On What There Is
Author(s): Willard V. Quine
Reviewed work(s):
Source: The Review of Metaphysics, Vol. 2, No. 5 (Sep., 1948), pp. 21-38
Published by: Philosophy Education Society Inc.
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20123117 .
Accessed: 11/12/2012 21:30
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
.
Philosophy Education Society Inc. is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The
Review of Metaphysics.
http://www.jstor.org
This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192.168.72.226 on Tue, 11 Dec 2012 21:30:36 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
THERE IS *
ON WHAT
A
plicity.
curious
is its sim
problem
thing about the ontological
:
It can be put in three Anglo-Saxon
monosyllables
is
"What
there
?
?"
It
?
can
be
in
moreover,
answered,
a word
as
this answer
everyone will accept
"Everything"
to say that there is what
true. However,
this is merely
there
over cases; and so
remains room for disagreement
is. There
the issue has stayed alive down the centuries.
now that two philosophers,
McX
and I, differ
Suppose
over ontology.
maintains
McX
there
is something
Suppose
and
I maintain
there is not. McX
can, quite consistently
own
our difference
his
of opinion
point of view, describe
certain entities.
that I refuse to recognize
I should
by saying
in his formulation
of our dis
protest of course that he is wrong
for I maintain
that there are no entities, of the kind
agreement,
which he alleges, for me to recognize; but my finding him wrong
which
with
in his
of our disagreement
is unimportant,
formulation
for I am
to considering
in his ontology
him wrong
anyway.
on the
/ try to formulate our difference
When
of opinion,
committed
I cannot admit that
hand, I seem to be in a predicament.
there are some things which McX
countenances
and I do not,
for in admitting
that there are such things I should be contra
dicting my own rejection of them.
other
if this reasoning were
sound, that in any
the
the
of
side suffers
proponent
dispute
ontological
negative
the disadvantage
of not being able to admit that his opponent
disagrees with him.
This
is the old Platonic
riddle of non-being.
Non-being
must
in some sense be, otherwise what
is it that there is not ?
It would
appear,
This
tangled doctrine might be nicknamed
it has proved
frequently
torically
tough,
*
This
the Graduate
latter
March
beard;
his
the edge
of
razor.
Occam's
before
Plato's
dulling
paper,
is a
revised
Philosophy
in turn, was
the Graduate
version
Club
a
a paper
of
which
of Yale
revised
Philosophical
University
version
of
Seminary
of
was
on May
one which
Princeton
before
presented
7, 1948. The
was
presented
University
on
15.
[21]
This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192.168.72.226 on Tue, 11 Dec 2012 21:30:36 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
22
Willard
V. Quine
It is some such line of thought that leads philosophers
like
to impute being where
otherwise
McX
be
quite
they might
content to recognize
that there is nothing.
take Pegasus.
Thus,
were not, McX
If Pegasus
argues, we should not be talking
it would
be
about anything when we use the word;
therefore
nonsense
to show
to say even that Pegasus
is not. Thinking
cannot be coherently
maintain
thus that the denial of Pegasus
that Pegasus
is.
ed, he concludes
that any
himself
McX
cannot,
indeed,
quite persuade
or
a
near
contains
of
remote,
space-time,
region
flying horse of
for further details on Pegasus,
flesh and blood.
Pressed
then,
he
that
says
is an
Pegasus
idea
in men's
minds.
Here,
however,
for the sake of
to be apparent.
We
may
begins
even a unique
an
is
that
and
there
concede
entity,
argument
is the mental
this
is
rather
which
implausible),
entity
(though
are
is
not
mental
what
this
but
entity
people
Pegasus-idea;
when
they deny Pegasus.
talking about
never confuses
with
the Parthenon
the Parthenon
McX
a confusion
is physical;
is mental
the Parthenon-idea
to
version
I
of
have no
and
McX's
ideas,
way
any
(according
is visible;
the Parthenon-idea
better to offer).
The Parthenon
cannot easily imagine two things more unlike,
is invisible. We
than the Parthenon
and the Par
and less liable to confusion,
to Peg
But when we shift from the Parthenon
thenon-idea.
idea.
The
the
asus,
Parthenon
confusion
sets
in
*?
for
no
other
reason
than
that McX
and most
be deceived
by the crudest
flagrant
of Pegasus.
than grant the non-being
counterfeit
it would
must be, because
other
The notion that Pegasus
even
is not, has been seen
to say
that Pegasus
wise be nonsense
into an elementary
confusion.
Subtler minds,
to lead McX
would
sooner
come out with
taking the same precept as their starting point,
are less patently
than
which
of Pegasus
theories
misguided
more
to
difficult
eradicate.
One
and
McX's,
correspondingly
is named,
let us say, Wyman.
of these subtler minds
Pegasus,
his
has
maintains,
possible.
being as an unactualized
Wyman
we say of Pegasus
that there is no such thing, we are
When
does not have the special
that Pegasus
saying, more precisely,
is not actual
is on
that
attribute of actuality.
Pegasus
Saying
not
is
a par, logically, with
that the Parthenon
red; in
saying
This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192.168.72.226 on Tue, 11 Dec 2012 21:30:36 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
On What
case
either
we
are
saying
23
Is
There
an
about
something
whose
entity
is unquestioned.
being
who
is one of those philosophers
by the way,
Wyman,
'exist'. Despite
his
in ruining the good old word
have united
he
limits
'exist
the
word
of unactualized
possibles,
espousal
an illusion of ontological
ence' to actuality ?
thus preserving
the rest of
between
and us who
himself
agreement
repudiate
to say, in our
have all been prone
universe. We
his bloated
common-sense
word
because
that
'exist\
does
Pegasus
not
exist,
is no such entity at all.
If Pegasus
be in space and time, but only because
that there
meaning
simply
existed he would
the
of
usage
indeed
has
'Pegasus'
exists'
has
and
connotations,
spatio-temporal
connotations.
spatio-temporal
If
not
spatio
of
is lacking when we affirm the existence
reference
a cube root is not a
root of 27, this is simply because
kind of thing, and not because we are being
spatio-temporal
temporal
the cube
ambiguous
in our
conceived
effort
non-existence
of
use
'exist'.
of
to appear
Pegasus
and
However,
genially
agreeable,
then,
in
Wyman,
contrary
grants
to what
we
an
ill
us
the
meant
insists that Pegasus
is. Existence
of Pegasus,
by non-existence
is another.
The
is one thing, he says, and subsistence
only
of issues is to give
I know of coping with
this obfuscation
way
I still
I'll try not to use it again;
the word
'exist'.
Wyman
let's get back toWyman's
have 'is'. So much for lexicography;
ontology.
Wyman's
overpopulated
universe
is
in many
ways
un
of us who have a taste
the worst of it. Wyman's
sense
It offends
the aesthetic
lovely.
but this is not
for desert landscapes,
is a breeding
for disorderly
slum of possibles
elements.
ground
fat man in that doorway;
for instance,
the possible
and,
Take,
it that doorway.
Are
bald man
the possible
they the
again,
same possible man, or two possible men ? How do we decide ?
men are there in that doorway
? Are
many
possible
of
thin ones than fat ones ? How many
there more possible
them one ?
their being alike make
them are alike ? Or would
Are no two possible
things alike ? Is this the same as saying
How
is
it is impossible
for two things to be alike ? Or,
finally,
to
unactualized
the concept, of identity simply inapplicable
pos
sense can be found in talking of entities
sibles ? But what
that
This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192.168.72.226 on Tue, 11 Dec 2012 21:30:36 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
24
V. Quine
Willard
cannot
be said to be identical with
them
meaningfully
one
from
selves and distinct
another ? These
elements are well
con
of individual
By a Fregean
high
incorrigible
therapy
but I feel
cepts, some effort might be made at rehabilitation;
slum and be done with
we'd do better simply to clear Wyman's
which
it.
the other modalities
of necessity
along with
and
raises
upon which
contingency,
impossibility
problems
I do not mean to imply that we should turn our backs.
But we
can at least limit modalities
to whole
statements.
We
may
as a whole,
and
impose the adverb
'possibly' upon a statement
Possibility,
and
we may well worry about the semantical
analysis of such usage;
in
is to be hoped
such
real
for in
advance
but little
analysis
our
to include so-called
universe
entities.
expanding
possible
that the main motive
is simply the
I suspect
for this expansion
it would
that Pegasus,
old notion
other
e.g., must be because
wise
be
nonsense
to
say
even
that
he
is not.
universe
of pos
Still, all the rank luxuriance of Wyman's
seem to come to naught when we make a slight
sibles would
in the example
and speak not of Pegasus
but of the
change
round square cupola on Berkeley
unless
If,
College.
Pegasus
to say that he is not, then by the
it would
be nonsense
were,
same token, unless the round square cupola on Berkeley
College
to say that it is not.
be nonsense
But, unlike
on
cannot
the
round
square cupola
Berkeley
Pegasus,
College
even as an unactualized
we
Can
drive
be admitted
possible.
a
now
to
realm
of
unactualizable
also
impos
Wyman
admitting
could be
sibles ? If so, a good many
questions
embarrassing
in
asked about
them. We
hope even to trap Wyman
might
it would
were,
contradictions,
by getting
entities are at once round
him
to admit
that
certain
of
these
But
and square.
the wily Wyman
and concedes
that it is
the other horn of the dilemna
to say that the round square cupola on Berkeley
Col
'round square cupola'
is
is not. He says that the phrase
chooses
nonsense
lege
meaningless.
Wyman
of
doctrine
back.
The
Wittgenstein
was
not
the first to embrace
the meaninglessness
tradition
who
survives,
seem
to
share
of
this alternative.
runs
contradictions
moreover,
none
in writers
of Wyman's
The
away
such
as
motivations.
This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192.168.72.226 on Tue, 11 Dec 2012 21:30:36 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
On What
There
25
Is
to such a doctrine
whether
I wonder
the first temptation
not
motivation
which we have
been
the
have
may
substantially
no intrinsic
inWyman.
the
doctrine
has
observed
Certainly
as
to
extremes
its
it
devotees
such
and
has
led
quixotic
appeal;
Still
that of challenging
a challenge
dum ?
the method
in which
of proof by reductio ad absur
I seem to detect a quite striking
eius ipsius.
of contradic
the
doctrine
of meaninglessness
Moreover,
it
tions has the severe methodological
drawback
that it makes
an
ever
in
to
test
what
devise
effective
of
impossible,
principle,
ad absurdum
reductio
is not.
is meaningful
It would
be forever impossible
and what
a string
for us to devise
of
systematic ways
deciding whether
even to us individually,
of signs made sense ?
let alone other
?
or not.
in mathe
from a discovery
For, it follows
people
that there can be no generally
logic, due to Church,
test
of contradictoriness.
applicable
I have spoken disparagingly
of Plato's
beard, and hinted
I have dwelt at length on the inconveniences
that it is tangled.
matical
of putting up with it. It is time to think about taking steps.
in his theory of so-called
Russell,
singular
descriptions,
use seeming names
showed clearly how we might meaningfully
without
that the entities allegedly
named be. The
supposing
names
are complex
to which
Russell's
theory directly
applies
as
names
such
'the
author
of
'the present
descriptive
Waverly',
on
of
'the
round
France',
square cupola
King
Berkeley College'.
as fragments
Russell
such phrases
of
analyzes
systematically
occur.
in which
sentences
the whole
sentence
The
'The
they
author
of
was
Waverly
a
poet',
e.g.,
is explained
as
a whole
as
wrote Waverly
and
meaning
(better : something)
. (The point of
was a poet, and nothing
else wrote Waverly
this added clause is to affirm the uniqueness
is implicit
which
in the word
sentence
The
'the', in 'the author of Waverly'.)
'The round square cupola on Berkeley
is pink' is ex
College
'Someone
as
is round and square and is a cupola on
'Something
and
is pink, and nothing
else is round and
College
Berkeley
square and a cupola on Berkeley
College'.
is that the seeming name, a des
The virtue of this analysis
is paraphrased
in context as a so-called
incom
criptive phrase,
plained
plete
symbol.
No
unified
expression
is offered
as an analysis
This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192.168.72.226 on Tue, 11 Dec 2012 21:30:36 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
26
Willard
V. Quine
as a whole which
the descriptive
phrase, but the statement
the context of that phrase still gets its full quota of mean
? whether
true or false.
ing
statement
was a
The unanalyzed
'The author of Waverly
a
contains
'the
author
which
is
of
part,
poet'
wrongly
Waverly',
to demand objective
and Wyman
reference
supposed
by McX
in order to be meaningful
at all. But in Russell's
translation,
wrote
and was a poet and nothing
else
'Something
Waverly
of
was
wrote
the burden of objective
reference which
had
Waverly',
is now
the descriptive
taken over by
put upon
phrase
of the kind that logicians call bound variables,
words
variables
: namely, words
of quantification
like 'something',
'nothing',
to be names
These
far from purporting
words,
'everything'.
to be
of the author of Waverly,
do not purport
specifically
names at all; they refer to entities
a
with
of
kind
generally,
to
studied
These
themselves.
peculiar
ambiguity
quantific
or bound variables
are of course a basic part of
ational words
been
at least in context,
and their meaningfulness,
is not
language,
to be challenged.
in no way presup
But their meaningfulness
or the round
there being either the author of Waverly
poses
on
or
other
square cupola
any
Berkeley
College
specifically
preassigned
Where
objects.
are concerned,
there is no longer any
descriptions
in
or
'There is the author
difficulty
denying
affirming
being.
of Waverly'
is explained
as
Russell
'Someone
(or,
meaning
by
more
wrote
and
else
strictly,
something)
nothing
Waverly
wrote Waverly'.
is not* is explained,
'The author of Waverly
as
the
alternation
'Either
each
correspondingly,
thing failed to
or two or more
This
things wrote Waverly.'
Waverly
is false, but meaningful;
no expres
alternation
and it contains
sion purporting
to designate
the author
of Waverly.
The
statement
'The round square cupola on Berkeley College
is not'
in similar fashion.
is analyzed
So the old notion that statements
write
of non-being
a
defeat
themselves
goes by the board. When
statement
is analyzed
of being or non-being
Russell's
by
theory
it ceases
of descriptions,
to contain any expression
even
which
name
to
the
in
whose
is
purports
alleged
entity
question,
being
so that
thought
no longer
the meaningfulness
of the statement
to presuppose
that there be such an entity.
can be
This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192.168.72.226 on Tue, 11 Dec 2012 21:30:36 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
On What
27
Is
There
rather than
Now what of 'Pegasus' ? This being a word
a descriptive
not
does
Russell's
immediately
argument
phrase,
it can easily be made to apply. We
have
apply to it However,
a
as
in
that
to
way
any
rephrase
description,
only
'Pegasus'
seems adequately
to single out our idea : say 'the winged
horse
such a phrase
that was captured by Bellerophon'.
Substituting
for
can
we
'Pegasus',
or
is',
'Pegasus
then
'Pegasus
of
Russell's
'The
to
proceed
is
not',
on
precisely
author
the
analyze
of Waverly
statement
analogy
of
is' and
'The
the
analysis
is not'.
author of Waverly
name or alleged name
In order thus to subsume a one-word
we must
such as 'Pegasus' under Russell's
theory of description,
of course be able first to translate
into a description.
the word
If the notion of Pegasus
But this is no real restriction.
had
been so obscure or so basic a one that no pat translation
into
a descriptive
we
had
offered
itself
familiar
lines,
phrase
along
could still have availed ourselves
of the following
and
artificial
:we could have appealed
to the ex hypo
device
trivial-seeming
thesi
adopting,
The
and
irreducible
unanalyzable,
its expression,
for
noun
'Pegasus'
after
identified
the
itself
all with
attribute
verb
of
being
'is-Pegasus',
could then be
a description
or
Pegasus,
'pegasizes'.
treated as derivative,
: 'the thing that is
'the thing that pegasizes'.
Pegasus',
as 'pegasizes'
seems
If the importing of such a predicate
to commit us to recognizing
attri
that there is a corresponding
in Plato's heaven or in the mind of men, well
bute, pegasizing,
we nor Wyman
nor McX
and good.
Neither
have been con
thus far, about the being or non-being
of universals,
tending,
we
but rather about that of Pegasus.
If in terms of pegasizing
can interpret
a
as
the noun
to
'Pegasus'
subject
description
we
Russell's
of
then
have
of
the
descriptions,
theory
disposed
old notion
cannot be said not to be without
pre
sense
is.
supposing
Pegasus
is now quite general.
Our argument
and Wyman
McX
we
a
not
that
statement
could
affirm
of
supposed
meaningfully
the form 'So-and-so
is not', with a simple or descriptive
sing
ular
noun
supposition
the singular
that Pegasus
that in some
in
place
is now
noun
of
seen
'so-and-so',
unless
so-and-so
be
to be quite generally
groundless,
in question
can always
be expanded
. This
since
into a
This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192.168.72.226 on Tue, 11 Dec 2012 21:30:36 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
28
V. Quine
Willard
and then analyzed
singular description,
trivially or otherwise,
out ? la Russell.
cannot conclude, however,
that man is henceforth
free
We
commit ourselves
of all ontological
commitments.
We
outright
to an
ontology
when
numbers
containing
ontology
numbers
between
1000 and
containing
centaurs
1010; we
we
when
we
say
there
say
commit
are
prime
to an
ourselves
there
are
centaurs;
to an ontology
and we commit ourselves
containing
Pegasus
to
is. But we do not commit ourselves
when we say Pegasus
an ontology
or
or the author of Waverly
containing
Pegasus
square cupola on Berkeley
College when we say that
or
or
in question
is
author
the
of
the cupola
Pegasus
Waverly
that the
not. We
the delusion
need no longer
labor under
a singular
term
of a statement
containing
meaningfulness
the round
an entity named by
presupposes
need not name to be significant.
the
A
term.
An
have dawned
inkling of this might
even without
if they
McX
benefit of Russell
?< as so few of us do ?
that there is a gulf
and naming even in the case of a singular term
ly
a name
of
an
object.
Frege's
names
a certain
example
will
term
singular
on Wyman
and
had only noticed
between meaning
is genuine
which
: the
serve
phrase
object of spher
large physical
'Evening Star'
ical form, which
is hurtling
through space some scores of mil
from here.
lions of miles
The
Star' names
phrase
'Morning
first established
the same thing, as was probably
by some ob
servant Babylonian.
cannot be regarded
But the two phrases
as having
that Babylonian
could
the same meaning;
otherwise
with
and contented
himself
his observations
on
the
his
words.
The
of
meanings
meanings,
reflecting
from one another, must be other than the
then, being different
is one and the same in both cases.
named object, which
have
dispensed
with
of meaning
with naming not only made McX
a continu
not meaningfully
repudiate Pegasus;
no
confusion
with
of
doubt
ing
meaning
naming
helped engend
er his absurd notion
that Pegasus
is an idea, a rnental entity.
is as follows.
The structure of his confusion
He confused
the
with
the
?word
named
the
of
alleged
object Pegasus
meaning
must be in order
that Pegasus
therefore
'Pegasus',
concluding
Confusion
think he could
that
the word
have
meaning.
But what
sorts
of
things
are
This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192.168.72.226 on Tue, 11 Dec 2012 21:30:36 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
On What
29
Is
There
one might
quite
point; however,
as
in
ideas
the
mind,
explain meanings
supposing
plausibly
we can make clear sense in turn of the idea of ideas in the mind.
ends up
Therefore
Pegasus,
initially confused with a meaning,
as an idea in the mind.
thatWyman,
It is the more remarkable
as McX,
to the same initial motivation
should have
subject
is a moot
? This
meanings
avoided
this particular
blunder
and wound
up with unactual
ized possibles
instead.
:
let us turn to the ontological
Now
problem of universals
rela
the question whether
there are such entities as attributes,
tions,
classes,
are
"There
are.
there
red
red
houses,
common-sense
philosophical
and
roses,
houses,
functions.
numbers,
thinks
enough,
McX,
roses,
red
in which
sunsets,
of
Speaking
then,
characteristically
this
sunsets;
we must
have
he
attributes,
These
all agree.
in
something
:
says
is pre
much
common;
is all I mean by the attri
they have in common
is
For McX,
bute of redness."
thus, there being attributes
even more obvious
and trivial than the obvious and trivial fact
and
this which
of
there being
is characteristic
I think,
red houses,
roses, and sunsets.
This,
or
at
that
of metaphysics,
least of
part of
:
one
a
statement
who
called ontology
regards
metaphysics
on this subject
One's
ontology
all
interprets
as
true at all must
it as
regard
is basic to the conceptual
scheme
even
experiences,
the
most
true.
trivially
he
by which
ones.
commonplace
some particular
scheme ?
and how
Judged within
conceptual
.?
an ontological
statement
else is judgment
?
goes
possible
in need of no separate
without
saying,
standing
justification
at all.
statements
follow
from all
Ontological
immediately
manner
of
from
?
casual
statements
of
the point of view, anyway,
is an attribute'
follows
'There
red
red
roses,
and
diacy
are
there
popular
anything
denote
is axiomatic
triviality,
red
just
?
as
of McX's
scheme
conceptual
from 'There are red houses,
sunsets.'
in another
Judged
ment which
fact,
commonplace
conceptual
to McX's
be adjudged
houses,
roses,
in common
each of sundry
and
manner
and misleading
The
words
individual
state
scheme, an ontological
mind may, with equal imme
false. One may admit that
but
sunsets,
of
speaking,
'houses',
entities
except
deny,
'roses',
which
that
and
they
as
a
have
'sunsets'
are houses
and
This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192.168.72.226 on Tue, 11 Dec 2012 21:30:36 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
30
V. Quine
Willard
roses
and
each
the word
individual
sundry
red sunsets;
individual
whatever,
roses,
for
nor,
'redness',
'red' or
'red object' denotes
are red houses,
red
which
in
is
but there
not,
addition,
any entity
or otherwise,
is named by the word
which
and
sunsets,
of
that
entities
matter,
the word
by
'rose
'househood',
That
and roses and sunsets
the houses
'sunsethood'.
hood',
are all of them red may be taken as ultimate
and irreducible,
and it may be held that McX
is no better off, in point of real
explanatory
such
under
for all
power,
names
as
the occult
entities
which
he posits
'redness'.
means by which McX
have tried to
might naturally
on
was
us
of
removed
his
universals
impose
already
ontology
cannot
of universals.
McX
before we turned to the problem
as
or
we
that
'red'
which
all
such
'is-red',
argue
predicates
concur
as names each of a single
in using, must be regarded
at all.
universal
For,
entity in order that they be meaningful
a
we have seen that being a name of something
is
much more
He cannot even charge
special feature than being meaningful.
us ?
an
at least not by that argument ? with having posited
attribute
of pegasizing
of the predicate
by our adoption
'peg
One
asizes*.
"Let us
McX
hits upon a different
However,
stratagem.
and naming
between meaning
grant," he says, "this distinction
so much.
of which
Let us even grant that 'is red',
yau make
'pegasizes',
etc.,
are
not
names
of
attributes
Still,
you
admit
whether
But these meanings,
they are
they have meanings.
to say that some
and I venture
named or not, are still universals,
or
of them might even be the very things that I call attributes,
same
in
to
much
the
end."
the
purpose
something
For McX,
this is an unusually
speech; and the
penetrating
it
is
to
to
counter
I
know
admit
by refusing
only way
meanings.
to admit
toward
I feel no reluctance
However,
refusing
statements
not
that
and
I
words
for
do
meanings,
thereby deny
are meaningful.
to the letter in our
and I may agree
McX
into
and the
classification
of linguistic
forms
the meaningful
as
even
construes
though McX
meaningless,
meaningfulness
some
sense
some
of 'having')
the having
of
abstract
(in
entity
I do not.
he calls a meaning,
I remain free to
which
whereas
is mean
that the fact that a given linguistic utterance
maintain
This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192.168.72.226 on Tue, 11 Dec 2012 21:30:36 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
On What
There
Is
31
as I prefer
to say so as not to invite
(or significant,
as
is an ultimate
and irre
of
entities)
meanings
hypostasis
it in terms
to analyze
ducible matter of fact; or, I may undertake
of what
do in the presence
of the linguistic
people
directly
ingful
in question
utterance
utterances
other
and
to
similar
it.
in which
talk or seem
The useful ways
people ordinarily
to talk about meanings
to two : the having
boil down
of
or
sameness
is
which
and
of
meanings,
meaning,
significance,
is called giving
the meaning
of an utterance
What
synonymy.
is simply
the uttering
of a synonym,
than the original.
clearer
language
as
meanings
we
such,
can
speak
in
couched,
ordinarily,
are allergic
If we
of
directly
to
as
utterances
sig
or heteronymous
or insignificant,
nificant
and as synonymous
one with another.
these adjectives
The problem of explaining
some
with
and
'significant'
'synonymous'
degree of clarity and
>?
see
as
in
terms
is as
I
of behavior ?
it,
rigor
preferably,
difficult
and
as it is important.
irreducible
But
the explanatory
value
called meanings
entities
intermediary
of special
is surely
illusory.
I have argued
that we can use
in sentences
without
presupposing
to name.
which
those terms purport
to now
Up
significantly
the entities
further
can
use
general
them to be names
conceding
further
we
that
we
that
onymous
or
can
view
heteronymous
terms,
e.g.,
of abstract
utterances
with
as
one
terms
singular
that there be
I have argued
without
predicates,
entities.
I have
significant,
and
another,
without
argued
as
syn
count
a realm of entities
called meanings.
this point
At
enancing
to wonder whether
McX
there is any limit at all to our
begins
immunity. Does
ontological
nothing we may say commit us to
or other entities which we may
of universals
the assumption
?
find unwelcome
a negative
answer
to this ques
I have already
suggested
or
in
of bound variables,
variables
of quantific
tion,
speaking
We
ation, in connection with Russell's
theory of descriptions.
can very easily
in ontological
involve ourselves
commitments,
by saying,
red houses
e.g.,
and
that there is something
which
(bound variable)
sunsets have in common; or that there is some
is a prime number between
But
1000 and 1010.
thing which
in
the only way we can involve ourselves
this is, essentially,
This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192.168.72.226 on Tue, 11 Dec 2012 21:30:36 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
32
Willard
V. Quine
: by our use of bound variables.
commitments
The
ontological
we
can
use of alleged names is no criterion,
for
their
repudiate
at the drop of a hat unless
namehood
the assumption
of a cor
in
in the things we affirm
entity can be spotted
responding
are in fact altogether
imma
terms of bound variables.
Names
in connection
terial to the ontological
issue, for I have shown,
with
and
'Pegasus'
that
'pegasize',
names
can
to
converted
be
can be
that descriptions
and Russell
has shown
descriptions,
we say with help of names can be said
Whatever
eliminated.
in a language which
To be is, purely
shuns names altogether.
In terms of the cate
and simply, to be the value of a variable.
to saying
this amounts
grammar,
gories of traditional
roughly
Pro
that to be is to be in the range of reference of a pronoun.
nouns
been
of reference; nouns might better have
of quantification,
The
variables
pro-pronouns.
are the basic media
named
'something',
'nothing',
over
range
'everything',
our
whole
ontol
of a particular
be; and we are convicted
ogy, whatever
if, and only if, the alleged
presup
presupposition
ontological
our
the entities over which
among
positum has to be reckoned
true.
variables
range in order to render one of our affirmations
it may
We
thereby
whiteness
may
as
e.g.,
say,
commit
that
entities.
some
are
dogs
to recognizing
ourselves
'Some
are
dogs
white,
either
white'
says
not
and
or
doghood
that
some
and, in order that this statement
things that are dogs are white;
the bound variable
be true, the things over which
'something'
must
some
white
include
ranges
dogs, but need not include dog
On the other hand, when we say that some
hood or whiteness.
zoological
species
to recognizing
are
cross-fertile,
we
are
committing
ourselves
as entities
the several species themselves,
abstract
remain so committed
at least until we
they be. We
though
as to show
the statement
devise some way of so paraphrasing
to species on the part of our bound
reference
that the seeming
manner
of speaking.
variable was an avoidable
to which
in
to
minimize
the degree
If I have been seeming
we
our philosophical
involve
discourse
and unphilosophical
in ontological
let me then emphasize
ourselves
commitments,
as the example
of primes between
that classical mathematics,
is up to its neck in commit
1000 and 1010 clearly
illustrates,
it is that the
to an ontology
ments
entities.
of abstract
Thus
This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192.168.72.226 on Tue, 11 Dec 2012 21:30:36 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
On What
There
33
Is
over universals
mediaeval
flared up
has
controversy
in the modern
issue is
The
of
mathematics.
philosophy
clearer now than of old, because we now have a more explicit
a given
to decide what
standard whereby
ontology
theory or
;
a
is committed
form of discourse
to
to
is committed
theory
to which
those and only those entities
the bound variables
of
in order that the affir
the theory must be capable of referring
great
anew
in the theory be true.
standard
of ontological
did
presupposition
not emerge
in
the
modern
the
tradition,
clearly
philosophical
mathematicians
have not on the whole
philosophical
recognized
that they were debating
in
the same old problem of universals
a newly clarified
form. But the fundamental
among
cleavages
modern
of mathematics
do come
points of view on foundations
down pretty explicitly
to disagreements
as to the range of en
mations
made
Because
tities
this
to which
to refer.
the bound variables
should be permitted
view
uni
three main mediaeval
of
points
regarding
are designated
as
versals
historians
realism, conceptualism,
by
and nominalism.
these same three doctrines
reap
Essentially
of the philosophy
of math
pear in twentieth-century
surveys
ematics under the new names logicism,
and form
intuitionism,
The
alism.
as the word
is used
Realism,
over universals,
diaeval controversy
or abstract
entities have
universals
mind;
the mind
may
discover
in connection
is the Platonic
being
them but
with
the me
doctrine
that
of the
independently
cannot
create
them.
as Frege,
Platonists
the use of
condones
represented
by such latter-day
Logicism,
and Carnap,
Russell, Whitehead,
Church,
to refer to abstract
bound variables
entities
known
and un
and
specifiable
unspecifiable,
indiscriminately.
holds that there are universals
but they are
Conceptualism
in modern
mind-made.
times in one
Intuitionism,
espoused
form or another
and others,
Brouwer, Weyl,
by Poincar?,
known,
to refer to abstract
the use of bound variables
are
when
entities
those
only
capable of being cooked
in advance.
from ingredients
As
up individually
specified
has put it, logicism holds
that classes are discovered
Fraenkel
intuitionism
while
holds that they are invented ?* a fair state
ment
indeed of the old opposition
between
realism and con
countenances
entities
This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192.168.72.226 on Tue, 11 Dec 2012 21:30:36 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
V. Quine
Willard
34
an
it makes
is no mere quibble;
This
opposition
ceptualism.
to
mathematics
in
amount
classical
of
the
difference
essential
are
or
one
to
is willing
subscribe.
which
realists,
Logicists,
orders of
to get Cantor's
able on their assumptions
ascending
to
are
with
lowest
order
the
stop
compelled
infinity; intuitionists
even
to
an
abandon
indirect consequence,
of infinity, and, as
con
some of the classical
The modern
laws of real numbers.
between
logicism and
over
infinity.
disagreements
troversy
intuitionism
arose,
in fact,
from
echoes
with
the name of Hubert,
associated
Formalism,
recourse
to
in deploring
the logicist's
unbridled
intuitionism
unsatisfac
also finds intuitionism
But formalism
universals.
reasons.
could happen
for either of two opposite
tory. This
formalist
The
classical
might,
mathematics;
object to admitting
sense of mind-made
like the logicist, object to the crippling of
or he might,
of old,
like the nominalists
abstract entities at all, even in the restrained
entities.
The upshot is the same: the form
as a play of insignificant
nota
alist keeps classical mathematics
can still be of utility ? whatever
tions. This play of notations
shown itself to have as a crutch for phys
utility it has already
But utility need not imply significance,
icists and technologists.
success of
sense.
Nor need the marked
in any literal linguistic
in spinning
and in finding
out theorems,
ob
one another's
with
for agreement
results,
imply
an adequate
basis
for agreement
For,
among
significance.
can be found simply in the rules which
mathematicians
govern
rules be
these syntactical
of the notations ?
the manipulation
intel
notations
and
the
unlike
themselves,
quite
significant
ing,
*
ligible.
we adopt can be
that the sort of ontology
I have argued
?
al
in
connection
with
mathematics,
notably
consequential
we
are
an
to
is
Now
how
this
example.
adjudicate
only
though
is not provided
? Certainly
the answer
among rival ontologies
formula "To be is to be the value of a vari
by the semantical
in testing the con
able"; this formula serves rather, conversely,
mathematicians
jective
formity
*
Journal
bases
of a given
See Goodman
of Symbolic
remark
and Quine,
Logic,
vol.
or doctrine
to a prior
a constructive
toward
"Steps
12 (1947),
pp. 97422.
ontological
nominalism,"
This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192.168.72.226 on Tue, 11 Dec 2012 21:30:36 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
On What
look
We
not in order
standard.
ontology
know
a
what
given
There
Is
35
in connection
with
to bound
variables
to know what
there is, but in order to
or
remark
ours
doctrine,
or
someone
else's,
a problem
involv
is; and this much is quite properly
says
is
is
another
what
there
But
question.
ing language.
over what
for
In debating
there is, there are still reasons
there
operating
on
a
semantical
One
plane.
reason
is
to
escape
from
of the paper : the pre
noted at the beginning
the predicament
to
admit that there are things
dicament
of my not being able
countenances
So long as I adhere
and I do not.
which McX
to McX's,
as opposed
I cannot allow my bound
to my ontology,
to McX's
to refer to entities which
variables
ontology
belong
describe our dis
I can, however,
and not to mine.
consistently
the statements which McX
affirms.
agreement
by characterizing
countenances
that
Provided
my
linguistic
ontology
merely
I can
and utterances,
forms, or at least concrete
inscriptions
sentences.
talk about McX's
reason
to a semantical
is
for withdrawing
Another
plane
in
to argue.
to find common ground on which
Disagreement
in conceptual
basic disagreement
involves
schemes;
ontology
that
basic
these
find
and
McX
I, despite
yet
disagreements,
in
interme
their
our conceptual
schemes
converge
sufficiently
suc
to enable us to communicate
diate and upper ramifications
cessfully
language.
on
such
In
so
as
topics
far
as
politics,
our
basic
weather,
controversy
and,
in particular,
over
ontology
into a semantical
about
controversy
upward
to do with
of the controv
and what
words
them, the collapse
may be delayed.
ersy into question-begging
should
It is no wonder,
then, that ontological
controversy
over language.
But we must not jump
tend into controversy
on words.
Trans
that what
there is depends
to the conclusion
can be
translated
terms is no indication
into semantical
of a question
latability
is to bear a name
is linguistic.
To see Naples
that the question
to the words
'sees Naples',
which, when prefixed
yields a true
about
still there is nothing
sentence;
seeing Naples.
linguistic
of an ontology
is, I think, similar in prin
acceptance
of a scientific
theory, say a system of
ciple to our acceptance
;we adopt, at least insofar as we are reasonable,
the
physics
into
which
the
disordered
scheme
conceptual
frag
simplest
Our
This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192.168.72.226 on Tue, 11 Dec 2012 21:30:36 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Willard
36
ments
of
ontology
conceptual
broadest
reasonable
e.g.
V. Quine
raw experience
can be fitted and arranged.
Our
once we have fixed upon the over-all
is determined
in the
science
is to accommodate
scheme which
a
which
determine
and the considerations
sense;
construction
of any part of that conceptual
or the physical
part, are not different
the biological
from
the
tion of
system
which
considerations
the whole.
of scientific
the same ?
guage,
of an ontology.
But simplicity,
To
determine
whatever
theory may
but no more ?
extent
\>e said
may
a
reasonable
the adoption
to be a matter
scheme,
in kind
construc
of
of
any
lan
be said of the adoption
as a guiding
in constructing
con
principle
a
not
is
clear
and
idea; and it is
ceptual schemes,
unambiguous
a
or
of presenting
double
standard.
quite capable
multiple
set of
the most economical
Imagine, e.g., that we have devised
to the play-by-play
of immediate
reporting
adequate
entities
under
The
of
the values
this scheme ?
experience.
?
bound variables
individual
are, let us suppose,
subjective
or reflection.
events
of sensation
We
should
still find, no
to talk
scheme, purporting
doubt, that a physicalistic
conceptual
concepts
in simplifying
about external
offers great advantages
objects,
our over-all
sense
scattered
reports.
By bringing
together
events and treating
them as perceptions
of one object, we re
to a manage
of our stream of experience
duce the complexity
is indeed our
The
rule
of
able conceptual
simplicity
simplicity.
;
sense
we
in
to
maxim
data
associate
assigning
guiding
objects
an earlier and a later round sensum with
the same so-called
two different
in obedience
so-called
to
penny, or with
pennies,
our
in
the demands
of maximum
total
simplicity
world-picture.
a phen
Here we have two competing
schemes,
conceptual
one. Which
one and a physicalistic
omenalistic
should prevail ?
in its
Each has its advantages;
each has its special simplicity
own way.
to
I suggest,
deserves
be developed.
Each
Each,
to be the more
in
fundamental,
may be said, indeed,
though
senses
; the one is epistemologically,
the other phys
different
ically, fundamental.
our account of
scheme simplifies
conceptual
physical
sense events
of
because
the
scattered
way myriad
experience
come to be associated
with
still there
single so-called
objects;
The
This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192.168.72.226 on Tue, 11 Dec 2012 21:30:36 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
On What
37
Is
There
can
about physical
that each sentence
likelihood
objects
into
and complexly,
however
deviously
actually be translated,
are postulated
the phenomenalistic
objects
Physical
language.
round out and simplify our account of the flux of
entities which
is no
sim
of irrational numbers
experience,
just as the introduction
con
the
view
of
of
From
the
arithmetic.
of
laws
point
plifies
of rational num
arithmetic
scheme of the elementary
ceptual
and irrational
of rational
arithmetic
the broader
alone,
have the status of a convenient
numbers would
simpler
myth,
and
of rationals)
the arithmetic
than the literal truth (namely
as
a
truth
literal
scattered
that
part.
Similarly,
yet containing
the conceptual
scheme
from a phenomenalistic
point of view,
a
than
literal
the
convient
is
of physical
myth,
simpler
objects
bers
that literal truth as a scattered part.
truth and yet containing
in
or attributes
of physical
of classes
Now what
objects,
sort
from
the
of
of
this
turn ? A platonistic
is,
point
ontology
view of a strictly physicalistic
scheme, as much of a
conceptual
for
scheme
itself was
as that physicalistic
conceptual
myth
a
is
and
useful
one,
This
higher myth
good
phenomenalism.
our account of physics.
Since
in turn, in so far as it simplifies
an
is
the utility
mathematics
integral part of this higher myth,
In speak
is evident enough.
science
for physical
of this myth
a
as
of math
myth, I echo that philosophy
ing of it nevertheless
ematics to which
I alluded earlier under the name of formalism.
is that an attitude of formalism may
But my present suggestion
the physical
toward
with
conceptual
equal justice be adopted
scheme,
in
turn,
by
the
aesthete
pure
or
phenomenalist.
the myth of mathematics
and the
between
analogy
some
in
additional
and
fortuitous
of
is,
perhaps
physics
myth
for example,
the crisis which
close.
Consider,
ways,
strikingly
at the turn
was precipitated
in the foundations
of mathematics,
of
Russell's
and other
of the century, by the discovery
paradox
These
had to be ob
antinomies
contradictions
of set theory.
our
mathematical
ad hoc devices;
viated by unintuitive,
myth
The
to all.
of
But what
deliberate
and evident
arose
between
the
and
the
undular
antinomy
physics
accounts of light; and if this was not as out-and-out
corpuscular
a contradiction
as Russell's
I ?suspect that the reason
paradox,
making
became
? An
is merely
that
physics
is
not
as
out-and-out
as
mathematics.
This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192.168.72.226 on Tue, 11 Dec 2012 21:30:36 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
V. Quine
Willard
38
of
crisis in the foundations
the second
great modern
Again,
?
there
that
in
G?del's
1931
mathematics
proof
by
precipitated
in arithmetic ?
has its
are bound to be undecidable
statements
in
in
indeterminacy
companion-piece
Heisenberg's
physics
principle.
to show that some common
I undertook
In earlier pages
are fallacious.
Fur
in favor of certain ontologies
arguments
to decide what
an explicit
standard whereby
ther, I advanced
commitments
of a theory are. But the question
the ontological
to adopt still stands open, and the ob
actually
Let us
is tolerance
and an experimental
spirit.
see
of
the
much
how
conceptual
physicalistic
by
to a phenomenalistic
one; still physics
scheme can be reduced
it
in toto though
irreducible
demands
also naturally
pursuing,
what
ontology
counsel
all means
vious
degree, natural science may be
but let us also
of
rendered
mathematics;
independent
platonistic
into
its
foundations.
mathematics
and delve
pursue
platonistic
various
best suited
schemes
From among
the
conceptual
be.
to
Let
these
us see how,
various
or to what
pursuits,
one
?
the
phenomenalistic
?
claims
from within
the phenomenal
Viewed
priority.
epistemological
and
of physical
the ontologies
istic conceptual
scheme,
objects
The quality of myth, however,
mathematical
objects are myths.
in this case, to the epistemological
is relative;
relative,
point of
view.
This point of view is one among various,
corresponding
to
one
among
our
various
interests
and
purposes.
Willard
Harvard
V. Quine
University
This content downloaded by the authorized user from 192.168.72.226 on Tue, 11 Dec 2012 21:30:36 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions