India & Artemis Accords
March 2023 Public Forum Topic
March 23: The Republic of India should sign the Artemis Accords.
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March 23: The Republic of India should sign the Artemis Accords.
Background
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March 23: The Republic of India should sign the Artemis Accords.
Glossary
1. 1967 Outer Space Treaty – the main body of international and multilateral law governing
Space, codified under the United Nations. 112 countries are parties to the treaty, including all
major spacefaring nations. It’s main purpose is to keep space peaceful and non-militarized.
2. 1968 Rescue Agreement – an international agreement stating that ratified states must make
efforts to rescue personnel of any spacecraft that lands in their territory, whether because of an
accident, distress, or emergency or accidental landing.
3. 1972 Space Liability Convention – an international agreement stating that member countries
are responsible for any spacecraft launched from their territory, and can be held responsible for
damages arising from them—for example, due to a satellite crashing in another nation.
4. 1974 Registration Convention – an international agreement stating that member states must
give the UN details about the orbit of any space object for tracking purposes.
5. 1979 Moon Agreement – an international agreement stating that control of all celestial bodies is
turned over to the UN for the ‘common heritage of mankind’– only 18 countries are party to the
treaty, including 0 nations that engage in human spaceflight.
6. Artemis Accords: The Artemis Accords are a set of international principles for responsible
behavior in outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies.
7. Artemis program: The Artemis program is a NASA plan to land the first woman and the next
man on the Moon by 2024 and establish a sustainable human presence there.
8. ASAT (Anti-Satellite Weapon): An ASAT is a weapon designed to disable or destroy satellites
in orbit.
9. Cislunar Space: Cislunar space refers to the region of space surrounding the Moon and
extending to the Earth-Moon Lagrange points.
10. ESA (European Space Agency): The ESA is a intergovernmental organization dedicated to the
exploration and study of space, with 22 member states from Europe.
11. ILRS (International Lunar Research Station): The ILRS is a proposed joint international
research station on the Moon that would serve as a platform for lunar exploration and scientific
discovery.
12. ISRO (Indian Space Research Organization): The ISRO is the national space agency of India,
responsible for the country's space program and aerospace research.
13. LEO (Low Earth Orbit): LEO refers to the region of space near the Earth, at an altitude of up
to 2,000 km.
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March 23: The Republic of India should sign the Artemis Accords.
14. The Moon Treaty: The Moon Treaty is a treaty under the jurisdiction of the United Nations that
sets forth principles for the exploration and use of the Moon and other celestial bodies.
15. Newspace: Newspace refers to a new era in the space industry characterized by private sector
companies and increased commercialization and privatization of space activities.
16. SDA (Space Domain Awareness): SDA refers to the capability to detect, track, and identify
objects and events in space, as well as to understand the implications of these activities for
national security.
17. UNOOSA (United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs): UNOOSA is a United Nations
office responsible for promoting international cooperation in the peaceful exploration and use of
outer space.
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March 23: The Republic of India should sign the Artemis Accords.
Accords Summary
Accords Summary: No fighting or littering.
The Hindu 20—[NASA’s new moonshot rules: No fighting or littering, p. (2020). NASA’s new moonshot rules: No fighting or littering, please .
Retrieved 5 February 2023, from https://www.thehindu.com/sci-tech/science/nasas-new-moonshot-rules-no-fighting-or-littering-please/article32849386.ece]
Debatetrack.
NASA’s new moonshot rules: No fighting and littering. And no trespassing at historic lunar landmarks like
Apollo 11’s Tranquility Base.
The space agency released a set of guidelines on October 13 for its Artemis moon-landing programme, based on
the 1967 Outer Space Treaty and other agreements. So far, eight countries have signed these so-called Artemis
Accords.
Founding members include the U.S., Australia, Canada, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, United Arab Emirates and the
United Kingdom. NASA Administrator Jim Bridenstine said he expects more countries to join the effort to put
astronauts back on the moon by 2024.
It promises to be the largest coalition for a human spaceflight programme in history, according to Mr. Bridenstine,
and is expected to pave the way for eventual Mars expeditions.
“It’s important not only to travel to the moon with our astronauts, but that we bring with us our values,” noted
NASA’s acting chief for international and interagency relations, Mike Gold.
Rule No. 1: Everyone must come in peace.
Other rules:
— Secrecy is banned, and all launched objects need to be identified and registered.
— All members agree to pitch in with astronaut emergencies.
— Space systems must be universal so everyone’s equipment is compatible, and scientific data must be
shared.
— Historic sites must be preserved, and any resulting space junk must be properly disposed.
— Rovers and other spacecraft cannot have their missions jeopardized by others getting too close.
Violators could be asked to leave, according to Mr. Bridenstine.
The coalition can say, Look, you’re in this programme with the rest of us, but you’re not playing by the same
rules, Mr. Bridenstine said.
The U.S. is the only country to put humans on the moon: 12 men from 1969 through 1972.
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March 23: The Republic of India should sign the Artemis Accords.
The Artemis Accords outline core tenants of space law, operational issues, and resource mining—
but only some of its text is controversial
Nelson 20—[The Artemis Accords and the Future of International Space Law | ASIL. (2023). Retrieved 4 February 2023, from
https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/24/issue/31/artemis-accords-and-future-international-space-law/] Debatetrack.
[Jack Wright Nelson is a Research Associate at the Faculty of Law of the National University of Singapore and a Member of the International Institute of
Space Law. The author is grateful to the Faculty's Centre for Banking & Finance Law for supporting his ongoing research.]
The Accords' ten operative paragraphs can be grouped into three categories. The first category reinforces
certain core tenets of international space law. In particular, the Accords emphasize that all space activities must
be for "peaceful purposes" and performed "in accordance with relevant international law." The Accords also
reaffirm and expand upon astronaut assistance obligations from the Rescue Agreement and registration
requirements from the Registration Convention.
The second category of operative paragraphs concerns specific operational issues. To this end, the Accords
promote transparency, interoperability, and the sharing of scientific data. On the pressing issue of space debris,
the Accords' signatories have committed to engage in mitigation planning.
The first and second categories are unlikely to be controversial: the first restates well-accepted law, while
the second codifies nascent best practice. But the third category of operative paragraphs aims to progress
international space law by promoting particular interpretations of the Outer Space Treaty concerning
lunar heritage protection, space resource extraction, and the "deconfliction"[12] of space activities. Further,
there are potential conflicts between the Accords and the most recent treaty to emerge from COPUOS—the Moon
Agreement.
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March 23: The Republic of India should sign the Artemis Accords.
Blocs
Astropolitical blocs are forming from extant terrestrial political blocs – India finds itself between the
major US-Artemis and Russia-China blocs, with a historic desire to remain neutral – however, this
neutrality will depend on its ability to nurture its domestic private space industry
Giri 21—[The Widening Panorama of India’s Space Diplomacy (2021). Retrieved 4 February 2023, from
http://nopr.niscpr.res.in/bitstream/123456789/59019/1/SD-5-7.pdf] Debatetrack.
[Dr. Chaitanya Giri is the former Gateway House Fellow of Space and Ocean Studies Programme. Prior to Gateway House, Dr. Giri has worked as planetary
and astromaterials scientist for nearly a decade. He was affiliated to the Earth-Life Science Institute at Tokyo Institute of Technology, the Geophysical
Laboratory at Carnegie Institution for Science, and the NASA Goddard Space Flight Center as an ELSI Origins Network Fellow.]
Space diplomacy is an acme of modern technology-profuse international relations. Nations use it as an ace
up the sleeve on bilateral and multilateral fronts. They closely guard their space capabilities and practitioners.
With the guards up, space diplomacy plays out when nations are willing to share some of their most protected
assets in order to enhance strategic interests or troubleshoot looming geopolitical tensions. With rapid
developments occurring in the global space domain, space diplomacy is about to grow in scope and
prominence. The growth calls India to make the much necessary multidimensional preparedness in times to
come.
More than twenty nations have established space agencies in the last twenty years, each with varying
capabilities and techno-economic goals. With more nations joining in, many assumed this would lead to the
democratization of outer space. However, increased access and international footprint in space are not
amounting to democratization, as anticipated. It instead is creating geopolitical bloc-equivalents in space
that can be called astropolitical blocs.
Space capabilities culminate from a national leadership’s ability to attain holistic - social, economic,
technological, and political - goals. These capabilities are usually an outcome of the national leadership’s ability
to invest in this resource-intensive long-gestation domain, regularly derive dividends from it while upkeeping a
conducive political, economic and social environment domestically and in its foreign affairs. Such variables are
challenging to manage. Whenever these variables have become too difficult to control, space programs have been
compromised. For this reason, nations that have diligently sustained their space programs, come what may
decade after decade, will continue to have the upper hand in space exploration over the new entrants.
United States, Russia, Europe (assuming the competence of the intergovernmental European Space Agency)
and China currently possess high-end capabilities from human spaceflight to planetary surface exploration
to space-based astronomy. Hence, they fit into the category of echelon-1 space-faring nations. China being
the recent entrant. The echelon-2 constitutes India, Japan, Germany and France. The new and expanding category
of echelon-3 constitutes United Arab Emirates, Canada, Nigeria, Australia, New Zealand, South Korea and Israel
among others. The echelon-1 countries also are members of the United Nations Security Council and are the most
impassioned nations globally. Therefore, each of them wants to accommodate a band of echelon-2 and
echelon-3 nations under their respective astropolitical blocs.
The most ostensible bloc currently in the works is the one signatory to the Artemis Accords. The signatories
of this US-led international cooperation agreement are aiming to return humans to the Moon by 2024 and make a
more significant footprint in deep space. The bloc now accommodates Canada, United Kingdom, Italy,
Luxembourg, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, South Korea as signatory parties.
These countries have fastened their return-on-investment from the Artemis goals, if not wholly, with each other.
For the first time, so many nations have joined hands for the enterprise of deep space exploration, not for
amorous aspirations but with an ambition for high-risk-high-reward business gains through collaborative
diplomatic spirit. Of course, with the US being at the helm of this international group’s affairs. Such
collaborative spirit and identification of shared interests are becoming the backbone of astropolitical blocs.
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March 23: The Republic of India should sign the Artemis Accords.
The coming together of so many economically advanced nations quickly activated a competitor for the
Artemis Accords. There is no exact counter to the Artemis Accords yet. Nonetheless, it has prompted Russia and
China to formulate their respective strategies, including a strategy that makes Moscow and Beijing collaborate to
build infrastructure on and around the Moon. The Sino-Russian International Lunar Research Station (ILRS)
could become a robotic and human habitat infrastructure network on the lunar surface and in lunar orbit.
Regardless of its nascent cooperation with Moscow, Beijing has realised a potential to the tune of 10 trillion USD
return on investments by 2050 from its ambitious Earth-Moon Special Economic Zone megaproject. Where
Artemis Accords has attracted substantial participation of economically and technologically well-equipped
nations, China is yet to gain such partnerships. However, that should not be considered a shortcoming for
Beijing.
Conversely, it may entice swathes of developing economies from the Global South. This astropolitical
duopoly is much larger in size, scope, and ambition than the one seen during the US and Soviet Union
Space Race. It will only deepen schisms between the three of the four echelon-1 nations. Europe will maintain a
delicate balance between Russia and China. So would India and France, who will refrain from associating with
any of the rapidly-forming astropolitical blocs.
Historically, India has been among the very few nations with the unique ability to engage in space
diplomacy with Europe, Russia, and the USA, all echelon-1 nations. However, there is trepidation in
making overtures to China. That space diplomatic radio silence will continue for the foreseeable future. The
radio silence is mainly due to Beijing’s inability to undertake confidence-building steps, its blow hot and cold
attitude towards bilateral diplomacy, and its quite vivid strategic encirclement of India through the use of proxies
through the Belt and Road Initiative. Such radio silence is not desirable as space diplomacy, regardless of
echelons, will not entirely depend on government-to-government track-1 interaction. Thus, the non-governmental
entities across all categorized echelons are becoming irreplaceable parties to space diplomacy. With ambitious
plans to raise connectivity between the Earth-Moon, and Moon-Mars systems are not devoid of large stakes by
non-government entities. The private space industry, especially those based out of echelon-1 and echelon-2
nations, is expected to do the heavy-lifting of production, operations, and services in the coming years. With
such responsibilities, the industry will be an essential constituent of track 2 business-to-business and track 1.5
business-to-government space diplomacy. The diplomatic heft of such companies will be directly proportional
to their market capitalization, their product’s quality, efficiency to deliver, liaisons with their national
governments, and international influence. Therefore, India needs to create innovation and manufacturing
ecosystems equally, with entities geared to take India’s space diplomatic cause.
Apart from private companies, the role of venture capital and other financing firms, especially those that fund
innovation and innovative manufacturing in the space and allied domains, should be taken as
a vital cog of futuristic space diplomacy. This consideration is important because, despite the growing
participation of the private sector, the space domain is of national strategic significance. It needs protection
from cross-border offensive and aggressive investors. The financial might of echelon-1 nations, combined with
their ability to curate top-notch space technologies, gives them the rare ability to invest in overseas innovation
companies and startups strategically. Although such foreign direct investments are desirable, they also need
to be vetted, monitored, and their ultimate beneficiaries tracked. India’s cause to endure its strategic
autonomy will only succeed if it enhances its space competencies, piggy-backing largely on domestic
investors.
Space diplomacy is no more a government-to-government interface. The entry of private sector and private
capital in a big way and the deployment of ample government resources for megaprojects on the Moon and
Mars are not eccentric endeavours. Market estimates suggest that a whopping revenue of 42 billion USD
could be made only from the few currently planned robotic missions to the Moon in the decade of 2020s.
This revenue will only increase with business germinating from the Artemis Accords and similar European,
Russian, and Chinese astropolitical blocs. The revenue-generation aspect of space exploration is a new
phenomenon. Once realized by all participating nations, space diplomacy will acquire never-before-seen
importance across echelons. This newfound significance calls for an entirely new paradigm of space diplomacy.
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March 23: The Republic of India should sign the Artemis Accords.
Space diplomacy in the coming years will be a quest where scientific strategy meets economic strategy. It
will be a play of both hard and soft power. With the culmination of these distant aspects and the immense
possibilities that space exploration brings to those with stakes, space diplomacy will be a contrivance of necessity
and not a choice. Those private entities pursuing this technically demanding tact must be identified and
groomed from the formal selection processes and unconventional revolving door lateral entry processes. They
must come from the sciences, engineering, commerce, arts, law, agriculture, philosophy, and numerous
other domains. The more diverse faculties populate space diplomacy, the greater the chances that it will
attain holistic objectives. India’s ability to uphold its strategic autonomy will depend on its ability to master
space diplomacy. It must begin to prepare for mastery.
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March 23: The Republic of India should sign the Artemis Accords.
ISRA
India’s Space Research Agency has made remarkable progress in space, especially considering its
shoestring budget
Shekhtman 16— [Shekhtman, L. (2016). How India is quietly becoming a space exploration power house. Retrieved 5 February 2023, from
https://www.csmonitor.com/Science/2016/0524/How-India-is-quietly-becoming-a-space-exploration-power-house] Debatetrack.
[Lonnie Shektman is a writer for the Christian Science Monitor]
India successfully launched a prototype space shuttle on May 23; a mini, unmanned space vehicle called the
Reusable Launch Vehicle-Technology Demonstrator. The shuttle traveled to an altitude of about 40 miles
above Earth's surface, short of the 62-mile barrier between Earth's atmosphere and outer space, before returning to
Earth and into the Bay of Bengal.
"In this flight, critical technologies such as autonomous navigation, guidance and control, reusable thermalprotection system, and re-entry mission management have been successfully validated," officials from the
country's space agency, the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO), reported in an announcement Monday.
The space vehicle launch officially entered the country into the global race to develop a low-cost, reusable
space shuttle, a feat considered critical to the feasibility of future space exploration. It also marks yet
another recent milestone of India's burgeoning space program, securing the south Asian country's spot
among the world's space exploration superpowers.
"They're not at the level of the Big 4, but they’re pretty darn good," Jonathan McDowell, an astronomer at
the Harvard-Smithsonian Center for Astrophysics, tells The Christian Science Monitor, referencing the
world's top four agencies for innovation in space-related technologies: United States, Russia, China, and Europe.
The US remains the only country to have sent humans beyond low-Earth orbit to the moon.
He places India in the second tier of space explorers, just behind Japan, a space innovation power and major
NASA partner on robotic Mars missions and running of the International Space Station, a science lab orbiting
Earth. All other countries are far behind, says Dr. McDowell. These leading space agencies have their own
rockets to launch space shuttles, build their own satellites, and are capable of interplanetary flight, he says.
"They have the ambitions and certainly the capability if they put in the money," says McDowell.
Despite ISRO's budget of about $1 billion – 5 percent of NASA's $17.6-billion annual budget – the thrifty
agency has unleashed a series of planetary accomplishments in recent years.
In September 2015, it became the first developing country to launch a space-exploration observatory, called
Astrosat. It is one-tenth the size of NASA's prodigious Hubble telescope. ISRO had already sent a probe to
explore the moon's surface from orbit in 2008, joining an elite club.
Perhaps most strikingly in recent history – and a feat that put India on the space map for casual space observers
– was its successful launch in September 2014 of an orbiter to Mars, called Mangalyaan, which is studying
the planet's atmosphere.
This made ISRO the fourth agency, after those of the United States, the Soviet Union and European, to reach the
Red Planet. And it spent only $75 million to do it, 11 percent of what NASA spent on a similar mission called
Maven, as The New York Times reported.
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March 23: The Republic of India should sign the Artemis Accords.
India continues to make strides in Space
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March 23: The Republic of India should sign the Artemis Accords.
Options
India has a number of options in regard to space & lunar agreements
Ramanathan et al. 20— [India and the Artemis Accords. (2021). Retrieved 3 February 2023, from
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/618a55c4cb03246776b68559/t/623060e18f0ff4552955f271/1647337698479/India-and-the-Artemis-Accords.pdf]
Debatetrack.
[Aditya is an Associate Fellow with the Takshashila Institution. A journalist by training, he has previously worked at Mint and as a freelancer. He has also
researched and written on colonial-era Indian military history.
Aditya Pareek was a Research Analyst with the Strategic Studies Programme at the Takshashila Institution from 2020 to 2022. He worked on issues relating
to space, nuclear and foreign policy with a specific interest in Russian affairs.
Nitansha Bansal was an intern with the Strategic Studies team from April to September 2021. Her research interests included Foreign Affairs, Cybersecurity,
Nuclear Studies and Space Technology.]
Despite this progress, technological and budget hurdles will keep India’s lunar programme modest unless it
collaborates with other spacefaring states. India will also have to come to terms with the prospect of the moon
becoming a significant locus of activity, thus requiring some widely accepted norms and rules.
India’s options can be broadly placed in three categories:
1. Joining the Artemis programme and signing the Artemis Accords.
2. Joining the ILRS and signing the associated document.
3. Joining neither programmes, pursue a new framework via the UN
In theory, neither of these options may be mutually exclusive, which means India can pursue one or more
at the same time. Therefore, India could join both the rival programmes and could potentially pursue a UN
framework simultaneously. It could also choose to join either one programme and exercise the option of pursuing
a UN framework. The Venn diagram below illustrates these choices. It is increasingly clear that China and
Russia are growing sceptical about the utility of cooperation with the US in both space governance and
space exploration.
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March 23: The Republic of India should sign the Artemis Accords.
Permanent Settlement
The Artemis program plans to establish a permanent base on the Moon as a launching pad for
crewed missions to Mars and beyond
Pillai 22—[To the Moon and Beyond - Open The Magazine. (2022). Retrieved 5 February 2023, from https://openthemagazine.com/feature/to-themoon-and-beyond/] Debatetrack
[Madhavankutty Pillai is an author at Open Magazine. He “has no specialisations whatsoever. He is among the last of the generalists”. And also Open chief
of bureau, Mumbai]
The present spacecraft has no passengers but by 2025, the third Artemis spacecraft plans to land humans on
the moon. That itself will be a milestone because the last person to step foot there was half-a-century ago.
The US then realised that the resources being taken over in its competition with the Soviet Union, the incentive
for the moon landings, was too high. The money just flowed in one direction without coming back.
Technology is now making it possible to see space as not just exploration but commerce and the promise of
vast profits on the distant horizon. For an instance of how the world has changed, a decade ago, a nongovernmental organisation called Mars One had the plan to get human beings on a one-way journey to Mars and
colonise it. They would finance it by making a longlist of potential volunteer space travellers and then have a
reality show to decide on the finalists. The proceeds from that show would fund the project. It didn’t work out and
Mars One went bankrupt, but it still is an indication of how sources of funds never available before were now
there to be tapped. There are also private ventures, like Elon Musk’s SpaceX, which has an endpoint in Mars
colonisation, and on the way, they are becoming a profitable private company by providing other services
related to space.
The one with the deepest pocket still remains the US government. Their first manned moon missions were
just flaunting superpower status. Now, they are also looking at space as resource material, starting with the
moon. As NASA says on its website about the Artemis launch: “With Artemis missions, NASA will land the first
woman and first person of color on the Moon, using innovative technologies to explore more of the lunar surface
than ever before. We will collaborate with our commercial and international partners to establish the first longterm human-robotic presence on and around the Moon. Then, we will use what we learn on and at the Moon to
take the next giant leap: sending the first astronauts to Mars.”
“Demonstrate new technologies, capabilities, and business approaches needed for future exploration including
Mars…Establish American leadership and a strategic presence on the Moon while expanding our US global
economic impact…Broaden our commercial and international partnerships.”
What makes Artemis truly historical is that they plan to stay on the moon. Just like the International Space
Station is a permanent outpost of humanity, the moon will be a base and it’s not too far away. Speaking to
BBC, Howard Hu, the programme manager for Orion, prophesied that this could be by 2030. The BBC website
said: “Once the safety of Artemis’ components and systems has been tested and proven, Mr Hu said the plan
was to have humans living on the Moon ‘in this decade’.” But there was even more. “A large part of the
reason for going back to the Moon is to discover whether there is water at the satellite’s south pole, he
added, because that could be converted to provide fuel for craft going deeper into space—to Mars, for
example. ‘We’re going to be sending people down to the surface and they’re going to be living on that
surface and doing science,’ Mr Hu said.” The presence of water on the moon is crucial to this ambition and India
itself made an important contribution when Chandrayaan confirmed that it indeed did exist. Water makes a
permanent settlement viable because it is the single most important necessity for the human body. It can
also become a fuel source and be used to make the environment habitable.
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March 23: The Republic of India should sign the Artemis Accords.
Politics
Countries will join Artemis or the ILRS based on their political leanings, rather than the merits of
each proposal
Rajagopalan 21—[Diplomat, T. (2023). The Artemis Accords and Global Lunar Governance . Retrieved 3 February 2023, from
https://thediplomat.com/2021/06/the-artemis-accords-and-global-lunar-governance/] Debatetrack.
[Dr. Rajeswari (Raji) Pillai Rajagopalan is the Director of the Centre for Security, Strategy & Technology (CSST) at the Observer Research Foundation,
New Delhi.]
The reason is that breaking the current deadlock in multilateral negotiations and developing appropriate multilateral
mechanisms for outer space is not going to be easy. As noted, the Artemis Accords are not the only initiative that has
been proposed. There are also some proposals made by China and Russia to build an International Lunar Research
Station (ILRS), and the two countries are currently seeking countries and international organizations to join their
endeavor. This was reportedly announced on the sidelines of the 58th session of the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee
of the United Nations’ Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) in April. China National Space
Administration (CNSA) and Russia’s Roscosmos have invited partners to join them at all stages of this proposal including
planning, design, research, development, implementation, and operations. China and Russia entered into this partnership in
March this year. It remains to be seen what kind of support Russia and China will get, but it is quite evident that even with
regard to lunar activities and governance proposals, the global community is going to be divided. Unfortunately, it is
reasonable to expect that countries will support the Artemis Accords or the ILRS based on their political leanings far
more than the merits of each proposal.
With the ILRS proposal by China and Russia, the choice for countries like India could become somewhat
complicated. Russia might want India to join, but on the other hand, growing animosity between India and China is
not only likely to prevent any meaningful collaboration between the two countries in outer space but also make India
wary of the Chinese and Russian proposal.
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March 23: The Republic of India should sign the Artemis Accords.
Signatories
23 countries have signed the Artemis Accords
Wikipedia – https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Artemis_Accords – Accessed February 2 2022
Australia, Bahrain, Brazil, Canada, Colombia, France, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Mexico, New
Zealand, Nigeria, Poland, South Korea, Romania, Rwanda, Singapore, Saudi Arabia, Ukraine, United Arab
Emirates, United Kingdom, United States
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March 23: The Republic of India should sign the Artemis Accords.
Pro
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March 23: The Republic of India should sign the Artemis Accords.
Uniqueness: Artemis needs India
India signing the Artemis Accords would add legitimacy and a needed connection with Russia and
China
Smith 21—[Using the Artemis Accords to Build Customary International Law: A Vision for a U.S.-Centric Good Governance Regime in Outer Space
(2021). Journal of Air Law and Commerce. Retrieved 3 February 2023, from https://scholar.smu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4189&context=jalc]
Debatetrack.
[Walker A Smith is an attorney who earned his JD at SMU Dedman School of Law]
Finally, the U.S. will need to build as broad and diverse a coalition under the Accords as possible to use
the Accords to build customary international law. Immediate targets for the U.S. should be the European
Space Agency (ESA) and the Indian Space Research Organisation. The European Space Agency is a
natural partner for the U.S., and indeed many ESA member states are already party to the Accords.
Unsurprisingly, the ESA has not yet signed on to the Accords, as “[t]he ambitious US deadline for the
project will clash with the lengthy consultation of the 17 member states required for the ESA to sign on
as a whole.”Getting the ESA on board will certainly go a long way to bolstering the legitimacy and force
of the Accords. Similarly, India would be an excellent partner for the U.S. in the Accords. As the
world’s largest democracy with a relatively established space program, India would add a
different layer of legitimacy to the Accords that bringing other European nations on board would
not. India’s warmer relationships with Russia and China would also benefit the U.S. From a
diversity perspective, the U.S. needs to continue courting South American nations. Securing a
partnership with an African nation would also round out the Accords and add further legitimacy to the
U.S.’s efforts.
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March 23: The Republic of India should sign the Artemis Accords.
Uniqueness: India needs Artemis
India should be an early member of the Artemis Accords
Mohandas 21 –[ Mohandas, P. (2021). Should India Sign the Artemis Accords? – The Wire Science. Retrieved 3 February 2023, from
https://science.thewire.in/aerospace/should-india-sign-the-artemis-accords/] Debatetrack.
[Pradeep Mohandas is an adjunct research analyst at the Takshashila Institution, Bengaluru.]
India is sharpening the Indian Space Research Organisation’s focus on R&D and advanced missions. Given
this, it’s essential that India be an early participant in the Artemis Accords, so that it can gain lessons and
expertise from other countries that are members of the accords. This could be things like robotics from
Canada, sample return and avionics from Japan, and ground station and deep space network expertise
from the US and Australia.
The accords form a natural extension of the Quad’s Critical and Emerging Technologies Working Group.
The US, Japan and Australia are already signatories of the accords. India’s addition to the accords would
provide a framework for space cooperation among these Quad countries, and could also be extended to
other critical and emerging technologies. India has a lot to offer and a lot to gain from strengthening this
connection. Signing the accords would make it easier to collaborate with other signatories.
19
March 23: The Republic of India should sign the Artemis Accords.
International Law
The Artemis Accords provide a needed set of guidelines for space law, leading to greater
transparency, accountability, safety and stability in outer space
Smith 21—[Using the Artemis Accords to Build Customary International Law: A Vision for a U.S.-Centric Good Governance Regime in Outer Space
(2021). Journal of Air Law and Commerce. Retrieved 3 February 2023, from https://scholar.smu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4189&context=jalc]
Debatetrack.
[Walker A Smith is an attorney who earned his JD at SMU Dedman School of Law]
By cloaking the Accords with the authority and legitimacy of the Outer Space Treaty, the U.S. seeks to use
the Accords to build customary international law, which would bind not only parties to the Accords but
also non-parties in their use and exploration of outer space. The U.S. has this unique opportunity because
(1) the Outer Space Treaty speaks only to general principles and is thus ripe for elaboration and
operationalization, and (2) the U.S. is the first-mover in this space, launching the first mission to return
humans to the Moon since 1972. The U.S. must capitalize on the opportunity to build a new legal regime
and system of good governance in outer space, specifically working to build recognition and consensus
around disclosure of scientific data, space resource extraction, and deconfliction of activities.
Custom plays an important role in the international legal system. Indeed, Article 38 of the Statute of the
International Court of Justice formally recognizes custom as a source of international law, including
“international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law” among its list of the sources of
international law. Customary international law “describes the body of rules that nations in the international
community ‘universally abide by, or accede to, out of a sense of legal obligation and mutual concern.’”
Customary international law consists of two components:
First, there must be a general and consistent practice of states. This does not mean that the practice must
be universally followed; rather it should reflect wide acceptance among the states particularly involved in
the relevant activity. Second, there must be a sense of legal obligation, or opinio juris sive necessitatis. In
other words, a practice that is generally followed but which states feel legally free to disregard does not
contribute to customary law; rather, there must be a sense of legal obligation. States must follow the
practice because they believe it is required by international law, not merely because that they think it is a
good idea, or politically useful, or otherwise desirable.
Thus, the two elements necessary to create customary international law are state practice and opinio juris. State
practice is developed by “the states particularly involved in the relevant activity” acting in a certain way
over some time, establishing a normal course of conduct. That element will undoubtedly be met through the
Accords—the U.S. and its partners will develop state practice around the Accords by acting underneath and
consistent with the obligations of the Accords when conducting their activities in outer space. The broader, more
extensive, and more diverse a coalition the U.S. can assemble under the Accords, the stronger the state practice
element becomes.
The concept of opinio juris is a bit more elusive, but it is essentially “the conviction of states that a
particular practice is obligatory or accepted as law.” The U.S. approach of continually discussing the Accords
as an outgrowth or extension of the Outer Space Treaty becomes relevant here for purposes of international law.
The U.S. could have pursued the Accords separate and independent from any of the five U.N. treaties on outer
space. It could have emphasized that the Accords were simply agreements between the U.S. and its partners
working on the Artemis Program—nothing more, nothing less. While this would contribute to state practice, it
would not trigger any opinio juris. States would be acting in a given way because the Accords demanded it, not
because they thought they had to act that way consistent with their obligations under international law. However,
the United States’ repeated overtures to the Outer Space Treaty in the Accords provide the missing link
that helps create opinio juris around the Accords. Now, partners in the Artemis Program will be acting in a
certain way not only because the Accords require them to but also out of a sense that the Outer Space
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March 23: The Republic of India should sign the Artemis Accords.
Treaty also requires them to act that way. For example, states will respect and honor safety zones because they
believe that is the only way to be consistent with their obligations under Article IX of the Outer Space Treaty to
use due regard and avoid harmful interference. It is in this way that the U.S. will be able to use the Accords to
begin building a U.S.-centric regime of laws and good governance in outer space through customary international
law.
One area where the U.S. should seek to use the Accords to establish legally binding customs is scientific
data disclosure. While the Outer Space Treaty does not explicitly mention this, NASA has emphasized that it is
“very much in the spirit of the treaty.” Disclosure of scientific data is something that NASA has always done,
and incentivizing countries—including China and Russia—to disclose scientific data related to their
activities in outer space would not only spur innovation and promote the sharing of ideas, but it would also
lead to more transparency, accountability, safety, and stability in outer space. These are values that the
U.S. should seek to promote. However, because the Outer Space Treaty is silent on this principle, the U.S. and
its partners will have to argue that the penumbra requires disclosure of scientific data of the Outer Space Treaty. It
remains to be seen how effective this will be in establishing opinio juris. Still, extensive state practice
surrounding scientific data disclosure will lay the foundation for that principle to become legally binding. It
can generate enormous peer pressure to coerce states into compliance.
Another area where the U.S. should seek to build customary international law is resource extraction. As
discussed in the previous Section, the jury is still out internationally on whether the Outer Space Treaty permits
the extraction and use of space resources.The U.S. is not waiting for an international consensus to form but rather
is forming that consensus itself. On the one hand, this reflects a sort of common-sense realization that to
establish a sustainable long-term presence on the Moon, astronauts will need to live off the land. The south
pole of the Moon contains vast quantities of water ice that will need to be harvested and utilized to sustain human
operations. It was not that long ago that scientists thought the Moon was bone-dry; there are undoubtedly many
more mysteries that the Moon will reveal as we begin to explore it more thoroughly, and we must be able to take
advantage of those potential opportunities.
The U.S. push for resource extraction in outer space also reflects that the United States’ domestic private space
industry is by far the most dominant on Earth. Jeff Bezos and Elon Musk are just two names pouring billions of
dollars into private space exploration.Space resource extraction must be accepted under international space
law and must take place under a stable and conducive legal regime to ultimately monetize and realize the
full potential of this industry. The U.S. has every incentive to use the Accords to begin crafting that regime,
being careful and intentional about portraying the source of that regime as the Outer Space Treaty and not the
Accords themselves. Even without identifying a positive source for the regime in the Outer Space Treaty, this can
be accomplished by simply reinforcing that the U.S.-crafted regime respects the Outer Space Treaty and does not
run afoul of any of its provisions. The U.S. would prefer to avoid negotiations about this issue with China or
Russia, who will undoubtedly be looking for ways to hamstring the U.S. domestic space industry. Thus,
forging ahead with the Artemis Program and the Accords allows the U.S. to build accepted practice around
space resource extraction and then leverage that emerging custom if and when the time comes to have these
conversations in a multilateral forum.
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March 23: The Republic of India should sign the Artemis Accords.
Interoperability
The Artemis Accords encourages standards for interoperability amongst its signatories—lowering
costs, increasing mission sustainability, and encourage developing countries to participate in outer
space missions, thereby reducing discrimination against poorer countries
Salmeri 22—[One Size fits them All: Interoperability, the Artemis Accords and the Future of Space Exploration (2023). Retrieved 4 February 2023,
from https://orbilu.uni.lu/bitstream/10993/45184/1/A.%20Salmeri%2c%20Spacewatch%20Global.pdf]. Debatetrack
[Antonino Salmeri is a doctoral researcher in Space Law at the University of Luxembourg, where he is pursuing a PhD on enforcement challenges of space
mining regulations under the supervision of Prof. Mahulena Hofmann and the support of the Luxembourg National Research Fund (FNR)
(PRIDE17/12251371). Within the space community, Mr. Salmeri is Lead of both the E.A.G.L.E. Action Team on Lunar Governance and the Space
Exploration Project Group for Space Generation Advisory Council, SSP19 graduate of the International Space University and member of the International
Institute of Space Law]
Simply put, interoperability is the “ability of a system to work with or use the parts or equipment of another
system”6 and is a relatively new concept for the space industry. Until the development and operation of the
International Space Station (ISS), there was no need to include interoperability within space systems,
simply because almost all of them were not meant to function for third parties. However, both the modular
structure of the ISS and the need to work with a pool of diverse international astronauts and experiments soon
revealed the fundamental importance of interoperability for the future of space exploration. Power systems,
communication devices, robotics and docking are just some of the fields in which the ISS partners have started to
develop interoperable standards, with the goal of facilitating daily operations on the station.7 Unfortunately,
despite the positive efforts carried out by the ISS partners, the fact remains that the station was not
designed to be fully interoperable. As a consequence, there will always be an inherent limit to the degree of
interoperability that can be achieved on board the station.
Learning from the ISS experience, Section 5 of the Accords recognizes that “the development of
interoperable and common exploration infrastructure and standards [...] will enhance space-based
exploration, scientific discovery and commercial utilization”.8 Therefore, the Accords commit the
Signatories “to use reasonable efforts to utilize current interoperability standards for space-based
infrastructure, to establish such standards when current standards do not exist or are inadequate, and to
follow such standards”. 9 Looking at its wording, object and purpose, Section 5 has the potential to start a
Copernican revolution in space exploration. The use of the expression “interoperable and common
exploration infrastructure and standards” seems to imply the possibility of developing and using
internationally shared facilities for joint exploration activities. Following this logic, instead of establishing
multiple lunar bases each with its own fundamental systems and infrastructures (landing, power,
communication, and so on), the Artemis Partners would integrate their different contributions to the
program for the incremental development of a shared outpost. In turn, this would significantly reduce the
costs of the Artemis program by avoiding unnecessary duplications of efforts and further minimizing the
risk of harmful interference among the Partners’ activities.
Besides its effects on the Artemis Program, the concept of interoperability promoted in Section 5 of the
Accords can also play an important role fr the general long-term sustainability of space activities, should
the international community decide to leverage it.10 In this respect, it should be noted that the development
and use of interoperable and common exploration infrastructure goes hand in hand with the UN Guidelines
for the Long-Term Sustainability of Outer Space Activities.11 This practice would in fact directly implement
Guidelines C.1 and D.1.3, respectively calling for the “exchange of equipment for space activities” and “the
development of technologies maximizing the reusability or repurposing of space assets”. Further, a shared lunar
outpost welcoming contributions from international partners would “encourage the participation of
developing countries” and “avoid unnecessary duplication of function and efforts”, implementing Guidelines
D1.5 and C.3.3 and significantly contributing to the sustainable development of the Moon. Looking at these
Guidelines, it seems clear that the idea behind Section 5 of the Accords is much broader than the Artemis
Program, and that its importance goes beyond the political commitment of the Artemis Signatories. Regardless the
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March 23: The Republic of India should sign the Artemis Accords.
debate on the Accords, there can be no sustainability if lunar exploration is conducted in silos. Thus, all space
actors should prioritize interoperability as a key component of their lunar missions.
On top of promoting sustainability, the development and use of common lunar infrastructure would also
significantly reduce entry barriers for emerging space players, consequently fostering the
exploration and use of the Moon as “the province of all humankind”.12 In this respect, Section 5 of the
Accords seems to be quite aligned with the European Space Agency (ESA)’s vision of a Moon Village13 as “an
environment where both international cooperation and the commercialization of space can thrive”. 14 The
development and use of common infrastructure would translate this ambitious vision in reality and reinforce the
traditional synergy between US and European approaches to space exploration, as showed by the recent
agreement on the Lunar Gateway.15
Looking at Section 5 of the Accords from the viewpoint of international space law, the development of
interoperable and common exploration infrastructure and standards seems to be very much aligned also
with many fundamental principles of the OST. 16 To begin with Article I OST, one may argue that
interoperability in itself is in the interest and for the benefit of all Countries, given that in principle every
actor could benefit from its implementation. Likewise, because interoperability fosters contributions from
international players at all levels of financial and technological development, this practice would slightly
reduce discrimination and promote substantive equality in space activities. On the same line of reasoning,
international cooperation for the development and use of a shared lunar outpost would prevent the
national appropriation of celestial bodies and guarantee their exploration and use for exclusively peaceful
purposes, in compliance with Articles II, III and IV OST. Last but not least, interoperability as enshrined in
Section 5 of the Accords seems to offer a pragmatic solution for the operationalization of Article IX OST. The
development of shared standards and common infrastructure would in fact inherently pay due regard to the
corresponding interests of all States, enabling their active participation in space exploration. Likewise, this
practice could significantly minimize the risk of harmful interference by addressing the issue at the root, within
the design of space systems.
23
March 23: The Republic of India should sign the Artemis Accords.
Quad
The Quad needs a binding space agreement—not loose collection of bilateral agreements—the
Artemis Accords are a great starting point to help secure peace & security in space
Silverstein 22—[Silverstein, B. (2023). The Quad Needs More Than Bilateral Agreements to Achieve Its Space Goals. Retrieved 4 February 2023,
from https://carnegieendowment.org/2022/05/20/quad-needs-more-than-bilateral-agreements-to-achieve-its-space-goals-pub-87145]. Debatetrack
[Benjamin Silverstein is a research analyst for the Space Project at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.]
Last year, the Quad—consisting of the United States, Japan, India, and Australia—committed to convene a
working group on space issues to foster efficient satellite data exchanges and manage space-related risks.
The working group was also charged to “consult on norms, guidelines, principles, and rules for ensuring the longterm sustainability of the outer space environment.” Bilateral agreements between Quad members
demonstrate that they are beginning to live up to their pledge, but the Quad must do more to achieve its
lofty goals. These partnerships build trust and confidence among participants but do not go far enough in
characterizing principles or demonstrating norms that safeguard the long-term sustainability of space.
Use the interactive dial below to explore recent space-related bilateral agreements among the Quad. Click on two
Quad members to display their notable agreements and joint activities. Broad themes of the partnerships are
indicated by the highlighted icons. Deselect a member by clicking on the country name.
A harmonized set of behaviors demonstrated by all Quad members would set a more powerful example
than a collection of loosely related bilateral commitments. The Quad need not reinvent the wheel in this
endeavor: the U.S.-developed Artemis Accords can serve as a readymade starting point. A collection of
principles based on the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, the accords outline behaviors that support peaceful, transparent,
and cooperative space activities. While the United States, Japan, and Australia are Artemis partners, it does
not appear that India is ripe to sign. India has ambitions to accomplish its own lunar missions and may not
want to be beholden to another state’s rules on these activities. To reach consensus, the Quad working group must
pare back some Artemis principles to reconcile the proposal with India’s aspirations.
Several of the principles are readily adoptable, including those on transparency and emergency assistance.
Additional concrete commitments might include an intra-Quad process to establish rules of the road to guide
satellite operators conducting collision avoidance maneuvers. Additionally, members should agree to a stringent
schedule for safely disposing spacecraft used in joint Quad missions. All members possess the technical means to
carry out these activities, and adherence would demonstrate commitments to sustainable uses of space.
The Artemis Accords represent more than just a lunar goal—the fundamental mission of the partnerships
is to reduce the chance that space activities incite conflict. This goal is congruent with the Quad’s space
priorities. Stepping back from long-term lunar goals can preempt objections within the Quad and help the
group ensure the long-term sustainability of space. Separating the general principles from those inextricably
linked to NASA’s lunar plans might facilitate agreement among the Quad, unencumbered by excess lunar
baggage. Coalescing around a handful of progressive behavioral expectations is the strongest way to advance the
Quad’s immediate space interests.
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March 23: The Republic of India should sign the Artemis Accords.
India needs partners in Space: it should join fellow Quad members through the Artemis Accords
Bhandari 21—[Bhandari, K. (2021). India, the Quad, and the Future of Outer Space. Retrieved 4 February 2023, from
https://carnegieindia.org/2021/10/21/india-quad-and-future-of-outer-space-pub-85610]. Debatetrack
[Konark Khandari is a lawyer who has researched on certain areas in the digital economy, focusing primarily on approaches to antitrust regulation of
companies in the digital realm. He had earlier worked at India’s antitrust regulator – the Competition Commission of India (CCI), where he worked closely
with senior officials on a variety of matters. He is also an avid follower of the regulation of space technology ecosystem and is keen to contribute to that
discipline. ]
A closer look at the Quad joint statement, however, suggests that the term “sustainable use of outer space” may
have wider connotations. Indeed, the United Nations secretary general’s recent report on “reducing space
threats through norms, rules and principles of responsible behaviors” states that sustainable use of space is
promoted through “responsible actions and activities.” The report lists one example of responsible behavior as
“continuing efforts to develop mutual confidence-building measures, including on norms and guidelines for the . . .
exploitation of resources.” It goes on to say that while legally binding instruments may take time, confidence-building
measures should be encouraged in the interim as the two are not mutually exclusive.
In light of the UN’s statement, the Artemis Accords—the U.S.-led effort to return a human to the moon by
2024—take on more significance. The accords are viewed in some quarters as contentious since they provide that
“extraction of space resources does not inherently constitute national appropriation” under the Outer Space Treaty (OST)—a
treaty that is widely considered to be part of customary international law. For those concerned that this may impact what is
understood as national appropriation, it is worth considering that the United States has an incentive not to do so: under Article
VI of the OST, a country is responsible for any violations by its nationals.
So far, twelve countries have already signed on to the Artemis Accords, which were introduced only in October
2020. All Quad members are signatories, save for India. But India has similarly interpreted the OST by
committing to maintain outer space as the “common heritage of mankind”—a phrase widely associated with
the principle that all countries should collectively benefit from any exploitation of space.
However, this principle, when articulated at the time, arguably neglected the possibility that private
commercial players would eventually become major actors in outer space as well. The OST was adopted during
the Cold War–era space race between the United States and Soviet Union, among fears that one of them could assert
sovereignty over celestial bodies such as the moon. Hence, the prohibition on national appropriation was an important
inclusion.
But outer space is no longer the sole preserve of government space agencies. The current prevalence of private commercial
players was inconsiderable at the time the OST was signed. But today, it is evident that private enterprise involvement in
space is here to stay. There are too many advantages to space-based technologies, including GPS, weather monitoring, and
the mapping of crop patterns.
While orbital spaces are finite, the number of players venturing into commercial space activities is not. What is now needed is
a road map for the possible exploitation of outer space resources. Without clear guidance, regulatory arbitrage in the form of
ad hoc processes adopted by each country may lead to more orbital congestion and, consequently, more debris in outer space.
Considering the Quad’s commitment to a larger international rules-based order, the time may be ripe to have a discussion on
the need for such a framework. India would do well to participate in forging a consensus.
India needs partners in this domain. Considering the long-term gestation period of most space-related
projects, India would do well to partner with reliable spacefaring countries that have a dependable track
record cultivating strong private players in space. The Artemis Accords would be a good starting point,
considering the large number of signatories with capabilities in the space economy.
Every U.S. administration since former president Dwight Eisenhower has issued a national space policy. Perhaps
it is time for India to do the same. To begin articulating a coherent space policy that encourages a role for private
actors, India’s participation in multilateral mechanisms like the Quad—or the rapidly growing ranks of the
Artemis Accords—may just be the right format. The Quad’s joint statement is a great start, and India’s
possible assent to the Artemis Accords should be closely watched.
25
March 23: The Republic of India should sign the Artemis Accords.
Safety
Treaties like the Artemis Accords are necessary for cis-lunar safety, an increasingly-important by
inherently-dangerous region of space
Chow 23—[The space between Earth and the moon is about to get a little more crowded. (2023). Retrieved 2 February 2023, from
https://www.nbcnews.com/science/space/space-earth-moon-get-little-crowded-rcna64333]. Debatetrack
[Denise Chow is a reporter for NBC News Science focused on general science and climate change.]
By some estimates, as many as 100 lunar missions could launch into space over the next decade — a level of
interest in the moon that far surpasses the Cold War-era space race that saw the first humans set foot on
the lunar surface.
With multiple nations and private companies now setting their sights on missions to the moon, experts say
cislunar space — the area between Earth and the moon — could become strategically important,
potentially opening up competition over resources and positioning, and even sparking geopolitical conflicts.
“We’re already seeing this competing rhetoric between the U.S. government and the Chinese government,” said Laura
Forczyk, executive director of Astralytical, a space consulting firm based in Atlanta. “The U.S. is pointing to China and
saying, ‘We need to fund our space initiatives to the moon and cislunar space because China is trying to get there and claim
territory.’ And then Chinese politicians are saying the same thing about the United States.”
Both the U.S. and China have robust lunar exploration programs in the works, with plans to not only land
astronauts on the moon but also build habitats on the surface and infrastructure in orbit. They are also not
the only nations interested in the moon: South Korea, the United Arab Emirates, India and Russia are
among the other countries with planned robotic missions.
Even commercial companies have lunar ambitions, with SpaceX preparing to launch a private crew this year
on a tourism flight in lunar orbit, and other private companies in the U.S., Japan and Israel racing to the moon.
Increased access to space — and the moon — comes with many benefits for humanity, but it also raises the
potential for tensions over competing interests, which experts say could have far-reaching economic and
political consequences.
“During the Cold War, the space race was for national prestige and power,” said Kaitlyn Johnson, deputy director and fellow
of the Aerospace Security Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. “Now, we have a better understanding
of the kind of benefits that operating in cislunar space can bring countries back home.”
Though definitions sometimes differ, cislunar space generally refers to the space between Earth and the moon,
including the moon's surface and orbit. Any nation or entity that aims to establish a presence on the moon, or
has ambitions to explore deeper into the solar system, has a vested interest in operating in cislunar space,
either with communication and navigation satellites or outposts that serve as way stations between Earth
and the moon.
With so many lunar missions planned over the next decade, space agencies and commercial companies will likely be angling
for strategic orbits and trajectories, Forczyk said.
“It might seem like space is big, but the specific orbits that we are most interested in get filled up fast,” she added.
Much of the increased activity in cislunar space owes to substantial decreases in launch costs over the past
decade, with advancements in technology and increased competition both driving down the price of sending
objects into orbit. At the same time, planetary science missions offered humanity a glimpse of the resources
available in space, ranging from ice deposits on the moon to precious metals in asteroids, said Marcus
Holzinger, an associate professor of aerospace engineering sciences at the University of Colorado Boulder.
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March 23: The Republic of India should sign the Artemis Accords.
“Once people started really thinking through that, they realized that that water-ice can provide substantial resources or enable
the gathering or collection of resources elsewhere in the solar system,” he said.
Water-ice can, for instance, help sustain human colonies on the moon, or be separated into oxygen and hydrogen to fuel
rockets on longer deep-space journeys.
With so much to gain, conflicts could emerge between nations or commercial entities.
In 2021, Holzinger co-authored a report titled “A Primer on Cislunar Space“ to help U.S. government officials understand the
ins and outs of cislunar space. Holzinger said it wasn’t intended as a strategy document, but rather to inform those in the
military and in government who are interested in cislunar operations.
That interest is apparent: Last year, the Space Force identified cislunar operations as a development priority,
and in April established the 19th Space Defense Squadron to oversee cislunar space. In November, the White
House released its own strategy for interagency research on "responsible, peaceful, and sustainable
exploration and utilization of cislunar space."
The 1967 Outer Space Treaty, with more than 110 countries counted as parties, essentially declared that the
exploration and use of outer space should benefit all of humankind and that no one country can claim or occupy
any part of the cosmos. More recently, the Artemis Accords signed in 2020 established nonbinding
multilateral agreements between the U.S. and more than a dozen nations to maintain peaceful and
transparent exploration of space.
Holzinger said these agreements are “easy” when there aren’t tangible economic and geopolitical interests at stake.
“Now we’re sort of seeing the rubber hit the road, because all of a sudden there are potentially geopolitical interests or
commercial interests,” he said. “We have to maybe come up with a more nuanced approach.”
Creating a sustainable and safe environment for cislunar operations will be critical, but the very nature of
this area presents its own challenges.
Situational awareness in cislunar space, or the ability to know where objects are at all times, is tricky
because of how expansive it is compared to the volume of space around Earth, including low-Earth orbit
and geostationary orbit, said Patrick Binning, who oversees programs on space solutions to national security
challenges at the Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory.
“The volume of cislunar compared to the volume below geostationary orbit is 2,000 times more volume, so
this is an enormous challenge to find things and keep track of things in that huge volume.” he said.
It's also harder to detect satellites and other spacecraft at such great distances from Earth, and in some
cases, harder to predict their paths.
This is because objects in cislunar orbit are influenced by three different gravitational forces: the Earth,
the moon and the sun, Johnson said.
“It’s a three-body system, which means that not all orbits are nice and circular or as predictable as those near
Earth orbit,” she said.
Together, these factors could make it difficult to manage traffic in cislunar space, particularly if
adversaries intentionally try to mask their activities there.
Yet if humans intend to establish a permanent presence on the moon, and venture beyond to Mars, it will
be imperative to prioritize safety, sustainability and transparency, said Jim Myers, senior vice president of
the civil systems group at The Aerospace Corporation, a federally funded research organization based in El
Segundo, California.
"Those elements have to be there," Myers said. "Unless we do this in a very thoughtful way, unless we plan,
we're going to run into all sorts of trouble."
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March 23: The Republic of India should sign the Artemis Accords.
Science
The Artemis missions have an incredible amount of cubesat-powered science, including missions
from the Italian and Japanese space agencies—such science will be inaccessible to India without
signing the Accords
Skibba 8/22 –[Skibba, Ramin. (2022). The Mini Missions Aboard the Artemis Rocket Pack a Big Punch. Retrieved 4 February 2023, from
https://www.wired.com/story/the-mini-missions-aboard-the-artemis-rocket-pack-a-big-punch/] Debatetrack.
[Ramin Skibba is WIRED’s space writer, where he covers the vastest beat, including space scientists, space environmentalists, space politics, space conflicts,
and the space industry, from launch to reentry. Prior to joining WIRED, he freelanced for Scientific American, The Atlantic, Undark magazine, Slate, and
other magazines, and before that, he explored the cosmos himself as an astrophysicist and he earned a master’s degree in science communication at the
University of California, Santa Cruz. He’s based in San Diego.]
ALL EYES WILL be on the moon as the Artemis mission’s inaugural launch blasts toward our lunar
neighbor in a couple of weeks, but the rocket won’t be the only new craft heading to space. After NASA’s Orion
capsule separates from the Space Launch System (SLS) rocket, the SLS will deploy 10 tiny satellites, each
about the size of a shoebox, which will then head off in different directions. The SLS will make for a deluxe
ride into deep space for the probes, which researchers usually launch into low Earth orbit aboard much smaller
rockets.
One of the miniaturized spacecraft, dubbed the Near Earth Asteroid Scout, will aim for a particularly
distant target: It will swing past the moon en route toward a near-Earth asteroid, where it will take detailed
images. The satellite will be propelled there by a sweeping solar sail. Despite its diminutive size, the NEA Scout,
as it’s known for short, can do cutting-edge science while aiding the search for the kind of asteroid that future
larger-class missions might want to visit.
“We want to image everything possible regarding the asteroid’s rotation, its size, its brightness, and its local
environment,” says Julie Castillo-Rogez, a planetary scientist at NASA’s Jet Propulsion Laboratory and head of
the NEA Scout science team. The spacecraft is equipped with a miniature yet top-of-the-line camera, similar
in resolution to the one aboard NASA's OSIRIS-REx, a much larger asteroid-probing craft. “It’s very
capable, but very small,” she says.
NEA Scout and its nine comrades demonstrate the many possible uses of nanosatellites known as CubeSats. Each
is made up of sets of cubes that measure about 4 inches on a side. While some CubeSats are composed of three
units in a row, called 3U, the spacecraft aboard Artemis 1 are 6U.
The Capstone spacecraft, the first CubeSat launched as part of the Artemis program, is a 12U. Capstone
launched in June and will scope out an orbit around the moon for the planned Lunar Gateway space station,
which astronauts will assemble during future Artemis missions. All such satellites exploit miniaturized
technologies and cram a battery, electronics, cameras, and other tools into an extremely compact space,
enabling cheaper research than building larger spacecraft, which can cost hundreds of millions of dollars.
After the NEA Scout deploys from the SLS rocket, it will fly by the moon, and then slowly unfurl its solar sail
several days later. Like everything else, the sail will initially be packed into a small box, fitting snugly into a third
of the craft. But not for long. “As soon as we give that command, four metallic booms will pop open, pulling the
sail off of a spool. It’s 925 square feet, roughly a school bus by a school bus,” says Les Johnson, head of the NEA
Scout technology team at Marshall Space Flight Center.
The sail is coated with reflective aluminum that’s thinner than foil—like Saran Wrap but not sticky, Johnson says.
Unlike a boat, the little spaceship’s sail will propel the craft when it catches rays of light, rather than gusts of
wind. As light reflects off the sail, it gives up a little bit of energy, which is converted into an extra push on the
sail and spacecraft.
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March 23: The Republic of India should sign the Artemis Accords.
The solar sail also counts as a technology demonstration for JPL: a possible propulsion system for flying a
small probe not too far from the sun, without the risk of running out of fuel. It follows two predecessors that
voyaged beyond Earth’s orbit: Japan’s Venus-bound Ikaros in 2010 and the Planetary Society’s Lightsail 2 in
2019.
After two years of sailing—sometime around September 20, 2024—NEA Scout will finally catch up with its
target asteroid, called 2020 GE. At about 15 to 50 feet in size, it will be the smallest asteroid probed by a
spacecraft. NEA Scout will slow down a bit as it approaches within 60 miles of the tumbling space rock, so that it
floats by at a speed of around 45 miles per hour, allowing a few hours to take images. Then the spacecraft will
continue on its way while 2020 GE continues along an orbital path that will bring it near Earth: Four days after its
encounter with NEA Scout, the asteroid will hurtle past the planet, but at a safe distance of about 410,000 miles,
or about 70 percent farther away than the moon is from us.
This CubeSat was one of the first that NASA officials picked in 2013 to launch on the SLS. The team had initially
envisioned their project as a spacecraft that could scout for the kind of asteroid that might be explored by a future
crewed mission, Castillo-Rogez says. No such mission is currently in the works, though NASA and other space
agencies have been designing and launching robotic asteroid missions for years. Private space companies could
also one day attempt to mine asteroids for lucrative minerals.
The asteroid 2020 GE is also relevant to the planetary defense effort to monitor near-Earth objects. NEA Scout’s
target is almost the size of the impactor that exploded as it fell to Earth in 2013, landing in Chelyabinsk,
Russia. But it’s much smaller than potentially more dangerous space rocks, like the target of NASA’s asteroidsmashing spacecraft called DART, which will make its mark in late September or early October.
NEA Scout will travel with a variety of other little CubeSat companions. These secondary payloads, as they’re
sometimes called, include NASA’s BioSentinel, which will use a biosensor containing yeast strains to measure
how space radiation affects living organisms over long periods. The Italian Space Agency’s ArgoMoon will
snap photos of the SLS second stage rocket and then of the moon’s surface. And the Japanese space
agency’s Omotenashi will test “semihard” landing technology by deploying an airbag to gently crash—er,
land—on the moon at about 110 mph.
Artemis 1 will also carry a commercial-led CubeSat: Lockheed Martin’s LunIR will use an infrared
camera, kept at low temperatures by a micro-cryocooler, to map out the moon’s surface during day and
night. (Lockheed was also NASA’s main contractor in building the Orion crew capsule, which sits atop the SLS.)
Onboard Orion, Lockheed, Amazon, and Cisco have added a payload called Callisto—named after one of
Artemis’s companions in Greek mythology—which includes a modified version of Alexa, the AI voice assistant,
that can operate without internet access, and a customized version of Webex, the videoconferencing service, on a
tablet. When astronaut crews ride aboard Orion on future flights, they could make use of such tools to take stock
of their craft’s flight status and telemetry and to communicate by video.
Two more CubeSats—LunaH-Map and Lunar IceCube—will study water ice on the moon’s surface, both
from a scientific perspective and because future lunar astronauts may attempt to extract some of that ice
for water. “We’ve known for quite some time that there’s water ice at the moon’s poles, but there are a lot of
unanswered questions about how much there is and where exactly it is,” said Craig Hardgrove, a planetary
geologist at Arizona State University and the LunaH-Map lead, at a NASA press conference on Monday. With
these projects, researchers aim to improve maps of lunar ice and to detect ice beyond the permanently
shadowed craters, if it exists.
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March 23: The Republic of India should sign the Artemis Accords.
Security
India should sign the Artemis Accords to enhance its security in space and strengthen cooperation
with partners
Rajagopalan 22 –[Rajagopalan, R. (2023). India’s Space Priorities Are Shifting Toward National Security. Retrieved 3 February 2023, from
https://carnegieendowment.org/2022/09/01/india-s-space-priorities-are-shifting-toward-national-security-pub-87809] Debatetrack.
[Dr. Rajeswari (Raji) Pillai Rajagopalan is the Director of the Centre for Security, Strategy & Technology (CSST) at the Observer Research Foundation,
New Delhi.]
Going forward, India should deepen its engagement with like-minded partners. In particular, it should
push the Quad to double down on its efforts on space security and governance. Space security threats have
the potential to rapidly reduce the usable space orbits, a common concern for all the Quad countries. The
lack of consensus in multilateral space security discussions and arms control debates suggest that the Quad has an
opportunity to play an essential role in consolidating views among key states. The Quad should eventually bring
in the UK, Canada, France, and others to develop a coordinated platform in multilateral negotiations.
India should also partner with the Quad on Space Domain Awareness (SDA), which is essentially the
capacity to track the space environment for threats, including naturally occurring events and intentional
attacks. The United States is the most capable state in this regard, but growing space insecurity, especially
acute among Indo-Pacific states, points to the need for more comprehensive coverage of the Southern
hemisphere. This would require upgrading space tracking and monitoring capabilities so that there is constant
flow of information on the threat environment, which can also enable timely action and appropriate redressal
measures. Outside the United States, Quad countries have limited SDA capabilities, but combining efforts can
provide a better picture of the threats in the Indo-Pacific and beyond. This could involve enhancing both the
quality of surveillance as well as the number of platforms available for this.
And despite India’s reluctance, New Delhi should consider joining the U.S.-led Artemis Accords, the bilateral
agreements between Washington and participant countries, based on key principles enshrined in the Outer
Space Treaty of 1967 for safe, secure, and transparent exploration of the Moon. India has not endorsed the
accords possibly because it is not a multilateral agreement created under a UN umbrella. Nevertheless, it offers
an important opportunity to review lunar activities as well as develop norms and standards for lunar
activities around themes such as information sharing, interoperability, and lunar governance measures. In
reality, India has no realistic alternative to the Artemis Accords; the International Lunar Research Station
being developed by China and Russia is simply not a viable option for India, considering the state of India’s
relations with China.
With the growing perception of space security threats from China and a desire to enhance India’s space
capabilities and influence in global governance of space, New Delhi is likely to press ahead with its
ambitious space goals in the coming years. This will lead India to focus on technology development while also
developing and nurturing space security partnerships with like-minded countries in the Indo-Pacific.
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March 23: The Republic of India should sign the Artemis Accords.
Technology
The Artemis Accords will enable India to gain technology, lessons and experience from its allies,
and strengthen space cooperation amongst Quad members
Mohandas 21 –[ Mohandas, P. (2021). Should India Sign the Artemis Accords? – The Wire Science. Retrieved 3 February 2023, from
https://science.thewire.in/aerospace/should-india-sign-the-artemis-accords/] Debatetrack.
[Pradeep Mohandas is an adjunct research analyst at the Takshashila Institution, Bengaluru.]
India’s lunar programme has had limited success. It has two missions in orbit. The first and only mission to
the surface failed in September 2019. The US has collaborated with India on Chandrayaan 1, the first lunar
mission. India is also collaborating with Japan on a future lunar mission, called LUPEX, to the Moon’s surface.
Japan is also a signatory to the Artemis Accords.
Next, India’s human space programme depends on Russia for astronaut training. It is presently in the
process of setting up its own facilities for the human spaceflight training programme. The US, France,
Germany and Italy in Europe, and Japan have also offered help to India with human spaceflight training.
India also depends on Ukraine for semi-cryogenic engines – and Ukraine is a signatory to the accords.
These various dependencies in advanced space technologies make up an important background to
understand the context in which India is operating. They may play a role in India’s decision on whether to join
the Artemis Accords.
India’s own space programme has different priorities. While continuing to launch and maintain its fleet of Earthobservation and communication satellites, it is presently pushing towards human spaceflight missions.
India is seeking to let private sector companies participate in building and launching Earth-observation and
communication satellites. It is presently in the process of drafting a space law and has been publishing several
draft guidelines towards opening up the space sector to private players.
It is also evident that the priority for interplanetary missions has been slipping. There is almost a decade-long gap
between interplanetary missions to the Moon and Mars. This trend is likely to continue towards the second Mars
mission. Chandrayaan 3 may break this decadal jinx.
India is sharpening the Indian Space Research Organisation’s focus on R&D and advanced missions. Given
this, it’s essential that India be an early participant in the Artemis Accords, so that it can gain lessons and
expertise from other countries that are members of the accords. This could be things like robotics from
Canada, sample return and avionics from Japan, and ground station and deep space network expertise
from the US and Australia.
The accords form a natural extension of the Quad’s Critical and Emerging Technologies Working Group.
The US, Japan and Australia are already signatories of the accords. India’s addition to the accords would
provide a framework for space cooperation among these Quad countries, and could also be extended to
other critical and emerging technologies. India has a lot to offer and a lot to gain from strengthening this
connection. Signing the accords would make it easier to collaborate with other signatories.
By being a part of the accords, India’s space companies could become part of a global supply chain, along
with Indian SMEs and NewSpace startups. This would also help attract investment capital towards Indian space
startups and lead to flow of capital into India.
In the 1960s and 1970s, India took help from western countries such as the US and the UK to better understand
sounding-rocket and satellite technologies. The Artemis Accords provides a similar opportunity to learn about
interplanetary missions and human spaceflight. India must take advantage of this opportunity.
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March 23: The Republic of India should sign the Artemis Accords.
There may be fears about what might happen to the indigenous programme if India were to participate in the
Artemis Accords. India should encourage the involvement of the private sector in communications and Earthobservation satellites construction and launch and also outline its priorities for interplanetary and human
spaceflight missions and actively pursue them. Aligning them with interests of countries that provide expertise in
certain areas could be the best use of the Artemis Accords for India.
India has had a traditional partnership with Russia, which recently partnered with China in its
International Lunar Research Station initiative. Signing up for the accords must not be equated to severing
ties with Russia. India has maintained a relationship with Russia in other strategic areas and the same
could apply for space after India signs the accords as well.
Finally, India has had skirmishes with China on the border and cooperation in space between the two
countries has been limited. However, institutions like the Indian Institute of Astrophysics and IIT-BHU have
signed up to fly experiments on board the Chinese space station. India also plans to build its own space station.
We may be able to witness an Indian space station flying to the Chinese space station similar to the Apollo-Soyuz
programme between Russia and the United States in 1975.
India has traditionally been wary of cooperation with the US on outer space, although their working
together on the Chandrayaan 1 and NASA-ISRO Synthetic Aperture Radar (NISAR) missions have helped to
build and restore some confidence in each other. These could be the stepping stones for India to sign the
accords themselves.
32
March 23: The Republic of India should sign the Artemis Accords.
Other Countries
France has signed onto the Artemis Accords
Grush 6/22—[Grush, Loren. (2022). Why France signing NASA’s lunar exploration pact is the most important signature yet / Now 20 countries are on
board with the Artemis Accords. Retrieved 2 February 2023, from https://www.theverge.com/2022/6/10/23159558/nasa-artemis-accords-france-signingmoon-exploration-significance] Debatetrack.
[Loren Grush was formerly a science reporter for The Verge, the technology and culture brand from Vox Media, where she specialized in all things space—
from distant stars and planets to human space flight and the commercial space race. The daughter of two NASA engineers, she grew up surrounded by space
shuttles and rocket scientists—literally. She also hosted Space Craft, an original online video series that examined what it takes to send people to space.]
On Tuesday evening, France officially signed onto NASA’s Artemis Accords — the space agency’s set of
guidelines and principles for how the US and other countries should explore the Moon in the future.
France’s addition, long considered a big get for the Artemis Accords, brings the total number of signatory
countries to 20, strengthening the international agreement ahead of NASA’s planned return to the lunar
surface this decade.
When the finalized Artemis Accords were presented during the Trump administration in October 2020, NASA
announced that eight countries had signed onto the document — including the United States. But there were some
notable absences from that list. Two of the world’s largest space superpowers — China and Russia — have not
signed, and Russia’s space chief has made it clear that the country is uninterested in partnering with NASA on its
lunar exploration efforts. Two of Europe’s biggest space nations, France and Germany, weren’t on board
either.
Now, after two years, France has finally come to the table, and the country is considered the most
significant signatory yet for the Accords. “It was critical to get France on the same page as us for our lunar
exploration and other plans, because they’re the dominant player in Europe along with Germany,” Gabriel
Swiney, a senior policy advisor at NASA and one of the original authors of the Accords, tells The Verge. France
is the largest contributor to the budget of the European Space Agency. The US also has a long-standing
partnership with France’s space agency, CNES, and the country plays a pivotal role in operating the
launch site and rockets for Europe’s primary launch provider, Arianespace.
France wasn’t completely sold on the Accords at first. “They have been open about the need for clarity on some
of the issues with the Artemis Accords,” Swiney says. Now, it seems the country’s issues with the agreement
have been resolved, giving the Accords a major stamp of approval from a once-skeptical nation.
Though the Artemis Accords are an international document, they’re intrinsically linked to NASA’s lunar
ambitions. The name Artemis comes from NASA’s Artemis program, which aims to land the first woman and the
first person of color on the lunar surface as early as 2025. While the timing of that landing is subject to change,
NASA saw the need to have a preemptive international agreement with other nations before humans walked on
the Moon again, detailing what rules and standards should be applied to lunar exploration. “What we’re trying to
do is establish norms of behavior that every nation can agree to,” former NASA administrator Jim Bridenstine
said in 2020. NASA collaborated with the US State Department to come up with the final rules.
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March 23: The Republic of India should sign the Artemis Accords.
US-India Cooperation
History: India & the US have history of cooperation in space
Ramanathan et al. 20— India and the Artemis Accords. (2021). Retrieved 3 February 2023, from
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/618a55c4cb03246776b68559/t/623060e18f0ff4552955f271/1647337698479/India-and-the-Artemis-Accords.pdf]
Debatetrack.
[Aditya Ramanathan is an Associate Fellow with the Takshashila Institution. A journalist by training, he has previously worked at Mint and as a freelancer.
He has also researched and written on colonial-era Indian military history.
Aditya Pareek was a Research Analyst with the Strategic Studies Programme at the Takshashila Institution from 2020 to 2022. He worked on issues relating
to space, nuclear and foreign policy with a specific interest in Russian affairs.
Nitansha Bansal was an intern with the Strategic Studies team from April to September 2021. Her research interests included Foreign Affairs, Cybersecurity,
Nuclear Studies and Space Technology.]
Historically, India’s space cooperation with the United States has been hobbled by the politics of the Cold
War and nuclear nonproliferation. However, in recent years, cooperation has grown. India’s Chandrayaan-1
moon mission carried two NASA payloads, a Miniature Synthetic Aperture Radar, which looked for ice in
the moon’s poles and a Moon Mineralogy Mapper. ISRO and NASA are presently collaborating on the
NASA-ISRO synthetic aperture radar or NISAR project, which will launch in 2022 and plans to “to make
global measurements of the causes and consequences of land surface changes using advanced radar
imaging.” Following a 2+2 ministerial dialogue in October 2020, the two governments have also committed to
cooperate on space situational awareness and discuss defence-related space issues.
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March 23: The Republic of India should sign the Artemis Accords.
US-India space partnerships are continuing to advance
White House 23—[(2023). FACT SHEET: United States and India Elevate Strategic Partnership with the initiative on Critical and Emerging
Technology (iCET) | The White House. Retrieved 6 February 2023, from https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/01/31/factsheet-united-states-and-india-elevate-strategic-partnership-with-the-initiative-on-critical-and-emerging-technology-icet/] Debatetrack.
[The White House is the seat of the Administrative Branch of the US Government]
[The US and India are launching bilateral initiatives in the following domains:]

Strengthening cooperation on human spaceflight, including establishing exchanges that will include
advanced training for an Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO)/Department of Space astronaut at
NASA Johnson Space Center.

Identifying innovative approaches for the commercial sectors of the two countries to collaborate,
especially with respect to activities related to NASA’s Commercial Lunar Payload Services (CLPS)
project. Within the next year, NASA, with ISRO, will convene U.S. CLPS companies and Indian
aerospace companies to advance this initiative.

Initiating new STEM talent exchanges by expanding the Professional Engineer and Scientist Exchange
Program (PESEP) to include space science, Earth science, and human spaceflight and extending a
standing invitation to ISRO to participate in NASA’s biannual International Program Management Course

Strengthening the bilateral commercial space partnership, including through a new U.S.
Department of Commerce and Indian Department of Space-led initiative under the U.S.-India Civil
Space Joint Working Group. This initiative will foster U.S.-India commercial space engagement and
enable growth and partnerships between U.S. and Indian commercial space sectors.

Welcoming the visit this week by the ISRO Chairman to the United States, as well as a visit to India by
the NASA Administrator later in 2023.

Expanding the agenda of the U.S.-India Civil Space Joint Working Group to include planetary
defense.
35
March 23: The Republic of India should sign the Artemis Accords.
Mutual Interests: India & the US have many areas of mutual interest—signing the Artemis accords
will give India access to US business and give it a seat at the table for establishing new clear rules
for Space
Upadhyaya 23—[Upadhyaya, K. (2023). Setting an Ambitious U.S.-India Space Agenda – South Asian Voices. Retrieved 2 February 2023, from
https://southasianvoices.org/setting-an-ambitious-u-s-india-space-agenda/] Debatetrack.
[Kriti Upadhyaya is Vice President of Strategic Advisory at C2Ci Inc, an intelligent platforms company providing defense and industry 4.0 solutions
globally. Kriti is also the Founding Director of Indus Tech Council, a nonprofit working to intensify U.S.-India technology collaboration. Previously, Kriti
was an Associate Fellow for the Wadhwani Chair in U.S.-India Policy Studies at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), where she led the
Chair’s work on Indian economic reforms and U.S.-India defense ties. Kriti has held various positions in policy and research roles in India and the United
States in the past eight years. Kriti has a B.A. from Hindu College at the University of Delhi, an M.A. from the School of International Service at American
University, and an M.S. Finance from the Johns Hopkins University.]
On January 31, the U.S. and Indian national security advisors met in Washington for the first convening of the
initiative on critical and emerging technologies (iCET). Along with artificial intelligence (AI), quantum
computing, 5G/6G, biotech, and semiconductors, space is a major focus area of iCET. As states race to dominate
the space domain and private players blaze separate paths toward exploration, a new era of space security and
innovation has arrived, forging new avenues for India’s space industry and cooperation with the United States.
The iCET meeting format provides the United States and India an opportunity to set an ambitious new space
agenda.
The space ecosystem is growing. Globally, the space economy is currently valued at over $400 billion and is
primarily dominated by satellites. However, with the emergence of the private space industry, newspace
has arrived with the potential to increase the global space economy to over $1 trillion by 2040. Newspace is
driven by private sector innovations and includes areas like space tourism, in-orbit manufacturing, space
situational awareness, and space resources. With newspace comes new opportunity.
Newspace opens opportunities for U.S.-India cooperation. While the United States and India have shared
interest in shaping a rules-based order in space, bureaucratic barriers have hindered state-to-state
cooperation in other domains. Through the private sector, space companies can work together in
component manufacturing and ensure smooth supply chains. Additionally, lunar missions herald an
emerging cislunar economy, opening new avenues for economic cooperation and employment generation
between the United States and India. While India can benefit from U.S. innovation, the United States can
leverage India’s cost efficiency in labor and manufacturing. Together, like-minded partners can usher in a
new era of newspace and cislunar economy.
New Delhi has instituted space reforms to encourage private sector involvement in the space domain. In 2020,
India opened the space sector to private players as part of larger industry reforms by the Modi government. Since
then, new institutions have come up to bolster the nascent but growing private sector space economy like New
Space India Ltd (NSIL), Indian National Space Promotion and Authorization Centre (IN-SPACe), and Indian
Space Association (ISpA). Furthermore, to foster innovation, the Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO) is
actively transferring technologies to the private sector to help commercialize the space industry, and space
challenges by iDEX are giving impetus to space startups. Looking ahead, this year will be crucial for India’s
space ambitions as New Delhi shapes its space policy.
Common Threats
Chinese space capabilities are increasingly seen as a threat to New Delhi. Between 2019 and 2021, Chinese
and Russian operational satellite fleets grew over 70 percent, evidencing China’s growing presence in space and
raising concerns about militarization. Moreover, China’s advancements in space have also prompted fears
over space colonization. China has already found success in landing a rover on the moon’s far side. In addition,
in 2021, China planted its PRC flag on the lunar surface and became the first country to execute robotic docking
in lunar orbit. Advancements in Chinese antisatellite capabilities have further sparked national security
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March 23: The Republic of India should sign the Artemis Accords.
concerns. With growing ambitions and capabilities, China poses a burgeoning threat in space, particularly
should capabilities find military uses.
New trends in the space economy coupled with threats like the weaponization and colonization of space present
new motivations for India and the United States to capitalize on economic prospects and contain common
challenges. The iCET meeting presented an opportunity to get started.
An Ambitious U.S.-India Space Agenda
While the United States can leverage its innovation and experience from having a mature private space sector,
India brings lessons learned from running a highly cost-effective space program with skilled talent. Together, the
two countries can augment each other’s space capabilities and create new economic opportunities. To do so, the
United States and India should cooperate in the following ways.
Regulatory and licensing ease. The United States should work towards easing export controls on
components and labor involved in space technology and related work for civilian use. Similarly, India must
provide more regulatory clarity with safeguards for intellectual property and liability insurance to ensure
ease of doing business in the space sector. Currently, International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR)
restrictions in the United States make licensing onerous while the novelty of the sector in India means much work
needs to be done and policy uncertainty looms large.
A lunar economy agenda. Thus far, India has not pursued a focused lunar economic agenda, choosing instead to
maintain its strategic autonomy by not signing onto either of the two global lunar programs. India could unlock
its space service and manufacturing capability by signing on to U.S. Artemis Accords, granting New Delhi a
clearly defined, forward-looking lunar mission with a designated role for the private sector. This will not
only aid India’s growing private sector but save costs for partners like the United States as India’s rising
startup and private space players provide low-cost services and space manufacturing.
Creating “rules of the game” in space. India and the United States should work together to establish rules
of the game in space exploration, prevention of space weaponization, space colonization, resource mining,
and other aspects relating to space activities by state and non-state actors. Since the space industry is still in
its nascent stages, an opportunity exists for the two countries to provide leadership in setting the policy
agenda with like-minded partners.
Securing the Indo-Pacific. The United States and India can play a key role in further ensuring Indo-Pacific
security through remote sensing of sensitive areas, reliable communication networks, and disaster planning. Such
efforts will augment existing avenues of intelligence sharing.
Tracking space objects. The United States and India recently signed the Space Situational Awareness (SSA)
agreement, which allows information sharing on space debris and other space threats. Information sharing should
be increased and serve as a tool to monitor space activities by threat actors. To that end, SSA must be actively
operationalized and more structures to share space information with like-minded partners must emerge.
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March 23: The Republic of India should sign the Artemis Accords.
Pro Blocks
38
March 23: The Republic of India should sign the Artemis Accords.
AT China Cooperation
India & China have frosty relations and are unlikely to cooperate in space
Ramanathan et al. 20— India and the Artemis Accords. (2021). Retrieved 3 February 2023, from
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/618a55c4cb03246776b68559/t/623060e18f0ff4552955f271/1647337698479/India-and-the-Artemis-Accords.pdf]
Debatetrack.
[Aditya is an Associate Fellow with the Takshashila Institution. A journalist by training, he has previously worked at Mint and as a freelancer. He has also
researched and written on colonial-era Indian military history.
Aditya Pareek was a Research Analyst with the Strategic Studies Programme at the Takshashila Institution from 2020 to 2022. He worked on issues relating
to space, nuclear and foreign policy with a specific interest in Russian affairs.
Nitansha Bansal was an intern with the Strategic Studies team from April to September 2021. Her research interests included Foreign Affairs, Cybersecurity,
Nuclear Studies and Space Technology.]
In contrast to Russia and the United States, India’s space cooperation with China is nonexistent. After the
launch of Chandrayaan-2 in 2019, China’s foreign minister had mentioned it was open to space cooperation
with India. However, the Galwan crisis and the subsequent deterioration of relations makes the prospects
for cooperation poor.
India’s own ambitions in space go well beyond launching satellites to lunar and interplanetary travel. Its
Chandrayaan-2 probe to the Moon’s South Pole ended in a crash landing but ISRO remains committed to lunar
exploration. It’s next mission to the moon is Chandrayaan3, which is scheduled to launch in the first half of 2022.
The project will consist of a stationary lander and a lunar rover and will use the existing orbiter from
Chandrayaan-2.
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March 23: The Republic of India should sign the Artemis Accords.
AT China Pushback
The US is on the forefront of space exploration, and therefore has a responsibility to establish rules
for the cooperative use of space – indeed, many of the principles already echo those that the
Chinese government agree to
Ji et al. 20—[Diplomat, T. (2023). What Does China Think About NASA’s Artemis Accords?. Retrieved 3 February 2023, from
https://thediplomat.com/2020/09/what-does-china-think-about-nasas-artemis-accords/] Debatetrack.
[Eillot Ji is a Ph.D. student in Princeton University’s Department of Politics. He holds a Masters in Global Affairs from Tsinghua University as a 2020
Schwarzman Scholar and a bachelor’s degree in Political Science from Emory University.
Michael Cerny holds a bachelor’s degree in Political Science and Chinese Studies from Emory University. He is an incoming MPhil student in the
Department of Politics and International Relations at the University of Oxford.
Raphael Piliero is a senior at Georgetown University pursuing a bachelor’s degree in Government. He was previously a legislative intern to the Chairman of
the House Foreign Affairs Committee.]
Although some commentators lambasted the Accords as an ill-conceived instrument to further U.S. dominance in
space, Chinese legal commentators did not immediately embrace this narrative.
Ma Zhanyuan, a professor from the Chinese University of Law and Political Science, acknowledged the need
for an international framework governing extraction of space resources, such as on the moon. Speaking
with two reporters from Beijing News, Ma explained that there “is currently a vacuum in international space
law regarding lunar resource extraction.” However, Ma emphasized that such a framework and activities must
benefit all of mankind, and that attempts by the U.S. to “formulate its own laws to allow the extraction of space
resources… will harm the interests of other countries.”
However, other legal experts were hesitant to sweepingly characterize the Artemis Accords as a self-interested
attempt to ensure U.S. interests. A prominent Beijing-based law professor contends that other countries
stand to benefit from key principles of the Artemis Accords. “[The Artemis Accords] are doing more
agenda-setting than law-writing as it is right now, but every space-capable country could stand to gain
cooperatively from moving this agenda forward,” he explained.
Moreover, he emphasized that successful implementation by space powers is critical to international
acceptance: “Only technologically capable countries [like the United States] can meaningfully implement
any international agreement on space, and potentially establish an acceptable practice as the future basis of
new international space law.”
Dai Xin, a U.S.-trained legal scholar and professor at Peking University, also understands the Artemis Accords as
more like a contract or vision for outer space than any claim of American sovereignty or authority. “There is little
binding effect if the U.S. does it unilaterally to ensure its interests in space,” says Dai. “Without consensus from
Russia and China, [the Accords] may at best be a precursor to something more treaty-like by establishing a shared
past practice among countries who would accept a U.S.-favorable bilateral or multilateral arrangement.”
Dai’s perspective is echoed in a brief report published by China’s government-sponsored space news platform,
which emphasized the benefits of a cooperative framework for lunar activities put forth by the Artemis Accords.
Explaining the Perception Gap
Brushing aside the boilerplate criticisms of U.S. space policy in Chinese news media, legal experts appear
cognizant of the parallel objectives between the United States and China as they continue to develop outer space.
Regardless of whether space cooperation between the two countries enshrines the Accords bilaterally (a
significant unlikelihood due to the Wolf Amendment, which restricts NASA’s ability to cooperate with Chinese
agencies), such reactions should encourage measured optimism about Chinese acceptance of the Accords’
underlying principles.
40
March 23: The Republic of India should sign the Artemis Accords.
In addition to the common interest of a shared framework for lunar exploration, the Accords build upon
widely-accepted and emerging norms. For example, the Accords’ pledge to provide emergency assistance
echoes China’s guarantee of such assistance as a signatory of the 1967 Rescue Agreement. Furthermore,
the Accords outline principles for responsible debris mitigation and spacecraft disposal; the Chinese
government has previously passed domestic legislation aligning with such principles, such as the 2006 China
National Industry Standard “Requirements on Space Debris Mitigation,” which was revised in 2015 in accordance
with debris mitigation guidelines set forth by the United Nations and IADC.
However, there remains a distinct possibility that the Chinese government will continue to view the Accords as a
campaign of encirclement. The moon plays a key role in China’s ambitions for global space leadership,
and leading Chinese space scientists have emphasized China’s goal to be the first space power to colonize the
moon. In context, the Accords’ announcement soon after the successful launch of China’s critical lunar-capable
rocket, the Long March 5, gives credence to the perspective in China that the United States is moving
opportunistically to regulate Chinese lunar behavior.
Nonetheless, it remains possible that the U.S. and China can find agreement on the principles outlined in
the Accords and can separately work to effectuate those objectives. Even though the Wolf Amendment restricts
bilateral cooperation between the U.S. and China, there remains the possibility for the principles of the
Accords to crystallize into international law through general state practice by both countries. As they
stand, China is not bound to abide by the Accords for its own lunar operations, yet China is equally
responsible for ensuring the peaceful and sustainable use of outer space.
41
March 23: The Republic of India should sign the Artemis Accords.
AT Conflict
The Artemis Accords have provisions to prevent the sources of conflict we see on Earth
Smith 21—[Using the Artemis Accords to Build Customary International Law: A Vision for a U.S.-Centric Good Governance Regime in Outer Space
(2021). Journal of Air Law and Commerce. Retrieved 3 February 2023, from https://scholar.smu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4189&context=jalc]
Debatetrack.
[Walker A Smith is an attorney who earned his JD at SMU Dedman School of Law]
The first principle of the Accords is that all activities conducted under them “should be exclusively for
peaceful purposes and in accordance with relevant international law.” This principle serves two purposes.
First, it incorporates and reaffirms Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty’s mandate that outer space shall be used
“exclusively for peaceful purposes,” a relatively noncontroversial baseline principle. Second, it provides a general
assurance that nothing in the Accords intends to replace or be in derogation of existing international law. This
section uses the permissive “should” language instead of the mandatory “shall” or “must” language, which is
something that critics may hone in on to ascribe nefarious intent to NASA and the Accords.
The second principle is transparency. This section requires that states publicly release information about their
space policies and plans and any scientific data gathered from their activities. This accords with Article XI of the
Outer Space Treaty, which imposes an obligation on states to inform “the public and the international scientific
community . . . of the nature, conduct, locations and results of such activities.” Mike Gold, Associate
Administrator for Space Policy and Partnerships at NASA and one of the main architects of the Accords,
noted that “transparency is so important to avoiding conflict that so many of our terrestrial conflicts are
based on misperceptions, lack of communication, and confusion, which is why we’re asking any country
who joins the Artemis Accords to just be public about what their plans are, what their policies are.” While
this may seem noncontroversial, transparency has very different meanings depending on where one is in the
world; NASA’s making transparency an explicit requirement of the Accords is a good step towards holding
countries to a high standard. Requiring the United Arab Emirates, for example, to be transparent in its space
policies and programs could have spillover effects and begin to build a culture of transparency within the
government, which the U.S. should strive to promote.
42
March 23: The Republic of India should sign the Artemis Accords.
AT Join ILRS
China’s involvement in the ILRS makes it risky for India to join
Ramanathan et al. 20— [India and the Artemis Accords. (2021). Retrieved 3 February 2023, from
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/618a55c4cb03246776b68559/t/623060e18f0ff4552955f271/1647337698479/India-and-the-Artemis-Accords.pdf]
Debatetrack.
[Aditya is an Associate Fellow with the Takshashila Institution. A journalist by training, he has previously worked at Mint and as a freelancer. He has also
researched and written on colonial-era Indian military history.
Aditya Pareek was a Research Analyst with the Strategic Studies Programme at the Takshashila Institution from 2020 to 2022. He worked on issues relating
to space, nuclear and foreign policy with a specific interest in Russian affairs.
Nitansha Bansal was an intern with the Strategic Studies team from April to September 2021. Her research interests included Foreign Affairs, Cybersecurity,
Nuclear Studies and Space Technology.]
1. The major role of China in the ILRS project could hamper or scuttle effective cooperation. As
India’s chief adversary, China would have the incentive to delay or limit the benefits India receives
from participation in the ILRS.
2. China’s presence could also hamper cooperation with the US and other states in the Artemis
programme, since US legislation bars NASA from cooperating with China.
3. There remains a possibility, however low, that proprietary Indian space technologies will be stolen
or reverse engineered.
43
March 23: The Republic of India should sign the Artemis Accords.
AT Legality
The Artemis Accords affirm the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, and the 1968 Rescue Agreement and the
1974 Registration Convention
Ramanathan et al. 20— [India and the Artemis Accords. (2021). Retrieved 3 February 2023, from
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/618a55c4cb03246776b68559/t/623060e18f0ff4552955f271/1647337698479/India-and-the-Artemis-Accords.pdf]
Debatetrack.
[Aditya is an Associate Fellow with the Takshashila Institution. A journalist by training, he has previously worked at Mint and as a freelancer. He has also
researched and written on colonial-era Indian military history.
Aditya Pareek was a Research Analyst with the Strategic Studies Programme at the Takshashila Institution from 2020 to 2022. He worked on issues relating
to space, nuclear and foreign policy with a specific interest in Russian affairs.
Nitansha Bansal was an intern with the Strategic Studies team from April to September 2021. Her research interests included Foreign Affairs, Cybersecurity,
Nuclear Studies and Space Technology.]
NASA, also from its press release, notes that the accords "reinforce and implement" the Outer Space Treaty
of 1967. Formally known as the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and
Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, the tripartite agreement between the US, the
UK, and then the Soviet Union soon grew to include 110 countries as of June 2020. One of the main points of the
1967 Outer Space Treaty is the prohibition of using outer space to stock or stage nuclear weapons.
Among the provisions reinforced by the Artemis Accords include the Registration Convention, which
requires concerned parties to disclose details about the launch and mission specifics of each space
undertaking. Another is the Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts - positing that all member states take
all possible steps to rescue and support astronauts found in distress and if possible, return them to their
home states.
NASA has also identified the principles of the accords, including Peaceful Exploration, Transparency,
Release of Scientific Data, Preserving Heritage, and Orbital Debris - which requires member states to
"commit to planning for the safe disposal of debris.
The space agency expressed that additional countries will join as signatories to the accords, citing its continuous
efforts to work with international countries. This announcement came after Roscosmos head, Dmitry Rogozin,
said Russia was unlikely to join in the Lunar Gateway project - a planned space station positioned on the Moon's
orbit to support future space exploration missions.
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March 23: The Republic of India should sign the Artemis Accords.
AT Moon Agreement
The Moon Agreement is a failed treaty that fails to reflect customary international law
Smith 21—[Using the Artemis Accords to Build Customary International Law: A Vision for a U.S.-Centric Good Governance Regime in Outer Space
(2021). Journal of Air Law and Commerce. Retrieved 3 February 2023, from https://scholar.smu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4189&context=jalc]
Debatetrack.
[Walker A Smith is an attorney who earned his JD at SMU Dedman School of Law]
Another area of contention is resource extraction vis-a-vis the ` Moon Agreement. The Moon Agreement allows
the exploitation of the Moon’s natural resources only through an international regime set up by the states to
govern the exploitation of natural resources on the Moon, which has yet to be established.Recall that the Moon
Agreement is regarded by many as a failed treaty (with only eighteen states having ratified it). The U.S. has
specifically repudiated that the Moon Agreement reflects customary international law. On their face, the
Accords seem to conflict directly with the Moon Agreement. However, Australia is a signatory of both the Moon
Agreement and the Accords, which means there may be room for an interpretation of the two without conflict.
Indeed, Mike Gold stated that “[e]ven for the Moon Agreement nations like Australia, I also don’t see any
conflict there between the Moon Agreement and what’s stated in the Accords in terms of legal principle: that the
Moon Agreement anticipates the extraction and utilization of resources.” He went on, however, to note that
“[w]here there would be a difference is relative to what the regulatory regime should look like and what a sharing
regime might look like for those resources, and we couldn’t establish common ground around those
topics . . . .”1In a way, having Australia as a partner in the Artemis Program helps the U.S. advance its ideas
regarding resource extraction in outer space because Australia’s participation in the Moon Agreement
bolsters the notion that nothing in the Accords conflicts with existing treaties.
45
March 23: The Republic of India should sign the Artemis Accords.
AT UN Agreement
Any Artemis-style agreement from the UN would take a long time—and we need effective space law
now
Smith 21—[Using the Artemis Accords to Build Customary International Law: A Vision for a U.S.-Centric Good Governance Regime in Outer Space
(2021). Journal of Air Law and Commerce. Retrieved 3 February 2023, from https://scholar.smu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4189&context=jalc]
Debatetrack.
[Walker A Smith is an attorney who earned his JD at SMU Dedman School of Law]
The reason that they are being pursued now is that the US is working hard to get back to the Moon with
humans at an expedited pace. The intent is to sign agreements between NASA (representing the US) and
individual nations and/or their space agencies. Every space agency that NASA works with is going to bring
their own interest to the table and it would make sense that these one on one agreements reflect the
pressing issues while including all of the other issues as mentioned above. The US is not likely going to be
able to sign agreements with China in the near future and it is uncertain how Russia wishes to approach things. So
if the US were to wait for a standard UN style agreement to clarify things for Artemis missions they’d be
waiting a long time.
Also, the original treaties that are now seen as limiting what can be done on other worlds were crafted half
a century ago during the height of the Cold War when no one really knew what lay ahead. As I noted, there
was some hope that perhaps some future human activity could be carved out in a preemptively peaceful fashion –
one based on avoiding the pervasive Cold War paranoia and cynicism of the time. Now we are in that future on
the cusp of wanting to return to the Moon with for scientific, exploratory, and possibly commercial reasons –
twenty-first century reasons. Existing treaties (which only refer to “mankind” and not “humanity”), like anything
else, evolve over time.
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March 23: The Republic of India should sign the Artemis Accords.
Con
47
March 23: The Republic of India should sign the Artemis Accords.
Ambiguity
Maintaining strategic ambiguity can help India to maintain defensive space capabilities and may help
to bring the US-Artemis and China-Russia blocs to the negotiating table
Rohera 22—[Rohera, M. (2022). Strategic Ambiguity in Indian Outer Space Policy – South Asian Voices. Retrieved 4 February 2023, from
https://southasianvoices.org/strategic-ambiguity-in-indian-outer-space-policy/] Debatetrack.
[Meera Rohera graduated from Tufts University with a BA in Political Science and Philosophy. Her research interests surround outer space law and policy,
including the Indian space economy and diplomacy, ASAT weapons, space resources, and the Artemis Accords. She is currently an associate at Rational
360, working on strategic communications and public affairs. Prior to that, she interned at the Aerospace Security Project at CSIS.]
While India’s space program is governed by a host of national laws and international agreements, it does not have
an official national space policy defining its civil and military goals in outer space. In its diplomatic messaging,
India has long maintained the position that it seeks to use space technology to benefit Earth and that outer
space should be used for peaceful purposes. Notably, unlike the United States, China, and Russia, the Indian
space program is founded on a civil rather than a military organization – the Indian Space Research Organization
(ISRO) – which continues to be the center of India’s space activities.
However, two significant developments have changed the Indian space landscape in recent times. First,
India opened its space industry to private players such as Skyroot and Pixxel in 2020. Second, India has begun to
recognize the military importance of outer space, successfully conducting its first direct-ascent ASAT test
in 2019. That year, it also established the Indian Defense Space Agency (DSA), an organizational equivalent
to the U.S. Space Force, and the Defense Space Research Organization (DSRO), which supports the DSA and
develops civilian space technologies for military use.
India’s historic position of strategic autonomy in its foreign policy is also reflected in its space diplomacy on
the international stage. India is one of the few countries with a robust space program that has not signed
the U.S. Artemis Accords, which are multilateral agreements between the United States and other countries to
establish frameworks for civil exploration and use of the Moon, Mars, and beyond. However, India does
cooperate on a range of civil and military space activities with the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD)
and through different bilateral instruments, including with the United States, allowing it to maintain its
national security priorities in space. Thus India maintains ‘partial alignment’ with the bloc, whereby it
cooperates on selective activities.
ASAT capabilities and space security have become increasingly important to India due to its asymmetric
capabilities compared to China, both in space and on Earth. Indian strategic focus on space security has
paralleled increased Chinese investment in technology, such as in ‘informationized war’ capabilities.
Meanwhile, the United States’ continued modernization and expansion of its own space capabilities is fueling the
Chinese pursuit of the same. The result is a security ‘trilemma’, roping India into the great power competition
taking place in outer space.
India developed its anti-satellite technologies on the defensive in an apparent response to threat perceptions
after the Chinese ASAT test in 2007. India successfully demonstrated its DA-ASAT capabilities on March
27, 2019, using a ballistic missile defense interceptor to hit a micro-satellite placed in orbit as a target.
Prime Minister Modi reiterated that the test did not violate any international agreements and that India was
working to ensure space security and protect its satellites. Exemplified by its name, ‘Mission Shakti’(‘power’), the
test was likely meant to deter aggression from adversaries like China and to signal that an attack on Indian
satellites could result in a quid pro quo response.
For the DA-ASAT to be a persuasive deterrent, India’s commitment to its use must be credible –or at least
be perceived as credible. By abstaining from voting for the resolution banning DA-ASAT tests, India
maintains strategic and political ambiguity on the subject, allowing it to use such tests as a tool in its
deterrence arsenal to pursue its national security goals. India is not alone in recognizing the deterrence
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March 23: The Republic of India should sign the Artemis Accords.
capability of ASAT weapons. When Vice President Kamala Harris first announced the United States’ pledge
against DA-ASAT tests, the move received criticism from congressional Republicans, who expressed
concerns that the move did nothing to deter adversaries and could have the opposite effect.
Given the value that outer space brings to Earth – from GPS, satellite imagery, and communication to the likely
exploration and mining of the moon and other celestial bodies – outer space is and will continue to be a
vital military domain. International efforts to demilitarize outer space have been in a deadlock between the
U.S.-Artemis and the Russia-China blocs for years. Since the civil and military space budgets and capabilities
of space powers like the United States and China dwarf that of India, a rule-based international order is firmly in
India’s interest. Addressing the root of space threat perceptions by building international instruments can reduce
the possibility of space warfare. This might aid India in maintaining its position of using space technology to
benefit Earth and preserving the domain for peaceful purposes.
While the moratorium might prima facie appear to be a step in that direction, it does little to stop the slippery
slope of space weaponization, because it specifically bans one method of testing for a single type of ASAT
weapon. DA-ASAT weapons can still be tested in orbit through intentional fly-bys, and there are numerous other
methods, both kinetic and non-kinetic, to eliminate or disable enemy satellites. However, while the ban does
not constrain the development and fielding of offensive space capabilities, the moratorium on DA-ASAT weapons
does help prevent the generation of dangerous space debris. Abstaining from the moratorium is still compatible
with adhering to the principle of not conducting DA-ASAT tests that generate dangerous space debris—this is a
norm India should participate in building. The destruction of a satellite inevitably generates a significant amount
of debris, which impacts not only foreign satellites but also the actor’s own space objects.
India has some visibility and negotiating power, given that it is one of four countries to have tested an
ASAT weapon. India’s strategic ambiguity might allow it to leverage its position to bring outer space
powers to the negotiating table to promote transparency and confidence-building measures as a first step
instead of direct arms control. This could include focusing on non-military issues such as technology
transfers and space traffic management, dual issues like space debris generation by ASAT tests and
commercial mega-satellites, and registering military and non-military satellites and attributability of
actions in space. India should commit to creating international space laws to prevent unilateral normbuilding and also irresponsible behavior in outer space.
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March 23: The Republic of India should sign the Artemis Accords.
China
The Artemis Accords are seen as an American land grab in space that sets to perpetuate existing
inequalities
Ji et al. 20—[Diplomat, T. (2023). What Does China Think About NASA’s Artemis Accords?. Retrieved 3 February 2023, from
https://thediplomat.com/2020/09/what-does-china-think-about-nasas-artemis-accords/] Debatetrack.
[Eillot Ji is a Ph.D. student in Princeton University’s Department of Politics. He holds a Masters in Global Affairs from Tsinghua University as a 2020
Schwarzman Scholar and a bachelor’s degree in Political Science from Emory University.
Michael Cerny holds a bachelor’s degree in Political Science and Chinese Studies from Emory University. He is an incoming MPhil student in the
Department of Politics and International Relations at the University of Oxford.
Raphael Piliero is a senior at Georgetown University pursuing a bachelor’s degree in Government. He was previously a legislative intern to the Chairman of
the House Foreign Affairs Committee.]
Although the announcement of the Artemis Accords did not make major headlines in China, the Accords elicited
a decisively negative response in Chinese news media. Characterizing the Accords as a disingenuous attempt to
stymie Chinese space ambitions, many commentators pointed to the arrival of the announcement shortly after
China’s successful test of the Long March 5B, a critical milestone for China’s manned spaceflight programs.
Song Zhongping, a Chinese military and aerospace commentator, likened the Accords to the enclosure
movement in 18th-century Great Britain, during which common land was privatized to the benefit of the
wealthy.
“The U.S. is developing a new space version of an ‘Enclosure Movement,’ in pursuit of colonization and
claiming sovereignty over the moon,” Song told the Global Times, criticizing the “Cold War” mentality of
the United States as it sought to outcompete China and Russia in outer space. Chinese central state
television echoed Song’s concerns, stating that the Accords are a step toward the enclosure of outer space
by a self-interested United States.
Others cast doubt on whether the United States could legally justify the Accords under the extant international
legal framework. Citing the OST and the Moon Treaty of 1979, critics argued that the Accords violate key
principles of international law, which restrict state sovereignty in outer space. In articles published by
Guancha and the Global Times, observers called the Artemis Accord an unembellished and “preposterous
attempt” to unilaterally set ground rules for lunar resource exploitation. Zhang Baoxin, a Chinese aerospace
expert and chief editor of China Aviation News, also explained that, by excluding Russia and China, the
Accords would encourage irresponsible use of lunar resources and instigate conflicts over lunar
sovereignty.
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March 23: The Republic of India should sign the Artemis Accords.
Conflict
Precedent: Space colonialism mirrors the European colonialism that led to hundreds of years of war
amongst Europe’s major powers—the Artemis Accords pave the way for us to repeat this pattern
O’Brien 20—[The Space Review: The Artemis Accords: repeating the mistakes of the Age of Exploration. (2020). Retrieved 3 February 2023, from
https://www.thespacereview.com/article/3975/1] Debatetrack.
[Dennis O’Brien is a member of the International Institute of Space Law and founder of The Space Treaty Project (www.spacetreaty.org). The Project is a
member of the Moon Village Association; Mr. O’Brien sits on their Coordination & Cooperation workgroup.]
In the spring of 1493, the King and Queen of Spain sent an envoy to the Pope in Rome. Along with
Portugal, Spain had just used its advanced sailing and navigation technology to reach “new worlds,” areas
of the Earth that had not been previously discovered by Europeans. But they had a problem: they wanted to
establish sovereign property rights in the lands they had discovered, but they weren’t sure they could do so
under their own authority. So, they turned to the only international authority in Europe at that time, the
Catholic Church, which held sway over governments from Portugal to Poland, from the Arctic to the
Mediterranean. If the Church would establish a legal framework that granted them sovereignty, then those nations
would be bound to recognize it.[2]
This is the first lesson that the current governments of the world can learn from the Age of Exploration &
Empire that began five centuries ago. Even then, the most powerful nation in Europe, with the largest army
and most advanced technology, realized that it could not unilaterally establish property rights or any other
kind of sovereignty without the approval of an international authority. After the Church granted that
authority, Spain was able to create one of the greatest empires in history. Spain and Portugal formalized the
arrangement with a binding international agreement, the Treaty of Tordesillas, whose purpose was to ensure
peaceful cooperation between their nations, primarily by establishing a line of demarcation that separated their
areas of activity.[3]
Unfortunately, the legal framework so established was based on national dominance, not multilateral
international cooperation. The grant of sovereignty was exclusive, made only to Spain and Portugal, and it
required them to subjugate the “savages” in the lands they discovered by taking along Church
missionaries. This exclusivity did not sit well with other nations as they also developed the technologies of
exploration; it was one of the reasons many northern European nations joined the Protestant Reformation and
rejected the authority of the Pope in Rome. Without a fair and equitable international agreement that
honored the interests of emerging states, the Church lost its ability to act as an arbiter between nations.
Even worse, the dominance model set up centuries of conflict among the major powers in Europe. Militant
nationalism and economic colonialism became the principles guiding national policy. The result was
centuries of war, suffering, and neglect among the major powers and the nations they subjugated. This
pattern did not end until the 20th century, when the major powers fought two world wars and finally
dismantled their colonial empires: sometimes peacefully, sometimes by force.
By the mid-1960s, most countries on Earth were independent or on their way to becoming so. But a new
conflict had started, one that threatened to repeat the mistakes of five centuries earlier. The great powers
were once again using their advanced technology to explore new worlds, and the race was on to plant their
flag on the Moon first. Under the ancient traditions, the country that did so would have a claim against all others
for possession and use of the territory. The Cold War was about to expand into outer space.
But then something wonderful happened. In 1967, the United Nations proposed, and the world’s space
powers accepted, an international agreement known as the Outer Space Treaty.[4] The treaty was an
intentional effort to avoid the mistakes of the Age of Exploration & Empire. Article I states, “The
exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, shall be carried out for the
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March 23: The Republic of India should sign the Artemis Accords.
benefit and in the interests of all countries, irrespective of their degree of economic or scientific development,
and shall be the province of all mankind.” Article II is even more specific: “Outer space, including the
moon and other celestial bodies, is not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means
of use or occupation, or by any other means.” Because of this treaty, the United States carried a plaque to the
Moon that said, “We came in peace for all mankind.”[5] When the Apollo 11 astronauts planted the US flag, they
did so out of pride, but did not establish any claim or national priority.
This legal framework worked well initially, but people soon started wondering about what to do when
countries or private entities wanted to start commercial activity on the Moon, or build settlements. The
solution was the Moon Treaty, proposed by the United Nations and adopted by enough nations to come into
force in 1984.[6] But it has not yet been adopted by any major spacefaring nation. The United States, by a
recent executive order, has specifically renounced the treaty and stated its intentions to extract materials
from the Moon without any international agreement.[7]
The newly announced Artemis Accords go even further. Although the actual Accords have not been released
pending consultation with possible partners, the summary provided by NASA[8] indicates that the United States
will unilaterally interpret the Outer Space Treaty to allow “space resource extraction,” despite the
prohibition against appropriation in Article II of the Treaty. There will also be “safety zones” to avoid
“harmful interference” with such operations. The effect is to establish exclusive economic zones, especially
if “harmful interference” is defined to include economic harm, not just safety. Will the new Space Force be
used to protect such economic interests? Will other nations be excluded if they support the Moon
Treaty?[9] Will private actors be required to follow the same rules as states, as recommended in the
recently drafted Moon Village Principles?[10] This is the slippery slope of using unilateral action to
establish economic rights rather than an international agreement.
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March 23: The Republic of India should sign the Artemis Accords.
Prefer Pluralism: Only a pluralistic approach to space governance can prevent conflict
Chaudhary 21—[Preventing space warfare: The Artemis Accords and what it means for Australia — United States Studies Centre. (2023). Retrieved
4 February 2023, from https://www.ussc.edu.au/analysis/preventing-space-warfare-the-artemis-accords-and-what-it-means-for-australia] Debatetrack.
[Rahul Chaudhary was a research intern at the United States Studies Centre in 2021.]
[The United States Studies Centre at the University of Sydney is a university-based research centre, dedicated to the rigorous analysis of American foreign
policy, economics, politics and culture.]
Critics view the Accords’ requirement for signatories to first sign a bilateral agreement with the United
States as an attempt for it to dictate the rules of international space behaviour and regulations for future
space projects such as commercialisation and resource mining according to its national interests; therefore,
giving the United States immense bargaining power and leverage.
Considering the Accords to be too US-Centric, China and Russia did not sign the Accords, and instead opted
to develop their own lunar missions. Even countries that typically are aligned with the United States on
multistakeholder, rules-based matters, such as India, France, and Germany, have also not signed the Accords.
This suggests that establishing a clear and universal set of space-faring principles will be difficult at best and
impossible at worst, as the international community seeks to reconcile multiple competing interests. The Artemis
Accords is a step in the right direction, yet US dominance and the threat of a quasi-legal structure have
turned away many, making it ineffective to uphold space law and prevent militaristic conflict.
Military conflict in space may seem like a concept taken straight out of a Sci-Fi movie, yet it represents a
potential future for the international community if a unanimously codified treaty is not implemented. In a
future where countries choose to abide by their own rules and compete instead of cooperating, space
becomes irresistibly exploitable, an untapped market for economically beneficial resources and a nearinfinite amount of annexable land.
Resource competition in space and space mining is likely to become the most important point of global
contention in the near term. The issues it raises will challenge the principles within the Outer Space Treaty,
which declares that space is the common heritage of mankind and not to be exploited. For now, the Outer Space
Treaty remains the backbone of space law with 111 countries remaining signatories to the treaty, including
Russia, China, and the United States.
While the Artemis Accords represent a new opportunity to rewrite and update the rules of space from the
Outer Space Treaty, it is essential that they are rules all countries can agree on. A more pluralistic treaty,
incorporating the views and concerns of all countries, whilst aspirational and challenging, is the only way to
ensure peaceful cooperation in space and pacify the self-interested inclinations that come with resource
competition.
Australia, historically, has played a key role in supporting the US space industry, providing essential broadcasting
technologies to events such as the 1969 moon landing, and the monitoring of satellites on the behalf of NASA.
We also support the United States in various defence treaties, as well as share many common values, especially
that of the rules-based order, free and fair governance and cooperation. Thus, our decision to join the Accords is
not a surprise.
But we must be forthright in our advocation for equitably sharing the benefits of future space exploration
as outlined in the Outer Space Treaty. The Artemis Accords simply does not represent a favourable
starting point to ensure peaceful space resource utilisation and management of potential space warfare.
While we expect to benefit from the social and technological advancements associated with the future of space
exploration and the development of our own national space industry, we must clarify the norms and values we
wish to see in the conduct of all the world’s space forces: of peace, cooperation, equitable opportunity and the
advancement of the common good.
53
March 23: The Republic of India should sign the Artemis Accords.
Investments
Artemis’ bilateral approach hurts investment in space by creating a multiplicity of overlapping and
inconsistent outer space agreements
Silverstein 11/22—[Governance in outer space: The case for a new global order. (2023). Retrieved 4 February 2023, from
https://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/en/knowledge/publications/e8862684/governance-in-outer-space-the-case-for-a-new-global-order]. Debatetrack
[Benjamin Silverstein is a research analyst for the Space Project at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.]]
As at July 2022, only 18 States were parties to the Moon Agreement.16 Yet the conflict between this multilateral
normative space law instrument and the bilateral Artemis Accords is readily apparent. Australia is the only nation
which is a party to both the Artemis Accords and the Moon Agreement, raising questions as to how Australia can
purport to reconcile the conflicting approaches to property rights under each of the instruments.
Apart from the specific concern over property rights, there is a further systemic governance concern arising
from the approach of the Artemis Accords – that, in favouring bilateralism in relation to agreements
concerning outer space rights and obligations (whether between States, or between government agencies or
private enterprises), there is the potential for a multiplicity of overlapping and inconsistent outer space
agreements that could be the subject of disputes over competing rights and obligations. There is also an
incentive for parties to pursue commercial self-interest, instead of cooperation under the auspices of
common international space law and protocols.
The Artemis Accords do contemplate in article 10(4) that signatories will ‘use their experience under the
Accords to contribute to multilateral efforts to further develop international practices and rules applicable
to the extraction and utilisation of space resources’. Whether this occurs, and whether the property rights
approach under the Artemis Accords itself forms part of any such practices and rules, remains to be seen.
Ultimately, from a governance perspective, a common, multilateral-based oversight regime, supported by
consistent standards for the recognition of common and individual ownership interests and the extraction
and use of resources, is essential to ensure peaceful exploration in outer space and the long term viability of
investment in activities from public and private entities. Cooperation, rather than competition, will help to
deliver tangible benefits for every nation on Earth.
54
March 23: The Republic of India should sign the Artemis Accords.
India can and should focus on resource extraction from space while maintaining strategic autonomy
rather than signing on to any single country’s plan
Giri 20—[Giri, C. (2020). Artemis Accords propel India's space ambitions - Gateway House. Retrieved 4 February 2023, from
https://www.gatewayhouse.in/indias-artemis-moon/]. Debatetrack
[Dr. Chaitanya Giri is the former Gateway House Fellow of Space and Ocean Studies Programme. Prior to Gateway House, Dr. Giri has worked as planetary
and astromaterials scientist for nearly a decade. He was affiliated to the Earth-Life Science Institute at Tokyo Institute of Technology, the Geophysical
Laboratory at Carnegie Institution for Science, and the NASA Goddard Space Flight Center as an ELSI Origins Network Fellow.]
Under the ‘Artemis Accords’ the U.S. is planning an international coalition to extract natural resources
from the Moon. China is concurrently planning an Earth-Moon Special Economic Zone. India’s antiquated
endorsement of the 1979 Moon Agreement is shackling its true potential for economics-driven space
exploration. India must immediately do away with Cold-War era, vintage whims of global commons.
On 6th April 2020, the White House announced a presidential “Executive Order on Encouraging International
Support for the Recovery and Use of Space Resources”[1]. The order pledges to continue nurturing the U.S.’
private sector towards developing an “innovative and sustainable program” that will “lead the return of humans to
the Moon for long-term exploration and utilization, followed by human missions to Mars and other destinations”.
The order refers to the important Space Policy Directive-1 of 2017[2].
The order states that the U.S. Secretary of State will object to any international organization or nation opposing
U.S.’ cis-lunar (the space between Earth and Moon) plans, directly or indirectly, by invoking the 1979 Agreement
Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (also known as the Moon Agreement)
as a customary legal instrument. It also says the U.S. will proactively negotiate bilateral and multilateral
arrangements with foreign countries for “safe and sustainable operations for public and private recovery of outer
space”. This last part of the order is now being detailed as the U.S.-led, international Artemis Accord[3].
This is of immediate importance to India that has space ambitions but has been unable to leverage them
with an appropriate, updated, global positioning. The U.S.’s confidence in its human spaceflight, space
resource utilization, and space exploration capabilities is higher than ever before. With the retirement of the
Space Shuttle in 2011, the U.S. lost a human-rated, space-proven, heavy-lift, launch vehicle for an entire decade.
It was forced to rely on Russian launchers especially for logistics and astronaut transport to the International
Space Station. But the U.S. has recovered and has several heavy-lift launch vehicles in various stages of
development and preparedness. The NASA Space Launch System[4], the SpaceX’ Falcon Heavy[5], Blue
Origin’ New Glenn[6] and the United Launch Alliance’ (Lockheed Martin and Boeing’s joint venture) Vulcan
launch vehicles[7] are a strong force of heavy-lift launch vehicle contingencies. Not restricting the private
sector from the space industry, the U.S. has meticulously nurtured private sector companies to build
spacecrafts, space stations, payloads, and components, and operate them as space contractors to the
government with a business-to-business model.
The Artemis Accord and the U.S.’ disregard for the Moon Agreement has incited strong reactions from
China, given their continuing geopolitical contentions. China has dismissed the Artemis Accord as dated,
and as the space version of the ‘Enclosure Movement of the Middle Ages’[8], but does not admit its own
ambitious plans for presence on the Moon. The day news of the Artemis Accord[9] became public, China
tested the Flexible Inflatable Cargo Re-entry Vehicle (FICRV) aboard its new heavy-lift launcher the Long
March 4B[10]. The FICRV is a deep-space capsule, purpose-built for carrying Chinese taikonauts to the
Moon[11], and is an important constituent of China’s plans for an Earth-Moon Special Economic Zone.
Beijing plans to establish this cis-lunar economic zone by the year 2050, and once operational, China
expects the zone to generate an astonishing $10 trillion dollars through space-based services and
manufacturing, and extraction of extra-terrestrial natural resources. Beijing has entrusted its state-owned
aeronautics company – the China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation[12] – with the job of leading
the construction of this zone.
55
March 23: The Republic of India should sign the Artemis Accords.
China, like the U.S., never committed to the 1979 Moon Agreement as it clearly had plans for economic
gains from lunar exploration. The U.S. and China have end-to-end space capabilities and strong economies
to sustain space exploration and human spaceflight. Through the Artemis Accord and the Earth-Moon
Special Economic Zone, they want to lead a cohort of politically-aligned partners into outer space and
entrench them in their plans for precise economic and strategic gains, out of space exploration and human
spaceflight.
Both countries are therefore nurturing domestic private and public companies, as well as co-opting
overseas space-technology enterprises, to further enable their governmental space agencies to realize their
national ambitions.
Given these developments, it is time for India to immediately announce its withdrawal from the redundant
Moon Agreement that it had signed in 1982[13]. India must not remain signatory to a treaty that most spacefaring countries discredit with impunity.
India had hastily signed the Moon Agreement largely because of its then fascination with the concept of a
‘common heritage of humankind’[14] but its space policymakers have always refrained from its ratification or
accession. Since the beginning of the country’s space exploration programme in 1999, Indian space policymakers
have planned for the utilization of lunar resources and long-duration human presence in outer space and on the
Moon. With successful missions, Chandrayaan-1 (2008) and Chandrayaan-2 (2019) behind it, India is now
preparing to land on the South Pole of the Moon with its Chandrayaan-3 mission, scheduled for 2021[15].
Simultaneously, India is also scheduled to undertake its maiden orbital human spaceflight test – Gaganyaan – by
2022[16] and has plans for an Earth-orbiting space station by 2030[17].
The failed Moon Agreement was signed by only four countries and just 18 countries have decided to go a step
further and have acceded and ratified it[18]. Of these four signatories, only India and France have developed
planetary exploration and human spaceflight competencies, after signing the treaty. France has already shown its
support for the U.S.’s Artemis programme[19] and so have Japan, Australia and Canada.
Given the fast pace of developments in the space exploration industry and India’s large stakes in it, the
Department of Space needs to act swiftly and must do the following:
a) Articulate that it adheres to the Outer Space Treaty and patronizes internationally-recognized, best
practices and codes of conduct in outer space but is withdrawing from the failed Moon Agreement.
b) Resolve that its lunar and planetary exploration, and human spaceflight plans will be contemporaneous
with the international space exploration industry’s trends and aspirations.
c) Pledge unprecedented and unequivocal support to public and private sector industries including
start-ups, thus unleashing their potential to engage and prosper in the space exploration industry.
d) Envision economically pragmatic and technologically-practicable, lunar and planetary exploration
goals that are driven by synergies between space agency and industry for the next two decades.
India has maintained productive space partnerships with Europe, Russia, Japan and the U.S. It’s
adherence to strategic autonomy as a national doctrine, even on the space front, has given it a privileged
manoeuvrability across geopolitical blocs. Being the third largest economy in the making, India need not
conceptually side with any of the space groupings but make pragmatic collaborations. For India to be an
active leader rather than a bystander watching other countries venture into deep space and achieve
successes, it must now, urgently, open space exploration to its private sector instead of limiting it to a few,
however great, laboratories of the Indian Space Research Organization.
56
March 23: The Republic of India should sign the Artemis Accords.
Legality
The Artemis Accords are strictly US-led, outside the bounds of the United Nations and international
law—this makes its intentions suspicious and its terms illegal
Newman 20—[Artemis Accords: why many countries are refusing to sign Moon exploration agreement. (2020). Retrieved 3 February 2023, from
https://theconversation.com/artemis-accords-why-many-countries-are-refusing-to-sign-moon-exploration-agreement-148134] Debatetrack.
[Christophen Newman is Professor of Space Law and Policy, Northumbria University, Newcastle.]
If the substance is reassuring, the US promotion of the accords outside of the “normal” channels of
international space law – such as the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space – will be a cause
of consternation for some states. By requiring potential collaborators to sign bilateral agreements on
behaviour instead, some nations will see the US as trying to impose their own quasi-legal rules. This could
see the US leveraging partnership agreements and lucrative financial contracts to reinforce its own dominant
leadership position.
Russia has already stated that the Artemis Program is too “US-centric” to sign it in its present form.
China’s absence is explained by the US congressional prohibition on collaboration with the country.
Concerns that this is a power grab by the US and its allies are fuelled by the lack of any African or South
American countries amongst the founding partner states.
Intriguingly Germany, France and India are also absent. These are countries with well developed space
programmes that would surely have benefited from being involved in Project Artemis. Their opposition may be
down to a preference for the Moon Agreement and a desire to see a properly negotiated treaty governing lunar
exploration.
The European Space Agency (ESA) as an organisation has not signed on to the accords either, but a number of
ESA member states have. This is unsurprising. The ambitious US deadline for the project will clash with the
lengthy consultation of the 17 member states required for the ESA to sign on as a whole.
Ultimately, the Artemis Accords are revolutionary in the field of space exploration. Using bilateral agreements
that dictate norms of behaviour as a condition of involvement in a programme is a significant change in space
governance. With Russia and China opposing them, the accords are sure to meet diplomatic resistance and
their very existence may provoke antagonism in traditional UN forums.
Questions also remain about the impact that the looming US election and the COVID-19 pandemic will have on
the programme. We already know that President Trump is keen to see astronauts on the Moon by 2024. The
approach of his Democratic rival, Joe Biden, is a lot less clear. He may well be less wedded to the 2024 deadline
and instead aim for broader diplomatic consensus on behaviour through engagement at the UN.
While broader international acceptance may be desirable, the US believes that the lure of the opportunities
afforded by the Artemis Program will bring other partners on board soon enough. Space-active states now face a
stark choice: miss out on being the first to use the resources of the Moon, or accept the price of doing
business and sign up to the Artemis Accords.
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March 23: The Republic of India should sign the Artemis Accords.
Mining
Conflict: The Accords’ thinly-veiled groundwork for resource exploitation will lead to conflict
Mohanty 22—[Artemis Accords: a step toward space mining and colonisation? - Friends of Europe. (2020). Retrieved 5 February 2023, from
https://www.friendsofeurope.org/insights/artemis-accords-a-step-toward-space-mining-and-colonisation/] Debatetrack.
[Dr. Susmita Mohanty (born 1971) is an Indian spaceship designer, serial space entrepreneur and a climate action advocate. She is well known for her
research on space related topics. She co-founded India's first private space start-up, Earth2Orbit in 2009. She is the only space entrepreneur in the world to
have started companies on three different continents in Asia, Europe and North America.]
Section 10 of the Artemis Accords focuses on ‘space resources’ noting that its use can benefit humankind, by
providing critical support for safe and sustainable operations. It also notes that the extraction and utilisation of
space resources should be executed in a manner that complies with the Outer Space Treaty and supports safe and
sustainable space initiatives.
The Accords have been dressed up as a “practical set of principles, guidelines, and best practices to enhance the
governance of the civil exploration and use of outer space”, but it would be myopic to not read between the lines.
The Accords herald the beginning of a race to harvest resources on the Moon which seems to be gathering
momentum. If the history on our home planet is anything to go by, commercial space resource mining can
neither lead to a peaceful nor environmentally sustainable presence on the Moon.
Three out of the eight signatories to this new agreement are keen on off-Earth mining and have taken legal steps
to ensure their companies can own and sell the celestial loot. It would therefore be unwise to view this
agreement as a benign instrument to facilitate cooperation between friendly nations for sustainable
exploration of outer space despite assurances made to that effect.
The honesty of intent in a recent quote by Dr. Mohammed Al Ahbabi, Director-General of the UAE Space
Agency, who compared outer space exploration to the law of the sea in international waters where no state can
claim sovereignty over the sea but commercial fishing operations can own and sell what they obtain, could serve
well as the prologue to the new agreement instead of letting it linger in the margins – “If you don’t own the fish
then why go to the sea?”.
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March 23: The Republic of India should sign the Artemis Accords.
Rich-Poor Gap
The Artemis Accords provide legal grounds for accelerating the rich-poor gap by giving rich
countries—those who get to the moon first—preferential access to those resources
Deplano 22—[Artemis Accords: First in, first served as Moon-mining gains legality. (2022). Retrieved 3 February 2023, from
https://www.eastmojo.com/space/2022/04/12/artemis-accords-first-in-first-served-as-moon-mining-gains-legality/] Debatetrack.
[Rossana Deplano is Associate Professor and Co-Director of the Centre for European Law and Internationalization, University of Leicester, UK. She has no
conflicts to declare.]
International law was rocked by the introduction of the Artemis Accords, an agreement that allows mining
on the Moon in support of scientific missions.
Richer nations stand to gain the most from access to space, with a recent international agreement allowing
them to lawfully mine the Moon and other objects in space in support of scientific missions. The United
States announced a plan to return humans to the Moon in 2020, half a century after the Apollo missions. Named
after the twin sister of Apollo, the Artemis plan aims at establishing a permanent human presence on the Moon
and a lunar orbiting station called the Gateway.
The Artemis missions on the Moon will serve as a testing ground for the first human missions to Mars and
beyond, effectively marking a new era in human spaceflight. To ensure the sustainability of long-term human
missions, the Artemis plan envisions the use of space resources. For example, mining the rocks and soil of
the Moon for oxygen and hydrogen. Oxygen can provide breathing air, and combining oxygen and
hydrogen can serve as drinking water as well as a radiation shield on the lunar camp. Oxygen and
hydrogen are also the basic elements of propellant, which is essential for space travel.
Current outer space treaties do not regulate the use of space resources. Nor do they prohibit it. The most widely
adopted space law is the United Nations’ 1967 Outer Space Treaty. It says that countries can’t claim
ownership of parts of the Moon or other objects in space. “Outer space, including the Moon and other celestial
bodies, is not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any
other means.”
The Artemis plan clarifies the legal basis for using space resources in support of the Artemis missions in an
agreement called the Artemis Accords. Legally speaking, the Accords are not a treaty: they do not create binding
obligations under international law. They only apply to the United States and the other countries that intend to
take part in the Artemis missions. However, the Artemis Accords have legal significance. They are presented as
“implement[ing] the provisions of the Outer Space Treaty”. As such, they represent a blueprint of conduct that
other nations may follow for their own purposes.
Some provisions in the Artemis Accords add detail and interpretation to the Outer Space Treaty. This is where the
issue of fairness comes into play.
The Artemis Accords clarify that “the extraction of space resources does not inherently constitute national
appropriation”, provided that “contracts and other legal instruments relating to space resources should be
consistent with the [Outer Space] Treaty”. In other words, nations mining the resources of the Moon do not
acquire any property rights over those resources; they do not own them.
In this sense, the Artemis Accords remain within the Outer Space Treaty’s provision on national appropriation. In
practice, the absence of any regulatory framework determining who has access to space resources and
under what circumstances, mean the Artemis Accords support the use of space resources on a first come,
first served basis. As a result, states with the financial and technological means to get there first will gain
the most. Less developed or emerging spacefaring states will not profit from space resource utilisation, at
least not directly.
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March 23: The Republic of India should sign the Artemis Accords.
Another provision of the Artemis Accords, adding detail to the text of the Outer Space Treaty, requires nations
conducting activities on the Moon to create a ‘safety zone’ to avoid harmful interference with the activities
of other nations. A safety zone is a temporary exclusion zone of limited size. The Outer Space Treaty does not
mention safety zones. It only requires nations to conduct their activities in outer space “with due regard” to others
operating in space.
But the Artemis Accords also introduce new concepts. For example, Section 9 aims at preserving outer space
heritage through the creation of a safety zone. While protection of historic sites on Earth is uncontroversial,
determining an historic site in outer space has no precedent.
If a nation unilaterally declared an area of the Moon a place of historic value, it could violate the principle
of non-appropriation. For example, the United States may declare the Apollo 11 landing site and Neil
Armstrong’s boot prints a site of historic value and create a safety zone around it. Such action could
amount to a de facto appropriation of an area of the Moon. The Artemis Accords appear to anticipate this
pitfall by requiring nations to engage in multilateral efforts to develop rules aimed at preserving outer space
heritage.
One way international law develops and evolves is through practices that become so ingrained that states consider
them to have the value of law. As of April 2022, 18 countries have signed the Artemis Accords. As many signed
the 1979 Moon Agreement, the least ratified among the outer space treaties.
If the number of nations supporting the Artemis Accords keeps increasing, it will create a widely shared standard
of conduct. A growing number of nations relying on the Artemis Accords to carry out space activities will
reinforce the belief that they are the applicable law for space mining, safety zones and heritage protection. The
Artemis Accords are not international law, but they have the potential to become the next customary
practice in international law.
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March 23: The Republic of India should sign the Artemis Accords.
Russia
Russia sees the Artemis Accords as space colonialism, a move by the US to provide a legal grounds
to seize resources at will
Fidler 20—[The Artemis Accords and the Next Generation of Outer Space Governance. (2023). Retrieved 2 February 2023, from
https://www.cfr.org/blog/artemis-accords-and-next-generation-outer-space-governance] Debatetrack.
[David P. Fidler is senior fellow for global health and cybersecurity at the Council on Foreign Relations. He is an expert in international law, cybersecurity,
national security, terrorism, counterinsurgency, international trade, biosecurity, and global health.]
The most controversial aspect of the Artemis Accords involves the issue of space resources. The accords
reinforce the long-standing U.S. position that the Outer Space Treaty permits countries to use resources,
such as minerals and ice on the Moon and Mars, in space activities. In April, President Trump issued
an executive order re-confirming the U.S. view that space is not a “global commons” and that U.S. policy
encourages “international support for the public and private recovery and use of resources in outer space,
consistent with applicable law.”
The U.S. position is not universally shared, and the executive order generated criticism. Roscosmos, the Russian
space agency, compared the U.S. stance to colonialism, in claiming for the United States the right to seize
territories and resources in space. Similarly, Russian officials expressed unease about the Artemis Accords
and their compatibility with international law, with the Roscosmos director asserting that “the principle of
invasion is the same, whether it be the Moon or Iraq.” This reaction suggests that Russia and like-minded
countries might oppose the accords in the UN Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space or create a
rival governance initiative on lunar activities.
Any such efforts will not deter the United States. As the world’s leading spacefaring power, it has
tremendous leverage in setting the conditions under which other countries participate in the Artemis
Program. The Artemis Accords embrace rules and principles developed through multilateralism rather than a
scofflaw version of American unilateralism. The agreements that NASA concludes with other space agencies will
serve as evidence of international support for the U.S. position on the use of space resources. Here, the United
States uses American power and influence to advance its interests through international agreements that
implement principles anchored in multilateral regimes for space activities. As it should be.
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March 23: The Republic of India should sign the Artemis Accords.
Space Debris
Prefer Multilateralism: individual state approaches fail to address space debris—but a UN-chartered
multilateral agreement could
Silverstein 11/22—[Governance in outer space: The case for a new global order. (2023). Retrieved 4 February 2023, from
https://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/en/knowledge/publications/e8862684/governance-in-outer-space-the-case-for-a-new-global-order]. Debatetrack
[Benjamin Silverstein is a research analyst for the Space Project at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.]]
Ultimately, from a governance perspective, a common, multilateral-based oversight regime, supported by
consistent standards for the recognition of common and individual ownership interests and the extraction and use
of resources, is essential to ensure peaceful exploration in outer space and the long term viability of investment in
activities from public and private entities. Cooperation, rather than competition, will help to deliver tangible
benefits for every nation on Earth.
The trend towards an individualist State approach in the exploration of outer space and the movement
away from collectivism and multilateralism has also left a void in governance and accountability which
risks compromising the long-term safety and sustainability of outer space activities. This is particularly
apparent in relation to the vexed issue of space debris.
The European Space Agency (ESA) has estimated that there are currently more than 8,410 satellites
orbiting the Earth in outer space, along with 36,500 pieces of space debris larger than 10 centimetres.
Debris can travel at speeds of more than seven kilometres per second – 25 times faster than a commercial
airliner. This ‘orbital graveyard’ – litter comprising around 9,000 metric tonnes of debris– is expected to
expand significantly each year unless proactive remediation and removal steps are taken, creating a risk of
‘catastrophic in-space collisions’. This may precipitate the ‘Kessler effect’, in which the low-Earth orbit
(LEO) – extending 2,000 kilometres beyond the Earth’s atmosphere – is so crowded that one collision will
lead to a chain reaction of cascading further collisions, potentially making the LEO inaccessible altogether
in future years.
Collaborative efforts among different nations to undertake a space debris remediation program are
limited. That is not to say that there is an absence of protocols and standards. Indeed, in 2002, the Inter-Agency
Space Debris Coordination Committee (IADC) – currently comprised of the national space agencies from 12
countries, long with the ESA – adopted non-binding guidelines designed to mitigate the increase in space debris.
In 2007, the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee of the UN COPUOS adopted space debris mitigation
guidelines (also non-binding) based on the IADC standards, which were endorsed by the UN General Assembly
in December 2007. The resulting Space Debris Mitigation Guidelines of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of
Outer Space offer seven broad principles intended to ‘be considered’ in the mission planning, design, manufacture
and operational phases of spacecraft and launch vehicle orbital stages: limiting debris released during normal
operations, minimising the potential for break-ups during operational phases, limiting the probability of accidental
collision in orbit, avoiding intentional destruction and other harmful activities, minimising the potential from postmission break-ups due to on-board sources of stored energy, and limiting the long-term presence of spacecraft and
launch vehicle orbital stages in the LEO region and geosynchronous Earth orbit region after the end of the
mission.
However, the practicalities of in fact removing space debris have proved to be difficult. As the ESA notes, space
debris mitigation guidelines provide a framework for what needs to be done, but not for how it is to be achieved.
A key issue is that there is no definition of ‘space debris’ in any internationally binding space treaty or other
instrument. There is reference in the Outer Space Treaty and the Liability Convention to ‘space object’ but there is
no distinction between a functional space object and a non-functional space object – the latter properly falling
within the scope of what space debris may commonly be understood to be. This is problematic because, according
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March 23: The Republic of India should sign the Artemis Accords.
to the Outer Space Treaty, space objects remain the property and responsibility of the ‘launching State’. Even an
uncontrolled, fragmented piece of space debris – as a ‘space object’ – would therefore continue to be owned by
the State which launched the satellite or other object into outer space in the first place. This means that salvage
rights of the kind seen in maritime law – where other States are entitled to remove pieces of debris posing a threat
to safety and security – are currently inconsistent with the international outer space regulatory framework. This
undermines the basis for cooperative efforts to design and implement an active space debris removal and
remediation program.
Recognising a clear distinction between functional and non-functional space objects would serve as a basis to
build such a program, supported by recognised and accepted salvage principles. Those principles could be
combined with an agreed waiver of sovereignty over identifiable space debris and authorisation for other States to
undertake removal activities. For smaller fragments of debris that cannot be identified, there could be automatic
salvage rights without the need for removal authorisation from the launching State.
This could in turn give confidence to private entities to invest in technologies that would facilitate the rapid
removal of space debris – opening the door to the commercialisation of debris removal in outer space just as much
as the commercialisation of satellite, imaging, mining and other activities.
Apart from this threshold definitional issue, the Liability Convention – which purports to define the scope of
States’ outer space liabilities to incentivise responsible behaviour – lacks the precision and clarity needed to
ensure that end by encouraging States to take responsibility for the removal of space debris originating from
objects launched from their territories. The Liability Convention contemplates that a launching State may be liable
for damage caused in outer space (including, in theory, from flying space debris), but only in the event of
‘fault’. That standard is left at large, and there is no clear framework for identifying causation and ultimate
liability for collisions. To encourage active remediation steps in relation to space debris, the ‘deterrent impact’ of
failing to take responsibility for the removal of the debris needs to be strengthened.
There is also a need to develop standards for space traffic management and space situational awareness. This
would help to improve safety and orbital debris management, and reduce the likelihood of collisions in outer
space.
The existing governance framework has, in this sense, become outdated and is not adapted to deal with the
contemporary issues and problems that have come from the commercialisation of outer space. A new
binding space debris mitigation framework – designed and facilitated by the UN COPUOS – is necessary to
ensure cooperation and the ongoing sustainability of outer space activities. The issue of the funding of a
remediation program and the apportionment of costs among nations – when the majority of existing space debris
can be attributed to the main space-faring nations of the United States, Russia and China – is also critical, and will
form a key part in negotiating a new regulatory framework.
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March 23: The Republic of India should sign the Artemis Accords.
Moon Debris: without an agreement all space-faring countries ascent to, we’ll trash the Moon much
as we’ve trashed low-earth orbit
Mohanty 22—[Artemis Accords: a step toward space mining and colonisation? - Friends of Europe. (2020). Retrieved 5 February 2023, from
https://www.friendsofeurope.org/insights/artemis-accords-a-step-toward-space-mining-and-colonisation/] Debatetrack.
[Dr. Susmita Mohanty (born 1971) is an Indian spaceship designer, serial space entrepreneur and a climate action advocate. She is well known for her
research on space related topics. She co-founded India's first private space start-up, Earth2Orbit in 2009. She is the only space entrepreneur in the world to
have started companies on three different continents in Asia, Europe and North America.]
We are living in a crucial moment in history where the West is re-examining its colonial and slave-running past,
where the world is grappling with climate collapse and a once-in-a-lifetime pandemic, where indigenous
communities are being vocal about the need to restore and respect traditional ecological knowledge systems,
where social and economic justice are back in the spotlight. It would be wise and timely for humanity to not
hide behind anachronistic space treaties in this hour of reckoning, to instead discuss the repercussions of
space resource exploitation with candour and concern for Earth’s immediate neighbourhood.
We can start by treating the Moon as our eighth continent for purposes of legal and policy deliberation.
Antarctica, our seventhcontinent, could serve as a precedent to ensure we do not destroy a shared resource
despite vested interests and pressure to monetise. If we refuse to act, we will wreck the Moon, much the
same way we have wrecked low earth orbit with millions of manmade debris objects due to the absence of
farsighted laws.
Who better than the European Union to play a lead role in crafting a bolder agreement with foresight that
addresses space resource exploitation, ownership implications of the laws passed by individual nations, and
come up with enforceable laws, acceptable to all COPOUS member states, not just a handful of US allies?
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March 23: The Republic of India should sign the Artemis Accords.
Space Hegemony
Hegemony: The Accords enable the US to perpetuate its existing hegemonic practices in outer
space
Chugh 21—[Legally Reaching For The Moon: Artemis Accords and Should India Sign It. (2023). Retrieved 4 February 2023, from
https://lawbeat.in/articles/legally-reaching-moon-artemis-accords-and-should-india-sign-it] Debatetrack.
[Subha Chugh is a Lawyer, Legal Consultant and Advisor based in New Delhi]
On 13th October 2020, in a livestream the Accords were signed by the directors of the national space agencies of
the United States, Australia, Canada, Japan, Luxembourg, Italy, the United Kingdom, and the United Arab
Emirates, with Ukraine, South Korea and New Zealand following suit and Brazil expected to join later in 2021.
The Artemis Accords have generally been lauded for being an agreement that will inspire uniform standards of
cooperation and exploration. Further, with this agreement, the US has used existing governance regimes
rather than pursuing a revision of old treaties or negotiating new agreements, though the fact that they
were drafted primarily by NASA in collaboration with the U.S. Department of State and the newly reestablished National Space Council and that they are for a US led mission does speak to US hegemony over
the whole matter and space laws at large. If history is any evidence, US’ dominance, as benevolently hidden
as it might be, finds its way out eventually, often at the cost of other ‘expendable’ nations. Concern has
been expressed over the fact that the treaty makes the US a licensing nation for commercial space
companies and in turn a ‘gatekeeper’ to the moon and other celestial bodies. Russia has already called the
accords “Too US- centric” and eventually went on to participate in the Chinese Programme. (China has proposed
its own version of a permanent lunar base.)
While the Outer Space Treaty establishes that no one can lay claim to the other worlds, NASA has made it
clear that countries and companies can own and use resources that are derived from the Moon. This has
incited objections against the motives behind the accord and their potential consequences.
It is also worth noting that both Germany and France, each with their own well developed Space programmes
have so far not joined the accords.
The only regulatory framework governing the space industry in India is determined by the Satellite
Communication Policy, 1997, the revised Remote Sensing Data Policy, 2011, the Technology Transfer Policy of
ISRO, in addition to the setting up of a new organisation called Indian National Space Promotion and
Authorisation Centre (IN-SPACe) which is yet to be established. The existing laws deal with dissemination of
data and regulating satellite use but make no mention of actual space exploration or the use of celestial resources
or even intellectual property rights, thus becoming a part of an international bid for space exploration can be good
for India and its mission to be a super power, which severely lacks in any codified space law.
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March 23: The Republic of India should sign the Artemis Accords.
Land Grab: The Accords are seen as an American land grab in space that sets to perpetuate existing
inequalities between countries
Grush 22—[Grush, Loren. (2022). Why France signing NASA’s lunar exploration pact is the most important signature yet / Now 20 countries are on
board with the Artemis Accords. Retrieved 2 February 2023, from https://www.theverge.com/2022/6/10/23159558/nasa-artemis-accords-france-signingmoon-exploration-significance] Debatetrack.
[Loren Grush was formerly a science reporter for The Verge, the technology and culture brand from Vox Media, where she specialized in all things space—
from distant stars and planets to human space flight and the commercial space race. The daughter of two NASA engineers, she grew up surrounded by space
shuttles and rocket scientists—literally. She also hosted Space Craft, an original online video series that examined what it takes to send people to space.]
The Artemis Accords build upon the backbone of international space law, known as the Outer Space Treaty.
Entered into force in 1967, the treaty creates a loose framework for how nations should explore space. Signatories
agree to explore space peacefully, not to claim sovereignty over celestial objects like the Moon and Mars, and not
to put weapons of mass destruction in space. But the Outer Space Treaty is vague by design, which has left many
of its tenets open to interpretation and debate over the last half-century.
The Artemis Accords take things further, focusing on slightly more rigid standards for exploring the Moon. For
instance, the agreement establishes areas on the Moon called “safety zones.” If one nation is conducting work on a
region of the lunar surface, it’ll let the other signatories know and other countries will not interfere in that area.
The Accords also call for the preservation of heritage sights, such as the landing locations for the Apollo missions,
and also protect the “extraction and utilization” of space resources. That way, countries can mine the Moon for
materials and then use those materials in their lunar exploration efforts.
When the Artemis Accords were first presented, they had their fair share of criticism. One major critique
revolved around the use of lunar resources, with some arguing the Accords were an American land grab in
space. The concept of utilizing space resources is seen by some as conflicting with the Outer Space Treaty’s
instruction not to claim sovereignty of a celestial object. In fact, this was partly one of France’s concerns at
first, according to Swiney.
“France has been one of the countries making clear that they think that space resources is something that the
international community needs to really spend some time and think about,” he says. “So that it doesn’t
become either a Wild West gold rush situation, or that it doesn’t just replicate some of the same
inequalities that we see on Earth.”
NASA and government officials worked with the French space agency, attempting to combat what they
considered to be a misperception that space resources were prohibited by the Outer Space Treaty. Ultimately,
France came around, with NASA presenting the Artemis Accords as simply a starting point — not an end to the
space resources discussion. Under the Accords, nations can extract resources, but “you have to do it lawfully and
you need to keep talking about it and resolve some of these bigger questions.” Swiney says. “So I think they
realized that that was a good starting point, to then address the issues that they continue to feel very strongly
about.”
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March 23: The Republic of India should sign the Artemis Accords.
Technical Difficulties
The Artemis program is plagued by a series of technical difficulties, management issues and cost
overruns, and is projected to cost $93 billion through 2025—according to NASA itself, this may make
the program unsustainable
NASA – Office of Inspector General 21—[NASA’S MANAGEMENT OF THE ARTEMIS MISSIONS (2021). Retrieved 4 February
2023, from https://oig.nasa.gov/docs/IG-22-003.pdf]. Debatetrack
The Artemis program seeks to return humans to the Moon by late 2024 rather than 2028 as initially
planned. Faced with a shortened timeframe, an uncertain budget, and the nascency of the required
development work, NASA implemented modifications to its routine procurement and program
management practices in an attempt to accelerate the mission schedule and reduce costs. The Agency’s
lunar strategy includes development of the Space Launch System (SLS) heavylift rocket, the Orion
Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle (Orion) capsule, a Human Landing System (HLS) to transport astronauts
from lunar orbit to the Moon’s surface, the Gateway outpost orbiting the Moon, next-generation
spacesuits, and delivery of science investigations and technology demonstrations to the lunar surface by
commercial landers.
Currently NASA’s most ambitious and costly activity, the Artemis program faces schedule,
procurement, technical, and funding risks. This includes procurement of Artemis-related
technologies and space flight hardware using research and development contracts that leverage
commercial capabilities but require a Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) deviation for acquiring
services and hardware. SLS and Orion have also experienced technical challenges in later
development phases as well as the effects of COVID-19 restrictions and severe weather events.
Additionally, the Gateway and HLS Programs received significantly less funding in fiscal year
(FY) 2021 than required to meet NASA’s initial acquisition strategy.
As the second in a series of audits examining NASA’s Artemis plans, this report assessed the Artemis
program’s schedule and projected costs as well as how the Agency’s acquisition and programmatic
approaches facilitate landing astronauts on the Moon. To complete this work, we reviewed documents,
systems, policies, and procedures pertaining to schedule, cost, budget, operations, acquisition strategy,
and program/project management requirements related to Artemis, its programs, and contactors. We also
reviewed contracts, interviewed NASA and contractor officials, and conducted site visits at SpaceX
headquarters in California and its Starbase facility in Texas.
NASA’s three initial Artemis missions, designed to culminate in a crewed lunar landing, face varying
degrees of technical difficulties and delays heightened by the COVID-19 pandemic and weather events
that will push launch schedules from months to years past the Agency’s current goals. With Artemis I
mission elements now being integrated and tested at Kennedy Space Center, we estimate NASA will be
ready to launch by summer 2022 rather than November 2021 as planned. Although Artemis II is
scheduled to launch in late 2023, we project that it will be delayed until at least mid-2024 due to
the mission’s reuse of Orion components from Artemis I. While the Advanced Exploration Systems
(AES) Division—which includes HLS, Gateway, and next-generation spacesuits—is working on an
integrated master schedule (IMS) for Artemis III that incorporates Exploration Systems Development
(ESD) Division programs—SLS, Orion, and Exploration Ground Systems—the draft version does not
include information on programs critical to Artemis that are outside of AES and ESD. Given the time
needed to develop and fully test the HLS and new spacesuits, we project NASA will exceed its
current timetable for landing humans on the Moon in late 2024 by several years.
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March 23: The Republic of India should sign the Artemis Accords.
In addition, NASA lacks a comprehensive and accurate cost estimate that accounts for all Artemis
program costs. For FYs 2021 through 2025, the Agency uses a rough estimate for the first three
missions that excludes $25 billion for key activities related to planned missions beyond Artemis III.
When aggregating all relevant costs across mission directorates, NASA is projected to spend $93
billion on the Artemis effort up to FY 2025. We also project the current production and operations
cost of a single SLS/Orion system at $4.1 billion per launch for Artemis I through IV, although the
Agency’s ongoing initiatives aimed at increasing affordability seek to reduce that cost. Multiple factors
contribute to the high cost of ESD programs, including the use of sole-source, cost-plus contracts;
the inability to definitize key contract terms in a timely manner; and the fact that except for the
Orion capsule, its subsystems, and the supporting launch facilities, all components are expendable
and “single use” unlike emerging commercial space flight systems. Without capturing, accurately
reporting, and reducing the cost of future SLS/Orion missions, the Agency will face significant
challenges to sustaining its Artemis program in its current configuration.
Further, for HLS, NASA has modified its traditional acquisition approach for large space flight
programs to reduce costs, encourage innovation, and meet an aggressive schedule for its Artemis lunar
landings. While its acquisition approach relies on competition to drive down costs and ensure
redundancy, the Agency selected a single provider—SpaceX— after receiving $2.5 billion less than
requested for HLS development in FY 2021. To help compensate, the Agency is accelerating its Lunar
Exploration Transportation Services procurement for sustainable, regularly-recurring crewed lunar
transportation services, and in September 2021 awarded five HLS contracts for the continued
development of sustainable HLS capabilities as a prelude to the competitive services procurement. Over
the past year, NASA has worked to solidify its HLS requirements and standards, established insight and
collaboration teams, and plans to establish resident offices at SpaceX. However, under NASA’s tailored
project management approach, HLS will use less standardized milestone reviews and instead utilize
other techniques such as annual synchronization reviews throughout development and testing, but this
approach runs the risk of technical changes later in development. Finally, instead of using a systems
integrator or Artemis program manager, NASA is establishing various collaborative processes
including new boards and a multi-directorate council to facilitate the communication and
approval process. The effectiveness of this approach remains to be seen. While these modified
approaches have the potential benefit of decreasing costs and encouraging innovation, they also
raise the possibility of schedule and performance risks on NASA’s human-rated systems.
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March 23: The Republic of India should sign the Artemis Accords.
Water
Artemis provisions are inadequate to deal with water extraction on the moon, which require largescale operations not easily confined to ‘safety zones’—a multilateral governance framework is
needed for larger extraction operations
McKeown et al. 22—[McKeown, B., Dempster, A., & Saydam, S. (2022). Artemis Accords: Are Safety Zones Practical for Long Term
Commercial Lunar Resource Utilisation?. Space Policy, 62, 101504. doi: 10.1016/j.spacepol.2022.101504] Debatetrack.
[Ben McKeown is an mineral extraction investor and a PhD student studying Space Resources
Andrew G. Dempster is Director of the Australian Centre for Space Engineering Research, UNSW, Sydney, Australia
Serkan Saydam, PhD is a professor and senior lecturer]
Commercial lunar resource extraction activities could become a reality in the mid to long term. Under the existing
Outer Space Treaty, there is ambiguity regarding the legal context within which such activities could occur. The
Artemis Accords, signed in 2020, are proposed as a mechanism by which space resource extraction activities
could take place, with a key proposal of the Accords being the use of Safety Zones to facilitate lunar resource
extraction. Whilst the use of Safety Zones is ostensibly proposed for small scale In Situ Resource Utilisation
(ISRU) activities focussed on lunar water production, messaging around the Artemis Accords has indicated
that there may be an intent to use them to set precedent for longer term, larger scale commercial resource activity.
This article explores the practicability of using Safety Zones for large scale commercial lunar resource extraction
from the perspective of the commercial entities that could undertake such activities. Conceptual long term demand
for water sourced from ice contained in the lunar Permanently Shadowed Regions (PSRs) is derived, and the
surface area required to produce sufficient water to meet this market demand determined. Due to the potential
characteristics of water ice occurrence in the lunar PSRs, the footprint of operations could be substantial,
and virtually without precedent in the terrestrial extractive resource industries. The article concludes that
the use of the Safety Zones proposed in the Artemis Accords could be impractical for the governance of
large scale commercial lunar resource production. It is suggested that whilst small scale ISRU activities
take place under the auspices of the Artemis Accords, efforts are continued to develop a
multilateral governance framework acceptable to both the international community and to the commercial
sector for the potential large scale development of lunar resources.
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March 23: The Republic of India should sign the Artemis Accords.
Con Blocks
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March 23: The Republic of India should sign the Artemis Accords.
AT Deconfliction
The Artemis Accords’ deconfliction wording is at best redundant, and at worst sloppy and it need of
revision
Cowing 20—[Cowing, K. (2020). What Are The Artemis Accords And Why Do We Need Them?. Retrieved 5 February 2023, from
https://spaceref.com/science-and-exploration/what-are-the-artemis-accords-and-why-do-we-need-them/] Debatetrack
[Keith Cowing is an American astrobiologist, former NASA employee, and the editor of the American space program blog NASA Watch. He is
a credentialed NASA journalist and is known to be a critic of NASA activities and policies.]
With regard to operational bases or research experiment locations on the Moon, it should don’t be difficult for
sponsors to provide reasonable areas with varying levels of access so as to prevent navigation hazards, scientific
disruptions, or communications interference. Indeed if we are going to have multiple human bases on the
Moon at some point it would be unlikely that we’d not know where everyone is simply due to satellites in
orbit observing the Moon. “Deconfliction” is a term you normally hear used to define the process of making
sure that military forces do not mistake one another or interfere with each other’s zones of influence or
operations. No one seems to be talking about military bases on or near the Moon – and they are already
prohibited by virtue of international treaty. As such the wording use by NASA is probably in need of some
slight revision.
In summary a lot of what is contained in the Artemis Accords, as NASA has public described them thus far, has
ample precedent on Earth. As noted above, I have been on expeditions where I lived in remote, dangerous
locations where help form the outside was unlikely and local resources were called upon in contingencies. The
last thing I’d think of doing would be to hamper my neighbor’s operations in any way since they might be
the people who come to rescue me tomorrow if I get in trouble. I don’t want them to have logistic issues and
I certainly do not want them to be mad at me if I call for help.
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March 23: The Republic of India should sign the Artemis Accords.
AT Governance
The Artemis accords fail to adequately provide rules for space governance
Ramanathan et al. 20— India and the Artemis Accords. (2021). Retrieved 3 February 2023, from
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/618a55c4cb03246776b68559/t/623060e18f0ff4552955f271/1647337698479/India-and-the-Artemis-Accords.pdf]
Debatetrack.
[Aditya is an Associate Fellow with the Takshashila Institution. A journalist by training, he has previously worked at Mint and as a freelancer. He has also
researched and written on colonial-era Indian military history.
Aditya Pareek was a Research Analyst with the Strategic Studies Programme at the Takshashila Institution from 2020 to 2022. He worked on issues relating
to space, nuclear and foreign policy with a specific interest in Russian affairs.
Nitansha Bansal was an intern with the Strategic Studies team from April to September 2021. Her research interests included Foreign Affairs, Cybersecurity,
Nuclear Studies and Space Technology.]
1. Since the Artemis Accords are a series of broad-based bilateral agreements and not a detailed multilateral
treaty, they do not meaningfully address the lacuna evident in existing space law.
Two points are most evident:
a. Harmful interference: Under Article IX of the OST, a state experiencing ‘harmful interference’ can
only ‘request consultation’. The Accords do not go beyond the OST to develop a practical dispute
resolution mechanism, despite making signing of the Accords a prerequisite for the Artemis exploration
programme.
b. Liability: The Accords also do not build on the 1972 Liability Convention to establish a mechanism
for liability from damage caused during lunar activity.
2. There is no provision for mutual inspection of lunar facilities, which is a useful mechanism for building
transparency and trust.
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March 23: The Republic of India should sign the Artemis Accords.
AT Legal Vacuum
Even with the Accords, there’s still no clear framework for a slew of important issues in space
Atkins et al. 11/22—[Governance in outer space: The case for a new global order. (2023). Retrieved 4 February 2023, from
https://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/en/knowledge/publications/e8862684/governance-in-outer-space-the-case-for-a-new-global-order]. Debatetrack
[Scott Atkins is a lawyer and Global Chair at Norton Rose Fulbright Australia. Martyn Taylor, Holly McAdam, Richard Morrison and Jo Feldman are
lawyers and partners at Norton Rose Fulbright Australia]
In more recent times, this multilateral approach has been superseded by an individualist State approach, as the
economic potential and commercialisation of outer space has been realised. Outer space activities now support
many aspects of our everyday lives, from high-speed internet and telecommunications to navigation, remote
health services, global financial transactions and environmental and climate mapping. There have also been
advancements in space mining and engineering, seen as a viable source of future economic growth and resource
capability on Earth to sustain an expanding population. In this period, the number of private commercial space
actors has increased substantially, fuelled by a start-up investment culture and innovations in technology, and
many commercial entities now have their own launch capabilities which enable them to take space objects and
infrastructure directly into outer space.
The existing space governance framework established under the architecture of the five UN space treaties
has, in this environment of rapid change and dynamic growth, become outdated. There is currently an
absence of a clear global space regulatory framework dealing with property and ownership rights, liability
in the event of a collision, dispute resolution, licensing and the registration of security interests. In this
regulatory void, individual nations have created their own distinct space legislation and policies and now
pursue new space programs with record investments.
This creates the risk of inconsistent and conflicting regulations between different nations in relation to
basic rights and obligations related to outer space activities. As a result, there is an increased likelihood of
disputes, and an unpredictable normative system to inform commercial investment and activities in outer
space. There has also been an impasse among public and private entities in terms of accepting responsibility and
taking committed action to ensure a safe and effective operating environment for commercial space activities –
undermining not only the ongoing viability of outer space activities but also creating a serious risk of harm to life
and property on Earth.
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March 23: The Republic of India should sign the Artemis Accords.
AT Overview Effect
Space exploration is now commonplace and may have lost its ability to inspire
Cowing 20—[Cowing, K. (2020). What Are The Artemis Accords And Why Do We Need Them?. Retrieved 5 February 2023, from
https://spaceref.com/science-and-exploration/what-are-the-artemis-accords-and-why-do-we-need-them/] Debatetrack
[Keith Cowing is an American astrobiologist, former NASA employee, and the editor of the American space program blog NASA Watch. He is
a credentialed NASA journalist and is known to be a critic of NASA activities and policies.]
When humans first walked on the Moon a live webcast was seen by somewhere around 650 million viewers. This
happened at a time when only 3.6 billion people lived on Earth. That’s one-fifth of humanity – while satellite
distribution of television was still in its infancy. There was no way that such an event was going to not find its
way as far as technology could send it.
Today we have the opposite problem when it comes to sending information about news, events and
discoveries out. Everyone is doing it everywhere about everything. It is expected. Even remote impoverished
nations have cellphone towers for people with cellphones and data plans. As such there is simply no way that a
renewed and expanded exploration of the Moon is not going to need to be as open and transparent as possible.
This does not mean that everyone will be paying attention though. We have a generation of people reaching
adulthood who have never known a time when there were not people living in space permanently. Yet they
do not make it the highlight of their lives. Yawn. So what. So, as the Artemis Accords talk about
transparency, it would be incorrect to equate that with visibility or interest. That is something that the
participants need to figure out when it comes to selling their efforts to audiences back on Earth. No treaty or
accord can mandate that.
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March 23: The Republic of India should sign the Artemis Accords.
AT Timeline
Timelines set by Artemis or NASA are absolutely not guaranteed
Pillai 22—[To the Moon and Beyond - Open The Magazine. (2022). Retrieved 5 February 2023, from https://openthemagazine.com/feature/to-themoon-and-beyond/] Debatetrack
[Madhavankutty Pillai is an author at Open Magazine. He “has no specialisations whatsoever. He is among the last of the generalists”. And also Open chief
of bureau, Mumbai]
The colonisation of the moon will be the precursor to the colonisation of Mars. But there could be slippages
in between. The Artemis launch took place after it was postponed twice, and any disaster with a crewed
spacecraft could take the clock back by a long time. Meanwhile, the moon is beginning to attract private
ventures, too. A Japanese company, ispace, is planning to be the first commercial venture to put a lander on the
moon next week and the spacecraft carrying it is that of SpaceX, also a private company. An article
in Nature said: “The success of the missions by ispace and other firms will be a “huge, important step to
developing the lunar ecosystem”, says Ryo Ujiie, chief technology officer at ispace. This system is ultimately
geared towards harvesting water on the Moon. Some companies hope that lunar water can be used to produce
rocket fuel that could eventually make Solar System exploration cheaper.”
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March 23: The Republic of India should sign the Artemis Accords.
Impacts
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March 23: The Republic of India should sign the Artemis Accords.
Economics
The space industry will grow to $1 trillion and employee 20,000 people by 2030
Segaloff 23—[Segaloff, J. (2023). The skies are no limit for the booming space industry. Retrieved 4 February 2023, from https://www.jns.org/theskies-the-limit-for-the-booming-space-industry/]
[Judith Segaloff is a writer]
Some believe space exploration is a thing of the past, but 2023 holds exciting prospects for proving them wrong.
New technologies and players are creating innovative ways for the space industry to forge collaborations
between private enterprise and governments and foster new industries.
The space industry is expected to grow to a $1 trillion enterprise, up 10% each year, and to employ 20,000
people by 2030.
This week, space industry leaders from NASA and the German, Italian and Greek space agencies, as well as from
Portugal, Morocco and the United Arab Emirates, met in Tel Aviv for the two-day Ilan Ramon Space Conference.
The theme, Earth and Space Becoming One, was highlighted by technologies exhibited at the conference.
Israeli Space Week is organized each year and led by the Israel Space Agency of the Ministry of Innovation,
Science and Technology. One of the event’s major objectives is to enhance Israelis’ access to science and
technology—with special emphasis on the country’s periphery—raise public awareness of the “New Space”
revolution and prepare the next generation of space innovators.
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March 23: The Republic of India should sign the Artemis Accords.
Resources
The Moon contains main resources—this includes water, which could be used to sustain life and for
fuel, and rare-Earth metals and platinum-group elements that would be valuable to use on Earth
David 15—[ Is Moon Mining Economically Feasible?. (2015). Retrieved 5 February 2023, from https://www.space.com/28189-moon-miningeconomic-feasibility.html/] Debatetrack.
[Leonard David is an award-winning space journalist who has been reporting on space activities for more than 50 years. Currently writing as Space.com's
Space Insider Columnist among his other projects, Leonard has authored numerous books on space exploration, Mars missions and more, with his latest
being "Moon Rush: The New Space Race" published in 2019 by National Geographic.]
[Ian Crawford, quoted, is a professor of planetary science and astrobiology at Birkbeck College, London.]
Better knowledge of the availability of rare earth elements on the moon would also be valuable, Crawford said.
"It's entirely possible that when we really explore the moon properly we will find higher concentrations of
some of these materials … materials that are not resolvable by orbital remote sensing," he said. The moon
might harbor concentrations of rare earth elements such as uranium and thorium — as well as other useful
materials that we're not aware of today — in small, geographically restricted areas, he said, "To explore the
whole moon at the level of detail required, that's a big undertaking," Crawford said. "But long term, we should be
keeping an open mind to that."
In rounding out his lunar resource listing, Crawford points to the high-value platinum-group elements. As space
researcher Dennis Wingo and others previously pointed out, a lot of metallic asteroids have pummeled the moon
over the eons. Locating those impactors could lead lunar prospectors to big yields of valuable platinumgroup elements, Crawford said.
"If you're just interested in platinum group elements, you would probably go and mine the asteroids," Crawford
said. "On the other hand, if going to the moon for scavenging polar volatiles, rare earth elements … then the
impact sites of crashed asteroids could offer an added bonus."
"So you add all of these things together, [then] even without helium-3, you can start to see that the moon might
become of economic interest in the longer term. That's my take," Crawford concluded.
78