Cayetano v. Monsod
G.R. No. 100113, September 3, 1991
Facts:
Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position of Chairman of the
COMELEC in a letter received by the Secretariat of the Commission on Appointments on April 25, 1991. Petitioner
opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not possess the required qualification of having been engaged
in the practice of law for at least ten years.
On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC.
On June 18, 1991, he took his oath of office. On the same day, he assumed office as Chairman of the COMELEC.
Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of Monsod's nomination, petitioner as a
citizen and taxpayer, filed the instant petition for certiorari and Prohibition praying that said confirmation and the
consequent appointment of Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections be declared null and void.
Issue:
Whether the appointment of Chairman Monsod of Comelec violates Section 1 (1), Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution?
Held:
The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1 (1), Article IX-C, that there shall be a Commission on Elections composed of
a Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their
appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a college degree, and must not have been candidates for any
elective position in the immediately preceding elections. However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be
members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the bar examinations of 1960 with a grade of 8655%. He has been dues paying member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines since its inception in 1972-73. He has
also been paying his professional license fees as lawyer for more than ten years.
At this point, it might be helpful to define private practice. The term, as commonly understood, means "an individual or
organization engaged in the business of delivering legal services." (Ibid.). Lawyers who practice alone are often called
"sole practitioners." Groups of lawyers are called "firms." The firm is usually a partnership and members of the firm are the
partners. Some firms may be organized as professional corporations and the members called shareholders. In either
case, the members of the firm are the experienced attorneys. In most firms, there are younger or more inexperienced
salaried attorneys called "associates."
Hence, the Commission on the basis of evidence submitted doling the public hearings on Monsod's confirmation, implicitly
determined that he possessed the necessary qualifications as required by law. The judgment rendered by the
Commission in the exercise of such an acknowledged power is beyond judicial interference except only upon a clear
showing of a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. (Art. VIII, Sec. 1 Constitution). Thus,
only where such grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown shall the Court interfere with the Commission's judgment. In
the instant case, there is no occasion for the exercise of the Court's corrective power, since no abuse, much less a grave
abuse of discretion, that would amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction and would warrant the issuance of the writs
prayed, for has been clearly shown.
Besides in the leading case of Luego v. Civil Service Commission, he Court said that, Appointment is an essentially
discretionary power and must be performed by the officer in which it is vested according to his best lights, the only
condition being that the appointee should possess the qualifications required by law. If he does, then the appointment
cannot be faulted on the ground that there are others better qualified who should have been preferred. This is a political
question involving considerations of wisdom which only the appointing authority can decide.
RODOLFO MILLARE vs. ATTY. EUSTAQUIO Z. MONTERO
FACTS:
Complainant obtained a favorable judgment from the MTC which ordered respondent’s
client to vacate the premises subject of the ejectment case. Respondent as counsel, appealed
the decision. CA dismissed Co's appeal from the decision of the RTC for failure to comply with the
proper procedures. Respondent thereafter resorted to devious and underhanded means to delay
the execution of the judgment rendered by the MTC adverse to his client.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility?
RULING:
Atty. Eustaquio Montero is suspended for (1) year.
Rule 12.02. — A lawyer shall not file multiple actions arising from the same cause.
Rule 12.04. — A lawyer shall not unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a judgment
or misuse court processes.
Under Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer is required to
represent his client "within the bounds of the law." The Code enjoins a lawyer to employ only fair
and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his client (Rule 19.01) and warns him not to
allow his client to dictate the procedure in handling the case (Rule 19.03). In short, a lawyer is
not a gun for hire.
It is unethical for a lawyer to abuse or wrongfully use the judicial process, like the filing of
dilatory motions, repetitious litigation and frivolous appeals for the sole purpose of frustrating
and delaying the execution of a judgment.
Judging from the number of actions filed by respondent to forestall the execution of the
same judgment, respondent is also guilty of forum shopping. Forum shopping exists when, by
reason of an adverse decision in one forum, defendant ventures to another for a more favorable
resolution of his case.
DOMINADOR P. BURBE vs. ATTY. ALBERTO C. MAGULTA
AC No. 99-634. June 10, 2002
FACTS:
On September 1998, respondent agreed to legally represent petitioner Dominador Burbe in a money
claim and possible civil case against certain parties for breach of contract. In consequence to such
agreement, Atty. Alberto C. Magulta prepared the demand letter and some other legal papers, for which
services he was accordingly paid and an amount of P25,000.00 for the required filing fee. A week later,
petitioner was informed by the respondent that the complaint had already been filed in court, and that he
should receive notice of its progress. The petitioner waited for several months for the notice from the
court but there was no progress in the case, he was also inquired repeatedly in the respondent’s Law
Office, however he was told to just wait.
The petitioner decided to go to the Office of the Clerk of Court with the draft of Atty. Magulta’s complaint
to personally verify the progress of the case, and there told that there was no record at all of a case filed
by Atty. Alberto C. Magulta on his behalf, copy of the Certification dated May 27, 1999. As such, the
petitioner confronted the latter. The respondent admitted that he has not at all filed the complaint because
he had spent the money for the filing fee for his own purpose he offered to reimburse him by issuing two
(2) checks, postdated June 1 and June 5, 1999, in the amounts of P12,000.00 and P8,000.00.
The petitioner filed a case against Atty. Magulta for misrepresentation, dishonesty and oppressive
conduct. The respondent denied the allegations and alleged that he was never been paid by complainant
for his acceptance and legal fees and that the amount he had paid was a deposit for the acceptance fee
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent Atty. Magulta is liable for misrepresentation of funds given to him for the
filing fee.
HELD:
YES. Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that lawyers shall hold in trust all
moneys of their clients and properties that may come into their possession.
Lawyers who convert the funds entrusted to them are in gross violation of professional ethics and are
guilty of betrayal of public confidence in the legal profession. It may be true that they have a lien upon the
client’s funds, documents and other papers that have lawfully come into their possession; that they may
retain them until their lawful fees and disbursements have been paid; and that they may apply such funds
to the satisfaction of such fees and disbursements. However, these considerations do not relieve them of
their duty to promptly account for the moneys they received. Their failure to do so constitutes professional
misconduct. In any event, they must still exert all effort to protect their client’s interest within the bounds of
law.
Respondent fell short of this standard when he converted into his legal fees the filing fee entrusted to
him by his client and thus failed to file the complaint promptly. The fact that the former returned the
amount does not exculpate him from his breach of duty.
ACE THE BAR
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July 23, 2020
CASE DIGEST: PIMENTEL VS. LEB G.R. NO. 230642 & 242954. SEPTEMBER
10, 2019
—
FACTS:
Petitioners in this case assail the unconstitutionality of R.A. 7662 or the Legal
Education Reform Act of 1993 which creates the Legal Education Board.
Petitioners particularly seek to declare as unconstitutional the creation of LEB
itself, LEB issuances and memorandums establishing law practice internship as a
requirement for taking the bar based on Sec. 7 (g) of RA 7662, adopting a system
of continuing legal education based on Sec. 2 (2) and Sec. 7 (h) of RA 7662, and
establishing and implementing the nationwide law school aptitude test known as
the Philippine Law School Admission Test or the PhilSAT pursuant to LEB’s
power to “prescribe the minimum standards for law admission” under Sec. 7 (e) of
RA 7662. Petitioners principally grounded the petitions on LEB’s alleged
encroachment upon the rulemaking power of the Court concerning the practice of
law, violation of institutional academic freedom, and violation of law school
aspirant’s right to education under the Constitution.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the regulation and supervision of legal education belong to the Court.
2. Whether the requirement of internship for admission to Bar Examination
embodied in LEB Memorandum pursuant to Sec. 7(g) of RA 7662 is
unconstitutional.
3. Whether the adoption of system of continuing legal education embodied in LEB
Memorandum pursuant to Sec. 2(2) and Sec. 7(h) of RA 7662 is unconstitutional.
4. Whether the establishment of PhilSAT embodied in LEB Memorandum
pursuant to Sec. 7(e) of RA 7662 is unconstitutional.
RULING:
1. NO. Regulation and supervision of legal education had been historically and
consistently exercised by the political departments. The historical development of
statutes on education unerringly reflects the consistent exercise by the political
departments of the power to supervise and regulate all levels and areas of
education, including legal education. Legal education is but a composite of the
entire Philippine education system. It is perhaps unique because it is a specialized
area of study. This peculiarity, however, is no reason in itself to demarcate legal
education and withdraw it from the regulatory and supervisory powers of the
political branches.
Two principal reasons militate against the proposition that the Court has the
regulation and supervision of legal education:
First, it assumes that the court, in fact, possesses the power to supervise and
regulate legal education as a necessary consequence of its power to regulate
admission to the practice of law. This assumption, apart from being manifestly
contrary to the history of legal education in the Philippines, is likewise devoid of
legal anchorage.
Second, the Court exercises only judicial functions and it cannot, and must not,
arrogate upon itself a power that is not constitutionally vested to it, lest the Court
itself violates the doctrine of separation of powers. For the Court to void RA 7662
and thereafter, to form a body that regulates legal education and place it under its
supervision and control, as what petitioners suggest, is to demonstrate a highly
improper form of judicial activism.
As it is held, the Court’s exclusive rule making power under the Constitution
covers the practice of law and not the study of law. The present rules embodied in
the 1997 Rules of Court do not support the argument that the Court directly and
actually regulates legal education, it merely provides academic competency
requirements for those who would like to take the Bar. Furthermore, it is the State
in the exercise of its police power that has the authority to regulate and supervise
the education of its citizens and this includes legal education.
2. YES. This requirement unduly interferes with the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Court to promulgate rules concerning the practice of law and admissions thereto.
The jurisdiction to determine whether an applicant may be allowed to take the bar
examinations belongs to the Court. Under Sec. 7(g), the power of the LEB is no
longer confined within the parameters of legal education but now dabbles on the
requisites for admissions to the bar. This is direct encroachment upon the Court’s
exclusive authority to promulgate rules concerning admissions to the bar and
should, therefore, be struck down as unconstitutional.
3. YES. By its plain language, the clause “continuing legal education” unduly give
the LEB the power to supervise the legal education of those who are already
members of the bar. Inasmuch as the LEB is authorized to compel mandatory
attendance of practicing lawyers in such courses and for such duration as the LEB
deems necessary, the same encroaches upon the Court’s power to promulgate
rules concerning the Integrated Bar which includes the education of Lawyerprofessors as the teaching of law is considered the practice of law.
4. YES. Accordingly, the Court recognizes the power of the LEB under its charter
to prescribe minimum standards for law admission. The PhilSAT, when
administered as an aptitude test to guide law schools in measuring the applicant’s
aptness for legal education along with such other admissions policy that the law
school may consider, is such minimum standard. However, the PhilSAT presently
operates not only as a measure of an applicant’s aptitude for law school. The
PhilSAT, as a pass or fail exam, dictates upon law schools who among the
examinees are to be admitted to any law program. When the PhilSAT is used to
exclude, qualify, and restrict admissions to law schools, as its present design
mandates, the PhilSAT goes beyond mere supervision and regulation, violates
institutional
academic
freedom,
becomes
unreasonable
and
unconstitutional.
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Labels: Constitutional Law, Remedial Law
COMMENTS
Model Tesoro October 1, 2021 at 6:35 AM
Hoping to see the latest cases and the new amendments Miss Joy. Good job
MJ Gorospe J.D. October 11, 2021 at 2:52 AM
Thanks! will upload more :)
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