Sec. 11. Immunities and Privileges
Section 11 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution provides important
immunities and privileges for Senators and Members of the House of
Representatives, aimed at protecting their legislative functions and
independence. Let's break down the key aspects of this provision in
detail:
1. **Privilege from Arrest During Congressional Sessions**: Senators and
Members of the House of Representatives enjoy immunity from arrest while
Congress is in session. This means that if a lawmaker is accused of an
offense punishable by imprisonment of not more than six years, they
cannot be arrested while Congress is conducting its sessions. This
privilege is designed to prevent the harassment or interference of
legislators in the performance of their legislative duties.
2.
- **Scope**: This privilege applies only to offenses with a penalty
of not more than six years of imprisonment. More serious offenses may
still lead to arrest.
2. **No Questioning or Liability for Speech or Debate**: Section 11 also
states that no Senator or Member of the House of Representatives can be
questioned nor held liable in any other place for any speech or debate
made within the Congress or in any committee thereof. This is a
fundamental protection to ensure that legislators can freely express
their views, deliberate on issues, and engage in debates without fear of
legal repercussions.
3.
- **Scope**: This protection extends to any speech or debate made
within Congress or its committees. It covers both verbal and written
statements, as well as the legislative process itself, ensuring that
lawmakers can discuss and deliberate on matters without external
interference.
- **Purpose**: The purpose of this provision is to safeguard the
integrity and independence of the legislative branch. It encourages open
and robust discussions among lawmakers, even on controversial or
sensitive topics, without the threat of legal action.
3. **Limitations and Accountability**: While this privilege is essential
for the functioning of a democratic legislature, it is not absolute.
Lawmakers are not immune from prosecution for criminal acts unrelated to
their legislative functions. If a legislator commits a crime outside the
scope of their legislative duties, they can still be subject to legal
proceedings.
In summary, Section 11 of the Philippine Constitution grants Senators
and Members of the House of Representatives important immunities and
privileges to protect their legislative work. These protections include
immunity from arrest during congressional sessions and the freedom to
engage in speech and debate within Congress without fear of external
legal consequences. However, these immunities do not shield legislators
from accountability for criminal acts unrelated to their legislative
roles. These provisions are essential for upholding the separation of
powers and ensuring that the legislative branch can effectively carry
out its duties in a democratic system.
1. Trillanes v. Pimentel, 556 SCRA 471 (2008) [re-election to office
and criminal charge]
- Title: Antonio F. Trillanes IV v. Judge Oscar Pimentel, Sr., et al.
G.R. No. 179817, February 11, 2008
Facts:
On July 27, 2003, a group of heavily armed soldiers led by junior
officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) staged a rebellion
at Oakwood Premier Apartments in Makati City, demanding the resignation
of the President and key national officials. Antonio F. Trillanes IV was
charged with coup d'etat following the incident. Four years later, in
2007, Trillanes won a seat in the Senate with a six-year term.
Before the start of his Senate term, Trillanes filed a motion to attend
Senate sessions and related activities, set up a working area at his
place of detention, receive members of his staff at his detention
facility, give interviews to the media, and attend Senate organizational
meetings. The trial court denied these requests.
Trillanes argued that his election to the Senate should allow him to
serve his mandate as a Senator and that denying his requests was
tantamount to removing him from office. He also cited cases of other
detention prisoners who were allowed temporary leaves for social
functions and claimed a violation of equal protection.
Issue:
Whether Trillanes, as a detention prisoner facing non-bailable charges,
should be granted the requests he made to attend Senate sessions and
related activities.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court denied Trillanes' petition and upheld the trial
court's decision to deny his requests.
1. Presumption of Innocence: The Court ruled that while Trillanes still
enjoyed the presumption of innocence, this did not entitle him to the
full enjoyment of civil and political rights. The denial of bail was
justified because the evidence of guilt was strong, regardless of the
stage of the criminal action.
2. Election Does Not Remove Criminal Charges: Trillanes' election to the
Senate did not exempt him from the criminal charges he faced. The
doctrine of condonation, which applies to administrative cases, does not
apply to criminal cases. He remained a detention prisoner with lawful
restraints imposed by the Constitution and jurisprudence.
3. Duty to Legislate: While Trillanes argued that his duty to legislate
was paramount, the Court held that Congress could function even in the
absence of one of its members. The mandate of the people yielded to the
Constitution and the rule of law.
4. Equal Protection: Trillanes claimed that he should be granted the
same treatment as other detention prisoners allowed to attend social
functions. However, the Court emphasized that emergency or temporary
leaves from imprisonment were allowed at the discretion of authorities
or court orders. His case did not warrant special treatment, and the
prior grants he received did not entitle him to blanket authorizations.
In summary, the Court concluded that Trillanes' requests for special
privileges were not justified, and his status as a detention prisoner
facing serious charges did not exempt him from the restrictions imposed
by law.
2. Jimenez v. Cabangbang, 17 SCRA 876 (1966) [coverage of immunities
and privileges]
- This case involves a complaint for damages arising from the
publication of an allegedly libelous open letter by the defendant,
Bartolome Cabangbang. The plaintiffs, Nicanor T. Jimenez, Carlos J.
Albert, and Jose L. Lukban, sought damages for the alleged defamation
caused by the letter.
The defendant, Cabangbang, argued that the letter should be considered a
privileged communication because he was a member of the House of
Representatives at the time of its publication. He relied on the
constitutional provision stating that Senators and Members of the House
of Representatives are privileged from arrest during their attendance at
congressional sessions, and for any speech or debate therein, they shall
not be questioned in any other place.
The court ruled that the privilege from arrest and the immunity from
questioning in any other place referred to in the Constitution pertain
to utterances made by Congressmen in the performance of their official
functions, such as speeches, statements, or votes in Congress, bills
introduced, and other acts performed as members of Congress or
Congressional Committees. The publication of the open letter did not
fall within this category, as it was not related to the official duties
of Cabangbang as a Congressman. Therefore, the communication was not
absolutely privileged.
Regarding the libelous nature of the letter, the court examined its
contents and found that while it contained allegations about the
plaintiffs' involvement in certain plans, it also included statements
suggesting that the plaintiffs might be unaware of these plans and were
possibly unwitting tools of the alleged planners. The court held that
these statements in the letter undermined the claim of defamation, as
they implied that the plaintiffs may not have been active participants
in the alleged wrongdoing.
Ultimately, the court affirmed the lower court's order dismissing the
complaint for damages. It concluded that the letter's contents did not
support the plaintiffs' claim for damages, and the statements in the
letter were inconsistent with the allegation that the plaintiffs
knowingly participated in the alleged plans.
Sec. 13. Disqualifications
Section 13 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution sets forth rules
regarding the disqualification of Senators and Members of the House of
Representatives from holding certain government positions during their
term in office. Let's explore this provision in detail:
1. **Prohibition on Holding Other Government Offices or Employment**:
The first part of Section 13 states that no Senator or Member of the
House of Representatives may hold any other office or employment in the
Government, its subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities. This
includes government-owned or controlled corporations (GOCCs) or their
subsidiaries.
- **Scope**: This prohibition is broad and applies to any government
position, whether it is elected, appointed, or employed. It covers
positions at all levels of government, from the national level to local
government units, as well as entities owned or controlled by the
government.
- **Purpose**: The primary purpose of this provision is to prevent
conflicts of interest. It ensures that legislators focus exclusively on
their legislative roles without the distractions and potential conflicts
that could arise from holding other government positions.
2. **Disqualification for Newly Created Offices or Increased
Emoluments**: The second part of Section 13 states that lawmakers cannot
be appointed to any office that may have been created or whose
emoluments (salary or compensation) have been increased during the term
for which they were elected.
- **Scope**: This disqualification is specific to offices that are
either newly created or experience an increase in emoluments during a
legislator's term. It aims to prevent lawmakers from benefiting
personally from the creation of new positions or salary increases that
may be seen as self-serving.
- **Purpose**: The purpose of this provision is to maintain the
integrity of the legislative process. It prevents lawmakers from
potentially influencing the creation or expansion of government
positions for their own gain while they are in office.
3. **Forfeiture of Seat**: The consequence of violating these
disqualification rules is the forfeiture of the legislator's seat. In
other words, if a Senator or Member of the House of Representatives is
found to be holding another government office or is appointed to a newly
created office with increased emoluments during their term, they will
lose their legislative position.
- **Effects**: Forfeiture of the seat means that the legislator is
no longer entitled to hold their elected position in Congress. A special
election or appointment process may be required to fill the vacant seat.
In summary, Section 13 of the Philippine Constitution aims to prevent
conflicts of interest and maintain the integrity of the legislative
branch by disqualifying Senators and Members of the House of
Representatives from holding other government positions or newly created
offices with increased emoluments during their term. Violation of these
disqualification rules leads to the forfeiture of their legislative seat.
These provisions help ensure that lawmakers focus solely on their
legislative duties and do not use their positions for personal gain or
undue influence.
1. Liban v. Gordon, GR No.175352 (2009) and (2011) [non-governmental
office]
**Case Title:** *Gordon v. PNRC (Philippine National Red Cross)*
**Digest:**
**Background:**
This case involves a motion for clarification and reconsideration filed
by Richard J. Gordon (respondent) and the Philippine National Red Cross
(PNRC) following a decision by the Supreme Court of the Philippines. In
the original decision, the Court ruled that Gordon did not forfeit his
Senate seat when he accepted the chairmanship of the PNRC, as the PNRC
was not considered a government office or an office in a governmentowned or controlled corporation under Section 13, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution. However, the Court also declared certain sections of the
PNRC Charter (Republic Act No. 95) void as they created the PNRC as a
private corporation.
**Issues Raised:**
1. Whether the issue of the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 95
(PNRC Charter) was properly raised in the case.
2. Whether the PNRC should be considered a private corporation and its
Charter declared unconstitutional.
3. Whether the Court's original decision should be modified.
**Ruling and Explanation:**
1. **Constitutionality of Republic Act No. 95:** The Court determined
that the issue of the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 95 was not
properly raised by the parties and, therefore, should not have been
decided in the case. The Court cited the principle that it should not
pass upon a constitutional question unless it is the very lis mota (main
issue) of the case. Since the case could have been decided on other
grounds, the Court deemed its previous ruling on the constitutionality
of Republic Act No. 95 as obiter dictum (a remark made in passing), and
therefore, it was not necessary to delve into this issue.
2. **Nature of PNRC:** The Court recognized the sui generis (unique)
nature of the PNRC, highlighting that it is distinct from both
government entities and strictly private corporations. The PNRC operates
under the Geneva Conventions and is considered an auxiliary of the
government in humanitarian work, regulated by international humanitarian
law. While it is not strictly a government office or a private
corporation, it occupies a special status. The Court emphasized that the
PNRC's work is crucial in times of disasters and armed conflicts and
that its existence should not be shaken drastically.
3. **Modification of Decision:** In light of the above considerations,
the Court modified its original decision. It upheld the
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 95 in its entirety and deleted the
second sentence of the dispositive portion of the decision, which
declared certain sections of the PNRC Charter void. The modified
dispositive portion now only reaffirms that the office of the Chairman
of the Philippine National Red Cross is not a government office or an
office in a government-owned or controlled corporation for purposes of
Section 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
**Conclusion:**
The Supreme Court, in this case, recognized the unique status of the
Philippine National Red Cross, which is neither strictly a government
entity nor a private corporation. It held that the constitutionality of
Republic Act No. 95 was not properly raised in the case and, therefore,
should not have been decided. The Court modified its original decision
to uphold the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 95 and clarified the
nature of the PNRC's office in relation to Section 13, Article VI of the
1987 Constitution.
Sec. 14. Prohibitions – Lawyer Legislators/ Conflict of Interests
**Section 14 of Article VI of the 1987 Philippine Constitution**
addresses the issue of lawyer legislators and conflicts of interest. It
outlines several key prohibitions and restrictions on Senators and
Members of the House of Representatives who are also practicing lawyers
or attorneys. Here's a detailed explanation of each aspect of this
section:
1. **Prohibition on Personal Appearance as Counsel:**
- This part of Section 14 prohibits Senators and Members of the House
of Representatives from personally appearing as counsel or lawyers
before any court of justice or before the Electoral Tribunals, quasijudicial bodies, and other administrative agencies.
- The rationale behind this prohibition is to prevent lawyer
legislators from using their positions to gain an unfair advantage or
influence legal proceedings, potentially compromising the independence
and impartiality of the judiciary or other adjudicatory bodies.
2. **Financial Interests in Government Contracts and Privileges:**
- Senators and Members of the House of Representatives are prohibited,
directly or indirectly, from having any financial interest in contracts
with, or in franchises or special privileges granted by, the government
or any of its subdivisions, agencies, instrumentalities, governmentowned or controlled corporations (GOCCs), or their subsidiaries during
their term in office.
- This prohibition is designed to prevent conflicts of interest that
could arise if legislators personally benefit financially from
government contracts or privileges. Such conflicts could undermine the
legislator's impartiality and lead to decisions that prioritize personal
gain over the public interest.
3. **Restriction on Intervention in Government Matters for Personal
Benefit:**
- This part of Section 14 also prohibits Senators and Members of the
House of Representatives from intervening in any matter before any
government office for their pecuniary (financial) benefit or when their
involvement may be prompted by their official positions.
- The intention here is to prevent legislators from using their
influence or authority to advance their personal financial interests
within the government. This restriction aims to ensure that elected
officials act in the best interests of their constituents and the public
at large.
**Rationale and Purpose:**
The purpose of Section 14 is to maintain the integrity, independence,
and impartiality of government institutions, particularly the judiciary
and administrative bodies, and to prevent conflicts of interest among
lawyer legislators. It seeks to ensure that Senators and Members of the
House of Representatives prioritize their public duties and
responsibilities over personal financial gain.
By prohibiting lawyer legislators from engaging in certain legal
activities and from having financial interests in government contracts
and privileges, the Constitution aims to preserve the separation of
powers, maintain public trust in government, and uphold ethical
standards among elected officials. It helps prevent situations where
legislators may use their positions to gain undue advantages or exploit
their authority for personal profit.
Puyat v. De Guzman, 113 SCRA 31 (1982) [appearing in “intervention”
on one’s behalf]
**Issue:** Whether Assemblyman Estanislao A. Fernandez's intervention in
SEC Case No. 1747 violates Section 11, Article VIII of the 1973
Constitution, which prohibits members of the Batasang Pambansa from
appearing as counsel before any administrative body.
**Facts:**
1. An election was held on May 14, 1979, for the directors of the
International Pipe Industries Corporation (IPI), a private corporation.
2. Two groups, the Puyat Group and the Acero Group, emerged from the
election as contenders for control of the IPI Board.
3. On May 25, 1979, the Acero Group initiated quo warranto proceedings
with the SEC (SEC Case No. 1747) to challenge the election's validity,
claiming that the votes were not properly counted.
4. Respondent Assemblyman Estanislao A. Fernandez initially attempted to
appear as counsel for the Acero Group but withdrew due to objections
based on constitutional grounds.
5. On May 31, 1979, Assemblyman Fernandez purchased ten shares of IPI
stock for P200.00, a day before filing an Urgent Motion for Intervention
in SEC Case No. 1747, citing a legal interest in the matter.
6. The SEC granted Assemblyman Fernandez's intervention on July 17, 1979,
based on his ownership of ten IPI shares.
**Ruling:** The court ruled that Assemblyman Estanislao A. Fernandez's
intervention in SEC Case No. 1747 was in violation of Section 11,
Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution. This section prohibited members
of the Batasang Pambansa (the legislative body) from appearing as
counsel before any administrative body.
**Reasoning:**
1. **Constitutional Prohibition:** Section 11, Article VIII of the 1973
Constitution explicitly prohibited members of the Batasang Pambansa from
appearing as counsel before any administrative body. The SEC was
considered an administrative body.
2. **Circumvention of the Prohibition:** The court noted that while
Fernandez's intervention appeared to be on the grounds of legal interest,
it was, in reality, an indirect way of "appearing as counsel" before an
administrative body. Fernandez's acquisition of shares and subsequent
intervention were seen as a circumvention of the constitutional
prohibition.
3. **Effectiveness of the Constitutional Provision:** The court
emphasized that allowing such interventions would render the
constitutional provision ineffective. Members of the Batasang Pambansa
could potentially influence administrative bodies by acquiring a minimal
interest in the client's matter and then intervening in proceedings.
**Conclusion:** The court reversed the SEC's decision to grant
Assemblyman Fernandez's intervention, finding it in violation of the
constitutional prohibition against members of the Batasang Pambansa
appearing as counsel before administrative bodies. The court emphasized
that this ruling was specific to the circumstances of this case and did
not impact the ability of other stockholders to intervene in SEC cases
related to intra-corporate matters.
Sec. 16. Officers and Internal Business
Section 16 of the 1987 Constitution of the Philippines outlines several
important provisions related to the organization, officers, and internal
business of the Senate and the House of Representatives, which are the
two chambers of the Philippine Congress. Let's explore each subsection
in detail:
**Subsection 16(1): Election of Officers**
- In this subsection, it is stated that the Senate shall elect its
President, and the House of Representatives shall elect its Speaker.
- These elections are to be conducted by a majority vote of all the
respective members of each house.
- Additionally, each house has the authority to choose any other
officers it deems necessary. These officers can include positions like
Majority Leader, Minority Leader, Sergeant-at-Arms, and others required
for the proper functioning of the legislative body.
**Subsection 16(2): Quorum and Attendance**
- This subsection specifies the quorum requirement for each house. A
quorum is the minimum number of members required to conduct official
business.
- It states that a majority of each house's members constitutes a quorum
to conduct business. This means that more than half of the total number
of members must be present to officially transact legislative affairs.
- However, a smaller number (less than a majority) may still adjourn
from day to day. In other words, if there are not enough members to meet
the quorum requirement, they can decide to adjourn and try again later.
- Importantly, this subsection also empowers each house to compel the
attendance of absent members. This is typically done through various
measures and penalties defined by the rules and procedures of each house.
**Subsection 16(3): Rules of Proceedings and Discipline**
- This subsection grants each house the authority to determine its own
rules of proceedings. These rules dictate how legislative business is
conducted, including how bills are introduced, debated, and voted upon.
- Each house also has the power to punish its members for disorderly
behavior. Disorderly behavior may include actions that disrupt the
legislative process or show disrespect towards fellow members or the
institution.
- Furthermore, with the concurrence of two-thirds of all its members, a
house can suspend or expel one of its members. Suspension is a
disciplinary action that temporarily removes a member's privileges and
duties. The maximum period of suspension is capped at sixty days.
**Subsection 16(4): Keeping Records**
- This subsection mandates that each house must keep a Journal of its
proceedings. The Journal serves as an official record of all actions
taken during legislative sessions.
- It also requires that the Journal be periodically published, with
certain exceptions for matters that could affect national security. This
publishing ensures transparency and allows the public to access the
legislative record.
- If requested by one-fifth of the members present, the yeas and nays
(how each member voted on a specific question) must be entered in the
Journal. This roll-call voting provides a clear record of individual
member votes on significant issues.
- In addition to the Journal, each house is required to keep a Record of
its proceedings, which likely contains more detailed information about
legislative activities.
**Subsection 16(5): Adjournment**
- This subsection places restrictions on the adjournment of either house
during congressional sessions.
- It states that neither house can adjourn for more than three days
without the consent of the other house. This provision prevents one
house from unilaterally adjourning and disrupting the legislative
process.
- Furthermore, both houses must adjourn to the same place where they
were originally sitting. This ensures that both houses remain in
proximity for communication and coordination.
In summary, Section 16 of the Philippine Constitution provides a
framework for the organization, conduct, and discipline of the Senate
and the House of Representatives. It establishes rules for the election
of key officers, the quorum necessary for conducting business, the
creation of internal rules and procedures, and the maintenance of
official records. Additionally, it outlines mechanisms for disciplining
members who engage in disorderly conduct and sets limitations on
adjournment during congressional sessions. These provisions are crucial
for the effective functioning of the Philippine legislature.
1. Baguilat, Jr. v. Speaker Alvarez, GR No. 227757 (2017) [officers of
congress]
**Facts:**
- Petitioners, members of the House of Representatives, sought a writ of
mandamus to compel the recognition of Rep. Baguilat as the Minority
Leader and themselves as the legitimate members of the Minority in the
17th Congress.
- A dispute arose regarding the election of the Minority Leader, with
Rep. Suarez being recognized as the Minority Leader despite objections.
- Petitioners argued that tradition dictated that the second-placer in
the Speakership Elections should become the Minority Leader.
**Issue:**
- Whether respondents can be compelled to recognize Rep. Baguilat as the
Minority Leader and petitioners as the legitimate members of the
Minority.
**Ruling:**
- The petition was dismissed.
- The Court emphasized that the election of officers in the House of
Representatives, including the Minority Leader, is an internal matter
left to the discretion of the House.
- Section 16(1) of the 1987 Constitution states that each House shall
choose such other officers as it deems necessary.
- The Court's role is limited to determining whether there has been a
grave abuse of discretion or violation of the Constitution.
- In this case, there was no showing of grave abuse of discretion, and
the Court refrained from interfering in the internal affairs of the
legislative branch.
- The Court highlighted the principle of separation of powers, which
prevents judicial intrusion into the internal workings of Congress,
absent a clear violation of the Constitution.
**Key Points:**
- The case underscores that the election of officers within Congress,
such as the Minority Leader, is an internal matter within the discretion
of the legislative body.
- Section 16(1) of the 1987 Constitution empowers each House to choose
its officers.
- The Court's role is to ensure that there is no grave abuse of
discretion or constitutional violation, but it does not have the
authority to dictate the internal rules and procedures of Congress.
- The case reiterates the importance of the separation of powers
doctrine, which prevents undue judicial interference in the affairs of
the legislative branch.
2. Avelino v. Cuenco, 83 PHIL. 17 (1949) [quorum to do business]
Facts:
- Senators Tañada and Sanidad filed a resolution with charges against
Senate President Avelino, seeking an investigation.
- During a session, Senator Tañada repeatedly stood up to deliver a
privilege speech, but Senate President Avelino ignored him.
- A commotion ensued, and Senate President Avelino abruptly left the
session hall with his followers.
- Senators who remained conducted a "rump session," declared the
position of Senate President vacant, and designated Senator Cuenco as
Acting Senate President.
- Senate President Avelino filed a petition to declare himself the
rightful Senate President and oust Senator Cuenco.
Issues:
1. Is the rump session a continuation of the morning session?
2. Was there a quorum when Senator Avelino was ousted and Senator Cuenco
was elected as Senate President?
Held:
1. Yes, the rump session is a continuation of the morning session. A
minority of 10 senators cannot prevent the other 12 senators from
passing a resolution that meets their unanimous endorsement.
2. Yes, there was a quorum when Senator Avelino was ousted and Senator
Cuenco was elected as Senate President. For practical considerations,
Senator Confesor's absence from the country meant he could not
participate in Senate deliberations. Therefore, an absolute majority of
all the members of the Senate, minus one (23), constituted a
constitutional majority for quorum purposes, which required 12 senators.
Even if the 12 did not constitute a quorum, they could have ordered the
arrest of one of the absent members, ensuring a quorum. Declaring
Senator Avelino as the rightful President of the Senate under these
circumstances would be injudicious.
Key Point:
- The case emphasizes the concept of quorum to do business. In this
context, a quorum refers to the minimum number of members required to
conduct official proceedings and make decisions.
- The decision highlights that for practical purposes, an absolute
majority of all members minus one may constitute a quorum when one
member is unable to participate, and this applies to legislative bodies.
- The case illustrates that even if there are disputes and disruptions
during sessions, the determination of quorum is crucial to the validity
of the proceedings and decisions made.
3. Datu Michael Abas Kida v. Senate, GR 196271 (2011) [supermajority is
unconstitutional]
**Facts:**
In these consolidated cases, several petitions were filed challenging
the constitutionality of Republic Act (RA) No. 10952, which postponed
the Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) elections originally
scheduled for October 23, 2017, to May 14, 2018.
Petitioners argued that the postponement of the Barangay and SK
elections violated the constitutional provision that mandates the
synchronization of national and local elections. They claimed that RA No.
10952 allowed the term extension of incumbent barangay officials without
the need for a constitutional amendment, thereby creating an
unconstitutional supermajority.
**Issues:**
1. Whether or not the postponement of the Barangay and SK elections
violated the constitutional mandate to synchronize national and local
elections.
2. Whether or not RA No. 10952 allowed an unconstitutional supermajority
to extend the terms of incumbent barangay officials.
**Ruling:**
1. **No, the postponement did not violate the constitutional mandate to
synchronize elections.**
The Supreme Court held that while the Constitution indeed mandates
the synchronization of elections, it does not mean that all local
elections must be held simultaneously. The Constitution provides for a
"synchronization of national and local elections starting from the year
1992." This means that the national and local elections must be held on
the same day, but not necessarily on the same year. In the case of the
postponed Barangay and SK elections, they were synchronized with the May
2018 elections, which complied with the constitutional requirement.
2. **No, RA No. 10952 did not allow an unconstitutional supermajority.**
The Supreme Court ruled that RA No. 10952 was validly enacted and did
not violate the Constitution. It emphasized that Congress has the
authority to set the date of local elections, subject to the
constitutional mandate of synchronization. The law did not extend the
terms of incumbent barangay officials but merely postponed the elections
to synchronize them with the May 2018 elections. There was no violation
of the constitutional provision against supermajorities.
**Key Point:**
- The cases highlight that the synchronization of elections does not
require all local elections to be held simultaneously but mandates that
national and local elections be conducted on the same day.
- The postponement of elections to synchronize them with a subsequent
election year does not violate the constitutional mandate.
- The notion of an unconstitutional supermajority was rejected in this
context, as long as the law's enactment followed constitutional
processes and did not extend the terms of incumbent officials.
4. Arroyo v. De Venecia, 277 SCRA 268 (1997) [internal rules and
discipline (determination of rules)]
**Facts**:
1. The case involved a challenge to the validity of Republic Act No.
8240 (R.A. No. 8240).
2. Petitioners argued that R.A. No. 8240 was null and void because it
was passed in violation of the rules of the House, which they claimed
were "constitutionally mandated." They contended that violation of the
House rules amounted to a violation of the Constitution itself.
3. The bill, which became R.A. No. 8240, was approved by the bicameral
conference committee and submitted to the House for consideration.
4. During the House session, various events occurred, including an
attempted adjournment for lack of quorum by Rep. Arroyo.
5. Petitioners claimed that the session was hastily adjourned to prevent
Rep. Arroyo from formally challenging the existence of a quorum and
asking for reconsideration.
**Issues**:
The main issues in the case were as follows:
1. Whether the passage of R.A. No. 8240 in the House was "railroaded"
and whether Rep. Arroyo was effectively prevented from questioning the
presence of a quorum.
2. Whether the passage of R.A. No. 8240 violated the internal rules and
discipline of the House and whether such violation rendered the law null
and void.
**Ruling**:
The Supreme Court made the following key rulings:
1. The Court emphasized that it generally respects the certification of
the presiding officers of both Houses of Congress that a bill has been
duly passed. The enrolled bill doctrine holds that the signing of the
bill by the Speaker of the House and the President of the Senate, along
with certification by the secretaries of both Houses, is conclusive of
its due enactment.
2. The Court rejected the argument that the enrolled bill doctrine
should be set aside in this case, as there was no evidence to the
contrary, and the Journal of the House confirmed that the bill had been
approved.
3. The Court highlighted that the internal rules and discipline of the
House are primarily matters for the House to address. Petitioners'
claims of violations of House rules did not warrant judicial
intervention, as there was no violation of constitutional provisions.
4. The Court noted that Rep. Arroyo's question regarding the quorum was
not in the form or substance of a point of order or a question of
privilege. Rep. Arroyo continued his interpellation, effectively
acknowledging the presence of a quorum.
5. The Court concluded that the passage of R.A. No. 8240 was in
accordance with the rules and procedures of the House, and there was no
basis for declaring it null and void.
In summary, this case underscores the principle that the internal rules
and discipline of a legislative body, such as the House of
Representatives, are generally within the purview of that body.
Violations of such rules, without clear constitutional violations, may
not warrant judicial interference, and the enrolled bill doctrine is
generally respected in determining the due enactment of laws.
5. Osmeña v. Pendatun, 109 PHIL. 863 (1960) [internal rules and
discipline (disorderly behavior)]
Facts:
- On July 14, 1960, Congressman Sergio Osmeña, Jr., submitted a petition
to the Supreme Court, seeking declaratory relief, certiorari, and
prohibition with preliminary injunction.
- The petition was directed against Congressman Salipada K. Pendatun and
fourteen other congressmen who were members of the Special Committee
created by House Resolution No. 59.
- Osmeña requested the annulment of House Resolution No. 59, alleging
that it infringed upon his parliamentary immunity and that the charges
against the President made in his privilege speech were without basis.
- House Resolution No. 59 was passed in response to Osmeña's speech,
which contained allegations against the President.
- The Resolution created a special committee to investigate Osmeña's
charges against the President and authorized the committee to summon
Osmeña to substantiate his charges.
- Osmeña refused to produce evidence before the committee, arguing that
he was protected by parliamentary immunity.
- Despite some doubts about the court's jurisdiction and the merits of
Osmeña's claims, the majority of the court decided to hear the case
further.
- The special committee continued its proceedings and found Osmeña
guilty of serious disorderly behavior, leading to his suspension from
office for fifteen months.
- Osmeña then challenged the House's power to suspend him under the
Constitution.
Issues:
1. Did House Resolution No. 59 infringe upon Osmeña's parliamentary
immunity for speeches delivered in the House?
2. Did Osmeña's speech constitute disorderly behavior?
3. Could the House still take action against Osmeña after other business
had been conducted?
4. Did the House have the power to suspend one of its members under the
Constitution?
Ruling:
1. Parliamentary Immunity: The court held that while the Constitution
provided absolute parliamentary immunity for speeches delivered in
Congress, it did not protect members from responsibility before the
legislative body itself if their words and conduct were considered
disorderly or unbecoming. Thus, the House had the authority to question
and discipline its members for disorderly behavior.
2. Disorderly Behavior: The court stated that the determination of what
constituted disorderly behavior fell within the purview of the House, as
it involved factual circumstances known best to the House itself. The
court refused to interfere in the House's judgment on this matter, as it
would amount to an impermissible interference in the legislative
branch's functions.
3. Timing of Action: The court held that the House had the power to take
disciplinary action even if other business had intervened after the
allegedly objectionable speech. It cited instances from the United
States Congress where similar actions were taken, emphasizing that
parliamentary rules were procedural and could be waived or modified by
the legislative body.
4. House's Power to Suspend: The court concluded that the House had the
inherent legislative prerogative to suspend its members for disorderly
behavior. It distinguished this case from the Alejandrino precedent,
emphasizing that the House now possessed full legislative powers as
granted by the Constitution, allowing it to exercise the power of
suspension.
Result:
The Supreme Court dismissed Osmeña's petition, upholding the House's
power to question and discipline its members for disorderly behavior,
including suspension. The court emphasized the separation of powers and
the legislative branch's authority in such matters.
6. Santiago v. Sandiganbayan, 356 SCRA 636 (2001) [order of suspension]
Title: Santiago v. Sandiganbayan (G.R. No. 124685)
Date: March 12, 2002
Ponente: Justice Puno
Facts:
This case revolves around the preventive suspension of Senator Miriam
Defensor-Santiago, who was facing criminal charges for alleged
violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (Republic Act No.
3019). The charges stemmed from her alleged approval of applications for
the legalization of certain aliens who had arrived in the Philippines
after January 1, 1984, which was purportedly in violation of Executive
Order No. 324.
The Sandiganbayan, a special anti-graft court in the Philippines,
ordered Senator Santiago's preventive suspension for 90 days while her
case was pending. Senator Santiago challenged this suspension order,
arguing that it was unlawful and unconstitutional.
Issue:
The primary issue in this case is whether the Sandiganbayan had the
authority to order the preventive suspension of Senator Miriam DefensorSantiago under Republic Act No. 3019 and whether such an order was
consistent with the Constitution.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court, in its decision, affirmed the authority of the
Sandiganbayan to issue the preventive suspension order. The Court cited
Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019, which provides for the suspension
of incumbent public officers who are facing criminal prosecutions under
the Act. The law mandates that such officers shall be suspended from
office pending the outcome of the criminal case.
The Court emphasized that the suspension under Republic Act No. 3019 is
not a penalty but a preliminary, preventive measure designed to ensure
that the accused public official does not use his or her position to
influence the proceedings or tamper with evidence. The suspension does
not presuppose guilt but is a precautionary measure during the pendency
of the case.
Furthermore, the Court clarified that the preventive suspension under
Republic Act No. 3019 is distinct from the power of Congress to
discipline its members under the Constitution. The suspension under
Republic Act No. 3019 is not imposed for misbehavior as a member of
Congress but as a result of the pending criminal charges.
In this case, the Court found that Senator Santiago's suspension order
was in accordance with the law and did not violate the Constitution. The
Court noted that the law does not require the guilt of the accused to be
established before trial on the merits but merely requires a
determination of the validity of the information filed against the
accused. Since the information against Senator Santiago was found to be
valid, her preventive suspension was deemed proper.
In conclusion, the Court upheld the authority of the Sandiganbayan to
order the preventive suspension of Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago
under Republic Act No. 3019, emphasizing that such suspension is a
preventive measure and not a penalty, and it is consistent with the
Constitution.
7. US. v. Pons, 34 PHIL. 729 (1916) [journal and records]
Facts:
In the case of United States vs. Juan Pons and others, the defendants
Gabino Beliso, Juan Pons, and Jacinto Lasarte were charged with the
illegal importation of opium. The charges stemmed from their alleged
conspiracy to knowingly and unlawfully bring 520 tins containing 125
kilograms of opium from Spain to the city of Manila, Philippine Islands,
aboard the steamer Lopez y Lopez. The value of the opium was stated to
be P62,400, Philippine currency. After importing the opium, the accused
individuals were accused of receiving and concealing the illegal drug,
aiding each other in its transportation, receipt, and concealment.
Beliso and Pons were tried separately and found guilty of the charges.
One of the key issues raised by the defendants was related to the date
of adjournment of the Philippine Legislature in 1914, as it was crucial
in determining the validity of the law under which Pons was charged (Act
No. 2381). The defendants argued that Act No. 2381 was passed on March 1,
1914, after the legislative session's supposed adjournment on February
28, 1914. To address this issue, the court considered whether it should
rely on the legislative journals as conclusive evidence of the
adjournment date or allow extraneous evidence to determine this date.
The legislative journals clearly indicated that the Philippine
Legislature adjourned at midnight on February 28, 1914. The court stated
that legislative records, when clear and explicit, should be considered
conclusive evidence of legislative actions. It emphasized that such
records are vital for public policy reasons, ensuring the authenticity
and permanence of laws, preventing reliance on uncertain oral evidence,
and protecting rights acquired based on legislative actions.
Additionally, the court presented evidence of the smuggling operation,
involving the importation of opium, its delivery to various locations,
and the subsequent discovery of opium tins at one of these locations.
The evidence included witness testimony, customs registry numbers, and
other incriminating facts. Juan Pons was arrested, and he initially
confessed to his participation in the smuggling operation.
Decision:
The court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, finding Juan Pons
guilty of the illegal importation of opium. It rejected the defendants'
arguments regarding the legislative adjournment date, emphasizing the
importance of relying on legislative journals as conclusive evidence and
rejecting attempts to alter the probative force of such records. The
court found the evidence against Juan Pons to be overwhelming and that
his involvement in the smuggling operation was proven beyond a
reasonable doubt.
Key Points:
1. The case involves charges of illegal opium importation against Gabino
Beliso, Juan Pons, and Jacinto Lasarte.
2. The defendants contested the date of legislative adjournment as it
related to the validity of the law under which Pons was charged.
3. The court emphasized the importance of legislative journals as
conclusive evidence of legislative actions and rejected attempts to rely
on extraneous evidence to alter these records.
4. The court found Juan Pons guilty based on strong evidence of his
involvement in the smuggling operation.
8. Casco Phil. Commercial Co. v. Gimenez, 7 SCRA 347 (1963) [journal and
records]
Facts:
Casco Philippine Chemical Co., Inc. (petitioner) sought a refund of
margin fees paid on foreign exchange transactions in accordance with
Republic Act No. 2609, also known as the Foreign Exchange Margin Fee Law.
Pursuant to this law, the Central Bank of the Philippines issued
Circular No. 95, which imposed a uniform margin fee of 25% on foreign
exchange transactions. The law provided exemptions, including one for
"urea formaldehyde for the manufacture of plywood and hardboard when
imported by and for the exclusive use of end-users."
Petitioner imported urea and formaldehyde as raw materials for
manufacturing synthetic resin glues, which were used in bonding lumber
and veneer by plywood and hardwood producers. Petitioner believed that
these imports were exempt from the margin fee based on Resolution No.
1529 of the Monetary Board, which declared that separate importations of
urea and formaldehyde were exempt.
Despite the issuance of margin fee vouchers for the refund of the fees
paid, the Auditor of the Central Bank and subsequently the Auditor
General refused to approve the vouchers, claiming that the exemption
granted by the Monetary Board was not in accordance with the provisions
of Republic Act No. 2609. Petitioner filed a petition for review to
challenge this decision.
Issue:
The main issue in this case is whether "urea formaldehyde" should be
construed as "urea and formaldehyde" in the context of the exemption
from margin fees under Republic Act No. 2609.
Decision:
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Auditor General and held
that "urea formaldehyde" should not be interpreted as "urea and
formaldehyde." The Court noted that "urea formaldehyde" is a finished
product distinct from urea and formaldehyde, which are the principal raw
materials used in its manufacture. The National Institute of Science and
Technology confirmed that "urea formaldehyde" is a synthetic resin
formed from specific proportions of urea and formaldehyde under certain
conditions.
The Court also rejected the petitioner's argument that individual
statements made by members of Congress during the bill's consideration
reflected the intent to exempt urea and formaldehyde separately. It held
that these statements did not necessarily represent the view of the
Senate or the House of Representatives. Furthermore, the enrolled bill,
which used the term "urea formaldehyde" instead of "urea and
formaldehyde," was conclusive evidence of the law's intent.
In conclusion, the Court upheld the denial of the refund claim,
emphasizing that any mistake in the bill's wording should be addressed
through legislative amendment rather than judicial intervention.
Key Points:
1. The case involved a dispute over the interpretation of an exemption
provision in Republic Act No. 2609 regarding margin fees on foreign
exchange transactions.
2. The petitioner sought a refund based on its belief that "urea
formaldehyde" should be interpreted as "urea and formaldehyde."
3. The Supreme Court affirmed the denial of the refund, holding that
"urea formaldehyde" referred to a finished product distinct from its raw
materials.
4. The Court emphasized the conclusive nature of the enrolled bill and
rejected arguments based on individual statements made during the bill's
consideration.
9. Astorga v. Villegas, 56 SCRA 714 (1974) [journal and records]
Facts:
1. On March 30, 1964, House Bill No. 9266, a local bill, was filed in
the House of Representatives.
2. The bill passed the House of Representatives without amendments on
April 21, 1964, and was sent to the Senate.
3. In the Senate, it was referred to the Committee on Provinces and
Municipal Governments and Cities, which recommended approval with a
minor amendment.
4. During the Senate's discussion of the bill on May 20, 1964,
substantial amendments were introduced by Senator Arturo Tolentino.
These amendments were approved.
5. The amendment recommended by Senator Gerardo Roxas did not appear in
the Senate journal as having been acted upon.
6. On May 21, 1964, the Secretary of the Senate sent a letter to the
House of Representatives, stating that House Bill No. 9266 had been
passed by the Senate "with amendments" and attached a certification of
the amendment recommended by Senator Roxas.
7. The House of Representatives approved the bill as returned by the
Senate, and it was signed by the President of the Philippines on June 18,
1964, becoming Republic Act No. 4065.
8. Senator Tolentino later claimed that the enrolled copy of the bill
signed by the President did not reflect the amendments he introduced and
approved in the Senate.
9. The Senate President invalidated his signature on the enrolled bill,
stating that it was not the bill approved by the Senate.
10. The President of the Philippines officially withdrew his signature
on the bill on July 31, 1964, stating that it would be against public
policy to enact a bill not actually approved by both Houses of Congress.
11. Respondent City Mayor of Manila, Antonio Villegas, issued circulars
to disregard the provisions of Republic Act 4065, causing a legal
dispute.
Issue:
The main issue is whether the enrolled bill, signed by the President,
should be considered the law or whether the journal entry of the Senate
should prevail in determining the bill's content and validity.
Decision:
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of considering the journal entry of the
Senate as the decisive factor in determining the bill's content and
validity. The Court held that the enrolled bill doctrine, which relies
on the respect due to coequal branches of government, should yield to
the specific facts of this case.
Key Points:
1. House Bill No. 9266 was passed by the House of Representatives and
then the Senate.
2. Substantial amendments introduced in the Senate were approved, but
the enrolled bill did not reflect these amendments.
3. Senator Tolentino claimed that the enrolled bill did not accurately
represent what was approved by the Senate.
4. The Senate President and the President of the Philippines both
withdrew their signatures from the enrolled bill.
5. The Court held that the enrolled bill doctrine, which typically
treats the signed enrolled bill as conclusive proof of a law's enactment,
did not apply in this case due to the factual discrepancy between the
enrolled bill and what was approved by the Senate.
6. The Court relied on the journal entry of the Senate, which showed
that substantial amendments were introduced and approved, and held that
the bill was not duly enacted and did not become law.
7. Republic Act No. 4065 was declared invalid, and the temporary
restraining order against its enforcement was made permanent.
Sec. 17. Senate and House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
1. **Creation of Electoral Tribunals**: The first part of Section 17
states that both the Senate and the House of Representatives shall each
have their own Electoral Tribunal. These tribunals are established to
handle and resolve disputes or contests related to the election, returns,
and qualifications of their respective members.
2. **Composition of Electoral Tribunals**:
- **Nine Members**: Each Electoral Tribunal is composed of a total of
nine members. This number is set by the Constitution and remains fixed.
- **Three Supreme Court Justices**: Three of the nine members of each
Electoral Tribunal are Justices of the Supreme Court. These Justices are
appointed to the tribunal by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. In
essence, this ensures that legal experts with experience in
constitutional and legal matters are part of the tribunal.
- **Six Members from the Senate or House**: The remaining six members
of each Electoral Tribunal are chosen from the Senate or the House of
Representatives, depending on whether it's the Senate or House Electoral
Tribunal. These members are selected based on proportional
representation from the political parties and parties or organizations
registered under the party-list system in their respective chambers.
This means that the composition of the Electoral Tribunal should reflect
the proportional representation of different political groups in the
Senate or House.
- **Chairmanship**: The senior Supreme Court Justice among the three
Justices appointed to the Electoral Tribunal assumes the position of
Chairman of the tribunal. This seniority-based arrangement helps in
maintaining order and leadership within the tribunal.
3. **Functions of the Electoral Tribunals**:
- The primary function of the Electoral Tribunals is to serve as the
sole judge in matters related to the election, returns, and
qualifications of the members of the Senate and the House of
Representatives.
- They have the authority to hear and decide on contests or disputes
that arise from these matters.
- Their decisions are final and binding within the scope of their
jurisdiction. This means that their rulings on election-related issues
cannot be appealed to other courts.
In summary, Section 17 of the Philippine Constitution establishes the
Electoral Tribunals for the Senate and the House of Representatives.
These tribunals are responsible for resolving disputes related to the
election, returns, and qualifications of their respective members. They
are composed of Supreme Court Justices and members of the Senate or the
House, selected based on proportional representation. The senior Supreme
Court Justice serves as the Chairman of the tribunal, and their
decisions are considered final in their jurisdiction. This setup is
designed to ensure impartiality and fairness in handling electionrelated disputes within the legislative branches of government.
1. Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 PHIL. 134 (1936) [nature and power]
**Case Title**: Jose A. Angara v. Electoral Commission
**Nature of the Case and Background**:
This case revolves around a constitutional dispute concerning the
jurisdiction of the Electoral Commission in the Philippines. In the
September 17, 1935 elections, Jose A. Angara and several other
candidates ran for the position of members of the National Assembly for
the first district of Tayabas. Angara was declared the winner by the
provincial board of canvassers and took his oath of office on November
15, 1935.
However, on December 8, 1935, Pedro Ynsua filed a "Motion of Protest"
before the Electoral Commission, contesting Angara's election and
seeking to either be declared elected or nullify the election results.
This motion was filed in line with Resolution No. 8 passed by the
National Assembly, which set the last date for filing election protests.
On December 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission adopted Resolution No. 6,
stating that the last day for filing protests was December 9. Angara
argued that the Constitution granted exclusive jurisdiction to the
Electoral Commission over matters related to contested elections for the
National Assembly and, therefore, the Supreme Court had no jurisdiction
over the case.
**Issues**:
1. Whether the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the Electoral
Commission and the subject matter of the controversy.
2. Whether the Electoral Commission has the authority to fix the
deadline for filing election protests.
**Ruling and Explanation**:
The Supreme Court ruled that it does have jurisdiction over the
Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the controversy. It
emphasized that although the Electoral Commission is an independent body
with its own functions, it is not beyond the reach of the constitutional
mechanism and is subject to constitutional restrictions.
The Court explained that the Electoral Commission is not a separate
department of the government but rather an entity created to assume the
powers previously exercised by the legislature in contested election
matters. The Constitution explicitly grants the Electoral Commission the
authority to be the "sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly."
The Court further stated that this grant of power to the Electoral
Commission implicitly restricts the legislative power of the National
Assembly in matters related to contested elections. Thus, any power
incidental to the Electoral Commission's exclusive authority to judge
election contests must also be recognized.
In this case, the Electoral Commission had legitimately exercised its
constitutional prerogative by setting the deadline for filing election
protests through Resolution No. 6. This action was taken while the
Electoral Commission was organizing itself, and it was well within its
jurisdiction to do so. The Court ruled that the National Assembly's
resolution confirming Angara's election could not affect the Electoral
Commission's authority to determine the filing deadline for election
protests.
In conclusion, the petition for a writ of prohibition against the
Electoral Commission was denied, with costs imposed on the petitioner.
This case highlights the principle of the supremacy of the Constitution
and the independence of constitutional bodies in the Philippines.
Pre-proclamation controversy v. election contests
The concepts of "pre-proclamation controversy" and "election contests"
are relevant to Article VI of the 1987 Constitution of the Philippines,
particularly in the context of the legislative department. Article VI
primarily deals with the composition, powers, and functions of the
Philippine Congress, which consists of the Senate and the House of
Representatives. These two types of legal disputes are related to the
legislative branch in the context of election processes and results:
1. **Pre-Proclamation Controversy**:
- **Definition**: A pre-proclamation controversy refers to a legal
dispute that arises before the official proclamation of winning
candidates in an election.
- **Article VI Relevance**: Article VI of the Constitution outlines
the process for conducting elections to select members of the
legislative branch. Pre-proclamation controversies are typically tied to
the election of members of the House of Representatives, who are elected
from various legislative districts in the Philippines.
- **Role of Congress**: In the case of pre-proclamation controversies,
the legislative branch, specifically the House of Representatives, may
become involved in resolving disputes related to the conduct of
elections or the eligibility of candidates from their respective
districts. Congress plays a role in deciding whether to recognize or
invalidate the proclamation of a winning candidate.
- **Resolution Process**: These controversies are often brought
before the House of Representatives through its respective Electoral
Tribunal. The Electoral Tribunal is responsible for deciding on
election-related issues, including disputes over the qualifications of
members and the results of the elections.
2. **Election Contests**:
- **Definition**: An election contest pertains to a legal challenge
filed after the proclamation of a winning candidate in an election,
typically by a losing candidate who believes irregularities or
violations of election laws occurred during the electoral process.
- **Article VI Relevance**: Article VI governs the composition and
functions of both houses of Congress—the House of Representatives and
the Senate. Election contests can apply to both legislative bodies, as
senators and representatives are elected by the Filipino people in
accordance with the Constitution.
- **Role of Congress**: When election contests arise for members of
the House of Representatives, the House has the authority to decide on
the outcome of these disputes, and it may unseat a member and declare a
different candidate as the rightful representative for a particular
district. Similarly, the Senate handles election contests involving
senators.
- **Resolution Process**: The process for resolving election contests
in Congress typically involves the respective Electoral Tribunals of the
House and the Senate. These tribunals are composed of members of the
legislative branch and are responsible for evaluating the merits of
election contest cases.
In summary, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution governs the legislative
department of the Philippine government and outlines the procedures for
conducting elections and resolving election-related disputes, including
both pre-proclamation controversies and election contests, which may
involve members of the House of Representatives and the Senate. The
legislative branch, through its Electoral Tribunals, plays a key role in
addressing these legal issues within the framework of the Constitution.
1. Vera v. Avelino, 77 PHIL. 192 (1946) [definition of election contest]
Facts:
- The case revolves around the aftermath of national elections in the
Philippines held in May. The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) submitted
a report stating that acts of terrorism and violence occurred in several
provinces, including Pampanga, Nueva Ecija, Bulacan, and Tarlac, which
affected the fairness of the elections in those regions.
- Petitioners, Jose O. Vera, Ramon Diokno, and Jose E. Romero, were
among the candidates for the Senate receiving the highest number of
votes and were proclaimed as winners by COMELEC. However, protests were
filed against their election based on the alleged irregularities.
- The President ordered the Secretary of the Interior to provide
protection due to the reported violence during the elections, implicitly
acknowledging its existence.
- Petitioners sought an order to annul a resolution preventing them from
being sworn in as senators and exercising their senatorial prerogatives.
Issues:
1. Whether the court has the authority to interfere with the internal
affairs of the Philippine Senate.
2. Whether the postponement of the administration of the oath to
petitioners amounted to a suspension from office.
Ruling:
- The court held that it cannot interfere with the internal affairs of
the Senate. The Constitution separates the powers of the government into
three distinct branches: the executive, legislative, and judicial. The
judiciary should not encroach on the authority of the legislative branch.
- The court cited the Alejandrino case, which established that it cannot
order a legislative body to reinstate a member. Such an action would
undermine the system of checks and balances in the government.
- The court emphasized that it is not the repository of remedies for
political or social issues and that the Constitution allocated powers to
the three branches of government.
- The court also noted that under the Constitution, the Electoral
Commission is the sole judge of election contests relating to the
National Assembly, and this power does not extend to contests within the
Senate itself.
- It clarified that the postponement of the administration of the oath
did not amount to suspension, and the Senate had the power to inquire
into the credentials of its members.
- Finally, the court maintained that the Senate's actions should not be
dictated by the judiciary, and the courts should not interfere with the
legislative branch's internal matters.
Definition of Election Contest:
An election contest, as discussed in this case, refers to a legal
dispute or challenge that arises after the proclamation of winning
candidates in an election. It involves questioning the validity of
election results, alleging irregularities, fraud, or violations of
election laws, and seeking remedies such as the nullification of
election results or a declaration of a different winner. Election
contests typically occur in the context of political elections and are
subject to specific legal procedures and remedies to resolve disputes
and ensure the integrity of the electoral process.
2. Abayon v. HRET, GR No. 189466 (2010) [jurisdiction over party-list]
Facts:
1. Daryl Grace J. Abayon was the first nominee of the Aangat Tayo partylist organization, which won a seat in the House of Representatives
during the 2007 elections. Respondents filed a petition for quo warranto
against Aangat Tayo and Abayon, alleging that Aangat Tayo was not
eligible for a party-list seat, and Abayon herself was not qualified as
a nominee.
2. Jovito S. Palparan, Jr. was the first nominee of the Bantay partylist group, also winning a seat in the 2007 elections. Respondents filed
a petition for quo warranto against Bantay and Palparan, claiming that
Palparan was ineligible as a nominee.
3. Abayon and Palparan argued that the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal (HRET) had no jurisdiction over their qualifications
as nominees, as the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) had already
confirmed their eligibility.
4. HRET dismissed the petitions as against the party-list organizations
but upheld its jurisdiction over the qualifications of Abayon and
Palparan.
Issue:
Whether the HRET has jurisdiction over the qualifications of party-list
nominees who have taken seats in the House of Representatives.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court upheld the jurisdiction of the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) over the qualifications of
party-list nominees who have taken seats in the House of Representatives.
The Court held that party-list nominees are considered "elected members"
of the House of Representatives, and their qualifications fall within
the jurisdiction of the HRET.
Key Points:
1. Party-list representatives are "elected members" of the House of
Representatives, as recognized by both the Constitution and the PartyList System Act.
2. The HRET is the sole judge of all contests relating to the
qualifications of members of the House of Representatives, including
party-list nominees.
3. Once a party-list nominee has been proclaimed and has assumed office
as a member of the House of Representatives, the COMELEC's jurisdiction
over election contests related to their qualifications ends, and the
HRET's jurisdiction begins.
4. The HRET's jurisdiction includes the authority to determine the
qualifications of party-list nominees, and it can hear and pass upon
their qualifications.
5. Challenges to the qualifications of party-list nominees that involve
alleged disqualifications should be resolved by the HRET, as it is the
appropriate body to determine the eligibility of elected members.
This ruling emphasizes the HRET's authority to adjudicate the
qualifications of party-list nominees who have assumed office in the
House of Representatives, affirming that they are subject to the same
standards and scrutiny as district representatives.
3. Abbas v. SET, 166SCRA 651 (1988) [judicial and legislative
composition]
Case Title: Agapito A. Aquino, et al. v. Senate Electoral Tribunal, et
al.
G.R. No. 94767
Date of Decision: February 17, 1992
Facts:
1. The petitioners filed an election contest (SET Case No. 002-87)
before the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) against 22 candidates of the
LABAN coalition who were proclaimed senators-elect in the May 11, 1987
congressional elections.
2. Subsequently, the petitioners, except Senator Joseph E. Estrada,
filed a Motion for Disqualification or Inhibition of the SenatorsMembers of the SET from hearing the case, alleging that the SenatorsMembers were interested parties as respondents in the contest.
3. Senator Juan Ponce Enrile, who was initially part of the SET,
voluntarily inhibited himself from participating in the hearings and
deliberations of the SET in both SET Case No. 002-87 and SET Case No.
001-87.
4. The petitioners argued that a proposed amendment to the SET's Rules
of Procedure could allow the contest to be decided by only three Members
of the Tribunal (Justices of the Supreme Court) in light of the
disqualification of the Senators-Members.
5. The SET dismissed the motion for disqualification, prompting the
petitioners to file a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether the Senators-Members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal should be
disqualified from hearing the election contest and whether the proposed
amendment to the SET's Rules of Procedure is valid.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that the Senators-Members of the Senate Electoral
Tribunal should not be disqualified from hearing the election contest,
and the proposed amendment to the SET's Rules of Procedure is not valid.
Key Points:
1. The composition of the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) is mandated by
the Constitution, which requires it to be composed of three Justices of
the Supreme Court and six Members of the Senate.
2. The Constitution clearly intends that both the "judicial" and
"legislative" components share the duty and authority of deciding all
contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of
Senators.
3. The proportion of Senators to Justices in the SET (6 Senators to 3
Justices) indicates that both components must participate in the
resolution of senatorial election contests.
4. While Members of the SET may voluntarily inhibit themselves if they
believe they cannot impartially participate, mass disqualification or
inhibition would render the SET unable to perform its duty as mandated
by the Constitution.
5. The proposed amendment to the SET's Rules of Procedure, which would
allow the contest to be decided by only three Justices in the event of
mass disqualification, is not in accordance with the Constitution's
intent and mandate.
In summary, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutional composition of
the SET and rejected the proposed amendment that would have allowed the
contest to proceed with only three Justices deciding it. The
participation of both judicial and legislative components is essential
to fulfill the constitutional duty of the SET in resolving election
contests for Senators.
Sec. 18. Commission on Appointments - Composition, nature, functions
1. Daza v. Singson, 180 SCRA 496 (1989) [political alignment]
2. Coseteng v. Mitra, 187 SCRA 377 (1990) [proportional representation]
3. Guingona v. Gonzales, 214 SCRA 789 (1992) and MR, 219 SCRA 326 (1993)
[undue reduction of representation of another party