Fortich vs. Corona
DOCTRINE: A real party in interest is a party who would be benefited or
injured by the judgment or is the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Real
interest means a present substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere
expectancy or a future, contingent, subordinate or consequential interest.
FACTS: On March 29, 1996, the Office of the President (OP) issued a
decision converting a large parcel of land from agricultural land to agroindustrial/institutional area. Because of this, a group of farmer-beneficiaries
staged a hunger strike in front of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR)
Compound in Quezon City in October 9, 1997. The strike generated a lot of
publicity and even a number of Presidential Candidates (for the upcoming
1998 elections) intervened on behalf of the farmers.
Because of this “blackmail”, the OP re-opened the case and through Deputy
Executive Secretary Renato C. Corona issued the so-called, “politically
motivated”, “win-win” resolution on November 7, 1997, substantially
modifying its 1996 decision after it had become final and executory.
On December 12, 1997, a Motion For Leave To Intervene 29 was filed by
alleged farmer-beneficiaries, through counsel, claiming that they are real
parties in interest as they were "previously identified by respondent DAR as
agrarian reform beneficiaries on the 144-hectare" property subject of this
case. The motion was vehemently opposed 30 by the petitioners.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the alleged farmer-beneficiaries are the real parties in
interest as they were "previously identified by respondent DAR as
agrarian reform beneficiaries on the 144-hectare" property subject of
this case?
2. Whether or not the “win-win” resolution, issued after the original
decision had become final and executory, had any legal effect?
RULING:
1. No, a perusal of the said document reveals that movants are those
purportedly "Found Qualified and Recommended for Approval." In
other words, movants are merely recommendee farmer-beneficiaries.
The rule in this jurisdiction is that a real party in interest is a party
who would be benefited or injured by the judgment or is the party
entitled to the avails of the suit. Real interest means a present
substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere expectancy or a
future, contingent, subordinate or consequential
interest. 59 Undoubtedly, movants' interest over the land in question is
a mere expectancy. Ergo, they are not real parties in interest.
2. No. When the OP issued the Order dated June 23,1997 declaring the
Decision of March 29, 1996 final and executory, as no one has
seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration thereto, the said Office
had lost its jurisdiction to re-open the case, more so modify its
Decision. Having lost its jurisdiction, the Office of the President has no
more authority to entertain the second motion for reconsideration
filed by respondent DAR Secretary, which second motion became the
basis of the assailed “Win-Win” Resolution. Section 7 of Administrative
Order No. 18 and Section 4, Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of Court
mandate that only one (1) motion for reconsideration is allowed to be
taken from the Decision of March 29, 1996. And even if a second
motion for reconsideration was permitted to be filed in “exceptionally
meritorious cases,” as provided in the second paragraph of Section 7
of AO 18, still the said motion should not have been entertained
considering that the first motion for reconsideration was not
seasonably filed, thereby allowing the Decision of March 29, 1996 to
lapse into finality. Thus, the act of the Office of the President in reopening the case and substantially modifying its March 29,1996
Decision which had already become final and executory, was in gross
disregard of the rules and basic legal precept that accord finality to
administrative determinations.
The orderly administration of justice requires that the
judgments/resolutions of a court or quasi-judicial body must reach a
point of finality set by the law, rules and regulations. The noble
purpose is to write finis to disputes once and for all.
Newsweek Inc. v. IAC
DOCTRINE: The SC however that the case at bar is not a class suit. It is not
a case where one or more may sue for the benefit of all (Mathay vs.
Consolidated Bank and Trust Company, 58 SCRA 559) or where the
representation of class interest affected by the judgment or decree is
indispensable to make each member of the class an actual party (Borlaza vs.
Polistico, 47 Phil. 348). We have here a case where each of the plaintiffs has
a separate and distinct reputation in the community. They do not have a
common or general interest in the subject matter of the controversy.
FACTS: In 1981, private respondents, incorporated associations of
sugarcane planters in Negros Occidental claiming to have 8,500 members
and several individual sugar planters, filed a civil case in their own behalf
and/or as a class suit in behalf of all sugarcane planters in the province of
Negros Occidental, against petitioner Newsweek Inc. and two of petitioners'
non-resident correspondents/reporters Fred Bruning and Barry Came.
The complaint alleged that petitioner and the other defendants committed
libel against them by the publication of the article "An Island of Fear" in the
February 23, 1981 issue of petitioner's weekly news magazine Newsweek.
Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds that the printed article
sued upon is not actionable in fact and in law; and the complaint is bereft of
allegations that state, much less support a cause of action.
The trial court denied the motion to dismiss. Petitioner's motion for
reconsideration was denied. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the
Intermediate Appellate Court seeking the annulment of the the trial court's
orders for having been issued with such a grave abuse of discretion and
praying for the dismissal of the complaint for failure to state a cause of
action. The respondent Court however affirmed the trial court's Orders and
ordered the case to be tried on the merits. Subsequently, the respondent
Court denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.
ISSUE: Whether a civil case for defamation can be filed under a class suit.
RULING: No, in the case of Corpus vs. Cuaderno, Sr., the SC ruled that "in
order to maintain a libel suit, it is essential that the victim be identifiable
although it is not necessary that he be named."
In an earlier case, this Court declared that "x x x defamatory matter which
does not reveal the identity of the person upon whom the imputation is cast,
affords no ground of action unless it be shown that the readers of the libel
could have identified the personality of the individual defamed."
This principle has been recognized to be of vital importance, especially
where a group or class of persons, as in the case at bar, claim to have been
defamed, for it is evident that the larger the collectivity, the more difficult it
is for the individual member to prove that the defamatory remarks apply to
him.
It is evident from the above ruling that where the defamation is alleged to
have been directed at a group or class, it is essential that the statement
must be so sweeping or all-embracing as to apply to every individual
in that group or class, or sufficiently specific so that each individual
in the class or group can prove that the defamatory statement
specifically pointed to him, so that he can bring the action
separately, if, need be.
Private respondents filed a "class suit" in representation of all the 8,500
sugarcane planters of Negros Occidental. Petitioner disagrees and argues
that the absence of any actionable basis in the complaint cannot be cured by
the filing of a class suit on behalf of the aforesaid sugar planters.
The SC however held that the case at bar is not a class suit. It is not a case
where one or more may sue for the benefit of all (Mathay vs. Consolidated
Bank and Trust Company, 58 SCRA 559) or where
the representation of class interest affected by the judgment or decree is
indispensable to make each member of the class an actual party (Borlaza vs.
Polistico, 47 Phil. 348). We have here a case where each of the plaintiffs has
a separate and distinct reputation in the community. They do not have a
common or general interest in the subject matter of the controversy.
The disputed portion of the article which refers to plaintiff Sola and which
was claimed to be libelous never singled out plaintiff Sola as a sugar planter.
The news report merely stated that the victim had been arrested by
members of a special police unit brought into the area by Pablo Sola, the
mayor of Kabankalan. Hence, the report, referring as it does to an official act
performed by an elective public official, is within the realm of privilege and
protected by the constitutional guarantees of free speech and press.
The article further stated that Sola and the commander of the special police
unit were arrested. The Court takes judicial notice of this fact.
Polytrade Corp v. Blanco
DOCTRINE: According to Section 2 (b), Rule 4 of the Rules of Court on
venue of personal actions triable by courts of first instance — and this is one
— provides that such "actions may be commenced and tried where the
defendant or any of the defendants resides or may be found, or where the
plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs resides, at the election of the plaintiff."
An accurate reading, however, of the stipulation, "The parties agree to
sue and be sued in the Courts of Manila," does not preclude the filing
of suits in the residence of plaintiff or defendant. The plain meaning is
that the parties merely consented to be sued in Manila. Qualifying or
restrictive words which would indicate that Manila and Manila alone is the
venue are totally absent therefrom.
FACTS: Petitioner initiated a suit for collection of money against Victoriano
Blanco, in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan of the place where the latter
resided. Blanco filed a motion to dismiss the action on the ground of
improper venue since, he claims, according to the contract, suit may be
lodged in the courts of Manila. This Motion was denied by the CFI of Bulacan
and rendered judgment against Victoriano.
ISSUE: Whether or not venue was properly laid in Bulacan?
RULING: Yes. According to Section 2 (b), Rule 4 of the Rules of Court on
venue of personal actions triable by courts of first instance — and this is one
— provides that such "actions may be commenced and tried where the
defendant or any of the defendants resides or may be found, or
where the plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs resides, at the election of
the plaintiff."
Qualifying this provision in Section 3 of the same Rule which states that
venue may be stipulated by written agreement — "By written agreement of
the parties the venue of an action may be changed or transferred from one
province to another."
No such stipulation appears in the contracts covering the first two causes of
action. The general rule set forth in Section 2 (b), Rule 4, governs, and as to
said two causes of action, venue was properly laid in Bulacan, the province
of defendant's residence. The stipulation adverted to is only found in the
agreements covering the third and fourth causes of action.
An accurate reading, however, of the stipulation, "The parties agree to
sue and be sued in the Courts of Manila," does not preclude the filing
of suits in the residence of plaintiff or defendant. The plain meaning is
that the parties merely consented to be sued in Manila. Qualifying or
restrictive words which would indicate that Manila and Manila alone is the
venue are totally absent therefrom.
We cannot read into that clause that plaintiff and defendant bound
themselves to file suits with respect to the last two transactions in question
only or exclusively in Manila. For, that agreement did not change or transfer
venue. It simply is permissive. The parties solely agreed to add the courts of
Manila as tribunals to which they may resort. They did not waive their right
to pursue remedy in the courts specifically mentioned in Section 2(b) of Rule
4.
Tantuico, Jr. v. Republic
DOCTRINE: Where the complaint states ultimate facts that constitute the
three essential elements of a cause of action, namely:
(1) the legal right of the plaintiff,
(2) the correlative obligation of the defendant, and
(3) the act or omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right, the
complaint states a cause of action, otherwise, the complaint must succumb
to a motion to dismiss on that ground of failure to state a cause of action.
However, where the allegations of the complaint are vague, indefinite, or in
the form of conclusions, the proper recourse would be, not a motion to
dismiss, but a motion for a bill of particulars.
FACTS: Petitioner Francisco S. Tantuico, Jr. was included as defendant in
Civil Case No. 0035 in the Sandiganbayan entitled "Republic of the
Philippines vs. Benjamin Romualdez, et al." for reconveyance, reversion,
accounting, restitution and damages on the theory that:
(1) he acted in unlawful concert with the principal defendants, Ferdinand E.
Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos, Benjamin Romualdez and Juliette Gomez
Romualdez, in the misappropriation and theft of public funds, plunder of the
nation's wealth, extortion, blackmail, bribery, embezzlement and other acts
of corruption, betrayal of public trust and brazen abuse of power;
(2) he acted as dummy, nominee or agent, by allowing himself to be
incorporator, director, board member and/or stockholder of corporations
beneficially held and/or controlled by the principal defendants;
(3) he acted singly or collectively, and/or in unlawful concert with one
another, in flagrant breach of public trust and of their fiduciary obligations as
public officers;
(4) he taking undue advantage of his position as Chairman of the COA and
with grave failure to perform his constitutional duties as such Chairman,
acting in concert with defendants facilitated and made possible the
withdrawals, disbursements and questionable use of government funds; and
(5) he acted as dummy, nominee and/or agent by allowing himself to be
used as instrument in accumulating ill-gotten wealth in order to conceal and
prevent recovery of assets illegally obtained.
On April 11, 1988, after his motion for production and inspection of
documents was denied by respondent court in its resolution dated March 8,
1988, petitioner filed a Motion for a Bill of Particulars, alleging inter alia that
he is sued for acts allegedly committed by him as (a) a public officerChairman of the Commission on Audit, (b) as a private individual, and (c) in
both capacities, in a complaint couched in too general terms and shorn of
particulars that would inform him of the factual and legal basis thereof, and
that to enable him to understand and know with certainty the particular acts
allegedly committed by him and which he is now charged with culpability, it
is necessary that plaintiff furnish him the particulars sought therein.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent Sandiganbayan acted with grave
abuse of discretion in issuing the disputed resolutions, denying the petitioner
for his motion for a bill of particulars?
RULING: Yes. A complaint is defined as a concise statement of the ultimate
facts constituting the plaintiff's cause or causes of action. Like all other
pleadings allowed by the Rules of Court, the complaint shall contain in a
methodical and logical form a plain, concise and direct statement of the
ultimate facts on which the plaintiff relies for his claim, omitting the
statement of mere evidentiary facts. Its office, purpose or function is to
inform the defendant clearly and definitely of the claims made against him
so that he may be prepared to meet the issues at the trial. The complaint
should inform the defendant of all the material facts on which the plaintiff
relies to support his demand; it should state the theory of a cause of action
which forms the bases of the plaintiff's claim of liability.
The rules on pleading speak of two (2) kinds of facts: the first, the
"ultimate facts", and the second, the "evidentiary facts." In Remitere vs.
Vda. de Yulo, the term "ultimate facts" was defined and explained as follows:
The term "ultimate facts" as used in Sec. 3, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court,
means the essential facts constituting the plaintiffs cause of action. A fact is
essential if it cannot be stricken out without leaving the statement of the
cause of action insufficient.
Ultimate facts are important and substantial facts which either directly
form the basis of the primary right and duty, or which directly make up the
wrongful acts or omissions of the defendant. It refers to principal,
determinate, constitutive facts, upon the existence of which, the entire
cause of action rests.
While the term "evidentiary fact" has been defined in the following tenor:
Those facts which are necessary for determination of the ultimate facts; they
are the premises upon which conclusions of ultimate facts are based. Facts
which furnish evidence of existence of some other fact.
Where the complaint states ultimate facts that constitute the three
essential elements of a cause of action, namely: (1) the legal right of the
plaintiff, (2) the correlative obligation of the defendant, and (3) the act or
omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right, the complaint
states a cause of action, otherwise, the complaint must succumb to a motion
to dismiss on that ground of failure to state a cause of action. However,
where the allegations of the complaint are vague, indefinite, or in the form
of conclusions, the proper recourse would be, not a motion to dismiss, but a
motion for a bill of particulars.
In this case, the complaint does not contain any allegation as to how
petitioner became, or why he is perceived to be, a dummy, nominee or
agent. There is no averment in the complaint how petitioner allowed himself
to be used as instrument in the accumulation of ill-gotten wealth, what the
concessions, orders and/or policies prejudicial to plaintiff are, why they are
prejudicial, and what petitioner had to do with the granting, issuance, and or
formulation of such concessions, orders, and/or policies. Moreover, the
complaint does not state which corporations petitioner is supposed to be a
stockholder, director, member, dummy, nominee and/or agent. More
significantly, the petitioner's name does not even appear in annex of the
complaint, which is a listing of the alleged "Positions and Participations of
Some Defendants".
The allegations in the complaint, above, pertaining to petitioner are deficient
in that they merely articulate conclusions of law and presumptions
unsupported by facts. Hence, without the particulars prayed for in
petitioner's motion for a bill of particulars, it can be said the petitioner can
not intelligently prepare his responsive pleading and for trial.
Furthermore, the particulars prayed for such as names of persons, names of
corporations, dates, amounts involved, a specification of property for
identification purposes, the particular transactions involving withdrawals and
disbursements, and a statement of other material facts as would support the
conclusions and inferences in the complaint, are not evidentiary in nature.
On the contrary, those particulars are material facts that should be clearly
and definitely averred in the complaint in order that the defendant may, in
fairness, be informed of the claims made against him to the end that he may
be prepared to meet the issues at the trial.
Sps. Villuga v. Kelly Hardware & Construction Supply et al.
DOCTRINE: The Court agrees with the CA in holding that respondent's
Second Amended Complaint supersedes only its Amended Complaint and
nothing more. Section 8, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 8. Effect of amended pleading. – An amended pleading
supersedes the pleading that it amends. However, admissions in superseded
pleadings may be received in evidence against the pleader; and claims or
defenses alleged therein not incorporated in the amended pleading shall be
deemed waived.
From the foregoing, it is clear that respondent's Request for Admission is not
deemed abandoned or withdrawn by the filing of the Second Amended
Complaint.
FACTS: The respondent corporation filed with the RTC a Complaint for a
Sum of Money and Damages against the petitioners-spouses Villuga, alleging
that the petitioners made purchases of various construction materials from
the respondent corporation in the sum of P259,809.50, which has not
been paid up to the present time, both principal and stipulated interests due
thereon. Respondent corporation made several demands, oral and written,
for the petitioners to pay all their obligations due, but the latter failed and
refused to comply.
In their Answer to Complaint, petitioners admitted having made purchases
from respondent, but alleged that they do not remember the exact amount
thereof as no copy of the documents evidencing the purchases were
attached to the complaint. Petitioners, nonetheless, claimed that they have
made payments to the respondent in the amounts of P110,301.80 and
P20,000.00, and they are willing to pay the balance of their indebtedness
after deducting the payments made and after verification of their account.
In a Manifestation, petitioners stated that they were willing to pay
respondent the principal sum of P259,809.50, but without interests and
costs, and on installment basis. Respondent signified that it was amenable to
petitioners' offer to pay the principal amount of P259,809.50. However,
respondent insisted that petitioners should also pay interests, as well as
litigation expenses and attorney's fees, and all incidental expenses.
Subsequently, respondent filed a Motion for Partial Judgment on the
Pleadings contending that petitioners were deemed to have admitted in their
Answer that they owed respondent the amount of P259,809.50 when they
claimed that they made partial payments amounting to P130,301.80.
Based on this premise, respondent prayed that it be awarded the remaining
balance of P129,507.70.
The RTC ruled that there is no clear and specific admission on the part of
petitioners as to the actual amount that they owe respondent.
Respondent filed an Amended Complaint, with leave of court, alleging that
petitioners purchased from respondent various construction materials and
supplies, the aggregate value of which is P279,809.50, and that only
P20,000.00 had been paid leaving a balance of P259,809.50.
Respondent filed a Request for Admission asking that petitioners admit
the genuineness of various documents, such as statements of accounts,
delivery receipts, invoices and demand letter attached thereto as well as the
truth of the allegations set forth therein. Respondent basically asked
petitioners to admit that the latter's principal obligation is P279,809.50 and
that only P20,000.00 was paid.
Respondent filed a Manifestation and Motion before the RTC praying that
since petitioners failed to timely file their comment to the Request for
Admission, they be considered to have admitted the genuineness of the
documents described in and exhibited with the said Request as well as the
truth of the matters of fact set forth therein, in accordance with the Rules of
Court.
Petitioners filed their Comments on the Request for Admission stating their
objections to the admission of the documents attached to the Request.
Respondent filed its Second Amended Complaint, again with leave of
court. The amendment modified the period covered by the complaint. The
amendment also confirmed petitioners' partial payment in the sum of
P110,301.80, but alleged that this payment was applied to other obligations
which petitioners owe respondent. Respondent reiterated its allegation that,
despite petitioners' partial payment, the principal amount which petitioners
owe remains P259,809.50.
Petitioners filed their Answer to the Second Amended Complaint denying the
allegations therein and insisting that they have made partial payments.
Respondent filed a Motion to Expunge with Motion for Summary Judgment.
The RTC granted the same. Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration,
but it was denied. The CA rendered affirmed the RTC.
ISSUE: Whether the respondent waived its Request for Admission when it
filed its Second Amended Complaint?
RULING: No. The Court agrees with the CA in holding that respondent's
Second Amended Complaint supersedes only its Amended Complaint and
nothing more. Section 8, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 8. Effect of amended pleading. – An amended pleading
supersedes the pleading that it amends. However, admissions in superseded
pleadings may be received in evidence against the pleader; and claims or
defenses alleged therein not incorporated in the amended pleading shall be
deemed waived.
From the foregoing, it is clear that respondent's Request for Admission is not
deemed abandoned or withdrawn by the filing of the Second Amended
Complaint.
The Court also finds no error when the CA ruled that petitioners' Comments
on the Request for Admission was filed out of time. Nonetheless, the Court
takes exception to the ruling of the CA that by reason of the belated filing of
petitioners' Comments on the Request for Admission, they are deemed to
have impliedly admitted that they are indebted to respondent in the amount
of P259,809.50.
A careful examination of the said Request for Admission shows that the
matters of fact set forth therein are simply a reiteration of respondent's
main allegation in its Amended Complaint and that petitioners had already
set up the affirmative defense of partial payment with respect to the above
allegation in their previous pleadings.
This Court has ruled that if the factual allegations in the complaint are the
very same allegations set forth in the request for admission and have
already been specifically denied, the required party cannot be compelled to
deny them anew. A request for admission that merely reiterates the
allegations in an earlier pleading is inappropriate under Rule 26 of the Rules
of Court, which as a mode of discovery, contemplates of interrogatories that
would clarify and tend to shed light on the truth or falsity of the allegations
in the pleading. Rule 26 does not refer to a mere reiteration of what has
already been alleged in the pleadings. Nonetheless, consistent with the
abovementioned Rule, the party being requested should file an objection to
the effect that the request for admission is improper and that there is no
longer any need to deny anew the allegations contained therein considering
that these matters have already been previously denied.