Ramirez v. CA
G.R. No. 93833, 248 SCRA 590, September 28, 1995
“Recording of conversation through a tape recorder”
The language of the Anti-Wire Tapping Law is clear and unambiguous.
The provision clearly makes it illegal for ANY person, NOT AUTHORIZED BY ALL PARTIES to any private
communication to secretly record such communication by means of a tape recorder.
Facts:
A civil case was filed by petitioner Ramirez alleging that the private respondent, Garcia, allegedly insulted and
humiliated her during a confrontation in the office, in an offensive manner contrary to morals, good customs and
public policy.
To support her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the event and sought moral damages.
In response, private respondent filed a criminal case alleging violation of ANTI-WIRE TAPPING LAW for secretly
taping the confrontation.
Issue: Whether the act of recording through a tape constitutes an offense?
Ruling:
YES. The Court ruled that the language of the law is clear and unambiguous. The provision clearly makes it illegal
for ANY person, NOT AUTHORIZED BY ALL PARTIES to any private communication to secretly record such
communication by means of a tape recorder.
The law makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be a party
other than or different from those involved in the private communication. The statute's intent to penalize all
persons unauthorized to make such recording is underscored by the use of the qualifier "any".
The nature of the conversations is immaterial to a violation of the statute. The substance of the same need not be
specifically alleged in the information. The mere allegation that an individual made a secret recording of a private
communication by means of a tape recorder would suffice to constitute an offense under Section 1 of R.A. 4200.
Petitioner's contention that the phrase "private communication" in Section 1 of R.A. 4200 does not include
"private conversations" narrows the ordinary meaning of the word "communication" to a point of absurdity. In its
ordinary signification, communication connotes the act of sharing or imparting signification, communication
connotes the act of sharing or imparting, as in a conversation, or signifies the "process by which meanings or
thoughts are shared between individuals through a common system of symbols (as language signs or gestures)."
These definitions are broad enough to include verbal or non-verbal, written or expressive communications of
"meanings or thoughts" which are likely to include the emotionally-charged exchange between petitioner and
private respondent, in the privacy of the latter's office.
In Gaanan v. Intermediate Appellate Court, a case which dealt with the issue of telephone wiretapping, we held
that the use of a telephone extension for the purpose of overhearing a private conversation without authorization
did not violate R.A. 4200 because a telephone extension devise was neither among those "device(s) or
arrangement(s)" enumerated, following the principle that "penal statutes must be construed strictly in favor of the
accused."
In this case, the use of tape recorder falls under the devices enumerated in the law (Dictaphone,
Dictagraph, Detectaphone, Walkie-talkie, and Tape recorder).Therefore, the act of recording through the tape
constitutes an offense.
The instant case turns on a different note, because the applicable facts and circumstances pointing to a violation of
R.A. 4200 suffer from no ambiguity, and the statute itself explicitly mentions the unauthorized "recording" of
private communications with the use of tape-recorders as among the acts punishable.
Gaanan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
GR L-69809, 16 October 1986
FACTS:
Atty. Tito Pintor and his client Manuel Montebon were discussing the terms for the withdrawal of the
complaint for direct assault filed with the Office of the City Fiscal of Cebu against Leonardo Laconico
after demanding P 8,000.00 from him. This demand was heard by Atty. Gaanan through a telephone
extension as requested by Laconico so as to personally hear the proposed conditions for the settlement.
Atty. Pintor was subsequently arrested in an entrapment operation upon receipt of the money. since
Atty. Gaanan listened to the telephone conversation without complainant's consent, complainant
charged Gaanan and Laconico with violation of the Anti- Wiretapping Act (RA 4200).
ISSUE:
Whether or not an extension telephone is among the prohibited devices in Sec. 1 of RA 4200 such that
its use to overheard a private conversation would constitute an unlawful interception of communication
between two parties using a telephone line.
HELD:
No. An extension telephone cannot be placed in the same category as a dictaphone or dictagraph, or
other devvices enumerated in Sec. 1 of the law as the use thereof cannot be considered as "tapping" the
wire or cable of a telephone line. this section refers to instruments whose installation or presence
cannot be presumed by the party or parties being overheard because, by their very nature, they are of
common usage and their purpose is precisely for tapping, intercepting, or recording a telephone
conversation. The telephone extension in this case was not installed for that purpose. It just happened
to be there for ordinary office use.
Furthermore, it is a general rule that penal statutes must be construed strictly in favor of the accused.
Thus in the case of doubt as in this case, on whether or not an extension telephone is included in the
phrase "device or arrangement" the penal statute must be construed as not including an extension
telephone.
A perusal of the Senate Congressional Record shows that our lawmakers intended to discourage,
through punishment, persons such as government authorities or representatives of organized groups
from installing devices in order to gather evidence for use in court or to intimidate, blackmail or gain
some unwarranted advantage over the telephone users. Consequently, the mere act of listeneing , in
order to be punishable must strictly be with the use of the enumerated devices in RA 4200 or other
similar nature.
Zulueta vs. Court of Appeals
253 S 699
Facts:
On March 26, 1982, petitioner entered the clinic of her husband, a Doctor of Medicine, and in the presence of her
mother, a driver and private respondent's secretary, forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet in her husband's
clinic and took 157 documents consisting of private correspondence between Dr. Martin and his alleged
paramours, greetings cards, cancelled checks, diaries, Dr. Martin's passport, and photographs. The documents and
papers were seized for use in evidence in a case for legal separation and for disqualification from the practice of
medicine which petitioner had filed against her husband.
Dr. Martin brought this action below for recovery of the documents and papers and for damages against
petitioner. The case was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila... which, after trial, rendered judgment for
private respondent declaring him "the capital/exclusive owner of the properties described in paragraph 3 of
plaintiff's Complaint or those further described in the Motion to Return and Suppress" and ordering Cecilia Zulueta
and any person acting in her behalf to immediately return the properties to Dr. Martin.
The writ of preliminary injunction earlier issued was made final and petitioner Cecilia Zulueta and her attorneys
and representatives were enjoined from "using or submitting/admitting as evidence" the documents and papers in
question. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court.
Alfredo Martin v. Alfonso Felix, Jr.,[1] this Court ruled that the documents and papers (marked as Annexes A-i to J7 of respondent's comment in that case) were admissible in evidence and, therefore, their use by petitioner's
attorney, Alfonso Felix, Jr., did not constitute malpractice or gross misconduct. For this reason, it is contended that
the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the decision of the trial court instead of dismissing private respondent's
complaint.
Issues: WON the petitioner’s contention is meritorious.
Ruling:
No. Petitioner's contention has no merit. The case against Atty. Felix, Jr. was for disbarment. Among other things,
private respondent, Dr. Alfredo Martin, as complainant in that case, charged that in using the documents in
evidence, Atty. Felix, Jr. committed malpractice or gross misconduct because of the injunctive order of the trial
court. The acquittal of Atty. Felix, Jr. in the administrative case amounts to no more than a declaration that his use
of the documents and papers for the purpose of securing Dr. Martin's admission as to their genuiness and
authenticity did not constitute a violation of the... injunctive order of the trial court. By no means does the decision
in that case establish the admissibility of the documents and papers in question.
It cannot be overemphasized that if Atty. Felix, Jr. was acquitted of the charge of violating the writ of preliminary
injunction issued by the trial court, it was only because, at the time he used the documents and papers,
enforcement of the order of the trial court was temporarily restrained by this Court. The TRO issued by this Court
was eventually lifted as the petition for certiorari filed by petitioner against the trial court's order was dismissed
and, therefore, the prohibition against the further use of the documents and papers became effective again.
Indeed, the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional injunction declaring
"the privacy of communication and correspondence [to be] inviolable"[3] is no less applicable simply because it is
the wife (who thinks... herself aggrieved by her husband's infidelity) who is the party against whom the
constitutional provision is to be enforced. The only exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a
"lawful order [from a] court or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law."[4] Any
violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained inadmissible "for any purpose in any proceeding."
Principles:
The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in breaking the drawers and cabinets of the other and in ransacking
them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by contracting marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or his right to... privacy as
an individual and the constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her.
The law ensures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for or
against the other without the consent of the affected spouse while the marriage subsists.[6] Neither may be... examined without the consent of
the other as to any communication received in confidence by one from the other during the marriage, save for specified exceptions.[7] But one
thing is freedom of communication; quite another is a compulsion for each one to share what one knows with the other. And this has nothing to
do with the duty of fidelity that each owes to the other.