’s .45 caliber gun but
missed his target. Instead, the bullet hit
Jepoy’s five year old son who was following
behind him, killing the boy instantaneously.
What is the criminal liability of Jonas and
Jepoy? (Question reframed) (2000 Bar)
Is Art. 247 (Death or physical injuries
inflicted under exceptional circumstances)
of the RPC applicable in this case given that
the paramour was of the same gender as
the erring spouse? (2015, 2016 Bar)
A: Jonas shall be convicted of the complex
crime of attempted murder with homicide.
Jonas as principal by direct participation and
Jaja as co-principal by indispensable
cooperation. It is a case of aberratio ictus. The
single act of pulling the trigger resulted into a
less grave felony and a grace felony: (1)
attempted murder, with respect to his real
A: The crime committed is parricide qualified
by the circumstance of relationship.
UST BAR OPERATIONS
14
QUAMTO (1987-2017)
target, Jonas; and (2) homicide, with respect to
the 5-year old son. Jaja should be liable as coprincipal and not only as an accomplice
because he knew of Jonas’ criminal design even
before he lent his firearm to Jonas and still he
concurred in that criminal design by providing
the firearm.
may be considered as so efficacious and
powerful so as to amount to physical or
moral coercion (People v. Assad, G.R. No. L33673, February 24, 1931). Neither is there
evidence to show that Mr. Red has an
ascendancy or influence over Mr. White
and Mr. Blue (People v. Abarri, F.R. No.
90815, March 1, 1995).
(b) Mr. Blue and Mr. White are liable as
principals by direct participation for the
crime of physical injuries for hurting Ms.
Yellow to the extent of the injuries
inflicted. Having no participation in the
attack upon Ms. Yellow, Mr. Red would
have no criminal liability therefor.
Q: A asked B to kill C because of a grave
injustice done to A by C. A promised B a
reward. B was willing to kill C, not so much
because of the reward promised to him but
because he also had his own long-standing
grudge against C, who had wronged him in
the past. If C killed by B, would A be liable
as a principal by inducement? (2002 Bar)
Accomplice (2007, 2012 Bar)
A: No. A would not be liable as principal by
inducement because the reward he promised B
is not the sole impelling reason which made B
kill C. To bring about the criminal liability of a
co-principal, the inducement made by the
inducer must be the sole consideration which
caused the person induced to commit the
crime and without which the crime would not
have been committed. The facts of the case
would indicate that B, the killer supposedly
induced by A had his own reason to kill C out
of a long standing grudge.
Q: Ponciano borrowed Ruben’s gun, saying
that he would use it to kill Freddie. Because
Ruben also resented Freddie, he readily
lent his gun, but told Ponciano: "O,
pagkabaril mo kay Freddie, isauli mo
kaagad, ha." Later, Ponciano killed Freddie,
but used a knife because he did not want
Freddie’s neighbors to hear the gunshot.
(a) What, if any, is the liability of Ruben?
Explain.
(b) Would your answer be the same if,
instead of Freddie, it was Manuel, a
relative of Ruben, who was killed by
Ponciano using Ruben’s gun? Explain.
(2009 Bar)
Q: Mr. Red was drinking with his buddies,
Mr. White and Mr. Blue when he saw Mr.
Green with his former girlfriend, Ms.
Yellow. Already drunk, Mr. Red declared in
a loud voice that if he could not have Ms.
Yellow, no one can. He then proceeded to
the men’s room but told Mr. White and Mr.
Blue to take care of Mr. Green. Mr. Blue and
Mr. White asked Mr. Red what he meant but
Mr. Red simply said, "You already know
what I want," and then left. Mr. Blue and Mr.
White proceeded to kill Mr. Green and hurt
Ms. Yellow.
A:
(a) Ruben’s liability is that of an accomplice
only because he merely cooperated in
Pociano’s determination to kill Freddie.
Such cooperation is not indispensable to
the killing, as in fact the killing was carried
out without the use of Ruben’s gun.
Neither may Ruben be regarded as a coconspirator since he was not a participant
in the decision-making of Ponciano to kill
Freddie; he merely cooperated in carrying
out the criminal plan which was already in
place (Art. 18, RPC).
(b) No. The answer would not be the same
because Ruben lent his gun purposely for
the killing of Freddie only, not for any
other killing. Ponciano’s using Ruben’s gun
in killing a person other than Freddie is
beyond Ruben’s criminal intent and willing
involvement. Only Ponciano will answer
for the crime against Manuel.
(a) What, if any, are the respective
liabilities of Mr. Red, Mr. White and Mr.
Blue for the death of Mr. Green?
(b) What, if any, are the respective
liabilities of Mr. Red, Mr. White and Mr.
Blue for the injuries of Ms. Yellow?
(2014 Bar)
A:
(a) Mr. Blue and Mr. White are liable for the
death of Mr. Green as principals by direct
participation. They were the ones who
participated in the criminal resolution and
who carried out their plan and personally
took part in its execution by acts which
directly tended to the same end. Mr. Red
cannot be held criminally liable as
principal by inducement because his
statement that Mr. Blue and Mr. White are
to take care of Mr. Green was not made
directly with the intention of procuring the
commission of the crime. There is no
showing that the words uttered by him
Q: Who is an accomplice? (2012 Bar)
A: Accomplices are those persons who, not
being the principal, cooperate in the execution
of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts
which are not indispensable to the commission
of the crime. (Art. 18, RPC).
Accessory (1998, 2010, 2013 Bar)
15
CRIMINAL LAW
Q: Immediately after murdering Bob, Jake
went to his mother to seek refuge. His
mother told him to hide in the maid’s
quarters until she finds a better place for
him to hide. After two days, Jake
transferred to his aunt’s house. A week
later, Jake was apprehended by the police.
Can Jake’s mother and aunt be made
criminally liable as accessories to the crime
of murder? Explain. (2010, 1998 Bar)
the fatal blow. Would you sustain his claim?
(1993 Bar)
A: No. Arthur’s claim is without merit. The
offenders acted in conspiracy in killing the
victim and hence, liable collectively. The act of
one is the act of all.
The existence of a conspiracy among the
offenders can be clearly deduced or inferred
from the manner they committed the killing,
demonstrating a common criminal purpose
and intent. There being a conspiracy, the
individual acts of each participant is not
considered because their liability is collective.
A: Obviously, Jake’s mother was aware of her
son’s having committed a felony, such that her
act of harbouring and concealing him renders
her liable as an accessory. But being an
ascendant of Jake, she is exempt from criminal
liability by express provision of Art. 20 of the
RPC. On the other hand, the criminal liability of
Jake’s aunt depends on her knowledge of his
commission of the felony, her act of harbouring
and concealing Jake would render her
criminally liable as accessory to the crime of
murder; otherwise, without knowledge of
Jake’s commission of the felony, she would not
be liable.
Q: State the concept of “implied conspiracy”
and give its legal effects. (1998, 2003 Bar)
A: An implied conspiracy is one which is only
inferred or deduced from the manner of
participants in the commission of crime
carried out its execution. Where the offenders
acted in concert in the commission of the
crime, meaning that their acts are coordinated
or synchronized in a way indicative that they
are pursuing a common criminal objective,
they shall be deemed to be acting in conspiracy
and their criminal liability shall be collective,
not individual.
(b) CONSPIRACY AND PROPOSAL (1988,
1990, 1992, 1993, 1998, 2004, 2006,
2012, 2013, 2016 BAR)
Q: As Sergio, Yoyong, Zoilo and Warlito
engaged in a drinking spree at Heartthrob
Disco, Special Police Officer 3 (SPO3)
Manolo Yabang suddenly approached them,
aimed his revolver at Sergio whom he
recognized as a wanted killer and fatally
shot the latter. Whereupon, YoyongZoilo
and Warlito ganged up on Yabang, Warlito,
using his own pistol, shot and wounded
Yabang.
The legal effects of an implied conspiracy are:
(1) Not all those who are present at the scene
of the crime will be considered as coconspirators;
(2) Only those who participated by criminal
acts in the commission of the crime will be
considered as co-conspirators; and
(3) Mere acquiescence to or approval of the
commission of the crime, without any act
of criminal participation, shall not render
one criminally liable as co-conspirator.
What are the criminal libailities of Yoyong,
Zoilo and Warlito for the injury to Yabang?
Was there conspiracy and treachery? (1992
Bar)
Q: During a town fiesta, a free-for-all fight
erupted in the public plaza. As a result of
the tumultuous affray, A sustained one fatal
and three superficial stab wounds. He died
a day after. B, C, D and E were proven to be
participants in the “rumble”, each using a
knife against A, but it could not be
ascertained who, among them, inflicted the
mortal injury. Who shall be held criminally
liable for the death of A and for what?
(1997 Bar)
A: If they have to be criminally liable at all,
each will be responsible for their individual
acts as there appears to be no conspiracy, as
the acts of the three were spontaneous and a
reflex response to Yabang’s shooting of Sergio.
There was no concerted act that will lead to a
common purpose.
Q: As a result of a misunderstanding during
a meeting, Joe was mauled by Nestor, Jolan,
Reden, and Arthur. He ran towards his
house but the four chased and caught him.
Thereafter, they tied Joe’s hands at his back
and attacked him. Nestor used a knife;
Jolan, a shovel; Arthur, his fists; and Reden,
a piece of wood. After killing Joe, Reden
ordered the digging of a grave to bury Joe’s
lifeless body. Thereafter, the four (4) left
together. Convicted for the killing of Joe,
Arthur now claims that his conviction is
erroneous as it was not he who conflicted
UST BAR OPERATIONS
A: B, C, D and E being participants in the
tumultuous affray and having been proven to
have inflicted serious physical injuries, or at
least, employed violence upon A, are criminally
liable for the latter’s death. And because it
cannot be ascertained who among them
inflicted the mortal injury on A, there being a
free-for-all fight or tumultuous affray, B, C, D
and E are all liable for the crime of death
caused in a tumultuous affray under Art. 251 of
the Revised Penal Code.
16
QUAMTO (1987-2017)
Q: Together XA, YB and ZC planned to rob
Miss OD. They entered her house by
breaking one of the windows in her house.
After taking her personal properties and as
theywere about to leave, XA decided on
impulse to rape OD. As XA was molesting
her, YB and ZC stood outside the door of her
bedroom and did nothing to prevent XA
from raping OD.
PENALTIES (1988, 1994, 1995, 1997, 2001,
2004, 2005, 2007 Bar)
Q:
(a) State the two classes of penalties under
the Revised Penal Code. Define each.
(b) May censure be included in a sentence
of acquittal? (1988 Bar)
A:
What crime/s did XA, YB and ZC commit
and what is the criminal liability of each?
Explain briefly. (2004 Bar)
(a) The two classes of penalties under Article
25 of the RPC are as follows:
A: The crime committed by XA, YB and ZC is
the composite crime of Robbery with Rape, a
single, indivisible offense under Art. 294 (1) of
the Revised Penal Code.
1.
2.
Although the conspiracy among the offenders
was only to commit robbery and only XA raped
CD, the other robbers, YB and ZC, were present
and aware of the rape being committed by
their co-conspirator. Having done nothing to
stop XA from committing the rape, YB and ZC
thereby concurred in the commission of the
rape by their co-conspirator XA.
Principal – A principal penalty is defined
as that provided for a felony and which is
imposed by court expressly upon
conviction.
Accessory – An accessory penalty is
defined as that deemed included in the
imposition of the principal penalty.
(b) Censure may not be included in a sentence
of acquittal because a censure is a penalty.
Censure is repugnant and is essentially
inconsistent and contrary to an acquittal
(People v. Abellera, 69 Phil 623).
The criminal liability of all, XA, YZ, and ZC, shall
be the same, as principals in the special
complex crime of robbery with rape which is a
single, indivisible offense where the rape
accompanying the robbery is just a component.
Q: Imagine that you are a Judge trying a
case, and based on the evidence presented
and the applicable law, you have decided on
the guilt of two (2) accused. Indicate the
five (5) steps you would follow to
determine the exact penalty to be imposed.
Stated differently, what are the factors you
must consider to arrive at the correct
penalty? (1991 Bar)
Q: Differentiate wheel conspiracy and chain
conspiracy. (2016, 2017 Bar)
A: There are two structures of multiple
conspiracies, namely: wheel or circle
conspiracy and chain conspiracy.
A:
A “wheel conspiracy” occurs when there is a
single person or group (the hub) dealing
individually with two or more other persons or
groups (the spokes). The spoke typically
interacts with the hub rather than with
another spoke. In the event that the spoke
shares a common purpose to succeed, there is
a single conspiracy. However, in the instances
when each spoke is unconcerned with the
success of the other spokes, there are multiple
conspiracies.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Determine the crime committed;
Stage of execution and degree of
participation;
Determine the penalty
Consider the modifying circumstances;
Determine
whether
Indeterminate
Sentence Law is applicable or not.
Q: After trial, Judge Juan Laya of the Manila
RTC found Benjamin Garcia guilty of
Murder, the victim having sustained several
bullet wounds in his body so that he died
despite medical assistance given in the
Ospital ng Manila. Because the weapon
used by Benjamin was unlicensed and the
qualifying circumstance of treachery was
found to be present. Judge Laya rendered
his decision convicting Benjamin and
sentencing him to "reclusion perpetua or
life
imprisonment".
Are
"reclusion
perpetua" and life imprisonment the same
and can be imposed interchangeably as in
the foregoing sentence? Or are they totally
different? State your reasons. (1994, 2001,
2005 Bar)
A “chain conspiracy”, on the other hand, exists
when there is successive communication and
cooperation in much the same way as with
legitimate business operations between
manufacturer and wholesaler, then wholesaler
and retailer, and then retailer and consumer.
(Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 148965,
February 26, 2002)
17
CRIMINAL LAW
A: The penalty of reclusion perpetua and the
penalty of life imprisonment are totally
different from each other and therefore, should
not be used interchangeably. Reclusion
perpetua is a penalty prescribed by the RPC,
with a fixed duration of imprisonment from 20
years and 1 day to 40 years, and carries it with
accessory penalties. Life imprisonment, on the
other hand, is a penalty prescribed by special
laws, with no fixed duration of imprisonment
and without any accessory penalty.
penalty. Therefore, unless Congress enacts a
law, no offense may be punished with the
death penalty at present.
Application (2005, 2013 Bar)
Indeterminate Sentence Law (Act No. 4103, as
amended) (Refer to SPL Section)
Q: Roman and Wendy are neighbors. On
Valentine's Day, without prior notice,
Roman visited Wendy at her condo to invite
her to dinner, but Wendy turned him down
and abruptly left, leaving her condo door
unlocked. Roman attempted to follow, but
appeared to have second thoughts; he
simply went back to Wendy's condo, let
himself in, and waited for her return. On
Wendy's arrival later that evening, Roman
grabbed her from behind and, with a knife
in hand, forced her to undress. Wendy had
no choice but to comply. Roman then tied
Wendy's hands to her bed and sexually
assaulted her five (5) times that night.
Roman was charged with, and was
convicted of, five (5) counts of rape, but the
judge did not impose the penalty of
reclusion perpetua for each count. Instead,
the judge sentenced Roman to 40 years of
imprisonment on the basis of the threefold rule. Was the judge correct? (2013 Bar)
Q: Under Article 27 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended by Republic Act (RA) No.
7959, reclusion perpetua shall be from 20
years and 1 day to 40 years. Does this mean
that reclusion perpetua is now a divisible
penalty? Explain. (2005 Bar)
A: No, because the Supreme Court has
repeatedly called the attention of the Bench
and the Bar to the fact that the penalties of
reclusion perpetua and life imprisonment are
not synonymous and should be applied
correctly and as may be specified by the
applicable law. Reclusion perpetua has a
specific duration of 20 years and 1 day to 40
years (Art. 27) and accessory penalties (Art.
41), while life imprisonment has no definite
term or accessory penalties. Also, life
imprisonment is imposable on crimes
punished by special laws, and not on felonies
in the Code.
A: No, the three-fold rule is applicable only in
connection with the service of the sentence not
in the imposition of the proper penalties. The
court must impose all penalties for all the
crimes for which the accused have been found
guilty. Thus, the court should not make a
computation in it decision and sentence the
accused to not more than the three-fold of the
most severe of the penalties imposable. The
computation under the three-fold rule is for
the prison authorities to make.
Q: What are the penalties that may be
served simultaneously? (2007 Bar)
A: The penalties that may be served
simultaneously are imprisonment/destierro
and –
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Perpetual absolute disqualification;
Perpetual special disqualification;
Temporary absolute disqualification;
Temporary special disqualification;
Suspension from public office, the right to
vote and be voted for and the right to
follow a profession or calling;
6. Fine; and any principal penalty with its
accessory penalties.
7. Fine and bond to keep the peace;
8. Public Censure;
9. Civil Interdiction; and
10. Confiscation and payment of costs
Q: E and M are convicted of a penal law that
imposes a penalty of fine or imprisonment
or both fine and imprisonment. The judge
sentenced them to pay the fine, jointly and
severally, with subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency.
(a) Is the penalty proper? Explain.
(b) May the judge impose an alternative
penalty of fine or imprisonment?
Explain. (2005 Bar)
Principles (include R.A. No. 9346 – Act
Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty
in the Philippines) (1988, 1997, 2004 Bar)
A:
(a) No. The penalty should be imposed
individually on every person accused of
the crime. Any of the convicted accused
who is insolvent and unable to pay the
fine,
shall
serve
the
subsidiary
imprisonment.
(b) No. Although the law may prescribe an
alternative penalty for a crime, it does not
mean that the court may impose the
alternative penalties at the same time. The
Q: What offenses, if any, may be punished
with the death penalty in our jurisdiction at
present? Explain. (1988, 1995 Bar)
A: At present, no offense may be punished with
the death penalty in our jurisdiction at present.
The 1987 Constitution has abolished the death
penalty and the abolition affects even those
who has already been sentenced to death
UST BAR OPERATIONS
18
QUAMTO (1987-2017)
conviction as well as the penalty imposed
by the court a quo. After sixty days, the
Court of Appeals issued an Entry of
Judgment and remanded the records of the
case to the RTC. Three days thereafter,
Tiburcio died of heart attack. Atty. Abdul,
Tiburcio's counsel, filed before the RTC a
Manifestation with Motion to Dismiss,
informing the court that Tiburcio died
already, and claiming that his criminal
liability had been extinguished by his
demise.
sentence must be definite. Otherwise, the
judgment cannot attain finality.
C. CRIMINAL AND CIVIL LIABILITIES
1. EXTINCTION OF CRIMINAL LIABILITIES
(1988, 1990, 2004, 2015 BAR)
Q:
(a) How is criminal liability totally
extinguished? (1988, 1990 Bar)
(b) How is criminal liability partially
extinguished?
(c) If an accused is acquitted does it
necessarily follow that no civil liability
arising from the acts complained of
may be awarded in the same judgment?
Explain briefly. (1988 Bar)
a) Should the RTC grant the Motion to
Dismiss the case? Explain.
b) Assuming that Tiburcio' s death occurred
before the Court of Appeals rendered its
decision, will you give a different answer?
Explain. (2015 Bar).
A:
A:
a) The RTC may not grant the motion to
dismiss because the Court of Appeals, having
issued an Entry of Judgment, the decision has
become final and executory. Moreover, the
pecuniary penalty, such as the civil liability
arising from the crime consisting of actual
damages of P25,000 survives the death of
Tiburcio.
b) Yes. The RTC decision must be set aside and
the case against Tiburcio must consequently be
dismissed. The demise of Tiburcio which
occurred before the Court of Appeals rendered
its decision causes his criminal liability, as well
as his civil liability ex delicto, to be totally
extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a
defendant to stand as the accused, the civil
action is instituted therein for recovery of civil
liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished,
grounded as it is on criminal case.
(a) Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code
provides for the following causes of total
extinction of criminal liability:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
Death of the convict as to personal
penalties, as to the pecuniary
liabilities, liability therefore is
extinguished only when death occurs
before final judgment
Service of sentence
Amnesty
Absolute pardon
Prescription of the crime
Prescription of the penalty
Marriage of the offended woman as
provided in Article 344.
(b) Article 94 of the Revised Penal Code
provides for the following causes of the
partial extinction of criminal liability:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Conditional pardon
Commutation of sentence
Good conduct allowance
confinement
Parole
Probation
Q: AX was convicted of reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide. The trial court
sentenced him to a prison term as well as to
pay P150,000 as civil indemnity and
damages. While his appeal was pending, AX
met a fatal accident. He left a young widow,
2 children, and a million-peso estate. What
is the effect, if any, of his death on his
criminal as well as civil liability? Explain
briefly. (2004 Bar)
during
(c) If an accused is acquitted, it does not
necessarily follow that no civil liability
arising from the acts complained of may be
awarded in the same judgment except: If
there is an express waiver of the liability;
and if there is a reservation to file a
separate civil action (Rule 107; Padilla v.
CA, People v. Jalandoni).
A: The death of AX while his appeal from the
judgment of the trial court is pending,
extinguishes his criminal liability. The civil
liability insofar as it arises from the crime and
recoverable under the RPC is also
extinguished; but indemnity and damages may
be recovered in a civil action if predicated on a
source of obligation under Art. 1157, NCC, such
as law, contracts, quasi-contracts and quasidelicts, but not on the basis of delicts (People v.
Balagtas, 236 SCRA 239).
Q: The Regional Trial Court {RTC) found
Tiburcio guilty of frustrated homicide and
sentenced him to an indeterminate penalty
of four years and one day of prision
correccional as minimum, to eight years
of prision mayor as maximum, and ordered
him to pay actual damages in the amount of
1125,000.00. Tiburcio appealed to the
Court of Appeals which sustained his
Prescription of crimes (1987, 1990, 1993,
1994, 1997, 2000, 2001, 2004, 2009, 2010,
2015 Bar)
19
CRIMINAL LAW
offended party nor an authority or an agent of
an authority. It was discovered by the NBI
Authorities only when Albert revealed to them
the commission of the crime. Hence, the period
of prescription of 20 years for homicide
commenced to run only from the time Albert
revealed the same to the NBI Authorities.
Q: B imitated the signature of A, registered
owner of a lot, in a special power of
attorney naming him (B) as his attorney-infact of A. On February 13, 1964, B
mortgaged the lot to a bank using the
special power of attorney to obtain a loan.
On the same day, both the special power of
attorney and the mortgage contract were
duly registered in the Registry of Deeds.
Because of B’s failure to pay, the bank
foreclosed the mortgage and the lot was
sold to X in whose name a new title was
issued. In March, 1974, A discovered that
the property was already registered in the
name of X because of an ejectment case
filed against him by X.
Q: On June 1, 1988, a complaint for
concubinage committed in February 1987
was filed against Roberto in the Municipal
Trial Court of Tanza, Cavite for purposes of
preliminary investigation. For various
reasons, it was only on July 3, 1998 when
the judge of said court decided the case by
dismissing it for lack of jurisdiction since
the crime was committed in Manila. The
case was subsequently filed with the City
Fiscal of Manila but it was dismissed on the
ground that the crime had already
prescribed. The law provides that the crime
of concubinage prescribes in ten (10) years.
Was the dismissal by the fiscal correct?
Explain. (2001 Bar)
If you were the counsel of B, what would be
your defense? Discuss. (1993 Bar)
A: My defense will be prescription because the
crime was committed in 1964 and almost ten
years had already elapsed since then. Even if
we take Falsification and Estafa individually,
they have already prescribed.
It is to be noted that when it comes to
discovery, the fact that the crime was
discovered in 1974 will be of no moment
because the offended party is considered to
have constructive notice on the forgery after
the Deed of Sale where his signature had been
falsified was registered in the office of the
Register of Deeds (Cabral v. Puno, 70 SCRA
606).
A: No. The fiscal’s dismissal of the case on
alleged prescription is not correct. The filing of
the complaint with the Municipal Trial Court,
although only for preliminary investigation,
interrupted and suspended the period of
prescription inasmuch as the jurisdiction of a
court in a criminal case is determined by the
allegations in the complaint or information, not
by the result of proof (People v. Galano, 75
SCRA 193).
Q: On January 1990, while 5-year old Albert
was urinating at the back of their house, he
heard a strange noise coming from the
kitchen of their neighbor and playmate,
Ara. When he peeped inside, he saw Mina,
Ara’s stepmother, very angry and
strangling the 5-year old Ara to death.
Albert saw Mina carry the dead body of Ara,
place it inside the trunk of her car and drive
away. The dead body of Ara was never
found. Mina spread the news in the
neighborhood that Ara went to live with her
grandparents in Ormoc. For fear of his life,
Albert did not tell anyone, even his parents
and relatives. 20 and ½ years after the
incident, and right after his graduation in
Criminology, Albert reported the crime to
NBI authorities. The crime of homicide
prescribes in 20 years. Can the State still
prosecute Mina for the death of Ara despite
the lapse of 20 and ½ years? Explain. (2000
Bar)
Q: A killed his wife and buried her in their
backyard. He immediately went into hiding
in the mountains. Three years later, the
bones of A’s wife were discovered by X, the
gardener. Since X had a standing warrant of
arrest, he hid the bones in an old clay jar
and kept quiet about it. After two years, Z,
the caretaker, found the bones and
reported the matter to the police. After 15
years of hiding, A left the country but
returned three years later to take care of
his ailing sibling. Six years thereafter, he
was charged with parricide but raised the
defense of prescription.
(a) Under the Revised Penal Code, when
does the period of prescription of a
crime commence to run?
(b) When is it interrupted?
(c) Is A’s defense tenable? Explain. (2000,
2004, 2009, 2010 Bar)
A:
A: Yes. The State can still prosecute Mina for
the death of Ara despite the lapse of 20 & ½
years. Under Article 91, RPC, the period of
prescription commences to run from the day
on which the crime is discovered by the
offended party, the authorities or their agents.
(a) Generally, the period of prescription of a
crime commences to run for the date it
was committed; but if the crime was
committed clandestinely, the period of
prescription of the crimes under the RPC
commence to run from the day on which
the crime was discovered (the discovery
In the case at bar, the commission of the crime
was known only to Albert, who was not the
UST BAR OPERATIONS
20
QUAMTO (1987-2017)
rule) by the offended party, the authorities
or their agents (Art. 91, RPC).
(b) The running of the prescriptive period of
the crime is interrupted when “any kind of
investigative proceedings is instituted
against the guilty person which may
ultimately lead to his prosecution.”
(Panaguiton, Jr. v. DOJ, G.R. No. 167571,
November 25, 2008)
(c) No, the defense of prescription of the
crime is not tenable. The crime committed
is parricide which prescribes in twenty
(20) years (Art. 90, RPC). It was only when
the caretaker, Z, found the victim’s bones
and reported the matter to the police that
the crime is deemed legally discovered by
the authorities or their agents and thus the
prescriptive period of the crime
commenced to run. When A left the
country and returned only after three (3)
years, the running of the prescriptive
period of the crime is interrupted and
suspended because prescription shall not
run when the offender is absent from the
Philippine Archipelago (Art. 91, RPC). Since
A had been in hiding for 15 years after the
commission of the crime and the
prescriptive period starting running only
after 5 years from such commission when
the crime was discovered, only 10 years
lapsed and 3 years thereof should be
deducted when the prescriptive period
was interrupted and suspended. Hence,
the 3 years when A was out of the
Philippines should be deducted from the
10 years after the prescription starts
running. Adding the 7 years of
prescription and the 6 years that lapsed
before the case was filed, only a total of
thirteen (13) years of the prescriptive
period had lapsed. Hence, the crime has
not yet prescribed.
(a) If I were the judge, I will deny the motion
to quash. Article 93 of the Revised Penal
Code provides when the prescription of
penalties shall commence to run. Under
said provision, it shall commence to run
from the date the felon evades the service
of his sentence. Pursuant to Article 157 of
the same Code, evasion of service of
sentence can be committed only by those
who have been convicted by final
judgment by escaping during the term of
his sentence. Taylor never served a single
minute of his sentence, and thus,
prescription never started to run in his
favor. Clearly, one who has not been
committed to prison cannot be said to
have escaped therefrom (Del Castillo v.
Torrecampo, G.R. No. 139033, December 18,
2002).
(b) Even if Taylor was able to go to another
country which the Philippines had no
extradition treaty, I will deny the motion
to quash. Going to a foreign country with
which this Government has no extradition
treaty to interrupt the running of
prescription is not applicable nor even
material
because
the
period
of
prescription is not applicable nor even
material
because
the
period
of
prescription had not commenced to run in
the first place; hence, there is nothing to
interrupt.
Pardon and Amnesty (2006, 2009)
Q: Enumerate the differences between
pardon and amnesty. (2006 Bar)
A: The following are the differences between
pardon and amnesty:
In pardon –
Q: Taylor was convicted of a violation of the
Election Code, and was sentenced to suffer
imprisonment of one year as minimum, to
three years as maximum. The decision of
the trial court was affirmed on appeal and
became final and executory. Taylor failed to
appear when summoned for execution of
judgment, prompting the judge to issue an
order for his arrest. Taylor was able to use
the backdoor and left for the United States.
Fifteen years later, Taylor returned to the
Philippines and filed a Motion to Quash the
warrant of arrest against him, on the
ground that the penalty imposed against
him had already prescribed.
The convict is excused from serving the
sentence but the effects of conviction remain
unless expressly remitted by the pardon;
hence, for pardon to be valid there must be a
sentence already final and executory at the
time the same is granted. Moreover, the grant
is in favor of individual convicted offenders,
not to a class of convicted offenders; and the
crimes subject of the grant may be common
crimes or political crimes. Finally, the grant is a
private act of the Chief Executive which does
not require the concurrence of any other
public officer or office.
In amnesty –
(a) If you were the judge, would you grant
Taylor's Motion to Quash? Explain.
(b) Assuming that instead of the United
States, Taylor was able to go to another
country with which the Philippines had
no extradition treaty, will your answer
be the same? Explain. (2015 Bar)
The criminal complexion of the act constituting
the crime is erased, as though such act was
innocent when committed; hence, the effects of
the conviction are obliterated. Amnesty is
granted is in favor of a class of convicted
offenders, not to individual convicted
offenders; and the crimes involved are
generally political offenses, not common
A:
21
CRIMINAL LAW
2. CIVIL LIABILITIES IN CRIMINAL CASES
(1987, 1990, 1991, 1992 BAR)
crimes. Amnesty is a public act that requires
the conformity or concurrence of the
Philippine Senate.
Q: Rico was convicted of raping Letty, his
former sweetheart, by the Regional Trial
Court of Manila and he was ordered to
serve the penalty of life imprisonment, to
indemnify Letty in the amount of
P30,000.00 and to support their offspring.
Pending appeal in the Supreme Court, Rico
died. His widow, Bernie, moved for a
dismissal of the case.
Q: Senator Adamos was convicted of
plunder. About one year after beginning to
serve his sentence, the President of the
Philippines granted him absolute pardon.
The signed pardon states: "In view hereof,
and in pursuance of the authority vested
upon me by the Constitution, I hereby grant
absolute pardon unto Adamos, who was
convicted of plunder in Criminal Case No.
XV32 and upon whom the penalty
of reclusion perpetua was imposed." He
now comes to you for advice. He wants to
know if he could run for senator in the next
election.
a) What advice will you give Adamos?
Explain.
b) Assuming that what Adamos committed
was heading a rebellion for which he was
imposed the same penalty of reclusion
perpetua, and what he received was
amnesty from the government, will your
answer be the same? Explain. (2015 Bar)
What is the legal effect of Rico’s death on
his civil liability? State your reasons. (1990
Bar)
A: The civil liability of Rico survives. (People v.
Tirol, G.R. L-30588, January 31, 1981, People v.
Naboa, et. al., 132 SCRA 410)
PART II. REVISED PENAL CODE (BOOK II)
A. CRIMES AGAINST NATIONAL SECURITY
AND THE LAW OF NATIONS
A:
a) If I were the counsel of Senator Adamos, I
will give him the advice that he cannot run in
the Senatorial race since the terms of the
pardon has not expressly restored his right to
hold public office or remitted the accessory
penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification.
Under Article 36 of the Revised Penal Code, a
pardon shall not work the restoration of the
right to hold public office unless such right be
expressly restored by terms of the pardon.
Under Article 41, the penalty of reclusion
perpetua shall carry with it perpetual absolute
disqualification which the offender shall suffer
even though pardoned as to the principal
penalty, unless the same shall have been
expressly remitted in the pardon (Risos-Vidal v.
Lim, G.R. No. 206666, January 21, 2015).
Piracy and mutiny on the high seas or in
Philippine waters (2006, 2008 Bar)
Q: The inter-island vessel M/V Viva Lines I,
while cruising off Batanes, was forced to
seek shelter at the harbor of Kaoshiung,
Taiwan because of a strong typhoon. While
anchored in said harbor, Max, Baldo and
Bogart arrived in a speedboat, fired a
bazooka at the bow of the vessel, boarded it
and divested the passengers of their money
and jewelry. A passenger of M/V Viva Lines
I, Dodongtook advantage of the confusion to
settle an old grudge with another
passenger, and killed him. After their
apprehension, all four were charged with
qualified piracy before a Philippine court.
b) If he was given amnesty, he can run in the
Senatorial race. Under Article 89 of the Revised
Penal Code, criminal liability is totally
extinguished by amnesty, which completely
extinguishes the penalty and all its effects.
Thus, the amnesty extinguishes not only the
principal penalty of reclusion perpetua but
also its effects such as the accessory penalty of
perpetual absolute disqualification. Amnesty
looks backward and abolishes and puts into
oblivion the offense itself, it so overlooks and
obliterates the offense with which he is
charged, so that the person released by
amnesty stands before the law precisely as
though he had committed no offense
(Barrioquinto v. Fernandez, G.R. No. L-1278,
January 21, 1949)
UST BAR OPERATIONS
(a) Was the charge of qualified piracy
against the three person (Max, Badong
and Bogart) who boarded the interisland vessel correct? Explain.
(b) Was Dodong correctly charged before
the Philippine court for qualified
piracy? Explain. (2008 Bar)
A:
(a) No. Dodong was not correctly charged
with qualified piracy because committing
piracy was never in his mind nor did he
have any involvement in the piracy
committed. He merely took advantage of
the situation in killing the passenger. He
should be charged with murder since there
was evident premeditation and intent to
kill.
(b) The charge is correct. Qualified Piracy was
committed when the offenders seized the
vessels by firing on or boarding the same.
22
QUAMTO (1987-2017)
items and loaded them in their own
motorboat. Before the band left, they
planted an explosive which they detonated
from a safe distance. The explosion
damaged the hull of the ship, killed ten (10)
crewmen, and injured fifteen (15) others.
What crime or crimes, if any, were
committed? Explain. (2016 Bar)
In the problem, they even went further by
divesting the passengers of their money
and jewelry. The vessel was anchored in
the harbour of Kaoshioung, Taiwan and it
is submitted that the crime was committed
within the territorial jurisdiction of
another country. The Supreme Court has
ruled that the high seas contemplated
under Art. 122 of the RPC include the
three-mile limit of any state (People v. Lollo, G.R. No. 17958, February 27, 1922).
Moreover, piracy is an offense that can be
tried anywhere because it is a crime
against the Law of Nations.
A: The crime committed is Qualified Piracy
under Article 123 of the Revised Penal Code.
The elements of piracy being present, namely,
(1) the vessel is on the high seas; (2) that the
offenders are not members of its complement
or passenger of the vessel; and (3) that the
offenders attack or seize the vessel, or seize
the whole or part of the cargo of said vessel, its
equipment or personal belongings of its
complement or passengers. The latter act is
committed when the offenders took away the
several crates containing valuable items and
loaded them in their own motorboat.
Q: While SS Nagoya Maru was negotiating
the sea route from Hongkong towards
Manila, and while still 300 miles from
Aparri, Cagayan, its engine malfunctioned.
The Captain ordered the ship to stop for
emergency repairs lasting for almost 15
hours. Due to exhaustion, the officers and
crew fell asleep. While the ship was
anchored, a motorboat manned by
renegade Ybanags from Claveria, Cagayan,
passed by and took advantage of the
situation. They cut the ship’s engines and
took away several heavy crates of electrical
equipment and loaded them in their
motorboat. Then they left hurriedly
towards Aparri. At daybreak, the crew
found that a robbery took place. They
radioed the Aparri Port Authorites
resulting in the apprehension of the
culprits.
It is qualified because: (1) the offenders have
seized the vessel by boarding; and (2) the
crime or piracy was accompanied by murder
and physical injuries. The facts show that the
offenders planted an explosive in the vessel
which they detonated from a safe distance and
the explosion killed ten (10) crewmen and
injured fifteen (15) others.
The number of persons killed on the occasion
of piracy is not material. The law considers
qualified piracy as a special complex crime
regardless of the number of victims (People v.
Siyoh, G.R. No. L-57292 February 18, 1986).
(1) What crime was committed? Explain.
(2) Supposing that while the robbery was
taking place, the culprits stabbed a
member of the crew while sleeping.
What crime was committed? Explain.
(2006 Bar)
B. CRIMES AGAINST THE FUNDAMENTAL
LAW OF THE STATE
Arbitrary Detention or Expulsion, Violation
of Dwelling, Prohibition, Interruption, and
Dissolution of Peaceful Meeting and Crimes
Against Religious Worship
A:
(1) The crime committed was piracy under
Art. 122, Revised Penal Code, the essence
of which is robbery directed against a
vessel and/or its cargoes. The taking of the
several heavy crates of electrical
equipment from a vessel at sea, was
effected by force and undoubtedly with
intent to gain. It is of no moment that the
vessel was anchored when deprecated so
long as it was at sea.
(2) The crime was qualified piracy under Art.
123 of the RPC because it was attended by
a killing committed by the same culprits
against a member of the crew of the vessel.
ARBITRARY DETENTION AND EXPULSION
(2006, 2008, 1992 BAR)
Q: Major Menor, while patrolling Bago-Bago
community in a police car with SP03 Caloy
Itliong blew his whistle to stop a Nissan
Sentra car which wrongly entered a oneway street. After demanding from Linda Lo
Hua, the driver, her driver’s license, Menor
asked her to follow them to the police
precinct. Upon arriving there, he gave
instructions to Itliong to guard Lo Hua in
one of the rooms and not to let her out of
sight until he returns; then got the car key
from Lo Hua. In the meantime, the latter
was not allowed to make any phone calls
but was given food and access to a
bathroom.
Q: The Royal S.S. Maru, a vessel registered
in Panama, was 300 nautical miles from
Aparri, Cagayan when its engines
malfunctioned. The Captain ordered his
men to drop anchor and repair the ship.
While the officers and crew were asleep,
armed men boarded the vessel and took
away several crates containing valuable
When Menor showed up after two days, he
brought Lo Hua to a private house and told
her that he would only release her and
23
CRIMINAL LAW
return the car if she made arrangements for
the delivery of P500,000.00 in a doctor’s
bag at a certain place within the next
twenty-four hours. When Menor went to the
designated spot to pick up the bag of
money, he suddenly found himself
surrounded by several armed civilians who
introduced themselves as NBI agents. What
criminal offense has Menor committed?
Explain. (1992 Bar)
REBELLION (1991, 1994, 1998, 2004 BAR)
Q: In the early morning of 25 October 1990,
the troops of the Logistics Command
(LOGCOM) of the AFP at Camp General
Emilio Aguinaldo headed by their
Operations Officer, Col. Rito Amparo,
withdrew firearms and bullets and, per
prior agreement, attacked, in separate
teams, the offices of the Chief of Staff, the
Secretary of National Defense, the Deputy
Chief of Staff for Operations, the Deputy
Chief of Staff for Intelligence and other
offices, held hostage the Chief of Staff of
LOGCOM and other officers, killed three (3)
pro-Government soldiers, inverted the
Philippine flag, barricaded all entrances
and exits to the camp, and announced
complete control of the camp. Because of
the superiority of the pro-Government
forces, Col. Amparo and his troops
surrendered at 7:00 in the morning of that
day.
A:Menor is liable under Art. 124, RPC
(Arbitrary Detention) he being a public officer
who detained, a person without legal grounds.
Violation of a traffic ordinance by entering a
one-way street is not a valid reason to arrest
and detain the driver. Such only merits the
issuance of a traffic violation ticket. Hence,
when Lo Hua was ordered to follow the police
officers to the precinct (confiscating her
license to compel her to do so), and confining
her in a room for two days and prohibiting her
to make phone calls, is a clear case of
deprivation of personal liberty. Giving her food
and access to the bathroom will not extinguish
or mitigate the criminal liability.
Did Col. Amparo and his troops commit the
crime of coup d’etat (Article 134-A, RPC) or
of rebellion? (1991 Bar)
Menor is further liable for robbery, because
money or personal properly was taken, with
intent to gain, and with intimidation. The
peculiar situation of Lo Hua practically forced
her to submit to the monetary demands of the
major.
A: Under the facts stated, the crime committed
would be coup d’etat (R.A. 6988 incorporating
Art. 134-A).
However, since the law was not yet effective as
of October 25, 1990, as the effectivity thereof
(Sec. 8) is upon its approval (which is October
24, 1990) and publication in at least two (2)
newspapers of general circulation, the felony
committed would be rebellion.
Q: What are the 3 ways of committing
arbitrary detention? Explain each. What are
the legal grounds for detention? (2006 Bar)
A: The three (3) ways of committing arbitrary
detention are:
a.
b.
c.
Q: VC, JG, GG, and JG conspired to overthrow
the Philippine Government. VG was
recognized as the titular head of the
conspiracy. Several meetings were held and
the plan was finalized. JJ, bothered by his
conscience, confessed to Father Abraham
that he, VG, JG and GG have conspired to
overthrow
the
government.
Father
Abraham did not report this information to
the proper authorities. Did Father Abraham
commit a crime? If so, what crime was
committed? What is his criminal liability?
(1994 Bar)
by detaining or locking up a person
without any legal cause or ground
therefore purposely to restrain his liberty
(RPC, Art. 124);
by delaying delivery to the proper judicial
authority of a person lawfully arrested
without a warrant (RPC, Art. 125); and
by delaying release of a prisoner whose
release has been ordered by competent
authority (RPC, Art. 126).
In all the above-stated ways, the principal
offender should be a public officer acting
under color of his authority.
A: No. Father Abraham did not commit a crime
because the conspiracy involved is one to
commit rebellion, not a conspiracy to commit
treason which makes a person criminally liable
under Art 116, RPC. And even assuming that it
will fall as misprision of treason, Father
Abraham is exempted from criminal liability
under Art. 12, par. 7, as his failure to report can
be considered as due to "insuperable cause", as
this involves the sanctity and inviolability of a
confession. Conspiracy to commit rebellion
results in criminal liability to the coconspirators, but not to a person who learned
of such and did not report to the proper
The legal grounds for detention are:
1.
2.
commission of a crime;
violent insanity or other ailment requiring
compulsory confinement in an institution
established for such purpose.
C. CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC ORDER
1.
Rebellion, Coup d’etat, Sedition, and
Disloyalty
UST BAR OPERATIONS
24
QUAMTO (1987-2017)
authorities (US v. Vergara, 3 Phil. 432; People
vs. Atienza, 56 Phil. 353).
purpose is to seize power by taking over such
installations.
COUP D’ ETAT (BAR 1988, 1991, 1998, 2002
BAR)
The leader being unknown, any person who in
fact directed the others, spoke for them, signed
receipts and other documents issued in their
name, or performed similar acts, on behalf of
the group shall be deemed the leader of said
coup d'etat (Art 135, RPC).
Q: Distinguish rebellion from coup d’etat.
(1991, 2004 Bar)
A: Rebellion distinguished from coup d’etat:
SEDITION (1987, 2007 BAR)
As to overt acts, in rebellion, there is public
uprising and taking up arms against the
Government. In coup d’etat public uprising is
not necessary. The essence of the crime is a
swift attack, accompanied by violence,
intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth,
directed against duly constituted authorities of
the Government, or any military camp or
installation, communication networks, public
utilities, or facilities needed for the exercise
and continued possession of government
power.
Q: A, B, C, D, and E were former soldiers
who deserted their command in Mindanao.
Jose and Pedro, two big landowners, called
A, B, C, D, and E to a conference. Jose and
Pedro proposed to these former soldiers
that they recruit their comrades and
organize a group of 100 for the purpose of
challenging the government by force of
arms in order to prevent the enforcement
or implementation of the Land Reform Law
in Cotabato Province. Jose and Pedro
promised to finance the group and to buy
firearms for the purpose. The former
soldiers agreed. After Jose and Pedro left, A,
the leader of the former soldiers, said that
in the meanwhile he needed money to
support his family. D suggested that they
rob a bank and agreed to carry put the plan
on the 15th day of the month. Unknown to
all of them, as they were conferring with
Jose and Pedro and as they were planning
to rob the bank, Rosauro, a houseboy was
within hearing distance. On the pretext of
buying cigarettes, Rosauro instead went
directly to the Police and told them what
transpired. All the former soldiers, as well
as Jose and Pedro, were arrested.
As to objective or purpose, in rebellion, the
purpose is to remove from the allegiance of the
Philippines, the whole or any part of the
Philippines, or any military or naval camps,
deprive the Chief Executive or Congress from
performing their functions. In coup d’etat, the
objective is to seize or diminish the state
powers.
As to participation, in rebellion, any person
may commit. In coup d’etat, any person
belonging to the military or police or holding
public office, with or without civilian
participation may commit.
Q: Supposing a public school teacher
participated in a coup d'etat using an
unlicensed firearm. What crime or crimes
did he commit? (1998 Bar)
(a) What crime, if any, did the former
soldiers commit?
(b) What about Jose and Pedro? (1987 Bar)
A:
A: The public school teacher committed only
coup d'etat for his participation therein. His
use of an unlicensed firearm is absorbed in the
coup d'etat under the new firearms law (R.A.
8294).
Q: If a group of persons belonging to the
armed forces makes a swift attack,
accompanied by violence, intimidation and
threat against a vital military installation
for the purpose of seizing power and taking
over such installation, what crime or
crimes are they guilty of?
(a) The former soldiers committed the crime
of conspiracy to commit sedition. What
Jose and Pedro proposed to the soldiers
that they recruit their comrades and
organize a group of 100 for the purpose of
challenging the government by force of
arms in order to prevent the
implementation of the Land Reform Law in
Cotabato Province is to commit sedition.
If the attack is quelled but the leader is
unknown, who shall be deemed the leader
thereof? (1998, 2002 Bar)
A: The perpetrators, being persons belonging
to the Armed Forces, would be guilty of the
crime of coup d'etat, under Art. 134-A of the
RPC, as amended, because their attack was
against vital military installations which are
essential to the continued possession and
exercise of governmental powers, and their
(b) Jose and Pedro will also be liable for
conspiracy to commit sedition since they
are members of the conspiracy where the
act of one is the act of all. If the soldiers did
not agree to their proposal, they would not
Proposal to commit sedition is not
punished. But since the soldiers agreed, a
conspiracy to commit sedition resulted
which is now punishable. Conspiracy
arises on the very moment the plotters
agree (People v. Peralta, 25 SCRA 759).
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CRIMINAL LAW
incur any criminal liability because there is
no proposal to commit sedition.
(a) What, if any, are the respective criminal
liability of X, Y and Z?
(b) Would your answer be the same if B
were a barangay tanod only? (2001
Bar)
Q: What are the different acts of inciting to
sedition? (2007 Bar)
A: The different acts which constitute the
crime of inciting to sedition are:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
A:
Inciting others through speeches, writings,
banners and other media of representation
to commit acts which constitute sedition;
Uttering seditious words, speeches or
circulating scurrilous libels against the
Government of the Philippines or any of its
duly constituted authorities, which tend to
disturb or obstruct the performance of
official functions, or which tend to incite
others to cabal and meet for unlawful
purposes;
Inciting through the same media of
representation rebellious conspiracies or
riots;
Stirring people to go against lawful
authorities, or disturb the peace and public
order of the community or of the
Government; or
Knowingly concealing any of the
aforestated evil practices (Art. 142, RPC)
1.
Y is liable for the complex crimes of Direct
Assault with Less Serious Physical Injuries
for the fist blow on A, the teacher, which
caused the latter to fall down. For
purposes of the crime in Arts. 148 and 151
of the RPC, a teacher is considered a
person in authority, and having been
attacked by Y by reason of his
performance of official duty, direct assault
is committed with the resulting less
serious physical injuries complexed.
ASSAULT UPON, AND RESISTANCE AND
DISOBEDIENCE TO PERSONS IN AUTHORITY
AND THEIR AGENTS (1993, 1995, 2001,
2002, 2013 BAR)
Q: A, a teacher at Mapa High School, having
gotten mad at X, one of his pupils, because
of the latter’s throwing paper clips at his
classmates, twisted his right ear. X went out
of the classroom crying and proceeded
home located at the back of the school. He
reported to his parents, Y and Z, what A had
done to him,
2.
Y and Z immediately proceeded to the
school building and because they were
running and talking in loud voices, they
were seen by the barangay chairman, B,
who followed them as he suspected that an
untoward incident might happen. Upon
seeing A inside the classroom, X pointed
him out to his father, Y, who administered a
fist blow on A, causing him to fall down.
When Y was about to kick A, B rushed
towards Y and pinned both of the latter’s
arms. Seeing his father being held by B, X
went near and punched B on the face, which
caused him to lose his grip on Y.
Throughout this incident, Z shouted words
of encouragement at Y, her husband, and
also threatened to slap A.
Z, the mother of X and wife of Y may only
be liable as an accomplice to the complex
of crimes of direct assault with less serious
physical injuries committed by Y. Her
participation should not be considered as
that of a co-principal, since her reactions
were only incited by her relationship to X
and Y, as the mother of X and the wife of Y.
If B were a Barangay Tanod only, the act of
X of laying hand on him, being an agent of
a person in authority only, would
constitute the crime of Resistance and
Disobedience under Art. 151, RPC since X,
a highschool pupil, could not be
considered as having acted out of
contempt for authority but more of
helping his father get free from the grip of
B. Laying hand on an agent of a person in
authority is not ipso facto direct assault,
while it would always be direct assault if
done to a person in authority in defiance
to the latter’s exercise of authority.
Evasion of Service of Sentence
Q: Dancio, a member of a drug syndicate,
was a detention prisoner in the provincial
jail of X Province. Brusco, another member
of the syndicate, regularly visited Dancio.
Edri, the guard in charge who had been
receiving gifts from Brusco everytime he
visited Dancio, became friendly with him
and became relaxed in the inspection of his
belongings during his jail visits. In one of
Brusco's visits, he was able to smuggle in a
Security guards of the school arrived,
intervened and surrounded X, Y and Z so
that they could be investigated in the
principal’s office. Before leaving, Z passed
near A and threw a small flower pot at him
but it was deflected by B.
UST BAR OPERATIONS
X is liable for direct assault only, assuming
the physical injuries inflicted on B, the
Barangay Chairman, to be only slight and
hence, would be absorbed in the direct
assault. A Barangay Chairman is a person
in authority (Art. 152, RPC) and in this
case, was performing his duty of
maintaining peace and order when
attacked.
26
QUAMTO (1987-2017)
pistol which Dancio used to disarm the
guards and destroy the padlock of the main
gate of the jail, enabling Dancio to escape.
What crime(s) did Dancio, Brusco and Edri
commit? Explain. (2015 Bar)
2.
3.
A: Dancio committed the crime of direct
assault under Article 148 for disarming the
guards with the use of pistol while they are
engaged in the performance of their duties.
Using a pistol to disarm the guards manifests
criminal intention to defy the law and its
representative at all hazard. [Note: Illegal
possession of firearms may also be considered]
4.
5.
6.
7.
It is noteworthy to mention that Dancio cannot
be convited for the crime of evasion of service
of sentence under Art. 157 of the RPC because
this crime can only be committed by a convict
who shall evade service of his sentence by
escaping during the term of his imprisonment
by reason of final judgment. By escaping while
undergoing preventive imprisonment, he is not
evading the service of his sentence.
8.
9.
Counterfeiting coins; Forging treasury or
bank notes, obligations and securities;
Importing and uttering false or forged
notes, obligations and securities
Edri committed infidelity in the custody of
prisoner or evasion through negligence under
Article 224. As the guard in charge, Edri was
negligent in relaxing the inspection of the
Brusco’s belongings during jail visits allowing
him to smuggle a pistol to Dencio, which he
subsequently used to escape. By accepting gifts
from Brusco, who was part of the syndicate to
which Dancio belonged, he is also guilty of
indirect bribery under Article 211.
Q: Is mere possession of false money bills
punishable under Article 168 of the Revised
Penal Code? (1999 Bar)
A: No. Possession of false treasury or bank
note alone without an intent to use it, is not
punishable. But the circumstances of such
possession may indicate intent to utter,
sufficient to consummate the crime of illegal
possession of false notes.
Brusco committed delivery of prisoner from
jail under Article 156, qualified by his bribery
of Edri. Helping a person confined in jail to
escape constitutes this crime. “Helping” means
furnishing the prisoner with the material
means or tools which greatly facilitate his
escape; hence, providing a pistol which helped
Dencio to escape is delivery of prisoner from
jail.
Introduction of false documents
Q: M was forced by a policeman to sign a
document entitled “Sinumpaang Salaysay”
in which M implicated X as the brain behind
the robbery of a bank where P500,000.00
were lost. The document was prepared by
the policeman upon advice of B, the bank’s
lawyer, who was present when the
policeman asked M to sign the document.
As M refused to sign it, the policeman held
him by the neck and forced him to sign,
which he did as he was afraid he might be
bodily harmed.
D. CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC INTEREST
Forgeries
Q: How are "forging" and "falsification"
committed?
A: Forging or forgery is committed by giving to
a treasury or bank note or any instrument
payable to bearer or to order the appearance
of a true and genuine document; or by erasing,
substituting, counterfeiting, or altering by any
means the figures, letters, words or signs
contained therein.
During the hearing of the robbery before
the Fiscal’s Office, B submitted the
“Sinumpaang Salaysay” as evidence, on the
basis of which X was included in the
information filed by the Fiscal in court.
When M testified in court, he repudiated
the document and told the court there was
no truth to its contents as he was merely
forced to sign it. Did lawyer B commit any
crime when he used the “Sinumpaang
Salaysay” as evidence?
Falsification, on the other hand, is committed
through –
1.
Counterfeiting
or
imitating
handwriting, signature or rubric;
Causing it to appear that persons have
participated in any act or proceeding when
they did not in fact so participate;
Attributing to persons who have
participated in an act or proceeding
statements other than those in fact made
by them;
Making untruthful statements in a
narration of facts;
Altering true dates;
Making any alteration or intercalation in a
genuine document which changes its
meaning;
Issuing in an authenticated form a
document
Purporting to be a copy of an original
document when no such original exists, or
including in such copy a statement
contrary to, or different from, that of the
genuine original; or
Intercalating any instrument or note
relative to the issuance thereof in a
protocol, registry, or official book.
any
27
CRIMINAL LAW
A: The lawyer would be liable under Article
172 of the RPC for the offense of introducing a
false document in a judicial proceeding as he
knew the same to be false.
A:
(a) Dee Kiam can be indicted for the felony of
Falsification of a Public Document
committed by a private individual under
Art. 172 of the RPC in relation to Art. 171
thereof. A residence certificate is a public
or official document within the context of
said provisions and jurisprudence. Since
Dee Kiam made an untruthful statement in
a narration of facts (Art. 171(4), RPC), and
he being a private individual, he is
culpable thereunder.
(b) Falsification of public documents under
Arts. 171 and 172, RPC does not require
that the document is required by law. The
sanctity of the public document, a
residence certificate, cannot be taken
lightly as being a “mere scrap of paper”.
Intent to cause damage or actual damage, is
not an indispensable requisite for falsification
of public document.
Falsification of Public Document (1988,
1992, 1993, 1999, 2000, 2008 Bar)
Q: Andrea signed her husband’s name in
endorsing his treasury warrants which
were delivered to her directly by the
district supervisor who knew that her
husband had already died, and she used the
proceeds to pay for the expenses of her
husband’s last illness and his burial. She
knew that her husband had accumulated
vacation and sick leaves the money value of
which exceeded that value of the three
treasury warrants, so that the government
suffered no damage. Andrea’s appeal is
based on her claim of absence of criminal
intent and of good faith.
Should she be found guilty of falsification?
Discuss briefly. (1988 Bar)
Q: A falsified official or public document
was found in the possession of the accused.
No evidence was introduced to show that
the accused was the author of the
falsification. As a matter of fact, the trial
court convicted the accused of falsification
of official or public document mainly on the
proposition that “the only person who
could have made the erasures and the
superimposition mentioned is the one who
will be benefited by the alterations thus
made” and that “he alone could have the
motive for making such alterations”.
A: Andrea should be held guilty of falsification
of public documents. Her claim of absence of
criminal intent and of good faith cannot be
considered because she is presumed to know
that her husband is dead. The element of
damage required in falsification does not refer
to pecuniary damage but damage to public
interest.
NB: Executive clemency can, however, be
sought for by Andrea.
Was the conviction of the accused proper
although the conviction was premised
merely on the aforesaid ratiocination?
Explain your answer. (1999 Bar)
Q: Jose Dee Kiam, a Chinese citizen born in
Macao, having applied with a recruitment
agency to work in Kuwait, went to Quezon
City Hall to procure a Community Tax
Certificate, formerly called Residence
Certificate.
A: Yes. The conviction is proper because there
is a presumption in law that the possessor and
user of a falsified document is the one who
falsified the same.
He stated therein that his name is Leo
Tiampuy, a Filipino citizen born in Binan,
Laguna. As he paid for the Community Tax
Certificate, Cecille Delicious, an employee
in the office recognized him and reported to
her boss that the information written in the
Community Tax Certificate were all lies.
Shortly thereafter, an information was filed
against Dee Kiam alias Tiampuy.
Falsification of Private Document (1989,
1991, 2007 Bar)
Q: In a civil case for recovery of a sum of
money filed against him by A, B interposed
the defense of payment. In support thereof,
he identified and offered in evidence a
receipt which appears to be signed by A. On
rebuttal, A denied having been paid by B
and having signed the receipt. He presented
a handwriting expert who testified that the
alleged signature of A on the receipt is a
forgery and that a comparison thereof with
the specimen signatures of B clearly shows
that B himself forged the signature of A.
(a) An information was filed against Dee
Kiam. What crime, if any, may he be
indicted for? Why?
(b) The accused move to quash the
information on the ground that it did
not allege that he had the obligation to
disclose the truth in the Community Tax
Certificate; that the same is a useless
scrap of paper which one can buy even
in the Quiapo underpass and that he
had no intent of deceiving anybody.
Would you grant the motion to quash?
(1992 Bar)
UST BAR OPERATIONS
(a) Is B liable for the crime of using a
falsified document in a judicial
proceeding (last paragraph of Article
172 of the Revised Penal Code)?
28
QUAMTO (1987-2017)
(b) If he is not, what offense of offenses
may he be charged with? (1991 Bar)
ALTERNATIVE
ANSWER:
The
crime
committed by Fe are theft and falsification of
private document because Fe’s possession of
the proceeds of the rice mill was only physical,
not juridical, possession, and having
committed the crimes with grave abuse of
confidence, it is qualified theft.
A:
(a) No. B should not be liable for the crime of
using a falsified document, under the last
paragraph of Art. 172, RPC. He would be
liable for forgery of a private document
under the second mode of falsification
under Art. 172, RPC.
The falsification is a separate crime from the
theft because it was not committed as a
necessary means to commit the theft but
resorted to only to hide or conceal the
unlawful taking.
Being the possessor and user of the
falsified document he is presumed to be
the forger or falsifier and the offense of
introducing falsified document is already
absorbed in the main offense of forgery or
falsification.
Simulation of birth
Q: A childless couple, A and B, wanted to
have a child they could call their own. C, an
unwed mother, sold her newborn baby to
them. Thereafter, A and B caused their
names to be stated in the birth certificate of
the child as his parents. This was done in
connivance with the doctor who assisted in
the delivery of C. What are the criminal
liabilities, if any, of the couple A and B, C
and the doctor? (2002 Bar)
(b) If he testified on the genuineness of the
document, he should also be liable under
Art. 182, which is false testimony in civil
cases.
Q: Fe is the manager of a rice mill in
Bulacan. In order to support a gambling
debt, Fe made it appear that the rice mill
was earning less than it actually was by
writing in a “talaan” or ledger a figure
lower than what was collected and paid by
their customers. Fe then pocketed the
difference. What crime/s did Fe commit, if
any? Explain your answer. (2007 Bar)
A: The couple, A and B, and the doctor shall be
liable for the crime of simulation of birth
penalized under Article 347 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended. The act of making it
appear in the birth certificate of a child that the
persons named therein are the parents of the
child when they are not really the biological
parents of the said child constitutes the crime
of simulation of birth.
A: If the “talaan” or ledger which Fe made to
show a falsehood was a private document, the
only crime that Fe committed was estafa thru
abuse of confidence or unfaithfulness.
C, the unwed mother is criminally liable for
“Child Trafficking”, a violation of Article IV, Sec.
7 of RA 7610. The law punishes inter alia the
act of buying and selling of a child.
Criminal liability for falsification of a private
document does not arise without damage or at
least proof of intent to cause damage. It cannot
co-exist with the crime of estafa which also
essentially requires damage or at least proof of
intent to cause damage.
False testimony (1987, 1991, 1993, 1994,
1996, 1997, 2005, 2008 Bar)
Q: Explain and illustrate “subordination of
perjury”. (1993 Bar)
Since the “talaan” was falsified to cover up or
conceal the misappropriation of the amount
involved, whatever damage or intent to cause
damage that will attend the estafa.
A: Subordination of perjury refers to the act of
a person procuring a false witness to testify
and thereby commit perjury. The procurer is a
co- principal by inducement.
If such “talaan” or ledger was a commercial
document, damage or proof of intent to cause
damage is not necessary. The falsification
alone if done with intent to pervert the truth,
would bring about criminal liability for
falsification of a commercial document.
Damage or intent to cause damage, would
sustain the estafa independently of the
falsification of the commercial document. In
this case, two (2) separate crimes are
committed – estafa and falsification of the
commercial document. The falsification should
not be complexed with estafa since it was not
committed as a necessary means to commit the
estafa but rather resorted to, to conceal or hide
the misappropriation of the amount she
pocketed.
Q: Sisenando purchased the share of the
stockholders of Estrella Corporation in two
installments, making him the majority
stockholder thereof and eventually, its
president. Because the stockholders who
sold their stocks failed to comply with their
warranties attendant to the sale, Sisenando
withheld
payment
of
the
second
installment due on the shares and
deposited the money in escrow instead,
subject to release once said stockholders
comply with their warranties. The
stockholders concerned, in turn, rescinded
the sale in question and removed
29
CRIMINAL LAW
Sisenando from the Presidency of the
Estrella Corp., Sisenando then filed a
verified complaint for damages against said
stockholders in his capacity as president
and principal stockholder of Estrella Corp.
In retaliation, the stockholders concerned,
after petitioning the Securities and
Exchange Commission to declare the
rescission valid, further filed a criminal
case for perjury against Sisenando,
claiming that the latter perjured himself
when he stated under oath in the
verification of his complaint for damages
that he is the President of the Estrella
Corporation when in fact he had already
been removed as such.
direct participation (People v. Podol, 66 Phil.
365).
Since in this case, A cannot be held liable for
perjury, the matter that he testified to being
immaterial, he cannot therefore be held
responsible as a principal by inducement when
he induced C to testify on his status.
Consequently, C is not liable as principal by
direct participation in perjury, having testified
on matters not material to an administrative
case.
Q: Al Chua, a Chinese national, filed a
petition under oath for naturalization, with
the Regional Trial Court of Manila. In his
petition, he stated that he is married to Leni
Chua; that he is living with her in Sampaloc,
Manila; that he is of good moral character;
and that he has conducted himself in an
irreproachable manner during his stay in
the Philippines. However, at the time of the
filing of the petition, Leni Chua was already
living in Cebu, while Al was living with
Babes Toh in Manila, with whom he has an
amorous relationship. After his direct
testimony, Al Chua withdrew his petition
for naturalization. What crime or crimes, if
any, did Al Chua commit? Explain. (2005
Bar)
Under the facts of the case, could Sisenando
be held liable for perjury? Explain. (1996
Bar)
A: No.Sisenando may not be held liable for
perjury because it cannot be reasonably
maintained that he wilfully and deliberately
made an assertion of a falsehood when he
alleged in the complaint that he is the
President of the Corporation.
Obviously, he made the allegation on the
premise that his removal from the presidency
is not valid and that is precisely the issue
brought about by his complaint to the SEC. It is
a fact that Sisenando has been the President of
the corporation and it is from that position that
the stockholders concerned purportedly
removed him, whereupon he filed the
complaint questioning his removal. There is no
wilful and deliberate assertion of a falsehood
which is a requisite of perjury.
A: Al Chua committed perjury. His declaration
under oath for naturalization that he is of good
moral character and residing at Sampaloc,
Manila are false. This information is material to
his petition for naturalization. He committed
perjury for this wilful and deliberate assertion
of falsehood which is contained in a verified
petition made for a legal purpose.
E. CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC MORALS
(1996, 1993 BAR)
Q: A, a government employee, was
administratively charged with immorality
for having an affair with B, a co-employee in
the same office who believed him to be
single. To exculpate himself, A testified that
he was single and was willing to marry B,
He induced C to testify and C did testify that
B was single. The truth, however, was that A
had earlier married D, now a neighbor of C.
Q: Pia, a bold actress living on top floor of a
plush condominium in Makati City
sunbathed naked at its penthouse every
Sunday morning. She was unaware that the
business executives holding office at the
adjoining tall buildings reported to office
every Sunday morning and, with the use of
powerful binoculars, kept on gazing at her
while she sunbathed. Eventually, her
sunbathing became the talk of the town.
Is A guilty of perjury? Are A and C guilty of
subordination of perjury? (1997 Bar)
A: No. A is not guilty of perjury because the
willful falsehood asserted by him is not
material to the charge of immorality. Whether
A is single or married, the charge of immorality
against him as a government employee could
proceed or prosper. In other words, A's civil
status is not a defense to the charge of
immorality, hence, not a material matter that
could influence the charge.
(a) What crime, if any, did Pia commit?
Explain.
(b) What crime, if any, did the business
executives commit? Explain. (1996 Bar)
A:
(a) Pia did not commit a crime, the felony
closest to making Pia criminally liable is
Grave Scandal, but then such act is not to
be considered as highly scandalous and
offensive against decency and good
customs. In the first place, it was not done
in a public place and within public
There is no crime of subornation of perjury.
The crime is now treated as plain perjury with
the one inducing another as the principal
inducement, and the latter, as principal by
UST BAR OPERATIONS
30
QUAMTO (1987-2017)
knowledge or view. As a matter of fact it
was discovered by the executives
accidentally and they have to use
binoculars to have public and full view of
Pia sunbathing in the nude.
(b) The business executives did not commit
any crime. Their acts could not be acts of
lasciviousness (as there was no overt
lustful act), or slander, as the eventual talk
of the town, resulting from her sunbathing,
is not directly imputed to the business
executives, and besides such topic is not
intended to defame or put Pia to ridicule.
State with reasons whether
committed the following crimes:
(a) Direct bribery
(b) Indirect bribery
(c) Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act)
(d) Obstruction of Justice under PD 1829
(2005 Bar)
A: Patrick committed the crimes of direct
bribery under Article 210 of the Revised Penal
Code, Violation of Section 3 (e) of the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act (RA3019) and
Obstruction of Justice under Section 1 (b) of PD
1829.
Q: Juan and Petra are officemates. Later,
intimacy developed between them. One
day, Juan sent to Petra a booklet contained
in a pay envelope which was securely
sealed. The booklet is unquestionably
indecent and highly offensive to morals.
Juan was thereafter charged under par. 3 of
Art. 201 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by P.D. 969, which provides that
the penalty of prision mayor or a fine from
P6, 000to P12,000, or both such
imprisonment and fine shall be imposed
upon those who shall sell, give away or
exhibit films, prints, engravings, sculpture
or literature which are offensive to morals.
(a) Direct bribery was committed by Patrick
when, for a consideration of P500,000.00,
he committed a violation of PD 1829 by
destroying the drugs which were evidence
entrusted to him in his official capacity.
(b) Indirect bribery is not committed because
he received the P500,000.00 as
consideration for destroying the evidence
against the offender, which was under his
official custody as a public officer. The
money was not delivered to him simply as
a gift or present by reason of his public
office.
(c) Patrick also violated Section 3 (e), R.A.
3019 causing undue injury to the
government through evident bad faith,
giving unwarranted benefit to the offender
by destroying evidence of a crime.
(d) Obstruction of justice under Section 1 (b)
of P.D. 1829 is committed by destroying
evidence intended to be used in official
proceedings in criminal case.
Is Juan guilty of the crime charged?
Reasons. (1993 Bar)
A:No. Juan is not guilty of the crime charged
because the law (Art. 201, RPC) covers only the
protection of public moral and not only the
moral of an individual.
F.
Patrick
CRIMES COMMITTED BY PUBLIC
OFFICERS
Q: Define malfeasance, misfeasance and
nonfeasance. (2016 Bar)
Indirect bribery
Q: Commissioner Marian Torres of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) wrote
solicitation letters addressed to the
Filipino-Chinese Chamber of Commerce and
Industry and to certain CEOs of various
multinational corporations requesting
donations of gifts for her office Christmas
party. She used the Bureau's official
stationery. The response was prompt and
overwhelming
so
much
so
that
Commissioner
Torres'
office
was
overcrowded with rice cookers, radio sets,
freezers, electric stoves and toasters. Her
staff also received several envelopes
containing cash money for the employees'
Christmas luncheon. Has Commissioner
Torres committed any impropriety or
irregularity? What laws or decrees did she
violate? (2006 Bar)
A: Malfeasance is the doing of an act which a
person ought not to do at all
Misfeasance is the improper doing of an act
which a person may or might lawfully do
Nonfeasance is the omission of an act which a
person ought to do.
(Black’s Dictionary, 6th Edition, West Publishing
1990)
Bribery (1990, 1993, 1994, 1997, 2001,
2005, 2006, 2010, 2014 Bar)
Q: During a PNP buy-bust operation, Cao
Shih was arrested for selling 20 grams of
methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu)
to a poseur-buyer. Cao Shih, through an
intermediary, paid Patrick, the Evidence
Custodian of the PNP Forensic Chemistry
Section, the amount of P500,000 in
consideration for the destruction by Patrick
of the drug. Patrick managed to destroy the
drug.
A: Yes. Commissioner Torres violated the
following:
1.
31
Indirect bribery (Art. 211, RPC) for
receiving gifts offered by reason of office.
CRIMINAL LAW
2.
3.
Q: Dencio, who is the Municipal Treasurer
of the town, was also the treasurer of a
charity ball of the church. Because he was
short of payroll funds for the municipal
employees, he used part of the church funds
to replenish the payroll funds with the
intention of returning the same when the
public funds came.
RA 6713 or Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and
Employees when he solicited and accept
gifts (Sec. 7[d]).
PD 46 making it punishable for public
officials and employees to receive, and for
private persons to give gifts on any
occasion, including Christmas.
(a) Is Dencio guilty of malversation under
the RPC? State your reasons.
(b) Assuming that he failed to replenish the
church funds, may he be held criminally
liable thereby? (1990 Bar)
Q: A, who is the private complainant in a
murder case pending before a Regional
Trial Court judge, gave a judge a Christmas
gift, consisting of big basket of assorted
canned goods and bottles of expensive
wines, easily worth P10, 000.00. The judge
accepted the gift knowing it came from A.
What crime or crimes, if any, were
committed? (1997, 1993 Bar)
A:
(a) No. The church funds used by Dencio do
not constitute public funds which are the
proper subject of malversation. Neither
does said funds constitute the so called
private funds which could be the proper
subject of malversation under Art. 222,
RPC, which pertain to private property
placed in the custody of publicofficers by
reason of their office.
(b) Yes. Momentary use of funds, since there
is defraudation, is tantamount to estafa
under Art. 215 of the RPC. This is because
he received the funds in his capacity as
treasurer and there was temporary
damage caused. Personal benefit is not an
element of the crime of estafa.
A: The judge committed the crime of indirect
bribery under Art. 211 of the RPC. The gift was
offered to the judge by reason of his office. In
addition, the judge will be liable for the
violation of P.D. 46 which punishes the
receiving of gifts by public officials and
employees on occasions like Christmas.
Qualified bribery
Q: What is the crime of qualified bribery?
May a judge be charged and prosecuted for
such felony? How about a public
prosecutor? A police officer? Explain. (2010
Bar)
Q: Randy, an NBI agent, was issued by the
NBI an armalite rifle (M16) and a Smith and
Wesson Revolver Cal. 38. After a year, the
NBI Director made an inspection of all the
firearms issued. Randy, who reported for
work that morning, did not show up during
the inspection. He went on absence without
leave (AWOL). After two years, he
surrendered to the NBI the two firearms
issued to him. He was charged with
malversation of government property
before the Sandiganbayan.
A: Qualified bribery is a crime committed by a
public officer who is entrusted with law
enforcement and who, in consideration of any
offer, promise, gift of offer, refrains from
arresting or prosecuting an offender who has
committed a crime punishable by reclusion
perpetua and/ or death (Art. 211-A, RPC).
No, a judge may not be charged of this felony
because his official duty as a public officer is
not law enforcement but the determination of
cases already filed in court.
Randy put up the defense that he did not
appropriate the armalite rifle and the
revolver for his own use, that the delay in
accounting for them does not constitute
conversion and that actually the firearms
were stolen by his friend,Chiting. Decide
the case. (1994 Bar)
On the other hand, a public prosecutor may be
prosecuted for this crime in respect of the
bribery committed, aside from dereliction of
duty committed in violation of Art. 208 of the
Revised Penal Code, should he refrain from
prosecuting an offender who has committed a
crime punishable by reclusion perpetua
and/or death in consideration of any offer,
promise, gift or present.
A: Randy is guilty as charged under Art. 217,
RPC. He is accountable for the firearms they
issued to him in his official capacity. The
failure of Randy to submit the firearms upon
demand created the presumption that he
converted them for his own use. Even if there
is no direct evidence of misappropriation, his
failure to account for the government property
is enough factual basis for a finding of
malversation.
Meanwhile, a police officer who refrains from
arresting such offender for the same
consideration above stated, may be prosecuted
for this felony since he is a public officer
entrusted with law enforcement.
Malversation of Public Funds (1987, 1988,
1990, 1994, 1996, 1999, 2001, 2005, 2006,
2008, 2016 Bar)
UST BAR OPERATIONS
Indeed, even his explanation that the guns
were stolen is incredible for if the firearms
32
QUAMTO (1987-2017)
Q: Alex Reyes, together with Jose Santos,
were former warehousemen of the Rustan
Department Store. In 1986, the PCGG
sequestered the assets, fund and properties
of the owners-incorporators of the store,
alleging that they constitute "Ill-gotten
wealth" of the Marcos family. Upon their
application, Reyes and Santos were
appointed as fiscal agents of the
sequestered firm and they were given
custody and possession of the sequestered
building and its contents, including various
vehicles used in the firm's operations.
were actually stolen, he should have reported
the matter immediately to the authorities.
Q: Elizabeth is the municipal treasurer of
Masinloc, Zambales. On January 10, 1994,
she received, as municipal treasurer, from
the Department of Public Works and
Highways, the amount of P100, 000.00
known as the fund for construction,
rehabilitation,
betterment,
and
Improvement (CRBI) for the concreting of
Barangay Phanix Road located in Masinloc,
Zambales, a project undertaken on
proposal of the Barangay Captain. Informed
that the fund was already exhausted while
the concreting of Barangay Phanix Road
remained unfinished, a representative of
the Commission on Audit conducted a spot
audit of Elizabeth who failed to account for
the P100,000 CRBI fund. Elizabeth, who was
charged with malversation of public funds,
was acquitted by the Sandiganbayan of that
charge but was nevertheless convicted, in
the same criminal case, for illegal use of
public funds. On appeal, Elizabeth argued
that her conviction was erroneous as she
applied the amount of P50,000.00 for a
public purpose without violating any law or
ordinance appropriating the said amount
for any specific purpose. The absence of
such law or ordinance was, in fact,
established.
After a few months, an inventory was
conducted and it was discovered that two
(2) delivery vans were missing. After
demand was made upon them, Reyes and
Santos failed to give any satisfactory
explanation why the vans were missing or
to turn them over to the PCGG; hence, they
were charged with Malversation of Public
Property. During the trial, the two accused
claimed that they are not public
accountable officers and, if any crime was
committed, it should only be Estafa under
Art. 315, par. 1(b) of the Revised Penal
Code.
What is the proper offense committed?
State the reason(s) for your answer. (2001
Bar)
Is the contention of Elizabeth legally
tenable? Explain. (1996 Bar)
A: The proper offense committed was
Malversation of Public Property, not estafa,
considering that Reyes and Santos, upon their
application, were constituted as "fiscal agents"
of the sequestered firm and were "given
custody and possession" of the sequestered
properties, including the delivery vans which
later they could not account for.
A: Elizabeth's contention that her conviction
for illegal use of public funds (technical
malversation) was erroneous is legally tenable
because she was charged for malversation of
public funds under Art. 217 of the RPC but was
convicted for Illegal use of public funds which
is defined and punished under Art. 220.
They were thus made the depositary and
administrator of properties deposited by
public authority and hence, by the duties of
their office/position, they are accountable for
such properties. Such properties, having been
sequestered by the Government through the
PCGG, are in custodia legis and therefore
impressed with the character of public
property, even though the properties belong to
a private individual (Art. 222, RPC).
A public officer charged with malversation
may not be validly convicted of illegal use of
public funds (technical malversation) because
the latter crime is not necessarily included nor
does it necessarily include the crime of
malversation.
The Sandiganbayan should have followed the
procedure provided in Sec. 11, Rule 119 of the
Rules of Court and order the filing of the
proper
Information
(Parungao
v.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 96025, May 15, 1991).
From the facts, there is no showing that there
is a law or ordinance appropriating the amount
to a specific public purpose. As a matter of fact,
the problem categorically states that the
absence of such law or ordinance was, in fact,
established.
The failure of Reyes and Santos to give any
satisfactory explanation why the vans were
missing, is prima facie evidence that they had
put the same to their personal use.
Q: Allan, the Municipal Treasurer of the
Municipality of Gerona, was in a hurry to
return to his office after a day-long official
conference.
He
alighted
from
the
government car which was officially
assigned to him, leaving the ignition key
and the car unlocked, and rushed to his
office. Jules, a bystander, drove off with the
car and later sold the same to his brother,
So, procedurally and substantially, the
Sandiganbayan's decision suffers from serious
infirmity.
33
CRIMINAL LAW
Danny for P20,000.00, although the car was
worth P800,000.00.
A: Governor A committed the crimes of (1)
Technical Malversation; and (2) Violation of
Sections 3(e)and (g) of Republic Act No. 3019
(a) What are the respective crimes, if any,
committed by Allan, Danny and Jules?
Explain.
(b) What, if any, are their respective civil
liabilities? Explain. (2005 Bar)
Governor A committed the crime of illegal use
of public funds or property punishable under
Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code, also
known as Technical Malversation. The crime
has three elements: a) that the offender is an
accountable public officer; b) that he applies
public funds or property under his
administration to some public use; and c) that
the public use for which such funds or
property has been applied is different from the
purpose for which they were originally
appropriated by law or ordinance (Ysidro v
People, G.R. No. 192330, November 14, 2012).
A:
(a) Allan, the municipal treasurer is liable for
malversation
committed
through
negligence or culpa. The government car
which was assigned to him is public
property under his accountability by
reason of his duties. By his act of
negligence, he permitted the taking of the
car by another person, resulting in
malversation, consistent with the language
of Art. 217 of RPC.
The amount of P 10 M granted by the
Department of Agriculture to Governor A, an
accountable public officer, is specifically
appropriated for the purpose of buying
seedlings to be distributed to the farmers.
Instead, Governor A applied the amount to
acquire modern farm equipment through
direct purchase from XY Enterprise owned by
his kumpare. The law punishes the act of
diverting public funds earmarked by law or
ordinance for a specific public purpose to
another public purpose, hence, the liability for
technical malversation.
Danny committed the crime of fencing for
having bought the car which was the
proceeds of carnapping, a crime in the
nature of theft or robbery of motor vehicle.
The presumption of fencing applies to him
for he paid a price so inadequate for the
value of the car.
Jules committed the crime of carnapping
for the unlawful taking, with intent to gain,
of the government’s motor vehicle.
(Unlawful taking of a motor vehicle is now
governed by the Anti-Carnapping Act, R.A.
6539, not by the provisions of the RPC on
theft or robbery).
Governor A can also be held liable for violation
of Section 3(e) of RA 3019, which has the
following elements: (1) the accused is a public
officer discharging administrative, judicial, or
official functions; (2) he must have acted with
manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
excusable negligence; and (3) his action caused
undue injury to any party, including the
government, or gave any private party
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference
in the discharge of his functions.
(b) Allan, Jules and Danny are all civilly liable
for restitution of the car to the government
or if not possible, reparation of damages
caused by payment of the replacement
cost of the car minus allowance for
depreciation,
and
to
indemnify
consequential damages.
The facts show that the first element is
present. The second element is likewise
present because “through manifest partiality”
in favoring his kumpare, Governor A did not
hold pubic bidding and directly purchased the
farm equipment from the latter. With respect
to the third element, Governor A’s actions
caused undue injury to the government as well
as the farmers deprived of the seedlings. His
acts likewise gave his kumpare, a private party,
the unwarranted benefit, advantage, or
preference, to the exclusion of other interested
suppliers.
Technical Malversation
Q: Governor A was given the amount of PIO
million by the Department of Agriculture
for the purpose of buying seedlings to be
distributed to the farmers. Supposedly
intending to modernize the farming
industry in his province, Governor A bought
farm equipment through direct purchase
from
XY
Enterprise,
owned
by
his kumpare B, the alleged exclusive
distributor of the said equipment. Upon
inquiry, the Ombudsman discovered that B
has a pending patent application for the
said farm equipment. Moreover, the
equipment purchased turned out to be
overpriced. What crime or crimes, if any,
were committed by Governor A? Explain.
(2016 Bar)
UST BAR OPERATIONS
The act committed by the Governor is also in
violation of Section 3(g) of RA no. 3019 for
entering a contract on behalf of the
government which is manifestly and grossly
disadvantageous to the same.
Q: A typhoon destroyed the houses of many
of the inhabitants of X Municipality.
Thereafter, X Municipality operated a
shelter assistance program whereby
34
QUAMTO (1987-2017)
construction materials were provided to
the calamity victims, and the beneficiaries
provided the labor. The construction was
partially done when the beneficiaries
stopped helping with the construction for
the reason that they needed to earn income
to provide food for their families. When
informed of the situation, Mayor Maawain
approved the withdrawal of ten boxes of
food from X Municipality's feeding
program, which were given to the families
of the beneficiaries of the shelter assistance
program. The appropriations for the funds
pertaining to the shelter assistance
program and those for the feeding program
were separate items on X Municipality's
annual budget.
a) What crime did Mayor Maawain commit?
Explain.
b) May Mayor Maawain invoke the defense
of good faith and that he had no evil intent
when he approved the transfer of the boxes
of food from the feeding program to the
shelter assistance program? Explain. (2015
Bar)
(Ysidoro v. People, G.R. No. 192330, 14
November 2012)
Infidelity of Public Officers
Custody of prisoners (1989, 1990, 1996,
1997, 2002, 2009, 2014 Bar)
Q: Ernani was accused of estafa. Unable to
post a bail bond for his provisional liberty
pending trial of his case, he was detained in
the city jail. On the date of the hearing of
the estafa case, Daniel, a policeman detailed
in the city jail, escorted Ernani to the city
hall for the trial. Daniel removed the
handcuffs of Ernani and allowed him to sit
on one of the chairs inside the courtroom.
As Daniel was talking to a lawyer inside the
courtroom, Ernani, with the help of a
cigarette vendor, Meynardo, who used his
cigarette container as cover, surreptitiously
moved out of the room and escaped. Ernani
and Meynardo went to the comfort room
for a while, then went down the stairs and
lost themselves in the crowd. What crime/s
were committed by Ernani, Daniel and
Meynardo? Give your reasons. (1989 Bar)
A:
a) Mayor Maawain committed the crime of
Illegal use of public funds or property
punishable under Article 220 of the RPC. This
offense is also known as Technical
Malversation. The crime has 3 elements: a.)
that the offender is an accountable public
officer; b) that he applies public funds or
property under his administration to some
public use; and c) that the public use for which
such funds or property were applied is
different from the purpose for which they were
originally appropriated by law or ordinance.
The funds for the feeding program are not
specifically appropriated for the beneficiaries
of the shelter assistance program in X
Municipality’s annual budget. Mayor Maawain
ought to use the boxes of food earmarked
particularly for the feeding program, which
would cater only to the malnourished among
his constituents who needed the resources for
proper nourishment
A:
1.
2.
Ernani, the escaped prisoner himself is not
criminally liable for any offense. The
detention prisoner who escapes from
detention does not commit any crime. If he
were a convict by final judgment who is
serving a sentence which consists of
deprivation of liberty and he escapes
during term of his sentence, he would be
liable for Evasion of Service Sentence (Art.
157).
Daniel, the policeman, committed the
crime of Evasion thru Negligence, one of
the forms of Infidelity in the custody of
Prisoner (Art. 224), the essential elements
of which offense are:
a.
b.
b) No. Mayor Maawain cannot invoke good
faith when he approved the transfer of the
boxes of food from the feeding program to the
Shelter Assistance program. “Criminal intent is
not an element of technical malversation. The
law punishes the act of diverting public
property earmarked by law or ordinance for a
particular purpose to another public purpose.
The offense is mala prohibita, meaning that the
prohibited act is not inherently immoral but
becomes a criminal offense because positive
law forbids its commission based on
considerations of public policy, order and
convenience. It is the commission of an act as
defined by the law, and not the character or
effect thereof that determines whether or not
the provision has been violated. Hence, malice
or criminal intent is completely irrelevant”.
c.
That the offender is a public officer
That he has in his custody or charge a
prisoner, either detention prisoner/s
by final judgment
That such prisoner escaped from his
custody thru his negligence.
All of these elements are present, Daniel, a
policeman detailed in the city jail, is a
public officer. As the escort for Ernani in
the latter’s trial, he had custody of charge
of a detention prisoner. Ernani escape was
thru his negligence because after removing
Ernani’s handcuffs and allowing him to sit
in one of the chairs inside the courtroom,
he should have taken the necessary
precautions to prevent Ernani’s escape by
keeping an eye on him. Instead, he
provided the opportunity for the escape by
talking with a lawyer and not keeping
watch over his prisoner.
35
CRIMINAL LAW
3.
money for her medicines. Depressed by his
dismissal and angered by the nagging of his
wife, Aldrich struck Carmi with his fist. She
fell to the ground. As a result, she and her
unborn baby died.
Meynardo, not being a public officer, is
guilty of the crime of Delivering Prisoners
From Jails (Art. 156), which is committed
by any person who either removes from
any jail or penal establishment any person
confined therein, or who helps the escape
of such person by means of violence,
intimidation, bribery of other means. The
act of Meynardo in giving to Ernani his
cigarette container is helping in the latter’s
escape by other means.
What crime was committed by Aldrich?
(1994 Bar)
A: Aldrich committed the crime of parricide
with unintentional abortion. When Aldrich
struck his wife, Carmi, with his fist, he
committed the crime of maltreatment under
Art. 266, par. 3 of the RPC. Since Carmi died
because of the felonious act of Aldrich, he is
criminally liable of parricide under Art. 246,
RPC in relation to Art. 4, par. 1 of the same
Code. Since the unborn baby of Carmi died in
the process, but Aldrich had no intention to
cause the abortion of his wife, Aldrich
committed unintentional abortion as defined
in Art. 257, RPC. Inasmuch as the single act of
Aldrich produced two grave or less grave
felonies, he falls under Art. 48, RPC, i.e. a
complex crime (People v. Salufrancia, 159 SCRA
401).
Q: Amy was apprehended and arrested by
the Patrolman Bart for illegal parking. She
was detained at the police precinct,
underwent investigation, and released only
after 48 hours.
(a) Is Patrolman Bart liable for any
offense? Explain your answer.
(b) Suppose Amy resisted the arrest and
grappled with patrolman Bart, is she
criminally liable thereby? State your
reasons. (1990 Bar)
A:
(a) Patrolman Bart is liable for violation of
Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code –
Delay on the Delivery of Detained Persons
to the Proper Judicial Authorities.
(b) She is criminally liable for slight
disobedience under Art. 151 of the RPC –
Resistance and disobedience to a person in
authority or the agents of such person.
Q: After a heated argument over his
philandering, Higino punched on the head
his wife Aika, who was six and a half
months pregnant. Because of the impact,
Aika lost her balance, fell on the floor with
her head hitting a hard object. Aika died
and the child was expelled prematurely.
After thirty-six hours, the child died.
a) What crime(s) did Higino commit?
Explain.
b) Assuming that when the incident
occurred, Aika was only six months
pregnant, and when she died, the fetus
inside her womb also died, will your
answer be different? Explain. (2015 Bar)
Was there any crime committed by A?
(1997 Bar)
A:
a) With respect to the killing of the wife,
parricide under Article 246 of the Revised
Penal Code is committed because of the
qualifying circumstance of relationship. With
respect to the killing of the child, Higino is
liable for infanticide under Article 255 of the
Revised Penal Code because his child was born
alive and was already viable or capable of
independent existence and the child’s age is
less than three (3) days for the latter died after
thirty -six hours from expulsion. Higino shall
incur criminal liability for parricide and
infanticide although these crimes committed
are different from his criminal intention of
maltreating his wife (Article 4, RPC). This is a
complex crime because the single act of
punching the victim constitutes two grave
felonies (Article 48).
Q: During a town fiesta, A, the chief of
police, permitted B, a detention prisoner
and his compadre, to leave the municipal
jail and entertain visitors in his house from
10:00 am to 8:00 pm. B returned to the
municipal jail at 8:30 pm.
A: Yes. A committed the crime of infidelity in
the custody of a prisoner. Since B is a detention
prisoner, as Chief of Police, A has custody over
B. Even if B returned to the municipal jail at
8:30pm. A, as custodian of the prisoner, has
maliciously failed to perform the duties of his
office, and when he permits said prisoner to
obtain a relaxation of his imprisonment, he
consents to the prisoner escaping the
punishment of being deprived of his liberty
which can be considered real and actual
evasion of service under Article 223 of the RPC
(People v. Leon Bandino, 29 Phil 459).
G. CRIMES AGAINST PERSONS
Parricide (1994, 1996, 1997, 2003, 2006,
2015 Bar)
b) If the child died inside the womb of Aika,
who was only six months, the crime committed
is complex crime of parricide with
unintentional abortion. Killing the unborn
child as a result of the violence employed
Q: Aldrich was dismissed from his job by his
employer. Upon reaching home, his
pregnant wife, Carmi, nagged him about
UST BAR OPERATIONS
36
QUAMTO (1987-2017)
against the mother without intent to abort is
unintentional abortion. Since the child died
inside the womb of the mother, unintentional
abortion is committed regardless of viability of
the victim. Because the same violence that
killed the mother also caused unintentional
abortion, the crime committed is a complex
crime (People v. Pacayna, Jr. G.R. No. 179035,
April 16, 2008; People v. Robinos, G.R. No.
138453, May 29, 2002; People v. Villanueva, G.R.
No. 95851, March 01, 1995; People v. Salufrania,
G.R. No. L- 50884, March 30, 1988)
quarrels, she suffered birth pangs and gave
birth prematurely to a live baby girl while
Oniok was at his place of work. Upon
coming home and learning what happened,
he prevailed upon Ana to conceal his
dishonor. Hence, they placed the infant in a
shoe and threw it into a nearby creek.
However, an inquisitive neighbor saw them
and with the help of others. Retrieved the
infant who was already dead from
drowning. The incident was reported to the
police who arrested Ana and Oniok.
Q: In 1975, Pedro, then a resident of Manila,
abandoned his wife and their son, Ricky,
who was then only three years old. Twenty
years later, an affray took place in a bar in
Olongapo City between Pedro and his
companions, on one hand, and Ricky and
his friends, upon the other, without the
father and son knowing each other. Ricky
stabbed and killed Pedro in the fight, only
to find out, a week later, when his mother
arrived from Manila to visit him in jail, that
the man whom he killed was his own father.
The two were charged with parricide under
Article 246 of the RPC. After trial, they were
convicted of the crime charged.
Was the conviction correct? (Bar 2006)
A: The conviction was incorrect because:
(a) Under Art. 46, Civil Code, a newborn with
an intra-uterine life of less than 7 months
must live for at least 24 hours before it
may be considered born and hence, before
it may acquire personality of its own;
(b) The newborn, therefore was still a fetus
when killed and was not yet a person.
Hence, the crime in law is abortion. It is
legally a fetus who was killed, not a person
or child because legally it has no
personality yet.
(c) Infanticide and parricide involves a killing
when the victim is already a person.
(1) What crime did Ricky commit?
(2) Suppose Ricky knew before the killing
that Pedro is his father, but he
nevertheless killed him out of
bitterness for having abandoned him
and his mother, what crime did Ricky
commit? Explain. (1996 Bar)
Murder (1987, 1991, 1993, 1995, 1996,
1999, 2001, 2008, 2009 Bar)
A:
(1) Ricky committed parricide because the
person killed was his own father and the
law punishing the crime (Art. 246, RPC)
does not require that the crime be
knowingly committed. Should Ricky be
prosecuted and found guilty of parricide,
the penalty to be imposed is Art. 49 of the
Revised Penal Code for Homicide (the
crime he intended to commit) but in its
maximum period.
(2) The crime committed should be parricide
if Ricky knew before the killing that Pedro
is his father, because the moral basis for
punishing the crime already exists. His
having acted out of bitterness for having
been abandoned by his father may be
considered mitigating.
Q: A, a 76-year old woman, was brought to
the hospital in a coma with slight cerebral
hemorrhage. An endotracheal tube was
inserted in her mouth to facilitate her
breathing. B, a hospital janitor, removed
the tube. The victim started to convulse and
bleed in the mouth. Only the timely arrival
of the nurse prevented the patient’s death.
The patient was then transferred to
another hospital where she died the next
day of cardio-respiratory. Is B criminally
liable? If so, what crime was committed?
(1991 Bar)
A: Yes. B is criminally liable for Murder
(qualified by treachery) because the death of A
appears to be the proximate cause of the overt
acts of B.
Q: Ana has been a bar girl/GRO at a beer
house for more than 2 years. She fell in love
with
Oniok,
the
bartender,
who
impregnated her. But Ana did not inform
about her condition and, instead, went to
Cebu to conceal her shame.
A died of cardio-respiratory arrest which
evidently was brought about by the convulsion
and bleeding in the mouth of the victim due to
the removal by B of the endotracheal tube
twice. The two acts of B can be considered as
the result of one criminal design.
However, her parents drove her away so
she returned to Manila and stayed with
Oniok in his boarding house. Upon learning
of her pregnancy, already in an advanced
state, Oniok tried to persuade her to
undergo an abortion, but she refused.
Because of their constant and bitter
In People v. Umaging, 107 SCRA 166, the
Supreme Court ruled that removal of the
endotracheal tube is attempted murder,
qualified by treachery, because the patient did
not die.
37
CRIMINAL LAW
the deprivation of his liberty. In this case, the
victim was not deprived of his liberty since he
immediately died. The demand for ransom did
not convert the offense into kidnapping with
murder. The defendant was well aware that
the child would be suffocated to death in a few
moments after she left. The demand for
ransom is only a part of the diabolic scheme of
the defendant to murder the child, to conceal
his body and then demand money before the
discovery of the cadaver (People v. Lora, G.R.
No. L-49430, March 30, 1982).
Q: Define murder. What are the elements of
the crime? (1999 Bar)
A: Murder is the unlawful killing of a person
which otherwise would constitute only
homicide, had it not been attended by any of
the following circumstances:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
With treachery or taking advantage of
superior strength, or with the aid of armed
men, or employing means to weaken the
defense or of means or persons to insure
or afford impunity;
In consideration of a price, reward or
promise;
By means or on the occasion of inundation,
fire,
poison,
explosion,
shipwreck,
stranding of a vessel, derailment or assault
upon a railroad, fall of an airship, or by
means of motor vehicles, or with the use of
any other means involving great waste and
ruin;
On occasion of an earthquake, eruption of
a volcano, destructive cyclone, epidemic or
other public calamity;
With evident premeditation;
With cruelty, by deliberately and
inhumanely augmenting the suffering of
the victim, or outraging or scoffing at his
person or corpse.
Fely is not liable for murder as principal or
accomplice since there is neither conspiracy or
community of design to commit murder since
her criminal intention pertains to kidnapping
for ransom. In addition, her participation of
demanding ransom for the release of the child
is not connected to murder. Her criminal mind
to assist Lina in committing kidnapping for
ransom is not constitutive of a felony. Mens rea
wihout actus reus is not a crime.
Q: Candido stabbed an innocent bystander
who accidentally bumped him. The
innocent bystander died as a result of the
stabbing. Candido was arrested and was
tested to be positive for the use of “shabu”
at the time he committed the stabbing.
What should be the proper charge against
Candido? Explain. (2005 Bar)
Q: Lina worked as a housemaid and yaya of
the one-week old son of the spouses John
and Joana. When Lina learned that her 70year old mother was seriously ill, she asked
John for a cash advance of P20,000.00, but
the latter refused. In anger, Lina gagged the
mouth of the child with stockings, placed
him in a box, sealed it with masking tape,
and placed the box in the attic. Lina then
left the house and asked her friend Fely to
demand a P20,000.00 ransom for the
release of the spouses' child to be paid
within twenty-four hours. The spouses did
not pay the ransom. After a couple of days,
John discovered the box in the attic with his
child already dead. According to the
autopsy report, the child died of
asphyxiation barely minutes after the box
was sealed.
What crime or crimes, if any, did Lina and
Fely commit? Explain. (2016 Bar)
A: Candido should be charged with murder
qualified by treachery because the suddenness
of the stabbing caught the victim by surprise
and was totally defenseless. Being under the
influence of dangerous drugs is a qualifying
aggravating circumstance in the commission of
a crime (Sec. 25, RA 9165, Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002). Hence, the
penalty for murder shall be imposed in the
maximum.
Homicide (1989, 1990, 1992, 1994, 1995,
1996, 2003, 2005, 2014 Bar)
Q: Tommy saw Lino and Okito engaged in a
street fight. Lino then suddenly drew his
balisong and lunged at Okito. In an effort to
break up the fight, Tommy tried to snatch
the balisong from Lino but not before the
latter had inflicted a wound on Okito. As
Lino withdrew the weapon and attempted
to stab Okito a second time, Tommy tried to
grab the weapon again. In so doing, his left
forearm was slashed. As he succeeded in
snatching away the balisong with his right
arm, it flew with such force, that it hit
Nereo, a passerby who was seriously
injured.
A: Lina is liable for murder. Gagging the mouth
of the child with stockings, placing him in a
box, sealing it with masking tape, and placing
the box in the attic were only the methods
employed by the defendant in committing the
murder qualified by treachery (People v. Lora,
G.R. No. L-49430, March 30, 1982). Taking
advantage of the defenseless condition of the
victim by reason of his tender age, one-week
old, is treachery (People v. Fallorina, G.R. No.
137347, March 4, 2004). She is not liable for
kidnapping with murder. The essence of
kidnapping or serious illegal detention is the
actual confinement or restraint of the victim or
UST BAR OPERATIONS
Explain your answers fully.
(a) What is the criminal liability of Lino
with respect to Okito, Tommy and
Nereo?
38
QUAMTO (1987-2017)
(b) In turn, is Tommy criminally liable to
Nereo? (1992 Bar)
Since the road was slippery at that time, the
vehicle skidded and hit Belle causing her
death. What is the liability of Gaston? Why?
(2005 Bar)
A:
A: Gaston is criminally liable for homicide in
doing the felonious act which caused Belle’s
death, although the penalty therefor shall be
mitigated by lack of intention to commit so
grave a wrong as that committed (Art. 13 [3],
RPC). The act having been deliberately done
with malice, is felonious and being the
proximate cause of Belle’s death, brings about
criminal liability although the wrong done.
(a) As far as Okito is concerned, Lino is liable
for frustrated homicide, assuming that the
wound suffered by Okito is such that for
reasons or causes independent of the will
of Lino (such as timely medical attention)
Okito would have died. If the injury is not
serious enough, the liability is only
attempted homicide.
Intent to kill is manifest because of the use
of a deadly weapon. For the injury on the
arm of Tommy, Lino is liable only for
physical injuries (serious, less serious or
slight, depending on the nature of the
injury). Apparently, there is no intent to
kill.
Rape (1992, 1993, 1995, 1996, 2000, 2002,
2004, 2009, 2015 Bar)
Q: The complainant, an eighteen-year old
mental retardate with an intellectual
capacity between the ages of nine and
twelve years, when asked during the trial
how she felt when she was raped by the
accused, replied “Masarap, it gave me much
pleasure.”
For Nereo, Lino should be liable for
serious physical injuries as the wounding
of Nereo was the natural and logical
consequences of Lino’s felonious act.
With the claim of the accused that the
complainant consented for a fee to the
sexual intercourse, and with the foregoing
answer of the complainant, would you
convict the accused of rape if you were the
judge trying the case? Explain.(1996 Bar)
(b) Tommy is exempted from criminal liability
for the injury to Nereo as he was
performing a lawful act with due care and
the injury was caused by mere accident
(Art. 12, par. 4), or that he was in lawful
exercise of a right (Art. 11, par. 6), that is,
defense of a stranger.
A: Yes, I would convict the accused of rape.
Since the victim is a mental retardate with an
intellectual capacity of a child less than 12
years old, she is legally incapable of giving a
valid consent to the sexual intercourse. The
sexual intercourse is tantamount to a statutory
rape because the level of intelligence is that of
a child less than 12 years of age. Where the
victim of rape is a mental retardate, violence or
intimidation is not essential to constitute rape
(People v. Trimor, G.R. 106541-42, March 31,
1995). As a matter of fact, R.A. No. 7659, the
Heinous Crimes Law, amended Art. 335, RPC,
by adding the phrase “or is demented”.
Q: In a free-for-all brawl that ensued after
some customers inside a nightclub became
unruly, guns were fired by a group, among
them A and B, that finally put the customers
back to their senses. Unfortunately, one
customer died. Subsequent investigation
revealed that A’s gunshot had inflicted on
the victim a slight wound that did not cause
the deceased’s death nor materially
contribute to it. It was B’s gunshot that
inflicted a fatal wound on the deceased. A
contended that his liability should, if at all,
be limited to slight physical injury. Would
you agree? Why? (2003 Bar)
Q: Flordeluna boarded a taxi on her way
home to Quezon City which was driven by
Roger. Flordeluna noticed that Roger was
always placing his car freshener in front of
the car aircon ventilation but did not
bother asking Roger why. Suddenly,
Flordeluna felt dizzy and became
unconscious. Instead of bringing her to
Quezon City, Roger brought Flordeluna to
his house in Cavite where she was detained
for two (2) weeks. She was raped for the
entire duration of her detention. May Roger
be charged and convicted of the crime of
rape with serious illegal detention? (2000
Bar)
A: No. I beg to disagree with A’s contention
that his liability should be limited to slight
physical injury only. He should be held liable
for attempted homicide because he inflicted
said injury with the use of a firearm which is a
lethal weapon. Intent to kill is inherent in the
use of a firearm (Araneta, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,
187 SCRA 123).
Q: Belle saw Gaston stealing the prized cock
of a neighbor and reported him to the
police. Thereafter, Gaston, while driving a
car, saw Belle crossing the street. Incensed
that Belle had reported him, Gaston
decided to scare her by trying to make it
appear that he was about to run her over.
He revved the engine of his car and drove
towards her but he applied the brakes.
A: No. Roger may not be charged and
convicted of the crime with serious illegal
detention.
39
CRIMINAL LAW
People, G.R. No. 157718, April 26, 2005) Under
Section 5 (b) of RA 7610, when the victim
(child subjected to sexual abuse) is under 12
years of age, the perpetrators shall be
prosecuted (for acts of lasciviousness) under
Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code:
Provided, That the penalty for lasciviousness
conduct when the victim is under 12 years of
age shall be reclusion temporal in its medium
period.
Roger may be charged and convicted of
multiple rapes. Each rape is a distinct offense
and should be punished separately. Evidently,
his principal intention was to abuse
Flordeluna; the detention was only incidental
to the rape.
Q: A, a male, takes B, another male, to a
motel and there, through threat and
intimidation, succeeds in inserting his
penis into the anus of B. What, if any, is A’s
criminal liability? Why? (2002 Bar)
Q: Charlie was charged for the qualified
rape of AAA. The Information alleged that
AAA was 14 years old at the time the crime
was committed and that Charlie was AAA's
stepfather. The presentation of AAA's birth
certificate during the trial duly established
the following: (1) that AAA was indeed 14
years old at the time of the rape; and (2)
that AAA's mother is BBB and her father
was the late CCC. BBB and Charlie only
became live-in partners after CCC's death.
The RTC found Charlie guilty of qualified
rape. On appeal, the Court of Appeals
convicted Charlie of simple rape. Charlie
appealed before the Supreme Court. How
will you rule and why? (2015 Bar)
A: A shall be criminally liable for rape by
committing an act of sexual assault against B,
by inserting his penis into the anus of the
latter.
Even a man may be a victim of rape by sexual
assault under paragraph 2 of Article 266-A of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended, “when
the offender’s penis is inserted into his mouth
or anal orifice.”
Q: Braulio invited Lulu, his 11-year old
stepdaughter, inside the master bedroom.
He pulled out a knife and threatened her
with harm unless she submitted to his
desires. He was touching her chest and sex
organ when his wife caught him in the act.
A: The CA ruling is correct. The crime
committed by Charlie is simple rape. To be
held liable for qualified rape, a qualifying
circumstance should be alleged in the
information and proven by evidence beyond
reasonable doubt. Although minority and steprelationship as a qualifying circumstance are
alleged in the information, what is proven by
the evidence is the qualifying circumstance of
minority and common-law relationship with
the mother of the victim. The concept of steprelationship is different from that of common law relationship because in the former the
mother of the victim and the offender are
legally married while in the latter they are not.
To appreciate this qualifying circumstance of
minority and common-law relationship will
offend the constitutional right of the accused to
be informed of the nature of the crime charged
against him
The prosecutor is unsure whether to charge
Braulio for acts of lasciviousness under Art.
336 of the RPC, for lascivious conduct
under RA 7610 (Special Protection against
Child
Abuse,
Exploitation,
and
Discrimination Act); or for rape under Art.
266-A of the RPC. What is the crime
committed? Explain. (2016 Bar)
A: The acts of Braulio of touching the chest and
sex organ of Lulu who is under 12 years of age,
are merely acts of lasciviousness and not
attempted rape because intent to have sexual
intercourse is not clearly shown. (People v.
Banzuela, G.R. No. 202060, December 11, 2013)
To be held liable of attempted rape, it must be
shown that the erectile penis is in the position
to penetrate (Cruz v. People, G.R. No. 166441,
October 8, 2014) or the offender actually
commenced to force his penis into the victim’s
sexual organ. (People v. Banzuela, supra)
H. CRIMES AGAINST PERSONAL LIBERTY
AND SECURITY
Kidnapping (1991, 2009, 2014, 2016 Bar)
The same acts of touching the chest and sex
organ of Lulu under psychological coercion or
influence of her stepfather, Braulio, constitutes
sexual abuse under Section 5(b) of RA No.
7610. (People v. Optana, G.R. No. 133922,
February 12, 2001)
Q: A charged B with the crime of rape.
While the case was pending in court, B,
together with his mother and brother,
overpowered A while riding a tricycle,
dragged her inside a carenderia owned by
them and detained her for two (2) days.
They demanded that she sign an affidavit of
desistance and reimburse B the sum of P5,
000.00 which he paid to his lawyer in the
case. She was released only after she signed
the affidavit asking for the dismissal of the
case and delivered to B P1, 000.00. She
promised to deliver the balance of P4,
000.00 thirty (30) days later. What crime/s
Since the requisites for acts of lasciviousness
under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code
are met, in addition to the requisites for sexual
abuse under Section 5 of RA No. 7610, and the
victim is under 12 years of age, Braulio shall be
prosecuted for acts of lasciviousness under the
Revised Penal Code but the penalty imposable
is that prescribed by RA No. 7610. (Amployo v.
UST BAR OPERATIONS
40
QUAMTO (1987-2017)
was/were committed by B, his mother and
brother? (1991 Bar)
his penis into the anal orifice or mouth of
Angelino or an instrument or object into anal
orifice or genital orifice, hence, this act
constitutes acts of lasciviousness under Art.
336. Since the acts of lasciviousness is
committed by reason or occasion of
kidnapping, it will be integrated into one and
indivisible felony of kidnapping with homicide
(People v. De Leon, G.R. No. 179943, June 26,
2009; People v. Jugueta, G.R. No. 202124, April 5,
2016)
A: This is Kidnapping with Ransom which is
kidnapping or illegal detention committed by a
private person for the purpose of extorting
ransom. Since the victim is a woman, it is
serious.
Q: A, with lewd designs, took a 13-year old
girl to a nipa hut in his farm and there had
sexual intercourse with her. The girl did
not offer any resistance because she was
infatuated with the man, who was goodlooking and belonged to a rich and
prominent family in the town. What crime,
if any, was committed by A? Why? (2002
Bar)
Max is liable for kidnapping with homicide as
an accomplice since he concurred in the
criminal design of Razzy in depriving Angelino
his liberty and supplied the former material
aid in an efficacious way by helping him beat
the latter.
A: A committed the crime of Consented
Abduction under Article 343 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended.
Trespass to dwelling
Q: At about 11:00 in the evening, Dante
forced his way inside the house of Mamerto.
Jay, Mamerto’s son, saw Dante and accosted
him. Dante pulled a knife and stabbed Jay
on his abdomen. Mamerto heard the
commotion and went out of his room.
Dante, who was about to escape, assaulted
Mamerto. Jay suffered injuries which, were
it not for the timely medical attendance,
would have caused his death. Mamerto
sustained injuries that incapacitated him
for 25 days.
The said Article punishes the abduction of a
virgin over 12 and under 18 years of age,
carried out with her consent and with lewd
designs. Although the problem did not indicate
the victim to be a virgin, virginity should not be
understood in its material sense, as to exclude
a virtuous woman of good reputation, since the
essence of the crime is not the injury to the
woman but the outrage and alarm to her family
(Valdepeñas v. People, 16 SCRA 871).
What crime/s did Dante commit? (1994
Bar)
Q: Angelino, a Filipino, is a transgender who
underwent gender reassignment and had
implants in different parts of her body. She
changed her name to Angelina and was a
finalist in the Miss Gay International. She
came back to the Philippines and while she
was walking outside her home, she was
abducted by Max and Razzy who took her to
a house in the province. She was then
placed in a room and Razzy forced her to
have sex with him at knife's point. After the
act, it dawned upon Razzy that Angelina is
actually a male. Incensed, Razzy called Max
to help him beat Angelina. The beatings
that Angelina received eventually caused
her death. What crime or crimes, if any,
were committed? Explain. (2016 Bar)
A: Dante committed qualified trespass to
dwelling, frustrated homicide for the stabbing
of Jay, and less serious physical injuries for the
assault on Mamerto.
The crime of qualified trespass to dwelling
should not be complexed with frustrated
homicide because when the trespass is
committed as a means to commit a more
serious crime, trespass to dwelling is absorbed
by the greater crime and the former
constitutes an aggravating circumstance of
dwelling (People v. Abedoza, 53 Phil 788).
The stabbing of Jay and the assault on
Mamerto were merely an afterthought, hence
Dante is liable for the separate crimes of
trespass to dwelling, frustrated homicide, and
less serious physical injuries.
A: Razzy is liable for kidnapping with
homicide. Abducting Angelino is not forcible
abduction since the victim in this crime must
be a woman. Gender reassignment will not
make him a woman within the meaning of Art.
342 of RPC. There is no showing, moreover,
that at the time abduction is committed with
lewd design; hence, his abduction constitutes
illegal detention. Since Angelino was killed in
the course of the detention, the crime
constitutes kidnapping and serious illegal
detention with homicide under Art. 267
Grave Threats and Coercion (1987, 1988,
1989, 1998, 1999)
Grave Coercion
Q: Isagani lost his gold necklace bearing his
initials. He saw Roy wearing the said
necklace. Isagani asked Roy to return to
him the necklace as it belongs to him, but
Roy refused. Isagani then drew his gun and
told Roy, “If you will not give back the
Since the victim is not a woman, it cannot be
rape by sexual intercourse. Neither can it be
rape by sexual assault for Razzy did not insert
41
CRIMINAL LAW
necklace to me, I will kill you!” Out of fear
for his life and against his will, Roy gave the
necklace to Isagani. What offense did
Isagani commit? (1998 Bar)
draw such confession, the crime is grave
coercion because of the violence employed
to compel such confession without the
offended party being confined in jail. (US v.
Cusi, 10 Phil 143)
A: Isagani committed the crime of grave
coercion (Art. 286, RPC) for compelling Roy, by
means of serious threats or intimidation, to do
something against the latter’s will, whether it
be right or wrong. Serious threats or
intimidation approximating violence constitute
grave coercion, not grave threats. Such is the
nature of the threat in this case because it was
committed with a gun, is a deadly weapon.
It is noted that the offended party was
merely
“brought”
to
the
police
headquarters and is thus not a detention
prisoner. Had he been validly arrested, the
crime committed would be maltreatment
of prisoners.
I.
Robbery (1987, 1988, 1992, 1996, 2000,
2001, 2012 Bar)
The crime cannot be robbery because intent to
gain, which is an essential element of robbery,
is absent since the necklace belongs to Isagani.
Q: Five robbers robbed one after the other
five houses occupied by different families
located inside a compound enclosed by a
six-foot high hollow block fence. How many
robberies did the five commit? Explain.
(1996 Bar)
Q:
(a) Distinguish coercion from illegal
detention.
(b) Forcibly brought to the police
headquarters, a person was tortured
and maltreated by agents of the law in
order to compel him to confess a crime
imputed to him. The agents failed,
however, to draw from him a
confession which was their intention to
obtain through the employment of such
means. What crime was committed by
the agents of the law? (1999 Bar)
A:
A: The offenders committed only one robbery
in the eyes of the law because when they
entered the compound, they were impelled
only by a single indivisible criminal resolution
to commit a robbery as they were not aware
that there were five families inside said
compound, considering that the same was
enclosed by a six-foot high hollow block fence.
The series of robbery committed in the same
compound at about the same time constitutes
one continued crime, motivated by one
criminal impulse.
(a) Coercion may be distinguished from illegal
detention as follows: In coercion, the basis
of criminal liability is the employment of
violence
or
serious
intimidation
approximating violence, without authority
of law, to prevent a person from doing
something not prohibited by law or to
compel him to do something against his
will whether it be right or wrong; while in
Illegal Detention, the basis of liability is the
actual restraint or locking up of a person
thereby depriving him of his liberty
without authority of law. If there was no
intent to lock up or detain the offended
party unlawfully, the crime of illegal
detention is not committed.
(b) Evidently, the person tortured and
maltreated by the agents of the law is a
suspect and may have been detained by
them. If so and he had already been
booked and put in jail, the crime is
maltreatment of prisoner and the fact that
the suspect was subjected to torture to
extort a confession would bring about a
higher penalty, in addition to the
offender’s liability for the physical injuries
inflicted.
Q: A, brother of B, with the intention of
having a night out with his friends, took the
coconut shell which is being used by B as a
bank for his coins from inside their locked
cabinet using their common key. Forthwith,
A broke the coconut shell outside of their
home in the presence of his friends.
(a) What is the criminal liability of A, if
any? Explain.
(b) Is A exempted from criminal liability
under Article 332 of the Revised Penal
Code for being a brother of B? Explain.
(2000 Bar)
A:
(a) A is criminally liable for Robbery with
force upon things, because the coconut
shell with the coins inside, was taken with
intent to gain and broken outside of their
home (Art. 299 [b], [2], RPC).
(b) No. A is not exempt from criminal liability
under Art. 332 because said Article applies
only to theft, swindling, or malicious
mischief. Here, the crime committed is
robbery.
But if the suspect was forcibly brought to
the police headquarters to make him
admit the crime and tortured/maltreated
to make him confess to such crime, but
later released because the agents failed to
UST BAR OPERATIONS
CRIMES AGAINST PROPERTY
Q: A entered the house of another without
employing force or violence upon things. He
42
QUAMTO (1987-2017)
was seen by a maid who wanted to scream
but was prevented from doing so because A
threatened her with a gun. A then took
money and other valuables and left. Is A
guilty of theft or robbery? Explain. (2002
Bar)
snatcher who had grabbed it from the
owner a block away from where Francis
had found it and further investigation
traced the last possessor as PO1 Reyes.
Charged with theft, PO1 Reyes reasoned out
that he had not committed any crime
because it was not he who had found the
bracelet, and moreover, it turned out to
have been stolen.
A: A is liable for robbery because the
intimidation he employed on the maid before
the taking of the money and other valuables. It
is the intimidation of the person relative to the
taking that qualifies the crime as robbery,
instead of simply theft. ‘
Resolve the case with reasons. (2001 Bar)
A: PO1 Reyes is criminally liable. His
contention that he has not committed any
crime because he was not the one who found
the bracelet and it turned out to be stolen also,
is devoid of merit. It is enough that the bracelet
belonged to another and the failure to restore
the same to its owner is characterized by
intent to gain.
The non-employment of force upon things is of
no moment because robbery is committed not
only by employing force upon things but also
by employing violence against or intimidation
of persons.
Theft (1989, 1998, 2000, 2001, 2005, 2008,
2012 Bar)
The act of PO1 Reyes of selling the bracelet
which does not belong to him and which he
only held to be delivered to its owner, is furtive
misappropriation with intent to gain.
Q: Sunshine, a “beauteous” colegiala but a
shoplifter, went to the Ever Department
Store and proceeded to the women’s wear
section. The saleslady was of the
impression that she brought to the fitting
room three (3) pieces of swimsuits of
different colors. When she came out of the
fitting room, she returned only two (2)
pieces to the clothes rack. The saleslady
became suspicious and alerted the store
detective. Sunshine was stopped by the
detective before she could leave the store
and brought to the office of the store
manager. The detective and the manager
searched her and found her wearing the
third swimsuit under her blouse and pants.
Was the theft consummated, frustrated, or
attempted? Explain. (2000 Bar)
A: The theft was consummated because the
taking or asportation was complete. The
asportation is complete when the offender
acquired the exclusive control of the personal
property being taken. In this case, when
Sunshine wore the swimsuit under her blouse
and pants and was on her way out of the store,
with evident intent to gain, the taking
constitutes theft and being complete, it is
consummated. It is not necessary that the
offender is in a position to dispose of the
property.
Where a finder of lost or mislaid property
entrusts it to another for delivery to the owner,
the person to whom such property is entrusted
and who accepts the same, assumes the
relation of the finder to the owner as if he was
the actual finder; if he would misappropriate it,
he is guilty of theft (People v. Avila, 44 Phil
720).
Q: Bruno, a taxi driver, had an indebtedness
in the sum of P10,000.00 which would
become due in one week. He was starting to
worry because he still had not raised the
amount to pay for his debt. Every day, he
had prayed for divine intervention. One
night, while returning the taxi to the
garage, he found a wallet on the back seat.
Inspecting it, he learned that it contained
exactly Pl 0,000.00 cash, the amount of his
obligation, and IDs. Thinking it was divine
intervention, and that his prayers were
answered, he took the money and used it to
pay his debt.
a) What crime, if any, did Bruno commit?
Explain.
b) Assuming that instead of using the
money, Bruno turned over the wallet and
its contents to the nearby police station,
and it was the chief of police of that station
who appropriated the money for his own
benefit, what crime was committed by the
chief of police? Explain. (2015 Bar)
Q: Francis Garcia, a Jollibee waiter, found a
gold bracelet in front of his working place
in Makati and, upon inspecting it, saw the
name and address of the owner engraved
on the inside. Remembering his parents’
admonition that he should not take
anything which does not belong to him, he
delivered the bracelet to PO1 Jesus Reyes of
the Makati quad precinct with the
instruction to locate the owner and return
it to him. PO1 Reyes, instead, sold the
bracelet
and
misappropriated
the
proceeds. Subsequent events brought out
the fact that the bracelet was dropped by a
A:
a) Bruno committed the crime of theft. The
owner is known to Bruno because there are
IDs found in the wallet. Under Article 308 of
RPC, “theft is likewise committed by any
person who, having found lost property, shall
fail to deliver the same to the local authorities
or to its owner”
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CRIMINAL LAW
consent of the owner/raiser of large cattle,
which includes cows and horses, whether or
not for profit or gain, or whether committed
with or without violence against or
intimidation or intimidation of any person or
force upon things. It includes the killing of
large cattle, or taking its meat or hide without
the consent of the owner/raiser
b) The chief of police is liable for theft.
Although he is not the one who found the
property, he is considered as finder in fact
since the property was surrendered to him by
the actual finder. He acquired the position
occupied by the actual finder and assumed by
voluntary substitution the obligation to
surrender the property to the lawful owner.
Appropriating the property is of the same
character of that made by one who originally
found the same (People v. Avila, G.R. No. L19786, March 31, 1923). The liability of the
finder in fact is the same liability of the finder
in law. Thus, what the Chief of Police
committed is Theft.
Q: A fire broke out in a department store. A,
taking advantage of the confusion, entered
the store and carried away goods which he
later sold. What crime, if any, did he
commit? Why? (2002 Bar)
A: A committed the crime of qualified theft
because he took the goods on the occasion of
and taking advantage of the fire which broke
out in the department store. The occasion of a
calamity such as fire, when the theft was
committed, qualifies the crime under Article
310 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
Qualified theft (1992, 2002, 2006, 2016
Bar)
Q: Domingo is the caretaker of two (2) cows
and two (2) horses owned by Hannibal.
Hannibal told Domingo to lend the cows to
Tristan on the condition that the latter will
give a goat to the former when the cows are
returned. Instead, Tristan sold the cows
and pocketed the money. Due to the neglect
of Domingo, one of the horses was stolen.
Knowing that he will be blamed for the loss,
Domingo slaughtered the other horse, got
the meat, and sold it to Pastor. He later
reported to Hannibal that the two horses
were stolen.
[a] What crime or crimes, if any, did Tristan
commit? Explain.
[b] What crime or crimes, if any, were
committed by Domingo? Explain. (2016
Bar)
Q: Forest Ranger Jay Velasco was patrolling
the Balara Watershed and Reservoir when
he noticed a big pile of cut logs outside the
gate of the watershed. Curious, he scouted
around and after a few minutes, he saw
Rene and Dante coming out of the gate with
some more newly-cut logs. He apprehended
and charged them with the proper offense.
What is that offense? Explain. (2006 Bar)
A: The offense committed is qualified theft
pursuant to Sec. 1 of P.D. No. 330 and Sec. 68 of
P.D. No. 705 defining the offense committed by
any person who directly or indirectly cuts,
gathers, removes or smuggles timber or other
forest products in violation of existing laws,
rules and regulation, from any public forest
reserves, and other kinds of public forest or
even privately owned forest lands.
A: Tristan is liable for Estafa through
Misappropriation under Article 315 of RPC.
Their transaction is a commodatum. He
received the cows with the duty to return the
same thing deposited, and acquired legal or
juridical possession. Selling the cows as if he
owned it constitutes misappropriation or
conversion within the contemplation of Art.
315
Q: A is the driver of B’s Mercedez Benz car.
When B was on a trip to Paris, A used the
car for a joy ride with C whom he is
courting. Unfortunately, A met an accident.
Upon his return, B came to know about the
unauthorized use of the car and sued A for
qualified theft. B alleged that A took and
used the car with intent to gain as he
derived some benefit or satisfaction from
its use. On the other hand, A argued that he
has no intent of making himself the owner
of the car as he in fact returned it to the
garage after the joy ride. What crime/s, if
any, were committed? Explain. (2016 Bar)
Domingo is liable for qualified theft. Although
Tristan received the horse with the consent of
the owner, Hannibal, his possession is merely
physical or de facto since the former is the
employee of the latter. Slaughtering the horse,
which he physically possessed, and selling its
meat to Pastor shall be considered as taking
without the consent of the owner with intent
to gain, which constitutes theft (Balerta v.
People, G.R. No. 205144 November 26, 2014).
Since the horse is accessible to him, the theft is
qualified by the circumstances of abuse of
confidence (Yangco v. People, G.R. No. 209373
July 30, 2014)
A: The crime committed by A is carnapping.
The unlawful taking of motor vehicles is now
covered by the Anti-Carnapping Law (RA 6539
as amended) and not by the provisions on
qualified theft or robbery. (People v. Bustinera,
G.R. No. 148233, June 8, 2004) The concept of
carnapping is the same as that of robbery and
theft. Hence, rules applicable to theft or
robbery are also applicable to carnapping.
Further, Domingo committed an act in
violation of the Anti-Cattle Rustling Law (P.D.
No. 533). Cattle rustling is the taking away by
any means, method or scheme, without the
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QUAMTO (1987-2017)
(People v. Asamuddin, G.R. No. 213913,
September 2, 2015) In theft, unlawful taking
should be understood within the Spanish
concept of apoderamiento. In order to
constitute apoderamiento, the physical taking
must be coupled with the intent oto
appropriate the object, which means intent to
deprive the lawful owner of the thing, whether
permanently or temporarily. (People v.
Valenzuela, G.R. No. 160188, June 21, 2007) In
this case, A took the car without the consent of
B with intent to temporarily deprive him of the
car. Although the taking was “temporary” and
for a “joy ride”, the Supreme Court in People v.
Bustinera (supra), sustains as the better view
which holds that when a person, either with
the object of going to a certain place, or
learning how to drive, or enjoying a free ride,
takes possession of a vehicle belonging to
another, without the consent of its owner, he is
guilty of theft because by taking possession of
the personal property belonging to another
and using it, his intent to gain is evident since
he derives therefrom utility, satisfaction,
enjoyment and pleasure.
documents when he arrived. Donato
thereafter solemnized the marriage and
later turned over the documents to Mayor
Abral for his signature. In the marriage
contract, it was stated that the marriage
was solemnized by Mayor Abral. What
crime(s) did Mayor Abral and Donato
commit? Explain. (2015 Bar)
A: Mayor Abral is liable for falsification of
public document by a public officer under
Article 177 of the RPC. Making an untruthful
statement by stating in a marriage contract, a
public document, that the marriage was
solemnized by him, is an act of falsification.
The crime of illegal marriage is not committed
because element that “the offender has
performed an illegal marriage ceremony” is
lacking (Ronulo v. People, G.R. No. 182438, July
2, 2014).
Donato committed the crime of usurpation of
function under Article 177 of the Revised Penal
Code because he performed the act of
solemnizing marriage, which pertained to the
mayor, a person in authority, without being
lawfully entitled to do so. The crime of illegal
marriage is not committed, because the
element that “the offender is authorized to
solemnize marriage” is lacking (Ronulo v.
People, G.R. No. 182438, July 2, 2014).
Usurpation (1988, 1989, 1996 Bar)
Q: Jorge is the owner of 10 hectares of land
in the foothills which he planted with
lanzones. On his last visit there, he was
shocked to discover that his land had been
taken over by a group of 15 families whose
members had forcibly driven away his
caretaker, had appropriated the fruits for
themselves, and were not threatening to
kill him should he try to eject them.
Q: A and B, both farmers, entered the land
owned by X and planted palay thereon.
When X came to know about it, he
confronted A and B and inquired why the
latter occupied his land and planted palay
thereon.
What crime should Jorge charge these 15
families? Explain. (1988 Bar)
A, with a bolo in hand, replied that the land
belongs to the family of S, and not to X and
at the same time said, “If you touch this
land and my palay, blood will flow on this
ground.” Because of the said remark, X
went to the Chief of Police and complained.
The Chief of Police filed a complex crime of
Usurpation of Real Property with Grave
Threats.
A: Jorge can charge the 15 families of 2
separate crimes namely:
(a) Violation of Article 282, Grave threats xxx
(b) Violation of Article 312 which provides
that: “Occupation of real property or
usurpation of real rights in property. – Any
person who, by means of violence against
or intimidation of persons, shall take
possession of any real property or shall
usurp any real rights in property
belonging to another, in addition to the
penalty incurred for the acts of violence
executed by him, shall be punished by a
fine...”.
What crime/s were committed? (1989 Bar)
A: The crime committed by A and B is
squatting under PD 772 and not Usurpation of
Real Property because in the latter crime, there
must be violence against or intimidation of
persons employed in taking possession of any
real property or in usurping any real rights in
property belonging to another (Art. 312, RPC).
In this case, it appears that A and B entered X’s
land without the owner’s consent or against
his will but without any violence against or
intimidation of persons.
Q: Erwin and Bea approached Mayor Abral
and requested him to solemnize their
marriage. Mayor Abral agreed. Erwin and
Bea went to Mayor Abral's office on the day
of the ceremony, but Mayor Abral was not
there. When Erwin and Bea inquired where
Mayor Abral was, his chief of staff Donato
informed them that the Mayor was
campaigning for the coming elections.
Donato told them that the Mayor
authorized him to solemnize the marriage
and that Mayor Abral would just sign the
The crime of squatting is committed by any
person, who, with the use of force, intimidation
or threat, or taking advantage of the absence or
tolerance of the landowner, succeeds in
occupying or possessing the property of the
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CRIMINAL LAW
latter against his will for residential,
commercial or any other purposes.
commit arson. This is not just a preparatory
act, because it already ceased to be equivocal
and revealed a clear intention to burn the
house. In sum, he already commenced the
commission of the crime of arson directly by
overt acts but he did not perform all acts to
execute his criminal design to commit arson by
setting the house on fire due to a cause other
than his spontaneous desistance, and that is,
having been caught by the police.
The threat uttered by A, not having been used
in the taking of possession of the land, it is not
absorbed in the crime of squatting. When A
threatened X that blood will flow if X touches
the land and his palay, he committed the crime
of grave threats by threatening another with
the infliction of a wrong amounting to a crime.
Only A is criminally liable for the crime of
grave threats.
J.
Arson (1994, 2000, 2015 Bar)
Adultery & Concubinage (1991, 1994, 2002,
2005, 2010 Bar)
Q: One early evening, there was a fight
between Eddie Gutierrez and Mario Cortez.
Later that evening, at about 11 o’clock,
Eddie passed by the house of Mario
carrying a plastic bag containing gasoline,
threw the bag at the house of Mario who
was inside the house watching television,
and then lit it. The front wall of the house
started blazing and some neighbors yelled
and shouted. Forthwith, Mario poured
water on the burning portion of the house.
Neighbors also rushed in to help put the
fire under control before any great damage
could be inflicted and before the flames
have extensively spread. Only a portion of
the house was burned. Discuss Eddie’s
liability. (2000 Bar)
Q: A, a married woman, had sexual
intercourse with a man who was not her
husband. The man did not know she was
married. What crime, if any, did each of
them commit? Why? (2002 Bar)
A: A, the married woman, committed the crime
of adultery under Article 333 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended, for having sexual
intercourse with a man not her husband while
her marriage is still subsisting. But the man
who had carnal knowledge of her, not knowing
her to be married, shall not be liable for
adultery.
Q: A is married. He has a paramour with
whom he had sexual relations on a more or
less regular basis. They meet at least once a
week in hotels, motels, and other places
where they can be alone. Is A guilty of any
crime? Why?
A: Eddie is liable for destructive arson in the
consummated stage. It is destructive arson
because fire was resorted to in destroying the
house of Mario which is an inhabited house or
dwelling. The arson is consummated because
the house was in fact already burned although
not totally. In arson, it is not required that the
premises be totally burned for the crime to be
consummated. It is enough that the premises
suffer destruction by burning.
A: A is guilty of the crime of concubinage by
having sexual intercourse under scandalous
circumstances, with a woman who is not his
wife.
Having sexual relations on a more or less
regular basis in hotels, motels, and other
places may be considered scandalous
circumstances that offends public conscience,
giving rise to criticism and general protest,
such acts being imprudent and wanton and
setting a bad example (People v. Santos, 86
SCRA 705).
Q: Senio planned to burn Bal' s house. One
evening, during a drinking spree at his
house, Senio told his friends what he
intended to do and even showed them the
gasoline in cans that he would use for the
purpose. Carlo, a common friend of Senio
and Bal, was present at the drinking spree.
He was still sober when Senio told them his
plans. Before going home, Carlo warned Bal
that Senio would burn his house and had
already bought gasoline that would be used
for the purpose. Bal reported the matter to
the police authorities. Meanwhile, Senio
went to Bal' s house and proceeded to pour
gasoline around the walls of the house and
it was at that point when he was caught by
the police. What crime did Senio commit, if
any? Explain. (2015 Bar)
K. CRIMES AGAINST HONOR
Libel (2002, 2005, 2013, 2016 Bar)
Q: A was nominated Secretary of a
Department in the Executive Branch of the
government. His nomination was thereafter
submitted
to
the
Commission
on
Appointments for confirmation. While the
Commission
was
considering
the
nomination, a group of concerned citizens
caused to be published in the newspapers a
full-page statement objecting to A’s
appointment. They alleged that A was a
drug dependent, that he had several
mistresses, and that he was corrupt, having
A: Senio is liable for attempted arson. He
manifested before his intention to burn the
house of Bal to his friends. He then performed
the act of pouring gasoline around the walls of
the house to execute his criminal design to
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CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY
46
QUAMTO (1987-2017)
accepted bribes or favors from parties
transacting business in his previous office,
and therefore he was unfit for the position
to which he had been nominated. As a
result of the publication, the nomination
was not confirmed by the Commission on
Appointments. The official sued the
concerned citizens and the newspapers for
libel and damages on account of his nonconfirmation. How will you decide the case?
(2002 Bar)
Appeals, G.R. No. 128959, September 30, 2005).
Journalists bear the burden of writing
responsibly when practicing their profession,
even when writing about public figures or
matters of public interest. The report made by
C describing a lawyer in the Bureau of Customs
as corrupt cannot be considered as “fair” and
“true” since he did not do research before
making his allegations, and it has been shown
that these allegations were baseless. The
articles are not “fair and true reports,” but
merely wild accusations. He has written and
published the subject articles with reckless
disregard of whether the same were false or
not(Erwin Tulfo v. People, G.R. No. 161032,
September 16, 2008).
A: I will acquit the concerned citizens and the
newspapers involved from the crime of libel.
One of the requisites of libel is the existence of
malice on the part of the accused.In this case,
the publication is made from a moral or social
duty.Thus, there is an absence of malice.
Yes, A, B and C are liable for the crime. Under
Art. 360 of the RPC, “Any person who shall
publish, exhibit, or cause the publication or
exhibition of any defamation in writing or by
similar means, shall be responsible for the
same. The author or editor of a book or
pamphlet, or the editor or business manager of
a daily newspaper, magazine or serial
publication, shall be responsible for the
defamations contained therein to the same
extent as if he were the author thereof.” A, the
president, and B, the managing editor, are
liable to the same extent of C, the author. The
provision in the RPC does not provide absence
of participation as a defense, but rather plainly
and specifically states the responsibility of
those involved in publishing newspapers and
other periodicals. Hence, A, B, and C are all
liable for libel (Erwin Tulfo v. People, G.R. No.
161032, September 16, 2008).
As a nominee for the public position of a
Department Secretary, A’s moral, mental, and
physical fitness becomes a public concern. The
publication merely reflects on his public
character and image as a public official. Hence,
the act of publishing such criticisms is bereft of
malice.
Q: A is the president of the corporate
publisher of the daily tabloid, Bulgar; B is
the managing editor and C is the
author/writer. In his column, Direct Hit, C
wrote about X, the head examiner of the
BIR-RDO Manila as follows:
"Itong si X ay talagang BUWAYA kaya ang
logo ng Lacoste T shirt niya ay napaka
suwapang na buwaya. Ang nickname niya ay
si Atty. Buwaya. Ang PR niya ay 90% sa
bayad ng taxpayer at ang para sa RP ay
10% lang. Kaya ang baba ng collection ng
RDO niya. Masyadong magnanakaw si X at
dapat tanggalin itong bundat na bundat na
buwaya na ito at napakalaki na ng kurakot."
Defamation (1988, 1993, 2003 Bar)
Q: Romeo Cunanan, publisher of the Baguio
Daily, was sued by Pedro Aguas for libel for
the public publication of his picture with
the notice that: “This is to inform the public
that Mr. Pedro Aguas whose picture
appears above has ceased to be connected
with the Sincere Insurance Company as
underwriter as of December 31, 1987. Any
transaction entered into by him after the
said date will not be honored.
A, B and C were charged with libel before
the RTC of Manila. The three (3) defendants
argued that the article is within the ambit
of qualified privileged communication; that
there is no malice in law and in fact; and
that defamatory comments on the acts of
public officials which are related to the
discharge of their official duties do not
constitute libel.
Is the publication defamatory? Explain
briefly. (1988 Bar)
A: The publication is not defamatory, because
the element of imputation of a defamatory
statement is absent. There is no imputation of
a crime, vice, defect, or any act, or omission,
condition, status or circumstance, tending to
cause the dishonor, discredit or contempt to a
natural or juridical person, or to blacken the
memory of one who is dead. This is a mere
announcement and does not carry any
implication.
Was the crime of libel committed? If so, are
A, B and C all liable for the crime? Explain.
(2016 Bar)
A: Yes, the crime of libel is committed. While,
fair comment on acts of public officers related
to the discharge of their duties is a qualified
privileged communication, the accused can still
be held liable for libel if actual malice is shown.
In fair comment, actual malice can be
established by showing that comment was
made with knowledge that it was false or with
reckless disregard of whether it was false or
not. (Guingguing v. The Honorable Court of
Q: During a seminar workshop attended by
government employees from the Bureau of
Customs and Bureau of Internal Revenue, A,
47
CRIMINAL LAW
the speaker, in the course of his lecture,
lamented the fact that a great majority of
those serving in said agencies were utterly
dishonest and corrupt.
when feelings are running high and people
could not think clearly only amount to light
slander. Moreover, his statements against
Marco pertains to a person who is running for
public office wherein a wider latitude is given
.
The following morning, the whole group of
employees in the two bureaus who
attended the seminar, as complainants,
filed a criminal complaint against A for
uttering what the group claimed to be
defamatory statements of the lecturer.
PART III. QUASI-OFFENSES
ARTICLE 365 – CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE
(2001, 2007 BAR)
In court, A filed a Motion to Quash the
Information, reciting fully the above facts,
on the ground that no crime was
committed. If you were the judge, how
would you resolve the motion? (2003 Bar)
Q: Eddie brought his son Randy to a local
faith healer known as “Mother Himala”. He
was diagnosed by the faithhealer as being
possessed by an evil spirit. Eddie thereupon
authorized the conduct of a “treatment”
calculated to drive the “spirit” from the
boy’s body. Unfortunately, the procedure
conducted resulted in the boy’s death.
A: I would grant the Motion to Quash on the
ground that the facts charged do not constitute
an offense, since there is no definite person or
persons dishonored.
The faith healer and three others who were
part of the healing ritual were charged with
murder and convicted by the lower court. If
you were the appellate court Justice, would
you sustain the conviction upon appeal?
Explain your answer. (2007 Bar)
The crime of libel or slander is a crime against
honor such that the person/s dishonored must
be identifiable even by innuendoes. Otherwise,
the crime against honor is not committed.
Moreover, A was not making a malicious
imputation, but merely stating an opinion; he
was delivering a lecture with no malice at all
during a seminar workshop. Malice being
inherently absent in the utterance, the
statement is not actionable as defamatory.
A: No. The conviction for murder should not be
sustained because there is no indication that
the accused acted with intent to kill Randy. On
the contrary, the facts show that the accused
aimed to “treat” the victim by driving away the
evil spirit which was believed to have
“possessed” him. Considering that the
proximate cause of the victim’s death was the
healing ritual done by the accused which is not
recognized in law as legitimate, the accused
are still criminally liable for the victim’s death.
As they may have overdone the “healing ritual”
they conducted on the victim’s body, causing
the latter’s death, although the intent to kill
was absent, the accused may be held criminally
liable for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in
Homicide.
Slander
Q: Lando and Marco are candidates in the
local elections. In his speeches, Lando
attacked his opponent Marco alleging that
he is the son of Nanding, a robber and a
thief who amassed his wealth through
shady deals. May Marco file a case against
Lando for grave oral defamation? State
your reasons. (1990 Bar)
A: Marco cannot file a case for grave oral
defamation. If at all, he may file a case for light
slander.
PART IV. SPECIAL PENAL LAWS
The gravity of the oral defamation depends not
only (1) upon the expressions used, but also
(2) on the personal relations of the accused
and the offended party, and (3) the
circumstances surrounding the case. It is a
doctrine of ancient respectability that
defamatory words will fall under one or the
other, depending not only upon their sense,
grammatical significance, and accepted
ordinary meaning judging them separately, but
also upon the special circumstances of the
case, antecedents or relationship between the
offended party and the offender, which might
tend to prove the intention of the offender at
the time (Rogelio Pader v. People, G.R. No.
139157, February 8, 2000).
ANTI-CHILD ABUSE LAW (R.A. NO. 7610, AS
AMENDED) (1993, 2004 Bar)
(1) Q: Sometime in December 1992, retired
Lt. Col. Agaton, celebrating the first year
of his compulsory retirement from the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, had in
his company a fourteen (14) year-old
girl whose parents were killed by the
Mt. Pinatubo eruption and being totally
orphaned has been living or fending for
herself in the streets in Manila. They
were alone in one room in a beach
resort and stayed there for two (2)
nights. No sexual intercourse took place
between them. Before they parted,
retired Lt. Col. Agaton gave the girl
In the case of People v. Laroga (40 OG 123), it
was held that defamation in a political meeting
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QUAMTO (1987-2017)
P1,000.00 for her services. She gladly
accepted it.
(2) What crime may the retired colonel be
charged with, if any? Discuss.
(3) What possible defenses can he
interpose? Explain. (1993 Bar)
or have in his company a minor, twelve (12)
years or under or who in ten (10) years or
more his junior in any public or private place,
hotel, motel, beer joint, discotheque, cabaret,
pension house, sauna or massage parlor, beach
and/or other tourist resort or similar places is
liable for child abuse. To be held liable, it is
indispensable that the child in the company of
the offender must be 12 years old or under or
who is 10 years or more his junior in a public
place.
A:
(1) The retired colonel may be charged with
the violation of Sec. 10 (b) of RA 7610 or
the Anti-Child Abuse Law. Under the law,
“any person who shall keep or have in his
company a minor, twelve (12) years or
under or who in is ten (10) years or more
his junior in any public or private place,
hotel, motel, beer joint, discotheque,
cabaret, pension house, sauna or massage
parlor, beach and/or other tourist resort
or similar places” is liable for other acts of
neglect, abuse, cruelty or exploitation and
other conditions prejudicial to the child's
development(Sec. 10 (b), RA 7610).
In this case, Leilani is 17 years of age, and she
is only 8 years younger than Arnold. Moreover,
Leilani sat beside Arnold without his
permission. Hence, he is not in the company of
a child in a public place.
Lastly, applying the episdem generis principle,
Luneta Parkis not a place similar to hotel,
motel, beer joint, discotheque, cabaret, pension
house, sauna or massage parlor, beach and/or
other tourist resort.
ANTI-FENCING LAW (P.D 1612) (1987,
1990, 1992, 1995, 1996, 2005, 2010, 2013
Bar)
Considering that Lt. Col Agaton is
compulsory retired and that the child is
only 14 years old, there must be an age
difference of more than 10 years between
them. The age difference and the fact that
Lt. Col. Agaton stayed with the child in one
room at a beach resort for two nights and
thereafter giving her P1,000.00 “for her
services,” constitutes violation of the said
law.
Q: Pedro, a municipal treasurer, received
from the Provincial Treasurer of the
Province five (5) brand new typewriters for
use in the municipal treasurer’s office. Each
typewriter is valued at P10,000.00. Since
Pedro
needed
money
for
the
hospitalization of his sick son, he sold four
(4) of the typewriters to his friend, Rodolfo,
a general merchant in San Isidro for
P2,000.00 each. Rodolfo, as a general
merchant knew that one typewriter could
easily
be
between
P6,000.00
to
P10,000.00.For this reason, he readily
agreed to buy the typewriters. Rodolfo then
resold the typewriters at P6,000.00 thus
making a profit of P16,000.00. Two months
after the transaction, Pedro was audited
and
the
investigation
as
to
his
accountabilities led to the discovery that
Rodolfo bought the four (4) typewriters
from Pedro. Is Rodolfo liable for violation of
the Anti-Fencing Law? (1987 Bar)
(2) The possible defenses Lt. Col. Agaton may
interpose are:
(a) That the child is related to him within
the fourth degree of consanguinity or
affinity or by a bond recognized in law,
or local customs and traditions; or
(b) That he was only acting in pursuance
of a moral, social or legal duty(Sec. 10
(b), Art. VI, R.A. 7610).
Q: Arnold, 25 years of age, was sitting on a
bench in Luneta Park, watching the statue
of Jose Rizal, when, without his permission,
Leilani, 17 years of age, sat beside him and
asked for financial assistance, allegedly for
payment of her tuition fee, in exchange for
sex. While they were conversing, police
operatives arrested and charged him with
violation of Section 10 of RA 7610 (Special
Protection of Children against Child Abuse,
Exploitation and Discrimination Act),
accusing him of having in his company a
minor, who is not related to him, in a public
place. It was established that Arnold was
not in the performance of a social, moral
and legal duty at that time.
A: Rodolfo is not liable for violation of the AntiFencing Law as this law is applicable only to
the buy and sell of articles of value which are
the proceeds of robbery and theft. In this case,
the
typewriters
were
proceeds
of
malversation.
Q:
(1) What are the elements of fencing?
(2) What is the difference between a fence
and an accessory to theft or robbery?
Explain.
(3) Is there any similarity between them?
(1995 Bar)
Is Arnold liable for the charge? Explain.
(2016 Bar)
A: No, Arnold is not liable. Under Section 10
(b) of RA No. 7610, any person who shall keep
A:
49
CRIMINAL LAW
from Antonia and produced a receipt
covering the sale. She presented other
receipts given to her by Antonia
representing
previous
transactions.
Convicted of the charge, Ofelia appealed,
arguing that her acquisition of the jewelries
resulted from a legal transaction and that
the prosecution failed to prove that she
knew or should have known that the pieces
of jewelry which she bought from Antonia
were proceeds of the crime of theft.
(1) The elements of fencing are:
(a) A crime of robbery or theft has been
committed;
(b) Accused, who is not a principal or
accomplice in the crime, buys,
receives, possesses, keeps, acquires,
conceals or disposes or buys and sells
or in any manner deals in any article,
item, object or anything of value ,
which has been derived from the
proceeds of said crime;
(c) The accused knows or should have
known that said article, item, object or
anything of value has been derived
from the proceeds of the crime of
robbery or theft; and
(d) There is, on the part of the accused,
intent to gain for himself or for
another.
(a) What is a “fence” under PD 1612?
(b) Is Ofelia liable under the Anti-Fencing
Law? Explain. (2016 Bar)
(a) A fence includes any person, firm,
association, corporation or partnership or
other organization who/which commits
the act of fencing (Sec. 2(b), PD 1612).
Fencing is the act of any person who, with
intent to gain for himself or for another,
shall buy, receive, possess, keep, acquire,
conceal, sell or dispose of, or shall buy and
sell, or in any other manner deal in any
article, item, object or anything of value
which he knows, or should be known to
him, to have been derived from the
proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft
(Section 2(a), PD 1612).
(2) As to the degree of participation and
penalty – a fence is punished as a principal
under PD 1612 and the penalty is higher,
whereas an accessory to robbery or theft
under the RPC is punished with penalty
two degrees lower than the principal,
unless he bought or profited from the
proceeds of theft or robbery arising from
robbery in Philippine highways under PD
532 where he is punished as an
accomplice, hence the penalty is one
degree lower.
(b) No, Ofelia is not liable under the AntiFencing Law. The presumption of fencing
only shifted the burden of evidence to the
defense. Burden of proof is upon the fence
to overcome the presumption.
As to the presumption - there is a
presumption of fencing by mere
possession of any good, article, item,
object, or anything of value which has been
the subject of robbery or thievery. There is
no such presumption applicable to an
accessory to theft or robbery.
In this case, Ofelia’s defense that the
jewelries werea cquired in a legitimate
transaction is sufficient. Further, there is
no other circumstance indicating that
Ofelia, an innocent purchaser, should have
known that the jewelries were the subject
of theft. On the contrary, there was even a
receipt produced by Ofelia for the
transaction.
(3) There is similarity in the sense that all the
acts of one who is an accessory to the
crimes of robbery or theft are included in
the acts defined as fencing. In fact, the
accessory in the crimes of robbery or theft
could be prosecuted as such under the RPC
or as a fence under PD 1612. The state
may choose to prosecute the person either
under the Revised Penal Code or P.D. No.
1612, although the preference for the
latter would seem inevitable considering
that fencing is a malum prohibitum, and
P.D. No. 1612 creates a presumption of
fencing and prescribes a higher penalty
based on the value of the property (DizonPamintuan v. People, G.R. No. 111426 July
11, 1994).
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER: Yes. Under
Section 5 of P.D. 1612, mere possession of
any good, article, item, object, or anything
of value which has been the subject of
robbery or theft shall be prima facie
evidence of fencing. Failure to prove that
Ofelia knows, or should have known that
the jewelry is stolen is not a defense since
this element is presumed to be present
because Ofelia is in possession of the
stolen property. Moreover, there is no
showing that Ofelia secured a permit or
clearance from PNP station commander of
the place of sale required in Section 6 of
P.D. 1612
Q: Ofelia engaged in the purchase and sale
of jewelry, was charged with violation of PD
1612, otherwise known as the Anti-Fencing
Law, for having been found in possession of
recently
stolen
jewelry
valued
at
P100,000.00 at her jewelry shop. Her
defense is that she merely bought the same
UST BAR OPERATIONS
ANTI-GRAFT AND CORRUPT PRACTICES
ACT (R.A. NO. 3019, AS AMENDED)
50
QUAMTO (1987-2017)
(1990,1991, 2001, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2014,
2016 Bar)
share percentage or benefit wherein the
public officer, in his official capacity, has to
intervene under the law. He was later
charged also with indirect bribery under
the RPC. Malo claims he can no longer be
charged under the RPC for the same act
under RA 3019. Is he correct? (2014 Bar)
Q:
a.
Melda who is the private secretary of
Judge TolitsNaya, was persuaded by a
litigant, Jumbo, to have his case
calendared as early as possible for a
consideration of P500.00.May she be
held criminally liable for this
accommodation? Explain your answer.
b. What will be the criminal liability of
Melda if she volunteered to persuade
Judge TolitsNaya to rule in Jumbo’s
favor
without
asking
any
consideration? Explain your answer.
(1990 Bar)
A: No, Malo is not correct. Although the two
charges against Malo stemmed from the same
transaction, the same act gave rise to two
separate and distinct offenses. Whereas the
mere request or demand of a gift, present,
share, percentage or benefit is enough to
constitute a violation of Section 3(b) of RA
3019, acceptance of a promise or offer or
receipt of a gift or present is required in direct
bribery. Moreover, the ambit of Section 3(b) of
RA 3019 is specific. It is limited only to
contracts or transactions involving monetary
consideration where the public officer has the
authority to intervene under the law. Direct
bribery, on the other hand, has a wider and
more general scope: (a) performance of an act
constituting a crime; (b) execution of an unjust
act which does not constitute a crime and (c)
agreeing to refrain or refraining from doing an
act which is his official duty to do. No double
jeopardy attached since there was a variance
between the elements of the offenses charged.
The constitutional protection against double
jeopardy proceeds from a second prosecution
for the same offense, not for a different one
(Merencillo v. People, G.R. Nos. 142369-70, April
13, 2007).
A:
a.
The answer would depend or be qualified
by the implication of the phrase “to have
his case calendared as early as possible.”
If the phrase is interpreted as an unjust act
and in violation of the rule to give priority
to the older cases, then she would be liable
under direct bribery for an act which does
not constitute a crime but is unjust. He
may also be held liable under Section 3 (e)
of RA 3019 for“giving any private party
any unwarranted benefits.”
b.
If the phrase is interpreted as a nonviolation of the rules and regulations, then
she can only be held liable for direct
bribery.
ANTI-PIRACY AND ANTI-HIGHWAY
ROBBERY (P.D. NO. 532) (2000, 2001, 2006,
2008, 2012 Bar)
Melda is not criminally liable because the
act of volunteering to persuade is not a
criminal act. It is the act of persuading that
is considered a criminal act. The act does
not fall under Article 210 of the Revised
Penal Code on Direct Bribery nor does it
fall under Article 211 of the RPC on
Indirect Bribery. Neither does it fall under
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
Section 3(a) of RA 3019 refers to acts of
persuading another public official to
violate rules and regulations.
Q: A postal van containing mail matter,
including checks and treasury warrants,
was hijacked along a national highway by
ten (10) men, two of whom, were armed.
They used force, violence and intimidation
against the three postal employees who
were occupants of the van, resulting in the
unlawful taking and aspiration of the entire
van and its contents.
(A) If you were the public prosecutor,
would you charge the ten (10) men who
hijacked the postal van with violation of
Presidential Decree No. 532, otherwise
known as the Anti-Piracy and AntiHighway Robbery Law of 1974? Explain
your answer.
(B) If you were the defense counsel, what
are the elements of the crime of
highway robbery that the prosecution
should prove to sustain a conviction?
(2012 Bar)
A:
Q: Malo, a clerk of court of a trial court,
promised the accused in a drug case
pending before the court, that he would
convince the judge to acquit him for a
consideration of P5 million. The accused
agreed and delivered the money through
his lawyer to the clerk of court.
The judge, not knowing of the deal,
proceeded to rule on the evidence and
convicted the accused.
Malo was charged with violation of Section
3 (b), RA 3019 which prohibits a public
officer from directly or indirectly
requesting or receiving any gift, present,
(A) No. I would not charge the 10 men with
the crime of highway robbery. The mere
fact that the offense charged was
committed on a highway would not be the
51
CRIMINAL LAW
determinant for the application of PD No.
532. If a motor vehicle, either stationary or
moving on a highway is forcibly taken at a
gunpoint by the accused who happened to
take a fancy thereto, the location of the
vehicle at the time of the unlawful taking
would not necessarily put the offense
within the ambit of PD 532. In this case,
the crime committed is violation of the
Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972 (People v.
Puno, GR No. 97471, February 17, 1993).
committed on a highway, the robbery is
committed only against predetermined
victims;
(2) It is Highway Robbery under PD 532,
when the offender is a brigand or one who
roams in public highways and carries out
his robbery in public highways as venue,
whenever the opportunity to do so arises.
It is ordinary Robbery under the RPC
when the commission thereof in a public
highway is only incidental and the
offender is not a brigand; and
(3) In Highway Robbery under PD 532, there
is frequency in the commission of the
robbery in public highways and against
persons traveling thereat; whereas
ordinary robbery in public highways is
only occasional against a predetermined
victim, without frequency in public
highways.
Moreover, there is no showing that the 10
men were a band of outlaws organized for
the purpose of depredation upon the
persons and properties of innocent and
defenseless inhabitants who travel from
one place to another. What was shown is
one isolated hijacking of a postal van. It
was not stated in the facts given that the
10 men previously attempted at similar
robberies by them to establish the
“indiscriminate”
commission
thereof
(Filoteo, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, GR No.
79543, October 16, 1996).
ANTI-PLUNDER ACT (R.A. NO. 7080, AS
AMENDED) (1993, 2014)
Q: Through kickbacks, percentages or
commissions
and
other
fraudulent
schemes/conveyances
and
taking
advantage of his position, Andy, a former
mayor of a suburban town, acquired assets
amounting to P10 billion which is grossly
disproportionate to his lawful income. Due
to his influence and connections and
despite knowledge by the authorities of his
ill-gotten wealth, he was charged with the
crime of plunder only after twenty (20)
years from his defeat in the last elections he
participated in.
(B) Under Section 2 of PD 532, highway
robbery is defined as “the seizure of any
person for ransom, extortion, or other
unlawful purposes, or the taking away of
the property of another by means of
violence against or intimidation of person
or force upon things or other unlawful
means, committed by any person on any
Philippines highway.” Hence, the elements
of highway robbery are:
(a) Intent to gain;
(b) Unlawful taking of property of
another;
(c) Violence against or intimidation of any
person;
(d) Committed on a Philippine highway.
(1) May Andy still be held criminally liable?
Why?
(2) Can the State still recover the
properties and assets that he illegally
acquired, the bulk of which is in the
name of his wife and children? Reason
out. (1993 Bar)
To obtain a conviction for highway
robbery, the prosecution must prove that
the accused were organized for the
purpose
of
committing
robbery
indiscriminately. If the purpose is only a
particular robbery, the crime is only
robbery, or robbery in band if there are at
least four armed participants (See People v.
Mendoza, GR No. 104461, February 23,
1996).
A:
(1) Andy will not be criminally liable. Under
Sec. 6 of RA 7080, “the crime punishable
under this Act shall prescribe in twenty
years.”For crimes punished by special
penal laws, Sec. 2 of Act 3326 provides
that “prescription shall begin to run from
the day of the commission of the violation
of the law, and if the same be not known at
the time, from the discovery thereof and
the institution of judicial proceeding for its
investigation and punishment.” In this
case, Andy was charged with the crime of
plunder after twenty (20) years from his
defeat in the last elections he participated
in, despite knowledge by the authorities of
his ill-gotten wealth. Thus, the crime has
already prescribed.
Q: Distinguish Highway Robbery under PD
No. 532 from Robbery committed on a
highway. (2000 Bar)
A: Highway Robbery under PPD 532 differs
from ordinary Robbery committed on a
highway in these respects:
(1) In Highway Robbery under PD 532, the
robbery is committed indiscriminately
against persons who commute in such
highways, regardless of the potentiality
they offer; while in ordinary Robbery
UST BAR OPERATIONS
52
QUAMTO (1987-2017)
(2) Yes. Sec. 6 of RA 7080 provides that the
right of the State to recover properties
unlawfully acquired by public officers
from them or their nominees or
transferees shall not be barred by
prescription, laches or estoppel(Sec. 6, RA
7080).
stabbed wounds. Can Ms. A validly put up a
defense? Explain. (2014 Bar)
A: Yes. Ms. A can put up the defense of
battered woman syndrome. It appears that she
is suffering from physical and psychological or
emotional distress resulting from cumulative
abuse by her husband.
ANTI-VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND
THEIR CHILDREN (R.A. NO. 9262)
Under Section 26 of RA 9262, “victim survivors
who are found by the courts to be suffering
from battered woman syndrome do not incur
any criminal and civil liability notwithstanding
the absence of any of the elements for
justifying circumstances of self-defense under
the RPC.”
Battered Woman Syndrome (2010, 2014,
2015 Bar)
Q: Define "Battered Woman Syndrome."
What are the three phases of the "Battered
Woman Syndrome"? Would the defense
prosper despite the absence of any of the
elements for justifying circumstances of
self-defense under the Revised Penal Code?
Explain. (2010 Bar)
As a rule, once the unlawful aggression ceased,
stabbing the victim further is not self-defense.
However, even if the element of unlawful
aggression in self-defense is lacking, Ms. A,
who is suffering for battered woman
syndrome, will not incur criminal and civil
liability.
A: “Battered Woman Syndrome” refers to a
scientifically define pattern of psychological
and behavioural symptoms found in woman
living in battering relationships as a result of
cumulative abuse (Sec. 3[d], R.A. 9262).
Q: Dion and Talia were spouses. Dion
always came home drunk since he lost his
job a couple of months ago. Talia had gotten
used to the verbal abuse from Dion. One
night, in addition to the usual verbal abuse,
Dion beat up Talia. The next morning, Dion
saw the injury that he had inflicted upon
Talia and promised her that he would stop
drinking and never beat her again.
However, Dion did not make good on his
promise. Just after one week, he started
drinking again. Talia once more endured
the usual verbal abuse. Afraid that he might
beat her up again, Talia stabbed Dion with a
kitchen knife while he was passed out from
imbibing too much alcohol. Talia was
charged with the crime of parricide.
a) May Talia invoke the defense of Battered
Woman Syndrome to free herself from
criminal liability? Explain.
b) Will your answer be the same, assuming
that Talia killed Dion after being beaten up
after a second time? Explain. (2015 Bar)
The three (3) phases of the BWS are: (1)
tension- building phase; (2) acute battering
incident; and (3) tranquil, loving, or nonviolent phase (People v. Genosa, G.R. No.
135981, January 15, 2004).
Yes, the defense will prosper. Sec. 26 of R.A.
9262 provides that victim-survivors who are
found by the courts to be suffering from
battered woman syndrome do not incur any
criminal and civil liability notwithstanding the
absence of any of the elements of justifying
circumstances of self-defense under the RPC.
Q: Ms. A had been married to Mr. B for 10
years. Since their marriage, Mr. B had been
jobless and a drunkard, preferring to stay
with his “barkadas” until the wee hours of
the morning. Ms. A was the breadwinner
and attended to the needs of their three (3)
growing children. Many times, when Mr. B
was drunk, he would beat Ms. A and their
three children, and shout invectives against
them. In fact, in one of the beating
incidents, Ms.A suffered a deep stab wound
on her tummy that required a prolonged
stay in the hospital. Due to the beatings and
verbal abuses committed against her, she
consulted a psychologist several times, as
she was slowly beginning to lose her mind.
One night, when Mr. B arrived dead drunk,
he suddenly stabbed Ms. A several times
while shouting invectives against her.
A:
a) No, a single act of battery or physical harm
committed by Dion against Talia resulting to
the physical and psychological or emotional
distress on her part is not sufficient to avail of
the benefit of the justifying circumstance of
“Battered Woman Syndrome”. The defense of
Battered Woman Syndrome can be invoked if
the woman with marital relationship with the
victim is subjected to cumulative abuse or
battery involving the infliction of physical
harm resulting to the physical and
psychological
or
emotional
distress.
Cumulative means resulting from successive
addition. In sum, there must be “at least two
battering episodes” between the accused and
her intimate partner and such final episode
produced in the battered person’s mind an
actual fear of an imminent harm from her
Defending herself from the attack, Ms. A
grappled for the possession of a knife and
she succeeded. She then stabbed Mr. B
several
times
which
caused
his
instantaneous death. Medico-Legal Report
showed that the husband suffered three (3)
53
CRIMINAL LAW
batterer and an honest belief that she needed
to use force in order to save her life (People v.
Genosa, G.R. No. 135981, January 15, 2004)
battered woman deems this incident as
unpredictable, yet also inevitable. During
this phase, she has no control; only the
batterer may put an end to the violence.
The final phase of the cycle of violence
begins when the acute battering incident
ends. During this tranquil period, the
couple experience profound relief.
b) Yes, Talia can invoke the defense of Battered
Woman Syndrome to free herself from
criminal liability for killing her husband since
she suffered physical and emotional distress
arising from cumulative abuse or battery.
Under Section 26 of RA 9262, victim survivors
of Battered Woman Syndrome do not incur any
criminal or civil liability despite the absence of
the requisites of self-defens
(b) Yes. Under Section 3(c) of RA No. 9262,
“Battered Woman Syndrome” refers to a
scientifically
defined
pattern
of
psychological and behavioral symptoms
found in women living in battering
relationships as a result of “cumulative
abuse”. Under Section 3(b), “Battery”
refers to an act of inflicting physical harm
upon the woman or her child resulting in
physical and psychological or emotional
distress.
Q: Romeo and Julia have been married for
twelve (12) years and had two (2) children.
The first few years of their marriage went
along smoothly. However, on the fifth year
onwards, they would often quarrel when
Romeo comes home drunk. The quarrels
became increasingly violent, marked by
quiet periods when Julia would leave the
conjugal dwelling. During the times of
quiet, Romeo would court Julia with flowers
and chocolates and convince her to return
home, telling her that he could not live
without her; or Romeo would ask Julia to
forgive him, which she did, believing that if
she humbled herself, Romeo would change.
After a month of marital bliss, Romeo
would return to his drinking habit and the
quarrel would start again, verbally at first,
until it would escalate to physical violence.
In sum, the defense of Battered Woman
Syndrome can be invoked if the woman in
marital relationship with the victim is
subjected to cumulative abuse or battery
involving the infliction of physical harm
resulting to the physical and psychological
or emotional distress. Cumulative means
resulting from successive addition. In sum,
there must be “at least two battering
episodes” between the accused and her
intimate partner and such final episode
produced in the battered person’s mind an
actual fear of an imminent harm from her
batterer and an honest belief that she
needed to use force in order to save her
life. (People v. Genosa, G.R. No. 135981,
January 15, 2004)
One night, Romeo came home drunk and
went straight to bed. Fearing the onset of
another violent fight, Julia stabbed Romeo,
while he was asleep. A week later, their
neighbors discovered Romeo’s rotting
corpse on the marital bed. Julia and the
children were nowhere to be found. Julia
was charged with parricide. She asserted
“battered woman syndrome” as her
defense.
In this case, because of the battering
episodes, Julia feared the onset of another
violent fight and honestly believed the
need to defend herself even if Romeo had
not commenced an unlawful aggression.
Even in the absence of unlawful
aggression, however, Battered Woman
Syndrome is a defense. Under Section 27
of RA No. 9262, Battered Woman
Syndrome is a defense notwithstanding
the absence of any of the elements for
justifying circumstances of self-defense
under the Revised Penal Code such as
unlawful aggression. (Section 26, RA No.
9262)
(a) Explain the cycle of violence.
(b) Is Julia’s “battered woman syndrome”
defense meritorious? Explain. (2016
Bar)
A:
(a) The Battered Woman Syndrome is
characterized by the so-called “cycle of
violence,” which has three phases: (1)
tension-building phase; (2) the acute
battering incident; and (3) the tranquil,
loving (or at least, nonviolent) phase.
BOUNCING CHECKS LAW (B.P. 22) (1987,
1990, 1991, 1995, 1996, 2009, 2010, 2013
Bar)
Q: As security for a loan of P50,000.00 he
obtained from his friend, Joseph David,
payable not later than 17 April 1990, Roger
Vasquez drew and delivered to Joseph a
check on due date. The check was
dishonored on the ground of insufficiency
of funds. After appropriate preliminary
investigation, the City Prosecutor filed
against Roger an Information for violation
During the tension-building phase, minor
battering occurs – it could be verbal or
slight physical abuse or another form of
hostile behavior. The woman tries to
pacify the batterer through a kind,
nurturing behavior; or by simply staying
out of his way. The acute battering
incident is characterized by brutality,
destructiveness and sometimes, death. The
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54
QUAMTO (1987-2017)
of B.P. Blg. No. 22 alleging therein, inter
alia, that Roger “with intent to defraud, by
means of deceit, knowing fully well that he
had no funds and/or sufficient funds in the
bank, for value received, did then and
there, willfully and feloniously, issue the
aforesaid check” but “when the said check
was presented for encashment, said check
was dishonored and returned” on the
ground of insufficiency of funds.
she had adequate funds in the bank. While
she admits that she may be held liable for
estafa under Article 215 of the Revised
Penal Code, she cannot however be found
guilty of having violated B.P. Blg. 22. Is her
contention correct? Explain. (1996 Bar)
A: No. BP 22 also covers any person who,
having sufficient funds in or credit with the
drawee bank when he makes or draws and
issues a check, shall fail to keep sufficient funds
or to maintain a credit to cover the full amount
of the check if presented within a period of
ninety (90) days from the date appearing
thereon, for which reason it is dishonored by
the drawee bank (Sec. 1, Par. 2, BP 22).
In a decision rendered thereafter, the trial
judge ruled that Roger cannot be convicted
of the offense charged because the
information failed to allege that he knew,
when he issued the check, that he would
have insufficient funds for its payment in
full upon its presentment to the drawee
bank.
Estafa (1989, 1998, 1990, 1991, 2005, 2010,
2013, 2014 Bar)
Q: B imitated the signature of A, registered
owner of a lot, in special power of attorney
naming him (B) as the attorney-in-fact of A.
On February 13, 1964, B mortgaged the lot
to a bank using the special power of
attorney to obtain a loan of P8, 500. On the
same day, both the special power of
attorney and the mortgage contract were
duly registered in the Registry of Deeds.
Is the judge correct? (1991 Bar)
A: No. The allegation satisfies the legal
definition of the offense. The maker’s
knowledge of insufficiency of his funds is
legally presumed from the dishonor of the
check for lack of funds (People v. Lagui, G.R. No.
131840. April 27, 2000).
Q: Val, a Nigerian, set up a perfume
business in the Philippines. The investors
would buy the raw materials at a low price
from Val. The raw materials consisted of
powders, which the investors would mix
with water and let stand until a gel was
formed. Val made a written commitment to
the investors that he would buy back the
gel at a higher price, thus assuring the
investors of a neat profit. When the
amounts to be paid by Val to the investors
reached millions of pesos, he sold all the
equipment of his perfume business,
absconded with the money, and is nowhere
to be found. What crime or crimes were
committed, if any? Explain. (2016 Bar)
Because of B’s failure to pay, the bank
foreclosed the mortgage and the lot was
sold to X in whose name a new title was
issued. In March 1974, A discovered that
the property was already registered in the
name of X because an ejectment case filed
against him by X.
(a) If you were the lawyer of A, with what
crime or crimes would you charge B?
Explain.
(b) If you were the counsel of B, what
would be your defense? Discuss. (1993
Bar)
(a) The crime to be charged against B is estafa
through falsification of a public document.
When the offender commits in a public
document any of the acts of falsification
enumerated in Article 171 of the RPC as a
necessary means to commit another crime,
like estafa, theft or malversation, the two
crimes form a complex crime under Article
48 of the same Code. The falsification of a
public, official or commercial document
may be a means of committing estafa
because, before the falsified document is
actually utilized to defraud another, the
crime of falsification has already been
consummated, damage or intent to cause
damage not being an element of the crime
of falsification of a public, official or
commercial document. In other words, the
crime of falsification was committed prior
to the consummation of the crime of
estafa. Actually utilizing the falsified
public, official or commercial document to
defraud another is estafa. The damage to
A: The crime committed is estafa through false
pretenses (Art. 315 par. 2[a]). Val defrauded
the investors by falsely pretending to possess
business or imaginary transactions. The fact
that he sold all the equipment of his perfume
business, and absconded with the money when
the amounts to be paid by him to the investors
reached millions of pesos shows that the
transaction or his business is imaginary, and
he defrauded the victims.
Q: The accused was convicted under BP Blg.
22 for having issued several checks which
were dishonored by the drawee bank on
their due date because the accused closed
her account after the issuance of checks. On
appeal, she argued that she could not be
convicted under B.P. Blg. 22 by reason of
the closing of her account because said law
applies solely to checks dishonored by
reason of insufficiency of funds and that at
the time she issued the checks concerned,
55
CRIMINAL LAW
A: No. The President of the financing
corporation does not incur criminal liability for
estafa because a money market transaction
partakes of the nature of a loan, such that nonpayment thereof would not give rise to estafa
through misappropriation or conversion. In
money market placement, there is transfer of
ownership of the money to be invested and
therefore the liability for its return is civil in
nature. (Sesbreño v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
84096, January 26, 1995).
another is caused by the commission of
estafa, not by the falsification of the
document(Intestate Estate of Manolita
Gonzales Vda. De Carungcong v. People, G.R.
No. 181409, February 11, 2010).
(b) The defense may be prescription if the
filing of the complaint against B was done
beyond the prescriptive period.
Art. 90 of the RPC states that “crimes
punishable by death, reclusion perpetuaor
reclusion temporal shall prescribe in
twenty years. Crimes punishable by other
afflictive penalties shall prescribe in fifteen
years. Those punishable by a correctional
penalty shall prescribe in ten years; with
the exception of those punishable by
arresto mayor, which shall prescribe in five
years.”Article 91 of the same Code
provides that the period of prescription
shall commence to run from the day on
which the crime is discovered by the
offended party, the authorities, or their
agents. Under Art. 48 of the same
Code,“When a single act constitutes two or
more grave or less grave felonies, or when
an offense is a necessary means for
committing the other, the penalty for the
most serious crime shall be imposed, the
same to be applied in its maximum
period.”
Q: A sold a washing machine to B on credit
with the understanding that B could return
the appliance within two weeks if after
testing the same, B decided not to buy it.
Two weeks lapsed without B returning the
appliance. A found out that B had sold the
washing machine to a third party. Is B liable
for estafa? Why? (2002 Bar)
A: No. B is not liable for estafa because he is
not just an entrustee of the washing machine
which he sold; he is the owner thereof by
virtue of the sale of the washing machine to
him. The sale being on credit, B as buyer is only
liable for the unpaid price of the washing
machine; his obligation is only a civil
obligation.
There
is
no
felonious
misappropriation that could constitute estafa.
Q: A and B agreed to meet at the latter's
house to discuss B's financial problems. On
his way, one of A's car tires blew up. Before
A left following the meeting, he asked B to
lend him money to buy a new spare tire. B
had temporarily exhausted his bank
deposits,
leaving
a
zero
balance.
Anticipating, however, a replenishment of
his account soon, B issued A a postdated
check with which A negotiated for a new
tire. When presented, the check bounced
for lack of funds. The tire company filed a
criminal case against A and B. What would
be the criminal liability, if any, of each of
the two accused? Explain. (2003 Bar)
In this case, the most serious crime is
Falsification under Article 171 of the RPC
which has a corresponding penalty of
prision mayor and a fine not exceeding
₱5,000.00 and not Estafa, because under
RA 10951, the penalty is onlyarresto
mayor if the amount involved does not
exceed P40,000.00. Since prisionmayor is
an afflictive penalty, the prescriptive
period under Art. 90 of RPC is 15 years
from the time the crime is discovered by
the offended party, which is March 1974.
Thus, prescription is a defense if the
complaint was filed beyond March 1989.
A: A who negotiated the unfunded check of B
in buying a new tire for his car may only be
prosecuted for estafa if he was aware at the
time of such negotiation that the check has no
sufficient funds in the drawee bank; otherwise,
he is not criminally liable.
Q: On March 31, 1995, Orpheus Financing
Corp. received from Maricar the sum of
P500,000 as money market placement for
sixty days at fifteen (15) percent interest,
and the President of said Corp. issued a
check covering the amount including the
interest due thereon, postdated May 30,
1995. On the maturity date, however,
Orpheus Financing Corp. failed to deliver
back Maricar's money placement with the
corresponding
interest
earned,
notwithstanding repeated demands upon
said Corporation to comply with its
commitment. Did the President of Orpheus
Financing Corporation incur any criminal
liability for estafa for reason of the nonpayment of the money market placement?
Explain. (1996 Bar)
UST BAR OPERATIONS
B who accommodated A with his check may
nevertheless be prosecuted under B.P. 22 for
having issued the check, knowing at the time of
issuance that it has no funds in the bank and
that A will negotiate it to buy a new tire, i.e., for
value. B may not be prosecuted for estafa
because the facts indicate that he is not
actuated by intent to defraud in issuing the
check which A negotiated. Obviously, B issued
the postdated check only to help A; criminal
intent or dolo is absent.
Q: DD was engaged in the warehouse
business. Sometime in November 2004, he
56
QUAMTO (1987-2017)
was in dire need of money. He, thus, sold
merchandise deposited in his warehouse to
VR for P500,000.00. DD was charged with
theft, as principal, while VR as accessory.
The court convicted DD of theft but
acquitted VR on the ground that he
purchased the merchandise in good faith.
However, the court ordered VR to return
the merchandise to the owner thereof and
ordered DD to refund the P500,000.00 to
VR. DD moved for the reconsideration of
the decision insisting that he should be
acquitted of theft because being the
depositary, he had juridical possession of
the merchandise. VR also moved for the
reconsideration of the decision insisting
that since he was acquitted of the crime
charged, and that he purchased the
merchandise in good faith, he is not
obligated to return the merchandise to its
owner. Rule on the motions with reasons.
(2005 Bar)
A: The motion for reconsideration of DD
should be denied.
Juan went inside the shopping mall
while the officer waited at the corner of
mall. After 15 minutes, Juan returned
with ten sticks of marijuana cigarettes
which he gave to SPO2 Mercado who
thereupon placed Juan under arrest
and charged him with violation of The
Dangerous Drugs Law by selling
marijuana cigarettes. Is Juan guilty of
any offense punishable under The
Dangerous Drugs Act? Discuss fully.
(1995 Bar)
A:
(1) As to the criminal design, in entrapment, it
originates from and is already in the mind
of the lawbreaker even before entrapment.
In instigation, the idea and design to bring
about the commission of the crime
originated and developed in the mind of
the law enforcers;
In entrapment, the law enforcers resort to
ways and means for the purpose of
capturing the lawbreaker in flagrante
delicto. In instigation, the law enforcers
induce, lure, or incite a person who is not
minded to commit a crime and would not
otherwise commit it, into committing the
crime; and
In this case, there being no proof that title to
the goods was transferred to DD, only physical
possession is presumed transferred to and
obtained by DD. (U.S. v. De Vera, G.R. No. L16961, September 19, 1921)
The principal distinction between the two
crimes is that in theft the thing is taken while
in estafa the accused received the property and
converts it to his own use or benefit. However,
there maybe theft even if the accused has
possession of the property, if he was entrusted
onlywith the material or physical (natural) or
de facto possession of the thing, his
misappropriation of the same constitutes theft,
but if he has the juridical possession of the
thing, his conversion of the same constitutes
embezzlement or estafa (Santos v. People, G.R.
No. 77429, January 29, 1990).
Entrapment will not bar the prosecution
and conviction of the lawbreaker while
instigation absolves the accused from
criminal liability (People v. Dante Marcos,
185 SCRA 154, 1990).
(2) Juan cannot be charged of any offense
punishable under the Dangerous Drugs
Act. Although Juan is a suspected drug
pusher, he cannot be charged on the basis
of a mere suspicion. By providing the
money with which to buy marijuana
cigarettes, SPO2 Mercado practically
induced and prodded Juan to commit the
offense of illegal possession of marijuana.
Set against the facts instigation is a valid
defense available to Juan.
While VR is acquitted of theft, such acquittal
does not of itself negate civil liability of VR to
return the property stolen by DD. Civil liability
on the part of VR exists despite acquittal since
his acquittal is premised on the finding that his
liability is only civil in nature. (De Guzman v.
Alva, 51 OG 1311).
Q: Pat. Buensuceso, posing as a buyer,
approached Ronnie, a suspected drug
pusher, and offered to buy P300.00 worth
of shabu. Ronnie then left, came back five
minutes later and handed the aluminum
foil containing the shabu to him. Before Pat.
Buensuceso was able to deliver the marked
money to Ronnie, the latter spotted a
policeman at a distance, whom Ronnie
knew to be connected with the Narcotics
Command of the Police. Upon seeing the
latter, Ronnie ran away but was arrested
thirty minutes later by other policemen
who pursued him. Under the circumstances,
would you consider the crime of sale of a
prohibited drug already consummated?
(1996 Bar)
COMPREHENSIVE DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT
(R.A. 9165) (1990, 1992, 1995, 1996, 1998,
2000, 2003, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2009, 2015,
2016 Bar)
Q:
(1) Distinguish
entrapment
from
instigation. Discuss fully. (1990, 1995,
2003, 2015 Bar)
(2) Suspecting that Juan was a drug pusher,
SPO2 Mercado, leader of the Narcom
team, gave Juan a P100-bill and asked
him to buy some marijuana cigarettes.
Desirous of pleasing SPO2 Mercado,
57
CRIMINAL LAW
A: Yes. The sale of prohibited drug is already
consummated although the marked money
was not yet delivered. When Ronnie handed
the aluminum foil containing the shabu to Pat.
Buensuceso pursuant to their agreed sale, the
crime was consummated. Payment of the
consideration is not an element of requisite of
the crime. If ever, the marked money is only
evidentiary to strengthen the case of the
prosecution.
group of anti-drug agents. When Ong
arrived at the airport, the group arrested
him and seized his attaché case. Upon
inspection the Immigration holding area,
the attaché case yielded 5 plastic bags of
heroin weighing 500 grams. Chief Inspector
Gamboa took the attaché case and boarded
him in an unmarked car driven by PO3
Pepito Lorbes. On the way to Camp Crame
and upon nearing White Plains corner Edsa,
Chief Inspector Gamboa ordered PO3
Lorbes to stop the car. They brought out the
drugs from the case in the trunk to and got
3 plastic sacks of heroin. They then told
Ong to alight from the car. Ong left with the
2 remaining plastic sacks of heroin. Chief
Inspector Gamboa advised him to keep
silent and go home which the latter did.
Unknown to them, an NBI team of agents
had been following them and witnessed the
transaction. They arrested Chief Inspector
Gamboa and PO3 Lorbes. Meanwhile,
another NBI team followed Ong and
likewise arrested him. All of them were
later charged.
The absence of the marked money will not
create a hiatus in the prosecution’s evidence as
long as the sale of the dangerous drugs is
adequately proven and the drug subject of the
transaction is presented before the court.
There was a perfected contract of sale of the
drug (People v. Ong Co, 245 SCRA 733)
Q: Obie Juan is suspected to have in his
possession an unspecified amount of
methamphetamine
hydrochloride
or
“shabu”. An entrapment operation was
conducted by police officers, resulting in
his arrest following the discovery of 100
grams of the said dangerous drug in his
possession. He was subsequently charged
with two crimes: Violation of Section 11,
Article II of RA 9165 for the possession of
“shabu” and violation of Section 15, Art. II
of RA 9165 for the use of marijuana.
What are their respective
liabilities? (2006 Bar)
A: Chief Inspector Samuel Gamboa and PO3
Pepito Lorbes incur criminal liability under
Art. 11, Sec. 4 last par., RA No. 9165, otherwise
known as the “Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act of 2002”. They acted as
“protector/coddler” to the unlawful bringing
into the Philippines of the dangerous drugs. A
“protector/coddler” refers to any person who
uses his power or position in, inter alia,
facilitating the escape of any person whom he
knows or believes, has violated the Dangerous
Drugs Law, in order to prevent the arrest,
prosecution and conviction of the violator.
(a) Are the charges proper? Explain.
(b) So as not to be sentenced to death, Obie
Juan offers to plead guilty to a lesser
offense. Can he do so? Why? (1998,
2004, 2005, 2016 Bar)
A:
(a) The charge of possession of shabu is
proper as the mere possession of such
drug is punishable, but the charge of use of
marijuana is not proper as Section 15 of
R.A. 9165 (Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act of 2002) expressly excludes
penalties for “use” of dangerous drugs
when the person tested “is also found to
have in possession such quantity of any
dangerous drug” provided for in Section
11 of such Act.
(b) Yes. Section 23 of R.A. 9165 which
expressly provides that “Any person
charged under any provision of this Act
regardless of the imposable penalty shall
not be allowed to avail of the provision on
plea-bargaining.” has already been struck
down by the Supreme Court as
unconstitutional for it encroaches on the
rule-making power of the Supreme Court
(Estipona Jr v. Lobrigo G.R. No. 226679
August 15, 2017). Thus, Obie Juan can now
plea to a lesser offense.
The two police officers are criminally liable for
violation of Sec. 27. RA 9165 of the same law
for misappropriation and failure to account for
the confiscated or seized dangerous drugs.
On the other hand, Dante Ong is criminally
liable for the illegal importation or bringing
into the Philippines of the dangerous drugs
(Art. 11, Sec. 4, RA 9165).
Q: Tuburcio asked Anastacio to join their
group for a “session”. Thinking that it was
for a mahjong session, Anastacio agreed.
Upon reaching Tiburcio’s house, Anastacio
discovered that it was actually a shabu
session. At that precise time, the place was
raided by the police, and Anastacio was
among those arrested.
What crime can Anastacio be charged with,
if any? Explain. (2007 Bar)
Q: After receiving a reliable information
that Dante Ong, a notorious drug smuggler,
was arriving on PAL Flight No. PR181, PNP
Chief Inspector Samuel Gamboa formed a
UST BAR OPERATIONS
criminal
A: Anastacio may not be charged of any crime.
58
QUAMTO (1987-2017)
completely been rehabilitated and did not
want to have anything to do with drugs
anymore. But he was prevailed upon to
help when SP03 Relio explained that only
he could help capture Rado because he
used to be his customer. SP03 Relio then
gave Emilo the marked money to be used in
buying shabu from Rado. The operation
proceeded. After Emilo handed the marked
money to Rado in exchange for the sachets
of shabu weighing 50 grams, and upon
receiving the pre-arranged signal from
Ernilo, SP03 Relio and his team members
barged in and arrested Rado and Ernilo,
who were both charged with violation of
R.A. 9165, otherwise known as the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of
2002.
Sec. 7 of RA 9165 on the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs of 2002 punishes employees
and visitors of a den, dive or resort where
dangerous drugs are used in any form. But for
a visitor of such place to commit the crime, it is
a requisite that he is “aware of the nature of
the place as such and shall knowingly visit the
same.” These requisites are absent in the facts
given.
Q: Following his arrest after a valid buybust operation, Tommy was convicted of
violation of Section 5, Republic Act 9165.
On appeal, Tommy questioned the
admissibility of the evidence because the
police officers who conducted the buy-bust
operation failed to observe the requisite
"chain of custody" of the evidence
confiscated and/or seized from him.
(a) What defense, if any, may Emilo invoke
to free himself from criminal liability?
Explain.
(b) May Rado adopt as his own Emilo's
defense? Explain. (2015 Bar)
(a) What is the "chain of custody"
requirement in drug offenses? What is
its rationale? (2009, 2016 Bar)
(b) What is the effect of failure to observe
the requirement? (2009 Bar)
A:
(a) “Chain of custody” requirement in drug
offenses refers to the duly recorded,
authorized movement and custody of seized
dangerous drugs, controlled chemicals, plant
sources of dangerous drugs, and laboratory
equipment of dangerous drugs from the time
of confiscation/seizure thereof from the
offender, to its turn-over and receipt in the
forensic laboratory for examination, to its
safekeeping and eventual violation, and for
destruction
(Dangerous
Drugs
Board
Regulation No. 1 Series of 2001)
A:
(a) Ernilo may invoke Section 33, Art. II of RA
9165 or the “Comprehensive Drugs Act of
2002”. He may have violated Section 11 of
RA 9165 for possession of shabu but he is
immune from prosecution and punishment
because of his role as the poseur-buyer in
the entrapment operation. There was
virtually instigation. He is exempted from
prosecution or punishment because the
information obtained from him by the
PDEA agents, who had no direct and
concrete evidence of Rado’s drug-pushing
activities, led to the whereabouts, identity
and arrest of Rado. So long as the
information and testimony given are
pleaded and proven, Ernilo cannot be
prosecuted for violation of RA 9165.
(b) No. First, an entrapment operation is a
valid means of arresting violators of RA
9165. It is an effective way of
apprehending law offenders in the act of
committing a crime. In a buy-bust
operation, the idea to commit a crime
originates from the offender, without
anybody inducing or prodding him to
commit the offense. Second, the immunity
does not extend to violators of Section 5 of
RA 9165 or the sale of shabu (sec. 33, RA
9165). Lastly, he was the offender of the
crime and apparently the most guilty of
the offense.
Its rationale is to preserve the authenticity of
the corpus delicti or body of the crime by
rendering it improbable that the original item
seized/ confiscated in the violation has been
exchanged or substituted with another or
tampered with or contaminated. It is a method
of authenticating the evidence as would
support a finding beyond reasonable doubt
that the matter is what the prosecution claims
to be.
(b) Failure to observe the “chain of custody”
requirement
renders
the
evidence
questionable, not trustworthy and insufficient
to prove the corpus delicti beyond reasonable
doubt.
Hence, Tommy would
reasonable doubt.
be
acquitted
on
Q: Dimas was arrested after a valid buybust operation. Macario, the policeman who
acted as poseur-buyer, inventoried and
photographed ten (10) sachets of shabu in
the presence of a barangay tanod. The
inventory was signed by Macario and
the tanod, but Dimas refused to sign. As
Macario was stricken with flu the day after,
Q: The Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency
(PDEA) had intelligence reports about the
drug pushing activities of Rado, but could
not arresthim for lack of concrete evidence.
SP03 Relio, a PDEA team leader,
approached Emilo and requested him to act
as poseur-buyer of shabu and transact with
Rado. Emilo refused, saying that he had
59
CRIMINAL LAW
he was able to surrender the sachets to the
PNP Crime Laboratory only after four (4)
days. During pre-trial, the counsel de
oficio of Dimas stipulated that the
substance contained in the sachets
examined by the forensic chemist is in fact
methamphetamine
hydrochloride
or shabu. Dimas was convicted of violating
Section 5 of RA 9165. On appeal, Dimas
questioned the admissibility of the
evidence because Macario failed to observe
the requisite "chain of custody" of the
alleged "shabu" seized from him. On behalf
of the State, the Solicitor General claimed
that despite non-compliance with some
requirements, the prosecution was able to
show that the integrity of the substance was
preserved. Moreover, even with some
deviations from the requirements, the
counsel of Dimas stipulated that the
substance seized from Dimas was shabu so
that the conviction should be affirmed.
absorbed in the crime of rebellion, such
possession being a necessary means for
the perpetration of the latter crime. (Elias
v. Rodriguez, 107 Phil 659)
(b) The charges here could not be absorbed in
the separate charge of rebellion as it is
clear that the act of murder, coupled with
the possession of an unlicensed firearm,
was not in furtherance of the rebellion.
Q: PH killed OJ, his political rival in the
election campaign for Mayor of their town.
The Information against PH alleged that he
used an unlicensed firearm in the killing of
the victim, and this was proved beyond
reasonable doubt by the prosecution. The
trial court convicted PH of two crimes:
Murder and Illegal Possession of Firearms.
Is the conviction correct? Reason briefly.
(2004 Bar)
A: No. The conviction of PH for two crimes is
not correct. Under the new law on illegal
possession of firearms and explosives, RA
8294, a person may only be criminally liable
for illegal possession of firearm if no other
crime is committed therewith; If a homicide or
murder is committed with the use of an
unlicensed firearm, such use shall be
considered as an aggravating circumstance.
Rule on the contention of the State (2016
Bar).
A: The contention of the State is meritorious.
The rule is settled that failure to strictly
comply with Section 21(1), Article II of RA
9165 does not necessarily render an accused’s
arrest illegal or the items seized or confiscated
from him inadmissible. The most important
factor is the preservation the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized item. Moreover,
the issue of noncompliance with Section 21 of
RA 9165 cannot be raised for the first time on
appeal (People v. Badilla, G.R. No. 218578,
August 31, 2016)
PH therefore may only be convicted of murder
and the use of an unlicensed firearm in its
commission may only be appreciated as a
special aggravating circumstance, provided
that such use is alleged specifically in the
Information for Murder.
INDETERMINATE SENTENCE LAW (R.A.
4103, AS AMENDED) (1988, 1989, 1990,
1994, 1997, 1999, 2002, 2005, 2007, 2009,
2010, 2013, 2016)
ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS (P.D.
1866, AS AMENDED BY R.A. NO. 8294 AND
R.A. 10591) (1990, 2000, 2004 Bar)
Q:
Q:
State
the
application
of
the
Indeterminate Sentence Law. (1988, 2016
Bar)
(a) Ka Jacinto, an NPA commander, was
apprehended with unlicensed firearms
and explosives. He was accordingly
charged with illegal possession of said
firearms and explosives. He now
questions the filing of the charges on
the ground that they are deemed
absorbed in a separate charge of
rebellion filed against him. Decide the
issue.
(b) Suppose Ka Jacinto, using one of the
unlicensed firearms, shot and killed his
neighbor in an altercation. May the
charge of murder and illegal possession
of firearms be deemed absorbed in the
separate charge of rebellion filed
against him? Resolve the matter with
reasons. (1990) Bar
A:
(a) The Indeterminate Sentence Law (ISLaw)
applies in cases where the penalty
imposed is more than one year and the
ISLaw shall apply where there is a
minimum penalty which is not lower than
the penalty next lower in degree provided
by law and the maximum not higher than
the maximum penalty provided by law in
cases of felonies but when it comes to
statutory offenses, it must be lower than
the minimum penalty provided by law and
not higher than the maximum penalty
provided by law except in the following
cases as provided by Section 2 of Art.
4103:
A:
1.
2.
(a) The charge of illegal possession of
firearms and explosives is deemed
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Life imprisonment
Those convicted of treason, conspiracy
or proposal to commit treason
QUAMTO (1987-2017)
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
To those convicted of misprision of
treason,
rebellion,
sedition
or
espionage
Those convicted of piracy
Those who are habitual delinquents
Those who shall have escaped from
confinement or evaded sentence
Those who having been granted
conditional pardon by the Chief
Executive shall have violated the
terms thereof
Those whose maximum term of
imprisonment does not exceed one
year, not to those already sentenced
by final judgment at the time of
approval of this Act, except as
provided in Sec. 5 hereof
7.
Those who having been granted
conditional pardon by the Chief Executive
shall have violated the terms thereof;
8. Those whose maximum term of
imprisonment does not exceed one year;
9. Those already sentenced by final judgment
at the time of the approval of this Act; and
10. Those whose sentence imposes penalties
which do not involve imprisonment, like
destierro.
Q: How are the maximum and the minimum
terms of the indeterminate sentence for
offenses punishable under the Revised
Penal Code determined? (2002 Bar)
A: For crimes punished under the Revised
Penal Code, the maximum term of the
indeterminate sentence shall be the penalty
properly imposable under the same Code after
considering the attending mitigating and/or
aggravating circumstances according to Art. 64
of said Code. The minimum term of the same
sentence shall be fixed within the range of the
penalty next lower in degree to that prescribed
for the crime under the said Code.
Q: Explain how the Indeterminate Sentence
Law is applied in crimes punished by
special laws (2017 Bar)
A: The indeterminate sentence in such cases
shall consist of a maximum term which shall
not exceed the maximum fixed by the special
law and a minimum term which shall not be
less than the minimum term pescribed by the
same.
Q: While serving his sentence, Macky
entered the prohibited area and had a pot
session with Ivy (Joy’s sister). Is Macky
entitled to an indeterminate sentence in
case he is found guilty of use of prohibited
substances? Explain your answer. (2007
Bar)
Q: Itos was convicted of an offense
penalized by a special law. The penalty
prescribed is not less than six years but not
more than twelve years. No modifying
circumstance attended the commission of
the crime. If you were the judge, will you
apply the Indeterminate Sentence Law? If
so, how will you apply it? (1994, 1999 Bar)
A: No. Macky is not entitled to the benefit of
the Indeterminate Sentence Law (Act 4103, as
amended) for having evaded the sentence
which banished or placed him on destierro.
Sec. 2 of the said law expressly provides that
the law shall not apply to those who shall have
“evaded sentence”.
A: If I were the judge, I will apply the
provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
as the last sentence of Section 1 Act 4103,
specifically provides the application thereof for
violations of special laws. Under the same
provision, the minimum must not be less than
the minimum provided therein (six years and
one day) and the maximum shall not be more
than the maximum provided therein, i.e. twelve
years.
Q: Bruno was charged with homicide for
killing the 75 year old owner of his rooming
house. The prosecution proved that Bruno
stabbed the owner causing his death; and
that the killing happened at 10 in the
evening in the house where the victim and
Bruno lived. Bruno, on the other hand,
successfully proved that he voluntarily
surrendered to the authorities; that he
pleaded guilty to the crime charged; that it
was the victim who first attacked and did so
without any provocation on his (Bruno's)
part, but he prevailed because he managed
to draw his knife with which he stabbed the
victim. The penalty for homicide is
reclusion temporal. Assuming a judgment
of conviction and after considering the
attendant circumstances, what penalty
should the judge impose? (2013 Bar)
Q: When would the Indeterminate Sentence
Law (ISLaw) be inapplicable? (1999, 2003
Bar)
A: The ISLaw is not applicable to:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
Those persons convicted of offenses
punished with death penalty or lifeimprisonment or reclusion perpetua;
Those convicted of treason, conspiracy or
proposal to commit treason;
Those convicted of misprision of treason,
rebellion, sedition or espionage;
Those convicted of piracy;
Those who are habitual delinquents;
Those who shall have escaped from
confinement or evaded sentence;
A: Bruno should be sentenced to an
indeterminate sentence penalty of arresto
mayor
in
any
of
its
period
to
prisioncorreccionalin its medium period as
maximum. Bruno was entitled to two
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CRIMINAL LAW
(a) No. A is not entitled to a suspension of
sentence because he is no longer a minor
at the time of promulgation of the
sentence. For purposes of suspension of
sentence, the offender’s age at the time of
promulgation of the sentence is the one
considered, not his age when he
committed the crime. So although A was
below 18 years old when he committed
the crime, but he was already 23 years old
when sentenced, he is no longer eligible
for suspension of sentence.
(b) Yes. So long as the offender is still a minor
at the time of the promulgation of the
sentence. The law establishing Family
Courts, RA 8369, provides to this effect:
that if the minor is found guilty, the court
should promulgate the sentence and
ascertain any civil liability which the
accused may have incurred. However, the
sentence shall be suspended without the
need of application pursuant to PD 603,
otherwise known as the “Child and Youth
Welfare Code” (RA 8369, Sec. 5a). It is
under PD 603 that an application for
suspension of the sentence is required and
thereunder it is one of the conditions for
suspension of sentence that the offender
be a first time convict: this has been
displaced by RA 8369.
privileged mitigating circumstances of
incomplete self-defense and the presence of at
least two ordinary mitigating circumstances
(voluntary surrender and plea of guilt) without
any aggravating circumstance under Art. 69
and 64(5) of the RPC respectively, which
lowers the prescribed penalty for homicide
which
is
reclusion
temporal
to
prisioncorreccional.
JUVENILE JUSTICE AND WELFARE ACT (R.A.
NO. 9344, AS AMENDED, R.A. NO. 10630
AND IN RELATION TO P.D. 603) (1995,
2003, 2006, 2009, 2013 Bar)
Q: Victor, Ricky, Rod and Ronnie went to the
store of MangPandoy, Victor and Ricky
entered the store while Rod and Ronnie
posted themselves at the door. After
ordering beer, Ricky complained that he
was shortchanged although MangPandoy
vehemently denied it. Suddenly, Ricky
whipped out a knife as he announced
“Hold-up ito!” and stabbed MangPandoy to
death. Rod boxed the store’s salesgirl Lucy
to prevent her from helping MangPandoy.
When Lucy ran out of the store to seek help
from people next door, she was chased by
Ronnie. As soon as Ricky had stabbed
MangPandoy, Victor scooped up the money
from the cash box. Then Victor and Ricky
dashed to the street and shouted,
“Tumakbona kayo!” Rod was 14 and Ronnie
was 17. The money and other articles
looted from the store of MangPandoy were
later found in the houses of Victor and
Ricky.
PROBATION LAW (P.D. 968, AS AMENDED)
(1988, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1995,
2000, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2010 Bar)
Q: Who are the offenders disqualified from
availing themselves of the benefits of the
probation law (P.D. 968, as amended)?
(1988 Bar)
Are the minors Rod and Ronnie entitled to
suspended sentence under The Child and
Youth Welfare Code? Explain. (1995 Bar)
A: The following offenders are disqualified
from availing of the benefits of the Probation
Law:
A: No. Because the benefits of suspension of
sentence is not available where the youthful
offender has been convicted of an offense
punishable by reclusion perpetua to death
under Art. 294 (1), RPC (People v. Galit, 230
SCRA 486).
1.
2.
Q:
3.
(a) A was 2 months below 18 years of age
when he committed the crime. He was
charged with the crime 3 months later.
He was 23 when he was finally
convicted and sentenced. Instead of
preparing to serve a jail term, he sought
a suspension of the sentence on the
ground that he was a juvenile offender.
Should he be entitled to a suspension of
sentence? Reasons.
(b) Can juvenile offenders, who are
recidivists, validly ask for suspension of
sentence? Explain. (2003, 2013 Bar)
4.
5.
Q: A was charged with theft and upon
arraignment, pleaded guilty to the charge.
He was detained for failure to post bail.
After two (2) months, a decision was
rendered
sentencing
“A”
to
an
indeterminate sentence of six (6) months
and one (1) day as a minimum, to one (1)
A:
UST BAR OPERATIONS
Those sentenced to serve maximum term
of imprisonment of more than six years;
Those convicted of subversion or any
crime against the national security of the
public order;
Those who have previously been convicted
by final judgment of an offense punished
by imprisonment of not less than one
month and one day and or a fine of not less
than P200;
Those who have been once on probation
under the provisions of this decree; and
Those who are already serving sentence at
the time the substantive provisions of this
decree applicable pursuant to Sec. 33 of
P.D. 968.
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QUAMTO (1987-2017)
year and one (1) month as maximum, and
to pay the offended party the amount of
P700. On January 16, 1985, the very day the
sentence was read to “A”, the Judge issued a
Commitment Order addressed to the
Provincial Jail Warden. On January 28,
1985, “A” applied for probation but his
application was denied on the ground that
the sentence of conviction became final and
executory on January 16, 1985, when “A”
commence to serve his sentence. Is “A”
eligible for probation? (1989 Bar)
the prosecution of the case. To avoid
further embarrassment of a court trial for
him and the girl, the accused entered a plea
of guilty. He then filed a petition for
probation before serving sentence, but the
court denied the petition on the ground
that “it would be better for the accused to
serve sentence so that he would reform
himself and avoid the scandal in the
community that would be caused by the
grant of the petition. The accused serve
sentence but he brought the matter to the
Supreme Court in a petition for certiorari.
Did the trial court act correctly in denying
the petition for probation? (1991 Bar)
A: A is still eligible for probation since he filed
his application for probation within 15 days
from the promulgation of the judgment. Under
the Probation Law, the accused may apply for
probation within the period for perfecting an
appeal which is 15 days from promulgation or
notice thereof.
A: The trial court acted incorrectly. In Balleta v.
Leviste (92 SCRA 719), the Judge precisely
denied the petition for probation on the same
excuse stated in the problem. The Supreme
Court held that an accused must fall within any
one of the disqualifications stated in Sec. 9 of
PD 960 in order to be denied probation.
The judge committed an error in issuing a
Commitment order on the same day of
promulgation. A commitment order for the
convict to begin serving his sentence can be
validly issued only if the period for perfecting
an appeal has expired with no appeal being
taken. The fact that in compliance with such
order, which is void, the accused commenced
to serve his sentence does not bar him from
availing himself of the benefits of the
Probation Law.
Q: Johnny Gitara was convicted of the crime
of estafa by the Regional Trial Court of
Manila. He was imposed the indeterminate
penalty of imprisonment of 3 years, 2
months and 1 day as minimum and six
years
as
maximum,
both
of
prisioncorreccional and was ordered to
indemnify the offended party in the amount
of P3,000.00. He filed an application for
probation upon the promulgation of the
judgment.
While it is true under the Rules that a
judgment in a criminal case becomes final after
the lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal
or when the sentence has been partially or
totally satisfied or served or the accused has
applied for probation (Sec. 7, Rule 120), Sec. 9
of the same Rule provides that “nothing in this
Rule shall be construed as affecting any
existing provision in the law governing
suspension of sentence, probation or parole.”
What is the legal effect of his application for
probation on the judgment of conviction?
Does said application interrupt the running
of the period of appeal? (1992 Bar)
A: The filing of the application for probation is
considered as a waiver of the right of the
accused to appeal; the decision has become
final. In view of the finality of the decision,
there is no period of appeal to speak of.
The probation law does NOT speak of filing an
application for probation before judgment has
become final. It only speaks of filing the
application WITHIN THE PERIOD FOR
PERFECTING AN APPEAL. There is nothing in
the Probation Law that bars an accused who
has commenced to serve his sentence from
filing an application for probation provided he
does so within the period for perfecting an
appeal.
Q: On February 3, 1986, Roberto was
convicted of arson through reckless
imprudence and sentenced to pay a fine of
P15,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment
in case of insolvency by the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City. On February 10, 1986,
he appealed to the Court of Appeals. Several
months later, he filed a motion to withdraw
the appeal on the ground that he is applying
for probation. On May 7, 1987, the Court of
Appeals granted the motion and considered
the appeal withdrawn.
What the Probation Law provides is that no
application for probation shall be entertained
or granted if the defendant has perfected an
appeal from the judgment or conviction. It
does not say that no application shall be
entertained if the judgment has become final
because the convict has already commenced to
serve his sentence.
On June 10, 1987, the records of the case
were remanded to the trial court. Roberto
filed a “Motion for Probation” praying that
execution of his sentence be suspended,
and that a probation officer be ordered to
conduct an investigation and to submit a
report on his probation.
Q: Boyet Mar was charged with consented
abduction by a 17-year old complainant.
The accused made wedding arrangements
with the girl, but her parents insisted on
63
CRIMINAL LAW
The judge denied the motion on the ground
that pursuant to Presidential Decree No.
1990, which took effect on July 16, 1986, no
application for probation shall be
entertained or granted if the defendant has
perfected an appeal from the judgment of
conviction. Is the denial of Roberto’s
motion correct? (1994 Bar)
A: Yes, even if at the time of his conviction,
Roberto was qualified for probation but that at
the time of his application for probation, he is
no longer qualified, he is not entitled to
probation. The qualification for probation
must be determined as of the time the
application is filed in Court (Bernardo v. Judge
Balagot, et. al., G.R. 86561, Nov. 10, 1992).
Q: Juan was convicted of the Regional Trial
Court of a crime and sentenced to suffer the
penalty of imprisonment for a minimum of
eight years. He appealed both his
conviction and the penalty imposed upon
him to the Court of Appeals. The appellate
court ultimately sustained Juan’s conviction
but reduced his sentence to a maximum of
four years and eight months imprisonment.
Could Juan forthwith file an application for
probation? Explain. (1992, 1995, 2000,
2001, 2002, 2003 Bar)
A: No. Juan can no longer avail of the probation
because he appealed from the judgment of
conviction of the trial court, and therefore,
cannot apply for probation anymore. Section 4
of the Probation Law, as amended, mandates
that no application for probation shall be
entertained or granted if the accused has
perfected an appeal from the judgment of
conviction.
Q: May a probationer appeal from the
decision revoking the grant of probation or
modifying the terms and conditions
thereof? (2002 Bar)
A: No. Under Sec. 4 of the Probation Law, as
amended, an order granting or denying the
probation is not appealable.
UST BAR OPERATIONS
64