RESEARCH SUMMARY
C O R P O R AT I O N
Alternative Futures Following a
Great Power War
Volume 1, Scenarios, Findings, and Recommendations
MIR ANDA PRIEBE, BRYAN FREDERICK, ANIK A BINNENDIJK, ALEX ANDR A T. EVANS, K ARL P. MUELLER, CORTEZ A.
COOPER III, JAMES BENKOWSKI, ASHA CL ARK, STEPHANIE ANNE PILLION
To access the full report, visit www.rand.org/t/RRA591-1
ISSUE
The U.S. Department of Defense has been increasingly focused on the possibility of a great power war. To inform
long-term thinking about such a war, we assess how the strategic environment could change after this type of
rare but consequential war.
APPROACH
We generated four hypothetical great power war scenarios and examined their postwar consequences. Because
the victor of a great power war is thought to have outsized influence on the postwar environment, we designed
scenarios with different winners. To generate plausible narratives that could lead to such outcomes and assess
other consequences of such a war, we drew from the literature on contemporary decisionmaking in key states;
the international relations literature on foreign policy decisionmaking, interstate war, and alliances; and
analogies from historical great power wars. We also examined the history of predictions prior to past great
power wars to identify common errors and to offer planners, decisionmakers, and analysts guidance on whether
any existing assumptions might merit additional consideration. This report considers the four hypothetical
great power war scenarios listed in the table. This report was finalized in January 2021, before the February 2022
Russian invasion of Ukraine. It has not been subsequently updated.
CONCLUSIONS
Although our hypothetical scenarios cannot be used to predict the most-likely postwar outcomes, they do
highlight the following plausible outcomes that U.S. decisionmakers and planners should consider:
• Wartime victory might not produce a favorable postwar setting. For example, victors will be weakened
relative to noncombatant states and could face stronger balancing coalitions.
• A U.S. victory could provoke deeper Sino-Russian military and economic cooperation—or even a mutual
defense pact.
• A great power war, even one with Russia, could sharpen the U.S. focus on the Indo-Pacific. Postwar resource
constraints would create incentives to prioritize China as the most significant potential threat to the United
States.
continued
• Although wars can strengthen bonds between allies, postwar alliance cohesion could suffer from wartime
disagreements and how allies respond to the changed strategic environment.
• Allied contributions to a U.S.-led war with Russia or China might vary across and even within scenarios,
suggesting the importance of plans that are robust to changes in access.
• U.S. allies and partners might face new incentives to proliferate after a great power war that degrades U.S.
power.
RECOMMENDATIONS
• Assess the potential postwar consequences of a war that goes according to planners’ assumptions (as well as
those that do not) to evaluate whether existing war plans are likely to support long-term U.S. interests.
• Consider setting a futures game in a period following a great power war to assess whether proposed
capabilities would be appropriate in an unfamiliar strategic context.
HYPOTHETICAL GREAT POWER WAR SCENARIOS EX AMINED IN THIS REPORT
Scenario
Victor
Role of Nuclear
Weapons
Length
Strategic Outcomes
China annexes Taiwan
China
8 months
Conflict ends with
China’s demonstration of
an NSNW
• China solidifies control of Taiwan.
• A U.S.-led multilateral counterbalancing
alliance forms.
• Japan, South Korea pursue nuclear
weapons.
The United States
degrades China’s
military power after an
East China Sea conflict
expands
United
States and
Japan
Possibility of nuclear
escalation affects
combatants’ targeting
6 months
• China commits to military rebuilding
program.
• Russia and China formalize a military
alliance.
• U.S. allies and partners continue to hedge.
A Taiwan conflict ends
indecisively
Indecisive
Possibility of nuclear
escalation affects
combatants’ targeting
4 months
• The possibility of renewed conflict drives a
regional arms race.
• U.S. troops remain on Taiwan.
• The PRC restarts conflict to take Taiwan
four years later.
War caused by Russian
misperception ends in
restrictions on military
forces in northeastern
Europe
Indecisive
Russian losses lead to
use of NSNWs and to
U.S. use of NSNWs in
response
3 months
• A NATO-Russia agreement limits foreign
forces in Baltic States, Poland, Belarus, and
Kaliningrad.
• Germany revokes U.S. basing access,
forcing a posture realignment.
• Poland initiates nuclear program and shifts
toward authoritarianism.
NOTES: NATO = North Atlantic Treaty Organization; NSNW = nonstrategic nuclear weapon; PRC = People’s Republic of China.
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research and development center for studies and analyses, supporting both the United States Air Force and the United States Space
Force. PAF provides DAF with independent analyses of policy alternatives affecting the development, employment, combat readiness,
and support of current and future air, space, and cyber forces. For more information, visit PAF’s website at www.rand.org/paf.